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FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1964-1968, Volume XXIX Korea
Department of State |
Korea Telegram from the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State Seoul, January 21, 1964, 8 p.m/1/ /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, DEF 15 KOR S-US. Secret; Priority; Limdis. Repeated to CINCPAC for POLAD./1/ 953. 1. I do not know exactly where US policy now stands on reduction of ROK armed forces level and withdrawing part of US forces, but have impression both are under active consideration with possibility of decision at any time./2/ If this so, and since this item will be on agenda of Secretary's meeting with President Pak,/3/ I offer my latest thinking on this subject. /2/An undated State-Defense-AID study of U.S. and ROK force reductions had been completed and an undated draft memorandum for the President had been prepared. U. Alexis Johnson submitted a copy of the latter to Rusk under cover of a January 14 memorandum in advance of a meeting on the question scheduled between Rusk and McNamara for 5 p.m. that day at the Pentagon. (Ibid.) Rusk's Appointment Book contains no reference to the meeting, and no further record of that meeting has been found. /3/Rusk was in Tokyo January 24-28 to attend the meeting of the Joint U.S.-Japan Committee on Trade and Economic Affairs. Before returning to Washington, Rusk stopped in Korea and met with Pak on January 29.2. We are forcing or trying persuade ROK Govt to make number of difficult decisions during first half this year: A tough economic stabilization program alongside reduced US aid; a ROK-Japan settlement; and devaluation. Within Korea price inflation of past year has produced under threat of strikes, demands for higher wages for civil servants and employees of govt enterprises and restlessness among junior military officers and NCOs with families. Govt will have to raise salaries and pay soon, but increases will fall short of price rise. To add to these difficulties price of rice is now beginning move upward (from 2,750 to 3,100 won per bag within last week) which is both earlier and higher than normal seasonal pattern, and we expect further rises before barley crop is harvested in June. Spring months are always lean food months and time of greatest economic difficulty and restiveness in country. 3. New govt is just getting under way. There is no doubt that it is preparing to take some of tough decisions required of it, i.e. economic stabilization, ROK-Japan settlement, and devaluation. Opposition tactics are to maintain continuous barrage of irresponsible criticism in order capitalize on govt's difficulties and public restlessness in effort bring govt down. Our effort it seems to me should be to encourage govt to act courageously and constructively in these next few months and, insofar as possible, to help it by US statements and actions. 4. In these circumstances, I think it would be prudent in next few months to avoid any announcement of reduction in US forces and to avoid loading on govt requirement to reduce ROK forces. This does not mean we should not take decisions, but timing of any announcements and consultation with ROKG on force reductions should be decided in light of complex of factors described above. I would hope that our actions on these two matters could be deferred until the second half of CY 1964. 5. Simultaneous announcement that both ROK and US forces will be reduced would come as severe jolt, with psychological and political repercussions that could jeopardize stability of ROKG. Accordingly, if both are to be reduced, the sequence should be for ROK forces to be reduced first and after public has adjusted to this shock, to deal with any US force reduction. 6. Ideally reduction in ROK and US forces should be accompanied by sound plan for restructuring and repositioning of two forces in order maintain or improve defense capability. In my 2 1/2 years here I have heard repeatedly from our military that too large a proportion of both US and ROK forces and reserves are in forward areas and that main lateral line of supply through Inchon and main supply depot at Ascom are dangerously vulnerable in event of attack. Furthermore US installations are far too numerous and too dispersed for military effectiveness or for economical administration. I am told what is needed and what has long been advocated is a repositioning of the forces, a consolidation of installations, and a speeding up of program now under way to develop our supply depots in south. The argument is invariably advanced that repositioning installations would be costly, but this ignores fact that our troops are presently installed in antiquated structures, some dating back to 1953. Many of these are falling apart and annual maintenance and replacement cost already running in millions annually and will go higher as obsolescence rate increases. I do not see economic, let alone military, wisdom of putting millions of dollars every year into existing installations which have inherent weaknesses described above. Therefore would hope that any ROK and US forces reduction will not be done by axe method of simply chopping off numbers and reshuffling rest into existing installations but would be part of a considered reorganization for improved defense of Korea. 7. Am aware that achieving reductions through a coordinated plan involving restructuring and repositioning might take time to work out in face of pressures to effect economies quickly. Nonetheless, urge that Washington take time to work out both US and ROK reductions in coordinated way that will meet all requirements: military, economic and political. 2. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Korea, Memos, Vol. I. Secret. An L on the memorandum indicates that the President saw it. This is for background, because Rusk and McNamara plan to take up with you shortly force cuts in Korea./2/ /2/At the Daily White House Staff Meeting of February 5 McGeorge Bundy reported that Rusk and McNamara decided not to approach the President on the question at this time. At that meeting Bundy, Forrestal, and Komer discussed the problem and agreed that "some action on force levels in Korea " should be taken, that U.S. and Korean forces should not be reduced simultaneously, and that Korean forces should be reduced before U.S. forces were cut. (Memorandum for the record, February 5; National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Chairman's Staff Group, Box 25) They met yesterday and reportedly agreed that rather than cut both ROK and US forces we should cut neither now! McNamara does favor both a 70,000 man cut in the 580,000 man ROK army (phased over two years) and a 12,000 man cut in US forces by the end of 1964. This is a big step forward from the military's previous adamant position. Rusk was perfectly willing to buy the ROK cut; State feels that such a small reduction probably would have little adverse political implication. But Rusk is strongly opposed to a simultaneous US cut, announced now. He fears it would upset the Japs and Koreans, and even worry all our Asian allies that we're disengaging from Asia. So McNamara then said that if we didn't cut US forces he didn't want to cut ROK forces either; this would be hard to defend on the Hill because it ran counter to our MAP theory of buying cheap infantry (i.e. why cut local forces instead of bringing our boys home?). It would be a pity to postpone entirely once again a long-needed shift which would also save some money. There is never a good time to cut, but the plain fact of the matter--no longer denied by anyone--is that we're overinsured militarily in Korea at a time when we need strength much more elsewhere. The big danger area is in Southeast Asia not Northeast Asia, and has been ever since the Korean War. Since the issue seems to be more one of timing than of substance, why can't we take a decision in principle now, while allowing ourselves tactical flexibility in execution? We ought to be able to devise some way of fuzzing up our action enough to forestall the adverse reactions State fears. For example, we could: 1. Decide now to go ahead with the ROK cut, but play it in low key so as to avoid the problem bothering McNamara. Rusk could tell the ROK when in Seoul that we desire a gradual streamlining of their forces, but feel that they and we should handle it in such a way as to minimize any political splash. The ROKs have as much incentive as we to avoid publicity. And a cut of only 35,000 per year out of 560,000 could be presented here if necessary as revamping, not a main cut. 2. Decide now within the USG, at least tentatively, on a substantial cut in US forces by the end of 1965, if not 1964. Planning should begin, but no announcement of any kind would be made until State and DOD present a final plan to you for decision by 30 June 1964. 3. State and Defense should work out together the optimum timing for such a cut, with an eye to mitigating any adverse political impact in the area. Perhaps doing it in several bites over an 18-month period would help. We could also begin to lay the public relations groundwork by pointing out the erosion of Chicom military capabilities as a result of the Sino-Soviet split, and how we're over-insured in Northeast Asia so may need some redeployment to increase the forces available for Southeast Asia. While any force cuts will always entail some pain, and I don't wish to play down State's concerns, we cannot always let this be an excuse for no action at all. So I urge you keep the pressure on State and Defense via some such proposal as that described above. Bob Komer
3. Airgram From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State/1/ Seoul, February 5, 1964. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 1 KOREA S-US. Secret. Drafted by Fleck; cleared by Doherty and Rosa; and approved by Habib. Repeated to Tokyo and CINCPAC for POLAD. A-553. Subject: Aide-Mémoire from ROKG in Connection with Secretary of State's Visit. Ref: Seoul's A-540, January 31, 1964. /2/ /2/Airgram A-540 from Seoul, January 31, transmitted the memorandum of the 3-hour conversation between Rusk and Pak on January 29 in Seoul. Documentation on Rusk's visit to Seoul is ibid., Conference Files: Lot 66 D 110, Chronology of International Conferences Abroad, 1961-1964. 1. Submitted as an enclosure to this airgram is the text of an Aide-Mémoire handed by the Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Counselor for Political Affairs on January 30, the day following the visit to Seoul for the Secretary of State. Prior to the Secretary's arrival, there had been frequent mention in the press of a memorandum, setting forth the ROK Government's position on problems of mutual US-ROK interest, which was to be presented to the Secretary during his visit. No such presentation took place and it is presumed that the Aide-Mémoire is the document in question. Why the Korean officials did not go through with their original plan to present the paper while the Secretary was in Seoul is not known at this time. 2. The Aide-Mémoire covers four main subjects: (a) The Level of Military Forces; (b) ROK-Japan Talks for the Normalization of Diplomatic Relations; (c) Economic Stabilization and Development Plan; and (d) Status of Forces Agreement, these being at the present time the four principal areas of concern of the ROK Government in its relations with the United States. All except the fourth were raised with the Secretary by President Pak Chong-hui./3/ Although not discussed, the Status of Forces Agreement negotiations were recognized by the President and the Secretary to be a subject of major interest and, accordingly, were mentioned prominently in the Joint Communiqué issued following their conversation./4/ /3/Rusk and Pak also discussed the implications of France's recognition of Communist China as well as threats posed to the Far East by Communist China. (Ibid.) /4/The joint communiqué is printed in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1964, pp. 920-921. 3. It should be noted that while, with one exception noted below, all of the points made by the President in his discussion with the Secretary are contained in the Aide-Mémoire, there are a number of items in the Aide-Mémoire which the President did not take up with the Secretary. It is not known whether the omissions, listed below, were the result of a conscious decision by Pak to concentrate only on the points which he did mention, either for emphasis or because of the shortness of time available, or whether they were inadvertent. 4. On the subject of military force levels, Pak spoke exclusively about the necessity for retaining present levels. He did not refer to the questions of improvement of the equipment of the ROK armed forces, maintenance of local procurement by the U.S. armed forces at last year's level, or the supply of P.L. 480 products to the ROK armed forces, which are discussed in subparagraphs (b), (c), and (d), respectively of paragraph 5, Section I of the Aide-Mémoire. 5. With regard to the ROK-Japan normalization issue, Pak did not mention to the Secretary the proposal to speed up the payment of the property claims settlement, the question of the legal status of ROK residents of Japan, or the dispute over Tok-to (Takeshima Island), discussed in subparagraphs (b), (e), and (f), respectively of paragraph 3, Section II. While omission of the latter two subjects appears appropriate in view of the limited time available for the conversation, it is surprising that the President did not refer to his Government's desire for U.S. intervention with the Japanese to obtain speedier payment of the property claims settlement, particularly since the Minister of Foreign Affairs had specifically told the Ambassador a few days prior to the visit that this would be one of the requests which Pak would make to the Secretary. 6. In discussing the general topic of economic stabilization and U.S. aid, Pak did not make the references to the ROK Five Year Plans contained in the Aide-Mémoire, nor did he cover the points concerning fertilizer imports [Section III, para. 3(b)],/5/ maintenance of the present exchange rate [3(c)], and offshore procurement [3(d)]. In discussing the MAP transfer program, Pak suggested suspension for two or three years instead of the 5 years recommended in the Aide-Mémoire [3(e)]. He did ask for the creation by the U.S. Government of favorable conditions for Korean imports but did not refer specifically to the problem of textile quotas [3(f)]. /5/All brackets in the source text. 7. It was during his discussion of this general topic that Pak deviated from the subjects covered in the Aide-Mémoire by asking for an additional 20 million to 30 million dollars of aid in order to check the price spiral (para 28, refair)./6/ The degree of seriousness with which the ROKG regards this request is as yet undetermined, but it can be presumed that we will be faced with further references to the need for additional economic assistance including supporting assistance throughout the year. /6/Airgram A-540 makes no mention of Rusk's response to Pak's request, except to note that Rusk complimented Pak on his "courage to bite the bullet and take steps needed to get the Korean economy moving " and mentioned several alternative methods available to promote economic development in Korea. 8. Some of the topics included in the Aide-Mémoire were also discussed at the separate conferences attended by Secretary of Commerce Hodges, Secretary of Labor Wirtz and other members of the party. The substance of these conferences is being reported separately./7/ A study of the gist of these conferences, Pak's conversation with the Secretary, and the Aide-Mémoire should afford a comprehensive view of the stance currently being taken by the ROKG with regard to its relations with the United States Government. /7/Memoranda of those conversations are in the National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Conference Files: Lot 66 D 110, Chronology of International Conferences Abroad, 1961-1964. For the Ambassador:
Attachment/8/ Seoul, January 29, 1964. /8/Confidential. AIDE-MEMOIREOn the occasion of the visit to Korea of Mr. Dean Rusk, Secretary of State of the United States of America, the Government of the Republic of Korea wishes to present its views and position on the following problems of mutual interest to the Governments of the Republic of Korea and the United States. 1. The Level of Military Forces 1. The North Korean regime has recently reinforced its combat resources by not only activating a new Army Corps but also expanding arsenals, ammunition and military vehicle manufacturing factories. On the other hand, the Communist regime has been maintaining close ties with bellicose Communist China and is constantly preparing for its renewal of an invasion against the Republic of Korea. 2. The existing armistice agreement has merely been a military measure for temporary cease-fire and the flagrant violation of the armistice committed by the Communists along the demarcation line is causing serious uneasiness in Korea. 3. In view of the present situation in South East Asia, particularly military instability in Laos and fruitless anti-guerrilla warfare in South Viet-Nam, the presence of the U.S. armed forces and the maintenance of powerful ROK military forces are essential for checking further Communist expansion in this part of the free world. 4. Although there has been a partial withdrawal of the U.S. armed forces in Europe particularly from West Germany, the security of Europe will not be affected owing to the presence of the effective North Atlantic Treaty Organization. However, since there is no such collective security organization so firmly established as NATO in the Far East, the existing Korea-U.S. Mutual Defense Treaty alone would not be sufficient enough to relieve the feeling of uneasiness from the Korean people. 5. As the new Government has just been established in Korea, it requires considerable time to lay down solid democratic foundation in political, economic and social fields. Taking into account the above mentioned internal and external situations confronting Korea, the following are presented for favorable consideration by the U.S. Government: a. The strength of ROK military forces and the U.S. armed forces in Korea should continuously be kept at present level. The reduction of the military forces might be considered only after having examined both internal and external situations in the future. b. The improvement of ROK military equipments should be implemented promptly. The incident of January 14, 1964, in which an F-86 jet was shot down by the North Koreans, clearly indicates that the Communist forces in the North have superior weapons. c. The military procurement by the U.S. armed forces in Korea should not be reduced from the level of last year, as any reduction in the amount of the U.S. military procurement is bound to have a direct and profound effect upon the stability of Korean economy. d. In order to alleviate the hardship suffered by the men in uniform due to the low salary allowance, it is desired that the U.S. Government would continue to supply U.S. surplus agricultural products to ROK military forces. II. ROK-Japan Talks for the Normalization of Diplomatic Relations 1. As the United States and other free nations desire, the Korean Government firmly stands by its basic policy to realize an early normalization of diplomatic relations between Korean and Japan from a broader scope of view-point that it would be of significant benefit to Korea and Japan as well as to the general free world interests. 2. However, the Korea-Japan normalization question has recently become a serious domestic political issue in Korea due to the national sentiment, derived from the past relations of the two countries, and the negative attitude from certain segments of the opposition parties. Primary reasons and commonplace belief attributable to such attitude of the opposition may be given as follows: a. They believe that the Korean fishing industry has been greatly handicapped by the Japanese monopoly of the fishery and their indiscriminate catch in the past, the consequences of which have resulted in curtailing the yearly per capita income of the Korean fishermen to mere 27 U.S. dollars at present. Under such circumstances, the Korean fishermen have naturally come to entertain a deep-rooted fear against the Japanese fishing industry. They also fear that any concession on the Peace Line would lead the Japanese fishery, overwhelmingly superior in number of fishing vessels, scale, equipment and technique, to indulge in random fishing activities, the result of which would undoubtedly bring about exhaustion of fishery resources and eventual ruin of the Korean fishery. b. It is also feared that the Japanese economic cooperation which is to follow the normalization of the relations between the two countries may result in a reduction of the United States assistance to Korea. c. They feel with resentment that the Korean Government is engaging in a low-postured diplomacy toward Japan at the expense of excessive concessions in an attempt to tide over the present economic crisis arising from inflation and shortage of foreign exchange in Korea. It is feared that any venture to settle the matter under such unfavorable circumstances may bring about a crisis of the present Government. The Korean Government, however, is firmly resolved to settle the problem with grave determination. 3. It is, therefore, earnestly requested that the United States would render its utmost cooperation in support of the position of the Korean Government in the following lines: a. Attitude of Japanese Government It is hoped that the Japanese Government fully realize the difficulties confronted by the Korean Government and show sincerity in seeking an early normalization of the relations between the two countries. b. Property Claims Payment It is desired that the property claims payment which is to/9/ be made in a shorter period and a larger portion of payment be made during initial period. In this connection, the good offices of the United States Government is solicited to urge the Japanese Government to consider favorably the request of the Korean Government. /9/be made over a period of 10 years. [Footnote in the source text.] c. United States Aid to Korea The Koreans fear that an influx of the Japanese capital into Korea may result in what may be called "an economic invasion " by Japan. In order to mitigate such sentiment entertained by the Korean public, it is desired that the United States would maintain present level of economic aid to Korea and encourage its positive investment in Korea. /10/ /10/Rusk told the Korean Ambassador in Washington in late February that although "aid could not of course be permanent feature of US-ROK relations, its level for ROK will be determined by actual needs of situation; neither ROK nor US would wish permanent aid relationship. Nor do we have in mind a shift of aid burden to Japan, which ROK would not desire and Japan would not desire or accept. " (Telegram 758 to Seoul, February 28; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL JAPAN-KOR S) d. Fishery and Peace Line Question The following are the basic principles of the Korean Government for the settlement of the fishery question. (1) It is deemed absolutely necessary to establish appropriate fishing regulatory measures for the purpose of preserving fishery resources in the waters adjacent to Korea. Only under this premise, Japan would be allowed to maintain status quo of their fishing activities on the basis of its past catch in the waters within the Peace Line. (2) The Korean fishermen should not be made victims of the pressure of the Japanese fishing activities, leading to an eventual ruin of the Korean fishery. (3) Extreme gap between the fishery capabilities of the two countries being the primary deterrent to the settlement of the fishery and the Peace Line question, it is desirable that Japan offer assistance to Korea as fishery cooperation at least in the amount of over 100 million dollars to improve Korean fishery capability. In this connection, it is earnestly hoped that the United States would advise the Japanese Government that the recent instructions given to the Korean delegation on this subject were made in full consideration of the Japanese position and therefore no further concession is possible on the part of the Korean Government. e. Legal Status of Korean Residents in Japan The Korean Government maintains that the question of legal status of the Korean residents in Japan must be solved with due consideration of the historical background that has led to their presence in Japan and they should be given a special legal status and more favorable treatments than those accorded to ordinary aliens in Japan./11/ Since it is expected that the solution of this question in line with the above principles would stimulate the affiliation of the Communist-inclined Korean residents in Japan to democratic camp, especially during the Tokyo Olympic games, it is desired that the Japanese Government would favorably consider the Korean position on this question. /11/In 1964 approximately 600,000 Koreans, brought to Japan as laborers during World War II, resided in Japan. Defense intelligence analysts represented that both countries competed for control and influence over that population, which lived in "depressed circumstances " and depended on relief from the Japanese Government. (DIA Intelligence Summary, March 25; Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of Robert W. Komer, Japan-Korea, December 1963-March 1966) f. Question of Dok-To Island/12/ /12/Referred to as Takeshima by the Japanese, Dok-To (or Tokto), a barren island in the Sea of Japan, had long been a point of contention between Korea and Japan. The question being out of the scope of the Korea-Japan normalization talks, the Japanese Government should refrain from taking up the subject at the negotiations aimed at an early normalization of the relations between the two countries. III. Economic Stabilization & Development Plan 1. It is the prevailing view of the Korean Government that the first five year economic development plan has achieved considerable progress. Especially, the economic development plan has contributed a great deal to the development of key industries and manufacturing fields as well as in the expansion of import-saving industry and the increase of export productions. At the same time, the Government notes that in the course of planning and implementation there have been many setbacks resulted from a series of unexpected changes in the economic climate and high growth rate of population. However, the Korean Government is firmly determined to carry out the current five year economic development plan through supplementary adjustments and reasonable modifications. Furthermore, the Government is contemplating a more practical and effective second year economic development plan which would be based upon the achievements and experiences gained through the implementation of the preceding one. 2. One of the most urgent tasks confronting with this Government is to stabilize price levels and to overcome the extremely unfavorable balance of international payment. In an effort to cope with such a situation, the Korean Government, in consultation with the United States Operation Mission, had established a financial stabilization program in the fiscal year 1963, and exerted utmost efforts to maintain and strengthen those measures. As in the case of last year, the Government has set up another stabilization program for the fiscal year 1964 and will effectively implement the program in cooperation with the United States Operation Mission. However, with respect to the international balance of payment, it is noted with regret that this country, in spite of all the efforts being made, still has to go a long way to reverse the current unfavorable trend. From the beginning of the fiscal year 1962, the United States economic aids have been steadily kept on the downward trend. The heavy cuts in the aids have come not only in the field of Supporting Assistance but also in such indirect fields as Military Assistance Program Transfer, off-shore procurement of United Nations forces and restrictive quota system on certain Korean products for export to the United States of America. These reductions simultaneously effected in the aids have inevitably brought tremendous and unbearable pressures upon all the segments of the Korean economy. Above all, the Korean Government wishes to remind the United States that the Republic of Korea, being at the forefront of anti-Communist struggle, has constantly to be on the alert and to maintain a strong military, economic and political posture to cope with ever-increasing menace in the Far East. 3. Therefore, the Korean Government, in the light of general economic situation set forth in the above, would like to take this opportunity to urge the Government of the United States to take into immediate and favorable consideration the following requests: a. The Supporting Assistance should be maintained at 1963 level at least for five years hereafter. b. The fertilizer import through Supporting Assistance and grain import under PL-480 program should be expedited so as to meet the seasonal demands. c. The dollar-won exchange rate should be maintained at the present level to prevent any possible impacts that may effect upon price levels such as inflationary trend and psychological chain reaction. d. The proper measures should be taken to ensure the present level of the U.S. offshore procurement program. e. The initiation of overall Military Assistance Program Transfer should be suspended for five years, as it would create heavy burden on the Korean economy. f. The overall trade and commercial policy toward Korea should be re-examined in more favorable terms and the restriction imposed on the quota for the Korean textile goods should be relaxed. g. The Supporting Assistance funds should be timely released in the future as was the case of recent release of 15 million dollars of Supporting Assistance fund which has greatly relieved the economic difficulties in Korea. IV. Status of Forces Agreement 1. It is recalled that prior to the resumption in September 1962 of the current negotiations for an agreement covering the status of the United States armed forces in Korea, the Republic of Korea and the United States announced that the conclusion of the agreement would await the restoration of civil government. 2. It need not reiterate the sincere desire of the Korean peoples for an early conclusion of such an agreement in order to seek reasonable and equitable solution of many problems arising from the stationing of the troops in Korea. It is also to be noted that the Korean populace has shown, particularly after the civil government was restored in Korea, an increased concern over the progress of the present negotiations. The Korean Government, therefore, would like to urge the United States Government to render its fullest cooperation possible so as to arrive at the conclusion of the said agreement at an earliest possible date. 3. In particular, the Korean Government desires to complete discussions, as soon as practicable, on all the important articles including the subject of criminal jurisdiction, the draft of which has not yet been tabled. The Korean Government further requests that, with regard to a pending issue of compensation to the owners of private facilities and areas used by the United States armed forces, the Government of the United States, taking into account current financial difficulties of the Korean Government, would bear the compensation with sympathetic understanding.
4. Airgram From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State/1/ Seoul, February 13, 1964. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 1 KOR S-US. Secret. Drafted by Habib and Fleck; cleared in draft by Rosa, Doherty, and Killen; and approved by Habib. Repeated to CINCPAC, CINCPAC for POLAD, and Tokyo. A-574. Subject: Proposed U.S. Objectives in the Republic of Korea for 1964. Ref: Seoul's A-483, January 8, 1964. /2/ /2/In airgram 483 from Seoul, January 8, the Embassy set its appraisal of the political situation in Korea in light of the transformation from military to civilian rule. It also recommended that the U.S. publicly state its objectives in Korea, recognize the threat represented by Pak confidante Kim Chong-pil, study the problem of Korean unification, and accelerate negotiations on a SOFA agreement. (Ibid., POL 2 KOR S) In the airgram under reference, the Embassy analyzed the present situation within the Republic of Korea, appraised the outlook for the near future, and suggested certain courses of action to be taken by U.S. Government agencies. Those suggestions were not presented in a systematic framework of specific policy objectives. In this message there is set forth in rough order of priority the objectives toward which the Embassy believes U.S. policies and actions in Korea should be directed in calendar year 1964. Progress Toward Internal Stability 1. In the political field, our efforts should be concentrated on facilitating the successful functioning of constitutional government and democratic institutions which have now been re-established in the wake of military government. While discouraging the government, if necessary, from resorting to authoritarian methods, we should on the other hand make every possible effort to influence the opposition to act in responsible fashion. At the same time we should seek to avoid giving the impression that the United States is interfering in the internal political affairs of Korea. 2. In the economic sphere, the primary goal for 1964 should be the pursuit of sound monetary and fiscal policies and the stabilization of price levels. The exchange rate will have to be adjusted to a realistic level some time not later than mid-summer 1964. ROK-Japan Normalization 3. It goes without saying that every effort should be made to encourage Korea and Japan to achieve a settlement this year. Conclusion of a Status of Forces Agreement 4. Full agreement can be reached this year and the pace of negotiations on this agreement should be accelerated. Agreement will remove a vexatious and potentially harmful issue from US-ROK relations. AID Policy and Effective Use of Available Resources by the ROKG 5. The Embassy and USOM hope that progress can be made during 1964 in persuading the ROK Government to make more efficient use of the resources available to it. We should continue pressing for an increase in exports and for adoption of a more restrictive import policy. We should also continue stressing the need for expansion of agricultural production and seek greater participation in ROK economic development by other governments and international agencies. With respect to economic aid policy, U.S. assistance programs should continue to be linked to Korean implementation of agreed stabilization goals. The cumulative load of economic adjustments which the ROK economy is being called upon to bear in 1964 and after should be gauged so as not to impose a drag on progress or force a further serious deterioration of the foreign exchange position. We will also need to take into account the ability of the government to bear such adjustments politically in a given period. This will necessitate in the course of the year politico-economic judgements affecting the emphasis and timing of U.S. actions involving among other things the level of support assistance, the MAP transfer program, and the level of PL 480 support. Force Levels 6. The decision has been made that the U.S. and ROK armed force levels should remain unchanged during 1964. Another review of the military, economic and political factors involved in force level reduction should be conducted toward the end of 1964 to determine whether reductions can be effected in 1965. Unification Problem 7. In 1964 we should re-examine our position on the Korean unification question and decide whether our strategy should be reformulated in the light of that review. Consolidation of the ROKG International Position 8. Continuing support should be given to ROKG efforts to expand its diplomatic relations and strengthen its international position through the widest possible recognition by non-communist governments particularly those African and Asian nations where the ROKG position vis-a-vis the North Koreans appears shaky at present. We should encourage the ROKG to cement relations with those governments with which it has already established diplomatic relations by opening or strengthening, wherever feasible, diplomatic or consular posts and providing technical assistance or training, within its available resources. We should continue to exert our utmost influence against the expansion of North Korean diplomatic relations. As necessary we should be prepared to defend Korea's position in the United Nations General Assembly taking into account any initiatives that may arise from the review proposed in paragraph 7 above. For the Ambassador:
5. Editorial Note In early March 1964 former Korean Prime Minister Kim Hyon-chol informed Ambassador Berger that the Republic of Korea might be willing to provide 3 or 4,000 troops to assist the United States and South Vietnam "in carrying war to North Vietnam. " The proposal did not reflect the official position of the Korean Government; nevertheless, once informed of it by Ambassador Berger, Foreign Minister Chong Il-kwon appeared to support Korean participation in the war and suggested ways in which prohibitions hindering Korean troops from serving abroad could be overcome. The Ambassador cautioned that the ramifications of such an action must be thoroughly considered and raised the potential negative impact Korean involvement in Vietnam could have on negotiations with Japan. (Telegram 1128 from Seoul, March 7; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 7 KOR S) In the following weeks contacts between Korea and South Vietnam increased. Kim Chong-pil, head of the Democratic Republican Party, traveled to Saigon in mid-March, and in early April a special Vietnamese military mission came to Korea to examine Korean military training and its governmental transformation from military to civilian rule. The Vietnamese diplomatic presence in Korea increased with additional embassy personnel. (Telegrams 1180, March 19, and 1276, April 9, both from Seoul; both ibid.) In circular telegram 2043, May 1, the Department of State informed U.S. Ambassadors of President Johnson and Secretary Rusk's "conviction that it is important for more nations of the Free World to ‘show their flags‘ in Viet Nam " in order to create a unified stand against communism in Southeast Asia. Accordingly, the U.S. Government appealed to the Republic of Korea and other free world governments to contribute to the defeat of the Communist regime in North Vietnam by furnishing men, material, and other forms of support to the resources already devoted to that struggle by the United States. (Ibid., POL 27 VIET S) After being informed of the U.S. position the Korean Foreign Minister indicated he would seek Cabinet-level approval for supplying a field-hospital unit to Vietnam and raised the possibility of Korea also sending signal corps support as well. (Telegram 1436 from Seoul, May 8; ibid., DEF 19-2 KOR S-VIET S) The Embassy in Saigon advised that it would welcome Korean "advisers and selected military personnel who would share in the really dangerous work" and suggested using some of them "for the type of work where our men are getting killed and wounded. "(Telegram 2162 from Saigon, May 9; ibid.) The Department of State concurred, notifying the Embassy in Seoul to "urge ROK contribution of special-forces advisors (in addition to field-hospital unit and signal-corps support earlier mentioned)." (Telegram 1030 to Seoul, May 12; ibid.) In June the United States and Korea agreed that the latter would send one field-hospital unit and 10 karate instructors to Vietnam as soon as the Korean Government received an official request from the Government of Vietnam. The Department of State instructed the Embassy in Seoul to urge the Korean Government "to assume as much of costs as possible" but noted that the United States was "prepared to underwrite whatever is needed to have ROK participate in Viet Nam in this fashion." (Telegrams 2378 to Saigon and 1186 to Seoul, June 24, and telegram 5 from Seoul, July 2; all ibid., DEF 19 KOR S-VIET S) The Embassy in Seoul also reported that the Korean Government was "still interested in supplying combat troops," and was apparently "at a loss to understand" why the United States was not "soliciting direct military participation." (Telegram 1748 from Seoul, June 30; ibid.) In reply the Department of State explained that combat forces had not been requested by Vietnam and that the inherent nature of guerrilla warfare made use of ground forces, particularly those from a third country, inappropriate and unsuitable. (Telegram 12 to Seoul, July 3; ibid.) On September 5 the United States and Korean Commands in Vietnam signed an agreement defining the terms and procedures applicable to Korean involvement in Vietnam. (Airgram A-455 from Saigon, December 14; ibid.) After those arrangements had been finalized, a Korean surgical-hospital unit, consisting of 34 officers and 96 enlisted men, and a team of karate instructors, consisting of 10 officers, departed for Vietnam on September 11. (Telegram 235 from Seoul, September 10; ibid., POL 27 VIET S) Additional documentation covering discussions between the United States and Korea on this issue during 1964 is ibid. and DEF 19-2 KOR S-VIET S.
6. Telegram From the Commander in Chief, United Nations Command, Korea (Howze) to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Taylor) /1/Seoul, March 26, 1964, 0245Z. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Korea, Cables, Vol. I. Top Secret; Flash. Repeated to CINCPAC, CIA, Department of State, which is the source text, and the White House. 60213. For General Taylor from General Howze. References: A. UK 50558, 24 Aug 63; B. JCS 2535, 18 Sep 63./2/ Student demonstrations in Seoul 24 March (about 5,000 strong) and 25 March (15,000 to 20,000 strong), ostensibly against government action to conclude a normalization agreement with Japan, are expected by ROK Chief of Staff to be followed today and on subsequent days by others much larger in size. Demonstrations have also occurred in other cities. /2/The text of reference A was repeated to the Department of State in JCS telegram 260651Z, March 26; the text of reference B was repeated to the Department in JCS telegram 181428Z, March 18. (Both in National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 23-8 KOR S) [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] has information from a usually very reliable and responsible ROK opposition source that the student demonstrations are part of a plan which is positively designed to bring down the current ROK Government, and will continue until that end is achieved. The same ROK source indicated [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] that he hoped very much that CINCUNC would hold the combat forces of the army firmly in place in order that the anti-government effort might succeed. Yesterday troops of the Seoul security command (old capital defense command) were deployed behind the lines of ROK National Police to stop student surges in direction of Presidential mansion. At request of ROKA Chief of Staff, to cope with the numbers expected today, I have indicated no objection to reinforcement of troops in Seoul by provisional battalions from cadres of the two locally stationed rear area security divisions and from the Special Forces Group also located nearby. I have consulted with the Ambassador, who confirms the fact that the current government, being a duly elected one, enjoys the recognition and support of the United States Government and concurs in my decision. We have no evidence of prospective attack by external Communist forces against the ROK. I intend therefore, in absence of other instructions, to proceed according to the intentions expressed in paragraphs 16, 17, 18, and 19 of Reference A/3/ and in consonance with the instructions of Reference B. /4// 3/These paragraphs established that troops were to be released to a recognized ROK Government to suppress a coup or an uprising. If pro-U.S. factions requested troops to overthrow the ROK Government, however, troops would be released only after authorization from JCS was received; the Ambassador was to be kept fully informed of all developments and consulted before any decisions were implemented; if warranted by the nature of the situation, decisions were to be made locally; and U.S. forces were to maintain a position of neutrality in any power struggle. /4/Telegram 2535 acknowledged JCS concurrence with the procedures outlined by CINCUNC and instructed that U.S. authorities were "to support those elements in ROK armed forces who are pro-US oriented" and "to keep ROK armed forces responsive to [U.S.] operational control." 7. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)/1/ Washington, March 26, 1964. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Korea, Memos, Vol. I. Secret. Mac-- Korean student riots, ostensibly against ROK-Jap settlement but actually against ROKG, are getting worrisome. No one expected they'd reach such intensity (students are normally feisty this time each year). Marshall Green, who knows his ROKs, sees better than even chance that ROK/Jap settlement is scuttled for 1964. Too bad if so, since gradual Jap cooling toward bailing out ROK has made us look on 1964 as year of decision. Also Pak government be in danger and nothing as good in sight. All in all, instead of urging Pak and his Rasputin, Kim Chong-pil to be more democratic, maybe we ought to tolerate a little more dictatorship in this messy fief. Korea is still a mess (one of our great failures despite billions in pump priming). So I'd settle for a bit more stability, which would permit us to cut our bill some more (still around $300 million per annum, all told). I'll sing this song to WPB and Green. Perhaps you could too. RWK
8. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) /1/Washington, April 21, 1964. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Korea, Memos, Vol. I. Secret. Mac-- We may have an internal crisis in Korea shortly (Seoul 1330)./2/ The students, obstreperous ever since they triggered overthrow of Rhee in 1960, are demonstrating again. If Pak's police kill a few we may have a "student revolt."Equally dangerous is internal split within ruling DRP between supporters and opponents of Kim Chong Pil, Pak's "eminence grise" /2/In telegram 1330 from Seoul, April 20, Berger detailed the political struggle taking place within Korea and the mounting pressure on the Pak government to remove Kim Chong-pil from political office. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 15 KOR S) Berger, who's always detested Kim Chong Pil (and almost seems to carry on personal vendetta against him), is worried. He doubts Pak will dump Kim, but can't see how Pak can cure internal split in DRP without doing so. All this clouds prospects for ROK/Jap settlement. Since Kim is great promoter of this (for graft involved, partly) opposition is opposing settlement largely as means of getting at Kim. ROKG in turn is thinking of imposing martial law. Am keeping in touch, and keeping State's eye on ROK/Jap angle. Will clue you if any WH-type problem arises. RWK
9. National Security Action Memorandum No. 298 /1/ Washington, May 5, 1964. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of Robert W. Komer, Korea, December 1963 to March 1966 [2 of 2]. Secret. Copies were sent to McCone, McGeorge Bundy, Komer, Bator, and Charles Johnson. TO SUBJECT This is to request that the Secretary of State coordinate a joint State-AID-Defense study which will enable me to weigh and resolve the choices facing us with respect to the possible redeployment/2/ of one of the U.S. Divisions now stationed in Korea. The study should explore what sequence of U.S. actions, involving economic assistance, military assistance, diplomatic communications, and public statements, would minimize the negative effects and maximize the benefit of such a redeployment, taking into account /2/President Johnson instructed that the words "to Hawaii" be removed here and in paragraph 2 below so that redeployment proposals would not be restricted to that destination. (Memorandum to holders of NSAM No. 298 from McGeorge Bundy, May 11; ibid.) --Korea's military security --Korea's short-term political stability --the long-term U.S. objective of stimulating sustainable economic expansion and strengthening Korea's social and political institutions. Specific requirements follow: 1. In considering changes in the level and composition of U.S. assistance, the study should offer both a bare-bones minimum program and a more generous variant which would fully compensate the Korean Government for the loss of a U.S. Division. In connection with the latter, attention should be given to the internal economic and military measures by the ROK which we might bargain for--measures that might appreciably shorten the period of Korea's dependence on extraordinary economic assistance. 2. The study should assess the value of such a redeployment for the balance and flexibility of the U.S. military posture. 3. The study should contain estimates of the budgetary gains and costs. 4. As regards the U.S. balance of payments, the study should estimate both the gross gain of withdrawing a U.S. Division, and the net gain that will result, after account is taken of the recommended changes in U.S. assistance. 5. The study should include recommendations as to the steps we should take, in the event of a redeployment, (a) to avoid any misreading of our intentions in Japan, Southeast Asia, Europe--and in Russia and Communist China, and (b) to explain the good sense of the move to the Congress and the U.S. public. 6. As regards timing, I should like two alternatives to be explored: one with a decision date of June 1, 1964; the other with a decision date of December 1, 1964. With respect to each alternative, the study should elaborate a detailed plan of action, giving announcement dates and implementation dates for all major actions. The study should be completed in time for NSC consideration on May 26. /3/ /3/Accepting the views of McNamara and Rusk expressed in discussions with McGeorge Bundy that the time was not right to address this issue, the President agreed to postpone the requested study until an unspecified future date. (Memorandum from U. Alexis Johnson to Bundy, June 6; ibid., National Security Action Memoranda, NSAM 298) Since a draft report had already been prepared, Bundy suggested it be circulated. (Memorandum from Bundy to Rusk and McNamara, June 9; ibid., Files of Robert W. Komer, Korea, December 1963 to March 1966 [2 of 2]) The JCS also recommended postponing any decision on redeployment until ongoing studies had been completed. (Memorandum from Taylor to McNamara, May 30; ibid.) The White House staff officer assigned to follow the study will be Mr. Robert Komer. Mr. Francis Bator will act in his stead until Mr. Komer's return. Lyndon B. Johnson [Continue with the next documents]
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