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FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES
1964-1968 Washington, DC |
270. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
New York, June 14, 1968.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 28 GER B. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Thompson. Secretary Rusk flew to New York on June 14 for meetings with Secretary-General U Thant and Romanian and Soviet officials. He returned to Washington that evening.
SUBJECT
Berlin
PARTICIPANTS
U.S.
Secretary Rusk
Ambassador Goldberg
Ambassador ThompsonSoviet
Deputy Foreign Minister Kuznetsov
Ambassador Malik
Ambassador Dobrynin
Mr. MendelevichThe Secretary said he wished to raise the question of Berlin. We were very much disappointed at recent developments affecting the 4-power agreements on Berlin to which the Soviet Union was a party. We were always sensitive to developments affecting access to Berlin. It was difficult to understand why these actions had been taken without any consultations with the other interested parties. The measures taken affected travel and trade and were a threat to the viability of Berlin. He hoped the authorities in East Germany and in the Soviet Union realized the gravity of making decisions affecting access to Berlin. The measures already taken were slowing down the traffic to Berlin. There was a further aspect and this was how these measures could be taken if there was a serious interest on the part of the Soviet Union to get Germany to sign the non-proliferation treaty. The German point of view was that they were already committed to their allies on the question of atomic weapons. They considered the NPT a unilateral concession to the Soviets without any reciprocity. The measures with regard to access to Berlin fed the opponents of the non-proliferation treaty in West Germany and added an additional new burden on this problem. The timing almost made it look as if the purpose was to sabotage the non-proliferation treaty. The Secretary said we could not accept the reason given for these measures. The Mayor of Berlin had made it clear that the emergency legislation would not apply to Berlin and there had been a gradual improvement of relations between the United States and the Soviet Union and between the countries of East and West Europe. The question arose whether East Germany wanted to interrupt this. He concluded by saying this was indeed a very serious matter.
Kuznetsov said the Government of the GDR had taken no new steps with regard to the existing situation on access. The line was the same as before. The East Germans were handling the access with respect to West Germany on the same basis as they would citizens of a foreign country. They now only require visas, which was a normal practice of sovereign countries, and allied access was not affected. It was not the intention of the Soviet Union to aggravate relations with the United States or with other war-time allies. We have developed an approach and understanding with respect to the GDR which the Soviets considered a sovereign state. Any attempt on the part of the West Germans to connect the non-proliferation treaty with the visa problem was deliberate on the part of opponents of the non-proliferation treaty.
The Secretary said that, looking at the long-standing practice with respect to access to Berlin, it was hard to see how these measures could be taken in this way at this time. The East Germans were requiring visas and imposing a fee for transit to West Berlin which was a burden on access. The proposed taxes on goods in transit were costs which could be discussed in the existing machinery for Inter-Zonal trade between East and West Germany. The way in which these measures were carried out, including neglect of consultation among the four powers with responsibility, was of very serious concern.
271. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation/1/
Washington, June 14, 1968.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Germany, vol. 15. Secret. No drafting information is on the source text.
PARTICIPANTS
Georg von Lilienfeld, Minister, Embassy of the Federal Republic of Germany
Eurgene V. Rostow, Under Secretary of State for Political AffairsMinister von Lilienfeld called Mr. Rostow to tell him that he had received a personal call from the Chancellor (off the record) on another matter but said that they were concerned about the German situation and in particular what the US and allies would do. Von Lilienfeld said that the Chancellor sounded very worried, that this thing might go on in Berlin, that they wouldn't be in a position to do much about it but protest, and that the other side could well get away with it. This would have a deep effect on public opinion, that there were feelings of frustration and discontent which seem to be in vogue, and that a weak and ineffective response could affect German attitudes to the allies.
Mr. Rostow said that we do take the GDR move very seriously, that it was extremely important that we work together and that the FRG take responsibility along with the allies.
Mr. von Lilienfeld said that he also told the Chancellor this. The feeling seems to be that an FRG move on the interzonal trade would not really be effective. Steps in other directions should be taken.
Von Lilienfeld said that Diehl also called him about getting to Berlin by air. If PanAm and some others could increase their air travel to Berlin, sort of a shuttle, that this would have a great effect by showing that something was being done. Von Lilienfeld added that, "Now you have to wait for days before getting to Berlin." Re the shuttle idea, he thought this would have a strong effect. Mr. Rostow said he would take this up with his colleagues.
272. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Read) to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow)/1/
Washington, June 16, 1968.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Germany, vol. 15. Secret. A notation on the source text reads: "C[op]y sent Ranch at 3:30 PM 6/16."
SUBJECT
Berlin Situation, June 15The autobahn remains quiet with traffic lighter than normal due to a three-day German holiday and no abnormal delays currently being experienced by travelers to and from Berlin.
There are continuing unconfirmed rumors that Chancellor Kiesin-ger may visit Washington, Paris and London in the near future to seek support. The President is considering sending the Chancellor a special message of support on the Day of German Unity, June 17./2/
/2/For text of the President's message, see Department of State Bulletin, July 8, 1968, p. 44.
The British and French called in the Soviet Ambassadors yesterday and made strong representations concerning the East German measures. The Soviet representatives took the line that the East German measures were "routine" and did not affect Allied access.
The Berlin Task Force met for two hours this morning to consider further developments and to examine proposed countermeasures. The BTF supported calling a special meeting of the NATO Permanent Representatives in Brussels for June 18 or 19, when the other NATO countries will be informed of the developments. This will be especially useful if their support is solicited for countermeasures in the trade and travel field.
In Bonn preparations are going ahead on a written tripartite legal protest, to be delivered in Moscow, against the violation of quadripartite agreements. We expect the drafts to be submitted to the three governments for approval on June 17. The Bonn Quadripartite Group is giving intensive study to countermeasure proposals. The FRG has proposed that it impose special levies on East German truck and barge traffic in the FRG, payable in hard convertible currencies--a suggestion in which we have concurred and suggested even further strengthening.
The Bonn Quadripartite Group has also agreed, with our concurrence, to propose in NATO that East Germans seeking to travel in the West (outside the FRG) be required to pay fees in hard currencies for their travel documentation--a service which had been rendered without fee in the past. We are maintaining a 24-hour watch in the Operations Center of the Department.
NWDavis/3/
/3/Davis signed for Read above Read's typed signature.
273. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State/1/
Bonn, June 18, 1968, 2017Z.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Germany, vol. 15. Secret; Immediate. Repeated to Paris, London, Moscow, Berlin, USNATO, USAFE, USAREUR, USNMRSHAPE, EUCOM, and USELMLO.
13432. Subject: Quadripartite Ambassadorial luncheon discussion of Berlin access problems.
1. At the regular Quadripartite Ambassadorial luncheon on Berlin and related problems today, State Sec Duckwitz made the following points in describing the FRG's position on the Berlin situation as worked out in yesterday's Cabinet meeting:
A. The formal statement to be made by the Chancellor in connection with the June 20 Bundestag foreign affairs debate is still in preparation but will be provided to the Allies shortly./2/
/2/For text, see Documents on Germany, 1944-1985, pp. 1010-1012.
B. The FRG does not contemplate an approach to Soviet Ambassador Tsarapkin in the near future. The FRG has taken steps to inform governments around the world of the East German moves and of the Federal Government's assessment of them.
C. It is not opportune to take countermeasures in the interzonal trade area since this would be very dangerous to Berlin. Duckwitz said the FonOff would send the three Allies a detailed explanation of this position.
D. The FRG is contemplating legislation which would bring into effect the automatic application in Berlin of Federal legislation subject only to negative action on the part of the Berlin Government or the Allies to prevent the application of individual laws. I also hope that the three Allies can provide now a favorable response to the FonOff aide-memoire of December 1, 1967 concerning the elimination of the Berlin clause in individual treaties. In this context Duckwitz also mentioned that the Reichs-tag building in Berlin would be ready next year but his inference was not clear.
E. The Berlin assistance law would be extended without any time limit.
F. It was hoped that an air shuttle service could be established between Berlin and Hannover so that the total cost of travel between points in the Federal Republic and Berlin by air would not be greater than the train fare. The FRG would provide the necessary subsidies. (Further details on this available from other FRG sources are being reported separately.)
G. The FRG hoped to utilize the laws on political parties and on passports to prevent entry into the Federal Republic of undesirable elements from the GDR whose purpose was subversion.
2. Duckwitz estimated that the Federal outlay required to compensate for the effects of the new East German measures would be about DM115 million annually. In connection with the travel restriction paper, Duckwitz said that Chancellor Kiesinger had opposed a public announcement on TTD restrictions alone since they seem such a small response to the situatuion.
3. The FonOff called a Bonn Group meeting shortly after the Quadripartite luncheon during which the following further details and background emerged on the German position:
A. The report of the Harkort Task Force deals with the possibility of action on the part of the FRG to suspend the IZT agreement/3/ or to begin a blanket denial of Warenbegleitscheine (shipping documents) thus stopping all shipments to the GDR. The Task Force concluded that such measures would be dangerous for Berlin and would not seriously interfere with the East German economy unless all Western countries suspended shipments. The Task Force concluded that this was not a likely possibility. This led to the conclusion that countermeasures in the IZT field were not opportune. It was decided, however, that the Cabinet should suspend consideration of measures to facilitate the East German regime such as the oil subsidy, the settlement of the PTT account and any further increase in the swing credit. Van Well said that if the Allies had other suggestions to make the German side would be glad to hear them and it was agreed that an experts meeting would be held tomorrow.
/3/Interzonal trade was regulated by the Berlin agreements of August 16, 1960, signed by officials of the Federal Republic of Germany and German Democratic Republic acting as representatives of their "economic areas."
B. The decision on IZT does not cover other possible countermeasures in related fields such as transportation. The Ministry of Transportation has completed a paper on truck and barge charges which will now be considered at the State Sec level.
C. In considering the whole problem, the Cabinet came to the conclusion that the Allies had publicly emphasized their own rights frequently during the past months but that it would be useful if measures were undertaken by the Allies which would reinforce the Federal Government's position in West Berlin. This would reassure the Berlin population and would be an appropriate answer to the Soviet Union and to the GDR. The FRG had thought of the Berlin clause change and the applicability of Federal legislation in Berlin as long pending issues on which action would now be useful and appropriate. Van Well could not elucidate State Sec Duckwitz's reference to the Reichstag building. However, the FonOff has now informed us that Duckwitz was referring to this as a major FRG construction project which would soon be completed as an example of Federal aid. The FRG has plans to reconstruct a library as a further such project.
4. During the meeting the German side raised for discussion the German paper on the activities of GDR trade and travel offices in Western countries. The French and British representatives said they had referred the German draft to capitals but expect that it would take several days for London and Paris to provide comment. Both reps thought it would probably be better if this FRG paper was not the next presentation to NATO. For psychological reasons it would be better to present NATO with some further paper outlining German action in either the trade or transport fields.
5. Our comments follow by septel./4/
/4/Not identified.
Lodge
274. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State/1/
Bonn, June 19, 1968, 1924Z.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Germany, vol. 15. Secret; Immediate; Exdis.
13515. Subj: Brandt-Abrasimov conversation.
1. Assistant Secretary Ruete called in the British, French and US DCMs to report on the Berlin aspects of the Brandt-Abrasimov conversation. Ruete explained that the other aspects of the conversation, which covered détente in general and mutual renunciation of the use of force, would be reported on personally by Brandt to the FonMins in Reykjavik on Sunday./2/
/2/See Document 278.
2. Ruete first reported on the origins of the meeting and some of the atmospherics. Brandt was invited in his capacity as SPD Chairman. Abrasimov emphasized this point, at one time making a disparaging remark about Tsarapkin and saying that it is much better to have "man to man" talk between members of Central Committees: like Brandt and himself. Another peculiarity of the meeting, Ruete said, is the fact that as late as 8 p.m. yesterday the East German news service, ADN, was saying that Brandt was still in West Berlin, even though he had been in East Berlin since 4 p.m. The implication was that the Soviets and the East Germans were not on the same wave length.
3. Ruete said that the origin of the meeting was a Soviet invitation to Brandt three weeks ago, before the East German measures on June 10. Immediately after receiving the invitation, Brandt had cleared the idea of accepting with the Chancellor. Ruete said that Brandt had done this because he was aware that the meeting was a potential "coalition splitter" and he wanted to be very sure that he and the Chancellor had a full understanding from the outset. Then came the East German measures on June 11, before Brandt had a chance actually to visit Abrasimov. Brandt again got the Chancellor's approval for the meeting, taking fully into account the new situation created June 11. (Comment: Ruete's account was not clear on whether the immediate initiative for holding the meeting yesterday came from Brandt or Abrasimov, and questioning by the DCMs failed to clear up this point. The obscurity suggested that the immediate initiative came from Brandt.)
4. In reporting on the meeting itself, Ruete read carefully from Brandt's written report. Brandt introduced the subject of Berlin. He referred to the East German visa measures as a "grotesque" thing to apply to Germans on German soil. He also said the East German measures were contrary to the whole effort at détente, both politically and psychologically. Brandt cited Chancellor Kiesinger's March 1st answer to Tsarapkin/3/ as proof that the FRG wants no aggravating of the situation in Berlin.
/3/For text, see Documents on Germany, 1944-1985, pp. 988-989.
5. Abrasimov answered with what Brandt characterized as three defensive arguments: A) The East German measures had nothing to do with existing international agreements, and the East Germans were entirely in their rights in doing what they did; B) The volume of traffic has not in anyway been affected. To prove this Abrasimov pulled out voluminous statistics on traffic for individual days before and after June 10; C) In general, the Soviet Union wants no tension in and around Berlin.
6. Abrasimov further said that the FRG has no political claim to West Berlin. Abrasimov said that the Soviet Union has never put into question the right of West Berlin to work culturally and economically with the FRG.
7. Later in the evening, the subject of Berlin came up again, this time raised by Abrasimov. He raised it in a curious way, asking Brandt what he should report to Brezhnev as Brandt's main point on Berlin. Brandt replied that he should tell Brezhnev that he, Brandt, had stressed the damage which would result for all concerned, including the détente effort, from the East German access measures. Abrasimov then said that the real problem was the efforts of the FRG to politicize West Berlin. He cited the holding of the CDU Parteitag and the plenary session of the Bundestag in West Berlin as examples. Interestingly, Abrasimov disparaged the importance of the FRG emergency legislation, strongly implying that this had simply been used as a pretext by the East Germans.
8. Brandt again referred to the Chancellor's March 1 message to the Soviets to show that the FRG has no claims on Berlin and wants no tension there. Brandt then repeated that the East German measures were serious and spoke particularly about the burden which they place on the average man. They hit hardest those least able to bear the burden economically. Brandt at this point suggested that it might be possible to work out a kind of "lump sum" overall settlement, negotiated directly between the FRG and the East German government, for all the costs of the use of the Autobahn. This presumably would substitute for the individual charges for visas and the movement of goods. (Comment: Questioning of Ruete by the DCMs made it seem that this proposal had not been thought out within the FRG and may have been a spur of the moment idea by Brandt.)
9. Significantly, Abrasimov reacted quite positively to this idea. Brandt felt that this was an encouraging sign.
10. Ruete said that Brandt's general impression of the whole conversation was that it was neither discouraging nor encouraging, but he did feel that Abrasimov was trying to make clear that the Soviets wanted no worsening of the situation in Berlin. There was also, by indirection, some flavor of the Soviets not being entirely with the East Germans on the June 11 measures, but this was nothing you could put your finger on.
11. In a press conference earlier this afternoon Brandt carefully dodged questions about the substance of his talks with Abrasimov. He stated merely that they had discussed questions of mutual interest, including, of course, the situation in Berlin.
Lodge
275. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
Washington, June 20, 1968, 3:15 p.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Germany, vol. 15. Secret. Drafted by Johnpoll and approved in U and M on June 27. The meeting was held in the Under Secretary's Conference Room.
SUBJECT
BerlinPARTICIPANTS
Alexander Boeker, Ambassador-at-Large, FRG Foreign Office
Georg von Lilienfeld, Minister, FRG Embassy
Horst H. Holthoff, First Secretary, FRG EmbassyThe Under Secretary
Walt W. Rostow, Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Eugene V. Rostow, Under Secretary for Political Affairs
George C. McGhee, Ambassador-at-Large
John M. Leddy, Assistant Secretary, EUR
Alfred Puhan, Country Director for Germany
Helmut Sonnenfeldt, INR/RSB
Alexander C. Johnpoll, ERU/GERThe Under Secretary welcomed Ambassador Boeker and told him how useful it was to have an opportunity to get German thinking on the Berlin problem just before the Reykjavik meeting.
Boeker said that the FRG felt very strongly that the situation should not be dramatized, and is trying to avoid creating the impression of being overly concerned. But everyone in the FRG knows of the great potential for danger in the present situation, and the Government is greatly concerned over the long-range effects of what the "GDR" has now done.
Three facts stand out:
1. The "GDR" is trying to enhance its prestige and standing as an international entity.
2. The new "GDR" visa and passport measures impose an economic burden and irritating hindrances on traffic with Berlin, but in themselves they do not represent a serious danger.
3. The great danger is that if the "GDR" gets away with this, it will be tempted to escalate the fees and other hindrances to the point where they become prohibitive and highly dangerous.
As things now stand, it will cost the German people about 100 million DM per year. One can easily imagine how the "GDR" can screw this figure upward.
The FRG had tried to look at the situation through the eyes of Pankow and Moscow. It did not seem to be a case of Ulbricht dragging the reluctant Russians along, but rather a long-range concerted plan. Two factors seem to have induced the Russians to let the "GDR" act at this time: various signs of weakness in the Western camp, and unrest, such as in Czechoslovakia, in the Eastern camp.
The FRG does not wish to dramatize and escalate the situation, but neither does it wish to behave like an ostrich. What the FRG has to think about together with the three Allies and with the wider NATO group is, at what point do we really have to undertake serious countermeasures. The FRG especially wants to talk with its American friends about what can be said to the Soviets to convince them that a point will unavoidably be reached, as things are now going, when the situation will have become not merely irritating but intolerable.
The Under Secretary asked whether the FRG has any further concrete steps in mind.
Boeker replied that there were none that the FRG hadn't already mentioned to the three Allies in Bonn for discussion in Reykjavik. He said that the FRG is open to suggestions for things that might be done together to prevent further "GDR" escalation.
Mr. Leddy pointed out that the major action available to us short of coordinated action in the trade field has now been taken with the imminent NAC approval of TTD measures.
Ambassador McGhee asked whether the FRG saw the purpose of countermeasures as overcoming the existing situation or the prevention of further "GDR" escalation. Boeker replied that it would be good if we could overcome the existing situation, but this would be difficult. He repeated the suggestion he had made earlier today of trying to reach a compromise with the Soviets for the "GDR" to enforce its demand for visas for entry into East Germany but drop the visa requirement for transit to Berlin.
Boeker said that it was useful to compare the situation now with that at the time of the Berlin Wall. The construction of the Wall was a dramatic act but was essentially defensive--to stop the economic hemorrhaging of East Germany. The current move is not dramatic but it is a dangerous and aggressive act because it is aimed against Berlin's viability. We should all, in responding to Soviet statements that the matter doesn't involve the Allies, reply publicly that it does indeed involve the Allies because if the "GDR's" act remains unchallenged, the potential will have been created for the destruction of Berlin's viability.
Under Secretary Rostow pointed out that we have protested to the Soviets and are looking hard with our German, British and French colleagues at the problem. He said that we are not clear, however, on the FRG position. Is the FRG interested in trying to get the "GDR" action undone? Has thought been given to asking the German people to avoid getting passports for travel to Berlin?
Boeker said "no", because that would really strangle Berlin. The enormous traffic between the FRG and Berlin would come to a halt except for a trickle of persons by air. The fact of the matter is that there is a power physically in existence which demands passports and visas. In order to keep Berlin alive and keep the traffic flowing, the FRG can only go ahead and acknowledge the existence of this power and announce, as Kiesinger did today, that the exercise of that power to force stamps on FRG citizens does not mean recognition of the "GDR".
The Under Secretary said that he understood the FRG view that it could live with the "GDR" effort to try to gain prestige from visa enforcement, and could put up with the inconvenience of the "GDR" travel and freight hindrances. It was somewhat more difficult to see how the FRG could handle the psychological problems. How will the Berliners react? How do you choose the point at which you draw a clear-cut line beyond which the situation cannot be accepted?
Boeker replied that the Berliners have over the years shown a great deal of stamina and determination, and they will continue to do so up to a point. Where that point is, nobody knows. It depends on the firmness of the responses and on the continued Allied presence in Berlin.
The Under Secretary asked what the FRG would have us do.
Boeker replied that the Allies in Reykjavik should make clear how high the stakes in Berlin are, and should show solidarity with the FRG. In this connection, Boeker said, it was hoped that Secretary Rusk might visit Germany after the Reykjavik meeting. He anticipated that Brandt would officially invite the Secretary when they met in Reykjavik.
Boeker said that it was important that the Foreign Ministers at the NATO meeting should state clearly and publicly that the situation in Berlin is close to that danger point of intolerability.
Mr. Leddy pointed out that we had discussed this morning the interzonal trade as a possible countermeasure. It is regarded traditionally as internal German trade, and the FRG is approaching IZT countermeasures very cautiously because of this; because it is not easy to reverse; and because evidently the FRG had considered this as an isolated German measure rather than a coordinated Western move. But we had thought of trade measures in terms of a NATO-wide step which could be quite effective. There are some loopholes in "GDR" trade with the West, e.g. Austria and Sweden. But with common NATO action, trade measures could hurt the "GDR" considerably. If it were decided by the Governments involved that some form of trade measures were needed, he was not pessimistic about the chances of getting common NATO action.
The Under Secretary said that he agreed that if some such step were to be taken it would be better to do enough to make it really pinch the East Germans.
Boeker thought that selective trade measures might be useful. He added that IZT is intimately bound up with supplies going to Berlin--Berlin might be badly hurt if IZT were cut off.
Boeker said that there is an isolated danger that people in Germany will acquire a feeling of being left isolated, in the absence of counter- measures. Also, in both the CDU and the SPD, there is a growing feeling that the FRG will have to take another look at the NPT in the light of the "GDR" and Soviet actions. Perhaps there would be some virtue to tying FRG signature on the NPT to a Russian guarantee on Berlin access.
The Under Secretary said that we should look at possible selective measures on a contingency basis, to see that we are in agreement on what would work and what wouldn't.
Boeker said that another aspect of "GDR" trade that could be examined would be the transit of "GDR" goods through Western countries on the way to ports--Austria, Denmark, Italy and others provide such transit facilities.
Walt Rostow asked where further contingency planning is taking place.
Mr. Puhan replied that this work is focused in Bonn, with the Quadripartite Group there.
Under Secretary Rostow said that it is clear that Ulbricht wants to isolate the two parts of Germany and the two parts of Europe from each other. We in the West, on the other hand, want more and more contact to take place. Our public position is clear that we regard the recent "GDR" steps as illegal, and we have protested against them. We don't want to take measures that the FRG doesn't want to do itself or doesn't want us to do. Evidently, the FRG is searching for a plan that would avoid future escalation rather than addressing itself to the current "GDR" steps. Is there an advantage to waiting? Boeker replied that the FRG is doubtful that serious countermeasures can be mounted, and it doubts whether there are available countermeasures that really would be effective. What has to be done is to make clear to the Soviets that there are limits to Western tolerance.
The Under Secretary said that the Soviets, the Germans, and we are all in the dark as to just what that limit is.
Mr. Sonnenfeldt thought that the Soviets rather than Ulbricht control the Eastern side of this problem. It is necessary to get the Soviets to put the brakes on Ulbricht by showing the Russians that their own interests would be better served that way.
Under Secretary Rostow said that trade countermeasures could be costly and might interrupt the processes of trying to bring the two parts of Germany closer together. He wondered whether it would be easier to face this early, when a matter of principle is involved, or later when it becomes a matter of the amount of money the "GDR" is trying to extort from its hold on access.
Boeker replied that there is not much in the way of countermeasures which offer much promise of effectiveness. It is necessary to say something to the Russians to show them that their own interests are involved.
Mr. Puhan said that in considering the use of countermeasures it is necessary to weigh their possible effect on public opinion. What will the effect of the situation be on the next elections in Germany, on the political parties, on the German public's view of the Allies. The U.S. looks to the Federal Republic for answers to some of these questions.
The Under Secretary thought that a significant public gesture should be made by the Foreign Ministers in Reykjavik.
Boeker agreed. He thought that at Reykjavik it would be necessary to convince the NATO Allies that it is not merely a question of visas that is involved but the potential strangulation of Berlin. Mr. Sonnenfeldt said that we would all have to think about some ways to get the Soviets and the "GDR" to stop the process of escalation against Berlin, and even pull back somewhat on implementation of the new "GDR" regulations.
The Under Secretary said that in considering countermeasures we should not give undue weight to the economic difficulties that would be involved for Western countries. Psychologically it might impress the Russians more to see a willingness on the part of the West to undertake measures that hurt us somewhat.
Mr. Puhan said that it was important to point out to our German friends the falseness of various news stories that the U.S. is unwilling to support the FRG in this problem because of our desire to improve relations with the Soviet Union. We have, in fact, supported the FRG and Berlin. The President's message is an example. Mr. Sonnenfeldt thought that we should be thinking of steps to be taken now to avoid a greater crisis three months from now.
The Under Secretary proposed that we all take a look at specifics on possible countermeasures that the Secretary and Brandt could look at in Reykjavik. We should also do some work on deciding on what kind of statements should be made there.
Mr. Puhan pointed out that we already have the draft text of a Tripartite legal protest to be delivered in Moscow.
Boeker said that in the recent talks with the Soviets on Berlin, the U.S. and U.K. referred to the breach of international agreements, whereas the French had only referred to a violation of established practices. He wondered whether the French are going along with the draft text of the Tripartite legal protest.
Mr. Johnpoll replied that the French Embassy in Bonn had gone along with it, but it had of course been referred to Paris for government decision, which we do not yet have.
Boeker agreed that we should all come up with a few specifics for examination in Reykjavik and that it would have to be made clear there to the other NATO Allies that steps should be taken in order to avoid a later, more serious, difficulty over Berlin.
276. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State/1/
Bonn, June 21, 1968, 1935Z.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Germany, vol. 15. Secret; Immediate; Limdis. Repeated to London, Paris, Moscow, Berlin, USNATO, USAREUR, EUCOM, USAFE, USNMR SHAPE, and USELMLO.
13634. Subj: Conversation with Kiesinger re Berlin.
1. Summary. Chancellor Kiesinger during an hour's conversation with the Ambassador this afternoon emphasized in strong terms the seriousness with which the entire CDU/CSU, the over-whelming majority of the SPD and the Federal Government as a whole view the East German passport and visa requirement. He thought that if this step were not met firmly it would be followed by a more serious Communist escalation. The objective must be to bring the East Germans to revoke the requirement whether this would prove possible in the end or not. The Federal Government was prepared to take any steps within its power and while the Chancellor did not feel that IZT constituted a very effective measure, he did not entirely rule it out. The United States for its part must talk directly to the Russians in a "most energetic" fashion. The German people must get the feeling that the Americans are "firm." The United States must convince the Soviets of the seriousness with which we view the situation. The Chancellor expressed his great hope that the Secretary would visit Bonn after the Reykjavik meeting if his health permits. Such a visit alone would have a beneficial psychological effect for the West Germans and Berliners. End summary.
1. The Ambassador met for an hour's discussion of the Berlin situation with Chancellor Kiesinger this afternoon at the latter's request. The Chancellor at the beginning noted that he had just come from a meeting of the CDU Steering Committee where yesterday's Bundestag debate had been discussed. He wished to express his views on the Berlin situation to the Ambassador before leaving Bonn for the weekend.
2. The Chancellor said that the FRG's friends must know that we here--all of the CDU, and overwhelming majority of the SPD and the whole government--view the Berlin situation as "very serious." The Chancellor was particularly pleased that the President in his message had expressed regret that Berlin "was again threatened." The East German move is in reality a threat, the most serious since the Wall. This may, the Chancellor noted, seem overly dramatic to an outsider but not to those who are familiar with the past history. Access, including civilian access, has always been most closely linked with the continued freedom of West Berlin.
3. The Chancellor said that the passport and visa requirement has undoubtedly been under consideration in East Berlin for a decade. It is interesting that the East Germans chose this particular moment to implement it. They may have felt that the present combination of circumstances--the Presidential elections in the US, the political upheaval in France, and the economic problem in England was particularly opportune. Developments in Czechoslovakia may also have played a part. The Chancellor could not judge whether the initiative was taken by the Soviets or the East Germans. The important thing was that the decision was made to take this "dangerous step." "It is my strong conviction," the Chancellor said (switching into English), "that at present the German people feel what will happen next, and then and then?"
4. The Federal Government desired to avoid escalation. It was in any event too weak alone to take strong steps. The FRG is prepared however, to take any measures it can in East Berlin. The Chancellor knew that the three Allies had frequently mentioned IZT. He was ready to do something in this field but he feared that it is not an effective measure as it had been in 1960. The GDR was no longer as vulnerable as then. The Chancellor emphasized that his government was ready to do everything "to strengthen the viability of Berlin." As he had said in the Bundestag, something must be done to make the other side cancel the new requirement. "We must not put up with it. We must strongly demand that the requirement be rescinded." Otherwise they will certainly escalate and the next step would mean that the confidence of the German people in Germany's partners, particularly the US, would be dangerously weakened. For this reason energetic and vigorous steps are required. The Chancellor noted in this connection that the extreme groups on the left and on the right in Germany are both endeavoring to exploit anything they can to encourage anti-Americanism.
5. The Chancellor then said that he had asked Brandt to urge the Secretary to come to Bonn after the Reykjavik meeting if possible. (At this point a news ticker was brought to the Chancellor indicating that the Secretary had announced he would decide on a visit to Bonn next Monday.) The Chancellor noted that the Secretary knows the whole Berlin problem so well and has always taken such a firm stand. The fact alone of the Secretary's visit would be of psychological benefit in West Germany and Berlin.
6. The Chancellor said that the great majority of the German people are convinced that the US and the FRG must stand together. His own party in particular has fought bitter fights for German-American friendship against earlier calls in Germany for neutralism. He doesn't expect the impossible from the Allies but he hoped that most of all in Washington the situation was seen as seriously as in the FRG.
7. The Ambassador replied that the United States Government certainly considered the new developments affecting Berlin most serious. Washington was not inclined to say that the German side must take countermeasures before we would do anything. In the Ambassador's view the key principle was to act "together." He noted that some effective steps had already been decided upon and that the Bonn Group has proven a useful instrument. The Ambassador thought that the German proposal for an air shuttle service between Berlin and Hannover and perhaps other cities was a very good idea. Whether the East Germans will revoke the visa requirement, however would, in his view, depend on whether the Soviets are really backing them up. Effective countermeasures taken now might in any event deter further Communist encroachments. The Chancellor agreed that this was an important objective.
8. The Ambassador then asked the Chancellor just what he had in mind that the United States should do. He replied that the most important thing is for the US to talk directly to the Soviets. He was asking for a "most energetic US approach." He had talked with the President and knew our problems--that we must carefully manage crises and not destroy such possibilities for understanding with the Sovs as may exist. We should not think that the Germans were the "last warriors" of the cold war. The German people, however, must get the feeling that the Americans are firm. If together we can reach a common "design" for action and the US warns the Soviets at the same time, this will help.
9. The Chancellor noted that he had made clear to Sov Ambassador Tsarapkin that the Federal Government is prepared to be realistic about Federal activities in the city. The FRG's legal position must be preserved and he could not say that a political party or the Bundestag would never again meet in Berlin. On the other hand, small questions such as the Defense Committee or police trade union meetings were of no real interest, and de facto solutions could be found. The Chancellor had the impression, however, that the Sovs were no longer interested in such solutions.
10. The Ambassador, referring to the Chancellor's request for a firm American approach to the Soviets said that for us to be firm there must be something concrete "in sharp focus" to be firm about. The Chancellor agreed that any US démarche must be credible. The Federal Republic, he said, is an orderly and healthy country. There were difficulties with the farmers and there would be further student unrest but there would be no political upheaval in the FRG unless some new source of unrest is introduced. He did not wish a loss of confidence in Germany's Allies to constitute such an element.
11. The Ambassador, after expressing his admiration for the way in which the Federal Government had so far handled the East German threat stated that he would report the Chancellor's views to Washington where he was sure they would be studied by the President and the Secretary.
12. Comment: The Chancellor's failure to be concrete on what he wanted us to be "firm" about leads me to the view that he was "making a record"--putting himself in a position to say that he had "told" us.
Lodge
277. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
Washington, June 21, 1968, 5 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 28 GER B. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Bohlen and approved in S/S on June 21.
SUBJECT
Berlin SituationPARTICIPANTS
Ambassador Anatoliy F. Dobrynin, USSR
The Secretary
Deputy Under Secretary Charles E. BohlenAmbassador Dobrynin told the Secretary he was leaving tomorrow for consultation in Moscow but did not know for what subject. He rather doubted it was for a Central Committee Meeting, and in any event expected to be back within a few days. Dobrynin then said he had been instructed to make the following comments in regard to the Berlin situation in response to the Secretary's observations to Kuznetsov last week in New York./2/ He said he was to tell the Secretary that the Soviet Union, as was hoped was the case in the U.S., was not interested in creating a state of tension in regard to the Berlin situation. The actions by the GDR were the result of an unrealistic and provocative policy followed by the West Germans. These actions however did not affect the rights for travel of the U.S., France or Great Britain, and were not inconsistent with any foreign power agreements. The GDR had for some time exerted rights in regard to passports, visas and documentation at certain specific points in their territories and that there would seem to be no grounds for any allied concern.
/2/See Document 270.
The Secretary inquired what particular policy of the West German Government did the Soviet Government have in mind. Dobrynin said it was using West Berlin as a meeting place for Bundestag committees and treating it as though it belonged to West Germany. There was also the emergency measures for the West Germans. The Secretary pointed out that the emergency measures specifically did not apply to West Berlin. He then pointed out the 1949 agreements in which the Four Powers reverted to the situation which existed prior to the blockade, namely on free transit of persons and goods./3/
/3/For text, see Documents on Germany, 1944-1985, p. 221.
Then ensued a discussion as to whether or not the East German actions were in violation of the 1949 agreement, with the Ambassador maintaining that they were not since nothing new was added, but the Secretary and Mr. Bohlen maintained that the power to regulate could theoretically imply the power to limit or stop. Ambassador Dobrynin did not agree with this interpretation. The Secretary pointed out in support of his argument that as he understood it a family of five West Germans would have to pay $17.50 to go into East Berlin, and he also pointed out that the taxes imposed on goods could theoretically be increased so as to constitute a real impediment to their movement.
The Secretary then inquired exactly what was it that Ulbricht feared. Dobrynin said he did not know that Ulbricht was afraid, to which the Secretary replied that he obviously was; he seemed to be concerned at the establishment of a peaceful, normal situation around Berlin, and it was not clear what he was afraid of--was it the situation in Czechoslovakia or was it simply that he was afraid of peaceful coexistence?/4/
/4/In telegram 13964 from Bonn, July 1, the Embassy suggested that the substance of this discussion be passed to the German Government. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Germany, vol. 15)
278. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
US/MC/17
Reykjavik, June 23, 1968, 1 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 69 D 182, CF 303. Confidential. Drafted by Puhan and approved in S on June 25. The meeting was held at the U.S. Embassy Residence. The source text is labeled "Part I." Part III, a discussion of NPT, is ibid. Part II, dealing with mutual force reductions, is printed in Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. XIII, Document 314. Brandt discussed the NATO meeting in My Life in Politics, pp. 165-166.
UNITED STATES DELEGATION TO THE FORTY-FIRST
MINISTERIAL MEETING OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL
Reykjavik, Iceland, June 24-25, 1968PARTICIPANTS
United States
The Secretary of State
Assistant Secretary Leddy
Deputy Assistant Secretary Springsteen
Mr. Al Puhan, EUR/GERGermany
Foreign Minister Willy Brandt
Mr. Georg Duckwitz, State Secretary
Dr. Hans H. Ruete, Assistant State Secretary
Mr. Wolf Schilling, Personal Assistant to State SecretarySUBJECT
BerlinThe Secretary said that Berlin had been much on our minds. He was very much interested in how the Foreign Minister saw the Berlin problem. He would welcome information regarding Brandt's visit with Abrasimov. The Secretary said he had three talks with Ambassador Dobrynin and, as Brandt knew, one with the Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Kuznetsov on Berlin.
Brandt said he was anxious to give the Secretary full details on his meeting over and above those already given by Ruete to the three DCMs in Bonn,/2/ and those which had been given to Ambassador Lodge yesterday./3/ However, his notes would not arrive until later and details would have to wait until then. He said Abrasimov had asked him to come and see him before the East Germans imposed their restrictions.
/2/See Document 274.
/3/No record of this conversation was found.
The Secretary asked whether Brandt thought Abrasimov knew of East German intentions when he invited the Foreign Minister of the FRG.
Brandt was not sure. Abrasimov told him that he had been ordered to go to Moscow to report to the meeting of the Supreme Soviet later this month and to the meeting of the Central Committee in early July. Abrasimov had told Brandt he had instructions to discuss all aspects of the FRG-Soviet relationship and to report to Brezhnev, Kosygin, and Podgorny with Gromyko present. Abrasimov invited Brandt to say something first.
Brandt said he told Abrasimov that he sometimes felt a mood of resignation regarding the USSR. Two topics were then discussed in detail: the renunciation of force and Berlin. Brandt said Brezhnev had called while he was talking to Abrasimov. Abrasimov asked what points he should make to Brezhnev. Brandt said that he told him to say to Brezhnev that on Berlin the USSR must not go contrary to the spirit of détente. He told him to say that if the Soviets were not satisfied with the FRG's April 9 memorandum on renunciation of force,/4/ Bonn was prepared to have further discussions. Abrasimov told Brandt that an answer to the April memorandum was on its way. Brandt gave it as his view that the Soviet reply would be quite negative.
/4/For text, see Documents on Germany, 1944-1985, pp. 997-1002.
Brandt concluded that there were no modifications in Soviet policy. While the Soviet presentation was not aggressive, there was stubborn insistence on their point of view. The Secretary said we had had that experience for many years.
Brandt said the Soviets appeared to play with history at times. He had recalled to Abrasimov that there were times in history where the Russians and Germans had been able to live in harmony. Brandt had cited in this connection the end of the 18th Century. Abrasimov did not disagree.
Brandt said Abrasimov had a paper with him on Berlin. Reading from this paper, Abrasimov attacked Brandt, stating that when he went from Berlin to Bonn and became Foreign Minister, the claims of the FRG on Berlin were stepped up. Abrasimov said he did not understand why the West Germans were complaining about the recent East German measures. He told Brandt that the FRG was fully aware of the treaty the Soviet Union had with the GDR and that it was the view of the Soviet Union that it was within GDR competence to impose the measures it had recently enacted. Brandt told Abrasimov that it was incongruous that the Yugoslavs and the West Germans should agree to dropping visas at the very moment the East Germans were imposing them.
The Secretary recalled that one Soviet official had called the East German measure anachronistic. Brandt said Abrasimov recited figures of people traveling to West Berlin, demonstrating that more West Germans went to West Berlin after the imposition of the East German measures than before. He asked Brandt how that could be called damage. Brandt said Abrasimov told him something which was apparently not in his paper, saying the Soviets wanted quiet (Ruhe), but warned Brandt that any manifestation of increased FRG presence in Berlin like the planned CDU Party Convention or a meeting of the Bundestag would have very serious consequences. Brandt added that Abrasimov said relations would be somewhat easier and certain things could be settled more easily after Schuetz, the Mayor of Berlin, was no longer President of the Bundestag. The Secretary noted that this was a point that bothered the Russians.
Brandt continued by saying that in Berlin itself, there was no feeling like that in 1958 or at the time of the Wall, but there was a good deal of resignation. Brandt said he was much worried about a deterioration. He felt that we might be in danger of getting on very wide roads, leading nowhere if we continue to talk about and plan on the basis of countermeasures developed in the past. The East Germans had been given the green light by the Soviets because of the effect their action would have on Czechoslovakia and on strengthening Bloc solidarity. East Berlin took its recent action despite knowing that in a relatively short period of time it could have gotten a good deal of money out of the FRG. He referred in this connection to the willingness of the FRG to pay oil subsidies and certain road fees. He said Finance Minister Strauss had been agreeable. He concluded that East German officials dealing with trade matters had been pushed aside in favor of a political act. If this conclusion was correct, fees for TTD's, fees to be paid by East German ships, are all of questionable value as countermeasures.
Brandt assured the Secretary that he was aware of American criticism that the West Germans had reacted reluctantly to the East German measures. He said he was aware of our expectations that the Germans should do something more. But, Brandt said, if his theory was correct that the East German measures represented a political action, it would have to be dealt with by the three allies with the USSR and, unfortunately, the United States would have to bear the largest part of this burden. Brandt said very emphatically that the Russians must not get the impression that there can be détente which excludes the problem of Berlin. He did not wish to leave the Secretary with the impression that the Germans were rigid on the point of other countermeasures. But in his view the political significance of the East German action was the dominant factor.
The Secretary said that he had hit the Soviets very hard on the Berlin situation. He referred again to his meeting with Kuznetsov and his three talks with Ambassador Dobrynin. The Secretary said he had some real concern about the total relations of Communism and the Free World. He saw a real problem in the Soviet-China relationship. He thought the developments in Czechoslovakia and Romania had disturbed the Soviets greatly. He recalled the feeling close to panic in Moscow after the Middle East crisis erupted. He thought the Soviet leaders faced real problems which made them very dangerous.
The Secretary said that he personally had been expecting difficulties in Berlin, in Korea, and in the Middle East. He had asked Dobrynin what Ulbricht was afraid of. What dangers would Ulbricht see in the Czechoslovakia developments. Dobrynin had been unwilling to reply.
The Secretary said that we were in a very delicate total situation. He felt we would be very fortunate if we got through this fall without difficulties in Korea.
The Secretary agreed with the Foreign Minister that developments in Czechoslovakia had a bearing on the situation. So did the situation in France and the unsettled political situation in Italy. He felt that the surprises and tragedy in the U.S. electoral campaign had also affected Soviet thinking. At no time had solidarity among the Western powers been of greater importance.
The Secretary said the Soviets had emphasized in talking to us their strong feeling about FRG efforts to incorporate West Berlin. The Secretary characterized the East German move as shrewd, since the Soviets were aware of differences between the constitutional view on Berlin held by the FRG and the three Western powers. The Secretary said the Soviets cited the recent German emergency legislation as a cause of East German retaliation. He said he had brushed this aside, and he was aware that Berlin Mayor Schuetz had denied the applicability of this legislation to West Berlin. The Soviets have told us, the Secretary continued, they had no desire for tension and did not wish to affect access to Berlin. They called the recent measures simply a change in form, a change in formalities. The Secretary said the Soviets knew that U.S. citizens traveling to unrecognized regimes like that of Communist China or of Cuba regularly get visas. The Soviets went to special pains to say they wanted quiet (Ruhe) in Berlin. The Secretary assured Brandt he didn't accept this Soviet explanation. He felt the Soviets must have known that the East German move would cause real problems. He told Brandt that we had protested the violation of Quadripartite Agreements reached after the end of the blockade of Berlin.
At this point, the Secretary expressed his appreciation for Ambassador Boeker's coming to the United States. He said he was looking forward to seeing Chancellor Kiesinger in Bonn.
The Secretary reminded Brandt that the Kennedy administration had begun with a Berlin crisis. At that time we had taken a very strong lead. We increased our defense budget by millions. We moved troops but no one else added anything. The Secretary said we were all alone. The French made no contribution and indeed even the Foreign Minister's predecessors in the FRG directed their suspicions at us rather than at the Soviets. The British were a pale echo. He said he wanted to be sure that we acted now with complete solidarity. He stressed the importance of establishing Four Power unity in the meeting tonight.
The Secretary said we were prepared to press the Soviets hard. He felt that it would be impossible for us to accept physical limitations on access to Berlin. This would affect Allied rights to Berlin. He reminded Brandt that the power to tax, as Chief Justice Marshall once said, was the power to destroy.
The Secretary agreed that countermeasures presented an extremely frustrating problem as long as physical access was not impaired. He mentioned the restrictions on GDR travel already taken by NATO. He wondered if it was not possible that the financial arrangements affecting trade could not be a matter of discussion between the two Germanies. He asked whether there had been any real interference with access.
Brandt said there were very few cases of interference. He recalled the East German decree on travel through the GDR by NPD members and a later one relating to FRG officials. He felt that the East Germans were not enforcing the latter measure.
The Secretary interjected that the measure against NPD members was obviously very clever because the Soviets knew we wouldn't fight a war over NPD members going to Berlin.
Brandt said he had sought Tito's judgment last week on the Soviets' intentions in Czechoslovakia. Tito said he was almost sure the Soviets could not turn the clock back in Czechoslovakia. He gave as reasons the Soviets' serious problems in other parts of the world, and the fact that Czechoslovakia had greater support in Eastern Europe, particularly in Hungary and Rumania, than the Soviets realized.
Brandt mentioned a recent incident where the East Germans stopped a truck carrying atlases which depicted the GDR as East Germany. This GDR gesture was a possible indication of future incidents. Brandt said the GDR could claim underwear manufactured in Berlin was produced for the West German Army. He thought that a most successful countermeasure would be to invite journalists to go to Berlin in an Allied car with Allied travel orders.
Mr. Leddy queried as to what the East Germans would do. There was no answer.
Brandt pointed out that in his view the imposition of fees was more important than the use of visas. Fees could be doubled; they could be used in a number of arbitrary ways. Brandt said he had told Abrasimov that the West Germans had been willing to make practical arrangements for the use of services maintained by the East Germans, roads, waterways, etc. He thought it was better to make a lump sum payment to the East Germans for the use of such services than to have fees levied on individual users. He noted that something like this had been worked out within IZT when he was Mayor in Berlin. He thought such proposals were of interest to East German planners, if they had any say in the matter, since they would remove the uncertainty regarding receipts of West German payments.
The Secretary thought Brandt's efforts had been very constructive. He asked whether the time had come to suggest to the Soviets a Joint Commission to regulate such matters. It appeared to him, and he emphasized he was speaking only in an exploratory sense, that there were advantages in making such a proposal to the Soviets, even if it were rejected.
Brandt seemed receptive to the suggestion. He also mentioned the possibility of going back to the idea of establishing an access authority for Berlin though he wondered if the suggestion was not now passe. He said he would appreciate it if the Allied side would speak to the Russians about establishing some sort of a Commission. He thought the Germans could parallel this action by insisting that a pre-condition for it should be a guarantee of freedom of travel and traffic.
The Secretary thought we might get somewhere if we related travel and traffic to Berlin with general international practice. He wondered what India charged Pakistan for the transit of goods. He wondered if general international practice in this regard might not be studied and applied to Berlin. He saw a whole range of possibilities. Positive steps also were needed to strengthen Berlin. He asked if organizations now located elsewhere could be moved to Berlin.
Mr. Leddy said we had already suggested that the International Bank and the Fund hold their next meeting in Berlin.
The Secretary wondered whether we could find ways of buying more in Berlin. He thought the quadripartite Bonn Group might look into this. The Secretary said that if the East Germans intend to depress the economy of Berlin, we must demonstrate that we can lift it.
Brandt said he would appreciate the inclusion in any record of support for Berlin the fact that the FRG was willing to make its contribution. Brandt noted recent efforts by the Bundestag to give preferential economic and financial treatment to Berlin. He then noted that in a recent Cabinet discussion the question had been raised whether, after seven years, the time had not come to restate or reformulate Allied commitments to Berlin. He said his colleagues in the Foreign Office, and the Chancellor, also would not be unwilling to help reformulate the relations of the FRG to Berlin. Brandt said he would tell the French and British about it tonight if it made sense to the United States. Brandt said that differences in interpretation of the legal situation in Berlin had been exploited by the Russians. They might, however, be prepared to accept an interim arrangement until Berlin becomes a whole. He said this might be put in terms of West Berlin being "linked to the FRG" rather than described as a "Land of the Federal Republic."
The Secretary said that this is a problem because it causes difficulties with the Russians and is divisive among the Four.
Mr. Leddy said the FRG "link" to Berlin might be stated in terms of viability.
According to Brandt, Abrasimov had voiced no objection to Berlin's cultural and economic relations with the FRG. He wondered if experts might not be able to devise a formula which could take advantage of this Soviet view to make it difficult for them to impede travel.
The Secretary recalled that in the crises of 1961 and 1962 it was of the greatest importance in dealing with the Soviets to stress that we--the Allies--were responsible for Berlin; that the United States was in Berlin. Our responsibilities for Berlin and our position in Berlin resulted from World War II. We are not indebted to the Soviets or anybody else for our presence in that city. The Secretary said the Soviets had had to accept this, and that is why we have been sensitive to any suggestion that our responsibility for Berlin be diluted. The Soviets have emphasized that they have no interest in interfering with allied rights to Berlin. He noted that deriving from this is an allied interest in the closest association of Berlin and the FRG.
The Secretary noted that we could exercise little pressure on the East Germans because our trade with them was very small. Moreover, few Americans travelled to the GDR.
Brandt agreed and noted that German interest was far greater since 600,000 people travelled between West Berlin and the FRG during one month.
Mr. Leddy noted that as many as 10 million West Germans move to and from West Berlin annually.
The Foreign Minister said the NATO Agreement on TTDs would affect very few people. Trade between East Germany and the West had declined. IZT trade had declined last year by 11 percent, and by 13 percent in the first quarter of this year. At the same time Brandt noted that GDR trade with the East was on the increase.
Mr. Leddy pointed out that if measures in the trade field were to be effective, they would have to be concerted and imposed by all members of NATO.
Brandt said he liked the British very much but he had great doubts about British willingness to go along with that suggestion.
The Secretary laughingly agreed and reminded Brandt that we remembered British trade with Cuba and China.
Mr. Leddy said that he simply wanted to emphasize that we could not think of countermeasures in the trade field in isolation.
Brandt said if the existing IZT agreement were cancelled the FRG could not get another one including Berlin.
The Secretary recalled that during an earlier Berlin crisis the British had insisted trade countermeasures were steps to be taken only just before nuclear weapons would be used.
279. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
US/MC/20
Reykjavik, June 23, 1968, 7 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 69 D 182, CF 303. Confidential. Drafted by Puhan and approved by S on June 27. The meeting was held at the British Embassy.
UNITED STATES DELEGATION TO THE FORTY-FIRST
MINISTERIAL MEETING OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL
Reykjavik, Iceland, June 24-25, 1968PARTICIPANTS
Federal Republic of Germany
Mr. Brandt
Mr. Duckwitz
Mr. Ruete
Mr. Van WellUnited Kingdom
Mr. Stewart
Lord Hood
Mr. Maitland
Mr. Benchley
Mr. ParsonsFrance
Mr. Seydoux
Mr. Puaux
Mr. Schricke
Mr. ManiereUnited States
The Secretary of State
Assistant Secretary Leddy
Mr. Springsteen
Mr. PuhanSUBJECT
Quadripartite DinnerAfter welcoming his guests to the Quadripartite Dinner, Mr. Steward asked Mr. Brandt to give an account of how he saw the situation in Berlin. Mr. Brandt said that if time permitted, he would also like to discuss German views on European security and the renunciation of force.
On Berlin, he thought the measures taken by the East Germans were part of a political program. A risk existed that the Soviets would be encouraged by their current success and seek to implement further measures. He thought the Alliance as a whole was called upon to do something about the East German restrictions. He indicated three areas in which action could be taken:
1. Manifest Western solidarity, to make clear that harassments would bring the Allies more closely together. FonMin Brandt expressed his appreciation for the statements of support from his colleagues and for NATO's efforts in the field of temporary travel documents (TTD's). He said it was important that political statements were devised to influence the Soviets.
2. Strengthen the viability of Berlin. He said the FRG Government would be promulgating a law which provided for substantial economic aid to Berlin. The FRG would also assume the burden of the levies imposed on passengers and traffic to Berlin. He felt that, in connection with Berlin's viability, we must make it clear how important we regard the ties between the FRG and Berlin. He assured his colleagues that they need fear no juridical arguments, but he wished to emphasize that the ties between the FRG and Berlin were of vital importance. He asked for a clear reply by the Allies to the Soviets in support of FRG efforts. He suggested it might be useful if the legal advisers in the Bonn Group were to study how the Western sectors of Berlin could be "linked to" the FRG in the absence of reunification.
3. Demonstrate to East Berlin that measures like their recent ones do not pay. He said countermeasures had to hit them where their greatest concern lies, namely in their desire for recognition.
Mr. Brandt said the East Germans knew that they were giving up certain economic advantages when they took their most recent actions. The Western Germans had been prepared to grant them a petroleum subsidy, and to make payments for postal services rendered by the East Germans. They discounted these economic advantages and opted for political actions. Thus, Minister Brandt felt countermeasures in the economic sphere would not be very effective. He urged his colleagues not to fall victim to the view that the Germans were running away from using IZT to counter the East German measures. He noted IZT trade had decreased greatly in 1967, by more than 11%. There was another decline of 13% in the first 3 months of this year. The GDR was trading more with other Western countries as well as with the East of Europe. He asked what measures could be taken. He said it was important that the Three Powers in the Allied Travel Office make absolutely clear when they refuse TTD's to East Germans that their action is in response to East German travel restrictions which directly affect the Allies responsibility. He asked if the Three could look into the possibility of transporting some Germans who were refused admittance by the GDR by Allied Military transport to and from Berlin. In other words, Minister Brandt said, we would like to move not only into the air but by land. He recalled the use of travel orders issued by the Allies to Germans when he was in Berlin.
Mr. Brandt asked what would happen if countermeasures failed. Mr. Brandt said Berlin was an essential problem which could not be excluded from East-West discussions. He added that there could be no détente which excluded Berlin. Minister Brandt said Kiesinger felt that we all must insist upon a withdrawal of the East German measures. Mr. Brandt made a distinction between travel into the GDR itself and transit travel from the FRG to Berlin. He pointed up the additional burdens which the East German measures imposed on the little man in Germany. He said a family with 3 or 4 children, going on vacation from Berlin to the FRG, would have to add another 50 DM's to their costs. He said this was not a theoretical but a very real problem.
Mr. Brandt recalled his conversation with Soviet Ambassador Abrasimov. He said Abrasimov had insisted that he was seeing Brandt as a member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. The Soviet Ambassador's Counselor in picking up the German Foreign Minister in West Berlin for the meeting had demonstratively addressed him as "Mr. Party Chairman". Mr. Brandt said he had made it very clear to Abrasimov that the Germans regarded the situation created by East Berlin as very serious and that it could have very serious consequences for FRG-Sov relations. Mr. Brandt said Abrasimov rejected these arguments. He regarded the East German action as normal and said it represented only a change in formalities. He cited figures to Brandt to show that travel to Berlin had increased since the East German measures had been put into effect. He assured Brandt that the Soviets wanted no trouble. He accused Bonn of creating all the noise. He warned Minister Brandt against any manifestation of FRG activity in Berlin, mentioning in this connection a planned CDU Party Convention and a meeting of the Bundestag, which Minister Brandt said incidentally had not been planned. Abrasimov, according to Mr. Brandt, told the Foreign Minister that the FRG's claims to Berlin had increased since Brandt had come to Bonn.
Minister Brandt said on other subjects he could discover no change in the Soviet position with the possible exception of some Soviet interest in trading with West Germany, particularly in the field of natural gas.
Minister Brandt said Abrasimov claimed the FRG aide-memoire of April 9 regarding the renunciation of force had been entirely negative, but in later discussions said he would not exclude following up on it. He indicated that Brandt's presentation of the case might influence the Soviet reply.
Mr. Brandt said the Soviets don't like the Grand Coalition in Bonn, in which respect they did not differ from some of his people. Brandt said he asked Abrasimov if he thought that any future German government would be more likely to bring about better relations between Germany and the Soviet Union.
The Secretary said we were very much concerned about the East German measures, both when looking towards the past and looking towards the future. Looking towards the past, they were a violation of Quadripartite Agreements. Looking towards the future, he said one could ask "What next?". He reminded his colleagues that Chief Justice Marshall had said the power to tax is the power to destroy.
The Secretary told of his talks with the Soviets./2/ They took essentially the same line with him that Abrasimov had taken with Brandt. They expressed their intention not to increase tensions in Berlin, and said they did not mean to interrupt access to Berlin nor to interfere with the rights of the Allies. The Soviets said the East German restrictions were formalities. The Secretary continued that he did not get the impression the Soviets were contemplating or would contemplate the elimination of these measures. He gave it as his estimate that the East German action had been carefully considered in advance and was not the result of weekend deliberations. He felt the Soviets would be rather stubborn.
/2/See Document 270 and 277.
The Secretary said his impression was that these moves were rather clever. The Soviets and East Germans could say that what was being done was in accord with normal international practice. The Soviets were emphasizing those aspects where differences between the Allies and the FRG exist on the status of Berlin. They judge these measures will not seem worth a crisis to the Allies. The fact that people and goods continue to move makes it difficult to work up a great deal of excitement. Thus, the Secretary concluded, the situation was not very satisfactory.
The Secretary suggested that we should examine the steps we can take to make it clear to East Berlin that action like that taken by the East Germans does not pay, but more specifically to make it absolutely clear that real interference with access is unacceptable.
The Secretary agreed with Brandt that the countermeasures thus far suggested were not too promising. He thought that conceivably it was one of Ulbricht's objectives to reduce contact between Berlin and the Federal Republic. It may be that Ulbricht was frightened of developments in Czechoslovakia. The Secretary thought these measures may be another kind of wall to prevent further contacts. He said the countermeasures which could be taken by the U.S. alone were not meaningful. There was little travel or trade between the United States and the GDR. Perhaps 50 East Germans came to the United States in the course of a year. He stated U.S. preparedness to examine with our allies what measures could be taken which would not hurt West Berlin.
The Secretary suggested further that we ought to examine new possibilities of reinforcing the viability of the City of Berlin. He thought the East German measures gave a special urgency to this task, to reassure West Berlin in a very tangible way. He thought the Bonn Group might wish to concentrate on this aspect. In this connection, the Secretary paid his respect to the attitude of the FRG toward the viability of Berlin.
The Secretary suggested that the two administrations of the two Germanies might somehow deal with the problem of German access to Berlin. The arrangement proposed by Mr. Brandt earlier for a lump sum payment for services rendered by the East Germans might make it possible to link the question of access with other matters of interest to the East Germans. We would like to make them realize that consultation and agreement are necessary.
The Secretary speculated regrading Soviet approval of the East German action. He thought the timing was both curious and ominous. He referred to Minister Brandt's statement that the East Germans had discounted in advance the advantages of arrangements with the FRG which would have been profitable to them. He said surely the Soviets must have known that the East German restrictions would make signing of the NPT by the FRG more difficult. The Secretary thought the explanation may be found in Eastern European developments. He felt that Ulbricht's concern with Czech developments had motivated the move. The Secretary denied that passage of the emergency legislation by the FRG had anything to do with the Berlin situation. The Secretary concluded by saying that we take the situation very seriously and we want to make absolutely clear that we will not allow Berlin to suffer.
Ambassador Seydoux began his remarks by recounting the conversation between Alphand and Soviet Ambassador to France Zorin a few days ago. Zorin's reply, according to Seydoux, was not unlike that of Soviet officials elsewhere. Seydoux said his Government was much interested in Kiesinger's and Brandt's statements in the Bundestag on June 20./3/ He expressed his admiration for the way in which the German Government was dealing with the problem. He referred to the questions raised and measures indicated by his German colleague, i.e., "linking Berlin to the FRG," the transport of German civilians in military cars, etc. He stated that the French were, of course, ready to study these problems. He felt the best place for studying them was in Bonn but he cautioned that all would have to make sure that measures undertaken would not create graver problems than they solved.
/3/For text of Kiesinger's statement, see Documents on Germany, 1944-1985, pp. 1010-1012. For text of the Brandt statement, see Meissner, Die deutsche Ostpolitik, pp. 264-267.
Seydoux said he was also very much interested in the Secretary's remarks. He associated himself with the view that the situation was very serious and repeated French readiness to examine all proposals but again, he cautioned, the measures must not create more problems than they solved.
British Foreign Secretary Stewart agreed with the assessment that the situation was very serious. He complained that there was no justification for these measures and that they were taken without consultation after the FRG had made determined efforts to improve relations with Eastern Europe. Perhaps it was this effort on the part of the FRG that caused the restrictions to be imposed. Mr. Stewart felt the U.S.S.R. was losing support in Eastern Europe. He suggested that some may be hoping the FRG would slacken off its policy of détente which would suit the Soviets very much.
The Foreign Secretary said he found Gromyko very hard and unyielding during his last visit to Moscow./4/ He said that if the FRG slackened its policy of détente, Moscow could say it never had been real.
/4/Stewart visited Moscow May 22-23.
The Foreign Secretary thought that with regard to Mr. Rusk's reference to the NPT, the Soviets could always turn FRG hesitation to sign into propaganda against the FRG. He was certain the Soviets wished to maintain the thesis that Germany was always to be feared. It was his view that the Soviets would like to provoke the FRG into a reversal of its current policies.
Mr. Stewart said that all had agreed on countermeasures which were right, proportional and supportable. They should drive home the need of the Soviets to take seriously these measures.
Mr. Stewart found Minister Brandt's suggestion of closer links between Berlin and the FRG entirely suitable. He recommended that the proposal of the German Foreign Minister to have German civilians carried by military automobiles to Berlin ought to be considered. He felt further the Bonn Group should also study measures to help with the viability of Berlin. He thought we could not rule out further measures because of the seriousness of the situation. Like his French colleague, he cautioned prudence.
The Foreign Secretary said the problem was to move with great care in order not to inflame the situation without however losing all in the end. The Foreign Secretary concluded by saying to Mr. Brandt that he wanted a manifestation of Western solidarity. He believed that the German Minister wanted a statement out of this meeting.
Foreign Minister Brandt said he would like to make an addendum. He noted that it was not very difficult for a citizen of West Germany to sign a paper when travelling to Berlin, stating that he was a citizen of West Germany. He thought it was more destructive however for a Berliner to have to state that he was a citizen of a "separate political entity". He had no doubt that this in the long run would affect the morale of the people in Berlin.
The Secretary agreed that the use of the term "separate political entity of West Berlin" was contrary to Allied concepts and could cause problems. He felt this matter could best be examined by the Quadripartite Bonn Group.
Mr. Brandt made a reference to the Secretary's remarks regarding the recent German emergency legislation. He said the Soviets had overestimated the opposition to these laws on the part of West German labor leaders. The opposite effect had been achieved, even among students. He called this a serious miscalculation.
Mr. Brandt said he also wished to note that the Eastern European countries had reacted negatively to the East German measures, citing Czech and Yugoslav newspapers and press associations to prove his point. He noted further that Italian Communist papers will weigh in against the East German measures. He said Ulbricht had stopped tourist traffic to Czechoslovakia and has forbidden the sale of a Czech Communist German-language weekly paper in East Germany. As a result, the Czechs would make it a daily even though there were not too many Germans in Czechoslovakia.
Mr. Brandt turned to FRG eastern policy. He said both Chancellor Kiesinger and he would not allow themselves to be provoked by Ulbricht into a position not their own. He said FRG foreign policy had received very strong support from the Bundestag.
Mr. Brandt noted that the German Government had some problems with morale, both in Berlin and the FRG itself. He asked his colleagues to avoid using the word "protest" since people had concluded that this was an empty gesture. He thought a further possibility to give Moscow some additional food for thought existed if the third world would support the FRG. He felt the third world would understand that the East German actions were contrary to the spirit of détente.
Mr. Brandt thanked his colleagues for their remarks regarding the viability of the City of Berlin. He thought any additional help that could be given in this regard would be most welcome. He assured his colleagues that when he spoke of linking the City of Berlin to the FRG, he did not intend to raise old legal controversies. He said he wished to state once more that if his colleagues believed there was any sense in going back to the idea of establishing an international authority on access to Berlin--a proposition for the two administrations to control traffic to Berlin under an allied umbrella--he would be willing to go along. However, he remained skeptical.
In conclusion, the German Foreign Minister asked that a statement, which would emerge from this Quadripartite Meeting should be added as an appendix to the NATO communiqué with a paragraph early in the main communiqué referring to the appendix. He felt under no circumstances should a reference to Berlin by the Fifteen become point 12 or 13 of the communiqué. He said such slighting of the serious situation which had been created would disappoint the German public. He also asked for language less legal but more political./5/
/5/For text of the NATO communiqué, see Department of State Bulletin, July 15, 1968, pp. 75-77.
There followed a brief discussion regarding the line to be taken with the press after this meeting. It was generally agreed that the Four would point out that they had discussed solidarity of the Allies, the seriousness with which all of them regarded the situation and further measures to deal with it. The Secretary thought we should say that there had been a complete review of the situation. Full agreement had been reached that the East German measures were serious and contrary to international agreements and long standing practice. He suggested further that we would say that we would be discussing these matters with the other allies after which we will make our plans known.
The meeting adjourned at this point after designating four advisers to work on a draft of a statement.
DINNER
At the start of the Dinner following the Quadripartite Meeting, Mr. Stewart asked Mr. Brandt to say a few words about the European Security Conference problem which Brandt had mentioned earlier in his presentation.
Mr. Brandt said whenever the subject of a European Security Conference arises the question is how to deal with East Germany. He said the FRG proposal is to create a kind of link so that when the time comes a new relationship would have been reached between the two parts of Germany.
Continuing, he said, however, that the security conference idea is blocked. He said he saw this on his recent trip to Yugoslavia and noted that not even all of the Group of Ten felt as strongly as the Dutch, the Belgians, and the Danes on the NATO side.
He noted that the FRG had said in Aide-Memoires to the USSR/6/ that it intended to work on proposals on an exchange of non-use of force declarations. As far as East Germany is concerned he sees some formulas which would not recognize the GDR as a state but which would not exclude it from participation. He said that the FRG has found a formula which contains several important elements.
/6/For text of the December 14, 1967, and April 9, 1968, German aides-memoire, see Documents on Germany, 1944-1985, pp. 980-982 and 997-1002.
He said that we must make clear to the USSR that not regarding the GDR as a sovereign state does not mean that declarations between the FRG and the GDR would be invalid. He stressed that they would be valid and that the validity would run from the declarations themselves and not from the manner in which the GDR was treated.
He recalled that the FRG had said in 1954/7/ that it would not use force, and it does not propose to re-open this issue. He said that the FRG will incorporate its ideas in a paper that he suggested be considered by the Bonn Group.
The Secretary welcomed this idea and noted that the US finds itself in a situation where it is often necessary to reach agreement with regimes that we do not recognize, citing Hanoi and Peking.
/7/For text, see Department of State Bulletin, October 11, 1954, pp. 520-521.
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