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FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES
1964-1968 Washington, DC |
290. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
Washington, September 20, 1968, 12:30 p.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Rostow Files, Non-Proliferation. Secret. No drafting information is on the source text, which was approved in S/S on September 24.
PARTICIPANTS
The Secretary
Ambassador Dobrynin
Assistant Secretary LeddyAmbassador Dobrynin had asked to see the Secretary either today or on Monday. The Secretary agreed to see him at 12:30 p.m. today.
Dobrynin began by referring to the question of technical talks on PNEDs (Peaceful Nuclear Explosive Devices). He said that the idea of the US and the USSR meeting on this subject had been at the US initiative, that the US thought it would be useful with the non-nuclear conference in Geneva and that the Soviets were now prepared to go ahead with the talks on October 7, as suggested by the US. The Secretary asked whether this subject had been discussed with Ambassador Foster when he and Dobrynin met the other day. Dobrynin replied that they had just discussed the NPT and that Ambassador Foster did not wish to discuss the PNEDs talks.
The Secretary said that he would have to discuss this question with the President and Ambassador Foster, and that he would let Dobrynin know later. He observed that there were complications.
The Secretary said that the Executive Branch, as the Ambassador knew, was attempting to move the non-proliferation treaty through the Senate. In response to the Ambassador's question, he said he thought the matter would not come to a vote before the Fortas nomination had been settled,/2/ probably not until the end of the month.
/2/Reference is to the nomination of Associate Justice Abe Fortas as Chief Justice of the Supreme Court.
The Secretary then opened up the question of the recent intense Soviet propaganda campaign against Germany and Berlin. He said that he wanted to discuss this question with real seriousness. There had been a buildup of propaganda, threats and agitation by the Soviets against West Germany and Berlin. We have observed an unusual series of attacks, charges, use of strong language, including the latest attack of today, by Izvestya and Pravda against Germany and Berlin. We had observed the strange interpretation by the Soviets of Articles 53 and 107 of the UN Charter as a justification for Soviet intervention, as well as the astonishing Soviet démarche to the Dutch Prime Minister de Jong attempting to dissuade him from making his prospective visit to Berlin. He said that the US cannot accept pressures against contacts between Berlin and the outside world. We and the other protective powers have a responsibility for Berlin, including its economic viability. He said that the Soviet campaign was developing in a serious way and asked for Ambassador Dobrynin's comments. He asked, "What's behind this?"
Dobrynin said in effect that all of this had been precipitated by the Federal Republic and the State Department acting together. As proof he observed that the US and allied statements on Articles 53 and 107 had just been issued now whereas the Soviet position on these Articles was stated to the Germans as long ago as July 1967./3/
/3/For text of U.S. statement, see Department of State Bulletin, October 7, 1968, p. 365. Similar statements were made by the United Kingdom and France.
The Secretary said that he hoped there would be no confusion in the Soviet Government over the fact that any rights under the UN Articles in question and the Potsdam Agreement must be multilateral as amongst the four powers (US, UK, France and Soviet Union) and cannot be unilaterally applied by the Soviets or arrogated to the Warsaw Pact.
Dobrynin then said that while he had nothing particular to say on the basis of instructions from Moscow, he would make certain personal observations: The Secretary had suggested that there might be the possibility of a military attack. He derided this possibility. He suggested that the US was simply playing the FRG game. He said, "Do you really think we would attack? Why are you making such a fuss?"
The Secretary then quoted the following excerpt from Pravda, dated September 18:
"As a participant in the Potsdam agreement, the Soviet Union will continue to stand ready, together with other peace-loving states, to take the necessary effective measures, if the need arises, to stop the dangerous activities of neo-nazism and militarism."
He asked what was the meaning of the phrase "together with other peace loving states"? If this meant the US, the UK and France, that would be one thing; but historically the Soviet Union had never used this phrase to describe the countries of the West. This suggested that perhaps the Soviet Union may have meant to imply that the Warsaw Pact countries as "peace loving states" were entitled to take this action. The Soviet Union and the US had had somewhat different ideas of "militarism" and "neo-nazism" in West Germany; but it had, after all, been the East Germans who had moved into Czechoslovakia. In July, in August, and now in the middle of September there had been a series of menacing statements regarding Germany and Berlin. We are listening to these and must listen; we will have to reply and expect to do so; but we want to know what is behind this campaign.
There was further inconclusive discussion about Articles 53 and 107 of the UN Charter, the position of NATO under Article 51 of the UN Charter and the question of the relative priorities between the UN and NATO, Dobrynin suggesting that the UN Charter was superior to NATO and the Secretary pointing out that the two were wholly consistent.
Dobrynin asked whether the Secretary was really concerned over the possibility of the use of force by the Soviets and its Warsaw Pact countries against Germany and Berlin. The Secretary said he was certainly "concerned", but not nervous or afraid; the US would do its duty together with its allies; but we want to know what is behind the Soviet campaign. He again reverted to the Soviet attempt to dissuade the Dutch Prime Minister from visiting Berlin, describing it as "unheard of". He said that the Soviets had stated that such a visit would lead to "undesirable consequences." He could not recall any such language having been used under these circumstances during his period of office. He asked Dobrynin to explain to the Soviet Government the seriousness of the view which we take over the propaganda assault and attempts at intimidation being conducted by the Soviet Union.
Dobrynin then referred to his earlier message to the Secretary of August 31 regarding Berlin./4/ In that message the Soviet Union had recognized the state interests of the US in Berlin and had stated that any reports about action against Berlin were "completely without foundation." He reaffirmed this message. He added that speaking personally he thought that the US was playing a German game and referred to the recent visits to Washington of Kurt Birrenbach and Helmut Schmidt.
/4/For text, see Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. XVII, Document 90.
The Secretary then pointed out that several Soviet divisions had moved to the West and to the South. There were several hundred thousand Warsaw Pact troops in Czechoslovakia and substantial additional Soviet forces along the NATO border (Bavaria). This inevitably brings up a problem for NATO.
Dobrynin interjected to ask, "Do you really believe now that this could be a military threat to NATO?" (His implicit denial at this point of any military threat to NATO ties in with his later remark below to the effect that the prime consideration for the Soviet Union is the preservation of the Warsaw Pact countries.)
The Secretary thought there was the question of Soviet intentions and the question of the redeployment of the Warsaw Pact forces which needed looking at both together and separately.
Dobrynin interjected to say that there were the same number of Soviet divisions but in a different place.
The Secretary, resuming, said that, with respect to Soviet intentions, we do not believe at the moment that the Soviets intend a military assault on NATO, but there was uncertainty. He said, frankly, we do not entirely understand why you did what you did in Czechoslovakia despite the obvious costs in your political relations with the US, with Europe and around the world. Therefore, we wonder whether there may be elements in the thinking of the Soviet leaders which we do not fully understand. He said that it would have been easier for him six months ago to make a prediction of what the Soviet Government might do than it would be today. Therefore, we and our partners in NATO have to take note of the redeployment of Soviet forces and have to question again our judgments about Soviet intentions and have to consider the two together.
At the close of a general discussion about peaceful co-existence, Ambassador Dobrynin made two major points which were clearly not just his own personal observation, but were in line with Moscow instructions:
1. The Soviet Union continued to pursue a policy of peaceful co- existence, including the promotion of East-West contacts, discussion of important subjects such as PNEDs, etc.
2. The Soviet Union would tolerate no weakening in any way of the solidarity or basic socialist structure of the Warsaw powers. He was emphatic on this point and said in effect "the Warsaw Pact structure must be preserved intact, and that's all."
The impression drawn from this conversation is that Dobrynin sought to reassure the Secretary regarding any intention of the Soviet Union to use military force against NATO, including the Federal Republic and Berlin; that it wished to continue the policy of peaceful co- existence with the West and with the US in particular; and that the action in Czechoslovakia was purely defensive in an effort to protect the socialist structure and military arrangements of the Warsaw Pact powers./5/
/5/In telegram 244788 to Moscow, September 25, the Department of State reported on the Rusk-Dobrynin meeting and, noting that the Soviet Ambassador had taken no notes of Rusk's comments, instructed the Embassy to meet with Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko to summarize the Secretary's comments. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 28 GER B) In telegram 5691 from Moscow, the Embassy urged reconsideration of these instructions since it would distract attention from Soviet actions in Czechoslovakia. (Ibid.)
291. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State/1/
Bonn, September 28, 1968, 1615Z.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Germany, vol. 16. Secret; Nodis.
17480. For the President and the Secretary from Lodge.
1. This message concerns American policy toward Germany in the light of the invasion of Czechoslovakia.
2. This event--deeply shocking to virtually all Germans--has resulted in increased readiness to provide more money for defense and to move further on European integration, including British entry into the Common Market. Although movement in this direction is hesitant and as yet inconclusive, it is more positive than any heretofore under the present government and clearly marks a waning of de Gaulle's influence here.
3. I welcome this evolution and believe it is in the interests of the US. Conversely, I believe that if the Germans do not act now, the opportunity to strengthen NATO in the light of the Czechoslovak crisis will have been missed. This will make the invasion of Czechoslovakia an even greater short term Soviet success than it is already and will sharply reduce the possibility of converting it into a long term Soviet failure.
4. If the crisis does not lead to strengthening NATO, I believe the result in Germany will be a mood of pessimism and of accommodation towards the USSR. The result in the US will be disappointment over the lack of European response and continuing pressures to withdraw more American troops from Europe. The outcome either way may be a historic turning point. If it is negative, it will give impetus to a downward spiral in the US relationship with Europe, which, Germans tell me, must eventually result in Western Europe's becoming an enlarged Finland.
5. The German decision is not firm yet. It may not take final form for several weeks. Perhaps the major concern of German leaders with regard to it is that, if they finally decide on a go-ahead policy, they will be left in isolation by their Allies, and thus exposed to Soviet attack and to both European and German criticism as being hasty and foolish "hardliners."
6. I hope I appreciate at least some of the difficulties of your present situation, but I believe it most desirable in view of the importance of the German decision to give them some encouragement by positive moves of our own in response to some positive prior European moves. One such move would be a statement from you that you will recommend to the incoming administration that the US should commit itself to continued adherence to the NATO Treaty beyond the 1969 deadline. Another would be a similar recommendation to retain at least the present level of troops in Europe in the face of the new situation caused by the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia, and preferably, to return to Europe permanently the two withdrawn brigades of the 24th Division.
7. The reports about strategic arms talks with the Soviets are a real worry here--at whatever level talks might be held. Although I know little of current plans, I accept the proposition that a workable arrangement on this subject would be in the interest of Europe as well as the US and that the matter should be pursued with the Soviets in the future.
8. Nonetheless, given the present atmosphere in Germany, a decision apparently to reward Soviet aggression by embarking on arms talks would, I fear, be incomprehensible here. How, it would be asked, can one explain a willingness to trust the Soviet word when they have just broken it so flagrantly in Czechoslovakia?
9. Another effect of an expression of US willingness to start talks with the Soviets now would put in doubt the judgment and good sense of German leaders in pressing for increases in defense. Such a US decision might well eliminate the possibility of a positive German decision on our defense.
10. You may have a different perspective in Washington. But as I view it, the chance for strengthening NATO, and the damage which would arise from not doing so, outweigh in terms of our national interest the potential gain from opening the talks with Soviets this time.
Lodge
292. Paper Prepared in the Department of State/1/
Washington, October 1, 1968.
/1/Source: Department of State, SIG Files: Lot 74 D 344, SIG Memo 87. Top Secret. An attached October 1 memorandum from Arthur Hartman, Staff Director, Senior Interdepartmental Group, to members stated that the paper was prepared for discussion at the October 4 SIG meeting.
[Here follows a 6-page discussion of background to the crisis, legal position of the parties, and Allied administrative machinery already in place to face a crisis in Berlin.]
VII. Berlin Contingency Planning
US strategic thinking with regard to military contingencies in Berlin have been set out in National Security Action Memorandum No. 109 of October 23, 1961 (see Appendix)/2/ which still provides current US view of the governing sequences and graduated responses in a Berlin conflict.
/2/Not printed. For text of NSAM No. 109, see Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, vol. XIV, pp. 521-523.
Detailed contingency plans are available which have been devised to meet various categories of contingencies. By experience we know that rarely does a crisis situation exactly meet the developments as they occur. Nevertheless we believe that plans that we have are well adapted and sufficiently flexible to meet real situations as they arise. The major kinds of contingencies that might well arise in the foreseeable future and the kinds of contingency plans designed to meet them are as follows:
A. Soviet/GDR action directed against FRG access to Berlin on the ground (road and rail). The Soviets may permit the East Germans to take action against FRG travellers instead of Allied traffic because (1) such a course is safer; (2) appeases Ulbricht's claim to sovereignty; (3) provides an indirect but very effective way of undercutting Berlin's viability; and (4) is a course of action that tends to exploit divisions between the FRG and its allies. The new passport, visa and tariff measures that were instituted in June provide an adequate basis for immediate and effective har-assment of FRG travellers.
There are three major ways in which FRG travellers to and from Berlin could be harassed by the GDR authorities:
1. Denial of Berlin access to German travellers on a broad scale, but short of blockade conditions. This action could easily be implemented by the GDR simply by refusing to issue visas to travellers on trains, busses, and on the autobahn.
Allied Response:
Depending upon the scale of these actions the Allied Powers would protest in East Berlin, the Western capitals, and Moscow, in that order; the FRG would certainly protest and warn the GDR through Interzonal Trade channels (IZT agreement does not permit harassment of goods or passengers). There would be an immediate diversion of essential FRG travel to the air routes and the Allied carriers would add some flights. (Note: an air bus scheme run by Modern Air Transport, an American carrier, is well into the discussion stages with the Minister of Transport.)
2. Interruption of German Cargo Traffic on a significant scale (i.e., more than token harassment for 2-3 days) by charging exorbitant fees, applying unreasonable inspection standards, false quarantines, excessive delays, or outright denial of access rights.
Allied Response:
Protests through diplomatic and IZT channels, followed by FRG and Allied economic and political countermeasures (e.g. expansion of export control measures; refusal of TTD's). Some limited transport of special cargoes by Allied train or by air cargo might well be attempted at an early stage, but not on a large scale.
3. Complete and sustained blockage of FRG traffic, passenger and cargo, while less likely than harassment, provides the Allies with one of their most difficult contingency problems.
Allied Response:
Aside from attempting to blunt the immediate effects of blockade by shifting passengers and cargo to air transport (which can be har-assed--"Harassment of Air Corridors," below), no immediate relief is at hand. Complete blockage of German rail, road and barge traffic certainly would be followed by a period of intense diplomatic activity, expanding airlift implementation, breaking off of IZT and NATO-wide implementation of more serious Allied economic political and even military countermeasures (e.g. augmentation of Berlin military forces, increase in Allied military traffic, publicized buildup of Berlin stockpiles). If the blockage persisted and a significant economic, physical and/or psychological threat is posed to Berlin, the Allies will consider taking civilian ground access under their auspices. If, as a result of the failure to end the blockade of civilian traffic, Allied travel also became blocked, Allied contingency planning would be applicable (see below). Since Allied access to Berlin for military travel is a matter of formal agreement and of Allied right (which the Soviets have formally recognized over the years), tampering with Allied access, in any form, is much riskier for the Soviets and poses a threat of general war. A number of contingency plans to determine exactly what Soviet intentions are in a given situation exist.
B. Interference with Allied access can come either by blockage of the Berlin/Helmstedt autobahn by the Soviets or East Germans, or by blockage of the Allied Military trains between Helmstedt and Berlin.
Allied Response:
The first aim of all contingency plans in this area is to determine Soviet/GDR intentions. For example, the tripartite armed train probe is designed solely as a test of Soviet/East German intent to use force to stop the daily Allied trains. One thrown switch or one removed section of track, if backed up by Soviet/GDR force to prevent the Allies from put-ting the track in order, would establish this point.
Similarly, a contingency plan for a company-level probe up the autobahn from Helmstedt is designed solely as a test of Soviet/East German intent to use force to keep the autobahns closed. This contingency is available for use following failure of diplomatic initiatives. We have also planned a second probe from the Helmstedt end of the autobahn, consisting of a reinforced battalion combat team which is designed to achieve one of two political objectives: (1) provide circumstances under which negotiations with the Soviets might prove fruitful, or, (2) compel the Soviets to face the imminence of general war. The purpose of the battalion probe is not to fight its way through to Berlin but to demonstrate Allied determination and to test the extent to which the Soviets may be willing to use force.
Finally, there is available a tripartite division-size force, again available for operations from the Helmstedt end of the autobahn. It is assembled under tripartite aegis upon the decision of governments, but to be implemented only under the command and control of NATO, since use of a force of that size through GDR territory obviously has implications for all of NATO. (One of its missions would be to extricate the battalion combat team probe.)
C. Harassment in the Air Corridors to Berlin
Soviet aircraft could undertake a campaign of harassment of civil flights traveling in and out of Berlin through the three air corridors set up by the Western Allies and the Soviets in 1946. Air access is solely an Allied responsibility and only Allied civilian and military aircraft fly the Berlin routes. However, the Soviets may permit harassment of civil Allied flights because they are carrying--or are alleged to be carrying--categories of FRG passengers forbidden by the GDR to travel in and out of Berlin.
Soviet air harassment would probably take the form of large numbers of Soviet military flights in the corridors, some of which might buzz or otherwise worry our civil flights in the corridors. (This could follow an initial demand by the Soviets that the Allies permit GDR officials to screen FRG passengers at West Berlin airports, ostensibly to determine individuals forbidden to travel across East German territory.)
Allied Response:
Initial Allied response to air harassment would take the form of protests through the Soviet controller in the Berlin Air Safety Center and Allied notes to the Soviet Ambassador in East Berlin. If civil air travel becomes clearly hazardous because of near-misses with Soviet flights or other dangerous moves by the Soviet aircraft, Allied plans call for unarmed military air transports, one from each Power, to provide an immediate response and a test of Soviet intentions. These flights are presently on six hours' stand-by. (In the event that air harassment is carried out by East German air units, the Allies would treat the Soviets as nonetheless responsible and continue to deal only with them.)
Contingency plans exist to cover the possibility of Soviet withdrawal from the Berlin Air Safety Center and include the situation of an attempted East German filling of the vacated Soviet position. These plans are currently under active review. In any case, the Allies will continue to hold the Soviets solely responsible and will attempt to pass on flight information to Soviet authorities in East Berlin as a flight safety measure. Rapid political advice to the Allied controllers in the Berlin Air Safety Center is of course essential.
In the event civil air carriers cease to operate, Allied plans provide for military-sponsored air service (MSAS), using civil aircraft either under government contract or with military crews. MSAS, which would operate initially without passengers, would keep Allied civil air access alive, help replenish Berlin stockpiles, and establish Soviet/GDR intentions. If Soviet/GDR action were to result in damage or loss of an Allied civil aircraft, tripartite plans call for possible fighter aircraft escort flights, subject to national approval at each stage of implementation.
D. Naval Countermeasures
A number of NAVCONS (Naval Contingencies) were approved by the WAG in 1967. While detailed planning is the responsibility of the appropriate national authority, a wide range of possible countermeasures affecting naval and maritime activities is now available which could be implemented in time of crisis. Prior to implementation a national decision would have to be made in each case, which probably would be coordinated through the WAG. As conceived, the naval countermeasures include a flexible and escalating series of moves including:
1. In-port harassment of USSR/GDR/Bloc shipping
2. In-port seizure of lend-lease ships
3. Delays and administrative harassment of shipping in Kiel and Panama canals
4. Intensified surveillance of submarines and surface vessels
5. Intensive naval exercises and augmentation of national naval forces
6. Electronic countermeasures against hostile shipping
7. Boarding and searching of ships with embargo or selected items
8. Exclusion of hostile shipping from selected areas
9. Minor damage inflicted on shipping up to/including seizure of designated ships on the high seas
E. Air Harassment of Berlin
Activity inside West Berlin proscribed by the Soviets or East Germans, such as FRG meetings, may be expected to stimulate Soviet/GDR air activity over the city. These have in the past taken the form of frequent sonic booms and low-level jet flights over West Berlin "targets" such as the Reichstag building, where Bundestag (Parliamentary) committees meet while in Berlin. Soviet helicopters may also intrude an unwelcome presence over the city. The effect of such harassment is mainly psychological, although there can be serious dangers to Allied civil and military flights using West Berlin's three airfields. Berliners have shown that they can take a heavy sonic pounding, at least for periods of several days at a time, without showing undue strain.
Allied Response is limited to protests to the Soviets through the Berlin Air Safety Center and through diplomatic channels.
F. Threats to the Continuation of Allied Control of the Western Sectors of Berlin
Extensive plans for the defense of Berlin in the event of attacks on the very existence of Free Berlin, whether from internal insurrection (coup de main) or military attack from outside the city, exist.
Efforts aimed at a "spontaneous" uprising by the SED directed against Berlin authority can be contained by the 15,000 Berlin police now in Berlin, supported by the 10,000 Allied troops in the city. If the East Germans make a determined effort at a take-over which might get out of hand, augmentation of the Berlin military forces (from the nearby FRG) always remains a possibility.
The control of civil disturbances is primarily a Berlin policy responsibility, but Allied planning is based on the assumption that the only way to counter the enemy threat of surprise is for every military and police unit to have detailed orders to secure points vital to the defense of Berlin in the following order or priority: (a) countering a potential military threat, (b) maintaining law and order, (c) re-establishing Allied control within West Berlin. If hostile elements penetrate border defenses, defensive positions call for falling back on a series of shortened lines while protecting vital internal communications lines. Troop commanders will see that S- and U-Bahn lines are closed, will block canals, keep railway repair yards under surveillance, maintain ready reserves, pacify areas under their control and keep on the alert for a direct military attack in support of the initial civil disturbance or surprise attack.
In the event of a military attack, the Allies plan to secure strong points in the city and secure the most vital lines of communication. Plans are based on a prior alert time of twenty minutes.
293. Action Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/
Washington, October 4, 1968.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Germany, vol. 16. Secret. A notation on the source text reads: "Rec'd 10:20 a.m."
SUBJECT
Possible Crisis in BerlinI have gone over the Berlin situation with my people in light of the Kraemer paper I sent to you./2/ This is the way we see it:
/2/On October 3, Rostow presented President Johnson with an untitled memorandum on the policy of the East German Government by Fritz Kraemer, "an extremely intelligent civilian who works in the Department of the Army." (Ibid.)
Military Indications
There is no significant change since Czechoslovakia in the Soviet military threat against Berlin. Their increased forces in Czechoslovakia cut down what they can mount immediately against Berlin. But the roads are good and they can change force dispositions in a day or two. Moreover, their alert status is improved.
The conclusion is that the current disposition of Soviet forces does not tell us much about their intentions toward Berlin.
The Soviet Propaganda Campaign against the Federal Republic:
The Russians are no longer coming down so hard on the claim that they have the right to intervene in the Federal Republic. They base this claim on Articles 53 and 107 of the UN Charter, which relate to actions against former enemy powers.
They began pushing this line pretty hard at the beginning of July. The Germans became very nervous. To counter this we took the following actions:
--On August 31, when Secretary Rusk warned Dobrynin about Rumania, he specifically warned that Berlin was a "state interest" of the U.S./3/
/3/See Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. XVII, Document 90.
--On September 17, the U.S., the UK, and the French, in separate announcements,/4/ said publicly that Articles 53 and 107 of the UN Charter did not give the Soviet Union the right to interfere in the affairs of the Federal Republic. We also said that such intervention would bring a NATO response.
/4/See Department of State Bulletin, October 7, 1968, p. 365.
--On September 20, Secretary Rusk repeated this position privately to Dobrynin./5/
/5/See Document 290.
--On October 2, Secretary Rusk made the point again in his speech at the UN./6/
/6/For text, see Department of State Bulletin, October 21, 1968, pp. 405-410.
--The next day, Gromyko in his speech to the UN did not assert Soviet intervention rights in the Federal Republic under the UN Charter./7/ For the moment, they seem to have backed off this line.
/7/For text, see U.N. Doc. A/PV. 1698, pp. 6-14.
The most serious threat lies in Communist moves to put pressure on Berlin by challenging Federal Republic rights and activities in the city. They could do this by:
--Putting more restrictions on the movement of people and goods between the Federal Republic and West Berlin. Last spring they got away with new visa and passport restrictions and travel taxes. They may well try to step up this kind of pressure--again without challenging Allied rights in the city.
--Intensifying their propaganda charges that Federal Republic meetings and other activities in Berlin are provocative acts. This could weaken Berlin morale and threaten the viability of the city.
The Russians have been building up this kind of propaganda campaign. On September 20 Secretary Rusk told Dobrynin we were concerned about the menacing Soviet tone on Berlin. He made it clear that any move against Berlin would be very dangerous and that we cannot accept pressures against Berlin or against Berlin contacts with the Federal Republic.
Dobrynin took no notes at this meeting. We cannot be sure that the full weight of Secretary Rusk's warning was brought home to the Kremlin.
Gromyko, in his speech to the UN, repeated the Soviet position that the Federal Republic had no rights in Berlin--but, with velvet glove, issued a warning that any "aggravation of tensions" would be Bonn's fault:
"The Federal Republic of Germany has ceaselessly laid claims on West Berlin, which has a special status of an independent political entity. Our answer is clear: West Berlin has never belonged, nor does it belong or will it ever belong to the Federal Republic of Germany. If sometimes an aggravation of tensions may occur here, the responsibility for this lies squarely with the West German Government."
A crisis could be associated with some important meetings the Federal Republic has scheduled in Berlin the end of October and early November. These are:
--October 27 to November 2: meetings in Berlin of about twenty committees of the Bundestag.
--November 3 to November 7: the National Party Congress of the Christian Democratic Union.
These are high visibility meetings. If the East Germans--with Russian support--increase travel restrictions and the Russians intensify their propaganda campaign against Berlin so as to interfere with these meetings, the impact on the city and throughout the Federal Republic could be great. We could have another Berlin crisis on our hands.
This would be a good time, therefore, to try to negotiate quickly an Allied Declaration on Berlin along the lines of the memo we sent you on September 17 (attached)./8/ As you know, this is what the Germans requested. The Declaration would be negotiated with the UK, the French and the Germans in Bonn. If you approve, Secretary Rusk could get this moving in his bilateral talks with Brandt, Debre, and Stewart at the UN in New York.
/8/Not printed. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, vol. 94)
You have previously set this aside as too openly provocative. The question is: do you now regard it as appropriate to move forward so as not to leave Gromyko's warning unanswered.
A fall-back position would be to agree that all three former Occupying Powers make a parallel démarche through diplomatic channels rather than in a public declaration. The experts believe this would not be as effective, but better than inaction--which could mislead Ulbricht and Moscow.
A decision is urgent because Secretary Rusk dines with the NATO Foreign Ministers on October 7 (Monday).
Walt
Go ahead with the Allied Declaration on Berlin
A tripartite diplomatic démarche
No
Call me/9//9/The President checked this option.
294. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State/1/
Moscow, October 6, 1968, 1510Z.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 28 GER B. Secret; Priority; Limdis. Repeated to Bonn, Berlin, London, Paris, and USUN.
5894. Ref: State 250963./2/ Subj: Allied declaration on Berlin.
/2/Telegram 250963, October 7, requested Thompson's evaluation of the likely impact of a draft text of an Allied declaration on Berlin. (Ibid.)
1. In view of Soviet concern over Western reaction to Czechoslovak affair, I think there is a good possibility that West Germans can get away with the various governmental and party meetings scheduled to be held in Berlin without serious Soviet reaction. If in addition to holding these meetings the Allies issue the proposed declaration, the chances of strong Soviet and East German action will be greatly enhanced. If declaration is to be made at all I think it would better be made in response to Soviet or East German statements in protest to the meetings.
2. As for proposed text, the statement that Allies will accept no interference with passage of Germans and commerce between Berlin and Federal Republic sounds rather hollow in view of fact that GDR has interfered with passage NDP members and others. Moreover, this passage speaks of Berlin and not West Berlin and we have certainly accepted in fact GDR control of West German access to East Berlin. If this paragraph applies only to West Berlin, statement that Three Powers' authority in Berlin (not Four Powers') implies that we are similarly prepared to accept Soviet decisions in East Berlin. Although we have not been able to do anything about Soviet actions there, I wonder if we should weaken our right to protest. Finally, I should think proposed declaration would weaken our ability to keep West German activities in West Berlin within bounds.
3. For these reasons I believe we should not make any declaration unless forced to do so by Soviets or East Germans.
Thompson
295. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
New York, October 6, 1968.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 38-8. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Rusk. Rusk and Gromyko met in New York in conjunction with the opening of the 23d session of the UN General Assembly. An attached note from Read to Rusk, dated October 19, reads: "John Leddy recommends strongly that you dictate a brief note covering the assurances you got from Gromyko on Berlin, which you have mentioned to Leddy and Willy Brandt but not recorded as far as we know."
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION WITH
FOREIGN MINISTER GROMYKO OF THE SOVIET UNIONFollowing dinner I drew Mr. Gromyko aside for a brief private talk, in the course of which I raised the subject of Berlin.
I reminded Mr. Gromyko that I had spoken directly with Ambassador Dobrynin about the importance of Berlin as a "vital state interest" of the United States and that we expected everyone to recognize that fact. I accepted Ambassador Dobrynin's subsequent message as a categorical statement that the Soviets would not move against Berlin. I said it was very important that there be no crisis on this matter because it would be a very grave matter indeed.
Mr. Gromyko stated clearly that the Soviet Union did not intend to move against Berlin and asked me whether I really thought they were planning to do so. I told him I accepted Soviet assurances on this point but did not wish to have a conversation with Mr. Gromyko without reiterating what I had said to Ambassador Dobrynin. Gromyko then said that the Soviet Union objects to the attempts of the Federal Republic of Germany to take over Berlin and indicated that they would continue to press on this point. I told him that it was important for West Berlin to have full contacts with the outside world and that it was perfectly natural for West Berlin to have close relations with the Federal Republic. I said I knew of nothing which the Federal Republic is doing in West Berlin which the East Germans are not doing to an even greater extent in East Berlin. I reaffirmed the tripartite responsibility for West Berlin. When I remonstrated with Gromyko about their démarche to the Dutch about a visit of the Dutch Prime Minister into Berlin he said this was because "the West Germans had arranged it". I scoffed at this reason.
Although the Russians have given us a flat commitment about moving militarily on West Berlin, this sort of commitment is worth only what it is worth and we can take no comfort from the continued pressure on West German activities in Berlin.
Dean Rusk/2/
/2/Initialed for Rusk above this typed signature by Deputy Executive Secretary John Walsh.
296. Telegram From Secretary of State Rusk to the Embassy in Germany/1/
New York, October 8, 1968, 2127Z.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL GER W-US. Confidential; Priority; Exdis. Also sent to the Department of State and repeated to all NATO capitals and USNATO.
6954. Secto 68. Subj: Secretary's October 8 luncheon with Brandt. Following based on uncleared notes FYI Noforn, and subject to revision.
Secretary gave luncheon for FonMin Brandt attended by Amb Knappstein, Egon Bahr, FRG FonOff, and Alex Johnpoll, GER. Highlights of conversation were:
1. Sovs, FRG and Berlin. Brandt told Secy that his speech at the UN and particularly the references to FRG and Berlin had made a deep impression in Germany. He said Kiesinger had asked him to pass along the Chancellor's own thanks.
The Secy informed Brandt that he had repeated to Gromyko what he had already told Dobrynin about Berlin being a state interest of the US; and had also raised with Gromyko the Sov propaganda attacks against the FRG. Gromyko had replied in two parts:
A. He stated quite categorically that the Sovs would not move against Berlin;
B. The Sovs object to what the FRG is doing in Berlin./2/
/2/See Document 295. Another memorandum of their October 6 conversation is in Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 69 D 182, CF 321.
The Secy had replied to Gromyko that what the FRG is doing in Berlin is our responsibility. There are no grounds for Sov objections, especially in view of what the East Germans are doing in Berlin.
The Secy told Brandt that we will simply have to watch the situation in Berlin and see how it develops. The President's position on Berlin is clear and firm, and the two major Presidential candidates are also people on whom the FRG and Berlin can rely.
Brandt thought it would be helpful if progress could be made on an Allied paper that would make clear the legitimacy of what the FRG has been doing in Berlin over the years, but avoiding areas of juridical controversy between the FRG and the Allies. Brandt said that there was some difficulty with the French over this, but Debre had told him the French would go along with an internal paper along these lines (from the three Occupying Powers to the FRG) that would not be passed on to the Sovs. Brandt said that even such a paper would be better than nothing.
The Secy replied that this is a matter that requires thought. We have said a lot to the Sovs in recent weeks about Berlin and the firmness of our resolve to defend it. Would it be a sign of weakness in Sov eyes if we keep making one statement after another about Berlin? This is something we have to give some thought to.
2. NPD. The Secy told Brandt that the problem of the NPD in Berlin was not entirely the same as the problem that party posed to the FRG. We have to take account of US public opinion and how it reacts to the program of the NPD and its anti American posture in a city which is occupied by U.S. troops. We can do whatever is required to defend Berlin, but we cannot do that to defend the NPD.
Brandt said that some people in the FRG have criticized Schuetz for asking the Allies to ban the NPD; they say Schuetz should have waited for the FRG to act. Brandt thought this was nonsense. Schuetz was right to bring the problem before the Allies. The FRG may decide to bring the NPD to court, but in any event the courts would not hand down a decision before the 1969 Federal elections. The FRG Minister of Interior is conducting a study but it will probably not be ready for at least another two weeks. In the meantime, the NPD in Berlin is infiltrated with many Communist agents from the GDR.
The Secy thought that the Allies would now have no alternative but to act against the NPD, Schuetz having raised the matter. Brandt didn't think there would be any objection from the FRG.
3. NATO. The Secy reminded Brandt of the discussion at last night's dinner/3/ concerning an extension of the area of NATO interests beyond the strict territorial limits of the NATO countries, particularly into the Mediterranean and ME. If Sov forces were to move toward the Adriatic NATO would be faced with a major problem. These questions are not taken as seriously by some of the NATO partners as they deserve to be. This is so important that consultations at high levels and through special channels should be established. The Secy asked Brandt whether he thought there was any chance that a European caucus might be established in NATO. The US would not object if a European caucus were formed. The Secy pointed out that there have been occasions when we were ready to do what Europe wants, but were confronted by the fact that there is no Europe in that sense. Brandt replied that a European caucus based on a broad definition of Europe (including the Turks, Greeks, Portuguese, et al) would not work. There might be a chance for a narrower European caucus. The WEU would provide a good foundation for this but that would require French cooperation. Brandt said that he did not want to see anything happen that would reduce US engagement in Europe. Bahr added that creation of an additional grouping in NATO would add to the problems caused by the existing groupings.
/3/See Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. XIII, Document 332.
The Secy asked, in connection with Stewart's suggestion on extending the duration of NATO, whether Brandt thought there was any chance of French cooperation. Brandt replied that he did not exclude such a possibility. He thought that the phrasing of such a suggestion would be very important. The language suggested by Stewart was too temporary, being limited to "present circumstances." Brandt said that the FRG and the Italians could accept a lengthy extension. On the other hand, other countries, like Denmark, would have problems.
The Secy pointed out that a decision that involved going to the Senate right now would cause some constitutional problems in the US.
Brandt asked whether the Greek regime was causing political problems for us. The Secy replied that we do have a political problem. Andreas Papandreou was very active. On top of that, the Greek regime does a lot of foolish things which create more difficulties. For example, they took away Miss Mercuri's citizenship and Mercuri is a popular actress here. It is not easy for anyone here to step forward and defend the regime. The Secy said that Pipinelis was a man who seemed to have good judgment and commanded a lot of respect. As a NATO matter we may have to decide to increase our military assistance to Greece.
Brandt thought that it would be helpful all around if there were a NATO agency through which military assistance from one member to another could be channeled. It would certainly make things easier for the FRG.
4. Offset. Brandt raised the subject. He said that the FRG had set up a task force, and had raised the level at which it was being handled in the FRG. He didn't know how close we could come to agreement in the next couple of months, but there was no doubt that we will have to get away from agreements that only cover a limited period.
The Secy pointed out that as a result of the Czech crisis things like the Mansfield Res had been put in the ice box for the moment. Undoubtedly efforts will be made to make them active again later. A satisfactory settlement of the offset issue will help us handle this.
Brandt said that it would also be helpful if a settlement of the offset problem could be worked out in the context of some broader NATO agreements. It is a matter of optics. It would not present a good picture if the only consequence in NATO of the Czech crisis were to settle this bilateral US-FRG problem. Brandt also cautioned against any expectations that the FRG would take the lead in a military build-up among the NATO countries. This would create problems within the Western community.
5. FRG-French relations. The Secy referred to Debre's remarks at last night's dinner on NATO choosing between nuclear weapons and doing nothing at all in the military field. As a matter of fact, there is hardly anything that would help NATO more than a demonstration of French solidarity with NATO.
Brandt said that the FRG has become disillusioned by the French, and this is also true of Chancellor Kiesinger who is quite disillusioned.
Brandt said that the Germans nevertheless will go on talking with the French about friendship between the two nations in order to try to save the new relationship between the peoples. The Secy though that it was important to leave the way open for France to return at some future time to Europe and NATO. In reply to Brandt's question, the Secy said that our own relations with the French had improved in manner but not in substance.
6. Spanish bases./4/ The Secy reviewed for Brandt our negotiations with Spain over the base problem. He told Brandt that even if we had gone along with the Spanish financial demands, they would have come right back with a request for a bilateral security treaty--something that simply could not have gotten through the US Senate. The Secy asked Brandt whether he thought there was any chance that the NATO partners would let Spain into the Alliance. Brandt said no. The Dutch, Norwegians, Danes, and the British would be opposed to it. But on the problem of Spanish bases, Brandt suggested to the Secy that he ask Ambassador Lodge to discuss this with Chancellor Kiesinger who is going to Spain on a visit shortly./5/ The FRG might have some economic leverage that could be used, and Kiesinger might be able to accomplish something in Madrid.
/4/Documentation on the negotiations is scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, volume XII.
/5/Kiesinger visited Spain October 27-30.
The Secy thought it was an interesting suggestion and said he would be communicating with Amb Lodge about it shortly.
Rusk
297. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
Bonn, October 11, 1968, 4 p.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Germany, vol. 16. Secret. No drafting information is on the source text, which was approved by Secretary Clifford on October 12. The meeting was held at the Palais Schaumberg.
PRESENT
United States
Secretary Clifford
Ambassador LodgeGermany
Chancellor Kiesinger
R/Adm. Guttenberg
Press Chief Ahlers
Interpreter WeberKiesinger said Secretary Clifford was a most welcome guest. The German people, he said, attached great importance to NATO and to the United States alliance. They have an overwhelming conviction on that subject. He hoped that the nuclear planning meetings had been good.
We must, he said, jointly study what happened in Czechoslovakia--without nervousness and without being hectic. He did not believe that Germany should be looking for a "big brother"--nor was it. We Germans, he said, are aware that we must do our part to the utmost of our capacity.
In view of the existing military balance, notably as regards conventional forces, Germany's best protection are the U.S. troops on Germany's own soil. It is they who make the aggressor think twice.
Kiesinger said he had asked himself many times whether the Russian invasion of Czechoslovakia was undertaken solely because of events in Czechoslovakia or whether it was but one phase in a much larger scheme. The Soviets, he said, seem to be out-flanking us on both of our maritime flanks, using intimidation among other methods.
Kiesinger said he had had many talks with eminent men both here and in his travels and still he was not sure what their aim really is. He was sure that they were trying to weaken NATO and that they have had some success.
On the whole, he thought the second explanation was the right one--that Czechoslovakia is part of a larger scheme. We are thus at a decision point in history and "I say this as one who does not favor reviving the cold war and who realizes that the US and the Soviet Union must be in touch with each other. Indeed, we must find a way of proceeding whereby both things are done: that is, the great powers are in touch with each other and are also in close consultation with their allies."
Kiesinger quoted an unnamed European Prime Minister as having said recently: "If the Russians had waited two years, nothing would have been left of NATO." Kiesinger realized that there was some weakening in both camps; the question was in which situation was the danger greater.
We must thus expect serious crises in the future. It is quite likely that the Russians will be reckless again. Yet even the use of force cannot eliminate the urge of nationalism. He could not help but be impressed by what had happened to Czechoslovakia and by the fact that the Western world seems all too willing to neglect necessary security measures. "I fear there will be a rude awakening."
Secretary Clifford said that he brought regards from President Johnson who wished to convey thoughts to Chancellor Kiesinger in two areas; (1) with regard to Czechoslovakia and (2) with regard to NATO.
In Washington "we think," said the Secretary, "that the Soviet incursion into Czechoslovakia is exceedingly serious." It is not merely a question of the intervention alone. The manner in which the Soviet Government reached this decision should also give us pause. The military performance was very efficient. The planes were well handled in bad weather. From a political standpoint, of course, it could hardly have been worse. There was no proof whatever of outside aggression against Czechoslovakia. Soviet intervention was dangerous, awkward and impulsive politically, while being sophisticated militarily. It showed that the hardliners had taken over in the Politburo.
We don't know whether it is an isolated action or not. Does it threaten Romania? There are ten to fifteen divisions there which could be in preparation for a move into Yugoslavia. The Soviet may well feel that, having taken the first step, they might as well go ahead.
We too are aware of the situation in the Mediterranean. Our Sixth Fleet is there and we have strengthened it. The Soviets have progressed with their Navy. They have a helicopter carrier, marines and landing craft, and a submarine building program. This is not a comforting picture. Secretary Clifford recalled Gromyko's recent statement at the UN that "as far as Socialism is concerned the Soviets know no national boundaries." All these events have brought about a complete collapse of the hopes of the many persons who thought that a new era was at hand.
These events also show the transcendent importance of NATO. We reaffirm our obligation to it. If an ultimate Armageddon is to be prevented, it will be by NATO. We recognize, of course, that each member is a sovereign power and must make its decisions for itself.
In the US Congress, the belief is held that the US has met its obligations to NATO and that there should be no need to keep forces there 23 years after the end of World War II. Indeed this belief is growing. Senator Symington has introduced legislation to cut the number of American troops down to 50,000. Senator Russell, the Chairman of the Armed Serv-ices Committee, is critical.
The Administration now in power believes these viewpoints to be in error. We maintain many troops, in many places.
But the pressure in the US to cut our contribution in NATO goes on because some of the NATO countries are not doing their share. Belgium and Canada are actually talking about reducing. The British talk about bringing troops back for service in NATO but we see very little coming to NATO. We, in the Administration, must be able to tell Congress of what Europe is doing. There is real pressure from the people. This is our problem, said the Secretary, and "I am telling you about it."
More must also be done in the balance of payments field. We have a $700 million deficit. The conferences on this subject at the lower levels are dragging badly. The problem will be there no matter who is in power.
We understand that our enlightened self-interest is involved in NATO. The deterrent to the Soviet Union today is that an invasion against Germany would be an invasion against the US. The Soviet Union is not persuaded by weakness.
Our expenses in the strategic nuclear field are growing.
In reply, Kiesinger asked Clifford to present his respectful compliments to President Johnson. He said he was quite aware of the situation which Secretary Clifford had described and wished to say two things: (1) Germans are reconsidering their contribution to NATO, notably as regards troops and (2) when the government passed the last defense budg-et it did so with the reservation that "we might have to increase it." An increase of as much as 15% would be serious. In spite of prosperity, public revenues have not risen commensurately. Germany, he repeated, was not looking for a "big brother." The German Defense Ministry was preparing a "white paper." He personally believed Germany should increase, he said.
The question of offset was an old problem. It involves a very considerable amount of money. The government is about to review it. Our representatives, of course, were bound by their instructions. An inter-departmental committee has been created to take a new look.
Please tell the President, he said, that in both areas "we are doing new thinking." A 15% increase in the defense budget and a 3.4 billion for offset, make a total of 7 billion DM out of 81 billion DM in the total budg-et. This means new taxes, as cuts in other parts of the budget are not possible. We need the backing of the whole population.
DeGaulle had said on his last visit to Bonn/2/ that France has more forces in Germany than the United Kingdom. Will the French too ask Germany for offset payments? Seven to eight hundred million Deutsche Marks for the French added to amounts for other countries could amount to 8 or 9 billion DMs. He said he wished to expose the whole problem. "I want," he said, "to meet United States interest and NATO. We will try."
/2/September 27-28.
Secretary Clifford said that yesterday at the meeting British Defense Minister Healey had said that the big deterrent to Soviet aggression was our tactical nuclear weapons. Clifford said it is not the tactical nuclear weapon; it is actually the presence of 300,000 soldiers. He had told Healey he was rendering great disservice to NATO by saying this. Should this idea ever get back to Congress there would be trouble. It is an invitation to disaster and it shows the difference of concepts on this problem.
Mr. Clifford said in conclusion that he could not suggest what the Germans should do. He said they must decide for themselves and do what is most important for their country.
Kiesinger said he saw the problem just as Clifford did but he was also aware that the German farmers "want billions."
298. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Germany/1/
Washington, October 22, 1968, 0037Z.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 28 GER B. Confidential; Immediate. Drafted by Johnpoll and Leddy, cleared by Puhan, and approved by Rusk. Repeated to London, Moscow, Paris, and Berlin.
259256. For Ambassador from Secretary. Subject: Proposed UK letter to Abrasimov. Refs: A--Bonn 18289; B--Bonn 18302; C--Berlin 2519; D--State 255038./2/
/2/The Embassy in Germany reported on the proposed British approach to Abrasimov in telegram 18289 from Bonn, October 10. (Ibid.) Telegram 18302 from Bonn, October 19, recommended that the United States associate itself with the British letter. (Ibid.) Telegram 2519 from Berlin, October 19, questioned whether the United States should initiate corres-pondence with Abrasimov. (Ibid.) In telegram 255038, October 14, the Department of State authorized the Embassy to tell British officials that a meeting with Abrasimov would be useful. (Ibid., POL 17 UK-GER W)
I see no substantive problem with the proposed UK letter, which is an excellent elaboration of the allied position already communicated to Abrasimov in tripartite letters delivered last November (Bonn's 4915, 7 Nov. 1967)./3/
/3/Not printed. (Ibid., POL 15-2 GER W)
I do, however, have a problem with the proposed procedure for specifically associating the US with the UK letter. As you know, the US is well out in front on the question of Berlin. We have recently made our position clear to the Soviets in the strongest possible terms through communications with Gromyko and Dobrynin. We have also visibly demonstrated our concern over Berlin through the appearances and statements in Berlin of yourself, Secretary Clifford and Secretary Cohen. Another specific démarche by us without any apparent reason would seem to me to fall clearly in the category of over-reaction on the part of the US.
The situation of the British and the French, who have not taken the same forceful steps as we have, is of course somewhat different. At the same time a letter limited to just the two and omitting the US would certainly raise questions in the minds of the Soviets and the East Germans.
I wonder whether we could not handle the matter in this way: Let the British send the letter to Abrasimov as a purely unilateral document setting forth the points which Jackling would have raised orally with Abrasimov if the scheduled meeting between the two had taken place; but amend the text of the letter slightly to show that the views set forth therein are in line with the tripartite views expressed to Abrasimov in the Nov. 8, 1967 letter. This would have the effect of showing that the UK position is simply an elaboration of established tripartite policy, without the need for specifically associating the US and France with the sending of the letter.
I suggest that this might be accomplished by inserting the following sentence immediately after the first sentence of the 4th paragraph of the Jackling letter: "The same views were expressed by the Ambassadors of France and the US." These two sentences would then read, "In this connection I should like to remind you that my predecessor wrote to you a year ago to put on the record my Government's views that the Federal Government has a legitimate concern for the welfare and viability of Berlin. The same views were expressed by the Ambassadors of France and the US." The rest of the letter would then continue as presently drafted.
Rusk
299. Telegram From the Department of State to Secretary of State Rusk in Brussels/1/
Washington, November 14, 1968, 0150Z.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, vol. 105. Secret; Priority; Limdis. The telegram was sent to Rusk at the U.S. Mission to NATO. Repeated to Berlin, Bonn, London, Moscow, and Paris.
271355. Tosec 34. Subject: Katzenbach-Dobrynin discussion re travel to Berlin.
1. Acting Secretary called in Dobrynin November 13 to make following points re Berlin:
(A) USG has become aware of number of rumors to effect that action might be taken in near future that would add to difficulties surrounding German travel between FRG and West Berlin.
(B) There was no need to repeat in detail what Secretary Rusk had already told Ambassador Dobrynin and FonSec Gromyko in many conversations regarding importance we attach to West Berlin and the maintenance of that city's viability.
(C) While we did not know whether there was substance to rumors or not, it should be understood that any actions in this direction could not help but be taken seriously by USG and affect progress on solutions to problems of interest to both USSR and USG.
2. Dobrynin noted that foregoing comments were based on rumors. Nevertheless, he wished to repeat that Soviet Government was not going to be initiator of actions against Berlin. He also wished to make clear, however, that if FRG continued its provocations re West Berlin that the Soviet Government would reserve the right to take its own measures. He said points made by Mr. Katzenbach would be conveyed to Moscow.
3. Neither Katzenbach nor Bohlen felt Dobrynin was particularly reassuring. Despite his statement about rumors not being worthy of a USG démarche he said nothing to discount their possible substance.
4. Foregoing conversation has not yet been passed to Germans, French or British here but we assume Secretary may wish to do so in Brussels.
At close of conversation, Dobrynin indicated he plans to return to Moscow at end of this month.
Katzenbach
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