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FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1964-1968 Volume XV Germany and Berlin DEPARTMENT OF STATE Washington, DC

240. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Germany/1/

Washington, December 2, 1967, 0020Z.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 28 GER B. Confidential. Drafted by Hirschfeld; cleared in GER, FBX, and L; and approved by Stoessel. Repeated to Berlin, London, Paris, Moscow, and USNATO.

78192. NATUS. Ref: Bonn's 5716./2/ Subj: Dealing with French Obstructionism on Berlin and All-German Matters.

/2/Telegram 5716, November 29, made recommendations for dealing with possible French obstructionism. (Ibid.)

1. Department agrees with your assessment of French obstructionsim on Berlin and All-German matters. We also agree that we may have to move independently on important cases when we meet French intransigence, to the extent of acquainting FRG Foreign Office with our view. We think that from past experience in such cases we have, at least, demonstrated to the Germans where the obstacle lies.

2. We have some reservations, however, in agreeing with you that this be done by a general review with Duckwitz. There seems to us to be some danger that we might give FRG impression we are seeking to cause difficulties between Bonn and Paris or forcing Germany to choose between friendship with France and friendship with the United States, a danger which you pointed out in your A-553./3/ There would be little likelihood of creating such an impression if we support Germans on specific cases, on an ad hoc basis, in which they are interested and involved.

/3/Airgram A-553, September 3, reported on the high priority Germany gave its relations with France. (Ibid., POL FR-GER W)

3. Finally, we think it would be useful for you to review this matter with UK Ambassador, and would of course, be glad to hear your further views.

Rusk

 

241. Telegram From Secretary of State Rusk to the Department of State/1/

Brussels, December 13, 1967, 1630Z.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, NATO 3 BEL (BR). Confidential; Immediate. Repeated to Bonn, London, Paris, Moscow, and Berlin.

1020. Secto 024. NATUS. Subject: NATO Ministerial Meeting: Quadripartite dinner.

1. Brandt opened meeting by suggesting discussion of Soviet note to the Four,/2/ and of the "inner" German situation (FRG-GDR relations). On the Soviet note Brandt said he was not alarmed since the Soviets often operate at two levels. Thus when they fear attack from inside their own camp they build up a smoke-screen. He believed the note was connected with Gromyko's recent visit to Warsaw and GDR Foreign Minister Winzer's visit to Belgrade, Soviets wanted to remove suspicion of Allies as to what was involved in Brandt/Tsarapkin talks. The note was also probably intended to influence attitude within the FRG.

/2/Dated December 8; for text, see Documents on Germany, 1944-1985, pp. 972-977.

2. For his part, Brandt believed talks with Soviets should continue without publicity to see what they mean. Soviet note should not be left unanswered. The FRG will give Soviets a short reply rejecting allegation against his government, but will also pick up last part where the Soviets seem to offer openings for further talks. Brandt believed Soviet allegations should also be rejected as soon as possible by British, US and French. He said replies need not be identical.

3. The Secretary referred to press reports concerning heavy Soviet pressure to avoid reestablishment of Yugoslav/FRG relations. He said we were prepared to reply briefly and offered to provide a draft for consideration. Foreign Minister Brown had no comment, but Mulley on British side agreed answer was called for. He wondered why Soviets sent note; he suggested usual coordination in Bonn would be best. Couve said he had not studied the Soviet communication nor had he discussed it. He did not know whether answer should be made or not. He agreed matter could be discussed in Bonn. Replies did not have to be identical since it is more difficult to get agreed text and we could spend weeks and weeks on that task. Secretary thought notes of Three Powers should be as close to identical as possible and prepared as promptly as possible. It was finally agreed question of sending response to Soviet statement would be coordinated in Ambassadorial Group in Bonn.

4. Brandt mentioned recent conference of FRG Chiefs of Mission from Eastern Europe. He said FRG was making some progress in the trade and cultural fields and some even in the political field. The next step is to resume relations with Yugoslavia. He pointed to the coincidence of Soviet statements attacking the FRG and the establishment of relations with Romania earlier this year, the agreement on trade missions in Prague in the summer, and now when the Soviets know Yugoslavia may be next. He said that up to now Kiesinger had had problems with the CDU on Yugoslavia, but now there will be no objection to negotiations. As a matter of fact, most of the problems have already been discussed informally.

5. Brandt said Tsarapkin had originally insisted on renunciation of force agreement between FRG and GDR as condition for progress in talks. Situation had changed at November 21 meeting. Tsarapkin now foresees bilateral between FRG and USSR which would be open to other socialist states, including the GDR, on basis of equality of treatment. Tsarapkin had also queried Brandt on Kiesinger statement that talks would not lead to much. Brandt reminded Tsarapkin that Chancellor Kiesin-ger's second letter to Stoph had not been answered. In the letter, Kiesin-ger had offered renunciation of force to East Germans. Brandt agreed the conditions for each party to these agreements should be equal but that the circumstances of each might differ. According to Brandt, Tsarapkin confirmed that it was not necessary for the FRG to recognize the GDR. In discussing framework of an agreement, the Soviets threw in every demand they have had against the FRG except issue of FRG membership in NATO. Tsarapkin was specifically interested in assurances on inviolability of frontiers (FRG-GDR), Oder-Neisse Line, Munich agreement, non-interference by the FRG in West Berlin, renunciation of nuclears and suppression of Nazism.

6. Tsarapkin said: (A) The Potsdam Agreement is the basis for relations of the USSR and Germany and the Three Powers; (B) Articles 53 and 57 of the UN Charter are still valid; (C) Referred to the WEU of 1954 and the Settlement Convention./3/

/3/For text, see ibid., pp. 430-431.

7. Brandt said the FRG had not thoroughly studied the implications of the Soviet approach. Meanwhile Duckwitz will feel out Soviet intentions shortly with Tsarapkin. Brandt had impression that Soviets are now interested in a bilateral declaration. Once agreement is reached thereon it would be open to the other socialist states on an equal basis. The FRG and Soviets are still far apart but Brandt saw renunciation of force as formula for bilateral exchange of views which would lead to reduction of tensions.

8. Brandt stressed that to be successful, discussions with Tsarapkin must be held quietly but if there were new developments or information the Three Powers would be informed through their Bonn Ambassadors. Such information should be closely held.

9. Secretary asked whether anything was said by Soviets about special status of Berlin. Brandt replied question was not discussed but only mentioned. Secretary asked for Brandt's reactions to points required by Tsarapkin for a renunciation of force agreement. Brandt was of the opinion that renunciation of force was a heading, under which many issues would be considered.

10. There ensued an exchange between Brown, Brandt and Couve as to the meaning of a renunciation of force agreement, the main thrust of which, as summarized by Brown, was that the FRG was being asked for a lot for the privilege of renouncing force.

11. Brandt, in response to the Secretary's question, confirmed that in his opinion the Soviets did not expect the FRG to leave NATO. After reviewing with Brandt the origin of the Brandt/Tsarapkin talks the Secretary expressed his concern that FRG efforts might lead to further Berlin problems. He recalled that if we had gone all the way on accepting existing frontiers, etc. in 1958-62 we might not have had a Berlin crisis. The Secretary was especially concerned lest anything happen that would cause another crisis in Berlin. He said we certainly cannot say no to these talks but we should know where we are going. He recalled that when the question of reopening the reunification question arose two or three years ago the FRG was unwilling to talk about the somewhat unpleasant things that go with it. He wanted to be sure that the Four would be there together if trouble occurred. It was inevitable that unpleasant issues would arise. It was possible the Soviets wanted to improve relations but the case to date is not persuasive. On the other hand they may be returning to the issue of Berlin and insist on changes in the status of the city. To Brandt's query as to whether he had any evidence of such an oncoming crisis, the Secretary replied in the negative.

12. The Secretary said that if the frontiers of the GDR were frozen and renunciation of force agreement was signed, reunification might be considered finished. In reply, Brandt sought to reassure the Secretary that little new was being done, indicating FRG had already undertaken not to use force, and that he would not sacrifice the interests of Berlin.

13. Couve felt that except for (1) boundary between East and West Germany; (2) Oder-Neisse Line; (3) Berlin's special status and (4) nuclear weapons the Three Powers had no concerns. The boundary and Oder-Neisse questions were not important and the nuclear issue is not relevant for the Three Powers. He was skeptical on outcome of the negotiations but believed them to be a good thing even if they led to nothing concrete.

14. Brandt gave assurances on protecting Allied prerogatives, pointing to FRG refusal to negotiate with the Soviets for Aeroflot use of the Berlin corridors.

15. Brown wondered whether you can protect the Berlin situation if you comply with Soviet demands. Brandt replied that he was not speaking of what the FRG would do but what the Soviets would want. The question is, would the Allies trust him to do what they had already done. He was not asking for permission but informing them and asking for their confidence.

16. The Secretary said there was no problem of giving our confidence but a problem of transferring to the FRG in the dark the rights of the US. We must stay very close when Allied rights are involved. He found the Soviet approach of the FRG somewhat objectionable. Should not the FRG consider some points on its side which should be involved in a renunciation of force agreement? If the Soviets really take seriously a renunciation of force, Soviet forces could go home and there could be a normal movement of people.

17. Brown wondered whether a mutual renunciation of force agreement could not be widened out in such a way as to help with the British BAOR offset problem. Brandt said the mutual withdrawal of troops was another problem and a time may come to take it up in the future. He considered his renunciation of force agreement similar to Brown's friendship treaty. Brown said that the friendship treaty and other proposed arrangements were dead and he wondered why the Soviets were switching their attentions to the FRG. Brown said the Soviets were picking a fight on every front. He referred to difficulties with them over the Brooke case,/4/ and mentioned particularly fact that KGB had increased its activity in the UK.

/4/Reference is to the 1965 sentencing of British citizen Gerald Brooke to 5 years in prison for "anti-Soviet activities." Wilson brought up the issue without a successful resolution during his January 22-24 visit to the Soviet Union.

18. At the end of the pre-dinner session, it was generally agreed that the FRG would go ahead with talks with the Soviets, but would proceed carefully and keep the Three Powers informed when their interests were involved.

19. Governing Mayor Schuetz joined the Foreign Ministers at dinner and made a report on the situation in Berlin. He said things were not so bad as some people thought. The student situation was better and he had been talking to West German businessmen, British businessmen and French businessmen to get them interested in the city. He would also be talking to American businessmen. He saw no signs of an oncoming crisis of any kind in the city. He was pessimistic on passes for this year but hopeful for 1968.

20. At the conclusion of the meeting the decision was made to issue no statement or declaration. Agreement was, however, reached on a common statement to be used for press background briefing, which being repeated separately.

Rusk

 

242. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State/1/

Bonn, December 20, 1967, 1230Z.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL GER W-US. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to Berlin, Geneva, USNATO, USUN, Paris, London, Brussels, Rome, and Moscow.

6447. NATUS/BUSEC/DISTO. Subj: Meeting with Kiesinger--NPT. I called on Chancellor Kiesinger yesterday evening for a final tour d'horizon prior to my departure later in the week for Washington. Several subjects were discussed./2/ The following concerns NPT.

/2/McGhee reported on the other portions of his conversation with Kiesinger in telegram 6496 from Bonn, December 20. (Ibid.)

1. The Chancellor said that he greatly appreciated the President's "friendly" letter of Dec. 11,/3/ in response to his own letter of Dec. 8,/4/ and the assurance that the President had given him regarding the NPT. He was concerned, however, about one sentence to the effect that the NPT must not hamper the free flow of nuclear materials "between nations who enter into the treaty and carry out its obligations in good faith." Since it was a fundamental German aim to preserve the European Community through EURATOM, he hoped that this did not mean that France would, as a non-signatory, be excluded. I told the Chancellor that I was confident that the President's statement had not been intended to exclude France, which as a nuclear power would have a special position under the treaty. I pointed out, however, that the Swedish draft and, indeed, an earlier German draft, had language which would have excluded even the nuclear powers from nuclear imports--if they did not submit to IAEA inspection. We would not desire to interrupt supplies to France under our present EURATOM arrangements. We would, however, not be willing to revert to a purely bilateral arrangement with France.

/3/For text, see Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. XI, Document 222.

/4/Not printed. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Special Head of States Correspondence, Germany)

2. The Chancellor expressed another concern about NPT. He quoted from a statement that Amb Foster had made in Geneva on Dec. 15 to the effect that the best way to overcome the present impasse on Article III was perhaps to negotiate with the Soviets in the same way that we had successfully negotiated Articles I and II./5/ The Chancellor reminded me that the principal German concern over the NPT in the early days derived from the fact that we had negotiated Articles I and II before consulting Germany and our other Allies. He hoped that this was not what Foster had in mind. I stated that I felt sure it was not. I quoted from the results of Foster's last meeting with Roshchin on Dec. 15, in which he had expressed to Roshchin the firm view that Article III could be based on nothing less than the US draft of Nov. 2--which the Chancellor knew had been supported by our Allies in the NAC meeting of Dec. 6. It was my understanding that, in comparing Article III with Articles I and II, Foster merely argued that, in Article III, we should deal with "the heart of the matter" and "avoid politically unacceptable labels" (such as IAEA safeguards), and had no intention to imply that we should not continue close consulations with our Allies.

/5/For text of the U.S. proposal, see Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. XI, Document 216.

3. The Chancellor, who apparently had heard of our adverse reaction to the German aide-memoire of Nov. 20,/6/ said that he wanted to be very clear that the Germans would not make proposals with respect to the NPT for purely tactical reasons. It was far too serious a matter. He seemed to be admitting that this had been done in the past and apologizing for it. The German NPT proposals had, through the intervention of technicians, often been uncoordinated and misleading. In response to my query, he confirmed that he considered that his own letter to the President of Dec. 8 superseded the aide-memoire. Germany was now concerned only with the issues of (A) verification, (B) preservation of the European nuclear community, (C) duration and (D) security from nuclear blackmail. I advised the Chancellor of the additional results of the Foster and Roshchin meeting Dec. 15 on the question of safeguards, duration and security issues.

/6/Not found.

McGhee

 

243. Letter From the First Secretary of Embassy in Germany (Imhof) to the Director of the Office of German Affairs (Puhan)/1/

Bonn, January 10, 1968.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL GER W-US. Secret; Nodis.

Dear Al:

I am giving you below a brief account of the conversations which Professor Henry Kissinger had here during a brief stay. Henry asked me to send a copy to Ben Read with whom he will discuss the matter further and requested that this account be closely held.

Henry was here on January 9 and left at noon on January 10. He said that during this period he saw, at his request, Finance Minister Strauss, All-German Affairs Minister Wehner, Parliamentary State Secretary Guttenberg, and, at their request, Chancellor Kiesinger and Defense Minister Schroeder. Chancellor Kiesinger left the Cabinet meeting on January 10 for 3/4 of an hour in order to see Henry. Guttenberg, whom Henry had seen earlier separately, was present during the meeting with Chancellor Kiesinger.

The NPT.

Mr. Kissinger said that both Strauss and Guttenberg remained adamantly opposed to an NPT in any form. Strauss said that he had once written to the Chancellor that he would resign from the Cabinet if an NPT was signed and that he continued to adhere to this position. If it came to that, there would then be the beginnings of a conservative party. Strauss observed that the opponents of the NPT and conservative elements in general were simply waiting for the moment when a nationally known figure would take the lead.

Barring such a development, Strauss said that he would adhere to his tactics of remaining silent on issues outside of his direct field of responsibility. He said he was frequently being chided by his adherents for maintaining silence but he was convinced that these tactics were sound. He observed that given Chancellor Kiesinger's age and temperament the question of succession would eventually arise. It was clear that Strauss believed that by remaining silent his chances to become Kiesinger's eventual successor would improve.

Mr. Kissinger said that Chancellor Kiesinger was more cautious on the NPT. He stressed that German views must be taken fully into account and that he would have to see the full text of the treaty before he could reach a final decision. Mr. Kissinger reported his impression during his talks in Moscow that the Soviets appeared interested in signing an NPT and were hinting at the possibility of a compromise. Since he had not been there in any official capacity it was difficult to evaluate the significance of these hints. Chancellor Kiesinger appeared to be somewhat concerned by this and emphasized again the need for German views to be taken fully into account.

Mr. Kissinger said that Wehner was the only minister with whom he had talked who had been positive with regard to the NPT.

Europe.

Strauss made it clear that the FRG would not undertake any cooperation with the UK and the other five that would antagonize the French. He said this was also the Chancellor's position. Chancellor Kiesinger later confirmed this.

Both the Chancellor and Strauss said that in the next round of discussions with de Gaulle in February an attempt would be made to explore whether progress on greater European political unity could be made, presumably along the lines of the Fouchet plan. Strauss will accompany the Chancellor on this trip.

Schroeder, on the other hand, continued to be in favor of a tough line toward the French and cooperation between the FRG, the UK and the other five.

The Offset.

Strauss said that "not a cent" could come from the budget. On the other hand, it would be possible to make arrangements through the Bundesbank for the purchase of about 1 billion worth of medium, preferably short term, but under no circumstances long term bonds. Mr. Kissinger was not sure whether Strauss, when mentioning the 1 billion figure, was talking in terms of dollars or DM, but he believed it was the latter.

Schroeder said that regrettably no funds could come out of the defense budget. The situation had been easier when the FRG was still making massive arms purchases but this was now no longer feasible.

Vietnam.

The Chancellor told Mr. Kissinger that Foreign Minister Brandt had written to the Secretary about the recent SPD statement on Vietnam./2/ The Chancellor said that he would be writing separately to the President, assuring him that the Federal Government had no intention of criticizing, or interfering with, US actions in this area and that the Government's position remained as he had outlined it in his press conference after his return from his Washington visit. Mr. Kissinger said that it was erroneous to believe that a premature US withdrawal from Vietnam would lead to an increased US presence in Europe; the same forces which were advocating a withdrawal from Vietnam were also in favor of a reduced US role in Europe. The Chancellor took note of this.

/2/Not found.

Wehner expressed a certain degree of impatience with the SPD statement on Vietnam which he considered the result of short-sighted local politics.

Miscellaneous Observations.

Mr. Kissinger said that he was struck by Chancellor Kiesinger's repeated references to German independence. The Chancellor had said at one point that he understood his role to be to "protect German interests rather than to execute Atlantic policies." The Chancellor apparently made this remark when discussing attempts to turn NATO into an instrument for détente about which be showed some irritation. Mr. Kissinger said that the Chancellor showed much interest in ABMs and wondered why Germany could not have such a system.

Mr. Kissinger said that Schroeder looked physically fit. It was obvious from Schroeder's remarks that he was strongly opposed to the Grand Coalition and the SPD, to whom he always referred to as "The Left."

I think it was of particular interest that Strauss continues to adhere to the position that he will break with the Chancellor if the NPT is signed. The Chancellor is looking for a broad consensus within the CDU/CSU on this issue and would, I believe, not let it come to a break with Strauss over the NPT unless there were massive counter pressure from the SPD which cannot be taken for granted.

With all best wishes.

Sincerely,
Hans

 

244. Memorandum of Conversation/1/

Washington, February 1, 1968, 5:15 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 28 GER B. Confidential. Drafted by Puhan and approved in S on February 7. The meeting was held in the Secretary's office. The source text is marked "Part I of V." Schuetz also met with Vice President Humphrey and had a non-substantive talk with President Johnson. Memoranda of these conversations are ibid., POL 7 GER W.

SUBJECT
Soviet Interest in Berlin

PARTICIPANTS
The Secretary
Alfred Puhan, Director of German Affairs

Governing Mayor of Berlin Klaus Schuetz

FRG Ambassador Heinrich Knappstein
FRG Minister Georg von Lilienfeld

FRG Counselor of Embassy Berndt von Staden

After an exchange of amenities, the Secretary raised the question of current Soviet interest in the status of Berlin.

Schuetz said he believed the Soviets were not really interested in changing the status of Berlin. They looked at Ulbricht and his efforts to get a new constitution which might want to do away with the vestiges of World War II. There were other possible explanations of current Soviet interest in Berlin. Schuetz saw a fear on the part of the Soviets that Schuetz' coming to Berlin, keeping in mind his past job in the Bonn government, signified an effort by the FRG to change the status of Berlin. In other words, in Soviet minds there was concern that the FRG was introducing new salami tactics in changing the status of Berlin. He saw in the Soviet Memorandum/2/ a warning rather than a new policy. He anticipated no crisis in Berlin. The Mayor asked if there was any evidence available to the Secretary pointing to a possible crisis over Berlin.

/2/For text of the January 29 Soviet note, see Documents on Germany, 1944-1985, pp. 984-986.

The Secretary said there was nothing of substance. Our Watch Committee had found no indicators. The Secretary could imagine that seen through the eyes of a Russian General, Berlin might appear to be a tempting and vulnerable object. He reminded the Mayor that he had pointed out to Gromyko in 1961 that Berlin was no more vulnerable than New York because of our presence there./3/

/3/Reference is presumably to 1961 discussions in New York; memoranda of their conversations are in Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, vol. XIV, pp. 431-433, 439-441, and 456-461.

Schuetz agreed, and added that while there appeared to be no evidence for any crisis, one would have to be watchful.

The Secretary asked how the Mayor interpreted the Soviet action in addressing themselves to the Germans alone on the question of Berlin.

Schuetz said this was puzzling since the Soviets must know that the Germans would inform the Americans as well as the British and French. He mentioned in this connection that Abrasimov had spoken to him recently of international obligations regarding Berlin which could only mean all of Berlin.

The Secretary referred to remarks he made to Foreign Minister Brandt in Brussels/4/ on this subject which had been interpreted as being rather negative. He assured Schuetz that he did not mean to be negative, but that out of his first 1-1/2 years of experience as Secretary of State with a Berlin crisis he only wanted to warn his colleague of the explosive nature of this problem. He said it was extremely important that all, the three Western Powers, as well as Bonn and Berlin stay very close on this.

/4/Reported in telegram Secto 16 from Brussels, December 13. (Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 67 D 586, CF 242)

Schuetz agreed that this was necessary and that as far as Berlin was concerned he would make sure that this was done.

 

245. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State/1/

Bonn, February 13, 1968, 0948Z.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Germany, vol. 14. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Repeated to Berlin for McGhee.

8270. Subject: Rostow meeting with the Chancellor.

1. During Under Secretary Rostow's meeting this afternoon with Chancellor Kiesinger, the Chancellor was primarily interested in providing information and views concerning German Eastern policy, the NPT, relations with France, and the state of his coalition government. These are reported in this telegram. The Chancellor requested that his remarks be transmitted to the Secretary and to the President. The portion of the conversation devoted to the US balance of payments problem is reported by septel./2/

/2/The Embassy reported on the portion of the talk dealing with balance-of-payments issues in telegram 8265 from Bonn, February 12. (Ibid.)

1. [sic] Eastern policy--The Chancellor said that the SPD is currently having serious internal trouble. The party membership feels increasingly that they are going to lose the next election. The Wehner school of responsible and constructive participation in the grand coalition has lost out. Real divergencies within the party have developed particularly on the subject of Eastern policy. The Chancellor said that he had talked directly to Brandt, Wehner, and Helmut Schmidt and all three agreed that it would be highly dangerous for the FRG to talk directly with the Sovs concerning Berlin. There is, however, a strong group in the SPD that feels otherwise. The Chancellor expected that within the coalition it will be necessary to "have it out" with the SPD on Eastern policy in general and that this will be done over the next two weeks. Under Secretary Rostow assured the Chancellor of US support for German efforts to improve understanding with the USSR and with the Eastern European countries. He said that we are quite willing to see the German side go ahead with talks with the Soviets as initiated by Brandt and Tsarapkin. Rostow made clear that we are now quite satisfied that there is no difference of view between US and the Federal Govt on the handling of the Sov memorandum concerning Berlin. The Chancellor, while making clear that real trouble was to be expected in the coalition concerning Eastern policy, stressed that he did not wish us to think that it would cause a real coalition crisis.

2. NPT--Still in the context of differences between the SPD and the CDU/CSU, the Chancellor turned to the subject of NPT. He said that the treaty still presents problems. Rostow commented in this connection that it was a good letter which Brandt had just sent to the Secretary on the subject./3/ The Chancellor, after consulting with the interpreter said that he thought the letter was "a little softly formulated." He suggested that this latest letter should be read in the context of Brandt's earlier letter to the Secretary concerning the NPT./4/

/3/Dated February 9; the letter was transmitted to the Embassy in Bonn in telegram 113607, February 10. (Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-6)

/4/Apparent reference to Brandt's letter of Oct 13. A copy is in Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Germany, vol. 14.

3. Relations with France--The Chancellor said that de Gaulle obviously poses a very serious problem for him. He had heard that concern may exist in the US about the possibility of some secret understanding between France and Germany. The Chancellor could assure us that this was not the case. He noted that a recent public opinion poll showed that 75 percent of the Germans consider the German alliance with the United States as the most important element of German foreign policy. The Chancellor said that he has explained to de Gaulle in the past and will do so again that by pursuing a strong anti-American line de Gaulle is only antagonizing German opinion against France. The Chancellor added that it is nevertheless of the utmost importance for a positive German-French relationship to be preserved. If new antagonism again arises after this "second effort" to overcome it (the Chancellor was presumably referring to Adenauer's efforts and his own) this would be a most grave development for the two countries and for Europe. Kiesinger thought that de Gaulle too understood this point. On the question of UK-EC entry, the Chancellor repeated his well-known views that de Gaulle could not be forced to change his opinion. Under Secretary Rostow told the Chancellor that the United States fully understood the importance of the French-German relationship. He said that the last thing which we wanted was to force Germany into any kind of choice between Paris and Washington. This telegram was not cleared with the Under Secretary.

McGhee

 

246. Telegram From the Mission in Berlin to the Department of State/1/

Berlin, February 15, 1968, 1700Z.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 28 GER B. Confidential. Repeated to Bonn, Paris, Moscow, London, USNATO, CINCUSAREUR, CINCEUR, USELMLO, and USAFE.

956. Subj: Abrasimov's February 13 letter to Ambassador McGhee. Ref: Berlin 951./2/

/2/Telegram 951 from Berlin, February 15, transmitted the text of the Soviet note. (Ibid.) For text, see Documents on Germany, 1944-1985, pp. 986-988.

Begin summary.

1. Abrasimov's letters to the US and British Ambassadors are virtually identical. The French were sent a copy of the letter to Ambassador McGhee with a brief accompanying letter. This stated the Soviets and French have an interest in relaxation of tension, France has responsibilities in West Berlin, and that letters have been sent to British and US Ambassadors about Bonn's "illegal activities" in West Berlin.

2. Abrasimov's letter is similar in many respects to the Soviet January 6 memorandum, but contains noteworthy differences. The letter contains no implication that if Bonn continues its "illegal activities" in West Berlin the Soviet Union will find it necessary to take measures to protect its rights, as did the memorandum. In making the letter public, the Soviets are on record regarding any steps they might plan to take in connection with the March Bundestag committee meetings. The letter carefully avoids mention of these meetings and any specific threats.

3. The Mission concurs in Ambassador McGhee's view/3/ that any reply should reaffirm Allied rights and responsibilities in Berlin, and that without attempting to justify FRG activities the reply should indicate that we follow carefully activities here to see that they are consistent with the legal status of the city. We also believe some reference should be drawn to the extent of East German steps to incorporate East Berlin into the GDR.

/3/Telegram 8431 from Bonn, February 15. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 17 USSR)

End summary.

4. Although Khrustalev told us yesterday, in response to question, that as far as he knew the Soviets did not intend "at this time" to publish the letter, the East German press carries on February 14 the text of the letter to Ambassador McGhee (Berlin 951). The East German press makes no mention of letters being sent to the British and French Ambassadors. The British here received a letter the text of which is identical to ours.

5. The French were handed a copy of Abrasimov's letter to Ambassador McGhee, with a brief accompanying letter from Abrasimov. The letter notes the USSR and France have a great interest in relaxation of tensions in Europe. It adds that France also has responsibilities for the establishment of a normal situation in West Berlin. In this connection, Abrasimov states he has sent letters to the US and British Ambassadors on the subject of Bonn's illegal activities in West Berlin which create tension in Central Europe.

6. While the text of Abrasimov's letter to Ambassador McGhee is in many respects similar to the January 6 Soviet memorandum to the FRG Government, there are noteworthy differences. The letter lists many of the same "illegal activities" of the FRG in West Berlin as the memorandum. However, it makes no reference to the recruitment of West Berlin youth for service in the German armed forces, and to the holding of a Bundestag Defense Committee meeting in West Berlin. The letter asserts that Bonn is attempting to change the status of West Berlin in its favor, and that this is a "highly risky course." The memorandum contains no such statement. It warns instead that Moscow will not tolerate the incorporation of West Berlin into the FRG, and that if Bonn holds to its course of conducting "illegal activities" in West Berlin, the USSR will find it necessary to take measures to protect its rights and interests.

7. It seems likely that Abrasimov, in his desire to meet with one or more of the Western Ambassadors in West Berlin in the second half of February (Berlin 917),/4/ would have raised FRG activities in West Berlin as his major topic. His letter presumably is intended to take the place of such meetings. In releasing the letter to the East Germans for publication, the Soviets have now put themselves on record for any steps they might plan to take in connection with the March 4-8 Bundestag committee meetings in West Berlin. It is to be noted, however, that the letter carefully avoids both mention of these forthcoming meetings and any specific threats. Its contents and fact that it was immediately published suggest that the Soviets have sent the letter primarily for propaganda purposes.

/4/Dated February 4. (Ibid., POL US-USSR)

8. In view of the fact that the Soviets have addressed similar letters to the British and US, we believe it would be preferable to coordinate any possible reply. The Mission concurs in Ambassador McGhee's view, expressed here, that any reply should be brief and reaffirm our concept about Allied rights and responsibilities in Berlin, as well as those responsibilities which have been assigned to the FRG. Without attempting to justify FRG activities about which the USSR has complained, our reply should indicate also that we keep a careful watch on activities here from the standpoint of their consistency with the legal status of the city. We believe any reply should draw attention also to the degree to which the Soviets have permitted the incorporation of East Berlin into East Germany in violation of post-war agreements with respect to Berlin. One example would be East German claims that East Berlin is the capital of the GDR.

9. The separate treatment accorded the French is a reflection of current Soviet policy toward France. We would hope that the French will agree to identical Ambassadorial replies or, failing this, coordinated replies. We hope we can avoid a situation in which the French follow the same procedure used by the Soviets.

Morris

 

247. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State/1/

Bonn, February 20, 1968, 1930Z.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL GER W-US. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to London, Paris, Brussels, USNATO, Geneva, and USUN. McGhee summarized and commented on this telegram in At the Creation of New Germany, pp. 243-245.

8568. CEDTO, BUSEC. Subj: Ambassador's call on FonMin Brandt. I called on FonMin Brandt today at my request. It was my first opportunity to see him--or for that matter any high official--since the German-French meeting in Paris on Feb. 15 and 16. Brandt departs on Feb. 22 for a four-day visit to Morocco. The following subjects were discussed. UK entry will be the subject of a septel./2/

/2/Telegram 8569 from Bonn, February 20. (Department of State, Central Files, EEC 6 UK)

1. US balance of payments and offset--I reviewed briefly the presentations made by Under Secretaries Rostow and Deming and Amb Trezise during their recent visits on the US balance of payments and offset problems. I stressed the importance that the US Govt attaches to the success of the President's program, announced Jan 1,/3/ to redress our adverse payments balance. We were considering in this connection a number of measures in the general area of border tax adjustments. It is our sincere desire that this be accomplished without restriction of trade, however, our ability to do so and at the same time to stave off the protectionist measures proposed in our Congress will depend in large degree on the assistance given us by our trading partners. In particular it is our hope that the surplus countries, including Germany, will as agreed in the OECD take appropriate measures to increase imports and encourage the flow of long-term investment capital abroad.

/3/For text of President Johnson's announcement, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1968, Book I, pp. 8-13.

In connection with the offset, I expressed appreciation for the reception accorded our reps. The meetings in Bonn had revealed no serious difference of views between us on this issue, and Under Secretaries Rostow and Deming had been well received by Pres. Blessing of the Bundesbank. We had made clear that our objective during fiscal 68/69, which can be achieved largely through purchase of medium-term securities, is a full neutralization of our foreign exchange losses resulting from our forces in Germany--$775 million. Although the final negotiation, which lay ahead, would be between the Bundesbank and the US Treasury, I hoped that the German Govt would support our objectives with the Bundesbank in whatever way was appropriate.

In response, Brandt said that the Chancellor himself had, in their recent meeting, raised with de Gaulle the possible acceleration of the Kennedy Round tariff concessions. However, the French reaction was totally negative. French FonMin Debre had advised de Gaulle that such action would be "illegal". German EconMin Schiller had difficult discussions on this point, to no avail, with his French opposite members.

2. East/West issues--I told Brandt that we are concerned by allegations recently made in the press of American misgivings over German Eastern policy. I assured him that this was not the case. We had stressed the importance we continued to attach to Four-Power responsibility in Berlin--and the risks of any bilateral Soviet-German negotiations on Berlin. However, Brandt had himself assured us quite adequately on this point. Apart from this issue we welcomed direct discussions between the Germans and the Soviets on issues outstanding between them, as well as continued German efforts to improve relations with the EE countries and the recent establishment of relations with Yugoslavia. We had every confidence that the Germans would continue to keep us advised of their discussions with the Soviets and would consult with us in connection with any matter involving Allied interests. I pointed out that I had in my contacts with German officials detected some uncertainty resulting from the article by Zbigniew Brzezinski, former member of the Dept's Planning Council, in the January Foreign Affairs./4/ I assured Brandt that this article did not reflect State Dept policy and that Brzezinski was no longer associated with the Dept.

/4/"The Framework of East-West Reconciliation," Foreign Affairs, January 1968, pp. 256-275.

Brandt expressed appreciation for the assurance given him on the American attitude toward German E/W policy. I asked Brandt what new moves he contemplated in the E/W arena, in particular what answer the German Govt proposed to make to the Soviet memo of Jan. 29 on mutual force reduction. He said that there is a draft reply to the Sov note with the Chancellor. They hope to discuss it in the Cabinet meeting tomorrow, after which they will contact the three Allied Ambassadors. In discussing the content of the reply, Brandt said that there was a view within the German Govt that they should in effect say: "Since there are so many issues on which we do not agree, we must exchange mutual renunciations of force in order to avoid conflict." His own view and that of the FonOff is more to the effect that: "Because we disagree we must discuss the areas of our disagreement with a view to reaching some solution--not necessarily in the short-term but in the long-term."

The Germans should, in his view, give the Sovs a complete and lengthy document giving reasonable German positions on all Eastern subjects. (Not, however, necessarily at the time of the German response to the Jan. 29 Sov memo.) There was always a danger that the Sovs might publish, with a view to making propaganda, their own interpretation of their exchanges with the Germans on E/W issues. If the Germans had presented them a paper giving reasonable positions, they would in this event be protected. The paper, moreover, could provide a basis for further exchanges of views.

Brandt pointed out that he considered it significant that Sov Amb Tsarapkin had in their talks never made it a condition for mutual force renunciation that all of the issues raised by the Sovs in their note be first resolved in their favor. Brandt thought that there was an opportunity for progress which could, even in the absence of an over-all agreement, reduce the potential danger of existing differences. For example, he thought it possible that the Germans might be able to tell the Poles they would accept the present western Polish border, until the matter could be considered in connection with a peace treaty. I informed Brandt that such an approach certainly seemed to be in the right direction.

3. Berlin--I reminded Brandt that, in addition to the note they had received from the Sovs on Berlin on January 6, the three Allies had also received notes on Feb. 16./5/ The French note, however, was quite different from that given the Brit and ourselves. Indeed, the Sovs appeared to consider the French to be on their side. I hoped that Brandt would help urge the French to join with the Brit and ourselves in making a reply along orthodox lines, otherwise there would be a considerable strain on the excellent Three-Power solidarity which has existed in Berlin.

/5/The January 6 Soviet note is summarized in The New York Times, January 17, 1968. For text of the February 14 note handed to the United States, see Documents on Germany, 1944-1985, pp. 986-988.

Brandt advised that the draft FRG reply to the Sov memorandum on Berlin was now before the All-German Affairs Committee of the Cabinet. Approval was expected tomorrow, and the text would be shown to the three Allies immediately. Brandt hoped that we could give our reaction quickly, since he considered it important to get the reply to the Sovs before the Bundestag committees begin their Berlin meetings on March 4./6/

/6/For text of the March 1 German note, see ibid., pp. 988-989.

I asked Brandt if a final decision had been made as to whether the Defense Committee would meet in Berlin. He raised his hands in obvious disapproval. He had raised this issue with Bundestag Pres Ger-stenmeier and found that the decision that it would meet had already been made. The committee would, however, meet only during the day and would not discuss military matters, which would be reserved until they returned to Bonn. He did not like this decision and assured me that this would not happen again. I pointed out that, although we had not advised the Germans not to have the meeting since we as well as they would not wish to appear to be backtracking in the face of Sov threats, I thought his own attitude toward the matter was a wise one.

4. NPT--I referred to the Sec of State's letter to Brandt of Feb 17 on the NPT,/7/ which had been in response to his own letter of Feb 9. Did he feel that this letter was sufficiently responsible. I also asked what if anything the French had said about NPT in their recent meeting in Paris. What were the next moves the Germans proposed to make on the NPT? Brandt replied that he considered the Secretary's letter to be quite positive. They themselves had favored the Swedish proposal to which the Secretary's letter referred. His inclination is not to answer the Secretary's letter although State Sec Duckwitz will raise the NPT issue when he is in Washington next week. Some of his assistants in the FonOff are in favor of forwarding a paper to the ENDC with the full German position on NPT. He is aware, of course, that any such paper will probably be included with the ENDC report made to the UN. He would, therefore, like to show it to us first. State Sec Duckwitz will bring it with him to Washington, and they would appreciate any suggestions we might have.

/7/Transmitted in telegram 116563 to Bonn, February 16. (Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-6)

The German side had raised the nuclear issue with the French during the recent meetings only in connection with EURATOM. French FonMin Couve had (not to Brandt but to someone else a day or two before) criticized French DefMin Messmer's negative public position on NPT (reported Bonn 7612)./8/ Brandt appealed to the French to "agree or at least to acquiesce" in EURATOM to discussions between IAEA and EURATOM on verification. Couve had made no comment other than to say that, "he saw the problem." The Quai Political Director Beaumarchais had said, however (in a separate conversation with FonOff Asst Sec Ruete) that although the French would not support such a move he presumed they would "let it go".

/8/Not found.

I advised Brandt of the contents of the first para of Moscow's 2843/9/ regarding Sovs consultations on NPT. Brandt indicated, however, that he was already informed.

/9/Dated February 19. (Ibid., TP 7 UK)

McGhee

 

248. Memorandum of Conversation/1/

Washington, February 23, 1968, 5 p.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Germany, Filed by Johnson Library. Confidential; Sensitive. Drafted by Obst. A note on the source text reads: "Not verbatim; approximate account from interpreting notes."

Memorandum of conversation between Messrs. Walt Rostow and Rainer Barzel at the White House, February 23, 1968, 5 p.m.

Mr. Barzel: We have the impression the other side is marshaling all their forces in one concerted offensive all over Vietnam and should have little left to strike with when this is over. Is that how you see it ?

Mr. Rostow: Yes, the war has entered a climactic period. We have experienced the first wave of that offensive. Though it brought a great deal of human suffering, it has failed in its objective to bring down the South Vietnamese government and its army and to leave the U. S. alone to defend the country. The enemy has yet to commit one-half of its forces and may employ them to force a major battle in the Khe Sanh-Quang Tri area and perhaps at Saigon. This may well put the war into its decisive phase.

Mr. Barzel: Have you heard of Kiesinger's statement on Vietnam last Tuesday?/2/ We had a meeting of the executive committee Tuesday morning. We thought it was high time to speak up on Vietnam in view of some of the growing anti-U. S. feelings. Mr. Gerstenmaier and myself made a strong plea in that direction. The Chancellor then made a declaration in which he stressed Germany's gratitude to the U. S. for its valiant defense of good causes around the world. He denounced anti-American sentiments as "stupid." Germany and others had much to be thankful for to the United States. German policy was sympathetic of the U. S. effort in Vietnam.

/2/McGhee reported on the statement in telegram 8682 from Bonn, February 23. (Department of State, Central Files, POL GER W-US)

He sent Prince Botho (himself an M.D.) to Vietnam to check on the performance of the German assistance program there. I myself have sent telegrams to our people in Vietnam, voicing appreciation for their efforts there and urging them to stay on at this difficult time.

President Johnson has told Chancellor Kiesinger he would be glad to talk any matter over with him, as long as the Press could be kept out of the discussion. The Chancellor was happy about that suggestion and would like to take advantage of it from time to time.

Did you receive McGhee's telegram on his talk with Kiesinger regarding the Chancellor's meeting with de Gaulle?/3/

/3/McGhee reported Kiesinger's summary of his talks with de Gaulle in telegrams 8667, 8682, 8683, 8692, 8693 from Bonn, February 23. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Germany, vol. 14) Telegram 8667 is printed in Foreign Relations, 1964- 1968, vol. XIII, Document 292.

Mr. Rostow: I have not seen it yet.

Mr. Barzel: Let me try to summarize the five major points from my notes. As you know, Mr. Johnson had urged Mr. Kiesinger to play the role of "harmonizer." This is what he is trying to do.

(1) With regard to Britain's entry into the EEC, Kiesinger was able to move only a small step further, but it was a step in the right direction.

(2) On NATO, de Gaulle said, as matters were standing now, he felt he could say that France will remain in NATO.

(3) In the area of the dollar discussions, Mr. Kiesinger is trying to get the Kennedy Round moved up. This is our policy now. I don't know how you feel about it.

Mr. Rostow: We are in favor of it. It would provide us some compensation for the losses we have taken from the "harmonization" of the border taxes which, in effect, represented a devaluation of the mark vis-à-vis the dollar.

Mr. Barzel:

(4) De Gaulle said this twice to Kiesinger and with emphasis: He (de Gaulle) had reason to believe that if the U. S. should resort to tactical nuclear weapons in Vietnam, the U.S. could expect that an atomic bomb of unknown origin would hit a city in the United States.

(5) On German policy towards the U. S., de Gaulle said, he would make no move to oppose it and would not put pressures on the FRG in this regard at this time.

You see, the Chancellor is doing his best to play the part of the harmonizer.

As you know, we had a huge pro-American demonstration in Berlin this week in response to a demonstration against the U. S. Vietnam policy there earlier. 150,000 people demonstrated their goodwill for the United States.

I had a meeting with Mr. Kiesinger on February 16, and he asked me to relay the following thoughts to you:

There could be a political crisis coming on in Germany if the following four matters should become acute at the same time:

1. the offset and dollar question

2. the NPT

3. the UN move to forbid legal time-limits on persecution for genocide and mass murder

4. a quarrel between the CDU and the SPD-FDP on Eastern policy.

A convergence of these four factors would result in a strong political tremor that could possibly bring down the government. However, the fact that reelections now would benefit the CDU and the fact that the SPD-FDP together command more votes in the Bundestag speaks against the likelihood of toppling the government now. But there could be a severe political crisis. The SPD and FDP are united in their stand on Eastern policy and in their stand against the war in Vietnam.

It is impossible to get money appropriated for the offset agreement without the help of the SPD, and some people in that party contend it amounts to an indirect subsidy of the Vietnam war.

As it stands right now, the majority in the CDU is against signing the NPT before additional clarification and assurances are obtained from Washington.

Should there be a political crisis, it would arrest or reverse the modest economic upturn we are now experiencing. This in turn would make it harder for the Bundesbank to come up with the money for offset, etc.

I do not know if there are solutions to all these problems. But I thought it best to come here and tell a friend about these possible difficulties, as they might in turn affect the U. S., particularly in an election year.

Mr. Rostow: I appreciate your coming here and informing me on your problems in Bonn. I know enough about politics to know I should not advise someone from another country about his politics. Moreover, I cannot respond substantively to your points with any new U. S. policy formulations. But I can comment.

I do not know the status in the UN of time limits for genocide, etc. But I shall look into the issue.

As far as offset is concerned, I think we clearly have an arrangement here which favors Germany. We are maintaining strong military resources in Germany for the joint defense of Europe and this is being offset by bonds which bear interest. This means that in addition to holding the Central Front with our resources we help Germany accumulate additional surplus in its balance of payments. Any thinking politician can recognize the imbalance in this arrangement. This helps to buttress the arguments of those people who say we should bring our troops home from Europe. The argument that the German offset finances the war in Vietnam is nonsense. It could only be made by Germans who, in fact, wish the U.S. to withdraw its forces from Europe.

As regards the NPT, the difficulties we experienced at one time on consultations resulted from the timing of the change in the German government. Ever since then, I believe our NPT consultations have been a model for what such consultations should be between friends. We have reviewed with you intensively and we have defended vigorously the German national interests. We managed to clear up a number of small matters. Then remained the Chancellor's two big demands:

(1) to find an acceptable formula for Euratom

(2) the matter of a time limit on the treaty.

Despite the fact that NATO was not united on this matter, we pressed the German Euratom formula and essentially the Soviets took the idea.

On point two, where you have said eternity is too long a time and you want a less rigid clause on duration, I think we are making some headway, too; and the Soviets may meet that demand.

I know the arguments of the opposition, and I can understand what makes some men feel so deeply about this matter. At the time of the Adenauer funeral, I spent a good deal of time conferring with Strauss and von Guttenberg./4/ I know this is a difficult issue for some Germans; but it is a great issue for the entire world. Important common interests are at stake. I am sure there is no group in Germany that wants to manufacture nuclear arms. Reliance on a system of collective security appears to be the common interest--including the German interest--as opposed to the fragmentation and danger of further nuclear proliferation.

/4/No record of these conversations was found.

On the matter of German contacts with the East, we have always regarded this as a matter for Germans to settle. We did not press you to take up such contacts in the past when you were hesitant to do so, and we shall not stand in your way now if you want to pursue them further.

I, personally, always thought that it was right of you not to take up these contacts years ago, as I did not think it promising for you to negotiate out of a sense of uneasiness and weakness. Such talks should be held from a basis of strength and confidence, such as you now possess. But that is for you to judge.

Our problem is that we have profound commitments towards Berlin and Germany including their defense against nuclear arms. This is a heavy responsibility. I lived through the '61-'62 crisis when we had to honor our pledge to defend Berlin, and I remember that we did not get much support from the rest of Europe then.

Offset and cooperation on monetary matters are intimately locked to our security commitments. It would be viewed as intolerable here to fulfill our security commitments and subsidize German foreign exchange at the same time.

Mr. Barzel: We do not really fear too much that the government may fall if what I mentioned happens, but we fear that a strong political tremor might result with an adverse impact on the economy.

I know that offset and the state of the Alliance are closely interlocked. I have discussed this in detail with your brother Eugene.

In the arena of Eastern policy there is much illusion, in my opinion, and little reality. As regards Berlin, you can rest assured that we will not stray from the path of virtue.

Is it true that the NPT is scheduled to go to the UN as early as March? If this is the case, I should like to say a few more words about it.

Mr. Rostow: (after inquiring on the telephone) It is scheduled to go to the UN about March 15 and to the individual governments shortly afterwards. A special session of the General Assembly should be called about April to debate the treaty. We would hope that the debate would end some time in May so that the treaty can then go to the individual governments for ratification. This is how the people that work on the NPT see the time schedule.

Mr. Barzel: I do not think we would sign the treaty before some other matters are made clear, like the Euratom question, for instance. We are grateful to you for getting the 18-month verification provision into the treaty. But what if Euratom and the IAEA cannot reach an agreement? Our American friends tell us, "Do not worry, everything will continue like in the past." But then the Soviets tell us something else again. What if we shall find ourselves unable to procure peaceful nuclear fuel?

Mr. Rostow: Do I understand that you are worried about being supplied with fuel for peaceful nuclear purposes?

Mr. Barzel: Yes, exactly. We now get our fuel from you via Euratom. If Euratom bows out or collapses one day, which is quite possible, as the French do not want to sign the treaty, we would have to turn to the IAEA, and if we apply there the Soviets are bound to say: "Now, wait a minute. Don't you know what the Germans would use this fuel for?"

Mr. Rostow: I don't know a specific answer to your question offhand, but I would say, since we have found answers to the other questions in the past, we should find a solution here also.

Some countries have said they will sign the treaty but delay ratification until a Euratom-IAEA accord has been reached. We understand their concern. However, in some countries the pressure to ratify is strong. What, then, if they ratify and later no accord is reached? The outcome would depend on the nature of the difficulty. If it were a serious political matter it might hold up application of the treaty; if it were a question of technical details, perhaps the 18 months might be extended. I can tell you that those who work on this matter do not see great difficulties in the EEC-IAEA negotiation. The scientists are not half as worried about this as are the lawyers and politicians.

If Euratom should dissolve for some reason, bear in mind that past history shows the generous attitude of this country in the supply of nuclear fuel for peaceful purposes to others. We recently passed legislation increasing the amounts of fuel for foreign consumption. We make fuel available to countries that are not very friendly to us, because there is a certain responsibility involved in being a nuclear power. After signing the treaty, our responsibility for supplying for peaceful purposes would become even greater. Your question about fuel supply in the event of a Euratom collapse is fair. You understand you and I cannot settle it here. But if your government wishes to pose the matter, it should be discussed in the spirit of the Chancellor's talks with the President. The history of the Johnson-Kiesinger meetings has shown that the President listens to these questions with attention and sympathy.

To summarize: I think you should clearly define the specific questions that still concern you. Then you should bring them before us or raise them in a multilateral forum. Then we can work together to find answers.

Mr. Barzel: I understand and I will pass along your advice. We want to remove the uncertainty. We do not want to sign any treaties, con dolus (in bad faith) as we did after World War I. We have to worry about the security of Europe in the '70's, in the post-de Gaulle nuclear period. You say the double-key system will not be touched by the treaty. The Soviets refuse to confirm that to us. We know what the situation is in Scandinavia. These questions are hotly debated in my party and must be cleared up to have the majority endorse the NPT.

Mr. Rostow: Surely the Soviets tried in the first phase of the NPT talks to bring about the destruction of NATO, to do away with the McNamara committee and the double-key system. We made it clear to them that we would have none of that. We agreed in the second phase, about September 1966, after the Rusk-Gromyko talk, that the treaty would narrowly concern what was required to avoid nuclear proliferation. What it didn't forbid was not forbidden. That is not just our understanding, that is the Soviets' as well. They know that they cannot raise the double-key question or the question of nuclear consultation. That is fundamental to our understanding. We will tell that to our Congress and you can say that to the Bundestag.

Mr. Barzel: This interpretation is all right for the present situation, but what may happen 5 or 10 years from now? The situation may be different then. Scandinavia, Greece, Turkey may then be unreliable or the U.S. may turn its interests away.

Mr. Rostow: First, you know that in our constitutional system any treaty that passed the Senate is binding on all subsequent administrations. Vietnam illustrates this point. President Johnson was prepared to honor President Eisenhower's commitment on the Gulf of Aqaba.

Second, if you were faced with a critical situation where your national security would be at stake--should the U.S. move its nuclear arms out of Europe, for instance--I assure you we do not intend to do that--then you would be able to denounce the treaty under the supreme-national-interest clause.

So you have one check against your fear in our constitutional system and another in the supreme-national-interest clause of the treaty. We understand that the position of the non-nuclear-weapons countries is vital for the future of the world; and we intend to find solutions that allow these countries to live in dignity with this treaty. We understand that we assume grave responsibilities with this treaty.

Mr. Barzel: Let me bring up one more point before leaving one of the busiest and most important men in the world. In the military area I have few doubts, but I have one political worry. You know we have a very progressive nuclear institution in Karlsruhe. In some small areas we may even be ahead of you.

One day, maybe when we file a fuel application in Vienna, the Soviets will denounce our efforts as military research. They have constantly tried to get at us in the past and would not be likely to pass up such an opportunity. You know we deliver reactors to other countries. We are living on a small area and have to make a living from technology.

At this time when ABMs and FOBs are already realities, we are supposed to have our hands bound. This could put us into enough of a predicament one day that it may cause some type of explosion.

Mr. Rostow: There are two separate matters here. First, there is nothing in the treaty that prevents peaceful research. The treaty is concerned with non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. Second, of course, the treaty cannot prevent the Soviets from mounting a propaganda attack against Karlsruhe or anything else. Nobody here at the White House believes that the Soviets wish either of us well.

I think I know how the President feels with regard to the defense of Europe. With all the heavy pressures from Vietnam, and with not a damn bit of help from Europe, he has not withdrawn any of our troops from Europe. In 1961 he was at the Wall in Berlin when it went up. We may have to stand together against propaganda attacks on Karlsruhe, or worse. Under pressure, our defense is not the NPT. It is that we remain partners that trust each other. To quote from Benjamin Franklin, "We must all hang together or surely we will all hang separately. "

The simple fact is that Germany depends, and must depend, on collective nuclear defense. If you would not sign, and decided to defend yourself with your own nuclear weapons, you would

(a) tear apart the Alliance

(b) face a very difficult period during which you might well be destroyed.

We need a free and secure Germany. It is in our interest and yours. So let us find the answers to these specific questions together in the spirit of Benjamin Franklin. This spirit has prevailed between President Johnson and Chancellor Kiesinger so far. I see no salvation any other way. We have now lived together as friends and partners successfully for 25 years. So let us take these questions one by one and find common answers to them.

Mr. Barzel: I agree with you. No agreement or treaty will be any good unless we can trust each other.

Just one final point before I leave. A lot will depend on the manner in which the NPT report is presented to the UN. Will it be a case of "Bird eat or die!" (Vogel friss oder stirb), as we say in Germany, or will the birds be offered the food with an option to eat or not? Will there be a chance for any changes at the UN in the package sent up by Messrs. Foster and Roschin?

Mr. Rostow: (after consulting on the telephone) I am told that the debate in the UN will not be just pro forma. I do not see how it could be, anyhow. There will be some opportunity for changes at the UN level.

Mr. Barzel: I want to thank you, Walt, for giving me so much of your precious time. You may take the fact that I made this long trip solely to talk with you as a sign that we regard these questions with great seriousness.

 

249. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State/1/

Bonn, February 28, 1968, 1825Z.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL GER W-US. Confidential; Limdis. Repeated to Paris, London, Moscow, Brussels, and USNATO.

8855. Dept pass White House. Subject: Franco-German relations in the light of the Paris visit. Ref: Bonn's 8568, 8569, 8667, 8682, 8683, 8692, 8693./2/

/2/Telegram 8568 from Bonn is Document 247. Regarding telegram 8659 from Bonn, see footnote 2 thereto. Regarding telegrams 8667 through 8693, see footnote 3, Document 248.

Begin summary: The Feb 15-16 Paris visit of Chancellor Kiesinger and FonMin Brandt, and the subsequent German reaction to the outcome are believed to provide evidence of: A) The continuing importance which the Fed Govt, and particularly Chancellor Kiesinger personally, attribute to relations with France; B) The extent of agreement and disagreement in German and French top-level thinking on the future shape of Europe; and C) The wide acceptance in Germany of the FRG's policy of determined friendship toward France despite disillusionment over the past months with de Gaulle personally. The Germans appear reasonably satisfied for the present with the limited "progress" made with de Gaulle on enlarging the CM, but were not able to "smoke out" the French position on NPT and in particular on negotiations between EURATOM and IAEA on a verification procedure. Kiesinger's thinking on the future role of Europe now seems to place more emphasis on the European, than on the Atlantic focus, but he is very firm that the Europe of the future must act in friendly agreement with the US. His concept, therefore, does not seem necessarily in conflict with that of an Atlantic partnership. While the depth of his commitment to France has been shown to be even greater than we earlier anticipated, he seems determined that it will not interfere with German vital interests, nor relations with us. End summary.

1. The Feb 15-16 Paris visit of Chancellor Kiesinger and a good part of his Cabinet, is being interpreted in quite different ways in the various European capitals. I have had an opportunity to discuss the visit both with the Chancellor and the FonMin (reftels), and we have also talked extensively with other German officials who were members of the party. This, together with the reaction of German politicians and the German press, has enabled us to reach certain conclusions concerning the significance of the visit, which I am setting forth in this message.

2. Gen de Gaulle had prepared the stage for the German visit by a very unfair exploitation of the false report of Brandt's Ravensburg speech. A cloud seemed to hang over the visit, which when it happily disappeared, made the sun of French friendship seem all the brighter--as perhaps was de Gaulle's intent all along. This was a matter of atmos-pherics, however, which can change again in the future just as they did before and during the visit. In assessing the present trend in Germany's relations with France, it is considered more important to examine the actual substantive agreements and disagreements apparent during the meeting.

3. The greatest attention, in Germany as elsewhere, went to the British CM entry issue. From Kiesinger down, the Germans treated the outcome as a modest success in the continuing German efforts to find a solution which will lead to eventual British admission without a crisis within the CM. Although the view is widely held elsewhere, including in France, that the FRG "caved in" under French pressure, neither the German media nor any important German politicians have seriously suggested that this is so.

4. The Germans had much earlier considered but never defined a concept of British entry "by stages." This may permit temporary accept-ance of the contention that what was agreed in Paris was in line with prior German ideas--even though State Sec Lahr, who is perhaps the most influential man in the German Govt on Common Market questions, was undoubtedly thinking in larger terms than those agreed with the French. It remains to be seen whether there can be any real advance on the question of British entry, however, the Germans have for the time being at least produced evidence that the door to British entry is not entirely closed and that opportunities exist for progress--if the British will take them. This was important from the German internal point of view and has been accomplished for the present to the general satisfaction of the German public. This can, of course, be changed if the Brussels meeting Feb 29 results in either the French backing out of their understanding with the Germans or strong opposition to the German-French understanding by the other CM countries.

5. A most interesting aspect of the Chancellor's account of his talks with de Gaulle was the indication it provided of Kiesinger's present thinking on Europe. He emphasized to me that he is seeking a Europe which would follow a European policy, but in harmony with the US. Whereas de Gaulle sees the future Europe as a third force between the two super powers, Kiesinger sees it as a bridge between them--a means of "distancing" them and helping relieve tensions between them. He opposes, as does de Gaulle but for different reasons, what he refers to as the "imperium concept" which would bring a tight Atlantic alliance up to the border of the Communist world, because it would put Germany at the point of contact between the two--and create a constant threat to peace.

6. This concept permits Kiesinger, in long-range terms, to find as he undoubtedly wishes--a fairly wide area of philosophical agreement with de Gaulle, since both place emphasis on a Europe of the future with a European policy. A part of Kiesinger's thinking embraces the idea that Europe "should put its house in order" so that it can achieve an independent role--which is, of course, what de Gaulle also demands.

7. There are, however, important differences between the German and French views. The Germans still, in principle, seek a greater degree of European political unity than de Gaulle, although Kiesinger's faith in its achievement may be wavering. The Germans wish to maintain the Alliance at least until a new European order is achieved. I think the essential difference, however, is the point which Kiesinger made three times to me--that Europe as it goes forward must act "in friendly agreement" with the United States. It is also noteworthy that he made this point very clear in public, immediately after the Paris meeting.

8. Implicit in the bilateral agreement reached between France and Germany on broad questions affecting Europe's future is the suggestion of an emergent German-French leadership of the CM. This was put into words by French Amb Seydoux at a large dinner here last week, when he spoke of the comforting fact that the Paris talks had shown Europe now to be under outstanding leadership, i.e., that of de Gaulle and Kiesinger. We detect a good bit of satisfaction in German quarters at this prospect, and less concern than in the past over the predictably adverse reaction in the smaller European countries who tend to equate French-German "leadership" with French-German domination. Germans perhaps derive some satisfaction in being, for the present, even second man in such a combination. They are increasingly sought out by those who wish them to use their influence with de Gaulle--i.e. by US in trade and monetary talks, the UK for CM entry, and the Italians on various CM issues.

9. The German side considered NPT the second most important topic to be discussed in Paris, and they certainly hoped to achieve a clarification of the French position on NPT and in particular on negotiations between EURATOM and IAEA on a verification agreement. They appear, however, to have made no real progress on these questions. The French, as in the past, repeated their disapproval of the principle of the treaty. Franz Josef Strauss, in a television interview from Paris, suggested that the French had no interest in the Germans signing the treaty, since the Germans were already committed under the WEU not to manufacture nuclear weapons. The FonOff, however, has categorically denied to us that the French in any way suggested that the Germans should not sign the treaty. We think it is fair assumption that the Germans were told again by the French that the treaty is an iniquitous example of Soviet-American power politics, but that the decision to sign is their own. They did not follow this to the logical conclusion, however, in giving insight into their own future course of action on matters of vital importance to the German decision. Thus, elements in the German Govt opposed to the treaty such as Strauss returned from Paris strengthened in their opposition. Those like Brandt and possibly Kiesinger, who were seeking some sign of French intentions in EURATOM which might permit the German side to move forward toward acceptance of the treaty, unfortunately returned without much satisfaction.

10. From the point of view of US interests, I realize that the vague French-German proposal for an enlarged free trade area without foreseeable political unity is disturbing. We can only take comfort in Kiesinger's assertion to us that this must lead to UK entry, and in the still doubtful prospects of success of this approach. If it does gain momentum, however, I frankly doubt that there is much we can do about it, unless we have a demonstrably better alternative to offer the British. Our Western European allies view this problem as essentially European, and I believe we shall have to accept the solution they find. Active intervention by us on this issue now would give de Gaulle an excellent pretext for claiming that the "Americans" wrecked the chances for any progress on UK entry.

11. In light of all of the evidence, I do not believe that Kiesinger's concept of the future of Europe is in conflict with our Atlantic partnership concept. There is no evidence that such a Europe will, for a long time, be willing to make an important contribution toward the world's "trouble spots." If, however, the Europe Kiesinger is speaking of can eventually build the capacity to defend itself without the indefinite presence of US forces this would, as Kiesinger suggests, permit us to be relieved of an unwelcome burden. Moreover, a Europe which would no longer be a direct scene of the Soviet-US confrontation might indeed move more easily toward friendly cohesion. Certainly, the concept is broad enough to permit the Germans to work on it constructively, both with France and with their other allies, including the US. This seems to me to be in our interest, even if some adjustment in our concept of Europe's future role may be required in the process.

McGhee

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