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FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES
1964-1968 Washington, DC |
220. Memorandum From the President's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bator) to President Johnson/1/
Washington, July 13, 1967, 9:30 a.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, Bator Papers, Chronological File. Confidential.
SUBJECT
Your Meeting with George McGhee, 5:30 p.m., July 14/2//2/According to the President's Daily Diary, the meeting with Ambassador McGhee took place on July 14 from 6 to 6:30 p.m. (Ibid.) No record of the discussion, in which Bator also participated, was found.
George will want to talk to you about the German defense cuts. Specifically, he will ask for guidance on what to say to Kiesinger when he returns to Bonn.
The Germans have clearly got the message that we are unhappy. They are coming in on every channel with assurances that there has been no decision on troop cuts. In any case, it will take them the rest of the summer to figure out how best to save the money without getting into a war with us.
In light of the above, my strong instinct would be to play the hand in low key--for the time being. If we keep hitting them hard during the next several weeks, I think we simply play into the hands of the Gaullists in Bonn, whose strongest card is German pride and vanity ("it's high time to assert independence from big brother, etc."). A secondary point is that we badly need German cooperation in the international money negotiations between now and September.
If you agree with the above, you will want to instruct George (who may be in a rather combative mood vis-à-vis the Germans) to play it softly, and to say to Kiesinger that:
--You were deeply concerned by the press reports about the defense budget and troop cuts.
--Any unilateral action would undo all the work in the Trilaterals. It would certainly play into the hands of those in the US who want to reduce the American commitment in Europe.
--You were reassured by Kiesinger's message about no decision on troops and about his intention to consult before doing anything that will affect the common defense./3/
/3/See footnote 2, Document 219.
--We sympathize with German worries about the state of their economy. (George might also say to Kiesinger--though not as coming from the President--that the economists in Washington are puzzled about the case for budget balancing at a time of recession in Germany, especially given the large German balance-of-payments surplus.)
--You look forward to seeing the Chancellor in Washington in September. Until then, you hope that the two governments will remain in very close touch.
I would advise against you taking personal notice of the press stories that we didn't consult about the aircraft rotation. As you know from my memo of yesterday,/4/ I have already made the point through the Embassy here.
/4/Not further identified.
At Tab A is a good cable from Marty Hillenbrand, McGhee's No. 2 in Bonn./5/
/5/Not found.
In case you want us, Walt and I will be standing by.
Francis
221. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State/1/
Bonn, July 18, 1967, 1607Z.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL GER W-US. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to Paris. London, Moscow, Berlin, USAREUR, EUCOM, USAFE, and SHAPE.
698. Subj: Meeting with Brandt. NATUS. I called on FonMin Brandt today at my request. The following topics were discussed:
1) Defense budget. Brandt said that he did not know precisely how the present unfortunate situation resulting from the defense budget decision had come about. There had been confusion and misunderstanding all around. The issue of "a change in defense concept" resulting from the budget decision had been injected into the Cabinet discussion by FinMin Strauss, but was included in the decision report only by accident. It will not be included in the final action. One thing he is sure of, however, is that the agreed overall defense budget figure will not be changed. He expects that the Germans will start discussions with respect to any changes in NATO commitments in September. This will be well in time for the NATO force planning and strategic decisions which will be taken in December.
There are several points of view, Brandt said, with respect to what steps the Germans should take in light of their defense budget decision. There is one point of view, which apparently includes the U.S. Congress, which is concerned principally with the number of divisions involved. General Lemnitzer tends, however, to look to the effectiveness rather than the number of divisions. Brandt believes that we should take into account the fact that there will be at least three or four days warning time and that "several divisions" might be left in skeleton form to be filled up in an emergency within the alert period. Although SACEUR is, in general, not interested in reserves as such, he might be interested in such divisions. Another proposal is to fold the territorial forces into the Bundeswehr.
2) German public attitude. I asked the FonMin how he could explain the apparent general apathy on the part of the German public to the defense cuts. I had been told that 64 percent believe that the cuts should be deeper. Brandt replied that there was no simple answer to my question. Since there had been no crises since that in Berlin in 1961-62, many considered there to be no immediate danger. Others believe a better defense can, with changes in the organization or concept, be obtained for less money. He did not believe that there was any general feeling that NATO in its present form had outlived its usefulness and required major revision. This feeling, should it ever come, will come much later and only after a change in the situation in Eastern Europe.
3) European security. I referred to recent public remarks Brandt had made regarding a European security system, particularly his statement on July 2. Did this represent a coherent plan which the German Government might put forward? Brandt replied to the contrary, stating that his remarks had indeed only been "tactical starting points." He felt that they must not leave the search for peace as a monopoly for the other side. Brandt had recently told Couve de Murville that he was opposed to calling a peace conference, as had been recently proposed by French Prime Min Pompidou. This must come later. Brandt said that he is currently more interested in the substance of peace securing arrangements, concerning which his thinking has focused on the following points:
A) The renunciation of the use of force
B) Making clear that Germany is not aiming at ownership of nuclear weapons
C) The search for East-West arrangements which could result in a reciprocal lowering of troop levels without disadvantages to either side.
These are matters which NATO itself is seized with, and in which the Germans are already cooperating. In the meantime, no drastic changes in NATO are required. Brandt regrets the fact that unilateral decisions are in the meanwhile being taken in the West through reduction in forces, without obtaining corresponding Soviet reductions. Indeed, he opposed the recent budgetary cuts as FonMin for this reason--even though, as SPD leader, he had to support them in the end. Brandt said that the Chancellor's recent statement to the effect that a reunified Germany could not be a member of either power bloc, reflected the view that the German question cannot be solved within the present context of East-West confrontation. This does not mean, however, that Germany would withdraw from NATO. Indeed, Germany could not withdraw from anything unless, at the same time, it enters something new. (I interpret this to mean either East-West security framework or a situation in which the East-West confrontation has disappeared.)
4) De Gaulle visit./2/ According to Brandt, the discussions during the recent de Gaulle visit went quite well in the bilateral field. The principal gain had been in the creation of organizational structures for intensified cooperation in the industrial and technical areas. In the political field, the talks had resulted in agreement for a greater exchange of information between the two affecting Eastern Europe, including telegrams received by both from their Embassies. (It is interesting to note that the FonOff has (Embtel 523)/3/ recently declined our offer for intensified intelligence exchange affecting Eastern Europe.) With regard to the big political issues, however, the situation after the meeting remains as before. De Gaulle had emphasized that the two countries must defend their national identities. Referring to "our American friends," which Brandt thought an amusing slip, de Gaulle said that he did not think they aimed at domination, but that they were so big that they could not avoid it. The Germans, for their part, had said that they were concerned only with the threat imposed by the Soviets. With regard to England, de Gaulle had posed the question "What is England?", mentioning Singapore and Hong Kong. He had warned against the special relationship between the UK and US and the threat of an Atlantic Europe. Brandt said that the attitude of de Gaulle toward UK entry posed a serious problem for Germany, which would become more acute before the end of the year. With regard to the Middle East, de Gaulle revealed the French objective as being basically to establish a presence there, without being too specific as to what it could accomplish. De Gaulle is convinced that the Arabs will not stick together in the long run. In Brandt's view, it is not possible for Europe in its present state of organization to form a common policy toward the Middle East--or other similar problems.
/2/July 12-13.
/3/Dated July 13. (Department of State, Central Files, POL GER W-US)
5. Common Market political cooperation. Brandt pointed out that the EEC Ministers had in their meeting on May 30 agreed to consider the question of political cooperation, not however any particular subject. Brandt does not know how far France will be willing to go in discussing particular political questions. The Six Foreign Ministers will meet again towards the end of October and will attempt to arrange another heads of state meeting before the end of the year. De Gaulle had asked Kiesinger to take the initiative in proposing such a meeting. Brandt is contacting the Italians to check the possibility of their proposing Luxembourg as the meeting place. He is, however, not optimistic that the meeting will take place, since the Dutch are reluctant to take part in such a meeting without progress on UK admission. In the event no progress is made in the next Council Ministerial Meeting, Brandt will attempt to convince the Dutch that this is a necessity.
McGhee
222. Memorandum From the President's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bator) to President Johnson/1/
Washington, August 11, 1967, 6 p.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, Bator Papers, Kiesinger Visit. Secret.
SUBJECT
Preparing for the Kiesinger Visit: Strategy and ProcedureThis will be a critical meeting--not quite in a league with Glassboro,/2/ but close enough to call for very careful preparation. And, in my judgment, the general impression we make will be much more important to future German behavior than what we say on any of the specific issues on the table. If we seem to have no broad, coherent approach to our European relations, or if we appear disorganized and uncertain about our priorities--or if we seem unaware of the sense of drift and uncertainty in Europe--we will lose what I think is a major opportunity to condition Kiesinger's thought and action on the full range of Atlantic issues.
/2/Reference is to the June 23 and 25 Summit meetings between President Johnson and Soviet Prime Minister Kosygin in Glassboro, N.J. Documentation is scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, volume XIV.
The only way to be certain that we will speak with vision and with one voice is for the President to give clear marching orders. The rest of this memo sets out a strategy we might follow and a procedure whereby you could instruct us.
Strategy
Kiesinger must leave this meeting convinced that:
--the President has a set of firm principles in his head which govern U.S. behavior toward Europe and the Russians;
--those principles are broadly consistent with German interests;
--they will not permit America to turn its back on Germany and Europe;
--specifically, the U.S. is not going to scuttle the Alliance whenever the Germans do something which annoys us;
--in turn, when we are forced by our problems to do something the Germans don't like, it does not mean that we are going to sue for divorce.
It follows that the President should:
1. Lay out for Kiesinger--and draw him into a dialogue about--the basic components of our European policy:
--Our solid commitment to Atlantic security in the context of an evolving NATO.
--Our commitment to bridge building and general improvement of the East-West environment as the best way to create conditions in which the healing of Germany is possible (it being understood that we will take our cue from the FRG on sensitive East German issues).
--Our need to keep open our bilateral channel with the Russians, which reflects our special nuclear responsibilities.
--Our support for an increasingly coherent and effective Western Europe.
2. On the tough, sensitive issues: the future of NATO, German unification, etc., probe in detail what is on Kiesinger's mind.
3. Use this kind of a conversation as the context in which to raise the currently hot issues (defense budget, troops, international money, future offset, etc.) and for getting across the general point that we both must be careful not to overload each other's politics; that isolationism breeds isolationism.
The point of the above strategy is to avoid limiting the conversation either to the hot questions of the day, or to a broad benign exchange which ignores both current troubles and the more fundamental strains which are inevitable in our relations with Europe following the excessive dependence of the post-war period.
If Kiesinger goes away without being confident that he understands what is really important to the President--and that he can depend on us not to overkill him on day to day problems--no amount of pleading or browbeating will make him more amenable on concrete issues as they arise. For instance, without such a framework a U.S. threat to cut troops might only draw a shrug and an air of bitter resignation. On the other hand, if the President can give the Chancellor a sense of confidence that he can calculate U.S. reactions to specific problems because he understands our general priorities, we will have a much better basis on which to lean on him, and to get him to lean on his anti-Americans when we have a specific problem.
Benefits
If the strategy works, the Chancellor will leave thinking that--whatever discordant noises there may be in the background--Lyndon Johnson understands the central propositions necessary to a good, workable relation between Europe and America, and can be counted on to steer a true course despite periodic flaps. It's quite possible that this would even show up in the newspapers. Further,
--it would maximize the chance that Kiesinger will try to play particular issues our way;
--when he cannot do what we want, he will be more careful to manage German policy so as to minimize the negative effect on us;
--when we must do things he doesn't like, rather than blasting away in public, he will be more inclined to deal quietly with us, in private. Fundamentally, he will work harder to keep U.S.-German relations on an even keel.
Procedure
On Monday, I would suggest you chair a strategy session with Rusk, McNamara, Fowler, Walt and myself./3/ You might use that meeting to cross-examine your advisers, to instruct us on the general line, and also on the handling of the specific question of U.S. troop levels. (At Tab A/4/ is a memo on that one question. If you do not wish to take the time to go over it on the weekend, I will send in another copy on Monday morning, prior to a strategy meeting.)
/3/According to the President's Daily Diary, Johnson met with his senior advisers from 6:50 to 7:30 p.m. on August 14 for an "off the record" discussion of the Kiesinger visit. (Johnson Library)
/4/Not found.
In addition, if it would be useful, I could spend 15-20 minutes before such a meeting going over the ground in this paper with you.
I apologize for asking for your valuable time for a strategy session on Monday, but this is the only means for pulling the government together and avoiding the inevitable tendency of the rest of us to emphasize our own particular concerns in conversations with the various Germans who will be fanning out around town.
FMB
OK for Marvin to set up mtg. with Rusk, McNamara, Fowler, Rostow, Bator on Mon. afternoon
In addition, Bator and Rostow to come in for 15 min. before such a meeting/5/
Speak to me/5/The President checked these first two options.
223. Letter From John J. McCloy to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow)/1/
New York, August 11, 1967.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, vol. 38. No classification marking. In an August 14 memorandum to the President, attached to the source text, Rostow provided a brief summary of the contents of the letter and commented: "You will, I believe, wish to read this letter from John McCloy. He underlines that the critical objective of the [Kiesinger] visit should be to achieve a significant meeting of the minds on détente." President Johnson appointed McCloy as U.S. Special Representative to the United States-United Kingdom-Federal Republic of Germany talks on Central European Defense on October 11, 1966.
Dear Walt:
I have been increasingly impressed by the importance of the coming talks with Kiesinger so much so that I am taking the liberty of writing you directly in the thought that you might convey some of my concern and some of my thinking to the President in preparation for the visit.
We are at a point of history where some very important decisions must be taken soon in respect of the Alliance and Germany, as an extremely important part of Europe, is one of the focal points on which a number of these far-reaching decisions have to be made.
The Alliance is coming up for review in 1969. Perhaps the review will be precipitated in 1968 by a formal notice of the renunciation of the Alliance by France. There are some in this country who are already advocating "some dilution of the Alliance" in the form of a détente with the Soviet Union. There are others who instinctively favor a return to a form of opportunistic isolationism on our part. There are those who feel that difficult as the prospect of reinvigorating NATO in the light of the French defection appears to be, that it is still the best clear chance for peace and security and for a reasonable modus vivendi with the Soviet Union.
deGaulle has not only defected from NATO, he is from all the signs seeking an outright reversal of the Alliance./2/ On top of this, we have an equivocal position on the part of Germany--equivocal due in part to a domestic political diversion which has taken the form of a pro-French-pro-U.S. division in Germany. This division has become a bit overheated by a very strong and very virulent campaign on the part of France to convince the Germans that the only way they can prove their loyalty to the Franco-German treaty is to follow the French lead in its present anti-American phobia. There is also some equivocation apparent in respect to the German Government's attitude toward the East as has been evidenced by some recent speeches of Brandt and even in some of Kiesin-ger's.
/2/Maybe this is too strong, but it certainly is an outright neutralization of the Alliance. [Footnote in the source text.]
A new phenomenon has entered into the picture in the form of the emergence of the Soviet Union in the Middle East and the Mediterranean as an aggressive political force there. It is clear that the Soviets intend to expand their position there if only to remove the sting of their miscalculation of the Israeli capacities. They intend to gain a position, if possible, which will enable them to influence the flow of oil from the area. They have seen the long-range potentialities of new pro-Soviet forces on the southern flank of NATO and astride the strategic nexus which the Mediterranean represents between the East and the West and between Europe and Africa. This only accentuates the pressing need for the Germans and the Americans to understand each other's objectives very clearly at this critical period in the history of the Alliance. The Soviets have not become benign merely because they seek to avoid a nuclear exchange. Their actions in the Middle East clearly demonstrate this.
On the other hand they have been hearing much from us on the subject of détente with the Soviet Union. This is not only in the nuclear field but in other areas as well. The article by Gilpatric in the Sunday Times will set them off again. What are our intentions? They are not going to be satisfied with general protestations any more than we should be. The Germans are great ones to insist on new assurances every week, but in the political world in which Europe moves, I have no doubt our position seems equivocal and disturbing too.
The important thing is to achieve, if at all possible, a real meeting of the minds as to what our respective objectives really are and what steps should be taken to bring them about. What do we intend to do about the Alliance if France does withdraw? What are the actual steps Brandt has in mind to take in furtherance of his long-range objectives in respect of the East? What do we really wish the Germans would do in respect of France?
It is important also to understand what should be avoided at the meeting. I suppose all would agree that we should not start out by berating the Chancellor for the reduction of his forward budget. We should not, I repeat, not, attempt to replay the record of the Erhardt visit. I doubt that it would be wise to even bring up offsets again. We should not take the budget cut as a new excuse to move in on our own troop levels. If we did this so close to the 1969 date, I think the base for a convincing reconfirmation of the Alliance and NATO would be too dangerously narrowed. I should assume that the tripartite agreements carried us beyond the need for that. It was implicit in them that we would not proceed unilaterally toward the reduction of troop levels except in conjunction with each other and with a real discussion of what the strategic and tactical needs were. It was also agreed that the Foreign Exchange problem was a common problem. I would leave it at that assuming that both they and we intended to operate under those principles. This whole issue is one which is so dependent on what our long-range objectives in respect of Europe and the Soviet Union are that the time should be spent in exploring those objectives in real depth rather than threatening further troop reductions or bickering with them over the budgetary developments or the way they handled the deGaulle visit.
We have a real opportunity now with the decline of deGaulle's prestige to begin now to lay a base for more meaningful discussion of our relations with Germany and Western Europe than we have had for some time. The disenchantment with deGaulle in Germany goes very deep and if we can show Europe that in spite of our domestic problems and with Viet Nam, we are prepared to think seriously of our future relations with Europe, this will be impressive. At the same time we ask that they be aware of our problems and relations with the rest of the world. Neither Europe nor we can afford these days to be provincial in our thinking.
I hope this may be of some help.
Sincerely,
John J. McCloy
224. Record of Meeting/1/
Washington, August 14, 1967, 6:50-7:35 p.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, Meeting Notes File. No classification marking. Drafted by Christian. The meeting was held in the Cabinet Room prior to Kiesinger's arrival.
ATTENDING
The President
Secretary Rusk
Secretary McNamara
Secretary Fowler
Walt Rostow
Francis Bator
George Christian
Marvin WatsonThe President said he thought he would tell the Chancellor that the U.S. has a 30 billion dollar deficit but is ready to go through hell to stay with McCloy's agreement;/2/ that if the Germans do go through with an adjustment of their troops the U.S. would have to do it proportionately.
/2/Reference is to an agreement regarding troop deployment and related financial arrangements announced by the United States, United Kingdom, and Federal Republic of Germany on May 2. For text of the U.S. statement, see Department of State Bulletin, May 22, 1967, pp. 788-789.
Secretary Rusk said that Kiesinger has four plans. One calls for the reduction of men in uniform and a cut of about 15,000 in civilians. He said that if the Chancellor says he has to make a troop reduction, the President will have to say what he indicated.
Rusk said there were two contingencies: Failure to get satisfactory execution of tri-lateral agreements; and failure to keep a satisfactory number of Germans in uniform.
The Secretary suggested that the President use this approach in talking with the Chancellor: 1. Count our blessings--that in the political and economic sphere, we are in good shape with the Germans; that we are doing a respectable job in foreign aid. 2. They have gotten away from Adenauer's rigid attitude towards the East. 3. In the broadest sense, the U.S. and Germany have a lot of common policy. 4. He is on the rebound from talks with De Gaulle, so be prepared for that.
The Secretary said it is well for everyone to remember that we are working against a pretty solid background--that the Germans are solid partners in NATO compared with others. He said a thorough explanation of each other's problems would be a good way to start the discussions.
George Christian
225. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
Washington, August 15, 1967.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL GER W-US. Secret. Drafted by McGhee and approved in S on October 31. Brandt accompanied Chancellor Kiesinger on his August 13-19 visit to Washington. For text of public statements issued during and at the conclusion of the visit, see Department of State Bulletin, September 11, 1967, pp. 325-330. McGhee commented on the visit in At the Creation of a New Germany, pp. 228-229.
SUBJECT
Secretary's Meeting with German Foreign Minister BrandtPARTICIPANTS
German Foreign Minister Willy Brandt
German Ambassador Heinrich Knappstein
The Secretary of State
United States Ambassador George C. McGhee1. U.S.-Soviet Relations--The Secretary asked Brandt whether there was suspicion in Germany, arising out of U.S. contacts with the Soviets, that we would reach agreement with the Soviets at the expense of German interests. Brandt replied that, although there are recurring intimations of this nature in the press, there is no substantial body of informed opinion in Germany that has such a concern. The Secretary pointed out the poor state of relations existing between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, which is not conducive to reaching new agreements. It is the Soviets who have failed to ratify the Consular Convention between us, even though it has now been approved by the U.S. Senate. His impression is that the Soviets are dominated by the fear of China--by the prospect of an unfriendly nation of a billion people possessing nuclear weapons on their border. Indeed, in his judgment it is the position of China with respect to the Vietnamese war, which prevents the U.S. and Russians from bringing about an end to the war. The Secretary felt that we and the Soviets could reach an agreement to end the war without difficulty. The Secretary referred in this connection to certain evidence that both the Soviet people and the satellites are getting tired of the sacrifices they are making throughout the world, i.e., in Vietnam, the Middle East and in the under-developed world.
2. German-Soviet Relations--Brandt reported that although the official Soviet attitude toward Germany, and the Soviet press, remained harsh and critical, he had received certain suggestions in recent months that the Soviets might be seeking an improvement. He considered that certain signals had been passed to German officials in Moscow and Geneva which could be so interpreted. He has discussed this matter with Soviet Ambassador Tsarapkin in Bonn, however, there has been as yet no change in Soviet policy. He would continue his efforts, since Germany desired an improvement in relations with the Soviets.
3. German Policy Toward Eastern Europe
a. Romania--Brandt commented very favorably on his recent visit to Bucharest./2/ He had been warmly received, having had some nineteen hours of conversation with high officials including six with the Prime Minister. He had found the Romanians willing to act quite independently of the Soviets. They seemed anxious to give practical effect to their recent establishment of diplomatic relations with Germany, both in the cultural and economic fields. They proposed cooperative economic enterprises in third countries--citing Morocco as a possibility. No details as to such arrangements, however, had been worked out. In discussions with the Romanians on how to proceed with negotiations on East-West security matters, Brandt had found, however, a sharp difference in view with the Romanians. Whereas Germany preferred that any negotiations be between the Blocs, i.e. NATO and the Warsaw Pact, the Romanians preferred that they be bilateral--looking toward the removal of the Blocs. Manescu said jokingly that "they did not propose to let the Germans put the Russians in control of them again."
/2/August 4-8. For text of the communiqué issued at the conclusion of the Brandt visit, see Meissner, Die deutsche Ostpolitik, pp. 218-220.
b. Czechoslovakia--Brandt was also optimistic about the exchange of Trade Missions/3/ recently negotiated between Germany and Czechoslovakia by his personal representative, Ambassador Bahr. Although this had not been extended to official diplomatic or consular relations, the Czechs understood that the German Trade Mission would look out for the interest of Germans in Czechoslovakia generally.
/3/For text of the August 3 German statement on these discussions, see ibid., p. 217.
c. Bulgaria--According to Brandt, Germany could also have diplomatic relations with Bulgaria, if it were willing to cancel certain Bulgarian indebtedness to Germany. In response to a query by the Secretary, Brandt advised that these arose from recent commercial transactions.
d. Eastern Germany--With respect to their relations with the GDR, Brandt commented on the harsh and unyielding attitude displayed by Ulbricht to the recent proposals made by the FRG, looking to the establishment of contacts in various technical areas.
4. UK-European Security Proposal--The Secretary made reference to a recent proposal made by the UK to the effect that the Four Powers, i.e., United Kingdom, United States, France and Germany, should together consider possible moves in the field of European Security. Brandt commented that British Foreign Minister George Brown had asked him to speak to Secretary Rusk about this proposal. As far as he could see, however, the proposal was largely procedural in nature. He was not clear as to what the mechanism created would deal with. His own concept was that the Germans might first feel out the East Germans, to see what possibilities existed, after which these could be taken up by the Four Powers. The Secretary commented that it was easy for us to accept the British proposal as a procedural step, however, he too is not clear as to what they really have in mind.
5. Greece, Turkey and Canada--In discussing NATO problems, Brandt referred to a rumor that he had heard to the effect that Greece and Turkey were considering withdrawing from NATO, and associating with some regional group--in Greece's case with Tito. The Secretary pointed out that Turkey's interest lay more with Iran and Pakistan, and that this association might prove profitable in dealing with the Arabs. In the course of the ensuing discussions, skepticism was expressed by both the Secretary and Brandt that Greece and Turkey would in fact take such a step. The Secretary explained the recent apparent inconsistencies in Canadian policy, in terms of Prime Minister Pearson's having been awarded the Pulitzer Peace Prize. Ever since that award, the Canadians have been looking for opportunities to be peacemakers. Difficulties arise in negotiations involving the Canadians, since no matter what the position of the U.S., they tend to take contrary or different views in order to demonstrate their independence of us.
6. UK Entry in the Common Market--Brandt referred to the strong public opinion in Germany supporting British entry into the Common Market. If de Gaulle persisted in blocking British entry, a serious problem would arise before the end of the year in German-French relations.
7. De Gaulle--The Secretary referred to de Gaulle's recent visit to Canada and indicated our concern as to the implications of de Gaulle's unusual behavior./4/ Did this mean that de Gaulle had become senile and was losing his grip? Brandt said that his impression from recent conversations on his visit to Bonn was that he was not, and he cited several examples of de Gaulle's mental acuity and firm grasp of the situation. In his judgment we would have to put up with de Gaulle for another two to three years.
/4/De Gaulle visited Canada July 23-26. During a speech at Montreal City Hall on July 25, he repeated the rallying cry of French-Canadian separatists, "Vive Quebec libre."
8. France and NATO--Secretary Rusk referred to recent evidence that we had heard that France was considering withdrawing from NATO in 1969. He suggested to Brandt the desirability of our discussing this with our NATO allies in order to prepare them for such an eventuality, otherwise, French withdrawal might have a serious effect on the NATO. Brandt discounted the possibility of French withdrawal. He pointed out the assurances de Gaulle had given him during his recent visit to Bonn. Brandt did not react to the suggestions of concerted action. Ambassador Knappstein pointed out the desirability of not taking any action since it might encourage the French withdrawal.
9. German Reunification--The Secretary said he wanted to make it clear to Brandt that we would be glad at any time to consider or support any reasonable move looking toward German reunification. The difficulties that he had had in this respect with Schroeder during his period of Foreign Minister was only that he had insisted that the Western Four be in agreement as to how we proceed and that the Soviets accept a Western proposal to negotiate. In the absence of such prior agreement there was the danger that the U.S. would find itself alone as it did in 1961 and 1962.
10. Soviet Troop Withdrawal--The Secretary advised Brandt that we see no evidence of Soviet willingness to engage in reciprocal troop withdrawals in central Europe. This is probably because the Soviets fear criticism that they had acted against the interests of the bloc, by making it possible for the U.S. to release troops for Vietnam. In fact, however, we have ample troops in Vietnam and in any event would not use troops so released. In recent years the U.S. has taken a different attitude on the question of troop withdrawals from that which we held earlier. Initially we were concerned with the obvious disparity between U.S. withdrawals to America and Soviet withdrawals to the Soviet Union, however, changing circumstances in Eastern Europe perhaps have reduced the disparity.
11. Political Consultation Among the Six--In responding to what had been decided at the recent Summit meeting in Rome concerning political consultation among the Six, Brandt said that the agreement had been only to consider the feasibility of such discussions--not to conduct such discussions themselves. He was very skeptical about the ability to have discussions about the security threat to Europe as provided for under the Treaty of Rome.
226. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
Washington, August 15, 1967, 2 p.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Germany, Kiesinger Visit. Secret. Drafted by Puhan. The meeting was held at the White House.
SUBJECT
President Johnson and Chancellor Kiesinger
Report on Their MeetingPARTICIPANTS
Americans
President Johnson
The Secretary of State
Walt W. Rostow, Special Assistant to the President
Eugene V. Rostow, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
George C. McGhee, American Ambassador to Germany
John M. Leddy, Assistant Secretary, EUR
Robert R. Bowie, Counselor of the State Department
Adrian Fisher, Deputy Director, ACDA
Francis Bator, Deputy Special Assistant to the President
Edward Fried, Senior Member, NSC Staff
Alfred Puhan, Director, EUR/GER
Harry Obst, InterpreterGermans
Chancellor Kurt Georg Kiesinger
Foreign Minister Willy Brandt
Heinrich Knappstein, Ambassador of the Federal Republic of Germany
Karl-Guenther von Hase, State Secretary and Press Chief
Karl Theodor, Freiherr von und zu Guttenberg, Parliamentary State SecretaryDr. Horst Osterheld, Assistant Secretary, Foreign Office
Dr. Johannes Prass, Assistant Secretary, Foreign Office
Ambassador Swidbert Schnippenkoetter, Foreign Office
Dr. Ulrich Sahm, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Foreign Office
Minister Georg von Lilienfeld, German Embassy
Mr. Claus Soenksen, Personal Aide to Foreign Minister Brandt
Mr. Berndt von Staden, Counselor, German Embassy
Mr. Hartmut Schulze-Boysen, Counselor, German Embassy
Heinz Weber, InterpreterAfter expressing regrets for having kept everyone waiting so long,/2/ the President said that the Chancellor and he had had a good exchange of views. He said that they had talked about our mutual problems and touched on all the important issues which would be taken up in detail during the latter part of the visit. The President said that he had explained to the Chancellor his feeling that our common bond, our unity, our standing shoulder-to-shoulder is unchanged. The President explained that he and the Chancellor were in complete agreement that NATO must be kept sturdy to defend Germany and Europe. He said that complete understanding had been reached on this point.
/2/The President and Chancellor met privately at noon. A memorandum of conversation covering the initial meeting is in Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. XIII, Document 263.
The President said that on the non-proliferation treaty he had asked the Chancellor to review with the Secretary of State and other officials all details of that project. He said he had made it abundantly clear to the Chancellor, as he had to his predecessor, Mr. Erhard, that we would not take any decisions affecting the welfare of Germany without first having had the most candid consultations.
The President reported that on the question of the trilateral talks and troop strength, the Chancellor had told him it would not be necessary to reduce the German strength at all; in any event it would in his view not be more than a reduction of some 15,000. The President said he had made it clear we didn't think there should be any reduction. He referred to gallant efforts on our part to avoid any reductions of U.S. troop strength. He stated that if the German people felt it was essential to make reductions in the German military establishment, it would cause us a serious problem here, a problem over which he might not be able to prevail. He said the decision of the FRG on this is one that would be made for both nations. He said we hoped it would not be necessary for us to make reductions. He said we will try to avoid them.
The President said that as far as the Chancellor and he were concerned, they had the same objectives: maintain our strength, work to lessen tensions, remain loyal and true to one another, and work for a united Germany and Europe.
The President said he and the Chancellor had exchanged views on de Gaulle. He mentioned that the Chancellor and he had talked about bridge building. He said he had given him our views on Viet-Nam and the Middle East. He told him how earnestly we were working to solve that problem. He said we were living in very serious times and were anxious to meet our problems without endangering our security.
The President returned, at the conclusion of his remarks, to the possibility of cutting troop strength. He reiterated the view that we should not reduce our troops, but he pointed to the $30 billion deficit we had and his need for getting a tax bill through the Congress. He said if we did not get such a tax bill, we would face serious problems. He might have to make cuts even where he didn't want to.
Chancellor Kiesinger expressed full agreement with the President's remarks. He said his colleague, Minister of Defense Schroeder, had done great damage with the report that German troop strength would be cut by 60,000. Kiesinger said there had been no such Cabinet decision; there had been merely cuts from projections for spending. The Chancellor said he had made it clear the Germans would increase their spending. He referred to the proposal for medium-term financing, a new kind of planning for the Germans, to give them some idea where they were going. He said he had learned that some of the planning in the Ministry of Defense had been highly unrealistic. He referred in this connection to a conversation he had had with General de Maziere, who had told former Defense Minister von Hassel to come down to earth. Two weeks before Erhard's fall, von Hassel finally accepted the General's recommendation.
The Chancellor said he was personally convinced that they could maintain their present troop strength but that if the decision was to cut, it would under no circumstances be more than between 15,000 and 19,000. He repeated, no final decision had been reached. He stated a final decision would be made only after consultations with us. He also assured the President that any of the four plans recommended for the absorption of the reduced projections would not weaken the German military establishment.
The Chancellor said he wanted to use this occasion to draw the President's attention to his Government's declaration of last December to the effect that the Germans would increase their spending for aid. He said the Germans had done so. He pointed to this sector of the German budg-et in which there had been no cut. He said German aid would increase in 1968 by 26%, in 1969 by 10% and in 1970 by 6%.
The Chancellor said he had told the President that according to a public poll taken in Germany this year, to the question, "Do you think close cooperation with the United States is necessary?", the response had been 42% affirmative in January, 47% in February, 69% in May, and 71% in June.
The Chancellor said he wanted to say a word about de Gaulle. He said he had decided to provoke the General and probe his real feeling about the United States. Kiesinger said he had told the General that the Germans regarded NATO and an integrated military system as indispensable and that the Alliance had to be strengthened. He warned de Gaulle that remarks about the U.S. could damage Franco-German relations. Kiesinger said it was interesting that de Gaulle had stated publicly and even more strongly privately that French policy was not directed against the U.S.; that he wanted to preserve French friendship for the U.S.; that he wanted to preserve the Alliance until relations with the East were completely changed; and that he had no objections to the maintenance of U.S. troops in Europe. Privately de Gaulle had told Kiesinger that the presence of U.S. troops was even desirable.
The Chancellor said up to a point the Germans could win some ground from de Gaulle. The General had been much more stubborn about U.K. entry into the Common Market, but the Germans continued to show their support for the British. At the same time they had told Harold Wilson they couldn't act as a bulldozer.
The Chancellor said that he and de Gaulle agreed that they disagreed on most points. The Germans hope, according to Kiesinger, in the long run to accomplish one big task, to overcome the existing antagonism and to restore normal conditions in Europe. He said there was a natural destiny which linked France and Germany.
The Chancellor turned to German efforts in Eastern Europe. He mentioned Foreign Minister Brandt's trip to Romania and the exchanging of trade missions with the Czechs. He said he had told the Czechs that the Munich Agreement was no longer valid; that the Germans no longer wanted to base their relations with Czechoslovakia on that treaty.
The Chancellor, in summing up, referred to reports in some U.S. papers alleging that a reduction of 60,000 men in the German Army had some connection with a new German policy, some new form of cooperation with France, or some new Rapallo. He said this was "sheer nonsense, sheer nonsense". He said the Germans were determined to continue their close relations with the U.S., adapted to modern requirements. He said he knew that European security could not be assured without U.S. support. He said the Germans would do what they could to make their contribution to assuring that security.
The Chancellor asked the President to trust him and not to listen to rumor makers. He said with great emphasis: "As long as I am the Chief of the German Government, you can depend on us going along that way. . . . ; we will be honest; we will make sure of your friendship by being your friend."
The President said it was very heartening to all around the table to hear the Chancellor's remarks. He regarded this a good omen for this visit. He said what had distressed all of us were rumors and reports before decisions had been made. He said he had been very glad to have the Ambassador come to him and inform him of the facts. The President said none of us should take action without full consultations with NATO. He said he was the last to want to dismantle NATO. This is why we had to help the British and the Germans earlier to keep them from starting the unravelling process. The President said he didn't want to mislead the Chancellor. He said he did not know whether he had the strength to keep Mansfield from forcing U.S. troop reductions if the Germans made reductions in their military establishment. The American people would not be able to understand why we should maintain our troop strength in Germany if the Germans themselves felt able to cut their own troops. The President concluded he hoped and prayed that no cuts would be made.
227. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
Washington, August 15, 1967, 4:15 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL GER W-US. Secret. Drafted by Leddy and Obst and approved in S on August 24, by Secretary Fowler, and by Secretary McNamara. The meeting was held at the Blair House.
SUBJECT
NPT; Liquidity; France and NATO; Offset; Defense Plans; U.S.-FRG RelationsPARTICIPANTS
Americans
Secretary of State Rusk
Secretary of the Treasury Fowler
Secretary of Defense McNamara
Ambassador McGhee
Assistant Secretary Leddy
Mr. Harry Obst, InterpreterGermans
Chancellor Kurt Georg Kiesinger
Foreign Minister Willy Brandt
Heinrich Knappstein, Ambassador of the Federal Republic of Germany
Karl-Guenther von Hase, State Secretary and Press Chief
Karl Theodor, Freiherr von und zu Guttenberg, Parliamentary State Secretary
Dr. Horst Osterheld, Assistant Secretary
Dr. Johannes Prass, Assistant Secretary
Ambassador Swidbert Schnippenkoetter, Foreign Office
Dr. Ulrich Sahm, Deputy Assistant Secretary
Minister Georg von Lilienfeld, German Embassy
Mr. Claus Soenksen, Personal Aide to Foreign Minister Brandt
Mr. Berndt von Staden, Counselor, German Embassy
Mr. Hartmut Schulze-Boysen, Counselor, German Embassy
Heinz Weber, InterpreterChancellor Kiesinger thanked the United States participants for coming and making their time available to this meeting. Responding to Secretary Rusk's inquiry, he said that in his meeting with the President they did not get into details on any subject. They had had a general tour d'horizon. Perhaps they would discuss details tomorrow. He had learned some interesting things. He had reported to the President on his talks with General de Gaulle in July. They then talked about East-West problems and European problems. On the nonproliferation treaty they just mentioned the subject without any detailed discussion. Foreign Minister Brandt added that he and Secretary Rusk in their discussions had covered the NPT problem.
Secretary Rusk said that in his talks about the nonproliferation treaty with Gromyko he had expressed the opinion that a number of countries would feel that "forever" was a long time and that the duration of the treaty would no doubt be raised. Gromyko had not indicated that a duration clause would be entirely unacceptable, but the Secretary thought the shorter the duration period, the more difficult it would be with the Soviets. We should now see how things develop in Geneva. After all, tabling the draft treaty is not the end of the process, but really the beginning. One hundred countries will have their own views. In his last talks with Gromyko the Secretary had found him not so much concerned with the FRG as with India. He added that we still have no final word from the Soviets as to whether they would be prepared to table the draft treaty or on what day. Perhaps it would be the end of this week or next week. The Secretary then asked Secretary Fowler to present the United States views on the liquidity problem.
Secretary Fowler said that, as he had discussed with Foreign Minister Brandt, the United States and the Federal Republic were together embarked on an ambitious but necessary venture in the financial field--to create within the IMF new arrangements to add liquidity to the world monetary system, which would be needed when the United States deficits came to an end and annual additions of gold to the world monetary system were found to be inadequate. Neither national currencies nor gold could in the future be a reliable source for accretions to liquidity. If this joint venture ends in failure, it could usher in a period of restrictionist practices by Central Banks, the adoption of beggar-thy-neighbor policies and the posing of a constant threat of financial crises such as we had had in the 30's. Dr. Otmar Emminger, Director of the German Bundesbank, had been the leader of a remarkable group of monetary technicians who after a period of two years of intensive work had completed the outline of a plan for establishing a new system to create additional liquidity which will be considered at the September meeting of the IMF in Rio de Janeiro. During the past spring and summer the momentum behind this work had been retarded by the unwillingness of the French to agree to the general framework for a new plan which all of the other major countries want to establish. At the meeting of Financial Ministers in London on July 17, at which Minister Schiller and Dr. Emminger represented Germany, agreement was very nearly reached on the two issues of: (1) voting and (2) providing for the new liquidity in a form which would make it acceptable as reserves to the Central Banks. In fact, with a little give and take, agreement would have been reached at the July 17 meeting if it had not been for the French. The French Finance Minister, M. Debre, who Secretary Fowler thought was personally inclined to go along, simply did not have the authority. Now there will be another meeting in London on August 26 to resolve these two issues but the French problem remained. The others were anxious to go ahead. He knew there was some reluctance on the part of the FRG to leave the French, but in his view if all the rest were determined to go ahead this would be the best way to bring the French along.
Secretary Rusk asked if Mr. Fowler had heard from M. Debre since their July 17 meeting in London.
Secretary Fowler replied he had not. M. Debre thought it would be in the interest of the world to get this matter resolved but he had no authority to do anything about it. He emphasized that the United States could agree to the compromise on the nature of the new reserve asset worked out by the Italians and the Germans but that the French wanted it all their own way. The United States had gone at least 60 per cent of the distance to meet European views.
Chancellor Kiesinger said he was not an expert on this matter but knew that President Johnson was anxious for a solution. He had had the impression from Minister Schiller's reports that good progress was being made on the matter.
Secretary Fowler replied the good progress was among the other participants with France remaining aside. Now the problem was to close the gap between the others and France. The United States had gone as far as it could down the road of concessions. Either of the two compromise proposals made by Italy and by Emminger/Schiller could be acceptable to the United States. But if further concessions were made only a meaningless gesture would result. The United States had gone very far to give General de Gaulle and Debre a political "out".
Chancellor Kiesinger said he believed progress had been made at the Munich Conference of the OEEC Ministers.
Minister Brandt suggested the matter be further explored through other contacts between the two governments before their departure on Saturday.
Secretary Rusk inquired if the IMF and the proposed plan provided for individual vetoes.
Secretary Fowler replied this was not the case. However, adoption of the 85 per cent voting qualification would provide the EEC countries, acting together, the possibility of a veto.
Chancellor Kiesinger said he believed de Gaulle had taken a softer stand on this matter during their second meeting. His government could prepare the climate perhaps by talking to Debre before the London meeting. He would discuss the matter with Minister Schiller upon his return to Germany and see what could be done.
Secretary Fowler added the technicians had exhausted their possibilities. The matter now called for a political decision.
Secretary Rusk then asked the Chancellor's opinion on rumors that de Gaulle might withdraw from the Atlantic Alliance, i.e. the North Atlantic Treaty. His reference to "blocs" in his last press conference may have pointed in that direction. He was interested in two questions:
a) Was it likely that he would withdraw?
b) If he did, how could the others best prepare for it?
Preparation would soften the shock the news would bring to many. Nobody, for example, would be very shocked to learn today that de Gaulle may want to withdraw from SEATO. But if the news of a French withdrawal from the North Atlantic Treaty came at an inopportune time, and without preparation, it could have serious effects on the Alliance.
Chancellor Kiesinger replied he concluded from de Gaulle's statement during their meeting in July that he wanted to preserve the Western Alliance at least until such time as the relationship with the East had "completely changed", that he did not intend to pull out of the NAT in 1969, as it was not conceivable that a "complete change" could come about so soon. He would try, however, to find out more on the matter in future talks.
Secretary Rusk asked if the Chancellor thought it was all right then to proceed on the assumption that the French would remain? Maybe by raising the issue he would only be putting ideas in de Gaulle's head.
Chancellor Kiesinger assured the Secretary nobody could put ideas in de Gaulle's head. He, for his part, felt satisfied that the phrasing "complete change" pointed to France remaining after 1969.
Secretary Rusk inquired if the FRG had started to think about the June 1968 expiration of the trilateral agreement and if the Chancellor though it might be a good idea to have an arrangement of a more extended nature rather than the previous one-year agreement. Would he prefer to start bilateral talks first or would he like to go into trilateral talks again?
Chancellor Kiesinger replied the British Ambassador had taken up this subject with him about two weeks ago. He had spoken of a medium or long-term arrangement. He (Kiesinger) could not make a full statement on this at this time. He was happy this matter was not on the agenda during this visit (said jokingly).
Minister Brandt added that before leaving for the United States yesterday he had asked that one man from each side explore the possibility of a suggested (by the British) 5-year agreement. He thought it advisable to have bilateral discussions first. Also, the last trilateral approach had been criticized by other NATO partners.
Messrs. McNamara, Fowler, McGhee and Leddy seconded the idea of bilateral talks to be held first and cited other reasons for it.
Secretary Rusk asked the Chancellor how he saw the timing of future German decisions to implement recent adjustments in military budget in relationship to the December defense review to be conducted in NATO?
Chancellor Kiesinger answered that a NATO questionnaire on this matter had to be filled out by October 6. They couldn't answer all the questions by that time but he felt certain that a clear picture could be presented by December.
Secretary McNamara suggested the Chancellor might want to explore a method similar to the United States rotational plan, namely, to offset cuts in his active forces by strengthening his reserves, which now were rather weak. In any adjustment it was important to not give the Soviets the impression that it would result in a weakening of the Allied strength, and it must, indeed, not be weakened in fighting power.
He was anxious to meet with Minister Schroeder to discuss this matter. He was at the Chancellor's disposal to answer any questions he might have.
Chancellor Kiesinger replied he basically agreed with McNamara's comment on the reserves and on maintaining fighting power. As a first-line power near the border the FRG was eager to have as strong a deterrent as possible. Some people were worried that in an emergency rotational forces could not be redeployed quickly enough. This matter should be reviewed again in more detail.
Minister Brandt added that some understanding would have to be found in SACEUR about the counting of reserves as a NATO contribution. SACEUR considers "forces in being" as the only acceptable contribution, but this was before the introduction of the new concept of political warning time which resulted from the trilateral talks. But even if there were only 3 to 6 days of warning, Germany could mobilize its reserves. The political-warning theory, which the Germans had been more reluctant to embrace than others (laughter) would have to be reviewed again also.
Secretary McNamara agreed with the German Foreign Minister. He said the opinions of the United States, the FRG and SACEUR on warning time should be compared in a study.
Secretary Rusk added that if the Soviets were to make proportionate troop redeployments, this would help in giving the West additional warning time.
Secretary McNamara said an inspection system also would result in additional warning time.
He was aware also of the FRG's strong interest in sharing more fully in nuclear planning, in knowing more about the nuclear hardware on their soil, and in having a voice in the decision of triggering or not triggering an atomic strike. The United States was anxious to cooperate on these matters and would provide any and all information. The NPG had been created for this purpose, but if desired, bilateral talks could be held first.
Secretary Rusk suggested the Chancellor might want to visit Omaha at some time. Secretary McNamara offered to take him there personally.
The Chancellor said that might be a good idea but did not commit himself one way or the other.
Secretary Rusk added the Chancellor might find Omaha quite appalling. It was another world that he hoped would never be heard from in the future. Nevertheless, it would be quite interesting to come to know it in the context of the common alliance.
Chancellor Kiesinger said the important thing in American-German and in Atlantic relations was to create a climate of trust. The people wanted to know where they stood. It would be very beneficial if some of the groundless rumors could be kept out of the papers. The news media were spreading the impression that NATO was slowly but surely disintegrating. Many people were influenced by this in their judgments and willingness to support the alliance.
Secretary Rusk pointed to the need for NATO to take a greater interest and play a greater role in areas of the world beyond the immediate borders of the defensive alliance. He cited the Middle East as an example.
Chancellor Kiesinger interjected this was bringing up the question whether NATO should be a political institution or just a defensive military organization.
Secretary Rusk said he had been surprised to learn during a visit to SACLANT headquarters last year that the people there drew a line at a certain parallel as limiting their field of naval planning. They were not interested in anything below a certain latitude. He could not conceive how the area south of that line in the Atlantic could not be of interest to the security of the Atlantic Ocean. Similarly he could not see how one could really cope with the problem of European security without considering the Middle East, for example.
Chancellor Kiesinger said NATO should at least study those matters and have a position on them.
Secretary Rusk thanked the Chancellor for the generous amount of time he had allotted for this discussion.
The meeting then broke up at 5:27 p.m.
228. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
Washington, August 16, 1967, 11 a.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Germany, Kiesinger Visit. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Obst. The meeting was held in the White House.
TITLE
President Johnson's Meeting with Chancellor Kiesinger on August 16, 1967PARTICIPANTS
Foreign
Kurt Kiesinger, Chancellor, Federal Republic of Germany
Mr. Heinz Weber, InterpreterUnited States
The President
Mr. Harry Obst, InterpreterAfter an exchange of pleasantries the talk turned to the question of possible troop reductions:
The President expressed his disenchantment with an article in the Washington Post of the same morning./2/ He said it was important to make this matter clear to the Press so that there would be no further distortions. He suggested the Chancellor may want to quote to the Press directly from his minutes of their meeting on the previous day./3/ The Chancellor might want to say:
/2/"LBJ Is Cool to Cut in German Troops," by Chalmers Roberts.
/3/See footnote 2, Document 226.
No decision had been made;
In his judgment a cutback was not now necessary;
A decision on such a matter would only be taken after discussing the matter with his cabinet, the United States and NATO.
He did not think it would even be good to talk about any figures on maximum cutbacks, like 15,000 or 19,000.
The Chancellor said he had even gone beyond that. He had stated that even the MOD and his generals were convinced that any needed cut would not have to exceed 15,000 or so.
The President replied it was not good to quote any specific figures. If the Chancellor would quote 15,000, for example, it was almost certain to be expected that other countries would take that figure as a basis for proportionate cuts. The British might say, they would then have to cut back 5,000, the Belgians 3,500, the US 35,000 etc.
The Chancellor stated he did not want to go back to Germany and have to say: President Johnson was adamant on this point, and he had to give in.
He would say that he personally was not convinced of the need of any cuts at this time. However, should that need arise the cuts would not be substantial.
The President said it was better to say "no substantial cuts" than to quote any figures. He did not want to use this as an excuse, but his experts had advised him that Congress may not be willing to allocate the money for the support of US troops in Europe if the FRG made any cuts. Such news would be ill-received on the Hill.
The Chancellor said he would stick to the language of "no substantial cuts".
The President inquired if an upgrading of the reserves may be a solution to the problem.
The Chancellor pointed to some of the difficulties this would raise. There was a shortage of non-commissioned officers and officers. Relations between the three levels of the service (officers, non-coms, enlisted) were "not sound". In a crisis non-commissioned officers may have to be supplemented by enlisted men functioning as NCOs. Rotation of reserves may aggravate that situation. Reserves also would have to be provided with periodic training exercises. There might be some merit to the reserve proposal, however, and he would have it examined.
The President suggested a sentence in the joint statement on their meeting dealing with Franco-German cooperation might be formulated differently.
The Chancellor, in agreeing to the change, spoke again of his intention to play a "harmonizing role" in US-French relations.
The President encouraged the Chancellor to be a bridge-builder between the two countries. The Chancellor may want to show de Gaulle notes of the transcript of their Washington meetings. The Chancellor was welcome to relay to de Gaulle the comments of the President on de Gaulle as stated in these meetings. He was anxious to avoid all quarreling among friends and allies. He was convinced, as he had stated before, that in times of real danger de Gaulle would be on our side.
The President then encouraged the Chancellor to take a little walk through the grounds. On the way out he showed him the folder with the "hot-line" transcripts/4/ and pointed to one message in particular which the Chancellor read with interest.
/4/The notebook of Hotline messages is in the Johnson Library, National Security File, Head of State Correspondence, USSR, Washington-Moscow "Hot Line" Exchange.
The President and the Chancellor then talked privately without interpreters in the Rose Garden and while walking. (At one point Mr. Walt W. Rostow was called by the President and joined them for about ten minutes.)
229. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State/1/
Bonn, September 9, 1967, 1303Z.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL GER W-US. Confidential. Repeated to London, Paris, Berlin, Moscow, EUCOM for General Burchinal, USAREUR for General Polk, USAFE for General Preston, and USCOB for General Fergusson.
2654. Subject: The current calm in US-German relations.
1. Contrasted with the situation six months ago, German-American relations are presently characterized by a pervading calm--an absence of controversial issues. Offset and related troop rotation problems have, at least pending the German decision on reduction of forces, been resolved. The NPT--while still not a happy prospect for the FRG--has been recast to meet the most acute FRG objections and there are now others who are willing to take the lead in seeking further gains. The emotional resentment against us is substantially reduced. The Kennedy Round and the international liquidity problem have both been settled to our mutual satisfaction. There is no acute concern over US investment--a recent large US purchase of a German firm went unnoticed. The FRG appears satisfied that consultation between us is adequate. The initial delay in a meeting between the President and Chancellor was in itself a source of instability. One could now say that, with the completion of their recent highly successful meeting, a new period in German-American relations--one long in the making--began.
2. The principal characteristic of the present period is a clearer separation--but not necessarily divergence--of German policy from our own. The Federal Govt knows that the FRG remains dependent on the US for defense. There is, however, no present military pressure from the East, and the Germans are therefore in a position to concentrate more of their attention on problems where the US role is less important. For the German Govt and people, the overriding present concern is their economic recession and budgetary squeeze, a field outside the direct influence of the US. During the period of their postwar recovery the Germans made massive contributions to every sort of international endeavor and charity--in order to gain acceptance by the community of nations. Now, deeply alarmed by their first real post-war economic turndown, they are looking out for themselves.
3. In second place among their concerns stands the German problem--or more precisely stated, the development of a more hopeful relationship with the Communist countries and with East Germany. The critical importance of the US in an eventual European settlement is accepted by the Germans, and they wish to work with us toward this goal. In their present efforts in Eastern Europe, however, they appear to have concluded that too close an association with the US can be more of a handicap than a help. They look to the French--their closest European associate--as being a more natural and effective partner in this particular enterprise.
4. The problem of Western security, particularly the German contribution thereto, probably ranks third in the list of current German concerns; and here the position of the US remains of paramount importance. It is indicative that our closest bilateral consultation is presently in this area.
5. It has no doubt been the Chancellor's objective to remove some of the emotion from German relations--both with France and the US. He has succeeded, in part at least, by insisting that German policy be friendly toward, but independent of, both. He does not hesitate to disassociate himself from French NATO policy--and US Viet Nam policy. As the Chancellor told the Press Club,/2/ the German Govt will no longer look to the US to solve all of its problems. Indeed, it has come to realize that we cannot in all cases do so, even if we wanted to. The result, I believe, will be less closeness in our relations but also, in the long run, less potential tension and recriminations.
/2/August 16. For extracts of the significant portions, see Meissner, Die deutsche Ostpolitik, pp. 225-227.
6. There are, nonetheless, possible areas of difficulty in the future. I would list the main ones as follows:
A. A new European order--We have in the past encouraged the FRG to seek better relations with the Soviets and Eastern Europe, and a more fruitful contact with East Germany. In doing so, we have defined no limits as to how far we think they could safely go without endangering Western security. We showed signs of unease when Kiesinger hinted that a reunited Germany might be neutral--and when Brandt suggested that NATO might disappear. But we have not--I think wisely--tried to say now what would or would not be acceptable to the US in the way of a European settlement. For their part the German leaders do not appear to have thought very clearly of the limits they would set for themselves. On the other hand, they show almost an eagerness for contacts--to wit, Brandt's recent discussion with Soviet Amb Tsarapkin (Bonn 2555)/3/--and Kiesinger's exchange of letters with East German Chairman Stoph. Should the East show some readiness for movement and the Germans respond, I believe misunderstanding might arise between us as to how far the FRG can and should go without doing harm to the interests of the US and of NATO. This is something we must discuss with the Germans.
/3/Dated September 7. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 38-6)
B. Security--The planned rotation of some 35,000 US troops has caused no serious disquiet in Germany. A more extensive reduction in the US presence would still bring with it, however, a strain in our relations and a further decrease in US influence in Germany. On the German side, some troop reduction seems inevitable, although not more than 19,000 troops for the present, and this probably over three years. Even, this, however, can cause strain on our side--and release presures for further US rotations or withdrawals. We must work closely with the Germans to minimize both their reduction and its impact in the US. The development of an American ABM system could also cause severe problems in our relations, probably more intense than with other less exposed European countries--although the difference would be only one of degree. A potential danger also lies in the possibility of our not reaching the same conclusions with respect to the carrying into the production phase our joint V/STOL and main battle tank development projects.
C. The US-Soviet relationship--During the recent past, the main problem for them which the Germans have viewed as resulting from US-Soviet relations has been the NPT. As indicated earlier, this issue has now largely been relieved of its emotional content. This same reaction can occur again, however, if we are able to reach further agreements with the USSR affecting Germany or Europe--without some progress, or visible effort on our part to achieve progress, on the German question. We should, therefore, clearly indicate to the Germans our willingness to consider any reasonable step they can propose which might result in some movement of the German question.
D. American investment--Further concentration of US investment in German industry, particularly in petroleum, will entail problems which could eventually reach serious proportions. We must consult closely with our companies on this possibility, pointing out the likely consequences of their actions.
7. Conclusion. It seems to me that we should also take advantage of the present absence of divisive issues in our relations with Germans in the following general ways:
A. We should seek to expand the constructive initiatives which have been taken to enlarge cooperation in mutually beneficial projects between our countries. For example, exchanges in the social environmental field initiated by Secretary Udall's visit--and more recently in transportation--should be pursued. Cooperation in research and co-production in advanced fields such as space technology should be expanded.
B. Consultation at all levels should be frequent and comprehensive, concentrating in particular on the fields of most likely future difficulties--in an effort to avoid troubles before they arise. Direct exchanges between the President and Chancellor, with emphasis on the broad world outlook, should be encouraged.
McGhee
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