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FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES
1964-1968 Washington, DC |
210. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
Washington, April 20, 1967, 7 p.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, Bator Papers, Trilateral Talks. Secret.
SUBJECT
Trilateral Talks1. Gen Boie, FRG Embassy, met with Lt Gen Spivy, Director, Joint Staff at 1900 hours on 20 April 1967. Gen Boie delivered the substance of a message received from the FRG Government pertaining to the proposed redeployment of US forces from Germany.
2. The proposal of the German Government relating to US forces redeployments is attached at Tab A./2/
/2/Not printed.
3. Gen Boie stated that if possible the German Government would like to obtain agreement on their proposals prior to the Trilateral Talks; if not, they would be discussed in the Trilateral Talks. If still necessary, they intend to make such proposals to the DPC.
4. Gen Boie also indicated that the German Government would like to discuss at the Trilateral Talks whether and in what way the US and the UK redeployments from the FRG might be used as an initiative to obtain mutual withdrawal from the "other Germany" of Soviet troops. In this connection, they ask that "experts" meet in London on 27 April to discuss the mutual reduction problem. (The German Government has requested that the Principals' meeting be held in London on 28-29 April.)/3/
/3/For a summary of these talks, see Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. XIII, Document 249.
5. Gen Boie stated that the German Government requested that a joint report by the three governments not be prepared this time but rather that each Principal prepare a separate report to his government to be passed to the DPC. It is further requested that any troop redeployment proposals be made by the individual governments to the DPC. Finally, Gen Boie stated that the German Government requested that the results of the Trilateral Talks not be presented to the WEU before being presented to the DPC.
6. Gen Boie stated that these same FRG proposals would be presented to the Department of State on the morning of 21 April 1967.
7. He further requested that I come to Bonn early next week to meet with the FRG Joint Staff. Tuesday, 25 April 1967 would be appropriate, since Gen Buchs and staff would be available then and since this would give the FRG needed time before the Trilateral Talks on the 28th of April 1967.
B. E. Spivy
Lt General, USA
Director, Joint Staff
211. Memorandum From the President's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bator) to President Johnson/1/
Washington, April 21, 1967, 2:30 p.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, Bator Papers, President's Trip to Europe. Secret; Sensitive.
SUBJECT
Your Trip to Germany/2//2/Former Chancellor Adenauer died on April 19, and President Johnson flew from Washington to Bonn for the funeral ceremonies on April 23. He returned to Washington on April 26. Memoranda of his conversation with German and other foreign government officials are ibid. President Johnson's statements regarding the death of Adenauer and his talks with Kiesinger are in Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1967, Book I, pp. 454, 462-463. McGhee discussed Johnson's visit in At the Creation of a New Germany, pp. 220-223.
I understand Walt spoke to you about my staying behind on Sunday-Wednesday. On reflection, I suspect I can be of more help to you here than in Europe. I hate to miss the trip, but with the Kennedy Round, liquidity negotiations, trilaterals, and non-proliferation all coming to a head, I had better keep holding the ring.
One comment about your meeting with Kiesinger. I may be soft on the British, but I am not on the Germans. However, in deciding how to talk to Kiesinger, I think it is important to remember that you are three times his size--and that he knows it. He also knows that Erhard was close to you. For both reasons, as well as the Nazi business,/3/ he is deeply insecure about his relations with you. A congenial and collegial approach could do wonders in reassuring him, and turning him into a more reliable friend. And I don't believe that this would mislead him into thinking that he has any hold or claim on us.
/3/Chancellor Kiesinger had been a member of a Nazi youth organization.
I am aware of your doubts. But I would bet that with a little Presidential warmth you can bring this man into line, in spite of the pressure on him from Strauss et al to prove that he is not an American stooge. The gain to us from making him feel that he is a friend--and therefore has to act like one--can be very great. The Germans will have a lot to do with the outcome in non-proliferation, the Kennedy Round, international liquidity, etc. And together, the above will cast a very long shadow.
It is true that deGaulle has nothing to offer the Germans, and that they will soon find that out. But by then they may have committed some great mistakes. If they stick with the French on international money, or don't help us move the Kennedy Round forward, or balk on non-proliferation, the structure of our relations with Europe could turn very sour. I am afraid it will be of no comfort to us that the Germans too would soon find out how wrong they had been. They are not immune to some whoppers, even when they have the most to lose.
Forgive me this special pleading. But we are reaching a crucial moment on a lot of fronts and the Germans are in a key position. I agree: it would be dead wrong for the President to plead with this man or to twist his arm. But to sit down and do a little friendly reasoning together--spelling out for him what kind of pressures you face at home, anxieties you have about the future of U.S.-European relations in case Kennedy Round and non-proliferation and liquidity go down the drain--could make a great deal of difference.
Now I'll hold my peace. Have a very good and successful trip. My thoughts will be with you.
Francis M. Bator/4/
/4/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
212. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
Bonn, April 24, 1967, 11:30 a.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 67 D 586, CF 163. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Obst and approved in S on April 24 and in the White House on June 28. The meeting was held in Kiesinger's office.
PARTICIPANTS
President Johnson
Chancellor Kiesinger
Secretary Rusk
Ambassador McGhee
State Secretary Guttenberg
Ambassador Knappstein
Mr. Heinz Weber (interpreter)
Mr. Harry Obst (interpreter)Opening Remarks
Kiesinger stated that it was a great honor for his government and for the German people that the President of the United States, together with so many of his most distinguished assistants, had come to attend the State funeral of former Chancellor Adenauer.
Though this was a very sad occasion that had brought the President to Germany, he was nevertheless happy that the President could be here and meet with him for the first time. He hoped they would find an opportunity to exchange views on their common problems.
President Johnson expressed his appreciation for the Chancellor's kind reception this morning. He was aware that the Chancellor had an extremely busy schedule for the next two or three days. He did not want to add to his burdens more than was necessary.
He equally regretted to have to come on such a sad mission, and equally welcomed the opportunity to be able to meet with Mr. Kiesinger to talk about his problems (Johnson's) and learn about those of the Chancellor.
Upon learning of Adenauer's death he had immediately determined to make the trip and had so stated. The purpose of his coming here was to underscore the great respect that he and the entire American people felt for the contribution to the world made by the late Chancellor. They also felt the same respect and admiration for the German people as a whole, and would continue to uphold the relationship of friendship and alliance with the Federal Republic.
He appreciated the courtesy that Mr. Kiesinger had shown the Vice President during their recent meeting in Bonn. The Vice President had conveyed a clear picture of the substance of their talks to the American people. He had been extremely pleased with the warm reception he had been given in Germany. The President was gratified that Mr. Humphrey had had an opportunity to review mutual problems with Vice Chancellor Brandt, a very good and old friend.
Efforts to divide U.S. and FRG
There were many people in the world who would like to divide Germany and the United States, and many attempts had been made particularly during the terms of office of Chancellors Adenauer and Erhard. None of those attempts, however, had been successful. He was positive that the same excellent relationship we had enjoyed during this period would continue in the future. He hoped that no enemy would ever be able to divide us or cause us to doubt each other.
Future meeting with Chancellor
The President hoped that he and the Chancellor would be able to discuss certain subjects of mutual interest when they meet on Wednesday. He only wanted at this time to express the sincere grief and deep sorrow of the American people over the passing of Konrad Adenauer. Apart from meeting with the Chancellor on Wednesday, he was looking forward to a meeting with the Chancellor in the future, maybe in a few months time. He hoped that such an encounter would be possible.
He had just told Mr. Humphrey over dinner before his departure to Bonn, when Mr. Humphrey was telling him about his visit to Germany, that during the three years that he had been President he had spent two of the three Christmases with German Chancellors. He had, during this period, met with them about a dozen times or so.
US-FRG Consultation
He had read several editorials a few days ago which stressed that there were no consultations between the U.S. and German Governments. While these editorials were being published, Ambassador Foster was in Bonn to talk to the Chancellor, Vice Chancellor Brandt was leaving the White House, Defense Minister Schroeder was entering his Cabinet room, Secretary Rusk was in Europe for consultations and the Vice President arrived a day or so later. Notwithstanding all this activity, the press maintained no exchanges of views were taking place.
FRG high on U.S. priority list
He welcomed the opportunity of the forthcoming meeting with the Chancellor, and would always look forward to further future discussions of joint problems and interests. His (the President's) election had not come out as well as Mr. Kiesinger's and he had to deal with a very recalcitrant Congress./2/ He was facing complex problems in other parts of the world. Some of these had already existed before he took office about three years ago. The United States had to live and deal with these problems, but it would never disregard the interests of the Chancellor and the German nation. He (Mr. Kiesinger) and the German people were right at the top of the list of American attention. The United States was willing to discuss all mutual problems with Germany and try to find solutions to them. Even if the Chancellor was not willing to sacrifice his Christmas celebration, a meeting with him would be welcome at any time.
/2/In November 1966 Congressional elections, the Democratic Party lost 47 House and 3 Senate seats.
Praise for Knappstein and McGhee
The President emphasized his high regard for Ambassador Knappstein, who had visited his home many times. Mr. Knappstein could be sure that he could call on the President with any message at any time and be welcomed with open arms.
The President also expressed appreciation for the very many courtesies and great cooperation shown by the Chancellor and the German Government to Ambassador McGhee. Mr. McGhee was doing an excellent job in representing the United States in Bonn. He was not only from the President's home state of Texas but also a long-time neighbor and good friend.
Vital that US-FRG stand together
Despite the fact that so much time and sacrifice had to be given for the support of the U.S. fighting men in Viet-Nam, and despite the difficulties with Congress that was trying to tie him down much more than he would like, there was hardly any question that he was giving more time and attention to--to the relationship of the United States with Germany and the other European nations. In the future, as in the past, there would be those who would by rumor, gossip and doubt try to divide them. He had no doubt, however, that the peace of the world could be assured in the future, as long as the German and American leaders would fully trust each other and stand shoulder to shoulder. That was what he and his government intended to do.
The President then explained that he was descended from German stock and lived in a German community in Texas. If he did not have the deep respect and love for the German people that he possessed, he would have moved long ago.
He was aware that there were many difficult problems and many danger signals in the 20th century. There would be times of uncertainty on certain subjects. If, however, the Chancellor and he would, with equal friendship and determination, continue to stand side by side, the period of their cooperation would turn out to be a very good one.
In closing the President said that President Eisenhower had very much wanted to be present at the funeral, but he was 76, ill and had a heart condition. His doctor had vetoed the trip.
FRG wants US friendship
Mr. Kiesinger, in response, said that the President had spoken of the burden of the Chancellor's office. He was almost embarrassed to compare it with the gigantic burden of concerns and responsibility that the President had to bear. He assured the President that his government was not only thinking of their own worries and problems, but were very much concerned about those faced by the United States. He had so stated in his initial Statement of Policy to the Bundestag. His government wanted the same firm relationship of determination and friendship that the President had spoken of, and would try to consolidate that friendship and make the alliance even stronger.
If the President had heard certain complaints made on the German side, and even by the Chancellor himself, these complaints were not meant to be unilateral accusations against the United States. Rather they were expressing what the Germans themselves had so often failed to do.
Quality of consultation
As far as consultations between the two governments were concerned, he was not worried so much about the lack of frequency, which indeed did not exist. His concern was one of quality rather than of quantity. Some subjects should be explored in greater depth. Candor should always prevail in their discussions, even on complex and troublesome questions.
Today, maybe more than at any time since the peak of the cold war, there was in Germany a feeling of deep sympathy for the United States, maybe more so than in any other European country. He appreciated the President's willingness to discuss mutual problems in depth and with candor.
Need to adjust to changes
It was true, of course, that great changes had taken place. Nowadays, the world was changing as much in a decade as it had once changed during a century. It was necessary to follow and adjust to these changes.
Kiesinger would like to visit President
He assured the President that he would be available whenever he would deem it advisable to have talks with him, be it Christmas, Easter or Whitsuntide (This would be an especially appropriate time, since the Holy Spirit descended during this period). He was as much concerned as the President that they work closely together in the future, to help secure peace and freedom and justice. And he did not just want to utter those big words.
Hope for even firmer friendship
He was aware of the fact that the United States was extremely powerful. It was indeed the first nation of the world. The President, as leader of this nation, was carrying a tremendous responsibility. He hoped that it would not be considered arrogant on his part (or whatever one might want to call it) if he stated that the Federal Republic would endeavor to make the friendship between the two countries even firmer and their alliance stronger.
However, in the joint discussion both sides should endeavor to reach the degree of "quality" which was commensurate with this particular hour of history.
By the way, he did not think the President would hear many more complaints coming from Germany. He had conducted many discussions in the previous weeks, first of all with Ambassador McGhee--and he appreciated greatly the great job the Ambassador had done in making clear to him the problems and position of the United States Government--then with Special Representative John McCloy whom the President had sent twice to Germany in recent weeks. He had, indeed, made a wise choice to dispatch such an old and highly esteemed friend of the German people. He was equally grateful for the visit of Vice President Humphrey, who had proved to be an eloquent and convincing representative for the American people, and for the call by Ambassador Foster, whom he had known since his early days as a member of the Bundestag Defense Committee. He was also glad to see again Secretary of State Dean Rusk for whose ability he had great respect, and whom he had visited on several occasions.
Need for candor
He was convinced that on most of the very important political issues, the interests of the two countries coincided to a large extent. Since the height of the cold war, great changes had taken place. Still many interests were similar; however, one should review their nature as well as those areas where possible friction could arise. The best method to secure a firmer alliance was through complete and candid exchange of views in an atmosphere of trust. He could assure the President that this was the will of the German Government.
The President had spoken of growing up in a German community in the United States and of hailing from German stock. Many of the Chancellor's family had emigrated to the United States, at one time or another, for reasons of material want or political persecution. Once, during the term of office of Chancellor Adenauer, the latter had asked him to be the German Ambassador in Washington. He had asked Jean Monnet his opinion on the matter. Monnet had advised him to go, but had warned him at the same time that if he had any children to be prepared to have one or all of them take up residence in the United States. He had not become Ambassador, yet this had not prevented his daughter from taking up residence in the United States. Having a daughter, son-in-law and grandchild there in itself tied him closer to the United States.
He appreciated very much the Vice President's kindness to have visited with his daughter before departing the United States. He also was grateful that the President has seen fit to bring his daughter and son-in-law along on this trip. By this he had made him and his wife extremely happy.
President Johnson said that it had been a great pleasure to have Mr. Kiesinger's daughter and son-in-law on the plane. He had enjoyed their company very much.
Topics for Wednesday's discussion
As for their discussion on Wednesday, if he had to try and outline the main subjects on which the two might have fruitful exchange of views, he would name the nonproliferation treaty, the question of troop levels, the Kennedy Round and the international liquidity negotiations.
High quality of U.S. personalities
If it was "quality" that the Chancellor was interested in, he could not expect to find better quality people than those handling the nonproliferation treaty and disarmament negotiations for the United States. Among them was the Vice President who had handled these matters already as a senator, and Ambassador Foster. Secretary Fowler himself had kept in close touch with the Munich Conference on currency matters. He had told the President that he was quite dissatisfied with the state of affairs at that meeting.
Troop levels
The troop level question had been discussed in Congress extensively in the past months, and he had been subjected to considerable pressure from that side. A hearing on foreign troop levels was coming up in Congress next week. He had invited leading congressmen to the White House for talks in anticipation of this hearing.
Speaking of "quality", he had discussed the question of troop levels two or three times with Secretary McNamara before coming here. He had reviewed with him the commitments that both countries had made to each other. He had asked Mr. McNamara, at that time, if he himself and top experts could make themselves available for Mr. Kiesinger if he so desired. The Secretary had agreed. Also, Defense Minister Schroeder had been in Washington just a week ago and had had extensive talks with Mr. McNamara. He had also called on the President.
One of the two biggest problems existing between the two countries--and this had been present ever since the end of the war--was this problem of troop levels in Europe. In the past, any expected changes or doubts in this regard had always been reviewed and straightened out in a sort of "family talk" between the two governments. Now, however, these matters were spread all over the New York Times and other papers. The American people had started to think and talk about them and some had gotten very upset. He thought it wise that the two governments keep such questions "in the family". As was once said in Hollywood, in a different context, "include the newspapers out." This would be in the interest of the German Government as well. Added to this publicity was some heavy resistance in congressional circles.
Mr. McNamara, or his experts, would be available to discuss details on this matter and to give the United States reasoning on any of these questions. He wanted to assure the Chancellor that Mr. McNamara would speak on his behalf. He had been given complete authority by him to make any agreement he considered necessary. He trusted the Secretary completely.
Secretary McNamara had spent some 80 hours before Congression-al Committees on questions of troop levels. The Chancellor was certainly aware of gentlemen like Senator Fulbright and Senator Mansfield, whose thinking was not exactly the same as that of Mr. McNamara. They believed, just as the Chancellor had expressed to him before, that great changes had taken place and that these changes were very material ones.
The President stated that he had urged Mr. McNamara to stay in frequent touch with the German military and the Defense Minister. He believed that cooperation on that level was closer than ever before.
Speaking of men of "quality", Secretary Rusk had just returned from a Washington meeting of the SEATO countries. The United States had serious problems in SE Asia. The Secretary would return to Europe for the NATO meeting in June.
So then "quality" seemed well represented in his Government with such people as Secretaries Rusk, McNamara and Fowler. And these men could be put at the disposal of the Chancellor for consultations at almost any time. Should, in addition, the Chancellor need the direct advice of the President, he would be glad to find a way to accommodate him. To summarize, the main issues between us included the NPT, the troop level issue and the liquidity question. There seemed to be some new matter to deal with every year. There was now in Germany a new Government, a new Chancellor and there was in Washington a new assertion of power by Congress, in particular in the Senate. For instance, the foreign policy committee of the Democratic Party, before which Mr. Rusk and Mr. McNamara had been pleading the President's case, favors substantial troop reductions in Europe. People like Mr. Mansfield do not think about a reduction of maybe a few thousand, but about many scores of thousands--indeed, entire divisions. Out of his own party members, 13 voted against him and none for him on the troop issue. In view of such developments, he had to stop, look and listen carefully on these matters.
He was happy to see the Vice Chancellor again for whom he had warm feelings of friendship. He (as Vice President) had been the first to go to Berlin when the Wall was built./3/ He wanted to be the first to go there when it would be torn down. Discussions on troop levels should better be conducted in such a manner as not to supply ammunition to Congressional critics.
/3/Johnson's report on his visit to Germany August 19-20, 1961, is in Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, vol. XIV, pp. 354-358.
He assured the Chancellor that there was no "complicity", that he was in favor of extensive discussions. The President of the United States had not changed. He was still the same. He had always had good and friendly feelings towards the German nation and the German people.
Keep vital discussions within "the family"
Mr. Kiesinger stated that he understood the problems the President had with his Congress. He often had similar problems with the Bundestag despite his great majority. There would be a discussion of the NPT coming up in the German Parliament in about a week, on which the Bundestag had insisted on its own initiative.
He agreed with the President's suggestion that discussions on troop levels should be kept in the family circle as much as possible, though it could not always be kept out of the press. He would try to steer a course that would not involve him in American domestic frictions and polemics.
He was convinced that the President had men of outstanding quality around him, and he always preferred to talk to the political leaders rather than to experts. There was much agreement on major trends in their thinking (President's and Kiesinger's). He was hopeful that the talk on Wednesday would produce some common results. Regarding the problems with Congress on the NPT, the Chancellor would be very careful to avoid giving the press an opportunity to again sow any seeds of friction between the two countries.
FRG problems with Bundestag
The new coalition government commanded a greater majority which gave it a better opportunity to come to solutions on some problems. However, he also often encountered dissension within his own party. Sometimes he had to walk a very narrow path to make his policies prevail. Also, he did not have the strong power with which the United States Constitution endows the President. In general, however, his Parliament was showing a great amount of good will.
Mr. Johnson stated that despite the 30 years he had dealt closely with Congress as Senator, Vice President and President, he sometimes did not have much control over its decision.
International liquidity
One item which he intended to discuss in detail in the Wednesday meeting was the "new-money problem". The talks on this matter had not produced good results. He was seriously concerned about this matter.
Press briefing
Secretary Rusk suggested one should think about what to say to the press before adjourning. He suggested that they say that the President had called on the Chancellor to pay his respects with regard to the passing of former Chancellor Adenauer. The President and the Chancellor had also taken note of the issues that they wanted to discuss in their meeting on Wednesday.
It might be acceptable to the President and the Chancellor to say no more than this.
The President and the Chancellor agreed, and the meeting adjourned having lasted about one hour and twenty minutes.
213. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/
Bonn, April 24, 1967.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Germany, Adenauer Funeral. Secret.
Mr. President:
The memorandum that follows may be important for your talk with Chancellor Kiesinger on Wednesday.
Here is the story.
At his request I called on Rainer Barzel at 11:00 a.m. this morning. As you know, he is the Majority Floor Leader in the German Parliament. We are good friends. Therefore, I gave him your position as outlined yesterday with the bark off, explaining that you cannot deal with the Mansfield problem unless they stop behaving like children and start behaving like serious partners in the task of preserving the unity of the West.
We then went on to the four specific issues. In his judgment, the withdrawal of aircraft is the most difficult for politicians in Germany to accept.
As we were leaving he said he was going to report immediately to the Chancellor.
I received a message this afternoon that he wished to see me again. I saw him at 6:00 p.m. at the American Embassy. He asked that I report the conversation only to you and that the interpreter destroy his notes.
This is what he said:
I. Chancellor Kiesinger was greatly impressed with you and your personality this morning./2/
/2/See Document 212.
II. He wishes on Wednesday to talk to you "extensively and, if possible, alone."
III. He wishes to discuss the large outlines of your policy rather than the details. This is particularly important after your conversation this morning and after Barzel's report to the Chancellor of what I said to him. (He meant, it turned out, that the Chancellor is pretty clear about what you wish him to do about the four specific issues.)
I then began to probe what he meant by the "large outlines of policy" rather than specifics. I said President Johnson was a man of large ideas and ideals; but he would rather discuss the next step in achieving them rather than to discuss them in abstract, rhetorical terms. (At that point he smiled and said President Johnson is like Adenauer: His last words to his children were not: "Keep the family together"; but "make sure you meet every Christmas.")
He then began to explain as follows: There are some people telling the Chancellor that if Germany signs the non-proliferation treaty, Germany is giving in on one of the three things the Soviet Union demands: the other two are the Oder-Neisse line and formal recognition of the East German Government.
They then go on to say that troop levels will be reduced by us but not by the Soviet Union. After that they ask: Will we have any possibility of raising the question of German unity in the future?
The critical question for Kiesinger in the face of this pressure is to be able to tell his cabinet that President Johnson has a concept of policy in which there is a place for German unity.
For example, Barzel said, President Johnson might say: "I am doing everything I can to ease tensions between East and West because the world needs peace. German unity cannot be my first consideration; but out in the process of bringing peace and arms control, German unity will have a place. Non-proliferation will contribute to the process of arms control. That is the kind of world in which German unity has the greatest chance of coming about."
Barzel went on to say that there is no chance for German unity if the world is divided into two big blocs. "We cannot achieve German unity by nuclear war; but if relations between the U.S. and the Soviet Union improve as we achieve progress in a limited way on East/West issues, then we create an environment in which German unity becomes more possible in the future."
He then shifted to a specific, practical point. Chancellor Kiesinger in the Parliament made a Declaration of the Federal Government on Amelioration of Living Conditions in All of Germany./3/ He urged that Germans in East and West Germany be permitted to travel more: that doctors--specialists--be permitted to cross from East to West. Kiesinger has spoken movingly in human terms about Germans being allowed to get closer in these matters. Still, the Soviet Union denounced Kiesinger's speech and has flatly refused to move in this direction.
/3/For text of the April 12 declaration, see Documents on Germany, 1944-1985, pp. 955-957.
Barzel then said: "Would it not be possible for President Johnson to tell Kiesinger that he will instruct Ambassador Thompson in Moscow to make representations to the Soviet Government that they should respond to this simple human appeal?" He said that nothing would affect Kiesinger and German opinion more than to know that President Johnson--with his great humanitarian heart--has considered seriously, among the human problems on this earth, the problem of human relations among Germans and German families divided one from the other.
I explained to Barzel that, while you worked for every reasonable approach to the Soviet Union, you were skeptical of Soviet motives and how fast they would move.
And I came back to my central point in the morning, which was: If we had any chance of making progress in the East, it was on the basis of a strong and united West; and it was not useful for the German Government to have these hopes to the East while it was cutting the ground from under your feet in maintaining the unity of the West. Barzel said that he understood this fully; and he believed Chancellor Kiesinger understood it also.
Before I make my recommendations, I wish to tell you now strongly I was impressed in this conversation that the Germans understand in their hearts--if not in their pocketbooks or their press relations--that they depend absolutely on you.
You should also know that: The German cabinet has been meeting in the wake of your talk with Kiesinger; Strauss has asked that I see him, which I shall do tomorrow morning; I have received an invitation to talk with Guttenberg this evening--the other extreme nationalist in opposition to Kiesinger.
My assessment and recommendations:
I. Your interview this morning with Kiesinger has had one hell of an effect.
II. You should agree to talk at length with Kiesinger alone on Wednesday.
III. Your talking points should be these:
--Although we have 500,000 men fighting in Southeast Asia, I have not pulled out one fighting man from NATO through this difficult period;
--I have kept my commitment in Europe because we have a vital security interest in Europe, but also because I am fully aware of the hope for peace in Europe;
--Working together in unity we have demonstrated in these 20 years since the end of the World War that we can defend ourselves against the Communists, that we can make more economic and social progress than the Communists;
--And that we can produce in the West societies that are so attractive and successful that Communism is failing as an ideology in the East;
--The Chancellor should remember that it was only after the Cuba missile crisis that people began to talk of détente and that very small steps--the atmospheric test ban--were possible; you have been working for small agreements with the West because you believe that as Communism becomes weaker, nationalism in the East becomes stronger in each country and more normal relations can fully be developed; so far as the non-proliferation treaty is concerned, you believe: it makes sense for the human race; it makes sense for the free world; and if we stay together it could contribute to arms control--for example, the avoidance of a major race in ABM and ICBM's;
--This is the environment in which you believe that movement towards German unity may gradually become possible; of all the American Presidents in this century, you have the closest ties to the German people; you understand the pain felt by every German that the division of their country cuts across families and language and cultures and memory;
--It is a simple fact that of all the nations in the West, the United States is the only one that honestly wishes to see German unity brought about: neither the British nor the French honestly wish this to happen no matter what they say;
--The reason the American people want German unity is because they want an end to the Cold War and that requires the drawing together of Germany and all of Europe under conditions of security for everyone. If, however, the West cannot remain united and if we cannot settle sensibly issues of trade and money and troops, then we shall not have détente and movement towards German unity, we shall have danger and crisis again. Therefore, the Chancellor should work with the President to maintain the unity of the West and count on the President--and on the United States--to be the strongest supporter he has in taking steps towards German unity.
--You might then say that we are prepared to take small steps or large, whatever is realistic and possible. For example, you have been informed of the Chancellor's interest in improving the simple human contacts between the people in East and in West Germany. Your men have spoken often to Soviet representatives and told them how unwise it is for them to attack democratic Germany. You have asked Secretary Rusk to arrange that we talk to the Russians about the wisdom of encouraging these human contacts between East and West.
--I suggest that you should close by saying once again that it is our experience together--Germans and Americans--that we have gotten nothing from the Russians through weakness and disunity. It is only if German policy and European policy is rooted in unity and strength in the West, that we have any chance of bringing peace to Europe and unity to the German people.
W. W. R./4/
/4/Printed from a copy that bears these typed initials.
214. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
Bonn, April 26, 1967, 10:30 a.m.-12:30 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL GER W-US. Secret; Nodis. No drafting information is on the source text, which was approved in the White House on June 28. The meeting was held at the Chancellor's private residence. A copy of this memorandum was sent to the Embassy in Bonn "for Ambassador McGhee only."
PARTICIPANTS
Chancellor Kiesinger
Hermann Kuesterer, Interpreter
Press Secretary Von Hase
President Johnson
Harry Obst, Interpreter
Press Secretary ChristianChancellor Kiesinger stated that he had been thinking about their earlier conversation/2/ and would like to repeat the following:
/2/See Document 212.
General US-FRG relations
1. His government was strongly interested in maintaining good relations with the US, its government, and the President.
2. The President had been a little annoyed about some of the comments coming out of Germany recently that had contributed to a certain strain of relations. He wanted to assure the President that his government would do everything possible not to create any difficulties for the US. He did not intend to make any statements on the matters discussed between them that would tend to involve him in any efforts by any party directed against the President or the US government. The German Government was aware of the big burden and heavy responsibility the President has to carry and did not want to add to it.
In general, he first would like to say how happy he was to be able to be with the President though the occasion may be a sad one. The very fact of the two of them meeting for the first time was more important than any of the individual decisions they would have to make in the coming weeks and months. He would like to emphasize that he himself, his government, and the majority of the two ruling parties wanted good relations with the US and trusted the President and the US. As a matter of fact, they did not only want to continue those good relations but indeed to try to make them better and closer.
Need to avoid certain public statements
Two days ago the President had talked to him about his concern for keeping certain subjects more "in the family circle". He agreed with that. In the last year the Germans had some worries. It had been necessary for him to make certain public statements at certain times but anything that he or Vice Chancellor Brandt had said had always appeared in the American news media magnified and exaggerated. In the light of this experience he would tend to be more cautious in the future.
German public opinion
As regards German public opinion--and he was always following reports on this matter closely--there seemed to be general conviction that permanent reconciliation between France and Germany would have to be established. On the other hand he would like to emphasize that the same people just as much advocate good relations and close cooperation with the United States. These two sentiments were not in opposition to each other. He believed that at this time public opinion in the FRG was more favorable to the US than in any other European country. He would also like to say a word about the occasional doubts that had arisen in the FRG. These doubts were not so much about the President's actions but had arisen from general developments. For some years there had been the question whether some change of US policy vis-à-vis Europe had taken place.
Anything that could be done to allay these doubts would be advantageous. He did not want to discuss this matter in great detail. However, he wanted to assure the President that it did not amount to a crisis of confidence. Such doubts could be understood from the fact that the cold war had abated to a certain extent and that people had not yet become adjusted to the new period properly.
President Johnson interjected that he was familiar with those doubts and agreed that some of them were due to the change in climate of the cold war.
He believed that current German public opinion presented a big problem.
US public opinion problems
So far, the United States had not reduced its troop level in Europe and had not given up its support and efforts in other areas despite the serious balance of payments situation. The question was, could he continue such a policy in the face of so many doubts? During the last six months the US press each day had been full of statements about German doubts, lack of faith in US policy and questioning of our commitments. He could not quite understand what was really causing those doubts. The US was maintaining over half a million troops in Europe and spending over a billion dollars there annually. This very morning Secretary of Defense McNamara and Under Secretary Katzenbach were testifying under oath before Congressional committee./3/ The first question that would surely be put to them would be "Why do we not pull out of Europe in the face of the changes that have taken place?" The closer ties between Chancellor Kiesinger and de Gaulle, the European statements about détente and other reasons would certainly be brought up by Congressional critics. Mr. McNamara would have a hard time to make them believe anything.
/3/For text, see U.S. Troops in Europe: Hearings Before the Combined Subcommittees of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and Armed Services. United States Senate, 90th Congress, 1st Session (Washington, 1967), pp. 5-56.
Force deployment
Chancellor Kiesinger stated he understood that if the US were to withdraw some forces at this time it was planned to cut the number of aircraft in half. The people would ask why does the United States not try simultaneously to make the Soviets agree to similar cuts? The US had introduced the "rotational plan" which he considered to be reasonable. The people would ask why would it not be possible for the US to try to get some commitment from the Soviet Union out of the negotiations on the Non-Proliferation Treaty which would tend to lessen the danger of war. They felt if there were changes to be made there should be some reciprocity on the other side.
De Gaulle comments on US-FRG relations
He had been told by de Gaulle in Paris on January 13-14 that he, even Adenauer, were too obedient to the United States. He had answered de Gaulle that he was not obedient to the US. Certain changes had taken place since the height of the cold war. During that period US and German interests had been completely identical. He realized that US policy in Europe had to follow the US interests. This was legitimate. He also believed that Bonn and Paris should not proceed on anything without the knowledge of Washington. Both sides should review where their interests are identical as well as where the areas of friction are. They had neglected to do this until now.
FRG supports NATO
In the final communiqué in Paris/4/ he had stated that France and Germany agreed on certain matters. However, he had stated the disagreements, for instance on NATO, with equal clarity. He had made this very clear to the public and had emphasized that the FRG fully supported an integrated NATO. There was no danger that the FRG would drift away from the US. This he had also stated clearly in a speech in the Bundestag. However, he could not prevent certain people occasionally making use of his public statements on certain matters to their advantage and trying to exploit them.
/4/Extracts of statements by Kiesinger and de Gaulle at the conclusion of their January 13-14 meeting are in Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 1966-1967, pp. 21855-21856.
Comments on Erhard
He would like to say a few frank words also with regard to his predecessor Ludwig Erhard: He had a very high regard for Erhard's excellent accomplishments as Minister of Economics. However, the German people thought that his foreign policy was a little "naive", that he failed to analyze the situation in depth and failed to recognize at times where the true interests lay. The people believed that he failed when he visited the President last year. This failure was one of the major reasons that the German public had lost confidence in him. His party prior to that had had a constant majority in public polls. This had dropped to 38% during the final days of the Erhard administration. The Social Democratic Party at that time had received over 50% of the votes taken by the public opinion polls. Now, happily, the Christian Democrats were above 50% again. He was happy about this fact as otherwise the coalition might break up if the Social Democrats should receive a majority. This tendency had been reaffirmed in the elections last week in Schleswig-Holstein where the SPD had not received the landslide they had hoped for.
German doubts about U.S.
The doubts about a changed US policy, he believed, started as early as the last period of the Eisenhower administration. He wanted to make clear, however, that there was no real distrust about the present relationship between the US and the Soviet Union. However, there were some people who were saying that the US had sold out to the Soviet Union and was no longer supporting the cause of German reunification. Some of this might just be the result of so many years of frustration on matters like German reunification.
The President asked why the Chancellor thought that such doubts were already present during the Eisenhower administration.
The Chancellor replied he thought this started with the Camp David meeting with Khrushchev. The people believed that Eisenhower had been too trusting and on top of this came the constant warnings of former Chancellor Adenauer. Some of these doubts were allayed by President Kennedy through the excellent speeches be made during his visit to Germany. However, later the same doubts arose again.
After a period of personal distrust it seemed to him that during the last meeting with the dying Adenauer the latter seemed to have reached a point of trusting that he (Chancellor Kiesinger) would follow the general direction of policy set by Adenauer. The Chancellor stated he strongly believed in the necessity for close ties between Germany and France, but without the "romantic attitude" on this question that Adenauer had displayed.
Need for US-FRG unity; Need for US-Soviet relationship
He, Kiesinger, was convinced that it was impossible to guarantee German security and find solutions to the German problems without the United States. Solutions to these problems could not be found by any drastic actions but only by a gradual approach and by creating an appropriate climate. Most of the German people had no illusions about this matter and realized it would take a long time. If the US and Germany would stand united, show trust in each other and support each other's interests as far as possible, those doubts should be appeased. The people realized that a certain relationship between the Soviet Union and the United States was necessary in view of the power and the heavy responsibility of these two countries. Otherwise, the result might be disastrous. Some people were talking a different language but they should let them talk, because it did not matter as long as the leaders would consult each other closely and make their own decisions.
US supports NATO and German reunification
The President said the Chancellor should make no mistake about the US determination to support German reunification and the Alliance. He was aware that the Soviet Union kept making attacks on the FRG. However, he invited the Chancellor to appoint his best research man on these matters to make a comparative chart of Soviet accusations made against Germany and those made against the US President. He was convinced he would come out number one on such a comparative chart.
Real nature of Soviets
The President stated he had very strong feelings about the real nature of the Soviets, just as much as Adenauer did. He just did not talk so much about them.
Soviet attitudes on FRG
The Chancellor said it was shameful in what a blatant way the Soviet Union could permit itself to attack the FRG in foreign capitals. The only European ally that had spoken up in defense of the FRG had been President Saragat of Italy. If the Soviets were to attack one of his allies like this he certainly would speak up in defense with determination.
Right-wing extremist party
Many people did not realize the complexity of the situation, the domestic antagonism against the President and the immensity of the problems he was facing in Southeast Asia and other parts of the world. He wanted to repeat again that despite existing doubts there was no present crisis of confidence, no serious situation. There had been a feeling that Erhard had not taken a firm enough stand on the offset problem during his last visit in Washington. He, Kiesinger, was happy that a solution had been found for this problem now. He had been forced to take a firm stand, not least because of the threat emanating from the propaganda campaign of the NPD. The NPD was not only composed of national socialists but contained a great number of what the French would call "poujadists", i.e. mostly disgruntled small businessmen, and a few old hard-core nationalists. The NPD knew that its campaign could only succeed if the party was able to create anti-American feelings in the German population. Fortunately, they had received less votes during the last two state elections than they had expected. The elections in Schleswig-Holstein were a hopeful beacon, as the NPD had only been able to poll 5.6% of the vote in this state which is traditionally very nationalistic. Gallop polls indicate that their national strength does not exceed 3%. Their propaganda plus statements by Adenauer on the Morgenthau plan and his declaration that the US had turned its back on Europe and did not really see the magnitude of the Communist threat had contributed to the doubts they were talking about. He wanted to reemphasize, however, that these were not major doubts and could be coped with.
Non-Proliferation Treaty
On the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Chancellor saluted the President's intervention through which some important points had been cleared up. The individual points of the present text he considered acceptable but the question was if the FRG could accept the Treaty out of the consideration of its relationship with the Soviet Union. The FRG had alone committed itself to forego nuclear weapons in the WEU agreements and had reiterated this policy repeatedly in public. The FRG wanted better relations with the Soviet Union but was running into such statements as Kosygin's declaration in London that it would have to sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty whether it liked to or not. There was a strong group in his own party disliking the Treaty and the Bavarian branch of the party had voted against it altogether. There was also some opposition in the SPD. The question was what could be done to meet the desire of the US to have the Treaty and get the necessary approval in the Bundestag. Many people including himself and Prime Minister Moro felt strongly that the Treaty should be of a limited duration. Five years had been suggested, but he himself felt that such a period would be too short and he would consider ten years more acceptable.
During the ten years one could see what could be accomplished on disarmament and how German-Soviet relations would develop. Then one would be in a better position to talk about a possible permanent Treaty. The idea of a limited Treaty was spreading fast. It might be useful for both of them to resume discussing the NPT after the US congressional hearings and the forthcoming Bundestag debate have been concluded.
International liquidity
He was not an expert on the liquidity question. It had not been possible to get French cooperation on this matter. He would have to explore it further to try and find out where the difficulties were located.
Troop reduction
On the reduction of troops he was prepared to do all that he possibly could. He favored first exploring the matter further in joint discussions. It would have to be reviewed in the light of the needs of European security and in the light of future developments (e.g. the changes expected in China during the next ten years). The thinking of the FRG on these matters was not guided by egotistical motives. The common [good?] was very much on their mind.
Kiesinger visit to Washington
The Chancellor then asked the President if he had any thoughts on a possible visit in Washington. He said he was prepared to come at any acceptable time.
Press briefing
The President might want to think about the possibility of including their principal assistants for the remainder of the talk and what to tell the press. He would suggest telling the press that they had friendly and comprehensive discussions, and that they wanted to continue the close and friendly relations that had existed between the countries in the past.
The President replied he had no objections to saying that to the press.
US and German public opinion
He said he was trying to put himself in the Chancellor's position and wondering how he could convey to him a picture comparing the problems that the Chancellor had with those that the President had without becoming argumentative or disagreeable. He believed that the picture on German sentiment and German public opinion painted by the Chancellor was about correct. He was of the opinion that in the next few months public feeling here and public feeling in the US would somehow jell and move jointly into one direction or into the other. He was disturbed and doubtful about the state of German public opinion at this time and still was not sure what was really causing it: the change of government in Germany; the sentiments of former Chancellor Adenauer; de Gaulle's reproaches on being too obedient; or whatever else it may be.
(Von Hase entered room)
While this was going on in Germany there was a similar type of "unfaithful husband-wife" thinking towards Germany in the United States. People were saying to themselves: Why should we continue to spend over a million dollars? Why should we keep on maintaining our troops there? Why should we not let them handle their own defense? They are grown up now. They have rebuilt their countries. They can take care of themselves. They have a better balance of payments situation. Why should we stay if de Gaulle feels we should get out, if the Germans doubt us? Why should we not talk to them in terms of the 20th century, in terms of planes and rockets rather than in 19th century terms of ground troops? If they are looking for defense protection by the French, why not let them do just that?
Problems in Congress over US troops in Europe
The President repeated that he had congressional hearings starting this very day in which many of these sentiments would be echoed. He also repeated that 13 of his own party leaders had voted down his own suggestions on these matters in a committee. He was opposing their views 100% but he did not know if he would always be able to prevail. The question was what action to take in view of the sentiments in the two countries. He did not want to be the architect of the dismantling of the Alliance. However, in the last months much had happened to further such a dismantling.
(Mr. Christian entered the room)
Bad effect of some European press stories
The European press was feeding our press. And he was reading in his press ideas like: LBJ did not care about Europe, LBJ was forcing the non-proliferation treaty on them, LBJ was only interested in Southeast Asia. This was very disturbing. The press was saying: it had become fashionable in Germany to be independent, to criticize the US; some governments believed the US to have become a second-rate power; the US was "buddying up" to the Russians. Some people were doing all they could to try and divide the two countries.
US friendship for FRG
He wanted to be friends with Germany. First of all, he had no illusions about the Soviet Union, not any more than the late Adenauer, President Eisenhower, or President Kennedy. He also had no illusions about the importance, necessity and desirability of enduring friendship and loyalty to the German people. He would never want to give up this partnership. He had been the first to say this when the Berlin Wall went up. He was speaking up for the reunification of Germany. He had made clear that if the need should arise he would do whatever was necessary with the troops stationed here. He had made clear his desire to ask for concessions from the other side whenever possible. If he were to reduce his forces to any significant extent he fully intended to ask the other side to make similar reductions in their troops, their ABMs and to ask them also to adjust to the 20th century.
Non-Proliferation Treaty
As far as the NPT was concerned, the US was not close to an agreement with the Soviet Union. If the Germans really meant what they were saying, namely that they did not want to have any nuclear arms he felt sure that a satisfactory arrangement for the treaty could be found. The US had changed the treaty text 25 times, just for the benefit of the FRG. He (the President) still could not accept the current version. The treaty was not all set and ready to be signed, as he had also told Prime Minister Moro yesterday./5/ He did not believe the Soviet Union would accept a treaty with a time limit. This seemed out of the question. He was in no hurry to rush the treaty and do anything that might help the Soviet Union and hurt the Germans. But at the same time he did not want to be looked upon as "the guardian of Germany". That was the Chancellor's job. (The Chancellor nodded approval.) However, he would not sign a treaty directed against Germany.
/5/Documentation on the President's meeting with Moro is scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, volume XII.
No US secret deal with Soviet Union
To repeat, he had changed the draft 25 times for the benefit of the FRG. The US was not close to signing the treaty. The latest version also was not acceptable to the Soviet Union. He was ready to cooperate with the Chancellor and Prime Minister Moro. The news media constantly made it appear as if he were making a secret deal "behind the barn", as if he were telling the Germans "to get in line." Nothing could be further from the truth. The two sides were not close to an agreement. The German people did not know these things.
The Chancellor said he had stated several times in public that the United States had been very cooperative with the FRG on the NPT. The idea of limiting the treaty was mainly born out of considerations of German policy commitments towards the Soviet Union.
President Johnson repeated that the US did not yet have a treaty with the Soviet Union. He would have to see what progress could be made now in the negotiations. He would not sign the treaty without having first consulted again with the FRG.
The Chancellor should not be misled by the statements of Mr. Kosygin. The Chancellor should make his own judgment about the President. He could be sure that this President would work with him. Likewise, he was looking towards Kiesinger, the Chancellor of the Federal Republic.
Comments on Adenauer and Erhard
He would like to say just a few words about the two previous Chancellors Adenauer and Erhard. He had had great respect for Adenauer and for the great accomplishments of his life. However, he thought that Adenauer sometimes had taken too strong a stand vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. One did not want to close a door permanently just because somebody was trying to break in.
We had not thought of Erhard "as a softie". We did not believe that he had neglected the interests of the German people. He was wise to see the danger of an isolationist trend which was growing in momentum in the US and he was willing to make certain concessions in an effort to head it off, just as we were trying to meet German interests on the question of the growing popularity of the NPD. Erhard had left a "good taste in our mouth."
The American people were not angry with Germany. After 20 years of being committed all over the world they were just growing weary and wanted to go back home.
Rotation of US Air Force elements
Chancellor Kiesinger asked about the 172 planes the US intended to withdraw from Germany.
The President said the figure was 144 and not 172.
Chancellor Kiesinger replied, 144 planes would be one-half of the US planes stationed here.
The President indicated his disapproval and pulled out a paper from which he determined that there were 662 planes of the US on European soil.
Chancellor Kiesinger replied he believed there were 288 US planes on German soil, thus it would be one-half of that figure.
Mr. Von Hase interjected: withdrawing one-half of the US air force in Germany would have a strong psychological impact on the German Luftwaffe.
Chancellor Kiesinger said he believe this would not be the time to try and make any specific suggestions on this matter. He was not a military man.
The President asked him if he meant to say that he wanted to reserve this decision for the future, after more consultations on the expert level.
Chancellor Kiesinger answered yes, he would. They should not try to decide too many difficult problems all at once.
The President summarized that there were basically four problems he was concerned with now, plus the added problem of public sentiment.
US support for FRG
First of all, he wanted to repeat the following: the US, as before, was in favor of German reunification; the US was determined to stand by Germany; the US was prepared and ready to defend Germany if that should become necessary; the US considered Germany a trusted ally.
NPT
First, on the NPT: the US had made the adjustments wanted by Germany; it was working together with German experts on this matter; it would not sign the treaty without prior consultations at the top level.
US-FRG relations
Secondly, on the question of consultation and trust, he would like to tell the Chancellor about the first meeting he had with Chancellor Erhard. At that time Erhard had told him of his constant fears about the Soviet Union. He had then taken Erhard's hand and pledged to him the US would stand by his side against any aggression by the Soviet Union. That handshake was more important than any individual assurances. He had told them he would remain the friend of Germany. He was ready to renew this pledge to Chancellor Kiesinger. (The President then took the Chancellor's hand and shook it.)
The Chancellor thanked the President for this pledge.
International liquidity
The President continued by emphasizing the importance to the US of a successful outcome of the liquidity talks. He said he expected that the Chancellor would not affect our position adversely.
Troop levels
In the fourth place, on the matter of troop levels, the President said, he expected understanding from the German side. He believed the Chancellor understood this problem well.
German confidence in U.S.
One matter which might well be more important than any of the above was the question of doubts. Statements about feeling neglected, lack of consultation, being guilty of complicity, etc., were doing much to hurt the standing of the German people in the United States. He reminded the Chancellor of what he had said before about the difference of saying something in privacy and having it all over the news media. He suggested also the Chancellor call him directly if he should ever have any serious doubts. What the press was writing was only helping his critics. It did not hurt him personally but he did not think it was good for the German people.
Important that US and FRG stick together
He was aware that the Soviet Union was trying to divide them any way they could. Equally, there were people in Europe trying to do the same. They were both smart enough not to be influenced by this. It was with this alliance (between the US and Germany) that the survival of freedom would best be served. If the Chancellor would stand by the US as we were loyal to Germany, nobody, neither the Soviet Union, nor de Gaulle nor anybody else would be able to divide us. We believed that the future of Europe also depended on complete trust between Germany and the US.
He had never said anything unkind to de Gaulle but the General had told him to "get out," and he had left quietly without creating a scene. They should not allow themselves to be swayed by the pronouncements of others. They were the Chief of State and as long as they stood together everything would be all right.
Economic commitments
He hoped the FRG would keep its economic commitments. A successful Kennedy Round would be in the interest of the FRG as well as in the interest of the US. He trusted that the FRG would try to support our interest in the liquidity talks.
NPT
There was no agreement on the NPT yet. He would not sign the treaty without prior consultation with the Chancellor.
Prior consultation
The Chancellor expressed his agreement with the latter suggestion. He said it had been necessary for him to speak out on certain points. Sometimes it was impossible to remain silent. However, he knew a little better now to what extent each of his statements was being magnified by the news media in the US. He therefore agreed that it was good to exchange certain views in confidence.
The President agreed that it was necessary to speak up at times. One could not be a statesman without getting elected. One had to have the support of the people. One could not do much good without being in office.
US efforts to improve relations with Soviet Union
Apart from the NPT, the US was working in many areas for a different relationship with the Soviet Union. It had adopted a Space Treaty and was working on a Consular Treaty. The Consular Treaty was not only in the interest of the Soviet Union and of the United States but in the interest of the entire free world. The Soviets had plenty of people in the United States. The US was interested in getting some of its people into the Soviet Union to be able to observe at close hand what was going on there.
Troop levels
The President suggested that the Chancellor present his views on troop reduction and that they consider the question at the highest level. Both sides should give and take until a satisfactory solution could be found. Details were not so important, what counted was the handshake. That pledge would be honored "when the roll is called."
The President and the Chancellor then agreed on what to say to the press after the meeting.
Strength in unity
The President then repeated that he was making no "backroom deals" with anybody, that he believed there was strength in unity and disaster in division. They should not let themselves be driven apart by columnists or others.
Kiesinger optimistic for future of our relations
The Chancellor said that he was very gratified about this conversation. He wanted to repeat that he would do nothing that might damage the good relations between the two countries. As a matter of fact, he would try to strengthen those relations. He accepted gladly the President's suggestion to call on his advice and have joint talks and try to find solutions on any difficulties that might come up. He believed that the small worries of Germany and the uneasy feelings could be overcome. He believed that public opinion in Germany and in the US would move again in the direction of closer friendship. The President would always find understanding here. The majority of the German people were for the President because they knew that whatever happened to the US would happen to the entire free world.
FRG should help less developed areas
The President said he wanted to add one more thing. He wondered how big the German population was--sixty million? (The Chancellor nodded yes.) Those sixty million, he said, eat very well and are dressed very well but there were over three billion people in the world that were not faring so well. The FRG should think about sharing some more of its prosperity with, for instance, the people of Asia and support his food program. This might be worth a few squadrons to him.
The Chancellor assured the President of the willingness of the FRG to cooperate as much as possible. He explained the restrictions placed on him by the bad financial situation of the Federal Government.
The President stated that the US was willing to give three million more tons of grain to India if the rest of the free world would match that total together. He urged the Chancellor to do his utmost to support this program.
At this point, the conversation ended, having lasted a little over two hours.
Note: The conversation was preceded by a fifteen-minute social talk with the entire Kiesinger family, including Mr. Kiesinger's son-in-law from Washington. The atmosphere was very cordial. The President, during that conversation, extended an invitation to Mrs. Kiesinger to accompany her husband to the US.
The private conversation between the President and the Chancellor also was conducted for the most part in a very cordial manner. It was noticeable that the Chancellor was feeling slightly uneasy about the emphatic, determined and simply-worded delivery of the President's thoughts. He (the Chancellor) seemed unable to control the direction of the conversation as he normally does. However, toward the end much of this uneasiness seemed to dissipate and it became clear that the President had made a positive impression in many respects on the Chancellor. The President, on the other hand, appeared completely at ease throughout the conversation.
215. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State/1/
Bonn, May 8, 1967, 1734Z.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Germany, vol. 13. Secret; Priority; Nodis.
13352. For Under Secretary Rostow. Ref: State's 89416./2/ Subject: German support for US position in international monetary reform.
/2/Not found. The telegram number appears to be incorrect.
1. I fully recognize the great importance that the administration places on the successful completion of negotiations on the basic framework of an acceptable plan for reform of the international monetary system in time for presentation to the IMF Governors at their meeting in Rio de Janeiro in September. At the same time, my considered judgment is that the approach suggested in the reftel is the wrong way to try to advance our interests in this field, and, in fact, would be counter-productive.
2. The main point, I believe, is that if the battery of expert opinion and argumentation which was obviously marshalled in Washington for the April 24-26 meetings could not carry the day, there is little chance of our making any contribution to swinging the balance by organizing approaches of the kind suggested in the reftel. I believe that the discussions have now progressed to a point where it would no longer be effective simply to have influential people urge Chancellor Kiesinger to support the US view generally against that of France. This is the one confrontation that Kiesinger and the German Cabinet will seek to avoid at all costs. A break in the EEC on this issue would be considered by the Germans only as a last resort, it could be accepted by them only on a showing that the French persisted in positions which threatened solutions that the Germans, in the light of their own interests, considered reasonable and desirable.
3. Kiesinger has little personal interest in this issue and no technical financial background on which to base an independent judgment. He has, to the best of our knowledge, no American confidants in such matters and relies on his government advisers: EconMin Schiller and Econ State Sec Schoellhorn. If he has an outside adviser on such matters he is likely to be Prof Dr. Otto Pfleiderer, President of the State Central Bank of Baden-Wuerttemberg. We have a report on Dr. Pfleiderer's general financial views which indicates that he is very conservative and a strong supporter of Pres Blessing in the Bundesbank Council. He would not be likely to counsel the Chancellor to take any action not favored by Blessing and possibly Emminger. Neither, in my judgment, would any other influential German financial leader. We know, for example, that Erhard opposes our position strongly.
4. There would, moreover, be a high probability that the approach suggested in the reftel would become known to Kiesinger and probably to Schiller as well. This would, in my opinion, be certain to arouse their resentment and that of their Cabinet colleagues. I have the distinct impression that there has already been some little annoyance at the totality of our actions mounted before the meeting of the EEC Finance Ministers in Munich. It will be recalled that I directed a strong letter to the Chancellor, enclosing copies of Sec Fowler's two letters to Schiller, on the eve of the meeting. I have never received a reply or any comment. The strong emphasis given to this subject by the Vice President before the Munich meeting, and by the President after, will have left no doubt as to where the US Government stands on this matter. Unless we have some persuasive new element to inject in support of our point of view, I can see no further advantage to be derived from additional general political type pressures.
5. To add the type of campaign now being suggested to what has already been done could, in my judgment, even arouse suspicion as to our real purpose in seeking reform. When we originally proposed the reforms now under consideration, it was on the basis that additional reserves would be required because of our intent to balance our payments. Since it is now well known that we cannot attain a balance in the immediate future, it will be generally concluded that the urgency of the situation should have been diminished rather than increased. During the parallel discussions conducted with Schiller during the President's recent visit, the amount of new liquidity required annually was stated by the US side as being roughly comparable to that currently being injected by the US. For us now to press with what will be considered an unwarranted degree of urgency, may lead others to the conclusion that our real purpose is to facilitate our financing of a continuing large payments imbalance. The possible benefits which might accrue to us through such a campaign are not in my opinion worth this risk.
6. My own feeling is that the best way for us to advance the negotiations in the direction we desire is through our regular contacts at all appropriate levels. I and my staff will take advantage of our contacts with German Government officials, and German and American businessmen, to sell the US point of view on these matters. In order to be effective in this effort, we will need to be kept up to date on the progress of the negotiations and the evolution of the US viewpoint on the issues of the day.
McGhee
216. Telegram From Secretary of State Rusk to the Department of State/1/
Luxembourg, June 13, 1967, 1630Z.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL GER W-US. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to Bonn, London, Moscow, Paris, and Rome.
470. Secto 05. NATUS. Secretary received Vice Chancellor Brandt for breakfast June 13, during which one hour conversation took place. Others present were Arnold (Brandt's Chef de Cabinet), Weber (Brandt's staff assistant), as well as Bowie and Johnpoll. Major items discussed follow:
1. Non-proliferation treaty. Brandt asked whether Secretary to ask for any NATO action during course of current NATO FonMin meeting. Secretary replied he intended discuss status of draft but would not ask for any action. Secretary mentioned the two alternatives on amendment procedures, but Brandt gave no indication of FRG reaction or preference.
2. Middle East. Secretary told Brandt we had not expected shooting to begin when it did, particularly since Israelis had told us privately they would exercise restraint. We had, however, anticipated that if shooting began the outcome would be what it turned out to be. Secretary told Brandt he intended to discuss Middle East situation at NATO Ministerial Meeting, particularly to illustrate current status of East-West relations. US and Soviet Union had been able to cooperate only to a very limited degree during the crisis, essentially only on the cease-fire. The Soviets had pushed the Arabs up to the closing of the Strait of Tiran; and they will now try to exploit the situation to enhance Soviet influence on the Arabs and to minimize Western influence. Secretary thought that it would be a long time before real peace comes to the area, with one side suffering from humiliation and the other from great pride.
Brandt said that FRG relations with the Near Eastern countries are poor on the whole. However, he thought FRG relations had been affected less severely by the crisis than ours. Secretary said quite a few of the NE countries who had broken with us had done so as a public gesture but privately wished to maintain contact.
Secretary told Brandt there some indications, still inconclusive, that Soviet Union may ask special session UNGA. Secretary and Brandt agreed that there evidence that Israeli Government had been seriously divided between activists and moderates before shooting began last week.
3. NATO role. Secretary expressed concern over NATO reluctance look after matter vital NATO interest even though out of immediate NATO geographic area. Said he hoped we could stimulate more continuing interest in these vital areas. France opposes common approach in principle, and feels NATO failed to help on Algeria, but NATO should nevertheless be concerned with its vital interests.
Brandt expressed general agreement and said he would have something to say during NATO Ministerial about the need for crisis consultations. He was afraid, however, that there would be little enthusiasm. Even as far as Germany was concerned, NATO involvement might have some politically damaging consequences.
Secretary asked whether European interest might be fostered by Harmel's idea of trying to develop European caucus. Said that we would have no objection. Brandt thought it might. Both agreed that consultation didn't mean everyone must agree to act jointly. Of course, the general objective would have to be kept in mind. For example, some could counsel moderation on Israel, others could seek to maintain contact with the Arabs.
4. Bilateral security consultation. Brandt suggested that Secretary designate someone to maintain contact with one or two FRG people to exchange and develop thoughts on development of Eur security system. On German side Brandt proposed the Chief of FonOff Political Department or Planning Chief Diehl although not certain he would be available since Kiesinger wants him to replace Von Hase as FRG Press Chief. Brandt said that in addition to the talks on Eur security system, he would be prepared to send someone to Washington to exchange views with us on developments in Eastern Europe and GDR if we felt, as relayed to him by Embassy Bonn, that there had not been sufficient discussion of these matters.
Secretary suggested that Bowie hold preliminary discussions with FRG reps concerning Eur security problems, and subsequently talks could move to senior level, possibly during Kiesinger visit to Washington. Secretary asked Brandt whether he intended accompany Kiesinger.
Brandt replied he might not accompany Kiesinger since they have a general agreement not to go abroad together. However, Von Hase in announcing Kiesinger's acceptance of President's invitation had mistakenly said Brandt would accompany; it might be internally embarrassing if after this announcement Brandt failed to do so. In any event, FRG would probably decide within next few days.
Secretary indicated to Brandt we would welcome it if FRG decides Brandt to accompany Kiesinger. Said that as a general practice we had found it useful for SecState and FonMin to hold discussions while President and Chancellor were conducting their talks.
5. East-West relations. Brandt told Secretary that FRG would probably send brief reply to Stoph's letter today./2/ Did not expect it to lead to any immediate results but will be embarrassing to Ulbricht because some of the Communist countries would welcome show of FRG flexibility. Brandt said Soviet Union had not slowed down FRG progress in developing EE contacts as drastically as had been feared two or three months ago. Shortly after the Karlsbad meeting,/3/ the Czechs had privately indicated to FRG desire for discussions, had not excluded eventual diplomatic relations, and had indicated that some intermediate solutions might be possible in the near future. Brandt thought that establishment of trade missions might be next step with the Czechs. Brandt said that the Poles, potentially most difficult problem, also seem to be somewhat more flexible and undogmatic towards Bonn. Brandt said he had impression Soviets themselves were becoming a little less rigid toward the FRG. For example, Tsarapkin had made some remarks at the Hanover Fair in favor of increased German-Soviet trade, using some of Brandt's own words on this subject. Brandt said that Soviet Embassy Bonn had sent two officers to the FonOff NATO Section to ask for FRG reaction to NATO redeployment plan at about same time two Soviet EmbOffs had called on US Embassy Bonn. Brandt said these Sov EmbOffs had made a vague statement to FRG FonOff that time might come when Soviet Union might not necessarily have to keep troops in GDR at present level.
/2/Stoph and Kiesinger exchanged four letters between May 10 and September 28. For texts, see Europe Archiv, 1967, vol. 2, pp. 327-330 and 473-477.
/3/Reference is to the April meeting of Communist Parties on the questions of Germany and European security. For extracts of the meeting's final statement, see Documents on Germany, 1944-1985, pp. 961-963.
Secretary said we had not approached Soviets on question of mutual troop withdrawals because we have nothing to offer Soviets. NATO redeployment is too small to interest Soviets, and we intend to maintain current effectiveness NATO forces. In response to Secretary's question Brandt said FRG had no information to indicate reduction Soviet troop levels in East Germany.
6. Free world exports to China. Secretary told Brandt we hoped to discuss with authoritative Germans--perhaps Brandt and Schroeder--contributions being made by free world to Chinese nuclear program by export metallurgical and other essential items. These items not covered by COCOM but UK and FRG exports involved. Japanese have already been briefed. Secretary said we hoped to send briefing team to Bonn in near future.
7. Common Market. Brandt said de Gaulle's objection to British entry is political. Brandt had told de Gaulle in Rome that UK could make important contribution in East-West relations, but de Gaulle had replied that UK would do nothing without US permission. Nevertheless, Brandt said he and Kiesinger believed de Gaulle understands he cannot have his way against the weight of European public opinion. Even in France substantial number of Gaullists disagree with their chief on British entry.
Brandt said that the French had not only gone along with the selection of Rey but that last April Couve de Murville had suggested Rey's name to Brandt as a compromise candidate. Secretary and Brandt agreed that French behavior during Kennedy Round had been encouraging.
Rusk
217. Telegram From Secretary of State Rusk to the Department of State/1/
Luxembourg, June 14, 1967, 0930Z.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, NATO 3 LUX. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to Bonn, London, Paris, Moscow, and Berlin.
486. Secto 18. NATUS. Following is report of June 13 Quadripartite supper meeting between Secretary Rusk and Foreign Ministers Couve de Murville, Brown and Brandt. It serves as approved memorandum of conversation.
1. FRG efforts with East Germany--After brief discussion Middle East situation and speculation about possible special UNGA session (to be reported septel) Brandt led off discussion on FRG relations with East Berlin regime and their effects on FRG relations with Soviet Union and EE.
Brandt said that since December NATO meeting, Ulbricht has increasingly followed policy isolation vis-à-vis FedRep. This dominated recent SED Congress. Clearly, ruling group in East Berlin does not want contact with FRG. Nevertheless FRG is offering contacts; accepted Stoph letter; and today has sent reply./2/
/2/See footnote 2, Document 216.
Brandt said FRG not optimistic regarding reaction to reply, but aims to convince its allies, neutral countries, and other Communist states that FRG willing to accept reasonable modus vivendi. Seeks to reach agreements where these are possible, is willing put aside problems on which agreement not possible, but cannot accede to Ulbricht demand that his regime be accepted by Germans as foreign country or that it be legitimated on democratic or national grounds.
Brandt said it would mean much to FRG if allies would regard its moves with respect to East Berlin regime as German contribution to détente but not as signal to treat that part of Germany as separate state.
2. FRG-EE relations--Brandt then described current state of FRG relations with EE. Said that after new FedRep Government had undertaken policy of improving Eastern relations, Ulbricht regime and Soviets had taken counter measures which have slowed up progress but have not destroyed the FRG policy or its future prospects. Brandt said there was considerable evidence of continued interest in EE for developing relations with FRG. For example, after Karlsbad conference, Czech privately contacted FRG reps for exchange of views. Brandt thought this might lead to exchange of trade missions and perhaps more. Poland has made some private contacts, but Brandt not very optimistic early progress could be expected here. Thought diplomatic relations would come with Czechs and Hungarians before Poles. Yugoslavs eager for diplomatic relations, but FRG has not yet found the right formula.
Brandt said FedRep wishes to put more emphasis on improving relations with Soviet Union. There are some signs, he said, that Soviet attitude toward FRG has recently become less aggressive. Said he expects to see Tsarapkin June 15 and will explore Soviet attitudes further.
Brandt said it more apparent now than six months ago that FRG must make clear to Communist countries that it not seeking to isolate Ulbricht regime from rest of Soviet bloc. Brandt said he thought there might be some Soviet interest in FedRep proposal re exchange of declarations on non-use of force on matters relating to the German problem. FRG might be willing, if Soviet interest develops, to extend declaration not only to USSR but also to her allies. He anticipated that Soviets might in that event ask whether FedRep declaration would also be binding on allied troops stationed on German soil. Of course the FRG answer would have to be "no." Brandt, responding to Secretary's query, said Berlin would also be excluded and Allied rights unimpaired. Brandt thought it might be useful for FRG to explore entire question with US, UK and France.
3. Reply to Stoph letter--Couve de Murville at this point stated that he had read the reply to Stoph, and thought it a good letter. He called it an important step. While he wasn't at all sure there would be a reply from the other side, the document was important as a new definition of FRG position. Brown said he agreed. Secretary Rusk asked Brandt what FRG intended to do if Ulbricht regime replied that its Ministers were prepared to talk with FRG Ministers.
Brandt said that FRG intention was to use State Secretaries, but that if prospects were otherwise favorable, and some technical subjects come up within the competence of certain Ministers (e.g. Minister of Communications), he did not rule that out. Contact between Ministers of Foreign Affairs was out of the question, however.
Secretary asked Brandt whether he had had any private indications re possible reaction of Ulbricht regime to the letter.
Brandt replied that the dominant group, which holds very rigid views, would have preferred to receive no answer. Now this group will have to debate with less doctrinaire colleagues as well as with other bloc countries. The FRG letter is being published on June 14 together with a FRG declaration of policy.
Secretary Rusk asked whether it would be useful to discuss this problem with Gromyko if latter comes to NY in near future. Brandt thought that it would be useful if we could let Gromyko know that we thought well of current FRG efforts to develop contacts with the other part of Germany.
Secretary said he felt line FRG was taking was constructive and well reflected the confidence of FedRep and its population. Thought it useful for FRG to stay a step ahead of East on this matter.
Brown agreed with Secretary. Said he was impressed during recent visit in Moscow by extent to which Soviets had changed in their reaction to Bonn. Thought that Soviets would continue anti-FedRep propaganda but more quietly than before. When he had supported FRG people like Brandt, Wehner, and Erler in talks with the Russians, the Russians had replied skeptically, but without invective, that they would wait and see.
4. On question of Soviet attitudes, Secretary said he had impression until blocking of Straits of Tiran that there was quite a debate between moderates and militants taking place in Moscow. He asked whether current developments in Middle East would tend to discredit the militants. Had someone in Soviet Union made serious mistake in estimate of Arab military ability?
Brown thought that the militants in Moscow might be strengthened rather than weakened. Nevertheless, someone will be called to account in Moscow for the mistaken judgement that the Arabs could take care of themselves militarily against Israel.
Secretary asked whether Soviets have the mistaken impression that we control Israel and had acted in bad faith in telling Soviets we would counsel moderation. Brown said he was convinced Soviet leaders knew we did not control Israel.
5. Berlin morale--Brandt then reverted to Berlin. Said he was worried that situation there was deteriorating psychologically. Economic problem did not seem so serious at present. Berlin unemployment lower than in FRG. Brandt pointed to recent Berlin student demonstrations, said these were more or less the same students who in 1961 and 1962 had risked their lives against the Wall and to rescue their compatriots. That these students are now turning their energy to destructive demonstration results from the psychological frustrations which are becoming a serious problem in Berlin. Brandt thought that in addition to the factors making for unrest among the students everywhere, Berlin presented special problems. After a genuine détente comes, Berlin will find a new role to play. Until then, it will suffer from frustrations. Brandt said that of course the plight of the civilian population of Berlin in this respect is an FRG problem. Brown said that any organization suffers a letdown after release from the tensions of crisis; in the absence of crisis, it is inevitable that the spirit of Berlin would be subdued.
Secretary Rusk thought that Berlin suffers from the fact that an illusion of détente has been created without the reality. As a result, Berlin at present has neither the stimulus of crisis nor the opportunities that would come with genuine détente.
Brandt said that the Berlin government would set up a committee to work out various ways of putting new life into the city. The FRG would cooperate. He asked that US, UK and French reps in Berlin show sympathetic interest in the activities and plans of the committee when it is established. Secretary Rusk thought it might be possible to make greater use of Berlin for international meetings of a technical or cultural nature. This might be psychologically useful. He also suggested that Brandt talk to the three Ambassadors in Bonn to explore quietly what can be done to help ameliorate the situation.
Rusk
218. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State/1/
Bonn, June 20, 1967, 1850Z.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL GER W-US. Confidential.
15024. Subj: Conversation with Wehner. I had an hour with All-German Affairs Minister Wehner on June 19.
1. The Stoph letter and its aftermath--I said that I was aware of the importance which Wehner attached to the reply to the Stoph letter and congratulated him on having won his point. Wehner said a corner had been turned; however, there would be many others. A majority of the leadership of the CDU/CSU Parliamentary group had fought to the last to prevent a reply. If Ulbricht's answer provided an opening, the fight would be on again.
2. Wehner said that while Neues Deutschland had been sharply negative, Ulbricht had been much more flexible. Ulbricht would be clever enough to put the ball back in the FRG's court. He might agree to appoint a delegate for the purpose of discussing with his FRG counterpart arrangements for a meeting between Kiesinger and Stoph. In this event, Wehner said that the FRG should respond positively. There was at this juncture no need to envisage a meeting between Kiesinger and Stoph. The meetings of the delegates could be strung out for a long time, and serve precisely the purpose desired by the FRG, i.e., a discussion of practical measures to prevent a widening of the gap. If these discussions reached a promising stage, a meeting on the Ministerial or sub-Ministerial (State Secretary) level could be held. Wehner defined science and transport as substantive fields for initial discussions and indicated that Kiesinger had accepted in principle this idea that Minister of Transport Leber could hold discussions with his East German counterpart once there were prospects for concrete results. Postal affairs could be another subject of discussion if it were not for Minister Dollinger's adamant opposition.
3. Wehner said that an Ulbricht reply along the lines indicated above would lead again to a strong negative reaction of a majority of the CDU/CSU. However, if this Chancellor led, the CDU/CSU would fall into line. If, on the other hand, he sought the advice of his party, there would be mounting opposition and long delays.
4. The Soviet attitude--Asked whether there were any indication of a more flexible Soviet attitude toward the FRG, Wehner said the Soviets were taking the position "Why are you in such a hurry?". He said that the two leading Soviet journalists who had visited the FedRep last March had finally written their articles. The tone was patronizing; the German problem had not yet sufficiently matured for a solution; moreover, there were other more important problems. In Wehner's opinion, if the FRG persisted in its attempts to create motion on the German problem, the Soviets eventually would have to become involved. They were already showing some interest in the proposal for a mutual renunciation of the use of force, although they were suggesting that this should be done directly between "the two German states." Also, Kiesinger's astute and repeated denials that the FRG, in its Eastern policy, was attempting to sow discord in Eastern Europe, and between the Eastern European countries and the Soviets, undoubtedly were having some effect.
5. Berlin--I noted that FonMin Brandt had talked about the Berlin situation at the NATO meeting at Luxembourg,/2/ and that the Secretary had indicated that we would like to be of help. Wehner said that there was no major morale problem; some substantive problems had to be met. Important industrial investments had been cancelled and this had led to unrest among the labor force. There was also the student problem, but this was a general phenomenon throughout Germany. On top of this, the Berlin press was highly irresponsible and overdramatized the issues. Wehner said that Minister Schiller would probably discuss in Washington the possibility of holding more international meetings in Berlin. This would be of some help. Discussions were also taking place with the industrialists (Berg) for a more determined effort to maintain investments in the city. The SPD was now paying greater attention to the student problem, with good effects.
/2/See Document 217.
6. Voting rights for Berlin Deputies--Wehner said that he and Brandt had killed a proposal to discuss voting rights for Berlin Deputies during this week's meeting of Bundestag committees in Berlin. They had taken the position that there would have to be preparatory discussion with the Allies before the Bundestag could consider the problem and that the time was not ripe for such discussions. He had just learned that Bundestag President Gerstenmaier, in Berlin, had called attention to the tripartite opinion on the Niekisch case. Wehner indicated that he had full understanding for the tripartite position and sharply criticized Gerstenmaier for having played up this issue. He said it was precisely this kind of unhelpful action which affected morale in Berlin. I said that we had a good record of finding practical solutions to such problems in Berlin. Wehner agreed.
7. The SPD and the coalition--In response to my question about the current mood in the SPD and the situation within the coalition, Wehner said that there had been difficulties within the SPD but these were being contained. There would be no extraordinary party convention. Instead, the SPD convention would be advanced from the autumn to the spring of 1968 and a meeting of elected delegates would be held this autumn. This would permit people to blow off steam.
8. Wehner said that unnecessary statements by spokesmen of both parties created friction within the coalition. On the SPD side, Helmut Schmidt, in his free and easy manner, was constantly repeating that there would be an SPD Chancellor in 1969. This kind of brave talk, reminiscent of "casino language of reserve officers," irritated Kiesinger who had queried Brandt whether the SPD was toying with the idea of a coalition with the FDP. State Secretary Jahn had recently called into question the Chancellor's authority to issue binding policy guidelines, arguing that under the grand coalition there had to be prior agreement between the two partners. Whether well-intentioned or not, public discussion of these problems was harmful as it immediately led to counter pressures from the other side. This merely embittered the atmosphere and served no useful purpose.
9. Wehner said that medium term financial planning and the financial reform were the most serious substantive problems currently confronting the coalition. A full day Cabinet meeting would be held on these problems on July 5. Painful decisions were required. In such a situation there was always room for demagoguery. Wehner indicated that he opposed those who argued that since there would have to be cuts in the social security budget, the defense budget should also be reduced. These were not comparable issues. Wehner also noted a tendency on the part of the CDU/CSU and the SPD Parliamentary groups to conclude deals between themselves in order to defeat unpopular but necessary economy measures proposed by the govt. If this tendency continued, the coalition might find itself in serious difficulties.
Comment: Throughout the discussion, Wehner was frank and candid. He was obviously pleased that he had won his point on the Stoph reply and appeared as firm as ever in his support for the grand coalition. At the same time he made it clear that he would continue to insist on using every opening that promised motion on the German problem. Wehner's expectations on East German and Soviet reactions is probably overly optimistic, reflecting the great importance that he attaches to motion on the German problem.
McGhee
219. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
Washington, July 11, 1967, 1 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 GER W. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Obst and approved in the White House on July 13. The discussion took place during a luncheon in honor of former Chancellor Erhard. The source text is noted as a "revision" of the original memorandum. The original read: "The Chancellor wanted the President to know that there will be no cuts in troops." In a memorandum attached to the source text, Benjamin Read, Executive Secretary of the Department of State, noted: "Although we have every reason to believe that Mr. Obst is accurate in recalling the statement, subsequent information including a check with Ambassador McGhee indicates that Ambassador Knappstein's statement should have been qualified to indicate that there had been no decision on troop cut levels."
SUBJECT
FRG Troop Levels; Chancellor Kiesinger's VisitPARTICIPANTS
President Johnson
FRG Ambassador Knappstein
Mr. Harry Obst, Language Services (interpreter)Ambassador Knappstein told the President that he had a message which he had just received from Chancellor Kiesinger. The Chancellor wanted the President to know that there has been no decision to cut troop levels, just a reduction of the military budget in terms of money. He wanted to assure the President that he will make no important decisions on foreign policy without first consulting with the US. He accepts the President's invitation to come to Washington and accepts the dates of September 12-13. He would write the President a personal message the same day./2/
/2/A copy of the July 11 Kiesinger letter confirming that no decision had been taken on troop reductions is in the Johnson Library, National Security File, Special Head of State Correspondence, Germany.
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