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FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES
1964-1968 Washington, DC |
250. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Germany/1/
Washington, March 5, 1968, 0210Z.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 GER W. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Puhan, cleared by Leddy and EA, and approved by Rusk. Also sent to Saigon.
124590. Ref: Bonn 9053./2/ For Ambassador from the Secretary.
/2/Telegram 9053, March 4, reported on the plans of three SPD Deputies to visit Hanoi. (Ibid., POL 7 GER W)
1. I believe it would be worthwhile for you to go and see Brandt and tell him that with regard to the proposed visit to Hanoi by an official SPD delegation (reftel), the decision is one of course to be taken by Brandt and his party. Brandt should, however, be aware of the fact that the SPD by authorizing an official delegation is in effect associating the Government of the Federal Republic with this trip. Hanoi is sure to interpret the trip this way and so it would be seen here too. While it would not be the first visit by individual Parliamentarians from a non-Communist country, a trip by a group of German Parliamentarians approved by the leadership of the SPD would be interpreted as lack of support for the U.S. on the part of the government of one of its principal Allies. I believe it would not be out of order to suggest to Brandt that such a visit to Hanoi would be seen in much the same light as many Germans would view the visit of an official US Congressional delegation (made up of one of our two major parties) to East Germany./3/
/3/In telegram 127694, March 9, the Department of State transmitted the text of Brandt's letter to Rusk clarifying the status of the SPD delegation and its mission. (Ibid.) In telegram 127761, March 9, the Department of State transmitted the text of a letter from Rusk to Brandt expressing the Secretary of State's thanks and appreciation for the information contained in Brandt's earlier message. (Ibid.)
Rusk
251. Memorandum From Nathaniel Davis of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow)/1/
Washington, March 8, 1968.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Germany, vol. 15. Secret. Also sent to General Robert Ginsburgh.
SUBJECT
Eastern European Support for Berlin CrisisYou asked whether it might now be harder for the Soviets to start something in Berlin than in 1961. Would there be less support from Warsaw Pact allies? Would this effectively slow down the Soviets?
There are three obvious ways a Berlin crisis could come: (1) as a clear decision, after consultation with Warsaw Pact allies; (2) as a Soviet decision with little consultation (perhaps only with the East Germans and the Poles); or (3) as an East German initiative (taking advantage of an ambiguous Soviet attitude). In any case, the crisis might well start with harassments, East or West German police shot, or other incidents where the fault and the initiative were not clear. Probably the West Germans would initially be the ones involved--not the occupying powers.
If there were prior Warsaw Pact consultation, there would be strong voices opposing a Berlin move. All the allies except the East Germans and Poles would be unhappy. The Czechs realize that their economic troubles are partly the result of the military readiness they had to maintain during the recurring Berlin crises of 1959-1961. Their imports from West Germany have doubled in the past half dozen years (I am sending you a separate paper on this) and they have a strong interest in trade with the West. The Romanians would almost surely dissociate themselves from a Berlin initiative, and oppose it furiously. The Hungarians and Bulgarians would be most reluctant.
It is more likely the Soviets would engineer it without giving their allies a chance to object. It is only too easy for a crisis to grow of itself in Berlin, and no Warsaw Pact ally would be in a position to withhold public support. This would be all that would be required (except from the East Germans and the Poles) in the initial stages. The southern tier allies might later be asked to mobilize, curtail trade with Bonn, and close down diplomatic and trade missions. By that time, however, the Berlin crisis might really have taken on a momentum and life of its own.
There is a real possibility that Ulbricht might sense an ambiguity in Soviet attitudes and start slicing salami slices off the Berlin status quo. Polycentrism in Eastern Europe has not left Pankow untouched, and it gives Ulbricht a weight and maneuverability which he once did not have.
There is an idea floating around the Intelligence Community that the Soviets might initiate a Berlin crisis in order to weld together the Warsaw Bloc. This is a minority view. Most analysts believe the Soviets are essentially cautious--particularly the current collective leadership--and not anxious to sacrifice their gains in Western Europe, their developing relationship with DeGaulle and the exploitable fissures in the West German coalition. While a Berlin crisis might force a degree of Eastern European solidarity, it would be bitterly resented.
Conclusion: Moscow's Eastern European allies south of Poland and East Germany would no doubt try to restrain the Soviets from initiating a Berlin crisis. However, if a crisis of ambiguous origin comes along, they are not in a good position to influence its development. With the possible exception of the Romanians, they would not be able to put themselves in the position of saying, "we won't support you." A crisis might, in fact, force the Czechs and others to pull in their horns. It would also produce deep resentments at being manipulated once again by Moscow.
ND
252. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Germany/1/
Washington, March 15, 1968, 1713Z.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Special Head of State Correspondence, Germany. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Text received from the White House.
130816. Deliver following message from the President to Chancellor Kiesinger as soon as possible:
"March 15, 1968
Dear Chancellor Kiesinger:
By now you will know that the Bank of England has acted to close the London gold market and that the governors of the central banks, active in the Gold Pool, have been invited to meet in Washington this week end.
It is plain that we have at hand the means to overcome the dangers caused by the disorder in the gold market. The speculators are banking on an increase in the official price of gold. They are wrong.
We can act together through the central banks to contain the speculative movements of funds that will almost surely occur in the next few weeks. Above all, we can act promptly to ratify and implement a plan for Special Drawing Rights as a means of replacing the reserves destroyed by speculation since the devaluation, and of meeting our needs for growth in reserves.
But it remains true that these financial disorders--if not promptly and firmly overcome--can profoundly damage the political relations between Europe and America and set in motion forces like those which disintegrated the Western world between 1929 and 1933. That is why the meeting in Washington this week end--and the cooperation it must organize--is of extraordinary importance to us both.
I hope that we can remain in close touch as our bankers and ministers work to devise means to overcome these dangers./2/
/2/In a March 17 reply, Kiesinger pledged to cooperate to the best of his ability. (Ibid.)
Sincerely, Lyndon B. Johnson"
Rusk
253. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State/1/
Bonn, March 22, 1968, 1310Z.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL GER W-US. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. McGhee summarized this telegram and commented on it in At the Creation of a New Germany, pp. 249-250.
9894. For the Secretary. Pass to the White House for the President. Subj: Kiesinger disturbed over reports from Washington.
1. I called on Chancellor Kiesinger yesterday to accompany Amb Schaetzel whom the Chancellor received, as an old friend, on the occasion of his current visit to Bonn. With some emotion, the Chancellor turned to me and said that he had been disturbed to hear reports from "recent German visitors to Washington" of "worries and doubts around the President" with respect to him and his govt. It was the form in which these doubts were expressed, as well as their content, which worried him. "Evidently our recent actions have not been understood in Washington." German visitors were told "by someone close to the Pres" that "the Pres feels cheated (by Kiesinger)". He would like to repeat that "as long as I am Chancellor I will steer the course that I discussed with the Pres when I met with him last year."
2. Moreover he has not, as alleged in Washington, engaged in any conspiracy with the Communists. It is true that he is trying to improve relations with the Eastern countries; however, he was not trying to "woo the Reds" as had been charged in Washington. It had also been said that he had knowledge of and had acquiesced in "certain conversations" which had taken place. (I refer that he referred to conversations between SPD officials and rep of the Italian Communist Party (PCI) reported in Embtel 3682,/2/ which Kiesinger appears to have discovered only in mid-February, see Embtel 8934.)/3/ He had also heard the reproach that the "SPD was the real master" of coalition Eastern policy, and that the Chancellor merely followed. He wanted to make it clear that the govt's policy was his policy. He was not moving to the left; the SPD was moving to the right. There were forces in the SPD trying to push the govt into a different policy; however, he had intervened to block this. The FonMin himself had given him to reason for doubt, although he did not like the SPD attitude toward Viet-Nam. He was not in favor of being "a school master to Americans."
/2/Dated October 4, 1967. (Ibid., DEF 4 NATO)
/3/Dated February 29. (Ibid., POL 12 GER W)
3. Kiesinger continued that he had also heard from German visitors to Washington accusations that he was following a Gaullist policy. He had been accused of making a secret agreement with de Gaulle in their last meeting. As he had told me when he returned from the meeting (Embtel 8667),/4/ he was unhappy that France had left the NATO. De Gaulle had assured him, however, that he would not leave the Alliance and that he welcomed US troops in Europe. He had told de Gaulle that de Gaulle underrated the Sov danger and had criticized de Gaulle for having said that "the US could not help but dominate." He had pointed out to de Gaulle that his anti-American feeling was losing him support in Germany, whereupon de Gaulle had explained to him that he had to take this attitude for domestic reasons.
/4/Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. XIII, Document 292.
4. De Gaulle, said Kiesinger, knows the FRG's opinion about currency and balance of payments problems--the FRG rejection of his efforts to create a new gold standard. He regretted that despite Germany's efforts de Gaulle would not accept an accelerated KR. He and de Gaulle differed on UK entry, and some have accused him of not talking forcefully enough to de Gaulle on this issue. He had not done more because he knew de Gaulle would not agree. Since he had no effective way of put-ting on pressure, he had to be content with a modest step forward. He had purposely left the arrangements made in Paris regarding UK entry vague; otherwise all of his efforts would have failed. The French have since pressed for a narrow interpretation of what was agreed in Paris, whereas the Germans have sought a liberal interpretation. President Johnson had told him in their meeting last year that he must be "the harmonizer" between the US and de Gaulle. He had made no secret agreements with de Gaulle. He had nothing to hide. He still believed, however, in the Franco-German treaty. Any rupture between France and Germany would be the end of efforts to build Europe. Indeed, he hoped in the future to come closer to de Gaulle in Eastern policy.
5. With respect to his views toward Europe, he had told de Gaulle of his belief in an "independent Europe in friendly partnership with the US." He corrected himself to say that "independent" was not quite the word--that what he sought could be better described as a "Europe that stood on its own feet." This was his firm decision. Any discussion with de Gaulle was a struggle--"A heavy battle." He knew, however, that de Gaulle cannot realize that role that he has in mind for himself and France.
6. Kiesinger referred to his "Atlantic imperium" concept, which he outlined on March 11 in his speech to the Bundestag./5/ There appears to have been a misunderstanding of his remarks on the part of certain sections of the American press, and certain American individuals. For example, Birrenbach has heard that Mr. McCloy was disturbed. Perhaps his use of the word "imperium" was a bad one. Some people might as a result consider what he had said Gaullism. He had hesitated, however, to use the word community, since he did not feel it was descriptive.
/5/For text, see Documents on Germany, 1944-1985, pp. 990-997.
7. Amb Schaetzel commented that the views as reported to the Chancellor did not accord with those he had heard during his recent visit to Washington. Quite to the contrary, there was widespread appreciation for the Chancellor's support which had been particularly helpful during the recent gold crisis. He stressed that, during the present unsettled period when both of us are under great tension and pressure, we must make a particular effort to avoid misunderstandings.
8. I assured the Chancellor that the views which he reported did not conform with those that I had encountered in my recent visit to Washington, nor with any reports from this Embassy nor comments in messages from my govt. I had reported fully what he had told me about his last meeting with de Gaulle, and my interpretation that he had not let us down was to my knowledge the view in Washington. As I had under instructions told him in our meeting on Feb. 22 we had no concerns with Germany's Eastern policy. Indeed, it is wholly in line with the President's views as expressed in his speech of Oct. 7, 1966./6/ I thought I knew what he was referring to when he spoke of conversations with the Communists. We knew that he was unaware of these discussions at the time and of his reaction when they were later reported to him. No one suspected him of collusion with the Communists. I had repeated to Washington his full views on the future of Europe, as he had expressed them to me on Feb 22 (Bonn 8692)./7/ Apart from his use of the word imperium, which could create some ambiguity, his views were in full accord with our well- known European unity-Atlantic partnership approach. Nothing that I had heard from Washington had indicated any concern over his remarks. I expressed doubt that any responsible US official could have made any considered remarks of the nature he described. Certainly they did not reflect the views of the Pres or the SecState. Particularly in time of tension and under informal circumstances with old German friends, it was possible that loose remarks could have been made which could be misinterpreted.
/6/For text, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1966, Book II, pp. 1125-1130.
/7/See footnote 3, Document 248.
9. The Chancellor appeared somewhat assuaged by Amb Schaetzel's and my remarks. However, it is clear that he believes in the authenticity of the reports of German visitors which have upset him. Naturally, he did not volunteer nor did I question him on the personalities involved.
10. Comment: I feel sure that whatever was said in Washington--if it was said--has been badly misquoted and misinterpreted to the Chancellor. The reports are obviously irresponsible, and I do not exclude the possibility that they constitute a deliberate effort to cause trouble. In addition to German visitors, it is conceivable that members of the German Emb are involved. We are not able, however, from what we know here, to pin the matter down further.
11. The important thing, however, is that the Chancellor is disturbed over false rumors, at a time when we need him most. We must be absolutely sure that nothing is done to upset the excellent relationship of mutual confidence between Kiesinger and the Pres. We must reassure Kiesinger that we do not doubt him.
12. Particularly in the light of the important contribution which Germany made through Bundesbank Pres Blessing to the success of the monetary meeting held in Washington on March 16-17, I strongly recommend that the Pres send a letter to Kiesinger expressing our appreciation for this assistance. At the same time I believe it would be appropriate, without referring to the present conversation, for the Pres to add a few remarks expressing full confidence in the Chancellor in his relations with de Gaulle and in his Eastern policy./8/
/8/In a March 27 letter to Kiesinger, transmitted in telegram 136964 to Bonn, President Johnson praised the "contribution" that his exchanges with the German Chancellor were having in creating progress in trade, finance, and security for Europe. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Special Head of State Correspondence, Germany)
13. In the future I hope that all high officials will be most cautious that their remarks do not cast doubt as to our own attitude toward the Chancellor or Germany--or suggest that we suspect any disloyalty or change in their attitude toward us.
McGhee
254. Telegram From the Mission in Berlin to the Department of State/1/
Berlin, March 25, 1968, 1810Z.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL GER W-US. Confidential. Repeated to Bonn and Moscow.
1176. From the Ambassador. Subject: Ambassador's talk with Governing Mayor Schuetz.
1. I called on GovMayor Schuetz today accompanied by Minister Morris. We talked for about forty minutes on several topics. Schuetz and I had a private conversation about Senat-Allied consultations, which I shall be reporting separately./2/
/2/Telegram 1177 from Berlin, March 26. (Ibid.)
2. Student demonstrations. I complimented Schuetz in the way the Senat and police had handled the March 23 Vietnam demonstration. I remarked that we are sorry that demonstrations against our Vietnam policy have recently caused German officials extra work. Schuetz said that he felt his government and the police were doing better recently in finding the right degree of flexibility in responding to demonstrations. The March 23 episode was not significant; police estimates (3,000 participants) actually were quite high. The disappointing thing was that despite the unimportant size of such demonstrations compared to Berlin's population, they continued to receive extensive press and TV coverage.
3. Soviet Trade Center in West Berlin. I told Schuetz that in view of the increased Soviet aggressiveness and the rash of spurious complaints that they had been making recently, the US Government was not inclined to favor increased Soviet presence in West Berlin at this time. The things SovAmb Abrasimov and the East Germans were saying about rampant Nazi activity in West Berlin were clearly exaggerated./3/ Their protests about Federal German activities here seemed an attempt to turn back the clock. We see nothing wrong with such activities as the Federal Republic has been carrying on in West Berlin, although we would be happier if the Defense Committee did not meet here again (Schuetz indicated full agreement on this point).
/3/Abrasimov's March 13 letter outlining charges regarding the NDP was forwarded to the Department of State in telegram 1109 from Berlin, March 13. (Ibid., POL 28 GER B) The Department of State provided a response in telegram 134324 to Bonn, March 21. (Ibid.)
I said I would be seeing Abrasimov for lunch and would tell him as well that we are displeased with the present aggressive Soviet attitude toward West Berlin.
Schuetz said he understood our view, but he still thought there might be value in having a Soviet trade representation in West Berlin--under German law, not Allied aegis--since the Senat felt that for businessmen to conduct business through the Soviet Embassy in East Berlin implied that the Embassy was competent for all of Berlin. I repeated that we were not inclined to accept such increased Soviet presence at this time.
4. Soviet flights over West Berlin. Schuetz raised the subject of recent Soviet overflights as another possible example of a harder Soviet attitude. I recapitulated for him the recent incidents and the unsatisfactory Soviet replies to our protests. The overflights seemed clearly to fall into the category of harassment. I said I would also speak to Abrasimov about this matter as well.
5. Berlin economy. I remarked that the Schering Company's plan to build a large new laboratory in Berlin was a gratifying example of industry's support for the Berlin economy. Schuetz agreed and said that despite some initial difficulty in acquiring the property necessary for the new plant, the project now seemed well underway. He still had the impression, however, that Berlin would have to keep up pressure on German industriallists to increase their interest in investing here. Berlin also hopes to achieve some results with US businessmen through the help of the German Consulates. I said I was sorry that our balance of payments deficit would restrict US investment here, but that we would still encourage US firms to invest locally-acquired funds in Berlin. Schuetz agreed that this course offered good possibilities. He had received the impression in Washington that despite the moratorium on investments, Berlin might still be able to get US consideration of important specific projects which could not be financed locally. I told him that I could not give him any encouragement on this point.
6. University reform. I noted that the public hearings on the draft Berlin University reform law were beginning March 25, and asked Schuetz what progress he expected. He replied that some politicians still hoped to pass a new university law by the end of 1968, but that most experts were less optimistic. Strangely, the students themselves were now urging that a new law not be passed too quickly. The most important change being considered would be the replacement of the Rector by a professional president, after the American pattern. Since this would bring a significant change to the traditional privileges and powers of professors, the new law would meet with criticism from all sides.
7. Berlin morale. Schuetz said that there still seemed to be a general uneasiness in Berlin about the future of the city. Berliners fear specifically that the Federal Government may be growing less concerned about their problems, "especially since that business at Nuernberg" (referring to the SPD Congress)./4/ I said that we wanted to help as much as possible, and that we would support efforts to have the FRG Berlin aid law extended indefinitely. Schuetz said that extension of the aid law would be a psychological boost for the city, as well as a material benefit.
/4/For text of the portion of the March 21 SPD Congress statement dealing with foreign policy and Berlin issues, see Meissner, Die deutsche Ostpolitik, pp. 245-247.
8. Problems in the Berlin SPD. Schuetz was not too forthcoming about problems in the Berlin SPD. He summed them up by saying "the left wants to dominate the party." He said personal ambition was mostly to blame, as was the left's "tradition" of fighting the party majority. There really is little dispute on substantive issues, with the possible exception of policy toward student demonstrations.
9. RIAS. Schuetz raised the subject of RIAS personnel cuts, saying that he had just written a letter to Minister Morris (not yet received) and also had written to USIA Director Leonard Marks stressing the importance of avoiding any hint that the US was reducing its presence in Berlin./5/ I told Schuetz that we felt it imperative to reduce our costs in running RIAS, but that this did not mean we were reducing our presence or interest. We had discussed the problem with FedRep Minister Wehner, who was now investigating other possible sources of additional funds. We hoped also to streamline RIAS staffing inter alia by means of the normal attrition rate. Schuetz said this was reassuring. He had been very concerned lest a noticeable change in RIAS spark public speculation about lessening US interest in Berlin.
/5/The text of the letter was transmitted in telegram 1184 from Berlin, March 27. (Department of State, Central Files, POL GER W-US)
Morris
255. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Germany/1/
Washington, March 26, 1968, 0454Z.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL GER W-US. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Stoessel, cleared by Leddy and Walt Rostow, and approved by Rusk. Repeated to Brussels for USEC.
136255. Reference Bonn's 9894./2/ For the Ambassador from the Secretary.
/2/Document 253.
1. I read your message 9894 regarding Kiesinger's state of mind with amazement. We have reviewed the list of recent German visitors to Washington and whom they saw. It is in our view inconceivable that any accurate report of these meetings could have resulted in the kind of conclusions Kiesinger came to, as reported in your telegram.
2. Since receiving your message, we have had further confirmation of Kiesinger's concern via Walther Casper. Latter saw Walt Rostow informally, March 24,/3/ and said that Kiesinger had recently received a circumstantial document in English alleging that Rostow had expressed strong criticism of Kiesinger along lines reported in your cable. It was also alleged that Katzenbach had made similar remarks, although less strongly stated. According to report received by Chancellor, President feels that Kiesinger has "betrayed" the United States on a whole series of questions, including making "secret agreements" with de Gaulle, selling out the UK on the Common Market, approving secret contacts between German Socialists and Communist politicians, passing on to East Germans knowledge derived from contacts with President Johnson, taking a weak position on Viet-Nam, and subverting the Atlantic partnership.
/3/No record of this meeting was found.
3. Rostow made clear to Casper that views of this kind had not been expressed by him and were not views of US Government. Rostow noted that he had recently seen only two German visitors, Duckwitz and Barzel (latter was here on unannounced and unreported visit),/4/ to both of whom he had expressed quite different views. Rostow told Casper that he could advise Chancellor that reputed views were not his nor those of US Government.
/4/A memorandum of conversation of the Rostow-Barzel meeting is Document 248. Duckwitz visited Washington February 28. No record of this meeting was found.
4. Casper had informed us that he was in touch with Chancellor by telephone morning of March 25 and that latter was much relieved to hear his report on talk with Rostow. Chancellor told Casper he would abandon further efforts to seek clarification of alleged views of US Government but that he would attempt to track down source of misinformation, since it was clear that someone was trying to make trouble between our two countries.
5. This whole episode strikes me as very dangerous business indeed and both President and I feel we should get to the bottom of it, if possible. It would appear that report received by Chancellor represented effort to mislead him intentionally about our attitude and we would like to know who was responsible.
6. I believe you should call on Kiesinger and tell him that I was dismayed at the report which he mentioned to you and Schaetzel and which Casper discussed with Rostow. You can assure him that we know of absolutely no grounds for suspicions and that we hope the assurances received via Casper will put his mind at rest. It would appear, however, that someone is deliberately trying to harm the relations of our two countries and we feel it is important to bring this out in the open and find out who is doing it. You could add that if, in the future, there are any rumors which could have the effect of dividing us, we should promptly run them down so that we can clear the atmosphere of any misunderstandings whatsoever.
Rusk
256. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State/1/
Bonn, March 27, 1968, 1840Z.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL GER W-US. Secret; Exdis. Repeated to Brussels.
10118. BUSEC. Subj: Inaccurate report of US views received by Kies-inger.
1. I called on Chancellor Kiesinger today to advise him of the replies received from Washington (State's 136255 and 136706)/2/ with regard to the disturbing rumors which had been reported to him (Bonn's 9894)./3/ Since I considered it the most convincing way of reassuring him, I showed him the reftels which he read with interest. Although the Chancellor admitted that he had been somewhat disturbed by Erhard's interview of today in Echo der Zeit (Bonn's 10062)/4/ which repeated some of the same American criticisms of FRG policy, he said that he fully accepted the forthright statement made by the Sec and Under Secretary, which confirmed what Walther Casper had advised him from Washington following his talks with Walt Rostow.
/2/Telegram 136255 is Document 255. In telegram 136706, March 26, Under Secretary Katzenbach instructed McGhee: "I want to add my own personal note to the message the Secretary has sent you on Kiesinger's state of mind. I was appalled to learn of the report that I had been critical of Kiesinger. The charge is totally untrue and I hope you will so state to the Chancellor. I have great respect for him. At no time have I spoken about him in any other vein." (Department of State, Central File, POL GER W-US)
/3/Document 253.
/4/Dated March 26. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 1 EUR E-GER W)
2. The Chancellor said that he agreed with the Sec as to the importance of finding out precisely who was responsible for making such false and malicious reports. In this case, he did not know the individual involved personally. It was not Duckwitz nor Barzel nor Berg nor any of the recent prominent visitors. All he could tell me is that it was a man who had been recommended to him by others as having been quite an accurate reporter in the past. Predictions he had made in the past had pre-sumably been confirmed by subsequent events. He promised that, after he had looked into the matter further, he would tell me who the individual is so that we may be forewarned. The Chancellor then repeated much of the same ground as I reported in Bonn's 9894, defending himself against the accusations allegedly made against him.
3. I assured the Chancellor of our desire to trace down and eliminate all possible sources of false rumors. I was pleased that he accepted at face value the response which the Sec had made. I was sure that he had noted that Erhard did not say he was reporting criticisms made by US Govt officials, but as views which he attributed to the American people. Subsequently, in response to the Chancellor's request, I provided him with a written paraphrase of the messages from the Sec and the Under Sec.
McGhee
257. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State/1/
Bonn, April 3, 1968, 1838Z.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL GER W-US. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to the Secretary of Defense and USCINCEUR.
10380. In my first official call on Ministry of Defense State Secretary von Hase, on April 1, we spent an hour discussing several subjects of current interest:
1. Vietnam--Von Hase made the obvious observation that the bombing cessation now puts the matter of negotiation and peace squarely up to Hanoi. He alluded to the Stern article re the alleged pronouncements of Vice President Ky and indicated interest in what we may discover as to the accuracy with which Ky was actually quoted./2/ Separate verification action is underway.
/2/The article, which appeared in the April 7 issue of Der Stern, pp. 24-25, 251-253, carried the title "Ja, ich bin Korrupt aber woher haben denn die Kennedys ihr Geld?" (Sure, I'm corrupt but how did the Kennedys make their money?)
2. Stockholm financial meeting--Von Hase indicated that the German Government has no reservations with the conference resolutions and the communiqué.
3. Neutralization of troop costs--
A) German postponement of financial talks--Von Hase was not familiar with the recent delay proposed by the German side. In response to my statement that we could not understand it and that if additional governmental meetings were required the Embassy stood ready to conduct them. He volunteered to inquire into the matter with the Foreign Ministry and advise.
B) Long-term solution--Min Schroeder, in a recent speech, alluded to the desirability of a "long-term solution" to the problem of neutralization of troop costs. Von Hase said that Schroeder had no specific solutions in mind; rather, he recognized the disadvantage of annual airings of the problem and simply felt it would be to everyone's advantage to work out a long-term solution--all of this seemingly with full recognition of the necessity of facing the problem of neutralizing our troop costs.
4. German procurement decisions--
A) Multi-role aircraft 1975 (MRA-75)--Germany needs one strong partner to develop and produce the MRA-75 (This is the new title given to the Neues Kampfflugzeug--NKF). This is necessary because all of the German aircraft industry together is to the French aircraft industry as 1:3, to the British 1:6 and to the US 1:35. The Germans require this strong partner not only to help in the development of the aircraft but also to participate in selling it. The MRA-75 aircraft, being down the road, leaves a void in work for the German aircraft industry in the meantime. Filling this void is one of the main considerations involved in the F/RF 4 vs. F/RF 104 "gap filler" decision.
B) Aircraft buy decision--Decision on the "gap filler" aircraft is expected in May, with Parliamentary deliberations to begin after Easter. Acceding that the F/RF 4 is the best aircraft from the military point of view, von Hase personally obviously leans to the F/RF 104 from the standpoints of German industry, politics, logistics and cost.
C) Helicopter decision--The Germans have firmly decided that helicopters are required to enhance the mobility of their ground forces. Parliamentary deliberations on the helicopter decision will go hand in hand with those on the "gap filler" aircraft.
D) Pershing 1A--The Germans definitely intend to buy the improved Pershing 1A missile system--perhaps not the full 72 but close to it.
5. Main battle tank 70--Von Hase expressed satisfaction with the recent main battle tank 70 developments which insure the continuation of the joint development program, including the solution to the funding of the program. He mentioned the psychological and combat advantages which will accrue if our forces who are standing ready side by side in Germany, have the same tanks.
6. Forthcoming SecDef/Minister of Defense meeting--Von Hase placed great importance on the two Ministers getting to know one another. He agreed that the meeting now being arranged for The Hague should be quite informal, a "get acquainted" meeting, however, he is anxious to see the resumption of the semi-annual SecDef/Minister of Defense meetings. For the first semi-annual meeting with Mr. Clifford the Germans did not intend to be "protocol conscious" and would be quite amenable to conducting it in Washington in consideration of plans for Secy Clifford's present responsibilities. He hoped that the plans for the first of these semi-annual meetings could be firmed at the Ministers meeting in The Hague.
7. Mutual force reductions--Von Hase affirmed that the Germans continue to have a keen interest in the general subject of mutual force reductions. They tend to look on our troop rotation as "advance reductions"--to eventual mutual force reductions. He agreed that such actions create a rationale for the Soviets to take comparable actions. There is a German group under the chairmanship of Gen Heusinger studying this subject. Von Hase promised to provide us with a summary of their conclusions up to this point.
McGhee
258. Letter From the Ambassador to Germany (McGhee) to Secretary of State Rusk/1/
Bonn, April 11, 1968.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL GER W-US. Confidential. A notation on the source text reads: "Weekend. A copy of this letter has been sent thru S/S to EUR (copies to U and M) for information."
Dear Mr. Secretary:
You will recall that we have submitted in airgram form analyses of German relations with France and with England, of Germany's Eastern policy and of the problem of reunification. I am now enclosing for your information the final analysis in this series, this one devoted to our own relations with the Federal Republic./2/
/2/Not printed. It was entitled "Principal Issues in US-German Relations," and transmitted as airgram A-1207 from Bonn, April 11. (Ibid.)
On the whole, our analysis is an optimistic one. We conclude that there is no conflict in German and American interests now or in the foreseeable future. The problems and tactical objectives of the Federal Republic have shifted in order to meet the changing circumstances of the late sixties, including the increase in the Federal Republic's own influence and importance. We have had to take this in account in American policy, and it is our conclusion that, generally speaking, this has been successfully accomplished. We have recognized sensitive areas in our relations and have eliminated the most direct causes of contention.
We also conclude, however, that there has been some deterioration of the American image in Germany which has begun to alter the nature and extent of American influence. The major causes of this are Viet- Nam, the social unrest in America and our balance of payments problem. On the German side, while the political situation is stable, there has been an increase in radicalism both on the right and on the left, and both exploit anti-Americanism. We believe nonetheless that we can have confidence in the future of our relations as an important factor in the stability and security of the western community. What we need is to keep in the closest possible contact with the Germans at all levels to ensure that our policies are mutually understood, and to be willing to adjust our concepts of European security and European economic and political organization to those developed by the Germans, in cooperation with the other Europeans, insofar as these do not genuinely prejudice essential American interests.
I hope that you will find time to read the airgram in its entirety, since US-German relations are, and will continue to be, of such central importance to the success of American foreign policy. I am also sending copies, as I have of the other airgrams, to Nick Katzenbach, Gene Rostow, John Leddy, and in the field, to David Bruce, Harlan Cleveland, and to Woody Wallner in Paris.
Sincerely,
George
259. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State/1/
Bonn, April 24, 1968, 1640Z.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 28 GER B. Confidential; Immediate. Repeated to Berlin, Paris, London, Moscow, USNATO, USAREUR, EUCOM, and USELMLO.
11203. Subject: GDR interference with Berlin access. Ref: Bonn 11159; Bonn 11202./2/
/2/Telegram 11159 from Bonn, April 23, reported three instances of East German interference with access to Berlin. (Ibid.) Telegram 11202 from Bonn, April 24, reported on the German presentation to the Quadripartite meeting regarding access. (Ibid.)
1. I am convinced that the succession of East German measures aimed at interfering with German access to Berlin poses a serious challenge which we must meet. Otherwise the East Germans will be encouraged to escalate their pressure on West Berlin and, as FonMin Brandt has stressed, the psychological effect in West Berlin could jeopardize the city's viability.
2. It seems to me that we face two requirements. First, we must show sufficient public reaction to prove that the three Allies and the FRG are actively defending free access. Otherwise there will be increasing media criticism--particularly if instances of access denial recur--and the United States in particular will be singled out for refusing to take a firm position with the Sovs concerning Berlin for fear of prejudicing our relations with the Sovs in other areas. Publicized protests however will not be effective unless accompanied by effective measures designed to persuade the Sovs and the East Germans to bring about cessation of access harassment.
3. With this in mind we are proposing the following steps in a Quadripartite meeting this afternoon/3/ in the hope of achieving agreement on recommendations to be made to capitals for approval:
/3/The Embassy reported on the meeting in telegram 11259 from Bonn, April 25. (Ibid.) A statement by the three powers was released following the meeting. The text was transmitted in telegram 11338 from Bonn, April 26. (Ibid.) Subsequently, the three Ambassadors addressed a letter of protest to Abrasimov. The text of this letter was transmitted in telegram 11339 from Bonn, March 26. (Ibid.) The Mission in Berlin reported on its démarche to the Soviets in telegram 1352, March 29. (Ibid.)
A. In order to clarify the policy being followed by the GDR the FRG should arrange for several probes in which FRG officials of varying ranks should attempt to drive to or from Berlin.
B. A formal protest should be drafted from the three Ambs to Abrasimov covering the specific instances which can be documented of persons denied surface access to Berlin as the result of the latest East German order.
C. In accordance with Ruete's suggestion, the American Amb in Moscow should make a quiet approach to the Sov Govt in behalf of the three Allies pointing to various recent steps taken by East German authorities such as the ban on NPD travel, the East German citizenship law and the present ban on FRG official travel, noting that a certain escalation of East German pressure is apparent and emphasizing the seriousness with which we view these developments. He could inquire what the Soviet intentions with regard to Berlin are, noting that in our view nothing is to be gained by an increase in tension in connection with the city.
D. Agreement should be reached among the three Allies and the FRG on countermeasures against the East German harassments. A list should be prepared which must include German as well as Allied and NATO-wide counteractions, since otherwise the required Allied cooperations cannot be expected.
E. As soon as agreement is reached on such a list NATO should be briefed in detail on the Quadripartite assessment of the threat to free Berlin access and on the various actions, including countermeasures, taken or proposed by the three powers and the FRG. If increased TTD restrictions are proposed, NATO agreement on this will be sought. In NATO the German Rep might be given the responsibility for the general presentation.
4. The recommendation for a further protest to Abrasimov is not in accord with the thinking expressed by Ruete yesterday (first reftel). However, I am convinced that some further publicized move by the three Allies will be required to meet press criticism here and eventually in the US alleging an inadequate Tripartite response.
5. In the event that the British or French do not wish to go along with a quiet approach in Moscow I believe that we should give serious thought to a unilateral US démarche. We shall [have] further recommendations on this when the outcome of today's meeting is known. In the meantime I have just learned that I will be seeing Abrasimov for a final call on May 3. I would expect to use this occasion to raise the access issue with Abrasimov. This conversation could be publicized or kept confidential, depending on the circumstances at the time and Abrasimov's response.
McGhee
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