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FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1964-1968 Volume XV Germany and Berlin DEPARTMENT OF STATE Washington, DC

200. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State/1/

Bonn, February 22, 1967, 1915Z.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL GER W-US. Secret; Priority; Limdis. Repeated to Geneva.

9817. DISTO. Subject: Meeting with Kiesinger--NPT.

1. I called on Chancellor Kiesinger late today at his request. At the outset he told me, as I had previously been advised that he had arranged the meeting in order to reassure me that the report made earlier in the week by a US news agency to the effect that the German Govt was dissatisfied with its relations with the US and with the American Amb was entirely false./2/ As an old friend, I had certainly known this. However, he wanted to set the record straight and had asked his Press Rep Von Hase to make a statement earlier in the day to this effect, advising the press of my visit. Some anonymous informant had apparently given rise to the story. He assured me, however, that there was no such attitude on the part of him or his Cabinet.

/2/A UPI dispatch reported that German officials had attributed a worsening diplomatic climate in part to McGhee. (Telegram 9702 from Bonn, February 20; ibid., PER McGHEE)

2. Kiesinger continued that he had, during his recent meeting with Sen Robert Kennedy,/3/ made the observation that he hoped that discussions between us would not be limited to points of disagreement--but also deal with broader issues and with areas in which there existed a common understanding. He had not intended to say this in a critical vein, since he considered it applicable equally to the German side. In response I said that we agreed with his observation. I pointed out the many specific areas such as defense, foreign aid, information policy, anti-pollution and resource development and space, in which organized consultations had proceeded with the previous govt and which we were in the process of resuming. I referred to the recent successful visit of FonMin Brandt, the invitation to DefMin Schroeder for a visit in April and the invitation we are extending to Min Heck.

/3/February 2.

3. The Chancellor replied that this was all excellent but he was also referring to those broader policies within which particular issues fit. He used as an example the NPT issue, which had struck Germany so emotionally. He is in the process of trying to calm Germany down on this issue. He is seeking to prevent the impression that Germany is reacting emotionally, causing unusual difficulties or conspiring to obtain nuclear weapons. He regretted some of the public statements that have been made, particularly that of former Chancellor Adenauer,/4/ as he had told Adenauer. Others, however, have raised sincere and objective questions which he hopes can be answered. No one, for example, can accuse Prof Weizsaecker of wanting an atomic bomb, but even he finds problems with respect to the treaty.

/4/During a February 16 speech at the University of Madrid. For text, see Konrad Adenauer, Reden, 1917-1967 (ed., H. Schwarz) (Stuttgart, 1975), pp. 484-491.

4. I suggested to the Chancellor that, as a way of precipitating more definitive discussions, he might wish to have Amb Foster visit Bonn at a suitable time. I had discussed this matter with our higher officials in Washington and yesterday with Amb Foster in Geneva, and he had indicated willingness to come after the current ENDC session gets underway. Also Dr. Kratzer of the AEC, who had recently been here on a short visit, would be willing to return with others and sit down around the table with the German technicians to answer their doubts and questions. I referred in this connection to my discussion of the previous day with Science Min Stoltenberg, who had raised with me some seven technical points which we had undertaken to answer. The Chancellor said that both suggestions seemed appropriate and he would let me know when this could be arranged. Next week may be impossible since he would be spending most of the time in Berlin.

5. The Chancellor observed that an important aspect of the problem was to assure that no impression is given the German people that they are being pressured to sign the NPT. Such pressure could have bad results for the coming Landtag elections. Kosygin's statement in London,/5/ which he said had been confirmed by the Soviet Emb in Bonn as being accurate, to the effect that "if the treaty came about the FRG would have to sign" had had a bad effect in Germany. This had caused concern as to how the Soviets would function under the NPT; would they use it as a basis for interference in German affairs.

/5/For text of Kosygin's press conference at the conclusion of his February 6-13 visit to the United Kingdom, see Current Digest of the Soviet Press, March 1, 1967, pp. 3-5. Extracts of his Guildhall speech which that also treated these issues are in Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 1967-1968, p. 21881.

6. I expressed appreciation to the Chancellor for the statement made by the German Govt yesterday to the effect that they were in agreement with the idea of nonproliferation in principle. We agreed with the two conditions they had posed, namely, that nuclear powers should undertake disarmament measures and that Germany should be protected in scientific research and commercial applications. Both had been included in the draft preamble we had shown the Soviets in Geneva./6/ I presented the Chancellor a copy of the preamble, along with the statement of President Johnson read on the opening of the ENDC meeting on Feb 20./7/ I also gave him the oral note received from the Dept in Deptel 141946,/8/ pointing out that this would be superseded by a formal note when the complete draft treaty can be tabled.

/6/The February 20 U.S. draft is summarized in The New York Times, February 21, 1967. Subsequently the United States and Soviet Union agreed to a joint draft that was presented to the Geneva Conference on August 24. For text, see Documents on Disarmament, 1967, pp. 338-341.

/7/For text, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1967, Book I , pp. 210-212.

/8/Dated February 21. (Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-6)

McGhee

 

201. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State/1/

Bonn, February 25, 1967, 1430Z.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL GER W-US. Secret; Limdis. This telegram is summarized in McGhee, At the Creation of a New Germany, pp. 216-217.

9959. Subj: Improvement of FRG-US relations. For the Secretary.

1. As is evident from our recent reporting, we are currently in a difficult stage in our relations with the FedRep. The fears and accusations of American disinterest and abandonment, voiced by men of much influence in Germany, have reached disturbing proportions. In large part, they have an emotional rather than a factual basis, however, there is small comfort in this circumstance for us. I believe it to be essential at this point to try to understand what lies beneath this emotion, and to consider what steps we can take to reverse the trend.

2. I believe that the German Govt and people are troubled because they do not see clearly for Germany the future role they feel that they--as one of the three leading economic and military powers of the free world--are entitled. They have during the past year witnessed a weakening of NATO, to them the keystone of the established order which provides the basis for their security. They see a number of mutual interests emerging between the US and the Soviet Union, which they feel could bring about a realignment in the post-war security pattern. In such an atmosphere it is perhaps only natural that there has developed an urge for Germany to pursue its own national interest in establishing a more favorable position for itself in the world community. German authorities are so far unable, however, to define just what this position should be. Meanwhile they are suddenly fearful that before they can reach this definition the two great powers will decide Germany's destiny between them. They feel "boxed in." They are frustrated by the limited freedom of action that they feel is permitted them in their international relations.

3. We began our relations with the grand coalition under a number of handicaps. First and foremost, there was the fall of the Erhard government which, because of its close ties to the US and our alleged association with its demise, constituted a blow to our position here. The offset issue, which was so central to Erhard's problems, seemed itself to raise the question of how closely the US continued to identify European security with its own. Although the new government says little about it, they must deeply resent having to pay the current offset in the light of the serious budgetary problems they have inherited. In addition, there is the increasing conviction here that the US has lost interest in Germany and Europe because of its preoccupation with Asia.

4. Nonetheless, we have made considerable progress in establishing good relations with the new government. Kiesinger and Brandt are well known quantities to us--and sympathetic to us. They have made it very clear that despite their bow to the French they wish to improve understanding with Washington. Their efforts in this direction, however, have until now been largely thwarted by the highly negative German reaction to the NPT, a reaction which shows signs of the psychological considerations mentioned above. There is in particular a feeling of frustration that we have, without adequate consultation, presented Germany with a fait accompli in the NPT with which it has no choice but to comply--despite possible adverse effects on German and European interests. Despite our best efforts the almost universal impression persists in Germany that the NPT is a sign of a new pattern of world organization being worked out secretly together--and imposed--by the two superpowers.

There is widespread fear as to where this will leave Germany. In many cases this fear has nothing to do with German access to nuclear weapons. Rather it is a fear that the US has lost faith in NATO and hope for a united Europe, leaving Germany to find its own future, possibly in the company of such neutrals as India and Sweden.

5. As the Chancellor told Senator Robert Kennedy and subsequently me (Embtel 9817),/2/ he hopes that German discussion with the US can go beyond specific points of disagreement--to broader and more positive aspects of common policy as well. I believe he has in mind that the US should try to inform the German Govt, and Kiesinger in particular, what our plans are for the longer range future--when the NPT will have become a reality and the offset solved in one way or another. To do this a good bit of preparatory thinking will obviously be required on our part--as well as by the Germans.

/2/Document 200.

6. It is with this background that I make the following recommendations:

A. Kiesinger visit. A principal element of uncertainty in our relations with Chancellor Kiesinger is the unclear status of the initial meeting between Kiesinger and the President. Kiesinger is a man of high intellectual qualities--who seeks an overall conceptual frame within which to place the particular aspects of policy, such as NPT, with which he must deal. It is evident that Kiesinger strongly desires, at first hand, an exposure to the President's personal thinking for the future. There is ample evidence that the postponement of discussions for a meeting with the President is being used as evidence of a negative attitude in our government toward the Chancellor and his Cabinet. I would propose, therefore, that I be permitted to tell Kiesinger that although the President wishes to come to Germany he has not yet been able to make a firm decision and that this should not interfere with a Kiesinger visit to the United States. If the Chancellor will tell us when in his view he considers such a visit to be propitious, and mutually convenient date can be found, the President will be delighted to extend an invitation. I would assure him that he will be warmly welcomed.

B. NPT consultations. For the immediate future we should do everything possible to provide answers to the seemingly unending series of questions raised by the Germans--public and private--on the NPT. I have, as reported in Embtel 9817, proposed to the Chancellor that Amb Foster come to Germany to discuss the NPT with him personally. The Chancellor's reaction was positive. I have been in contact with Foster who will be glad to come once the ENDC gets underway--perhaps after another week. I have also urged that Dr. Kratzer of the AEC return for a second visit to talk with the German scientific community, as well as with FonOff officials, and that he be accompanied by other technical experts. This has been arranged starting Feb 27. I am continuing my detailed private discussions on NPT which so far have included Kiesinger, Science Min Stoltenberg and Kurt Birrenbach.

C. East-West relations. I believe that we should make a concerted effort to bring home to the Germans that we offer them full support in the achievement of their own Eastern policies, and that we stand ready to coordinate with them our activities in this field where this proves desirable. (Although this seems obvious to us there is evidence that it is not so to the Germans.) This could also be a central theme of any eventual meeting between the President and the Chancellor. Speeches by leading Department officials should include approving references to Germany's new Eastern policy. We should make clear to the Germans that we are always prepared, where this is appropriate, to plead their case in Moscow and other East European capitals. Finally, as concrete proposal, I recommend that a group of three or four ranking Department officials come to Germany to discuss with their counterparts here in a systematic way our mutual assessments of the situation in Eastern Europe, our mutual policies and the means for better coordinating these policies. Perhaps this group could be headed up by Under Sec Rostow or Counselor Bowie, and include Lisle, Director for Eastern Europe, and Brzezinski of Policy Planning. The agenda might include the following: closer prior consultations concerning impeding unilateral move in Eastern Europe; greater German access to the end products of the US intelligence community, whose resources are greater than those of the FedGovt; a more systematic effort to pass on to the FonOff reports received from Prague and Belgrade, where the FRG has no regular missions and instructions to our missions in other Eastern European capitals to maintain the closest liaison with one another.

D. Western security. I would suggest that State Secretaries Schuetz (FonOff) and Carstens (Defense) be invited to Washington for a few days of off-the-record discussion, to include at least in part, the Under Secretaries of State and Defense. Every effort would be made to encourage an atmosphere of confidence and informality. Since both Carstens and Schuetz speak English, communication would be easy. The talks would center on the future of NATO and how we see Western security ensured for the future. We would attempt to give the Germans the feeling that they have some insight into our long-range thinking. This kind of conversation would be of immediate benefit in increasing confidence between us, and would be an excellent preparation for an eventual meeting between the President and the Chancellor.

7. I would appreciate your personal attention and comment on the foregoing at the earliest opportunity.

McGhee

 

202. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Germany/1/

Washington, March 1, 1967, 9:53 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL GER W-US. Secret; Immediate; Limdis. Drafted by Puhan and Hirschfeld; cleared by Leddy, Rostow, and ACDA; and approved by Rusk.

146957. From the Secretary.

1. I have reviewed your thoughtful analysis of the current state of our relations with the Germans,/2/ as well as your recommendations to improve them. I agree with your assessment that, to a large degree, the German reactions to issues like the proposed non-proliferation treaty have as much of an emotional as a factual basis. I suspect much of the current uneasiness among many of the Germans stems from their efforts to adjust to changes which are occurring in Europe, particularly as a result of de Gaulle's work and the subsequent looser cohesion in the alliance. Unquestionably, the reorientation of the Germans in their relations to France and to us has contributed to this uneasiness. Although Brandt and Kiesinger on one or two occasions have spoken out on behalf of better relations with us, I fear that most German politicians, and particularly the German press, have not helped very much in keeping our relations on a level keel. It seems to me that we will have to let the Germans spend a little time sorting out their own attitude and determine for themselves in what directions their best interests lie. At the same time, we would want to make sure that their reactions do not result in upsetting the moderate government which now runs Germany or let them drift in a direction dangerous to our national interests.

/2/Document 201.

2. With this in mind, I come now to your recommendations. I believe that a meeting between the President and Kiesinger at the proper time would be in order. The problem is essentially one of finding an appropriate time. Right now, for instance, such a visit would be interpreted as a desire on our part to call him to task for his remarks in Bonn before the CDU/CSU press club./3/ I understand one German press service has already taken this line. I notice Kiesinger said in his remarks that our conversations have all dealt with contentious subjects. While we have sought in the past not to have this happen, it is rather difficult to avoid discussions of subjects like the NPT, troop levels, balance of payments problems and so forth.

/3/Apparent reference to a statement made at the February 11 CDU/CSU Party meeting in which Kiesinger outlined current Ostpolitik efforts and the basis of the policy. For extracts, see Meissner, Die deutsche Ostpolitik, pp. 188-190.

3. As far as the proposed non-proliferation treaty is concerned, I believe we have been forthright in giving answers to the questions posed by the Germans. I have seen to it that all questions posed are answered. We discuss the proposed NPT with any German who comes to us. Blumenfeld, the Hamburg Deputy, was here just the other day and Adrian Fisher spent considerable time with him allaying his concerns. I know you and your staff have similarly been responding to German requests. We shall be glad to have Foster or Fisher go to Bonn as soon as possible. I agree that it was a good idea to have Kratzer of the AEC return to Bonn. If the Germans wish to explore technical aspects raised by the NPT further, they would be most welcome to do so in Washington where the resources are most readily available.

4. On the subject of East-West relations, I find it a little difficult to believe that the Germans could question our support of their activities leading to an improvement of East-West relations. When Brandt was here, he opened his discussion of this subject, you may recall, with the remark that this is one subject that he could take up in Paris or in Washington and get the same positive reactions. Our own efforts to improve relations with Eastern Europe ought to serve as a fairly good indicator of our views on this. However, I am not opposed to impressing upon them that we do approve, and your suggestion that leading Department officials include in speeches approving references to Germany's new Eastern policy can certainly be carried out. On the whole, our willingness to respond to their request that we support them in the Arab World, Finland and India is a more demonstrable indication of our support of their position. I see no problem either in giving them greater access to the end product of the U.S. intelligence community or to pass on to the Foreign Office reports received from capitals where the Germans have no diplomatic missions, subject to the usual limitations of not endangering our own intelligence gathering efforts. I am not convinced that group discussions on East-West relations of the sort you recommend in your paragraph C would, however, serve a really useful purpose at this time.

5. As for the visit by Schuetz of the Foreign Office and Carstens of Defense to Washington for off-the-record discussions of Western security, I believe such and similar discussions might well precede a meeting between the President and Kiesinger when such a meeting can be arranged. Carstens will of course be over here with Schroeder for the discussions with Secretary McNamara in April. But the suggestion you make would provide an opportunity for our as well as the German side to prepare their respective positions in some detail and perhaps reach preliminary agreement, thereby assuring that a meeting between the President and Kiesinger might have more substantial results.

Rusk

 

203. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State/1/

Bonn, March 3, 1967, 1219Z.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 GER W. Secret; Immediate; Nodis; Eyes Only.

10199. Subject: Kiesinger visit. For the Secretary and Under Secretary.

1. In accordance with the instructions given me late yesterday over the telephone by the Under Secretary, I sounded out Chancellor Kiesinger last evening on the question of a possible visit to the States./2/ Knowing the sensitivity of the subject, I was, as I have always been in the past, extremely cautious. As instructed, I did not purport to speak either for the President or the government, but assumed personal responsibility for my remarks. Our discussion took place alone after a small informal dinner in honor of retiring Con Gen Paul Sweet, an old friend of the Kiesin-gers, which was the first private social function the Kiesingers have attended since he assumed office. Since I have known Kiesinger well for almost four years our conversation was on a very easy and confidential basis.

/2/McGhee discussed the meeting in At the Creation of a New Germany, p. 215.

2. I began by advising the Chancellor that I wanted to discuss frankly with him the question of his possible visit to the States, in light of the speculation on this question which had emerged on the preceding day in the German press. Naturally, as the head of a country which is such a close friend and ally he would always be welcome in the States. We have not as yet raised the question of a visit with him officially because we have not wished to appear to be "rushing" him so soon after his coming into office. We have wanted to give him ample opportunity to carry out his planned visit to France, to establish his regime and to evolve his own policies--without apparent pressure from us. We had, moreover, observed certain statements attributed to him to the effect that he wished to delay his visit to America until after he had achieved his main legislative objectives. When he reaches the conclusion that he is ready for a visit, and there is something important that he wishes to discuss with the President, I would appreciate it if he would advise me. I was confident that, once a time suitable for both him and the President could be found, there would be no difficulty in arranging the visit.

3. Kiesinger responded by saying that he had never intended to give the impression that he wished to delay his visit to America for any reason connected with his attitude toward the US. He recounted his long background of good relationships with Americans in Bonn and Stuttgart and his frequent visits to the US to see his daughter who is married to an American citizen. When he came to power he had felt a strong necessity for overcoming the results of the "neglect" in German French policy, which he considered had resulted from Schroeder's curiously negative attitude toward the French. He had to this end visited Gen de Gaulle and they had had a very frank discussion. He had pointed out to de Gaulle the limitations on French and German cooperation, and had advised de Gaulle that Germany would continue to cooperate with the US. De Gaulle had responded to this in a rather cynical way, i.e. that the Germans would ultimately come to the French view with respect to the US; however, he would not seek to influence them in this respect. Kiesinger said that he really didn't know whether anything important would come of Germany's relations with France; however, he considered it important for all that he make an effort to continue friendly relations. I assured him that we fully agreed.

4. Kiesinger then said that, assuming we thought it desirable, he wanted to go to the US. When should he go? I replied that I believed this to be a decision for him. When did he feel that he would be ready, in terms of the evolution of the policies and actions of his regime? He replied that he thought it best to go before his next meeting with de Gaulle, which is now scheduled for June. He has, up to now, been consolidating his leadership over the coalition government. I gathered that he felt this had just about, but perhaps not quite yet, been accomplished.

There were certain high priority pieces of legislation that he wished to see well launched toward passage. When I asked him if he referred to the emergency legislation, the stabilization law and a new electoral law, he nodded. He hoped that all this could be accomplished by May. In short, he thought May was the right time.

5. Kiesinger said that the principal purpose of a meeting with the President and other US leaders should, in his view, be to provide the opportunity for a broad discussion on long-range problems and policies of the West vis-à-vis the Communist bloc. He referred, as an example, to the discussions held in the Bilderberg Group, which he on one occasion attended. He did not wish to negotiate specific issues, such as the offset or the NPT. Indeed he hoped that by then the NPT would be signed on conditions which would be considered to be honorable for Germany. (I thought it interesting that he apparently revealed his expectation that the NPT would be signed.)

6. I advised the Chancellor that I would inform my government fully on our conversation, portraying it as not being an initiative on his part but as a result of a frank discussion which I had myself raised.

Comment:

I believe that Kiesinger has now gone as far as we can expect him to go in suggesting that he visit the US. In view of the uncertainties which have been discussed privately and in the press as to whether he would be welcome, I do not believe that we should expect him to be the first to make the suggestion publicly. To do so would, from his viewpoint, possibly result in an embarrassing rebuff or delay. We would, in almost any normal similar circumstances, welcome a visit from a new German Chancellor--in connection with his calls on other heads of allied states. Our only hesitancy in the past has, as I understand it, arisen out of the unusual circumstances surrounding our relationship to the previous Erhard govt and Kiesinger's relationship to de Gaulle. Since Kiesinger has, I believe, in his conversation with me, removed any barriers arising out of these associations from his standpoint, I believe that we should do the same and should proceed to extend a normal invitation for him to visit the President, and attempt to work out a suitable date in May. It is obvious, in any event, that the visit must ultimately take place. As soon as a decision has been made to explore the time, I would hope that an announcement could be made both in Bonn and Washington to this effect. This would, I believe, have the effect of "pricking the bubble" of speculation which has grown to sizeable proportions here, and would enable us to resume a more normal relationship as preparations for the visit get underway./3/

/3/In a March 3 memorandum to President Johnson, attached to a White House copy of this telegram, Rostow wrote: "Herewith George delicately explores with Kiesinger and comes up tentatively with May. Is that agreeable in principle? It sounds right to me: the prospect will help us with McCloy and other negotiations in the next several months and we should have things in pretty good shape by May." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, vol. 22)

McGhee

 

204. Telegram From the Mission in Berlin to the Department of State/1/

Berlin, March 18, 1967, 1400Z.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 17-8 US. Confidential. Repeated to UNNMR SHAPE, Moscow, Bonn, Paris, CINCUSAREUR, and CINCEUR.

1214. NATUS info. Subject: Meeting with Soviet Ambassador Abrasimov--European matters. From Ambassador McGhee.

1. I attended a two-hour luncheon March 17 at the Embassy residence of Soviet Ambassador to the GDR Abrasimov. He was accompanied by Embassy Counselor Komarov, Protocol Officer Khrustalev, and a translator named Michurina. Minister Morris and Polansky of USBER accompanied me. The atmosphere was relaxed and straightforward. Abrasimov was quite forthcoming and in good humor.

2. Our conversation touched on relations between the FRG on the one hand, and East Germany, Eastern Europe and the USSR on the other, Berlin matters, and US-Soviet relations. The Berlin and US-Soviet topics are subjects of separate telegrams./2/

/2/McGhee reported on the discussion of U.S.-Soviet relations in telegram 1215 from Bonn, March 18. (Ibid.) He reported on their discussions on Berlin in telegram 1216 from Bonn, March 18. (Ibid.)

3. FRG relations with Eastern Europe and USSR. After an initial exchange of pleasantries, I noted that the USSR and the GDR appear to have reacted negatively to the new Eastern European policy of the Kiesinger government. I said that the establishment of diplomatic relations between Bonn and Eastern European countries could hardly be construed as a threat to the USSR or East Germany and invited Abrasimov's comments.

4. In a lengthy response, Abrasimov made the following points: the USSR was not opposed to the FRG establishing diplomatic relations with socialist countries. However, Bonn would have to give up its claim to represent all of Germany, and efforts to acquire nuclear weapons. Bonn makes pleasant noises about improving relations with Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, but does not follow this up with practical deeds. In fact, Bonn's policies are similar to those of Adenauer and Erhard. As Governing Mayor Brandt, in his conversations with Abrasimov, made many intelligent comments about improving relations with EE and the USSR, but said he (Brandt) was not in power in Bonn and therefore could not do anything. Now Brandt is in power and still is not doing anything constructive. The US welcomes Bonn's new Eastern European policy; we should, however, advise Bonn to take new, realistic steps in its Eastern European policy which would be acceptable to the USSR and East Germany.

5. With respect to Berlin, the US and the Soviet Union say that they are for the status quo. However, the US apparently makes no efforts to prevent the Kiesinger government from taking provocative actions, such as high-level talks and Bundestag meetings in Berlin. These are provocations against the USSR, when they occur in Berlin.

6. In reply, I pointed out that the US and the USSR appraise Bonn's policies differently. One can hardly call the Bonn government revanchist just because it wants to reunite the German people. Bonn has done nothing aggressive in this regard, and has gone so far as to renounce unilaterally the acquisition of nuclear weapons. It makes no claims for any specific areas beyond the Oder-Neisse Line, and asserts only that the final determination of German borders must await the signing of a peace treaty. I pointed out that I knew the present leaders of the FRG government very well personally and that Abrasimov knew Brandt. One could hardly call these leaders aggressive.

7. I said it seemed to me that the USSR and the East Germans had adopted a harder attitude toward the Kiesinger government than they had toward Erhard or Adenauer. The Bundestag Committee meetings in Berlin were normal and could hardly be called provocative. Furthermore, the GDR appears to have adopted a much harder line on such issues as passes for holiday visits and hardship cases. I saw no reason for the USSR to fear the FRG, which is a relatively small country. Moreover, the FRG has only a small army, much smaller than Soviet forces in the GDR, which remains under NATO control.

8. In response, Abrasimov stressed several times that the USSR is not afraid of the FRG. If the FRG starts something, however, there will be not much left of it.

9. Troop withdrawals from Europe. In response to a question about rumored Soviet troop withdrawals from the GDR, Abrasimov said that there was no truth to it. The USSR favors a continuation of the status quo in this connection. Abrasimov said that, as regards reciprocal withdrawals, the USSR would wait for deeds, not words. After the US, the UK and France withdrew from Germany (it was not clear whether he meant all or part), then the Soviet Union would withdraw from East Germany. He added in a jocular vein that since the US had the farthest to go, it should start first. I said nothing committal on this question.

10. Abrasimov said he had read that the cost of maintaining US troops in Europe amounted to approximately two billion dollars. He observed that the FRG pays for US forces stationed in West Germany, whereas the USSR pays for Soviet troops in Eastern Europe. I replied that there was widespread misunderstanding on the issue of troop costs. The FRG does not pay for US troops. We ask only that Bonn balance its foreign accounts with us either through the purchase of weapons or of bonds. We do not insist they purchase weapons they do not need.

11. German reunification. Abrasimov said that we should be realists and not expect German reunification during our lifetime. Moscow will not give up the GDR and Washington will not give up the FRG. Two separate German states exist, with different social-economic systems. I noted we had no illusions about when reunification would occur. However, we were certain that Germany would ultimately be reunited, and that until this comes about the division of Germany would continue to represent a serious source of tension in Central Europe.

Morris

 

205. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/

Washington, March 23, 1967, 4:45 p.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Germany, vol. 13. Secret. Annotations on the source text read: "Send to Watson," "C[op]y sent F. Bator, 3/24/67," and "Rec'd 5:30 p.m."

Mr. President:

I had a good talk with our old friend Ray Cline today, [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. He makes the following points.

1. Kiesinger himself never believed there was much to be gotten from Paris but felt the try was necessary to convince others of the limits of that relationship. There now is more widespread understanding that Paris cannot--or will not--advance serious German interests.

2. With respect to openings to the East, the Germans are finding, as might have been predicted, that the going will be long and slow. They will not despair of this policy; but they are increasingly conscious that the problem of German unity will not be solved soon; and that there are great resistances as well as historic opportunities in playing Eastern European nationalism and assertiveness.

3. Therefore, they have pretty well come to the judgment that they must rebuild their tie to the United States as the foundation for their policy over the near and middle future.

4. Kiesinger himself--and almost certainly others such as Schroe-der--knew this from the beginning but they had to reckon with the pressures from Strauss, with respect to Paris, and Wehner, with respect to the East.

5. The coalition, while tolerably close to a consensus on the above, remains extremely uneasy politically. As we know, Kiesinger is presiding over a cabinet which contains at least three major contenders for the Chancellorship in 1969. He has a great vested interest in making this coalition a success. The others have a primary interest in their own emergence by 1969 and judge the success of the coalition on whether its success will advance or detract from their candidacy.

6. Ray's point is that we should deal with Kiesinger as a man facing an extremely delicate political problem and not as a normal political leader with an assured domestic base of power. It is his assessment that Kiesinger's general orientation with respect to U.S. interests is good; but he is under pressures from elements in his coalition to make noises which are at best independent-sounding, and, at times, almost anti-American. The case for compassion is not sentimental, so far as U.S. interests are concerned; it is that the most probable successor to a failure of the coalition, in Ray's view, is Strauss--not Schroeder or Brandt. In particular, Strauss appears to be picking up support by taking a nationalist line on the non-proliferation treaty; and he hopes to build from his position as Finance Minister the paternity of a new phase of German revival and prosperity.

7. Specifically, Ray recommends that you do see Kiesinger some time before he is scheduled to see de Gaulle--in June. (The Franco-German agreement requires that they meet at 6-month intervals.)/2/

/2/De Gaulle visited Bonn July 12-13.

8. [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] it is clear that Kiesin-ger found your letter to him constructive,/3/ but he was uncertain whether, in fact, you intended him to come by the end of May or thereabouts./4/

/3/The President's March 10 letter, which included a statement of interest in a personal meeting, is in the Johnson Library, National Security File, Special Head of State Correspondence, Germany, January 1-April 30, 1967.

/4/A notation on the source text reads: "Keep options open."

Walt

 

206. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State/1/

Bonn, March 30, 1967, 1243Z.

/1/Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 67 D 586, CF 142. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Passed to the White House.

11431. Vipto 27. Pass White House for President. Subj: Vice President's visit: March 29 meeting with Brandt--offset and troop deployment./2/ (Following is approved record of conversation.)

/2/Vice President Humphrey visited Europe March 28-April 8. A complete set of the reporting telegrams and memoranda of his conversation is ibid. A report on his discussions with Brandt regarding European relations is in Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. XIII, Document 244.

1. Brandt said that he felt urgent need to bring trilateral talks to a good result. Redeployment of troops should come not on the basis of balance of payments, but on a basis of technological change. Then, obviously quite concerned re this point, Brandt said "democracy in the Federal Republic of Germany does not depend on the presence of foreign troops." He was quite certain that rightist groups in Germany had no future, and that Germany's partners should recognize this.

2. Vice President assured the Vice Chancellor that the U.S. did not regard the NPD vote as significant. It did not indicate any more influence in Germany than did Birch Society strength in the Rocky Mountain states indicate power in U.S. American troops in Germany are not forces of occupation, Vice President said, they are there to add reality to our commitment to European security. Any reduction of our troop levels would not mean any lessening of that commitment.

3. Brandt said that this was a very delicate issue, particularly because of leaks on German side following discussions with U.S. He regretted these leaks. He had discussed matter with his colleagues in hope that something could be done about problem. If he had chosen not to speak with his colleagues, it would have [been] difficult to make anything happen.

4. Vice President acknowledged the American concern with the news leaks. This was always a problem. There was a need for frank discussion in private about this matter. He believed that after trilateral discussions were concluded and modifications in troop levels might be made, there might be possible press misunderstanding. But what counted was the commitment to each other of nations and leaders.

McGhee

 

207. National Intelligence Estimate/1/

NIE 23-67

Washington, March 30, 1967.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, National Intelligence Estimates. Secret; Controlled Dissem. The estimate was prepared jointly by the Central Intelligence Agency, the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State and Defense, and the National Security Agency. It was submitted by the Director of Central Intelligence and concurred in by the U.S. Intelligence Board.

BONN'S POLICIES UNDER THE KIESINGER GOVERNMENT

The Problem

To assess the cohesiveness of the grand coalition government in West Germany and to estimate the development of West German foreign policy over the next two or three years.

Conclusions

A. The coalition headed by Chancellor Kiesinger has gained broad public support in West Germany and will probably remain united at least until the federal election of September 1969 draws near.

B. The extreme rightist National Democratic Party (NPD) is likely to make further gains in the next year, but we believe that it will remain a fairly small minority of the German electorate during the period of this estimate.

C. While maintaining its defense ties with the US and NATO, the Kiesinger government will be more assertive of national interests than previous governments in Bonn. Recently emerging political differences have led to a gradual increase in German criticism of various US policies and the present dispute over the proposed non-proliferation treaty will intensify this development. Nevertheless, we believe that if the principal other nonnuclear nations sign, the Kiesinger government will feel compelled to go along.

D. Kiesinger will continue his efforts to improve Franco-German relations, but the practical results will probably be limited, and the West German Government is not likely to accept French hegemony in Western Europe.

E. Bonn's present emphasis on improving relations with Eastern Europe, already successful in Rumania, will probably have some success in Hungary, Bulgaria, and--somewhat later--in Czechoslovakia. We think it unlikely that the West German initiatives will bring about any major change in Soviet policy toward Germany.

F. Bonn will seek to expand contacts with East Germany, even high-level contacts which might eventually approximate de facto recognition, but will almost certainly not grant de jure recognition to the Pankow regime.

[Here follows a 6-page discussion of the factors that led to the report's conclusions.]

 

208. Telegram From the Mission in Berlin to the Department of State/1/

Berlin, April 6, 1967, 2250Z.

/1/Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 67 D 586, CF 142. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Repeated to Paris for the Vice President.

1356. Vipto 90. Subject: Vice President's visit: Private Kiesinger comments on US-FRG relations./2/

/2/Humphrey and Kiesinger met twice on April 5. During the morning session, they discussed U.S.-German relations. In the afternoon, they talked about the Non-Proliferation Treaty, East-West relations, and a Kiesinger-Johnson meeting. Reporting cables on these discussions are ibid. Humphrey summarized his impressions of these talks in telegram Vipto 85 from Berlin, April 6. (Ibid.)

1. Both Chancellor and Vice President expressed their satisfaction with today's discussions. Latter stated that he thought they had closed a chapter of misunderstandings between the two countries which had existed over the past year or so. They had come out of a "dim atmosphere" back into "the clear air." He considered today's talks a political success for both sides.

2. Following the discussion, Chancellor took the Vice President privately aside and, in great earnestness, told him he would do nothing to impair US-FRG relations. Nothing was more important to him than friendship and close cooperation with the US. He would not heed others in Europe who would divide the US and FRG. The Chancellor said discussions during the day had been "like sunlight bursting through the clouds." President Johnson must know of his loyalty and steadfastness--he could be counted on as our friend and partner. As a result of today's talks he felt happy and confident. He was particularly reassured re NPT. He would help however we asked re liquidity and other problems, including the Kennedy Round. He desperately wanted the friendship of President Johnson and America.

3. Vice President thanked him for his obviously sincere expression and told him he would so inform President Johnson. He (the VP) wanted Chancellor to know that we stood by our friends, kept our commitments, and that FRG could count on us.

Morris

 

209. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State/1/

Bonn, April 14, 1967, 1755Z.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL GER W-US. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to Berlin for the Ambassador.

12257. Department pass Treasury. Subject: International liquidity. Ref: State 175047./2/

/2/Dated April 13. (Ibid.)

1. Reftel, which requests me to make an oral presentation to Chancellor Kiesinger on the possible adverse effect of the ECE Finance Ministers' meeting, scheduled for April 17-18, on the ultimate solution of the international liquidity problem, has been forwarded to me in Berlin where I am making a scheduled visit. I have been in touch with Embassy Bonn, who advise that Kiesinger is not available under normal circumstances today and tomorrow, since he is campaigning in Schleswig-Holstein.

2. Under the circumstances, it would appear to me to be putting undue pressure to seek an extraordinary meeting with the Chancellor, say out of Bonn, wherever he might be in his campaign, in light of the fact that this same subject has been raised with him in the President's letter,/3/ and in his meeting with the Vice President,/4/ as well as in two letters from Fowler to Minister Schiller/5/ and by Walter Heller personally with Schiller and Schoellhorn on April 10/6/ in behalf of Fowler. Both in his reply to the President's letter/7/ and to the Vice President, Kiesinger assured us of his "full cooperation," even though neither he nor Schiller in his discussions with Heller, indicated what the precise German position would be. The fact that Schiller observed to Heller, as reported in Embtel 12111,/8/ that Germany expected to be a buffer between France and the U.S. on this issue, would indicate that the Germans have no intention of capitulating to the French during the ECE meeting.

/3/See Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. XIII, Document 241.

/4/See footnote 2, Document 208.

/5/Transmitted in telegram 171594 to Bonn, April 11, and telegram 175048 to Bonn, April 14. (Both in Department of State, Central Files, POL GER W-US)

/6/Not found.

/7/Dated April 4. The text was transmitted to Vice President Humphrey in telegram Tovip 34, April 4. (Department of State, Central Files, POL GER W-US)

/8/Dated April 12. (Ibid., ORG 7 WH)

3. As a consequence I propose to send the following letter to the Chancellor today. We have been assured that it will reach him well in advance of the departure of Schiller and Strauss for the meeting.

4. Following is text of letter:

Begin Text

Bonn/Bad Godesberg
April 14, 1967
His Excellency Dr. H.C. Kurt Georg Kiesinger
Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany
Bonn

Dear Mr. Chancellor:

I have been asked to bring to your attention the concern of the United States Government over current developments in the negotiations on plans to reform the international monetary system. In particular this concern relates to the possible outcome of the April 17-18 meeting of the Finance Ministers of the European Economic Community.

Our fear is that the Ministers will at that meeting adopt a common position in international liquidity negotiations favoring a general drawing rights proposal, based on inadequately defined and limited common ground, which would fall far short of what is needed. Such a result would risk failure of the four-year effort to reform the international monetary system, with grave consequence for the future evolution of economic relationships between Europe and America.

You will recall, of course, the interest of the President in a successful outcome of these negotiations by September of this year, which he expressed in his letter to you of March 11. The Vice President also told you of our hope that your government would extend its active cooperation in bringing about agreement on an effective plan for reform of the monetary system.

Secretary of the Treasury Fowler has written two letters to Economics Minister Schiller about these matters. I attach copies of these letters for your ready reference. In his letters Secretary Fowler explains in some detail our objectives in the negotiations, and our concern at the trend of recent developments. In particular the possible outcome of the forthcoming meeting of the Finance Ministers of the European Economic Community.

I have been instructed to tell you that the viewpoints expressed in Secretary Fowler's letters reflect the political policy of the United States Government at the highest level. I hope therefore that you will review personally the issues and positions presented in Secretary Fowler's letters, so that they may be given appropriate consideration in your discussions with your Cabinet colleagues prior to the meeting.

Sincerely yours,
George C. McGhee
American Ambassador

End of text.

McGhee

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