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FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1964-1968 Volume XV Germany and Berlin DEPARTMENT OF STATE Washington, DC

260. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State/1/

Moscow, April 25, 1968, 1227Z.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 28 GER B. Confidential. Repeated to Bonn, London, Paris, USNATO, Berlin, USAREUR, EUCOM, and USELMLO.

3651. Subj: GDR interference with Berlin access. Ref: Bonn 11202./2/ While I am quite prepared to wade in with the Soviets here on GDR interference with Berlin access, it seems to me this should be last step and not the first, since this involves serious confrontation of two great powers and directly engages Soviet prestige. It seems to me it is typical of Federal Republic always to expect us to take action while such matters as interzonal trade are kept sacrosanct. If we are to be successful in facing down East Germans on this issue, we must find some means of retaliation which really hurts them. While restriction on TTDs is useful, I doubt that this is enough unless we stop issuing any until this issue is resolved. As minimum I should think that before any action taken here, we should have firm agreement on what our next step should be if Soviets ignore our protest. We have a certain amount of capital here but constant tendency to run to Soviets on every issue diminishes effectiveness of each subsequent démarche. I would therefore urge that Federal Republic be made to face up to this issue. I strongly suspect that Soviets tend to ride with punch under pressure from East Germans unless or until Federal Republic and Allies show that East German action is not in interest of Eastern powers./3/

/2/See footnote 2, Document 259.

/3/In telegram 153417, April 26, the Department of State indicated its preference for avoiding further public statements on the issues and for a "quiet approach" to Moscow. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 28 GER B) In telegram 156717, May 2, the Department of State outlined plans for calling in Ambassador Dobrynin for a discussion of Berlin-related issues with Secretary Rusk. (Ibid.)

Thompson

 

261. Memorandum of Conversation/1/

Washington, April 29, 1968, 4:30 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 28 GER B. Confidential. Drafted by Bohlen.

SUBJECT
Access to Berlin

PARTICIPANTS
Ambassador Anatoliy F. Dobrynin, USSR
Deputy Under Secretary Charles E. Bohlen

During his call on me today, I told Ambassador Dobrynin purely privately that I was somewhat concerned over the situation created by the events of the East German authorities to bar the travel to Berlin of the West German Mayor. I said this could create all sorts of unpleasant complications since we regarded it as a violation of the agreement for access to Berlin. Dobrynin said that he had not been informed recently of this development but understood it was not as Mayor of Berlin that Mr. Schuetz had been refused. I laughed and said I thought it was impossible even in East German parlance to divide an individual in two. Dobrynin agreed but repeated that he was not fully informed of the situation.

 

262. Paper Prepared in the Department of State/1/

Washington, May 5, 1968.

/1/Source: Department of State, NSC and Cabinet Papers: Lot 72 D 318. Confidential. An attached memorandum indicates that the paper was prepared for a May NSC meeting. Subsequently, the meeting was postponed to May 15 and then May 22. Page 8 of the paper and page 2 of the summary were revised to reflect the results of May 9-10 U.S.-FRG talks on military cost neutralization. (Memorandum by Benjamin Read, May 10, 1968; ibid.) The revised version of page 8 is printed here. The summary is not printed. The summary notes of the discussion at the May 22 NSC meeting is Document 266.

I. Germany in Perspective

The advent of the present Bonn Government in December 1966 marks a turning point in German-American relations. The Adenauer-Erhard years were years of German dependence upon the United States, with the FRG accepting U.S. tutelage in return for our security guarantees and our support for German efforts to rebuild a prosperous and respected nation. The fall of Erhard late in 1966, and the creation of the Kiesinger-Brandt government, signalled the evolution of German policy toward greater emphasis on the pursuit of reunification of their divided nation. The relative absence of crisis in Europe and the public belief that Soviet aggression had become somewhat less likely; the growth of a détente psychology; the passage of years since 1945 and the erosion of the post-war fears and sense of guilt; de Gaulle's rekindling of nationalism first in France and then elsewhere in Europe; all contributed to a greater German sense of independence from tutelage, and more active efforts to lay the groundwork for eventual reunification. In Germany, however, this has taken place without serious strain on FRG ties with NATO, and without rupturing cooperation and partnership with the U.S. NATO and the U.S. are still regarded in Germany as the basis of security on which German efforts to pursue reunification rest.

The Kiesinger-Brandt government's main single policy innovation has been the pursuit of a more flexible Eastern policy aimed at opening a dialogue with the Soviet Union, improving relations with the Eastern European states, and seeking to extend the FRG's ties with East Germany (short of recognition). The FRG regards improved relations with the East as a contribution to European peace and stability; but, at least equally important, it is a necessary prelude to progress toward reunification. The results of this policy up to now have been modest. This is not surprising. The German leaders have been aware that they are pursuing difficult and long-range goals with their Eastern policy, and that results will be slow at best.

II. U.S. Policy Objectives

We seek, in the framework of a stable and secure European community, a friendly unified peaceful and democratic Germany. With these goals in mind, our specific objectives are to 1) maintain the excellent and confident bilateral relations we enjoy with the Federal Republic at all levels; 2) encourage continuing German support of European integration; 3) promote continuing German confidence and participation in maintaining the security of the West within the NATO framework; 4) promote German cooperation in meeting global economic and financial problems; 5) assure the continued freedom and viability of Berlin; and 6) help promote the eventual peaceful reunification of Germany.

III. Problem Areas

A. Berlin--Our policy is to seek to preserve access to the city; maintain the confidence of the Berliners in our ability to keep the city free; and maintain Allied solidarity to the degree possible in the face of serious problems with France in matters external to Berlin but occasionally affecting Berlin directly. We must assure that our relations with Berlin officials are kept harmonious; and support the principle of close political and economic relations between Berlin and the Federal Republic but avoid allowing serious confrontations with the USSR over Berlin to develop, as far as this can be done without abandoning our responsibilities and rights.

The Soviets have given the East German regime a certain amount of latitude on Berlin access matters. On March 10, the East Germans issued a "decree" banning members of the right-radical NPD party of the FRG from traveling to and from Berlin. This was followed on April 13 by a ban on the travel of FRG cabinet members and other high FRG officials through East Germany. The Three Allies (U.S., U.K. and France) protested this action in a statement delivered to the Soviet Embassy in East Berlin on April 19. To date, there are only three confirmed cases of GDR authorities turning back FRG officials on the basis of this ban. Two were relatively minor officials; the third was the Governing Mayor of Berlin, Klaus Schuetz, who is also currently President of the Bundesrat (Federal Council), the upper house of the FRG parliament this month. GDR officials indicated that it was the latter position that resulted in the refusal to let Schuetz travel on the Berlin-Helmstedt autobahn to the FRG on April 26.

Identical letters protesting the illegality of this GDR interference with Berlin access were sent to the Soviet Ambassador in East Berlin by the three Allied Ambassadors in Bonn. These letters reminded the Soviets of their responsibility to provide access. NATO has been briefed on the situation and the FRG has proposed a series of diplomatic countermeasures to try to force the Soviets to tighten the reins on the GDR. The possibility of trade and travel restrictions on the GDR is also being studied by the three Protective Powers and the FRG.

The motives of the Soviet Union and the GDR in stirring up the Berlin access problem right now seem to include the following:

1. The East Germans are becoming increasingly isolated even within the Soviet bloc. In addition, they are pretty thoroughly isolated from the major international trends and activities of the day (e.g., they are absent from the NPT debate in the UN; they view with alarm the trend toward liberalization in some parts of the Soviet bloc and the first small steps now being taken to bring together the two parts of Europe). One of the few ways available to Ulbricht to exercise leverage on both his friends and his adversaries is the GDR's de facto hold on German ground access to Berlin. He is now using this to show everyone that the GDR is still around and has to be reckoned with. For the longer range, the East German regime may also hope that it can gradually, by salami tactics, assert an increasing degree of access control, reduce the free flow of traffic, and strangle West Berlin.

2. The Russians may wish to use Berlin frictions as a way of maintaining their hold on the increasingly restive East European countries. They may also be willing to let the GDR demonstrate to Bonn one side of the stick and carrot technique (Tsarapkin's willingness to talk with Brandt about non-aggression pacts being the "carrot"). Finally, it is not unlikely that the GDR initiated the decrees and access interruptions on its own, with the Soviets acquiescing but not pushing the GDR into these acts.

We will have to see, through quiet diplomatic intercession with the Soviets, whether the Soviets can be brought to recognize that some of the objectives they themselves say they have in mind for Central Europe (e.g., German acceptance of NPT, avoiding challenge to the status quo there) are put in jeopardy by the GDR's challenge to free German access to Berlin. If we can interest the Soviets in this, the result will not be a sudden retraction by the GDR, but more probably an unannounced diminution in the number of interruptions and denials of access.

There will probably be a rescission, without a major crisis, of the immediate problem over German officials' access to Berlin, since the Soviet Union retains strong controls over the East Germans; has not challenged the Allied regime in West Berlin; and gives no indication of wishing to provoke a major confrontation over the issue. The protests already made to the Soviet Union have led to some easing of East German interference. There are other measures available for use if necessary, including higher-level discussions with the Soviets and graduated Western economic countermeasures against East Germany.

The Berlin problem can probably be solved finally only in the context of a growing together of divided Europe of which it is a microcosm. In the meantime, we should use the political, diplomatic, and economic means at our disposal to counter threats as they arise. These would include engaging the Soviet Union's own interest in not disturbing the status quo; East German economic interests and fear of isolation; and a clear understanding on our own side of the serious consequences to ourselves if Berlin were allowed to die on the vine. The damage to our relations with the Federal Republic; to Western confidence in our commitments and resolution; and to Soviet restraint based on their respect for our power and determination to protect our European interests, would be very great.

B. German Reunification and Eastern Policy--One FRG major foreign policy goal remains the reunification of the German people. The Eastern policy of the governing coalition (better relations with Moscow, relations short of formal recognition with East Germany and diplomatic relations with the Eastern European states) reflects an effort to shake up existing rigidities in the hope of developing a climate or, at least opportunities, for ultimate reunification steps. No responsible German has a reunification timetable but most politicians are convinced that reunification can come about in some fashion. The leaders of the FRG know that at best it will be a slow process, and they will have to be patient.

Relations have been established with Romania and reestablished with Yugoslavia. The Czechs, treading cautiously to avoid Soviet reaction to their internal liberalization, will probably delay establishing diplomatic relations with Germany for a year or two, but closer economic ties are probable. Barring unforeseen circumstances flowing from the present turmoil in Poland,/2/ the Poles can be expected to resist FRG blandishments longer than the others. The USSR will resist any increase of German influence in Eastern Europe, but eventually may try to weaken German ties with the West, using German desire for reunification as bait. For the foreseeable future, however, the Soviets will not allow the GDR to be absorbed by the Federal Republic, nor is the Federal Republic likely to be seduced into abandoning NATO and EEC. More probably, we are seeing the beginning of a long process of greater interchange and discourse between the two parts of Europe, to which current FRG policy has made an indispensable contribution.

/2/Reference is to anti-Semitic demonstrations orchestrated by the "Partisan" faction of the Polish Communist Party that began in March.

The FRG Eastern policy is consistent with our own. In fact, the FRG probably was influenced toward greater flexibility by the U.S. example. Nevertheless, there has been German sensitivity to the U.S. reaction as the FRG seeks to open a dialogue with the Soviet Union. German press reports, private gossip in Bonn and reports by German travelers returning from the U.S., all have been quoted to the effect that the U.S. is worried that the FRG is too accommodating toward the East, talking with the Russians behind our backs, etc.

The U.S. Position--The highest U.S. officials have assured the FRG time and again that we think German Eastern policy is wise, and that we understand and sympathize with it. We will have to show patience and sympathetic understanding on this score for some time to come. At the same time, we have a right to expect the FRG to keep us fully informed about their conversations with the USSR.

C. Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)--Beginning in January, 1967, we have conducted hundreds of consultations with the Germans about the NPT. The Germans have had some serious objections to the Treaty text, most of which have been met. Essentially, however, they remain lukewarm. For one reason, they feel that the Soviets want it primarily to hurt German security; the Germans in turn don't like to make this kind of commitment to their enemies (a commitment they did not mind making in 1954 to their NATO Allies). Many Germans feel they will have to sign the Treaty. This realization does not make them any happier. Brandt's SPD, in general, advises adherence; Kiesinger's CDU is either opposed or lukewarm. Principal opponents of the Treaty include the leader of the Bavarian wing of the CDU, the CSU--Franz Josef Strauss.

The U.S. Position--We believe the FRG should adhere to the Treaty both because the Treaty is valuable in itself and because FRG policy objectives in relations with other Western nations and with Eastern Europe would suffer if the FRG impedes or rejects the NPT.

D. European Security Questions--When the Chancellor speaks of the future of Europe, we know he is not thinking of a Europe which would in any way be hostile to the United States. He foresees our acting together in friendly agreement. Beyond that, it is less clear what he has in mind. It does seem, however, that the Germans today prefer a Europe related to the U.S. in a partnership of equals rather than in what used to be called the Atlantic Community framework.

Although the Germans sense that European arrangements are presently in flux, they continue to rely on NATO as the surest guarantee of German survival, at least under foreseeable circumstances. They recognize that the U.S. with 200,000 men in Germany and its nuclear capacity is the best guarantor of German security. At the same time, they are aware of our need to neutralize foreign exchange losses incurred by stationing our troops and their dependents in Germany. Between 1961 and 1966 the German Government purchased military equipment here in the amount of $600-$700 million annually. In 1966, the Germans no longer found it possible to make military purchases of the previous magnitude. The current arrangement (German purchase of $500 million worth of medium-term Treasury securities) expires June 30. US/FRG talks in Washington May 9 and 10 resulted in an impasse. The German offer to continue cost neutralization for one year at the $500 million level was unacceptable to us in view of the anticipated net foreign exchange loss of about $770 million. We pointed out the seriousness of our balance of payments situation, congressional pressure for troop reductions, and the favorable FRG balance of payments position. There was, however, no give in the German position. The talks were adjourned for two or three weeks to permit the FRG to review the matter with the Bundesbank and in the Cabinet. We still expect to achieve agreement.

E. International Monetary Problems--The strong measures announced at the end of the year by the President to correct our balance of payments problems and to control American investment overseas were accepted by the FRG as a welcome step, although there is concern that we may adopt additional restrictive trade measures. To counter the need for US restrictive measures, the FRG has proposed European concessions in Brussels to encourage US exports. In Washington during gold discussions and later at Stockholm the Germans have been very helpful in maintaining the international monetary system.

F. Relations with France--The relationship with France is important for the Federal Republic because a) rapprochement with France has wide popular appeal; b) the Franco-German tie is necessary for progress toward a more united Europe, eventually; c) association with France may help German efforts in Eastern Europe. The promise of closer ties with France was a key policy plank of the coalition (in contrast to Erhard's alleged neglect to this relationship).

The above considerations sometimes put the Germans in positions where they come perilously close to having to choose between their basic security interests (NATO/USA) and their relations with France. This is a choice which the Germans assiduously avoid. Nevertheless from time to time the Germans publicly disagree with the French on issues such as: 1) unity with the United States and others in Stockholm on the two prices for gold and the additional drawing rights; 2) continued need for NATO protection and specifically United States protection at a time when France has withdrawn from the Alliance in all but name; 3) FRG desire to expand the EEC to include the United Kingdom. The Germans in fact seek to maintain a friendly tone in their relations with France while disagreeing with many major elements of French policy.

U.S. Policy--We should continue to express understanding for German desires for good relations with France. At the same time, we expect the Germans to keep the United States fully informed of any Franco-German agreements or planning that affect our interests and security arrangements.

G. Political Extremism--Political stability under a democratic government is clearly a primary American objective in Germany. As if recognizing this, the radical movements of both the right and left share a virulent anti-Americanism. The extreme right, represented by the National Democratic Party (NPD), is now seated in all but two of the German state parliaments. It had its greatest victory in Baden-Wuerttemberg on April 28 with almost 10 percent of the vote. It is likely to gain Bundestag representation in 1969. Although it may not grow much more, its major importance is that the major parties may during the 1969 elections try to pre-empt some NPD attitudes in order to attract voters. Furthermore, NPD growth causes public uneasiness in other countries, including the United States and other NATO members, and has been and will be exploited by the USSR in savage propaganda attacks against the FRG. Left-wing anti-Americanism has found little echo among the population except with respect to the war in Viet-Nam, which has been exploited as an issue by left-wing elements.

There has been some concern expressed in Eastern and Western Europe that the recent growth of the NPD may mean that Germany could repeat the process by which the Nazis came to power in 1933. It is important to bear in mind that there are fundamental differences in conditions now: the German economy is now strong; Germany is now no longer politically adrift and alone in a hostile Europe; it is no longer potentially the strongest military and industrial power on the entire continent; its people have been through the experience of Nazism once, and except for the ten percent fringe (which Germany has in common with many other countries), the German people have not shown an inclination to repeat that tragedy.

U.S. Posture--We can do very little directly about right radicalism in Germany. We should (a) recognize that 90 percent of the electorate has consistently voted against the NPD; (b) avoid official public comment on what is after all an internal political matter; (c) be aware that the NPD is fed by the absence of any other means for registering strong protest on election day; and (d) see that frustration in the pursuit of legitimate German national aims feeds nationalist extremism. Basically this is a problem the Germans will have to meet themselves. Sharply aware of their past history, the Germans know perfectly well from the press alone what the outside world thinks of the NPD. Official public comment from abroad only feeds extremists.

To the degree that U.S. policies contribute to general economic soundness in Europe, intra-European cooperation in which Germany participates, and to an evolution that gives hope for progress toward the healing of the division of Germany, we will contribute to conditions that make highly unlikely the emergence of extremist groups as serious contenders for power in the FRG.

 

263. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State/1/

Bonn, May 8, 1968, 1858Z.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 28 GER B. Confidential. Repeated to Berlin, London, Moscow, Paris, and USNATO.

11795. Subj: Conversation with Wehner--Berlin access. The main topic discussed during my farewell call/2/ on All-German Affairs Min Wehner on May 7 was Berlin access and related questions.

/2/President Johnson appointed Henry Cabot Lodge Ambassador to Germany and George McGhee Ambassador at Large on April 22. McGhee left post on May 21 and entered on his new duties on May 24. Lodge presented his credentials on May 27.

1. I gave Wehner a brief review of my conversation with Sov Amb to the GDR Abrasimov on May 3./3/ I had pointed out to Abrasimov that recent GDR actions restricting access injected new tensions into a situation which had remained calm for the past three years. It represented an attempt to upset the status quo. I said that Abrasimov had taken the position that the USSR had always protested meetings of Bundestag committees in Berlin and other actions on the part of the FedRep tending to create the impression that Berlin was being treated as a Land of the FedRep. Therefore this could not be considered as part of the status quo. Abrasimov had hinted that if the Fed Govt were to publicly announce their curtailment of these activities, the Sovs would prevail upon the GDR to rescind access restrictions. I had told Abrasimov that I did not see any basis in his proposal for a bargain.

/3/Reported in telegram 1396 from Berlin, May 3. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 17 USSR-GER E) McGhee commented on the meeting in telegram 1399 from Berlin, May 4. (Ibid.)

2. Wehner expressed appreciation for the position which I had taken. He agreed with my contention that Allied protests are not mere paper measures, but undoubtedly had some effect on the Soviet Union. As evidence he cited two recent lengthy articles in Pravda and Izvestia which took unusual and elaborate pains to relate access restrictions to the Potsdam Agreement. Wehner suggested that these articles should be closely studied. He was inclined to think that the Sovs, as a result of Allied protests, now felt it necessary to justify their position on the basis of the Potsdam Agreement.

3. Wehner said that Brandt had reported that the possibility of protest in Moscow was also under study. I confirmed this. I also told Wehner that countermeasures were being studied quadripartitely. If any were instituted, it would have to be by Quadripartite agreement and all, including the FedRep, would have to participate. Wehner agreed with this position.

4. I asked whether he had any suggestions as to what should be done next. Was he in favor of probes to determine the extent of the GDR measures? Wehner said that he was. He said that German civil servants had instructions to proceed as usual in traveling to Berlin. This involved of course the risk and inconvenience of being turned back at the checkpoint and having to continue by air. It was felt, however, that probes of this nature are necessary.

5. The Arndt-Behrendt exchange. Wehner then read from a memcon prepared by Parliamentary State Sec Arndt on his conversation with Behrendt (GDR Deputy Foreign Trade Min) at the Hannoverfair on May 1. He promised to make a copy of this memo available to us./4/ From this conversation it appeared that the GDR was sensitive to hints that access restrictions might affect interzonal trade. Behrendt took pains in pointing out that none of the GDR measures affected interzonal trade and that Pollak (the FRG interzonal trade negotiator) would be free to travel to Berlin by surface means.

/4/The memorandum of conversation was forwarded in telegram 11795 from Bonn, May 9. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 28 GER B)

6. Tsarapkin's Trier visit. Wehner said that the govt was paying close attention to two instances which constituted interference in West German internal affairs. One was Amb Tsarapkin's visit to Trier where, instead of attending the official Karl Marx celebrations, he visited the meeting organized by the leftist opposition. The Chancellor had instructed FonMin Brandt to make a suitable protest to Tsarapkin about this visit.

7. Special train carrying demonstrators. The other question concerned the special Reichsbahn train which would carry demonstrators to the May 11 protest meeting in Bonn from Berlin. This problem was still occupying the Cabinet and a final decision has not as yet been taken. Wehner said that he had taken the position that the govt should refuse permission for the train, at the risk of interference with the gymnastic festival in West Berlin which Wehner considered an ill-chosen occasion for a major exertion on the part of the FRG. It was however a difficult question to decide. The Min of Transport had taken the position that refusal to let the train go through might lead to further restrictive measures with regard to Berlin access. It was a question of judgment.

9. [sic] I agree that it was a difficult question. Permitting this train to go through however could set a precedent for similar demands in the future which would amount to permanent interference in internal German affairs. There was here a parallel to the offer by East German authorities to permit the SDS to demonstrate on the Autobahn. Wehner agreed.

10. Possible visit to the US. In conclusion, I told Wehner that I had greatly valued my association with him. I had admired the energy with which he had attempted to bring motion into the German problem. Wehner responded warmly. When I expressed the hope that he would undertake a visit to the US, Wehner smiled and said that the chances for such a trip decreased as election results became worse (this was the only reference during the conversation to the defeat suffered by the SPD in Baden-Wuerttemberg). He added that he had talked to Amb Knappstein at the foreign policy conclave chaired by Chancellor Kiesinger last weekend, and that Knappstein had urged him also to visit the US. I gained the impression that Wehner might, after all, undertake such a visit if a suitable occasion were found. I would consider this highly desirable and hope it will be followed up.

McGhee

 

264. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Germany/1/

Washington, May 9, 1968, 1559Z.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 28 GER B. Secret. Drafted by Johnpoll and Landfair, cleared by Toon and Stoessel, and approved by Leddy. Repeated to Berlin, London, Moscow, Paris, and USNATO.

160930. NATUS. Subject: Berlin Access. Ref: Berlin 1399./2/

/2/Telegram 1399 from Berlin, May 3, reported the views of CDU leaders on Berlin access issues. (Ibid., POL 38)

1. Department believes we should not encourage FRG to undertake probes (para 5 reftel). Would prefer to allow German travel to Berlin to develop normally; this will bring to light GDR interference with access in any event but would reduce risk of friction among the four western countries, imputations of blame, etc., if deliberate probe should lead to difficulties.

2. We share Ambassador's view that politically inspired efforts to dramatize Berlin-Bonn ties (para 6 reftel) are inopportune but Department reluctant to reproach Germans on them for the time being. Our motives might easily be misinterpreted, and we would not wish Berlin access problems to become a source of friction and misunderstanding between the FRG and ourselves.

3. We understand that FRG authorities are not planning to resume Bundestag plenary meetings or Defense Committee meetings in Berlin, which we agree should be avoided. Dept would appreciate any information that Embassy may obtain that would indicate any changes in FRG plans in these matters.

Rusk

 

265. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State/1/

Bonn, May 16, 1968, 1745Z.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 28 GER B. Confidential. Repeated to London, Moscow, Paris, Berlin, and USNATO. Brandt discussed his meetings with Tsarapkin in My Life in Politics, pp. 161-163.

12181. Subject: Berlin access. Ref: (A) Bonn 12007; (B) State 164087; (C) Bonn 11526./2/

/2/Telegram 12007 from Bonn, May 13, was a situation report on East German activities. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 28 GER B) In telegram 164087, May 14, the Department of State instructed the Embassy that if the issue of Brandt-Tsarapkin talks was raised by the Germans it should state that the United States had no objection to the discussions. (Ibid.) In telegram 11526 from Bonn, May 1, the Embassy reported on discussions with German officials regarding Berlin access. (Ibid., POL 38-6)

1. The Embassy's view is that it would be unwise for Brandt to get into the specifics of Berlin access with Tsarapkin, even German access. The Germans' right of access is inextricably if implicitly bound up with the Allies' rights and with the responsibilities of the Four Powers. It is because this is true that the Allies are in a position to direct their approaches to the Soviets when there is interference with German travel to and from Berlin. A German-Soviet dialogue on access, outside the traditional Quadripartite framework which the Soviets continue to accept, might render it more difficult for us to approach the Soviets in future cases of interference with German access. It was this reasoning which led us in reftel (C) to suggest that it would not be appropriate to have Brandt's discussion with Tsarapkin extend into matters which are an Allied responsibility.

2. The Germans do not seem inclined at the moment to have Brandt pursue the matter with Tsarapkin. They have not informed us that a meeting between the two has been scheduled. They have not indicated that they contemplate any further responses of their own in the access field soon.

3. However, the British Embassy (Gladstone) told us today that London felt a contingency plan should be developed, which would permit a swift Allied response in the event the GDR published a new travel decree or again interfered with German access to Berlin in the next few weeks. Gladstone said the British Minister in Washington had discussed this idea with the Department last week. Essentially what London had in mind was agreeing in advance that at a specified time after some new GDR access interference, the three Allies would proceed to deliver an oral démarche in Moscow. The three governments might also agree in advance to signal their displeasure directly to the GDR, perhaps in the form of a warning to the East German travel bureau about a possible slow down in TTD issuances. The British had no fixed ideas as to the details of this contingency plan but felt something along these lines would help us avoid having to go through the usual cycle of a press statement and protest to Abrasimov. We indicated that this idea had merit and that we would be willing, subject to any Departmental comments, to work out the details of such a plan at our next Tripartite meeting in Bonn on May 21./3/

/3/In telegram 166762, May 16, the Department of State replied that it saw merit in the idea of having Brandt warn the Soviets that "further GDR trouble making around Berlin would jeopardize a fruitful German-Soviet dialogue on matters of broader interest." (Ibid., POL 28 GER B)

McGhee

 

266. Summary Notes of the 586th Meeting of the National Security Council/1/

Washington, May 22, 1968, 12:15-1:10 p.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Meetings File, vol. 5. Secret; Sensitive; For the President Only. Drafted by Bromley Smith.

[Here follows discussion of events in France and Vietnam.]/2/

/2/The portion dealing with France is scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, volume XII.

Under Secretary Katzenbach: Turning to the German problem, he first commented on recent Italian elections in which the Communist Party did better than the Socialists./3/ The result will be difficult negotiations before a new Government can be formed.

/3/The Italian Communist Party had picked up 10 seats in the Chamber of Deputies and 2 in the Senate while the Unified Socialist Party lost 3 seats in the Chamber and nearly one-third of its 1964 vote.

Current East German activity, such as travel restrictions now being imposed, indicate that the East Germans are dealing from weakness. They are concerned about political developments in the Eastern European bloc.

Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Stoessel: The major German problems summarized in the State paper/4/ are: Berlin, relations with the USSR, German resistance to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the offset negotiations, and the political problem raised by neo-Nazis.

/4/Document 262.

Secretary Clifford: Even if the Germans are prepared to accept the figure of $500 million, we will still have a $300 million deficit in offsetting our balance of payment costs.

We cannot continue to keep 300,000 men in Europe indefinitely. We have worked out the problem of the control of tactical nuclear weapons. We must reduce the cost of our presence in Europe.

Secretary Fowler: We must find a long-range solution to the problem of the cost of our European policy. In our negotiations with the Germans, we should go no lower than $675 million. We should do all we can to hold them to the $750 million foreign exchange offset.

Under Secretary Katzenbach: The State Department is working on a project for the next Administration which deals with mutual troop withdrawals and the reduction of the cost to the U.S. of our NATO defense policy.

Secretary Fowler: We must insist, in addition to a reasonable offer on offset, that our European allies cooperate with us in international monetary affairs.

[Here follows further discussion of Vietnam.]

Bromley Smith

 

267. Memorandum From the Ambassador at Large (McGhee) to President Johnson/1/

Washington, May 31, 1968.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Germany, vol. 15. Confidential. A notation on the source text reads: "For the President From Walt Rostow: Herewith George McGhee's [Final Report on Germany]." The report was transmitted to the President at the LBJ Ranch in telegram CAP 81232, June 3. (Ibid.)

SUBJECT
Final Report on Germany

1. Kiesinger. In my last meeting with Chancellor Kiesinger, he asked me to convey to you his warm greetings and to assure you that he still felt as he had expressed himself to you in Washington last August. As he wrote you,/2/ he considers your decision not to seek a new term as an unselfish act of the highest order of statesmanship. In my conversation with him, it developed that his immediate concerns are with the current situation in France, both from the standpoint of its effect on France as a member of the European Community and insofar as it may induce unfavorable reactions in Germany. He is also concerned about the increase of the NPD vote to ten per cent in the recent Baden Wurtenburg elections, and the adverse effect on the stability of the SPD as a coalition partner resulting from its corresponding eight per cent loss.

/2/A copy of the Kiesinger letter is in Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 71 D 370, Germany.

2. Present Internal Situation. Despite the NPD increase and continued student unrest the internal situation in Germany remains relatively stable, particularly in comparison with that in France and even England. The political storm over the Emergency Law should recede once the law is passed. The Grand Coalition, although squeaky, is understood by all to be the only viable government available and will continue at least until 1969. Student unrest, although troublesome, has not resulted--and should not--in a threat to the government as in France. The greatest threat is that it may produce a right wing reaction. Most important, the workers have refused a linkage of their objectives with those of the students, and the labor unions remain conservative and stable and do not threaten strikes. The German economy is moving forward satisfactorily at a rate of five per cent annual increase in GNP, and unemployment has been reduced to manageable proportions. Germany has found itself, increasingly, as a pivotal country in European and world decisions--such as monetary reform, KR acceleration, and British entry. There is, however, an underlying apprehension largely arising from uncertainties in the general world situation.

3. U.S./German Relations. U.S./German relations are on the whole quite satisfactory. Although there is a strong anti-Viet-Nam sentiment among the youth, this has not resulted in any appreciable overall anti-Americanism. We still have a reservoir of good will among the German people and strong support among government and party leaders. Germany, being a country in unstable international equilibrium, must "lean" on other countries. With increasing evidence of French internal weakness, there should be a tendency to shift toward greater dependence on the U.S.--particularly the American security guarantee and the continued high level of U.S. forces in Germany. The creation of a Popular Front Government in France would produce a feeling of "encirclement" in Germany, which would require special reassurances from us. At the same time Kiesinger will continue to show that he is capable of pursuing an independent policy, which first takes into account German interests. He will continue to seek greater freedom for maneuver in the face of rapidly changing circumstances. He will continue, in a pragmatic way but with little hope of a real breakthrough, to press for progress in German Eastern Policy.

4. Current Problems. (a) NPT. The Germans are reluctantly drawn along by the course of events toward the signing of the NPT. I am convinced, particularly as a result of my last discussion with the CDU leader, Kurt Birrenbach,/3/ that they will sign--if a large majority of the other important nations of the world do. They will, however, wish to wait until after the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearings and will be influenced by the firmness of U.S. interpretations of ambiguities in the treaty and Soviet reactions.

/3/No record of the meeting was found.

(b) Offset. We are in the final stage in the negotiations for an Offset Agreement for the next fiscal year. In my judgment, the 250 million dollar difference remaining between us can only be settled by a "splitting of the difference" approach--involving concessions by both sides. In my last meeting with him, I urged Kiesinger that the Germans better their current offer.

(c) Troop Levels. The Germans remain sensitive to possible further decreases in U.S. troop levels. Reductions beyond the limited deployment now under way should be avoided if at all possible--and assurances to this effect given--although this need not preclude savings in "non-combat" activities.

5. Future U.S. Approach. We should continue to maintain and strengthen our ties with Germany as perhaps the most stable and potentially influential free world country, through full and early consultation--as an equal. We should be alert to and reassuring in regard to well-known German sensitivities.

George C. McGhee

 

268. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State (Katzenbach) to President Johnson/1/

Washington, June 12, 1968.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Germany, Berlin, General, vol. 1. Confidential.

SUBJECT
Berlin

The Department, upon learning yesterday of East German restrictions on travel by West German citizens to Berlin through East Germany and to East Germany itself, as well as on German freight traffic to West Berlin, convened the Berlin Task Force. The Berlin Task Force was formed in response to President Kennedy's request in 1961 to meet Soviet threats at that time to sign a separate peace treaty with East Germany. The Berlin Task Force, with representatives of State, DOD, CIA and USIA attending, examined a draft tripartite statement forwarded by Embassy Bonn. The Embassy had met with the British, French and Germans last night to consider how to deal with the situation created by the East German measures. The Task Force agreed to recommend to the Secretary that Bonn be authorized to discuss with the British and French an amended text to be issued after we have received further German plans on how to deal with the situation and you have given your approval to the final draft.

Final agreement on the draft has now been reached and you have given your approval. We expect the Three Embassies in Bonn to issue the statement tonight./2/

/2/For text, see Documents on Germany, 1944-1985, p. 1009.

The USIB Watch Committee this morning considered the Berlin problem and concluded that no Soviet or East German military measures relevant to the Berlin problem have been observed thus far.

The German Cabinet was called into session at 9 o'clock this morning and at the time of writing had met for more than four hours. Foreign Minister Brandt cut short his trip to Vienna and Belgrade to return for the Cabinet session. The Chancellor saw Ambassador Lodge this evening and told him he regards the situation as serious./3/ He said that it was important that responsible and realistic steps be taken. The Chancellor feels that the Three Protective Powers should take the matter up with the Soviet Union in the first instance, before the Germans do so, because it is a Quadripartite Agreement (to which the Germans are not a party) that is being violated by the Russians. Further steps that might be taken are under urgent study here and in Bonn. The Germans know we will expect them to do their share.

/3/See Document 269.

The German Chancellor has also announced that he plans to go to Berlin tomorrow. While the trip is billed as an "information trip" its purpose is obviously to buck up Berlin morale.

The East German measures, almost certainly undertaken with Soviet agreement, are designed to underscore further East German claims to sovereignty. Soviet agreement for the imposition of visa requirements by the Ulbricht regime probably was obtained late last month, when a high level East German delegation visited there. East German and Soviet thinking may be that the greater flexibility among West Germans on the question of recognition of the GDR, together with assumed difficulties we are having and recent French events, make this an appropriate moment to take this step. While the restrictions will not directly affect Allied access to Berlin, the East Germans can use them in a great many ways to harass traffic and the flow of goods to and from Berlin. West Berlin is almost entirely dependent upon the Federal Republic for its existence, and any impairment of this flow would strangle the city.

Nicholas deB. Katzenbach

 

269. Telegram From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson, in Texas/1/

Washington, June 13, 1968, 2133Z.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Germany, vol. 15. Confidential. Received at the Communications Center at the LBJ Ranch at 6:10 p.m.

CAP 81278. You will wish, I believe, to get the flavor of Kiesinger on the meaning of the East German visa move. Countermeasures not yet decided.

Bonn 13232.

Subj: Meeting with the Chancellor on Berlin access.

1. Summary: During a meeting with the three Allied Ambassadors this afternoon, Chancellor Kiesinger termed the East German measures on passports and visas a step in a long-prepared plan aimed at a gradual weakening of the status of Berlin and at the FRG. The Soviet Union clearly stands behind the measures and is seeking to isolate the FRG and to divide it from its allies. The new East German measures are not aimed only at Berlin and the FRG however but also at the Three Powers. The Chancellor felt that the assessment of the seriousness of this development provided in BQD-CC-28/2/ was correct. As suggested in that document countermeasures are required and not just protests. The Chancellor urged as a first step that the Tripartite public statement be issued by the three governments as quickly as possible. The German Government had not reached decisions on specific countermeasures which the German and Allied sides should undertake. This should be the subject of close Quadripartite consultation. He would welcome démarches by the three Foreign Mins with the respective Sov Ambassadors. The three Ambassadors expressed on a personal basis general agreement with the Chancellor's assessment of the situation and said that their governments would wish to consult closely in order to find the right response to the East German steps. End summary.

/2/Not found.

1. Chancellor Kiesinger met with the three Western Ambassadors for an hour this afternoon to discuss the East German passport and visa requirements. Also present on the German side were State Secs Carstens, Guttenberg and Duckwitz. The Chancellor first said that he would go to Berlin tomorrow to meet with Governing Mayor Schuetz for a discussion of the situation. He will not follow Schuetz's suggestion that he take part in a Senat meeting since he does not wish to provide the East Germans with any pretext for claiming that the FRG is seeking to intervene in the government of West Berlin. He thought that under the present circumstances the population of West Germany and of Berlin considers his visit necessary.

2. The Chancellor said that in his government's view the East German move is a step in a long-prepared plan that is aimed at a gradual weakening of the status of Berlin and at the FRG. The Soviets do not wish a real Berlin crisis and actual travel to Berlin will probably not immediately be affected. The dangerous thing however, is that the East Germans have created an instrument which can be used at any time in the future to interfere with access.

3. The Chancellor referred to the Quadripartite document BQD-CC-28 and said that the assessment contained therein of the seriousness of the introduction of a visa requirement was correct. The FRG believes that the East German measures are aimed not only at the FRG but also at the Three Powers. He felt that "not just protests but countermeasures are needed," if possible as contemplated in the BQD.

4. What makes the present East German moves more serious, Kies-inger stated, is that they mark a clear escalation. There is no doubt that the USSR stands behind the East German regime. It is trying more and more to isolate the FRG and divide it from its allies. The Sovs are seeking "permanent right of intervention in the FRG," they will not accept the very sincere FRG policy of seeking a relaxation of tension. Instead, they intend "to force us to our knees" and they naturally seek to use Berlin for this purpose as the most exposed point. The Sov approach to the FRG is so blunt as to be actually disarming as when, for example, they insist publicly that the FRG must sign the NPT and that the FRG signature is the only one of interest to them.

5. The time has come to make the Sovs realize, Kiesinger said, that they cannot through an indefinite continuation of salami tactics force the FRG to accept Sov positions. "My request," the Chancellor said,"is that the Allies, as foreseen in the BQD, take a very clear position against the East German moves." This is necessary to maintain the confidence of the German population in Germany's allies. The German people will expect a very clear position both from the FRG and the Three Powers "in the framework of the overall political situation." The Chancellor realized how difficult problems connected with Berlin were and how necessary it is to proceed with caution and realism. A balance is required in finding the right response but the basic elements of BQD-CC-28 are right.

6. The Chancellor said that this was a preliminary presentation of the German views which would be followed by written papers spelling out the German position in greater detail. He urged that in the meantime the three governments issue as quickly as possible the proposed Tripartite statement. The German Government had not yet issued a formal statement and would do so only after consultation with the Allies. The statements made by the FRG press spokesman yesterday and today were "impromptu."

7. The three Ambassadors expressed, on a personal basis, general agreement with the Chancellor's assessment and indicated that their governments would wish to work in close consultation, as the Chancellor had suggested, in finding the right response to the East German move. The French Ambassador said that he personally was of the opinion that the passport and visa requirement could not be left unanswered. Ambassador Lodge said that the United States considered the East German move a matter of the highest importance. He had been particularly interested in the Chancellor's mention of counter measures and asked if the German Government had any specific ideas. The Chancellor replied that they have not yet considered what measures can appropriately be taken by the FRG and the Allies.

8. Ambassador Lodge also noted that BQD-CC-28 foresees the possibility of the three Foreign Ministers and the German Government making appropriate démarches to Soviet Ambassadors or in the German case to East German trade reps. The Chancellor said that he would welcome an initiative by the three FonMins with the respective Soviet Ambassadors in order to express serious concern over developments. The Chancellor was not yet sure that he would call in Soviet Ambassador Tsarapkin right now since he considered it in the first instance better for the three Allies to approach the Sovs given the fact that it was a Four-Power agreement which has been violated. At an appropriate time he would, of course, make the FRG's views known to Tsarapkin.

9. Our comments follow by septel./3/

/3/Telegram 13246 from Bonn. June 13. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 38)

Lodge

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