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FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1964-1968, Volume XXIX Korea
Department of State |
Korea Seoul, September 3, 1964. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, DEF 15-3 KOR S-US. Confidential; Official-Informal. At the top of this document Bundy added a handwritten notation to Green: "MG--for your use. I gather Bob [Fearey] hopes to pull this together. WPB." REF /2/Airgram A-133 from Seoul contained the Embassy's evaluation of the status of the SOFA negotiations and its examination of the Criminal Jurisdiction Article. (Ibid.) Dear Bill: As you well know, one of our major current projects in Seoul is the negotiation of a Status of Forces Agreement. Since arriving here, I have been able to take a thorough look at these negotiations, which have been in course for two years. I find that they have now reached the stage at which the fundamental unresolved issue of waiver must be resolved or the negotiations will become deadlocked. I have just come out of a meeting with the Country Team in which we have approved a recommendation with respect to that issue which we hope may make agreement possible. This recommendation is contained in Airgram A-133. While there are a number of unresolved differences of position, the determinative question now at issue is the very simple one of whether we continue to insist on an automatic advance waiver of jurisdiction by the Koreans in all criminal cases in which they have the right of primary jurisdiction. We have not asked, or at least we have not obtained, such a provision in any other Status of Forces Agreement to which we are a party. All concerned here, including General Howze and his colleagues who have worked on this problem, are convinced that our proposed modification will adequately protect US interests. All of our negotiators are convinced that if we insist upon automatic advance waiver there will be no agreement. They do not think that a recess of negotiations will or can affect this basic situation. Even after my short stay here, I do not see how any Korean government could defend in the Assembly the acceptance of such a waiver provision, involving as it does a relinquishment of sovereignty to an extent greater than that of any other country, including Japan, in which we have forces. It is our desire to see this government negotiate and put into effect a settlement with Japan. To do so it needs every additional measure of public and legislative support which it can earn or otherwise obtain. Conclusion of a satisfactory SOFA will be a feather in its cap. Acceptance of our present waiver provision would almost certainly lead to its defeat on a major issue, if not to its downfall. Allowing the negotiations to drag on fruitlessly would be harmful to both the government and ourselves, particularly if, as is most likely, the respective positions of the parties on the issue dividing us become known. This year we have already had student demonstrations protesting almost every issue except the SOFA negotiations. Should these negotiations now break down, it is not at all difficult to envisage future student demonstrations protesting U.S. "insincerity." What we propose in essence in our Airgram is that the Koreans agree in advance to grant our request for a waiver except in cases in which the ROK Government has a special interest. In our judgment these cases would be rare. However, provision would be made for a review, first by the Joint Committee which is to be set up to implement the agreement, and later by diplomatic negotiation, if necessary. If these consultations failed, the Koreans would not have to grant the waiver. We would, however, under the provision as we propose it, retain custody of the accused before, during, and after trial and through all appeal procedures. If we were convinced that someone was really being railroaded we could simply ship him out of the country, undesirable as this action would be. Airgram A-133 was reviewed and approved by the Country Team. Because of the military chain of command, General Howze was unable to concur formally, but has informed CINCPAC of his agreement with the Embassy message. I have informally given Admiral Sharp my views during his recent visit to Korea. Thus the position is that General Howze, all of his colleagues, and the Embassy are convinced that the provision we propose would adequately protect our personnel. We are equally convinced that insist- ence on automatic advance waiver will mean that there will be no agreement. We believe that the terms we propose, if accepted, will result in an agreement more satisfactory than SOFA's we have with other countries. We think that prompt conclusion of a SOFA is in our interest. We therefore bespeak your sympathetic consideration of our recommendation and favorable action on it./3/ /3/The Department of State accepted the Embassy's approach to the issue, but redrafted the proposal to combine "an automatic advance waiver formula with a right of recall by the Korean authorities under certain specified circumstances." The approach combined the formula contained in the SOFA agreement with the Federal Republic of Germany and the Republic of China. (Airgram A-86 to Seoul, December 1; ibid.) Sincerely yours, Win
22. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara/1/ JCSM-815-64 Washington, September 21, 1964. /1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD/OASD/ISA Files: FRC 68 A 4023, 381 Korea. Top Secret. SUBJECT 1. In view of the possibility of a coup d'etat in the Republic of Korea (ROK) and its impact on the operational control of the Korean Armed Forces exercised by the United States through the Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (CINCUNC), the Joint Chiefs of Staff have given consideration to appropriate courses of action available to CINCUNC. 2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that the success of a coup may well be determined in the course of a few hours and that decisions as to the release of ROK troops and the nature of US involvement may have to be made by CINCUNC on short notice. CINCUNC should be provided appropriate guidance concerning approved courses of action available to him. 3. After considering the factors affecting the stability of the ROK Government and the nature of US involvement discussed in Appendix B hereto,/2/ the Joint Chiefs of Staff have concluded that: /2/Appendix B, "Korean Coup Analysis," discussed the widespread social discontent and political dissent pervading Korea stemming from economic adversity and political instability. A particular threat to the ROK Government noted in the analysis was Pak's continued support of Kim Chong-il, whose return from exile had the potential to "divide the military leaders and seriously jeopardize the stability of the regime." a. An attempted coup d'etat in the ROK is possible. The most likely source of successful action to unseat the present regime is the military. b. A successful procommunist coup is unlikely due to the presence of strong United Nations and South Korean Armed Forces, effective internal security, and the anticommunist orientation of the people. 4. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that: a. The following alternative courses of action be approved and coordinated with the Secretary of State: (1) The US forces remain neutral in any power struggle by noncommunist factions, strive to avoid bloodshed, and maintain responsiveness within the ROK Armed Forces to the United Nations Command. (2) Through the Military Assistance Program, continue current US support for pro-Western ROK Armed Forces and Government. Through the country team, support the Ambassador, as appropriate, to accelerate social and economic reforms and to eliminate corruption and illegal measures. (3) In the event of a coup or uprising instigated by communist or other anti-US elements, the United States support the recognized government and/or those elements of the ROK Armed Forces who are unquestionably pro-US. (4) In the event that the recognized government of the ROK requests release of ROK troops to suppress a coup or uprising, CINCUNC should comply provided it does not, in his judgment, unduly weaken his over-all military posture in Korea. (5) On the other hand, should anti-Government leaders, even though pro-US and anticommunist, request release of ROK troops from CINCUNC control to aid in the overthrow of the ROK Government, the proposal will be referred to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. (6) If necessary, CINCUNC as COMUS, Korea, in concert with the country team, should temporarily suspend POL and other items of the Military Assistance Program as the situation warrants. (7) In carrying out any of the above courses of action, US support must not include the involvement of US military action without prior approval of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, except as authorized by CINCPAC OPLAN 85-63 which has been approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff./3/ /3/Appendix B explains that "CINCPAC OPLAN No. 85-63 provides for US military operations under COMUS, Korea, as a last resort, in concert with ROK forces to prevent seizure of the ROK Government in the event a coup were to be instigated by communists." (8) Approved US military action in support of US unilateral policy should be carried out under COMUS, Korea. b. A memorandum substantially as contained in Appendix A hereto be forwarded to the Secretary of State./4/ /4/Appendix A, "Alternative U.S. Courses of Action in Korea Under Certain Contingencies," attached but not printed. William Bundy, who received a copy for review and comment, raised two objections to JCS recommendations 5 and 6 of this memorandum. Bundy believed CINCUNC and the Ambassador should retain authority to release ROK troops without channeling the request through the JCS, and he noted that, since Korea had its own refinery, a suspension of POL would be ineffective as a means to exert pressure on the ROK Government in the event of a crisis. (Letter from Bundy to Solbert, November 20; Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD/OASD/ISA Files: FRC 68 A 4023, 381 Korea) McNamara, the Department of State, and the Embassy in Seoul approved the proposal with slight modifications on July 1, 1965. (Memorandum from McNamara to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, July 1, 1965; ibid.: FRC 70 A 5127, 381 Korea) For the Joint Chiefs of Staff: /5/Printed from a copy that indicates Wheeler signed the original.
23. Letter From the Ambassador to Korea (Brown) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Bundy)/1/ Seoul, September 21, 1964. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 7 KOR S. Confidential; Official-Informal. Dear Bill: The Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister have spoken to me about President Pak's "intention" to visit the United States in April 1965. They requested that I consult Washington on such a visit. Obviously they are seeking an invitation for a state visit. I am favorably disposed toward the idea. As you know, aside from his quick trip to attend President Kennedy's funeral, President Pak has not been to the United States since his official visit in 1961 when he was Chairman of the Supreme Council. A visit in the spring of 1965 will be well-timed. I do not know what the future holds for our principle concern over the Korea-Japan question but there is no question that we will still be in the throes of trying to achieve the goal early next spring. In one way or another a Pak visit will provide the occasion for some support on the issue. If negotiations with Japan have been resumed by then and progress made, Pak will be looking for U.S. blessing to ease his task of gaining public acceptance in Korea. If the negotiations are on dead center, a visit may be used to get the ROKG moving again. There are other matters of mutual interest that would benefit from the visit. It could be the occasion for some high level exchange on such things as force levels and economic stabilization. The Koreans would no doubt seek to gain reaffirmation of the U.S. commitment here. Moreover, President Pak will hope to use his visit to demonstrate U.S. acceptance of his government and himself. He can use such a vote of confidence and we are disposed to grant it in the interest of confirming our support for constitutionalism and orderly processes in Korea. I am putting this proposal to you in this form in order to allow a little judicious exploring of the White House view prior to your coming here next month. If a visit from Pak in April or thereabouts is completely out of the question given President Johnson's desires and schedule, we will of course try and dissuade the Koreans. That will not be easy, as we can presume they have their hearts set on it or we would never have received the request. We can discuss this further when you get here. We are all enthusiastically awaiting your arrival and the opportunity to share with you first hand our thoughts and interests. Sincerely yours,
24. Editorial Note Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs Bundy visited Seoul October 1-3, 1964. During his visit he held individual meetings with Minister of Foreign Affairs Yi, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of the Economic Planning Board Chang, Prime Minister Chong, President Pak, and Minister of National Defense Kim. The discussions focused primarily on relations between the Republic of Korea and Japan, but participants also exchanged views on defense issues, economic developments, and the unification of Korea. (Memoranda of those conversations are attached to airgram A-190 from Seoul, October 7; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, ORG 7 FE) The text of the joint statement issued by the Assistant Secretary and the Minister of Foreign Affairs on October 3 is printed in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1964, pages 929-930.
25. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Barnett) to the Chief of the Military Assistance Division of the Agency for International Development (Black)/1/ Washington, October 5, 1964. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, DEF 19 US-KOR S. Secret. SUBJECT Korea We are facing serious problems in trying to maintain the ROK military forces adequately with the original $146 million planned for Korea, which we believe is a rockbottom requirement. The MAP for Korea in recent years had been in excess of $200 million, until FY 1964, when a cut to $153 million necessitated a sharp drop in investment funds. The additional $20 million cut now proposed for FY 1965 would in effect cancel all new modernization programs in 1965, with the exception of the introduction of F-5 aircraft. Some previously programmed projects probably would also be jeopardized. There would be no practical alternative to these cuts in investment, since the funding for operations has already been reduced to less than the necessary minimum. Ammunition, supplies and equipment are now in short supply for desired training programs. The Korean Government cannot at present increase its share of the burden. Partly because of the MAP Transfer Program, pressure on the Korean defense budget has made it necessary to maintain pay and allowances at a detrimentally low level./2/ /2/At a meeting between Korean and Embassy officials on September 25, ROK Minister of Defense and Chief of Staff reported that "pay and allowance, clothing and subsistence so inadequate that commanding officers are forced to devote their efforts to morale problems at expense of troop training." The Ambassador as well as the U.S. military leadership in Korea had been concerned about the problem for some time. (Telegram 289 from Seoul, September 26; ibid.) The present government's efforts to move forward with the settlement with Japan and with economic development are hindered by its limited public support. Of critical importance has been the support it has received from the military. The proposed cut would shortly become apparent to Korean military leaders and possibly to the political Opposition as well. It would be interpreted as evidence of lack of U.S. support of the Pak administration, and a confirmation of fears and allegations that the U.S. is engaged in a program of "withdrawal" from Korea. The capacity of the Pak administration to govern probably would be seriously impaired. The prospects for a Korean-Japanese settlement and economic progress would be greatly reduced, and the possibility that the government might be overthrown by a coup or revolt would be substantially increased. [Here follows discussion of China.] Robert W. Barnett/3/ /3/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
26. Airgram A-232 From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State Seoul, November 2, 1964. [Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 1 KOR S. Secret; Limited Distribution. 4 pages of source text not declassified.]
27. Editorial Note Intelligence-gathering and covert political activities in Korea in 1964 were limited. Efforts were directed toward improving and coordinating intelligence collection relative to North Korea. (Memorandum from Stuart to Hughes, November 24; Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Country Files, East Asia and Pacific General File, FE Weekly Staff Meetings, 1964) Modest election and political support of less than $10,000 was extended to four moderate candidates running for seats in the National Assembly in the November 16, 1963, election. Each candidate received support in amounts ranging from $2,000 to $4,000 to supplement campaign funds from other sources. (Election and Party Support in the Far East, 1962-65, undated; ibid., East Asia Reviews, 1964 to 1966; Memorandum from Stuart to Hughes, October 25, 1963; ibid., FE Weekly Staff Meetings, 1963)
28. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ Seoul, December 19, 1964, 11 a.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, DEF 19-3 KOR S-VIET S. Secret. This memorandum along with another recording Brown's conversation with Pak concerning the MAP transfer program were transmitted in airgram A-296 from Seoul, December 21. The meeting was held at the Blue House. PARTICIPANTS SUBJECT 1. I told the President that we had received a very glowing report from Ambassador McGhee about the success of his visit to Bonn and the satisfaction of the German Government in it. I congratulated him on behalf of the Secretary. He said that he had been very pleased by the warmth of his reception by German officials. 2. I said the reason for my call was to deliver a message from President Johnson about Viet Nam./2/ /2/Transmitted in telegram 531 to Seoul, December 17. (Ibid., AID VIET S) 3. President Johnson was concerned about the situation in Viet Nam and was making a great effort to broaden and deepen the basis of international support for the present government. Fifteen nations and over a thousand non-Americans were already helping in Viet Nam and the presence of a ROK military unit there was very much appreciated. Nevertheless, the President was asking a number of other countries to give their support and was asking some countries, particularly Far Eastern countries, who were already contributing, to increase their contribution. 4. President Johnson was not asking for combat troops./3/ This was not that kind of war. He had in mind possibly engineer or construction units, transport pilots, LST's, medical or service units. He would like to know if the Korean Government would feel able to increase its present contribution. /3/The ROK Government was willing to send combat troops to Vietnam, as the Chairman of the ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff reminded the Embassy on November 3. (Telegram 425 from Seoul, November 4; ibid., DEF 19 KOR S-VIET S) The Embassy had also received information about the formation of the Freedom Defense Volunteer Corps. Being formed with support from the Korean branch of the Asian People's Anti-Communist League, the unit would purportedly fight in Vietnam or in any other country facing a Communist threat. (Airgram A-265 from Seoul, December 3; ibid., POL 13-8 KOR S) 5. The President replied that his government wished to support the free world effort in Viet Nam in every possible way to the extent of its resources because he agreed that this was very important to the Free World and he supported the U.S. policy of helping the government of South Viet Nam. I said that President Johnson would deeply appreciate this reaction, at which point Yi Hu-rak intervened to say that the President would give his answer after he had consulted with his staff. I had already said that I did not expect the President to give me a firm answer right away, but asked that he let me know his decision soon so that General Howze could begin to discuss details with the Minister of National Defense. The President promised to do so. 6. The President said he did not know the new Viet Nam Prime Minister but had the impression that he was quite capable. I said that we felt that the Prime Minister had courage, the Deputy Prime Minister political skill, and that General Khanh was a good soldier, so we felt the government was promising. However, it had not yet achieved a firm political basis and we felt that its doing so was a fundamental prerequisite to success against the Viet Cong. Further support from the Free World would help materially in this respect. 7. The President said that he felt that more vigorous action by the United States would be helpful in defeating the Viet Cong and in getting the support of wavering neighboring countries. He said that Korea was willing to send two combat divisions if necessary. Moreover, there were a large number of recently discharged veterans in Korea who were willing to go to Viet Nam to fight if they could be equipped and transported. 8. I explained that we felt that the time had not yet come for introduction of outside combat troops but promised to pass on the President's views to President Johnson. 9. I thanked him again for his favorable reaction to our President's request. 10. Half an hour after getting back to my office I received a call from the Blue House saying that I could ask General Howze to get in touch with MND on this matter./4/ /4/After receiving information from Howze listing the Korean military-support units that could be sent to Vietnam without degrading Korean defenses, the Department of State authorized opening negotiations with the Korean Government. The Department of State noted its desire to have an "initial ROK force just over one thousand personnel" composed of engineers and similar types of units in Vietnam as soon as possible. Negotiations between Howze and General Kim Chong-O began on December 25. (Telegram UK 50915 from COMUSKOREA, December 19; Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Vol. XXIV; telegram 557 to Seoul, December 23, and telegram 573 from Seoul, December 26; both in National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, DEF 19 KOR S-VIET S)
29. Telegram From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State/1/ Seoul, December 21, 1964, 4 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 30 KOR S. Secret; Limdis. 557. Ref: Embtels 551 and 553./2/ /2/In telegram 551 from Seoul, December 19, Brown reported on his meeting with Pak concerning the return of Kim Chong-pil, and in telegram 553 from Seoul, December 19, stated that the arguments made to Pak had not affected Pak's view that "Kim's return is now `set in concrete.'" (Both ibid.) 1. After courtesy call by Senator Monroney December 21 I took President Pak aside and said that I had thought over very carefully what he had said to me on December 18 about return of Kim Chong-p'il./3/ I nevertheless continued to feel that it would cause a great deal of trouble for ROK-Japan negotiations and for political stability in Korea if KCP returned before the ROK-Japan negotiations were ended. I said that I wanted him to know that what I had said to him on Saturday was not only my own personal opinion but that I had conveyed to him this message by specific instructions of the Department of State./4/ /3/On December 18 Pak told Brown that he had no direct contact with Kim, that he heard from others that Kim planned to return, and that he could do nothing if Kim decided to come back to Korea. Pak also claimed that Kim's return would not affect the talks with Japan, since "Kim Chong-pil was not all that important." (Telegram 551 from Seoul, December 19; ibid.) /4/Brown explained to Pak that Kim's "mere presence in the country would create controversy" and instability within Korea at a time when internal affairs and the talks with Japan were going well. He reminded Pak that student demonstrations earlier in the year focused on Kim's involvement in the negotiations with Japan and asked him if he wanted to risk a return of that situation by allowing Kim to reemerge in Korea. (Ibid.) 2. At these words, the President drew in his breath sharply, looked down at the floor for some time, shook his head and said: "I understand." 3. At the door the President said that he could not force KCP to stay away but that he would try to find some way to advise him very strongly to do so. He could not say that it was because the US wanted him to stay away. Some other reason would have to be found. I agreed it would be a very great mistake if KCP were told that he would have to stay away because that was what Americans wanted. This was a Korean decision and I was simply giving the President, as a friend of his and a friend of Korea's, the advice that a friend would give when asked. I repeated that it would be a great mistake to attribute KCP's exile to pressure from the US. The President said he hoped that the US would not continue its opposition to KCP's return. 4. Above represents progress and indicates that President Pak got more of my message on December 19 than Yi Hu-rak indicated and had been thinking about it. But this battle is by no means yet won. I therefore renew recommendation para 2 Embtel 553./5/ /5/In telegram 553 Brown suggested that the Department of State hold a high-level meeting with Ambassador Kim to inform him that the U.S. views Kim Chong-pil's return as having a negative impact on all concerned and to instruct him to relay that message to Pak. In telegram 586 from Seoul, December 30, the Embassy reported that Kim's return was "an accomplished fact," that Pak had reneged on his commitment to keep Kim out of Korea for at least one year, and that even the anti-Kim opposition found that "accommodation was easier than struggle." (Ibid., POL 12 KOR S) Brown
30. Telegram From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State/1/ Seoul, December 30, 1964, 7 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, DEF 19-2 KOR S-VIET S. Confidential; Immediate. Repeated to Saigon for COMUSMACV, Department of Defense, and CINCPAC for POLAD and passed to the White House. 587. Ref: A. Embtel 578 rptd Saigon 23 CINCPAC unn; B. Deptel 572 rptd Saigon 1367 CINCPAC unn./2/ /2/In telegram 578 from Seoul, December 29, the Embassy reported that news of the request for Korean manpower for Vietnam had leaked to the press in Korea. In telegram 572 to Seoul, December 29, the Department of State suggested, in light of the premature publicity, that the Korean Government encourage the National Assembly to issue a resolution declaring its support for Vietnam and for dispatch of additional troops there. the Department also instructed the Embassy in Saigon to urge the South Vietnamese Government to submit its request for assistance to the Koreans. (Ibid.) 1. Vice FonMin told DCM Cabinet unanimously approved proposal send non-combat troops to Vietnam late Dec 29. ROKG still hoping to receive request from GVN before Assembly action. To this end, ROK Amb Saigon has been instructed approach GVN urgently and GVN Charge Seoul called in and urged seek quick action by his govt. 2. Earlier indications were that ROKG intended submit resolution to National Assembly Dec 31 but Embassy informed late Dec 30 by Chairman ROK JCS General Kim Chong-O that submission for Assembly approval now definitely postponed until next session. Date of next session still indefinite but present indications are that it will be convened approximately Jan 10./3/ /3/In telegram 576 to Seoul, December 30, the Department urged that the proposal come before the National Assembly prior to its adjournment for three reasons: (1) the United States wanted Korean troops in South Vietnam as soon as possible; (2) the request had already received publicity; and (3) United States and Korea were pressing the Vietnamese to submit their request for assistance. The telegram also requested that the Korean troops be increased to at least 2,000 men. (Ibid.) 3. Text of resolution drafted by ROKG for submission to Assembly being transmitted in separate message./4/ /4/Transmitted in telegram 588 from Seoul, December 30. (Ibid.) On January 8, 1965, the Korean Prime Minister of Public Information announced that the government would ask the National Assembly to approve a Vietnamese request, made on January 2, that 2,000 Korean noncombat troops be sent to South Vietnam. (Telegram 613 from Seoul, January 8, 1965; ibid.) 4. Assume GVN will make appropriate public statement of appreciation and thanks following ROK National Assembly approval. We also recommend that statements by President and Secretary, praising ROK action as further indication of firm ROK spirit of unity with free world and support of other free world nations fighting Communist aggression. Brown
31. National Intelligence Estimate/1/ NIE 42/14.2-65 Washington, January 22, 1965. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, S/P Files: Lot 72 D 139, Country Files. Secret; Controlled Dissem. According to a note on the cover sheet, the Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, Defense, the Atomic Energy Commission, and the National Security Agency participated in the preparation of this estimate. All members of the USIB concurred with this estimate on January 22 except the Federal Bureau of Investigation, who abstained because the subject was outside its jurisdiction. THE KOREAN PROBLEM The Problem To estimate the outlook for the Republic of Korea (ROK), including the nature of the challenge from North Korea. Conclusions A. Certain hopeful signs appeared in South Korean political life over the past few months: President Pak has shown greater awareness of the value of persuasion and compromise in dealing with opposition; the parties are beginning to submerge factional differences, and some opposition elements have cooperated with the administration on certain less controversial issues. The economic situation has improved in certain respects, and the military has firmly supported the government. (Paras. 4-5, 15) B. Nonetheless, there remain a number of underlying sources of instability and obstacles to achievement of a real sense of national unity and direction. The government has failed to convince many Koreans that it represents much more than a continuation of the unpopular and of the corrupt military junta which it replaced. It has shed its authoritarianism sufficiently so that active, often irresponsible, opposition elements have been able to block its initiatives and work sometimes openly for its downfall. Political conflict is often more a contest for personal power than a controversy over issues, and the regime remains ultimately dependent on the support of the ROK military. (Paras. 1-3, 11) C. The ROK is not likely to enjoy genuine political stability in the foreseeable future, but there is at least an even chance that the next two or three years will prove reasonably tranquil if the regime can handle certain issues. Among the most critical of these are a settlement with Japan--economically desirable but politically unpopular; [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]; factionalism within the ruling Democratic Republican Party; and a variety of chronic popular grievances, particularly among students and intellectuals. Serious trouble could arise over any of these issues, and while the military is likely to support the regime in most circumstances, its support cannot be guaranteed in all cases. (Paras. 6-14) D. Lasting stability is not likely unless further progress is made in improving a weak and imbalanced economy, heavily dependent on large-scale US assistance and burdened with serious problems of unemployment and a population growing at nearly three percent per year. Grounds for optimism are very limited, though a settlement with Japan--for which chances are about even during the next year--would help. In the best circumstances, however, the ROK will remain a petitioner for large and continuing US assistance for years to come. (Paras. 15-28) E. We believe that, during the next few years, the unification issue is likely to represent a more insistent problem for the ROK leaders than in the past. The North will probably continue to keep the initiative on unification, and sentiment within the ROK will make it more difficult for Seoul to stand pat. Pyongyang may fare better in the UN than in the past, particularly if Communist China is admitted or otherwise significantly improves its international status. We do not believe, however, that the trend is likely either to bring about the fall of the ROK Government or move it to contemplate unification on Pyongyang's terms unless the ROK suffers a series of unprecedented domestic disasters or becomes convinced that US support is weakening. (Paras. 29-41) [1 paragraph (5 lines of source text) not declassified] [Here follow the Discussion section of the estimate, [text not declassified] and a map of Korea.]
32. Editorial Note On January 26, 1965, the Korean National Assembly approved sending additional military personnel to Vietnam after contentious opposition by members of the Civil Rule Party and the Democratic Party. The Civil Rule Party, led by Yun Po-sun, distrusted the Pak regime and feared that the dispatch of more troops would leave South Korea vulnerable to North Korean subversion by weakening its defenses. Both opposition parties also criticized the Minister of Defense for making conflicting statements regarding the impetus behind the proposal, at times claiming that the Korean Government initiated the proposal to send troops to Vietnam, at others referring to a request from the Republic of Vietnam or from the United States. A Civil Rule Party member also privately informed the Embassy that because of "cuts in US foreign aid program it is doubtful USG really intends to persevere in Vietnamese war and that it is difficult to understand why ROK should send troops to become involved in situation which appears hopeless." (Telegram 647 from Seoul, January 21; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 27 VIET S; and telegrams 656 and 657, both from Seoul, January 22; ibid., DEF 19-2 KOR S-VIET S) When the proposal came before the Assembly for a vote, its passage was complicated by the Assembly's decision to vote by secret ballot. That decision prompted Yun Po-sun and 23 other members of the Civil Rule Party to walk out in protest. The dispatch of troops was approved by an overwhelming majority of the remaining members, all representing the ruling Democratic Republican Party. (Telegram 670 from Seoul, January 26; ibid.) Afterward President Pak issued a statement praising the results of the vote and characterizing it "as a signal for Korea to `to assume important role in world affairs.'" The opposition Civil Rule Party and Democratic Party accepted the outcome and hoped that the Korean troops would contribute to uniting the nations of the free world and to bringing peace and stability to the region. (Telegram 678 from Seoul, January 27; ibid.) After the National Assembly approved the dispatch of additional troops, the Korean and United States Governments concentrated on the issue of the rate and method to be used to pay allowances to the Korean military personnel serving in Vietnam. In late February the United States acceded to a Korean demand for payment to be made to the Korean Government with an unvouchered cash grant to be disbursed in dollars to Korean troops. Although the United States urged that payment be limited to an allowance of one dollar per day per man, the Koreans rejected that amount as conflicting with previous promises made to the troops and as inappropriate for higher-ranking men and officers. (Telegram 768 to Seoul, February 18; ibid., DEF 19 US-KOR S) Korean officials agreed with the United States request to do everything possible to prevent disclosing that funding originated in the United States. The United States also agreed to assume all costs for the medical and tae-kwon-do units already in Vietnam. (Telegram 799 to Seoul, February 27; ibid., POL 27-3 VIET S) Additional documentation on the development of this issue is ibid.; DEF 19 KOR S-US; DEF 19 US-KOR S; and DEF 19 KOR S-VIET S. The first of these troops, an advance party of approximately 600 men, arrived in Saigon on February 25. The remaining 1,400 troops were to arrive within the next month. (Telegram 2775 from Saigon, February 26; ibid., AID (KOR S) VIET S)
33. Telegram From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State/1/ Seoul, March 15, 1965, 5 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, DEF 19-2 US-KOR S. Secret; Priority. Repeated to CINCPAC for POLAD and the Department of Defense. 866. Country Team Message. 1. CT has considered various implications of cuts in US forces Korea which we understand are impending, for implementation between now and June 30, 1965. Our information stems from DA instructions received by COMUS Korea which indicate decision has been taken to subtract 9,000 spaces from present authorized strength of 8th US Army amounting to 51,000. The decision is reportedly based on balance-of-payments considerations./2/ /2/Reduction of forces in Korea was part of an effort to reduce U.S. military expenditures around the world, except in Vietnam, and improve the U.S. balance-of-payments position by maintaining overseas military forces at the September 30, 1964, level. Additional documentation on proposed reductions in Korea is ibid. 2. Cut of this magnitude represents reduction of about 18 percent in level of US Army Forces in Korea. This reduction in numbers of personnel would be likely sooner or later to attract public attention and give rise to rumors that US forces are "pulling out" of Korea. By the same token it would be virtually impossible to conceal fact and extent of reductions from ROKG. If we attempt to do this we are almost certain to fail, and to be accursed of bad faith by the ROKG. If, on the other hand, we inform ROKG at outset, result likely to be immediate leaks to press and National Assembly setting off widespread alarm that US is withdrawing its forces from Korea in anticipation of ROK-Japan settlement. It goes without saying that such a furor at this time would jeopardize prospect for successful conclusion that settlement which we have been expecting after so long this spring. As Dept aware, one of chief fruits ROKG seeking from forthcoming Washington visit President Pak is assurance that present US force levels will be maintained (Embtel 861)./3/ President and Foreign Minister have indicated that ROKG relying heavily on this and related assurances of continuing US commitment to Korea to help win public support for Korea-Japan settlement. /3/In telegram 861 from Seoul, March 12, the Embassy outlined the subjects Pak wanted to discuss during his Washington visit. With regard to Korea's security, Pak wanted to maintain U.S. and Korean force levels, increase MAP funds, and modernize Korean military equipment. (Ibid., POL 7 KOR S) The Minister of National Defense had also raised the issue of maintaining U.S. force levels in Korea during the negotiations in January on sending Korean forces to Vietnam. (Telegram 621 to Seoul, January 18, and telegram 658 from Seoul, January 22; ibid., DEF 19 KOR S-VIET S) 3. As indicated in previous para, failure on our part to give prior notification to ROKG of impending cut would give rise to accusation we not complying faithfully with our stated intention to consult with ROKG on this question. Most explicit assurance on this point was given personally by Secretary Rusk to President Pak at their meeting in January 1964 when Secretary said force reduction was not a current problem and US approach would be to examine question later on in consultation with Korean Govt (93540, para 32, Jan 31, 1964)./4/ Whether or not our recommendation given below that cut be postponed is accepted we believe that we must honor this commitment, at least by going through motions of consultation. /4/Not found, but telegram UK 60079 from CINCUNC, January 31, 1964, contains Rusk's comments to Pak on the question of force reduction. (Ibid., POL 27 KOR S) The joint communique released at the conclusion of Rusk's visit also addressed the issue; see footnote 4, Document 3. 4. However, now is not a good time to hold such consultations. It would spoil the atmosphere which both we and the ROKG hope to generate for President Pak's forthcoming visit to Washington and for the successful conclusion Korean-Japan talks. A settlement with Japan is almost within grasp; the outcome will be known, probably with certainty, before June 30. We believe that this accomplishment which for years has been a paramount objective of US policy in East Asia is so vitally related to the US national interest that the balance of payments savings which would accrue from the contemplated reduction over the next few months can and should be foregone until the outcome of the current negotiations is decided one way or the other. 5. Our rough estimate is that the reduction contemplated might reduce total US military spending in Korea by somewhere between $5 million and $10 million annually depending on how the reductions are carried out. CT does not deprecate the contribution this reduction in spending would make to a solution of our balance of payments problem, although doubting that it will be entirely a net gain to US in view US position as residual supporter of ROK balance of payments. Meeting high priority US objectives for Korean economic development may require additional offsetting supporting assistance. 6. Ideally, as set forth in agreed language of draft national policy paper on Korea, now in process final revision Washington,/5/ we believe no reductions in either ROK or US forces should be considered until after Korea-Japan normalization. In accordance with that carefully thought out recommendation we strongly urge that any reduction in US Forces Korea be postponed until a suitable period after a settlement with Japan is reached this year. If a settlement is reached, say by June 1, our judgment is that a period of at least six months should be allowed for the dust of that action, and its ratification by the National Assembly, to settle. Consultations with the ROKG on reduction of US Forces could then begin toward the end of the year. /5/The National Policy Paper on the Republic of Korea, consisting of Part 1, "U.S. Policy," November 9, 1965, and Part 2, "Factors Bearing on U.S. Policy," August 1965, is in the National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, S/P Files: Lot 72 D 139, Country Files. 7. General Howze, as member Country Team, agrees with general sense of foregoing subject to qualification that as CG 8th Army he is not appealing decision to carry out strength cut. Doherty
34. Editorial Note Foreign Minister Yi Tong-won visited Washington March 15-17, 1965. He met with Secretary Rusk on March 15 to discuss current Korean problems, including the situation in Vietnam, the Korea-Japan settlement, North Korea, the pending Status of Forces Agreement, economic matters, and similar issues. On March 16 the Foreign Minister met separately with Vice President Humphrey, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs Bundy, and Secretary of Defense McNamara, with whom many of the same issues were discussed, particularly Vietnam and the settlement with Japan. Before leaving Washington, the Foreign Minister also met briefly with President Johnson to exchange greetings and accept the President's thanks for Korea's support in Vietnam and his congratulations on the progress made thus far toward reaching an agreement with Japan. Documentation covering the Foreign Minister's visit is in the National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 15-1 KOR S; POL 2 KOR S; POL KOR S-US; POL JAPAN-KOR S; POL 7 KOR S; DEF 15-3 KOR S-US; Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD/OASD/ISA: FRC 70 A 3717, 333 Korea; and Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Korea, Park Visit, May 1965. The joint communique resulting from the visit is in Department of State Bulletin, April 5, 1965, page 491.
35. Special National Intelligence Estimate/1/ SNIE 10-4-65 Washington, March 19, 1965. /1/Source: Department of State, INR/EAP Files: Lot 90 D 99, SNIE 10-4-65. Top Secret; Controlled Dissem; Limited Distribution. According to a note on the cover sheet, the Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State and Defense and of the National Security Agency participated in the preparation of this estimate. All members of the USIB concurred with this estimate on March 19 except the representatives of the Atomic Energy Commission and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, who abstained on the grounds that the subject was outside their jurisdiction. PROBABLE COMMUNIST REACTIONS TO DEPLOYMENT The Estimate 1. We do not believe that the introduction of one ROK combat division into South Vietnam for static defense purposes would provoke Communist China, North Korea, or North Vietnam overtly to invade South Korea or South Vietnam. Neither do we believe that it would in itself change Communist attitudes toward negotiations, or lead to a slackening of the insurrection in South Vietnam. 2. The main question is what interpretation the Communists would put on the introduction of the full ROK combat division. They would almost certainly estimate that it would not in itself significantly alter the military situation. They might consider, however, that it portended a substantial further buildup of foreign forces--e.g., Chinese Nationalist, Thai, Philippine, and US--for ground combat. Whatever their estimate on this point, they would try to discourage such a buildup. To this end they would increase their propaganda, and again accuse the US of recklessly expanding the war. They would probably employ the theme of "US use of Asians to fight Asians" and attempt to stir up troubles between the ROK forces and the Vietnamese. 3. The Communists would probably supplement their propaganda with some sorts of action. The North Koreans would almost certainly attempt to arouse protests in South Korea against the export of South Korean forces. They might make threatening military movement within North Korea or along the DMZ, designed to reinforce any doubts the South Korean or other governments might have about the wisdom of thus diverting their troops. We think it unlikely that North Korean ground force "volunteers" would be sent to North Vietnam, though it is possible that North Korean technicians or anti-aircraft personnel (possibly SAM operators) might be brought in. In South Vietnam, Viet Cong terrorist efforts and military harassment might be directed against the ROK forces in the hope that casualties would cause discontent in South Korea and also serve as a warning to other potential foreign contingents. 4. Communist China might attempt to scare off further US-initiated strengthening moves in South Vietnam by deploying Chinese forces southward toward the North Vietnam border. We do not believe, however, that China would do much else. It would be unlikely to counter by sending a Chinese division to the DRV because it would be unneeded there and probably uninvited. If it had decided for independent reasons, to send more or less overt anti-aircraft or fighter plane units, it might seize upon the introduction of the ROK division in the South as further justification for doing so. 5. The introduction of a ROK division would add one more complication to an already difficult situation for Moscow. It would provide a new occasion for the DRV to put pressure on the USSR for more and quicker military aid. The USSR might agree to North Vietnamese requests for greater or speedier assistance, although we doubt that this would take forms which substantially increased the risks of direct Soviet involvement. It would also diminish somewhat any USSR hopes that negotiations could still be arranged. [Continue with the next documents]
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