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FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1964-1968, Volume XXIX Korea
Department of State |
Korea 10. Telegram From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State/1/ Seoul, May 20, 1964, 3 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 7 KOR S. Secret; Priority; Limdis; No Distribution Outside Department. 1501. Ref: Embtel 1470./2/ /2/In telegram 1470 from Seoul, May 13, Berger reported on Kim Chong-pil's planned trip to the United States in June and Pak's belief that Kim should not leave Korea at the present time. (Ibid.) 1. Toward end of my talk with President Pak May 13 after telling me that Kim Chong-pil would not go to U.S. (reftel), he hesitated and then said he wished tell me something in utmost confidence. 2. He said he is going to remove KCP as chairman of DRP (govt party). Said I may wonder why he has not done so already. There were two reasons: First, he had received several letters from Ohno/3/ warning him that if KCP removed there would be no settlement with Japan. Pak said he hoped settlement could be made in next month or two and some time thereafter KCP would be removed. Pak said if what he had in mind became known consequences would be "dangerous," because KCP had his supporters and it could endanger talks with Japan. He asked me reveal this information to no one. /3/Bamboku Ohno was Vice President of the Liberal Democratic Party in Japan and had met with Kim during the latter's trip to Tokyo in March. (Telegram 2785 from Tokyo, March 25; ibid.) 3. I gave him this commitment. Since Pak in making these remarks had spoken in tone of anger and emotion directed at KCP, I did not think it desirable for me to say anything on matter as personally sensitive as this one is and did not pursue matter further. Foregoing known here only to Doherty and Habib. Request Dept hold this information tight. 4. Comment: I have refrained from reporting this until I had time to consider what this meant. I am inclined to accept this as honest statement of Pak's present attitude and intentions and possibly explains his vacillations when he was under heavy pressure to remove KCP in April./4/ We have had several reports that relations between Pak and KCP have been strained ever since. PriMin told me several times KCP will be removed in about two months. On May 18 PriMin told me he expects KCP will leave Korea in September for "six months" study abroad, adding that relations between Pak and KCP bitter. /4/Telegram 1374 from Seoul, April 28, detailed the opposition to Kim and the pressures exerted on Pak to remove him. (Ibid., POL 23-8 KOR S) 5. Not only has Ohno's position added greatly to Pak's domestic difficulties, but whether Pak will or can remove KCP when time comes remains to be seen. KCP's plan is to stay on the scene and we expect that before long he may mount a campaign against his enemies and that they in turn will resume the attack on him. At present there is a lull in the fight, which Pak arranged by personal appeals to both sides. Berger
11. Editorial Note Conversations with several Korean officials on May 23 and May 24, 1964, reinforced Ambassador Berger's view that a serious crisis was rapidly evolving within the Republic of Korea and threatening the existence of the government of President Pak. (Telegram 1534 from Seoul, May 24; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 23-8 KOR S) The Ambassador reported that the "situation in Korea has again reached a peak of uncertainty, unrest and disarray," and described the current mood as being the "most grave and fraught with difficulty since the May 16, 1961 coup." The effects of the increasingly strong attacks from the political opposition intended to bring about the collapse of the government as well as the escalating threat posed by continuous student demonstrations were compounded by a paratrooper action suspected of being deliberately provoked by extremist supporters of Kim Chong-pil with President Pak's tacit approval. (Telegram 1532 from Seoul, May 24; ibid., POL 2 KOR S) The paratrooper incident occurred on May 21 when 13 armed men wearing army airborne unit uniforms stormed the court house where student demonstrators were being detained and processed. They also forcibly entered the home of the judge handling the cases and demanded he order the arrest of all students in custody. (Telegram 1519 from Seoul, May 21; ibid., POL 23-8 KOR S) Eight of the paratroopers were subsequently arrested, but Army Chief of Staff General Min hinted that a similar action could occur, if demonstrations continued. (Telegram 1526 from Seoul, May 22; ibid.)
12. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)/1/ Washington, June 3, 1964. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Korea, Memos, Vol. I. Secret. Mac-- FYI, Marshall Green thinks ROK rioting quite serious./2/ Pak will probably impose martial law, which we oppose. We fear it will only bottle up popular resentment, which will burst out even more violently sometime later. [4 lines of source text not declassified] /2/Green's views derived from his meeting with Yum Suk Heun, Minister of the Korean Embassy, on May 29. Green informed William Bundy that "Yun predicted that, unless immediate steps are taken to get rid of Kim Chong Pil and improve the Government's standing before the people, the populace led by the students would topple Park Chong Hui's Government within a matter of weeks." (Memorandum from Green to Bundy, June 1; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 15 KOR S) We're worried lest we be over-identified with yet another repressive campaign by one of our Asian clients. This may also spell the end of ROK-Jap settlement hopes this year./3/ It's regrettable that irresponsibility of a minority of the students, egged on by an irresponsible opposition, is undermining the ROK's real future hopes. This country isn't ready for democracy yet, any more than it was for Rhee-style dictatorship in the Fifties. Our Korean policy has been a mess from the beginning, except for the war period itself. /3/Yun also informed Green that popular opposition to a settlement was "not because of hatred of Japan but because Kim Chong Pil and company are obviously turning these negotiations to their own personal financial profit," making a settlement impossible. In Yun's view, if his government attempted to conclude an agreement with Japan, "the lid would blow." (Ibid.) RWK
13. Telegram From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State/1/ Seoul, June 3, 1964, 10:30 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 23-8 KOR S. Confidential; Immediate; Limdis. Repeated to CINCPAC for POLAD, and Tokyo and passed to the White House. 1593. Ref: Embtel 1589./2/ /2/In telegram 1589 from Seoul, June 3, Berger provided a brief overview of his meeting with Pak. (Ibid.) 1. Following are details of President's Pak's meeting with General Howze and me afternoon June 3 (see reftel). 2. Pak said: A. Govt has up to today been patient and lenient in treating with student demonstrations; student aim now is to bring govt down. B. Today's demonstrations had turned into rioting with police stations destroyed, govt trucks and jeeps seized and a police armory broken into. Police had suffered many casualties. (During meeting report came in that a policeman had been killed by students.) C. President of Seoul National University, main source of student activity, today sent message to President through Vice Speaker Na Yong-kyun (opposition) that he had info 65 students and a number of professors encouraging demonstrators were Communists. He had been afraid to pass this info but was doing so in view of today's rioting. D. President had summoned PriMin, other Cabinet members concerned, Chiefs of Armed Services, and members National Security Council to special meeting this afternoon, which came to conclusion that martial law required. It would be imposed tonight, and he requested General Howze to release 6th and 28th divisions. E. Martial law would be confined to Seoul initially, but might have to be extended to other areas depending on how situation developed. In that case more troops might be required. 3. In response my request for details of martial law, Pak said: A. All schools down to primary would be closed at outset, and would be reopened gradually as situation permitted. B. Manipulators of students would be investigated and indicted by prosecutor general. C. Press censorship would be established. D. Civil cases would be tried by civil courts. More important cases by military courts. E. General Min Ki-sik would be martial law commander. F. He could not say how long martial law would be kept on. He hoped not too long. 4. I said National Assembly now in adjournment, but could be convened by members. Assembly would want to debate martial law decision. In view divisions in Assembly govt action might face heavy criticism in Assembly adding confusion to situation. Pak said DRP leaders had met today and pledged full support of this action. I asked if this was DRP assemblymen or party action. He said party leaders which include some assemblymen. 5. I said we recognized situation had become serious as result today's rioting but martial law was no solution to basic problems. What further measures did President contemplate to deal with student and public grievances. Pak said immediate problem was to deal with rioting and he had not given consideration to further aspects of problem. 6. I said we of course hoped that law and order would be quickly restored under martial law, but in light of April 1960 experience there was danger of massive students and popular action in streets. Should this be case it would create for U.S. Government a very serious problem of supporting his government face of general public disapproval. He said he recognized this, but if faced with uncontrollable popular opposition he would have to resign. 7. I said would it not be better to try to head off this possibility by announcing measures that would meet popular grievances. He repeated this must wait until law and order was restored. I then said "Mr. President, I know how painful this subject is but the situation is serious, and it is important that we speak frankly. Since March 23 at least a dozen Korean leaders, who support you, have told me that if martial law is invoked, you and your government will be in serious danger unless Kim Chong-pil is removed. I want to make clear that I am not saying he should be removed, but this is what some of your most loyal supporters are saying." 8. Pak replied that he was aware that KCP "has lost the confidence of many people, including some in the armed forces and in the party." He then recounted events of May 31-June 2: his meeting with KCP on May 31 to discuss resignation; KCP's resignation June 1; the danger of conflict in DRP if he did resign; the meeting with DRP leaders June 1 where only one voice, Chang Kyong-sun, supported resignation; Pak unsure what decision to make and decided to leave it to the DRP party convention this summer. He said as I knew from previous conversation with him, he believes KCP should resign as Chairman of DRP, but not until this summer after ROK-Japan settlement made. I did not pursue the matter except to say that public animus was directed at KCP and not Pak. 9. General Howze then referred to Pak's request to release two divisions and said he prepared do so with my concurrence./3/ I agreed. General Howze then compared current situation with April 1960, when he was in Korea, saying at that time there was universal hostility to fraudulently elected govt; this not the case now. However, Korean military forces were close to people and reflected their views and feelings. In April 1960 martial law people cheered arrival of armed forces. Gen Howze was not sure this would be the case this time. It would be unfortunate if people came to think that govt required presence of armed forces in order stay in power. /3/Howze's report on this meeting was transmitted in telegram 60432 from CINCUNC, Seoul, June 3. (Ibid.) The ROK divisions released from UNC operational control were the 6th and the 28th. 10. General Howze was assured that tanks would not be brought into Seoul and that live ammunition would be held by regimental commanders. Pak said armed forces would not fire except with his express authority. 11. I then said question will arise as to whether US Govt approved or disapproved martial law. I wanted make clear that President had not asked for our approval but asked for release of troops. I wished his govt could avoid any statement that implied our approval or agreement. This action was taken by ROK Govt in its sovereign capacity. President agreed. 12. I then repeated points we had made so there would be no misunderstanding. A. We agreed situation was serious. B. Invocation of martial law was decision of Korean Govt. C. We agreed to release of troops at Korean Govt's request. D. Martial law would not solve basic problems. E. We hoped President would consider what measures might be announced to deal with popular grievances. In this connection that Kim Chong-p'il must be removed along with martial law had been expressed to me by Korean leaders who supported President. 13. President, Kim Chong-o and Min Defense said they understood clearly the views we had expressed./4/ /4/The Department of State approved of the positions taken by Howze and Berger in this meeting and commented that the United States wanted to prevent repression and further disorders in Korea while urging the government to implement reforms to address grievances. (Telegram 1109 to Seoul, June 3; ibid.) Berger
14. Telegram From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State/1/ Seoul, June 4, 1964, 3 a.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 23-8 KOR S. Secret; Immediate; Limdis. Repeated to CINCPAC for POLAD and Tokyo and passed to the White House. 1597. Ref: Embtel 1593 rptd Tokyo 688 CINCPAC 665./2/ /2/Document 13. 1. Large student demonstrations with some civilian participation followed by declaration of martial law June 3 pose question what we should do and say. 2. Martial law may succeed in restoring public order but situation might quickly worsen if students resist, populace joins in, and troops are forced to extreme measures. April 1960 precedent might then be repeated. Govt expects next two or three days will be critical, since all information indicates students intend challenge martial law. 3. Should situation develop on these lines Pak govt might be able head it off by announcing immediate measures that will impress upon public that govt is serious about dealing with legitimate grievances. 4. Our effort should be directed to trying to help govt stabilize situation hence Gen Howze and I agreed to release of troops. If govt resorts only to force without remedial measures and is faced with a mass uprising, question will arise whether we can continue to support it in such circumstances. Time therefore has come for us to recommend to ROKG what actions it must take if it expects to weather difficulties and count on our support. 5. In this situation I recommend US take following position and so inform Pak: A. US regards martial law as an emergency step to deal with public disorder. B. Pak must take the necessary measures to establish public confidence in govt. These measures would include following: (I) Martial law should be lifted as soon as possible. Govt must make plain it does not intend substitute martial law for normal processes over extended period of time. (II) Govt should appeal to responsible leaders of opposition who are willing to cooperate in national crisis. Pak should call meetings with opposition leaders and leaders those elements (press, university, military) of community who command public respect and seek their advice on how to deal with situation. He should also make a personal effort to establish a favorable image of himself before the public, in the process explaining the government's position on each pressing issue. (III) Kim Chong-p'il should resign from political offices and leave the country. (IV) Democratic-Republican Party should be reconstituted, its corruption eliminated, its Secretariat vastly reduced, and its unwarranted interference in govt ended. 6. Govt's past ineptitude, corrupt practices, and subsequent loss of public confidence have caught up with it. We are no longer confident that Pak able control situation for any length of time. We do not predict that Pak govt cannot survive immediate situation, but indications are that he may try to do so by use of force and suppression opposition press, students, and possibly even national assembly. This would be neither acceptable nor viable solution. 7. With Dept's concurrence I intend see Pak at appropriate time and convey sense of foregoing./3/ I plan to tell him that unless he takes actions of this sort we foresee that ROKG will soon find itself in situation where it can survive only by repressive and authoritarian measures in which USG will find it difficult continue to support him. By taking recommended measures promptly and vigorously, he will be acting to save his govt and preserve constitutional democracy in ROK. /3/The Department of State, with the concurrence of the Department of Defense, agreed with Berger's recommendation, adding only general suggestions. The Department of State believed Pak should undertake genuine reform of the DRP, with a solution to the problem of Kim Chong-pil part of the reform process, cautioning, however, that the United States must "avoid overplaying our hand with Pak on KCP." (Telegram 1110 to Seoul, June 3; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 23-8 KOR S) 8. I do not intend issue any public statements here other than those given Embtel 1591/4/ and suggest Dept follow suit along with indication our concern and watchfulness at this point. /4/In telegram 1591 from Seoul, June 3, the Embassy reported that it had issued public statements reflecting its position that the "declaration martial law is matter for Korean Government to decide" and acknowledging that General Howze had released two ROK divisions after receiving a request to do so from the Korean Government. (Ibid.) 9. Gen Howze concurs. Berger
15. Telegram From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State/1/ Seoul, June 6, 1964, midnight. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 23-8 KOR S. Secret; Immediate; Limdis. Repeated to Tokyo, CINCPAC, and USUN; passed to the White House, OSD, JCS, and CIA. 1620. Pass White House, OSD, JCS, CIA. Ref: Embtel 1619 rptd Tokyo 704 CINCPAC 677 USUN 67./2/ /2/Telegram 1619 from Seoul, June 6, discussed the situation surrounding Kim Chong-pil and his supporters in the wake of Kim's resignation as chairman of the DRP and potential options available to Pak to handle increased tensions and restore his authority. (Ibid., POL 15-1 KOR S) Although relinquishing his position as party chair, Kim retained his membership within the party as well as his seat in the National Assembly. 1. General Howze and I called on President Pak to ask how he viewed developments since martial law invoked and what was outlook. 2. He said next two or three days would be critical. Most university students had been sent home. He expected they would try to stir up trouble in the country. But if situation remained quiet, outlook would be favorable. He gave us numbers of "troublemakers" arrested in various categories which I am reporting separately./3/ He then mentioned the several measures taken to remove popular grievances which he hoped would help stabilize situation: National reconstruction movement abolished; DRP Secretariat and staff cut back; legislation to be drafted to provide for publication of contributions to party funds; and Kim Chong-p'il resignation as Chairman DRP. In a few days five hundred corrupt govt officials would be removed. /3/In telegram 1624 from Seoul, June 8, Berger reported that Pak indicated a "total of 1344 civilians and 523 students had been arrested" and an additional 191 students were being sought. The telegram also contained detailed information about those arrests. (Ibid., POL 29 KOR S) 3. I said Gen Howze and I not only wished have his view of situation, but also wished tell him of disturbing reports which had come to us in last three days. Essence these reports was that some people were thinking in terms of maintaining martial law indefinitely because this was only way to govern Korea. Under martial law press and other criticism could be curbed, critics arrested, Assembly abolished if necessary, and it would then even be possible to settle with Japan. I asked President to comment on these reports. 4. He said it impossible govern Korea under martial law and hoped it could be lifted soon. At same time he has worried as to what would happen when martial law lifted. If this meant more rioting, resumption (sic) irresponsible Assembly criticism, continuing Assembly sabotage of govt administration by requiring continuous appearance of Ministers in Assembly, and unrestrained press criticism, it would only lead to renewed rioting and martial law would have to be invoked again. He had to confess he was worried; he hoped martial law could be lifted soon. When Assembly met June 10 he expected it would vote for lifting martial law, but this did not seem a solution and he could not say when it would be possible. 5. To this evasive remark, I said I could not understand why he could not govern. He was elected as President. He had vast powers under the new constitution. His party with 110 of 175 [seats] had an easy majority in Assembly. Why could they not organize the work of the Assembly? Why could he not govern constitutionally? As for those [garble] spoke of martial law as the only solution, I could tell him that it would not be acceptable to the Korean people, to the Korean armed forces, or to Korea's friends abroad, including the US. We were committed to constitutional govt in Korea and were not prepared to support unconstitutional measures. 6. He said he agreed it was impossible to govern by force or by martial law. The trouble was that the public had lost confidence and trust in his govt. 7. I interrupted at this point and said General Howze wished to say something about yesterday's incident involving paratroopers breaking into Donga Ilbo newspaper office (in which they threatened to sabotage printing press). Gen Howze said he was deeply disturbed by this second incident involving special forces. This was a political act and it was apparent these troops were not properly disciplined. Washington authorities would take a serious view of this second incident. We were not prepared to use MAP funds to support undisciplined troops which threaten orderly processes. Pak said he had ordered an investigation of the matter. Gen Howze said that the troops should be withdrawn from capital security command and returned to their normal garrison. 8. I picked up thread of my part of conversation by saying I agreed basic problem was public distrust his govt and would be impossible stabilize situation or govern normally until confidence restored. I said I had been in Korea nearly three years. USG had done its utmost to be sympathetic to his problems and to help him both in days of military govt, during critical times last year, and since election. I would now speak in way I had never done before. Most of his problems during past three years came from activities of Kim Chong-pil. He had been a disturbing and divisive force and his controversial activities had so occupied and distracted everyone's energies and attentions that the govt had never got down to its real job which is to govern the country. I reminded Pak of his frequent mention to me many difficulties KCP has caused him. 9. Present situation was terribly serious and once again KCP was the source of most of President Pak's trouble. He had once and for all to free himself of KCP so that he could restore people's confidence and get down to business of governing. 10. Freeing himself of a problem which had plagued and distracted him for so long was only way I could see to save objectives for which he had worked so hard for three years, his govt and constitutionalism. It would be a decisive move that would restore public confidence in him. It would bring back those who had been alienated in the last two years and enable him to broaden the basis of his support. 11. General Howze interjected at this point and said the armed forces were loyal to Pak but in a critical situation would not support KCP. This division in their loyalties could become a serious problem. General Howze seriously doubted in the circumstances that the armed forces would shoot civilians to keep KCP in office. He said KCP speaks of himself as though he were running Korea. It was essential that Pak assert it is he who is President and responsible for country, not KCP. 12. Pak asked if it were possible to arrange for KCP to go to US for study. I said we had made such arrangements in other cases for the President and could do so again. I suggested KCP should take his family and plan to stay for one or two years so as to give President freedom to govern and chance to stabilize situation without ever- present worry of KCP's imminent return. I stressed importance of an early departure. 13. Pak said he would speak to KCP tonight "and try to persuade him" to remove himself. I said it was in the interest of the country, Pak, constitution, and even KCP himself that he leave as quickly as possible. If he left soon there was a chance of internal stability and unity, a chance to reestablish Pak as a popular leader of the country, and a chance for a Japanese settlement. If he stayed I saw nothing but continuing trouble ahead. 14. As we got up to go I said casually that ten minutes before coming to Blue House I had been given a report that a list of Assemblymen slated for arrest was being prepared, which included a large number of anti-KCP members of the Assembly as well as some opposition leaders. I asked if he knew anything of this. He said he did not. I said he and [I] had been caught by surprise several times by actions taken here over the last three years which we knew nothing about. I hoped this was not going to be repeated. He said with a smile that such arrests would require his signature. I smiled back and said if such arrests occurred there would be real trouble in Korea and we could not remain silent. 15. Comment: I have no certainty that Pak will follow the lead we have given him. We are letting our position be known to key govt and military leaders on whom Pak relies and who will reinforce our advice to him. KCP remains capable of desperate action but may very probably come to realize balance of forces is strongly against him. In that case he will go quietly. If so we will need to cooperate in making possible one or two years of study in US for KCP and possibly one or more of his associates. Berger
16. Editorial Note President Pak informed Ambassador Berger on June 7, 1964, that Kim Chong-pil agreed to leave Korea and study in the United States. (Telegram 1621, June 7; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 15-1 KOR S) Kim expressed an interest in attending a summer seminar followed by study of economics at a "good university" in the United States. He also suggested he be awarded a Department of State Leader Grant, which would, given the prestige associated with the grant, cloak his sudden departure and exile in respectability. (Telegram 1632 from Seoul, June 10; ibid.) The Embassy and the Department of State agreed that Kim was an unsuitable candidate for a Leader Grant, since it allowed only short-term study and extended an official status to the grantee that the United States did not intend to offer Kim. (Telegram 1635 from Seoul, June 10; ibid.) The Department of State secured a private sponsor--the Southwestern Research Society in Dallas, Texas--enabling Kim to attend the 6-week International Seminar conducted by Henry Kissinger at Harvard that summer and to undertake academic study in the fall. Kim was scheduled to depart Seoul for Cambridge on June 18. (Telegrams 1133 and 1134 to Seoul, and telegram 1647 from Seoul, all June 11; all ibid; and telegram 1660 from Seoul, June 15; ibid., POL 7 KOR S) Ambassador Berger advocated that Kim's presence in the United States not be viewed merely a means to "keep him out of way" but the time utilized as an "opportunity to train him and to alter his views." (Telegram 1632 from Seoul, June 10; ibid., POL 15-1 KOR S)
17. Draft Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson/1/ Washington, June 8, 1964. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, National Security Action Memoranda, NSAM 298. Secret. U. Alexis Johnson sent McGeorge Bundy a copy of the draft memorandum and the draft study written in reply to NSAM 298, noting that the drafts had not been approved by Rusk or McNamara. (Memorandum from Johnson to Bundy, June 12; ibid.) SUBJECT Attached pursuant to your request in NSAM No. 298 is a coordinated State-AID-Defense study of a possible redeployment of one of the two U.S. divisions now stationed in Korea. Appended to the study is a time-phased plan for carrying out the redeployment if such a decision is made./2/ /2/The study with appendix is attached but not printed. Defense Department Views Secretary McNamara has taken into consideration the recommendation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that a decision on the possible withdrawal, and on the manner of accomplishing it, not be made at this time, pending completion of studies on costs, prepositioning and relocation sites which are now under way./3/ He has considered also the view of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the withdrawal entails specific risks, and is feasible only if combined with early use of nuclear weapons. Secretary McNamara's conclusion is that the decision to redeploy should be made now and implemented over the next 18 months./4/ He believes that freeing a division from its static commitment in Korea would appreciably improve the U.S. defense posture not only in the Pacific area but world-wide. It is desirable to retain the division as far forward as possible on U.S. territory in the Pacific, but final determination as to the relocation site should await completion of the above-mentioned studies. In Secretary McNamara's judgment, the redeployment would not alter the U.S. strategic position in Korea or restrict the range of alternatives open to us in the event of renewed aggression there. He considers that the U.S. troops that would remain in Korea (over 40,000 at present manning levels), our ability rapidly to augment these forces, improvements in our tactical air capability, the improved flexibility of our over-all military posture in the Pacific and our other actions to counter communism in Asia would constitute convincing evidence of our purpose and will. Secretary McNamara estimates that a maximum annual savings of $22 million in balance of payments expenditures and $8 million in budgetary costs could be realized under the most favorable redeployment conditions. This maximum savings would be reduced to the extent that new facilities were constructed, the Forward Floating Depot augmented, or the Korean economy compensated for the U.S. withdrawal. /3/The views of the JCS are set forth in a May 22 memorandum to McNamara, JCSM-440-64. (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD/OASD/ISA Files: FRC 68 A 4023, 370.5 Korea) /4/According to the attached study, the redeployment involved one division consisting of 12,000 troops as well as 3,000 support personnel. McNamara received a copy of the draft report, but felt the matter should be postponed for a few months "because of the situation in Southeast Asia." (Memorandum from Solbert to McNamara, and memorandum from Stroud to Solbert, both June 5; ibid.) State Department Views My own view is that the proposed redeployment would not be in U.S. interest at this time, as the risks are disproportionate to the relatively small balance of payments and military gains (if any). However, I do agree that the matter periodically be reviewed, possibly again this coming December. My view may be summarized as follows: Consequences for Our Over-all Far Eastern Position--Our position in Asia is under heavy strain this year. A move of the sort proposed would entail the considerable danger of injecting further unsettling effects. Particularly at a time when our position in Southeast Asia is so critical, I would wish to avoid any semblance whatsoever of an implied U.S. willingness to withdraw our power from the Far Eastern area. I believe that Peiping's strategy is directed at having us tire of the frustrating problems in that area of the world, and I would not want to encourage them in the erroneous belief that they are succeeding. If it were possible to have the entire division deployed in a forward area in the Pacific such as Okinawa, Guam or the Philippines, this might have a positive political and psychological effect. However, such a deployment would entail major construction costs and other difficulties. The alternative of withdrawal to the U.S. of all or even a large portion of the forces would give exactly the wrong political signal. While I do not challenge the view of the Secretary of Defense that we may have the capacity/5/ of redeploying the forces in question to the Far East as required, the principal issue is not our capabilities but what both our allies and the Communists read as our intentions. Withdrawal of a U.S. division from the Far East, no matter what our technical capabilities may be, will be read as a U.S. intention to disengage. /5/The word "capacity" is double underlined. Consequences in Korea--Moreover, the redeployment would undermine Korean confidence in U.S. military capabilities and intentions just as the reorganized civil Government addresses itself with apparent determination and new promise to a settlement with Japan, economic stabilization and, largely through these means, strengthening of its own position and achievement of a measure of political stability. Realization of all these goals, in which the U.S. has so large a stake, would be seriously jeopardized. The withdrawal would also inevitably and undesirably focus attention throughout the Far East on the already heavy nuclear emphasis in our Korean posture. In my recent discussions with Chiang Kai-shek he sharply rejected any possibility of the use of nuclear weapons by the U.S. in Asia as being completely contrary to U.S. interests. Our other allies could be expected to take an even more vigorous stand in opposition. Since the Joint Chiefs of Staff do not endorse a reduction of U.S. forces in Korea unless a prior commitment to a nuclear strategy is accepted, the entire military rationale of the proposal gives me serious concern. In this connection, if the elements of the division which it is proposed be sent to Alaska are given responsibilities in terms of Alaskan defense, it is doubtful that they will be immediately available for rapid deployment to the Far East in case of need. Financial Consequences--As for the effects of such a redeployment upon the U.S. balance of payments and budget, Secretary McNamara's savings estimates specifically do not take into account construction of pre-stockage facilities on land and sea or the providing of necessary funds to compensate the Korean economy and stabilization program for the loss of income (estimated at $15 million) from the redeployed division. The studies of AID and State staffs indicate that the net annual balance of payments benefit after these factors are taken into account would be very small (probably negative if a brigade were deployed to the Philippines) and that there would be a definitely adverse effect on the U.S. budget--initial one-time budgetary costs ranging from $92 million to $370 million, and annual budgetary costs of from $7 million to $26 million. Possible Solution At the same time I fully share the view of the Secretary of Defense that our force posture in Korea results in inflexibilities in the use of our military resources. I have given considerable thought to this problem and am persuaded that we can find a way which is politically feasible, assuming it is also militarily feasible, to develop a more responsive force posture in the Far East. Basically, my proposal is that we transform one of the two divisions in Korea into a mobile reserve stationed in Korea but available for meeting crises elsewhere in the Far East. I do not feel that we must accept complete inflexibility in our Korean deployment, particularly when events are making clear the potential requirement for U.S. ground forces elsewhere in the Far East. I recognize that there may be a reluctance on the part of the Koreans to see us transform one of our divisions into a mobile Far Eastern area reserve. However, I think we can make a strong case that the most effective way to deter Communist adventurism anywhere in the Far East, including Korea, is by demonstrating our ability to deal immediately and effectively with aggression wherever it occurs throughout the region. It seems to me time to make this adjustment in the use of our military resources which are, after all, not unlimited. I am prepared to explore the feasibility of this proposal with Secretary McNamara and, if found militarily feasible, to work out a specific plan for your approval. Dean Rusk/6/ /6/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
18. Telegram From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State/1/ Seoul, July 6, 1964, 6 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 15-1 KOR S. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to Tokyo and CINCPAC for POLAD. 12. I spent July 2-3 in Chinhae with President Pak and had an opportunity for frank and friendly discussion on following matters./2/ /2/In telegram 1732 from Seoul, June 26, Berger reported that Pak had invited him to Chinhae and outlined the approach he would take in discussing the possibility that Kim Chong-pil planned to return to Korea around September 20. Berger noted that he was "convinced that return of Kim will plunge this govt. and this country into another and ultimately dangerous domestic crisis." He intended to tell Pak that Kim's prolonged absence was "essential to internal stability" of the ROK and to ask for Pak's assurance that Kim would not return soon. (Ibid.) The Department of State concurred, noting that Pak should be told of the importance of keeping Kim out of Korea for at least 1 year. (Telegram 1203 to Seoul, June 26; ibid.) 1. Economic Stability: I listed favorable economic developments and prospects since devaluation,/3/ i.e., reversal of capital flight, record-breaking exports in June, better than anticipated earnings from US/UN forces, improved KFX position, leveling off of prices within five weeks, bumper barley harvest, large food imports this year to provide reserve, and good rice crop prospects. Korea now had another opportunity to build on a solid economic foundation if wise policies were followed, but if inflationary policies again resumed there will be neither economic nor political stability, and he would have nothing but renewed domestic trouble in future. Urged him especially to keep a tight rein on Chang Ki-yong/4/ and Min. Agriculture. /3/The Korean Government announced a devaluation of the won in May. /4/Deputy Prime Minister and Chairman of the Economic Planning Board. 2. U.S. Assistance: President asked me to comment on requests made by Chang Ki-yong to Killen, and I ticked them off:/5/ /5/The specific economic requests made by Chang to AID Director James S. Killen on June 17 and 18 were detailed in telegram 1071 from Seoul, June 22. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 7 KOR S) A. No prospect of additional SA this year; B. Development loans for fertilizer plants would be sympathetically considered along with any other good projects; C. Buying POL from Ulsan refinery for ROK and US forces presented difficult problems for us owing to world-wide policy, but matter was being studied; D. Future of MAP transfer program under study, did not believe it would be suspended, but may be amended to provide for MAP funding of raw materials; E. Request for support for large highway development program was new request. It was under study, but not likely to be given high priority; F. Increased Korean Exports to Viet-Nam. In reply to his request for waiving "Buy American" policy in order to permit use of U.S. AID dollars to pay for Viet-Nam imports from Korea, I said our policy was likely to be flexible. Responsibility for finding items needed in Viet-Nam rested with Koreans, and I urged that a vigorous effort be made to sell in this market. 3. ROK-Japan: President said if U.S. could involve itself more openly and actively in the negotiations it would make it possible for him to overcome domestic, political and student opposition. Korean fear of Japanese economic domination, fear of being deserted by the U.S. and fear of "deals" between Korean and Japanese in respect of use of $600 million were real however unjustified. If U.S. would take initiative to form a consortium of consultative aid group and make long-term aid commitment to Korea it would be of immeasurable help in dealing with Korean fears. He appealed for Secretary Rusk to involve himself directly in talks with Japanese and Koreans to work out a solution on these lines by the end of this year. I said Dept anxious to be helpful and we are now exploring with Japanese and Germans possibilities for a new approach to ROK-Japan settlement on these lines. It unlikely Secretary would commit himself to direct involvement unless and until agreement reached beforehand. Meantime most hopeful line of attack was improved Japanese purchase of Korean exports. Reports from Japan suggested some progress might be made in this direction and we were doing our best to encourage it. 4. Martial Law: I urged him to lift martial law. I reminded him that Embassy had predicted student trouble week of June 1 when Kim Chong-pil, General Min Ki-shik and others were saying that gov threats to crack down on students had broken the back of the student demonstrations and that agitation would subside. I predicted that if his govt tried to bull-doze through the Assembly student control law, there would be most serious trouble in Assembly and in country. I urged him to support Assembly Speaker's efforts to develop agreements between govt and opposition moderates and to merge his own and PriMin's separate effort with those of the Speaker. I said that General Min Ki-shik's view that he could force these laws through the Assembly under martial law were dangerous and doomed to failure. This approach was opposed by every sensible person and by many of the commanding officers in the armed forces. I said General Min's bull-dozing and erratic behavior had lost him the confidence of General Howze and U.S. Govt. 5. President replied that he was aware of dangers and did not plan to try to bull-doze the laws through the Assembly under conditions of martial law. He and Chong Il-kwon were working together on this matter and would work with the Speaker of the Assembly in whom he had great confidence. They hoped to get agreement in principle with opposition that Assembly would pass such laws to deal with the possibility of renewed student and press agitation. Then he would lift martial law. I gathered from this and from a separate conversation earlier with PriMin that they were now engaged in feeling out the opposition, and testing how far they can go in passing restrictive legislation. 6. Kim Chong-pil: I said reports from Washington, Japan and Korea were coming in that Kim Chong-pil had stated he would return to Korea in Sept and that I was under instruction from the Dept to raise this matter with him. He said he had told Kim prior to his departure that he was to plan to stay away for a year or more and that he would look at this matter again in about a year's time. He said he had not made any statement on this in order to save Kim's face. I could assure the Dept that Kim would not return in less than a year. 7. Comment: Pak was relaxed, attentive and extremely friendly during all conversations. Only during discussion of martial law and cooperation with opposition did he become indecisive and slightly evasive. In my view he has not determined his final position on these questions. What is most worrying is that he remains particularly ill-disposed toward opposition and anti-govt press, and his tendency is to think in terms of force rather than compromise. 8. On economic questions I believe Pak readily appreciates importance of stabilization program and expect he will keep our views in mind when faced with inflationary tendencies on part some Cabinet ministers. Pak also made clear his continuing commitment to ROK-Japan normalization, but now is looking for a way to break impasse presented by student and political opposition. Berger
19. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara/1/ JCSM-683-64 Washington, August 11, 1964. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 27-14 KOR/UN. Secret. Attached to an October 1 letter from Green to Henry S. Rowen, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, and to an August 21 letter from Rowen to William Bundy. SUBJECT 1. Recent communications from the Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (CINCUNC), indicate the need for guidance for his use in discussions initiated by Republic of Korea (ROK) Government officials concerning military force levels in Korea and the Korean Military Assistance Program. Inasmuch as these matters have political and economic as well as military implications, your approval of guidance to CINCUNC is desired. 2. On 17 and 18 June 1964, General Howze (CINCUNC) was visited by ROK Minister of Defense Kim Sung-eun, who indicated he had five proposals he would like to present to the US Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense and to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, should he have the opportunity to visit Washington. These proposals were as follows: a. That ROK armed forces not be reduced. 3. The views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the above subjects are summarized in the Appendix hereto./2/ /2/Not printed. 4. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have concluded that CINCUNC should be furnished the following guidance for use in discussions initiated by ROK Government officials: a. ROK Force Levels (1) In view of the current situation in Southeast Asia, the United States does not favor any reduction in military capability in the Far East. Therefore, the United States considers that ROK forces should remain at the current levels. (2) Any announcement of reduction in ROK forces prior to an announcement to withdraw a portion of the US forces stationed in Korea could be expected to have an adverse effect on congressional support of the Korean MAP. b. US Forces (1) The United States does not intend to lessen its over-all military capability in the Far East. (2) No indication should be given ROK Government officials that the United States is considering withdrawing one division from Korea. c. Korean MAP (1) There are no immediate prospects for relief from the pressures of reduced funding. (2) There are many competing requirements for funds under MAP. The Department of Defense is obliged to seek a strategic balance world-wide within the dollar ceiling appropriated by the US Congress. (3) The Department of Defense recognizes the contributions to Free World security being made by the Republic of Korea, and the ROK need for support under MAP. d. MAP Transfer Program (1) The basic principle of the MAP Transfer Program, to encourage a country to shoulder more of the operations and maintenance cost of its defense burden, is valid. Through it a greater portion of the MAP can be devoted to investment purposes. (2) The MAP Transfer Program must be applied with flexibility, submitting it to frequent review, extending its time phasing, or reducing it as necessary when continued implementation will result in further reduction in ROK forces below Joint Strategic Objectives Plan (JSOP) force objectives; but cancellation of the program should be avoided. (3) As stipulated in the Military Assistance Manual, AID will support approximately two-thirds of the ROK defense budget, and the ROK defense budget should be permitted to increase to allow for the MAP Transfer. (4) As stated in the message AIDTO Circular 573,/3/ execution of the MAP Transfer Program does not imply a concomitant decrease in the Korean MAP. /3/AIDTO Circular 573, dated 16 December 1963. [Footnote in the source text; telegram in the National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, DEF 19 US-S KOR.] e. Korean Pay Raise Provision of a pay raise is primarily an internal matter to be acted upon by the ROK Government. However, the Military Assistance Manual provides that AID will underwrite approximately two-thirds of the cost of a cost-of-living pay adjustment. 5. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that the guidelines listed above be approved. Upon approval, the Joint Chiefs of Staff will issue appropriate guidance to CINCUNC./4/ /4/Rowen sent a copy of this memorandum to the Department of State for review and comment. Green replied on October 1 by suggesting that, although the JCS position differed from that of other agencies, the paper be sent to General Howze for his consideration. (Ibid., POL 27-14 KOR/UN) For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
20. Editorial Note On August 31, 1964, Korean Foreign Minister Yi Tong-won presented to Ambassador Brown an aide-memoire proposing a Foreign Ministers conference to be held in Seoul in April 1965 warranted by the "changing situation in Southeast Asia [that] has increased need for promotion of friendship and cooperation of free nations in area." The Foreign Ministers of Australia, the Republic of China, Malaysia, New Zealand, the Philippines, Thailand, and South Vietnam, as well as Japan, if the attendees desired, were to be invited. The Koreans envisaged the conference serving to "maintain peace and prosperity in Asia, strengthen region's defense against Communist subversion, consolidate friendly ties, and promote economic and cultural cooperation." The Foreign Office also believed the conference would enhance support within Korea for a settlement with Japan as well as enhance the international prestige of the Republic of Korea. (Telegram 197 from Seoul, August 31, and airgram A-135 from Seoul, September 1; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 7 KOR S) Initially the Department of State expressed misgivings about the feasibility of the proposal because of vagueness surrounding the purpose of the conference, doubt about the Foreign Minister's ability to organize and focus the conference, and uncertainty about the willingness of the invited countries to attend. (Telegram 196 to Seoul, September 1; ibid.) After further consideration the Department responded that the conference could achieve positive results by fostering stronger ties among the Asian nations friendly to the United States and the Western powers, enhancing a sense of solidarity among the participants, and reducing the isolation of the Republic of Korea. (Telegram 434 to Seoul, November 18; ibid.) The Embassy in Seoul agreed in general, but believed the conference could be successful only if attended by most or all the invited Foreign Ministers. Ambassador Brown suggested that the Republic of Korea would support efforts by the United States to urge all countries to attend. (Telegram 494 from Seoul, November 24; ibid.) On December 4 the Department of State informed the Embassy in Seoul and the other relevant Asian countries of its support for the proposed Foreign Ministers Conference. After stating the potential objectives of the meeting--strengthening intra-Asian relations, strengthening Korea's international position, reducing the feelings of isolation within Korea and the Republic of China--the Department provided a list of topics that could be fruitfully addressed at the conference: "1) security against Communist military threat"; "2) insurgency and counter-insurgency, including security, economic, social and psychological countermeasures"; "3) economic development"; and "4) expansion of regional collaboration in diplomatic, economic and perhaps other spheres." The Department suggested that Ambassador Brown discuss those points and other aspects of the conference with the Korean Foreign Minister. (Telegram 485 to Seoul, December 4; ibid.) Within a few days, Ambassador Brown had spoken to officials in the Foreign Office and informed Washington of Korea's ideas about the conference, of its receptivity to the Department's suggested topics and agenda, and similar matters. (Telegram 511 from Seoul, December 8; ibid.) As a result, the Department notified the Embassy in Seoul and in the Asian countries expected to participate in the conference of its renewed support for the conference. Although it did "not wish to get out in front or to appear to be promoting this conference," the Department suggested that U.S. support for the meeting be made known and steps taken to ensure participation by as many countries as possible. (Telegram 497 to Seoul and repeated to other Asian capitals, December 10; ibid.) [Continue with the next documents]
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