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FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1964-1968, Volume XXIX Korea
Department of State |
Korea 36. Letter From Secretary of State Rusk to Secretary of Defense McNamara/1/ Washington, March 22, 1965. /1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD/OASD/ISA Files: FRC 70 A 1266, Korea 013. Secret. Dear Bob: I am writing about our protracted negotiations with Korea and the Republic of China concerning status of forces arrangements for those countries. In each case, the negotiation is now centered upon the difficult and sensitive issue of criminal jurisdiction over our forces. Given the importance attached to the negotiations in these two countries, and the prolonged delay in reaching agreement, I believe that the way in which we now handle the criminal jurisdiction issue will have a significant bearing on our future political relationship with both governments./2/ /2/Additional documentation on the criminal jurisdiction issue is in the National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, DEF 15-3 KOR S-US. Our present position accepts in each case that the host government will have discretion to exercise some criminal jurisdiction over our personnel. We have designed our proposals, however, to take account of certain inadequacies in the local systems of judicial administration. First, we have insisted that our exposure to local jurisdiction be sharply reduced from the outset. We have demanded that these governments waive their primary jurisdiction in advance and agree that this waiver can be recalled (and their jurisdiction exercised) only in cases of major importance arising from certain types of offenses. Secondly, we are insisting on a variety of protections for those cases in which their jurisdiction might ultimately come to be exercised. These include an extensive list of fair trial guarantees, the presence of our trained observers at all proceedings, and U.S. custody of the accused throughout all proceedings. Neither the Koreans nor the Chinese regard our proposals as reasonable, or as really consistent with their sovereignty. Both are clearly concerned that their acquiescence in these arrangements would not be defensible against internal or external criticism. The Koreans have rejected the waiver arrangement, although they have shown flexibility on the procedural safeguards and custody. The Chinese have accepted the waiver proposal (which gives them greater latitude than in the Korean case for recall of the waiver), but they have done so with obviously great reluctance and diffidence, and only subject to our making concessions in the important area of U.S. custody. The Chinese have told us that in their view they are being offered a composite of the worst of our status of forces and base rights arrangements world-wide. Considering the long delay in reaching mutually satisfactory agreements with the Koreans and Chinese, and their reactions to our proposals, I have felt compelled to re-examine our position on the criminal jurisdiction issue. I certainly do not question that any formula we agree upon must offer adequate protection for our personnel. However, I think we should be careful not to overlook any more negotiable alternatives which would also provide such protection. I am particularly anxious to find an alternative because I do not believe our present position (even if it could be negotiated by some further application of pressure) would be politically viable. On the contrary, I believe it would leave a considerable residue of political bitterness affecting our broader national interests in these two countries. I have no doubt that the effects would be notable in the implementation of the status of forces agreements themselves. For example, we could expect to find both governments determined to exercise the full limit of the restricted jurisdiction available to them, rather than disposed to leave any of these cases in our hands. I am convinced that in the circumstances we should propose to these two countries the same waiver formula we use in the Federal Republic of Germany. The effect would be to make illustrative, rather than definitive, the list of offenses in which the host government could exercise jurisdiction. However, the host government would still be bound by rigorous criteria in electing to exercise its jurisdiction. For example, it would still be necessary that the host country's exercise of jurisdiction be required by major interests arising out of the special circumstances of a specific case. We would feel justified to intercede through diplomatic channels if the propriety of the host state's action under this stringent criterion were questionable. In respect of jurisdiction actually exercised by these two governments, the accused would be afforded the protection of those fair trial guarantees we consider necessary and a U.S. observer would be present during the trial proceedings. The U.S. would retain custody of the accused throughout all judicial proceedings and would not surrender the accused in any case where the accused had not been accorded a fair trial. On this basis, I feel that the so-called "German formula" would adequately provide for the protection of our personnel. We believe that the German formula would be negotiable with the Chinese and Koreans, and without establishing a residue of resentment and noncooperation, because it is in force with a major European ally and is appropriate to their forward-area location. Its justifiability on these grounds will be of great importance if our current discussions of criminal jurisdiction with the Philippines should produce an agreement there. In the Philippines, for a variety of reasons, we have proposed a formula which is much more favorable to the host state, and we will be pleased if we can get it. We must of course anticipate that there will be disparity between the Philippine settlement on the one hand, and the Chinese and Korean arrangements on the other. I believe this can be managed if the latter arrangements involve the German formula, because it can be justified by precedent and on the merits. If the disparity were to be greater, as our present position would make it, I can only anticipate that our difficulties with the Chinese and Koreans will be exacerbated sharply. At this writing, we are uncertain how fast the Philippine negotiations will proceed, but there is some indication today that they may move rapidly. If so, this would compound the problem with the Chinese and Koreans. But that problem would exist in any case, even if the Philippine negotiations were delayed, as there is the greatest possible evidence that the Chinese and Koreans have been watching closely the progress in each other's negotiations, and that both are well aware of the Philippine aspect. I would therefore appreciate it if you could concur in our working out new instructions to Seoul and Taipei, embodying the German waiver formula. With warm regards, Sincerely, Dean
37. Telegram From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State/1/ Seoul, March 30, 1965, 7 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 27-3 VIET S. Top Secret; Nodis. 931. Ref: Deptel 902./2/ Subject: ROK Combat Forces for Vietnam. /2/Not found. 1. Proposal to dispatch ROK combat division to Vietnam in present circumstances would present problem and involve consideration quite different from those surrounding dispatch of non-combat units. It involves factors which have probably not been fully presented to or even considered by Foreign Minister Lee Tong-won. 2. Sending ROK division to Vietnam would require approval of National Assembly and wide and free-ranging public discussion at a time when ROKG is engaged in major struggle in effort to normalize relations with Japan. This struggle likely to continue for at least two months and possibly longer. It may involve very survival of the government in face of determined opposition effort to create turmoil. We can say with certainty based on recent experience that this proposal would arouse strong objections and require great deal of attention from a govt already harassed. 3. Opposition politicians vigorously opposed dispatch of 2,000 non-combat troops to Vietnam. Their opposition to this new proposal will be even stronger. Opposition press can be counted on to oppose and to introduce strong element of doubt about wisdom of greater Korean participation in Vietnam. This has already begun in comments on news report from Washington of FonMin's reported offer to Secretary Rusk of further troops. Students, who were not on campus at time of National Assembly debate over ROK IMAF last January, will interject themselves and at least a vociferous minority among them is likely to oppose. Hue and cry will bewilder general public and generate uneasiness and fear of consequences of greater Korean participation in distant undeclared war when known enemy is nearby and their own daily problems appear so difficult. Adding controversy over this issue to other current controversies would weaken government at time when maximum strength is needed for ratification ROK-Japan agreement. Reservations about troop dispatch expressed previously by elements in DRP will be stronger and thus make it more difficult for govt to obtain National Assembly approval for the settlement by simple exercise of its majority. 4. Top leadership of govt feels greater readiness to expand Korea's contribution than any other sector of Korean society. President Pak, some Cabinet officers, and majority of military leadership are bold in vision and want ROK to play greater role in East Asia. They would in normal circumstances probably be quite prepared to act provided their conditions were satisfied. Nevertheless, we believe even this leadership would hesitate to take on task of sending combat division to Vietnam at this time. Their plate is full and before any more is added at least ROK-Japan issue must be out of way. 5. We therefore conclude time is not now propitious. 6. It would moreover in our judgment be undesirable to take up question with ROKG before or during Pak visit to Washington if, as now seems likely, ROK-Japan settlement not yet ratified and visit viewed primarily as aid to ROKG in getting ratification. In addition to certainty that proposal would lead to press, problem of negotiating suitable package for Pak on that occasion would be greatly complicated by US request for combat troops, especially since if request were made initial response would probably be affirmative but be followed immediately by second thoughts and stipulation of long list of conditions on points covered below. We recognize that it might seem strange if request were presented to ROKG soon after Pak returned without having been discussed during Washington visit. Nevertheless, on balance we think it better to defer raising matter with ROKG until after ratification, recognizing that Washington's judgment on this will be made in light of relative importance attached in short term to ROK-Japan settlement on one hand and reenforcement in Vietnam on other. If by chance ratification already in hand, Pak visit would be logical time to raise matter with ROKG. 7. In more normal political situation that is likely to obtain after ratification of ROK-Japan settlement, our present judgment is that ROKG, as distinguished from public, would wish to respond affirmatively to US request for combat division for Vietnam. We expect govt's position will be strengthened by successful conclusion Japanese settlement, although immediate aftermath will probably see Cabinet shakeup. Koreans remain fundamentally anti-Communist, with some pride in their willingness to stand at side of a country threatened by common enemy. It is not difficult for Koreans to recognize enemy even when he is distant and they do remember being helped in their own adversity. Many volunteers among veterans of ROK Army are ready to come forward, partly from a spirit of adventure and partly in hope of useful employment and financial gain. Even after ratification opposition would still oppose, as they did last January, and there would be nationwide discussion and debate, but with assurances and help from US (extent of these would be vitally important), proper preparation of public opinion, and good management, govt would stand sufficient chance of getting National Assembly approval to justify the effort. 8. In official and public consideration this action, there would be concern over possibility of greater danger along DMZ, where status quo would appear subject to change with Korean engagement in open conflict against Communist elements elsewhere. We agree with Dept's estimate that chances of all-out conflict on border between North and South Korea are not great. We do not exclude possibility of North Korean demonstration along DMZ (e.g. more fire fights, artillery fire on Paeng Yan-do or even large scale bombardment) to generate fear, inspire movement of refugees, etc. Whether danger is actually greater or not, many Koreans would raise question whether their country's actions in Vietnam might not endanger their own country's peace. 9. There would be some concern over legality sending combat troops to Vietnam in absence treaty obligation. This was raised by opposition and some newspapers during debate over sending non-combat troops and can be expected to be repeated with call for some form of formal treaty relationship which would sanction such intervention. 10. Many Koreans would question their ability share burden of collective security when their own problems are great and their progress is slow. They would question need for greater Korean role, when other free nations in Asia have not yet made contribution equivalent to their own. This questioning would be directed particularly at Japan's failure to help, at the wisdom of sterilizing the Chinese nationalists, at slowness of Philippines to act, and at the relatively modest contributions of Australia and New Zealand. Some responsible Korean military figures might question publicly (as they already have privately, e.g. commander of advance party for ROK IMAF and General Kim Chong-O) feasibility of employing Korean combat units in guerrilla war in foreign environment, under difficult tactical and logistical conditions. 11. Material aspects will loom large in Korean calculations, both official and private. Persuasion and appeals to rally to common cause will be useful, but special inducements on large scale will be necessary. Pressure will not work and should not be attempted. Volunteer aspect would need to be stressed to minimize complaints that comscripts being sent abroad to fight in undeclared war. 12. ROKG would seek firm assurances US forces in Korea would not be reduced and revision of US-ROK Mutual Security Treaty to secure US commitment along lines NATO formula as insurance against any increase in threat from North. Any proposal that one US division be shifted from Korea as part of build-up in Vietnam would be vigorously opposed and would increase effectiveness of opposition arguments that Korean interests were being sacrificed. 13. ROKG would expect all expenses of operation to be borne by US. This would include transportation, logistical requirements, special overseas allowances, and any other cost factors involved. For force of say 21,000 men this would be substantial amount. ROKG will almost certainly ask that division sent to Vietnam be replaced as soon as possible by activating a new division at US expense. 14. To bolster their defenses against what they would consider as substantially increased risk to their own security, ROKG would vigorously seek more military support to fill budgetary and military deficiencies, including suspension MAP transfer, increased military budget support, and expanded MAP levels. ROKG would expect to get substantial benefit from sale of goods to Vietnam under US aid financed program, and from maintenance and repair services which Korea can supply. This subject has been getting considerable attention in ROKG ever since their troops went to Vietnam. ROKG would also expect its active role in Vietnam to be reflected in US economic aid levels in Korea. Their argument would be such--if Korea is to help abroad it needs to be strengthened internally. It is not yet ready to bear extra burdens. 15. To sum up, we see formidable proposal [opposition?] and long drawn-out debate over proposal. Present time is particularly difficult, but under any foreseeable circumstances govt will have trouble and public opinion is certain to be divided. Extensive inducements will be required and cost will be great. But if approached after ROK-Japan ratification and with assurances of generous support from US, our present best judgment is that govt response is likely to be affirmative. National Assembly approval can be hoped for but cannot be assured. 16. We believe that question also has implications for the long-run psychology of US-ROK relationship which we are examining and which may affect judgments expressed above pro or contra. For example public debate of this question may give Koreans greater feeling of equality and partnership with the US, helping to compensate for age-old inferiority complex and fear of Japan, and contribute to a new sense of national confidence. On other hand, many Koreans may begin to question whether US-ROK relationship evolving into one in which ROK becomes tool which US uses for own political and strategic purposes instead of independent object of US assistance and support. These possible effects involve larger question of how both we and Koreans envisage not only their relationship with the US but their own changing role in Asia and the speed of that transition. Brown
38. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (McNaughton) to the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Vance)/1/ Washington, April 13, 1965. /1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD/OASD/ISA Files: FRC 70 A 1266, Korea 013. Secret. A copy of the attachment was sent to the Secretary of Defense. Cy-- Bill Bundy and Dean Rusk feel that we have reached a point where we must settle quickly the criminal jurisdiction issue that has been with us off and on over the past ten years in Korea and Taiwan. Bill is particularly anxious to get a favorable Defense reaction to State's proposed solution before Henry Lodge leaves this weekend to talk the Koreans into increasing their effort in Vietnam./2/ /2/Lodge visited Korea on April 27 during a trip to 10 Asian countries April 19-May 1 made at President Johnson's request. A copy of Lodge's report to the President is in the National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 27-3 VIET S. Lodge's mission in Korea was to explain the current situation in Vietnam and to raise the possibility of Korea furnishing a 4,000-man regimental combat team to Vietnam. (Telegram 2754 to Tokyo, repeated to Seoul as telegram 1039, April 25; ibid., POL 27-14 KOR/UN; additional relevant documentation is ibid., POL 27-3 VIET S) The Services and the Chiefs have taken a hard position against State's proposal but, on close analysis, it turns out that the difference between them and State is only of degree and approach. I am satisfied that State's proposal protects adequately Defense's interest (including the GIs'). General Howze and Admiral Gentner, speaking individually, have also indicated that State's proposal is satisfactory. John T. McNaughton
Attachment SUBJECT This memorandum recommends your concurrence in Secretary Rusk's criminal jurisdiction proposal (Tab A)/3/ for the Chinese and Korean Status of Forces negotiations. The Service Secretaries and the Joint Chiefs of Staff non-concur (Tabs B-E)./4/ /3/Document 36. /4/None of the tabs is printed. The issue is the extent to which the host states would have the option to exercise criminal jurisdiction over US personnel. Everyone is agreed that the US would have jurisdiction over official duty offenses and those involving only US personnel or property. In the remaining cases, the Services and the Joint Chiefs of Staff want to continue to press for limiting the host state's option to exercise jurisdiction to definitive categories of cases (e.g. rape, death of a human being and robbery). They are concerned by reports of corruption, bribery and political influence which, in their judgment, may have an impact that would not be readily detectable by US observers in the administration of justice by the courts of these countries. Through the definitive categories formula, they hope to reduce the exposure of US personnel to the local courts. Secretary Rusk believes that the definitive categories formula is not negotiable since it is without precedent and that, in any case, it is not necessary. He recommends we offer instead the jurisdiction formula in effect with the Federal Republic of Germany. Under this formula, the host state is not limited to specific categories of cases. However, before the Chinese or Korean authorities could exercise jurisdiction in a given case, they would have to determine that the particular circumstances of that case make their exercise of jurisdiction imperative. This stringent criterion would in Secretary Rusk's judgment limit the number of cases in which the host states would exercise jurisdiction. (The memorandum at Tab F from the Acting General Counsel discusses both sides of the issue in greater detail.) The difference in positions is basically one of degree and approach. No one contends that we must not accept some local exercise of jurisdiction over US personnel. It is a matter of judgment as to which formula is negotiable and which, if accepted, would work better over the longer term. The Acting General Counsel considers that either formula is acceptable from a legal point of view. Given all the circumstances, I believe that the totality of the safeguards incorporated in Secretary Rusk's proposal is adequate to protect our personnel. The Rusk proposal would require Korea and China to accept a far less favorable arrangement than we have offered to the Philippines. I share his judgment that the German formula is a reasonable solution to a difficult problem and that to continue to press for the definitive categories formula would jeopardize our present excellent relationships without any appreciable increase in protection for our personnel. If you approve Secretary Rusk's proposal, I will notify the Services and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and have appropriate instructions sent to Seoul and Taipei./5/ /5/Vance approved the proposal on April 15. John T. McNaughton/6/ /6/Printed from a copy that indicates McNaughton signed the original.
39. Telegram From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State/1/ Seoul, April 15, 1965. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 27-3 VIET S. Top Secret; Priority; Nodis. No time of transmission appears on the telegram. 1008. For Bundy. Ref: Deptel 982./2/ ROK Troops for Vietnam. /2/In telegram 982 to Seoul, April 14, the Department of State acknowledged the political difficulties arising from the troop issue in Korea and stated the "urgent need for introduction of additional Korean, Australian and New Zealand troops in SVN." The Department wanted the ROK to furnish a 3,000-man regimental combat team, with the probable future requirement of one division. (Ibid., POL 27 VIET S) Following telegram was on point of despatch when reftel received. It is nevertheless transmitted in order to stress importance in Korea of really substantial contributions by other countries, and in the hope that at least some of the considerations set forth therein may be helpful to Ambassador Lodge in his efforts to secure same. 1. Following are further thoughts referred to in last para Embtel 931./3/ /3/Document 37. 2. The basic danger to be averted if possible lies deeper than the immediate questions of whether ROKG will respond affirmatively to a request and the extent of political difficulties in National Assembly. It is the risk of creating a situation in which Korea appears to its own people and to others in the world not as an independent and willing contributor to a struggle in which it has a vital interest, but as a puppet or vassal of the US, brought into danger in distant Southeast Asia and at home to serve the interests of the US. If Korea is the only country besides the US which sends significant combat units to SVN, such an impression can be created. It certainly will be fostered and exploited to the utmost by the opposition here and if established will corrode US/ROK relationship. 3. Despite forthcoming attitude of President Pak and other leaders, Koreans generally are not yet psychologically prepared play large role on international stage. Conscious of economic and political weakness Koreans are preoccupied with proximate interests, e.g. normalization with Japan, unification, and with domestic problems. Country is divided, government is still weak and economy requires large scale external aid. Living under shadow of two most powerful Communist countries, its relations with nearest free world neighbor (Japan) are just, with difficulty, being restored to normal. With other free world and neutral nations, ROK has problem maintaining and extending recognition as only legitimate government in Korea. Thus by ordinary standards ROKG in no position to play important international role or to give economic or military assistance. 4. Relations with SEA countries (RVN itself, Thailand, Philippines and Malaysia) are friendly enough, and Thai and Filipino troops fought in Korean War. Except for thin layer of leadership in govt, however, Koreans do not think of themselves as heavily involved in SEA problems by virtue of either political or economic interests there. 5. ROKG's traditional anti-communism, the immense stake of all Asia, including Korea in free world success in SVN, Korea's special relationship with US and existence of large and powerful ROK military force in being, all constitute persuasive arguments for invoking ROK assistance. But strength of these arguments is diluted so long as US NATO partners remain aloof, and Asian allies much closer to scene, much further from enemy and with more obviously direct interest in SE Asia, e.g. Thailand and Philippines, do not send combat troops in any substantial number. Moreover, mission Korean forces in Korean eyes is to defend ROK, and if not needed for that purpose, many Koreans would wish to see force reduced. Force is not now adequately MAP supported and pay and allowances are heavy drain on limited budgetary resources which will be increasingly needed for local costs of economic development program. On other hand existence of unemployment on large scale in ROK will pre-dispose many in favor of sending volunteers to fight in Vietnam. This feeling especially strong among veterans. A division of volunteers would create far less domestic political difficulty, but would of course take much longer to activate and make ready. 6. These considerations emphasize importance of substantial contribution of forces by other countries to counteract impression ROK forces being used as mercenaries to fight US war in SE Asia. We recognize that Japan is not expected to contribute forces at this time, but reasons are not appreciated in ROK. A substantial economic contribution from Japan for Vietnam would at least help to lessen objections in Korea that other Asian countries not making proportionate sacrifices. 7. Finally, strong and stable Korea is important anchor for our security interests in Far East. Our concern is whether those interests will be best served by contributions of manpower in SVN, if that contribution adds to instability and weakness here. Chief domestic political task for present ROKG is to build public confidence which it now lacks. Before sending even volunteers to fight in RVN, it ought to be sure of broad measure of public support over and above majority party approval in National Assembly. Externally chief task is to ensure normalization results in successful ROK-Japan relationship. Active role of Korean military in RVN might well have adverse impact upon developing relations with Japan. We would value Amb Reischauer's judgment on this question. 8. Foregoing is submitted for consideration by Washington, along with the many other relevant factors of which we cannot have adequate understanding, in making decision whether to ask ROK to provide combat troops for SVN, and as possibly useful background for Ambassador Lodge on his trip." Brown
40. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Korea/1/ Washington, April 26, 1965, 2:51 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 27-3 VIET S. Top Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Bundy, cleared by Hilliker, and approved by Bundy. Repeated to Saigon. 1042. Embtel 1072./2/ We appreciate desirability giving Pak frank picture our possible future plans, but there are grave drawbacks to telling him now that we may eventually ask for as much as a division. /2/The Embassy in Seoul received confirmation that Washington recognized that a request for ROK forces for Vietnam "might rise to scale of one division (18,000 men) in later stage if required," although the Koreans were not to be informed of that possibility at present. (Telegram 1040 to Seoul, April 26; ibid.) The Embassy responded in telegram 1072, April 26, that, because the National Assembly would have to approve the dispatch of additional troops, Pak should be informed from the start so that he could decide whether to "seek authority in advance to dispatch up to division-size contingent rather than tackle problem piecemeal." (Ibid.) Basic factor is, as stated in our 1039,/3/ that we are most anxious avoid any publicity for deployments before they are firmly agreed with GVN and preferably before they actually arrive. We realize that in case of ROK units alerting and shipping arrangements alone would probably lead to necessity for announcement well prior to arrival, and it is for this reason, in part, that we did not visualize ROK RCT, even if fully agreed, closing SVN until mid-June at earliest. /3/Telegram 1039 to Seoul, also sent to Tokyo as telegram 2745, April 25, outlined the approach Lodge should take in his meeting with Pak when raising the question of Korea providing additional troops to Vietnam. Lodge was instructed "to mention to Pak personally that there may arise a possibility that a ROK combat contribution on the order of a regimental combat team (about 4,000 men) would become desirable within the next two months." (Ibid., POL 27-14 KOREA/UN) Secondly, if we do go through with proposed additional 2-3 enclaves, we are most anxious to have this appear--as indeed is the fact--as a limited measure to secure particular areas and conduct limited operations from them. Any foreshadowing of much greater deployments to come would jump the gun in view of the very tentative character of our thinking at this point, and would inevitably create the impression that we were simply moving inexorably to a large ground involvement. Obviously, if Pak were to seek Assembly approval for a ROK division, even if he made it clear that it would not be dispatched immediately in toto, it would inevitably lead to conclusion by press and other governments that if ROK was considering a force of this size we ourselves must have in mind something very much greater. For these reasons it seems to us vital that Pak not seek any Assembly approval for a division at least before the end of June and probably not until we have had a much better chance to evaluate effectiveness of more limited deployments now contemplated. It also seems to us, unless you can be really sure of security factor, that it would be most risky to tell him firmly that we even have in mind the possibility of a division-size ROK combat contribution. If it is humanly possible, we must take this thing one bite at a time in order to avoid most serious consequences in GVN and in world attitudes. We suppose that part of your problem is that ROK Assembly may recess during summer. We wonder, however, if it could not be recalled if required. Hence, we would vastly prefer you stick to original instructions while not foreclosing possibility additional contribution might later be requested. Please handle accordingly unless you have reply comments. Moreover, any publicity even for RCT proposal at this time would be most inopportune. We do not have GVN reaction to any additional deployments and would need to work out details even when and if both GVN and Pak are agreeable in principle. Moreover, exact timing of any public indication--much less formal seeking Assembly approval--will have to be weighed very carefully in total picture of public impact added deployments. Hence, you should make perfectly clear to Pak that we would need to consult very closely with him on future handling and that all publicity must be avoided for now. Rusk
41. Telegram From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State/1/ Seoul, April 27, 1965. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 27-3 VIET S. Top Secret; Exdis. No time of transmission appears on the telegram. Also sent to the White House and repeated to Saigon for Lodge. 1082. Following is draft memo of private conversation between Amb Lodge and President Pak, which has not been cleared by Amb Lodge. This followed more general discussion being separately reported./2/ /2/A summary of Lodge's general discussion of Vietnam with Pak and other high-level Korean officials was transmitted in telegram 1085 from Seoul, April 28. (Ibid., POL 7 US/LODGE) Additional documentation on the Lodge visit to Seoul is ibid. and POL 27-3 VIET S. 1. Amb Lodge said that President Johnson wants President Pak to know, for his personal ears only, that an appraisal of the situation in South Viet Nam indicated that it might be necessary to introduce additional troops. The possibility of asking Korea to contribute a regimental combat team of perhaps 4,000 men was being discussed with PriMin Quat. No conclusions had yet been reached. Hence the Amb was not making any specific request, but he did want President Pak to know that such a request might be forthcoming. 2. The President said that any request for further assistance from Korea would be given very serious consideration. He could assure Amb Lodge that Korea would do what it could to help. 3. The President said that the Korean Amb in Saigon (Sin Xang-ch'ol) was concerned that there were not sufficient combat troops in South Viet Nam adequately to protect the 2,000 non-combat troops which had been sent there./3/ This was a matter which had been under consideration by his govt. There had been opposition in some quarters to the dispatch of the 2,000 non-combat troops to South Viet Nam. Some of this came from people who were ignorant, some from people who were dubious about the policies being pursued in Viet Nam, and some was just political opposition. All of these matters would have to be considered, and also questions on timing. The President would consider them and would continue the discussion of this question with Amb Brown. /3/The Embassy in Saigon was puzzled by Pak's claim and noted that Korean forces included an infantry battalion and a company of marines, were stationed in a relatively secure area close to U.S. and Vietnamese air bases, and had reinforced their installations with sandbags and trenches. (Telegram 3607 from Saigon, May 1; ibid.) 4. Amb Lodge said we very much appreciated President Pak's forthright response to his remarks, and that Amb Brown would be in touch with the President when the matter had been further considered in Saigon and Washington. He stressed the importance that no word of this suggestion should get out to the public because of the obvious embarrassment that would be caused to all concerned in Saigon, Seoul, Washington, and in any other countries that might contribute, by premature disclosure. The President said he fully appreciated the necessity for secrecy. 5. The President then said that he wished to mention the matter of the settlement with Japan. He asked Amb Lodge to assure President Johnson that the Korean Govt was determined to complete the settlement with Japan. There would be opposition. There would probably be further demonstrations. There would be difficulty in the Assembly. But the President was convinced that the majority of the Korean people supported that settlement and that the govt would be able to secure its ratification. He said that he had hoped that the agreement would be signed before he left for Washington. Practical considerations of drafting, etc., however, made this very difficult. He thought now that it probably would be signed by the end of May, perhaps when he came back. The agreement might be submitted to the Assembly at the end of June or early July when, he said, with a smile, it was very hot and people would be less inclined to protracted debate and struggle. 6. The President closed by asking Amb Lodge to assure President Johnson that he was in full support of President Johnson's policies and that he intended to tell President Johnson personally when he saw him in Washington. Brown
42. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ Seoul, May 6, 1965. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 7 KOR S. Secret. Attached to airgram A-551 from Seoul, May 13. The meeting was held at the Ministry of National Defense. PARTICIPANTS 1. Ambassador Brown called on the Minister of National Defense at the latter's request to clarify Washington attitudes toward various requests for assistance previously made by the Minister. Minister Kim opened the conversation by asking what Ambassador Brown had heard from Washington. 2. Ambassador Brown said that he now had a reply from Washington covering the four main points raised by Minister Kim./2/ Washington's position was along the lines Ambassador Brown had expected and had warned Minister Kim to expect. /2/Brown and Kim met on April 29 and discussed military issues in preparation for Pak's visit to Washington. (Memorandum of conversation attached to airgram A-551; ibid.) 3. On measures to expand trade with South Vietnam, Ambassador Brown said the U.S. Government would be as helpful as possible consistent with the requirements of established policy. This meant that favorable consideration would be given to procurement of goods and services from Korea under MAP and AID funded programs where Korean suppliers were competitive as to price, quality and delivery terms, etc. Thus the door is open to Korean suppliers. It was our belief that there are many good opportunities and markets and that Korean suppliers are in a good competitive position. The Ambassador pointed out that Saigon is the best place to work out specific transactions, not only for goods, but for repair and service contracts as well. The Ambassador stressed that "buy American" limitations would continue to obtain for many commodities, and that in the case of other commodities which were open to "limited free world" procurement, Korea could not be given a preferential position. 4. With regard to the level of U.S. forces in Korea, as the Ambassador had previously explained, the U.S. cannot undertake to make a precise, open-ended commitment. We are prepared to say in the communique, to be issued in Washington on the occasion of President Pak's visit to the United States, that we have assured President Pak that the U.S. will continue to maintain powerful forces, which in conjunction with ROK forces, would be sufficient to ensure the security of the Republic of Korea. However, we cannot say that we will keep any specific number of troops for any specific period of time. Nor can we make the NATO-type undertaking that an attack on the Republic of Korea would be regarded as an attack on the United States. We are prepared, however, in the communique to reaffirm the U.S. intention to come to the defense of Korea in the event of an attack in accordance with the treaty of 1953. 5. The Ambassador told Minister Kim that he had not been able to change the Washington position on the MAP transfer. 6. As to the military assistance program, again Washington could not commit specific amounts for specific times. The communique could say that MAP would be continued and that the U.S. would do its best to provide MAP assistance in amounts necessary to ensure effective Korean forces. The communique would also say that a substantial portion of won counterpart funds would be available for the defense budget if that would be helpful. 7. The Ambassador then referred to the request for assistance made by the Minister of National Defense earlier (see Memcon dated April 29, 1965) for a military pay raise./3/ He said that we regarded this as a complicated and difficult question, especially since it involved the possibility of pay adjustments for other government employees. We recognized the need for pay adjustments but we wanted to make sure a solution was found which would be complete and at the same time not inflationary. Washington too was sympathetic but had suggested that we sit down here in Seoul with the ROKG, especially with the Economic Planning Ministry, to work out all of the details of the problem and try to find a solution. The Ambassador said to Minister Kim that he may have felt that a firm position on this question was lacking on the U.S. side. However, he had discussed the matter at length with General Howze and Mr. Bernstein and we were prepared to assist in finding a solution if the ROKG (not just the MND) would work out a government program. /3/Kim sought a 75 percent pay increase, which represented $30 million. (Ibid.) 8. Minister Kim was openly dejected after the Ambassador's recital. He remarked ruefully that if he could not get some relief on MAP transfer, he would have to stay in the United States; that he could not come back to Korea. Minister Kim went on to explain that the MAP transfer had become a grave political issue and that, more than anything else, the people were expecting that President Pak would come back from Washington with some adjustment in the transfer program. 9. The Ambassador asked what had led the Korean people to such a state of mind and Minister Kim understood the inference. He said he was aware that he is sometimes known as the world champion preventer of MAP transfer. This was because the MAP transfer led to an increased military budget. When he had to ask for more money for the military budget, journalists and editors became attentive and wanted to know why. It was difficult to get more money for the defense budget and therefore he must fight against anything that increases that budget. The Minister of National Defense must provide for the armed forces. The armed forces expect this of him. (The Minister implied at this point that the MAP transfer would make it more difficult to obtain funds for a military pay raise and he was therefore under pressure from the senior officers to resist the MAP transfer program.) 10. The Minister said that the pay raise problem was very serious but that the Korean Government has other serious problems. ROKG officials outside the Defense Ministry look with disfavor on a military pay raise because, in their view, it doesn't accomplish anything positive but does raise the level of government expenditure. With all the other complicated problems, there is great competition for any additional funds that become available and the Ministry of National Defense stands little chance of winning in the competition. The Ambassador asked why, if the problem is so serious, additional funds could not be raised from Korean revenues and set aside in the budget for a pay raise as is done in the United States. The Minister replied that this might be reasonable and logical in the United States, but it would not work that way in Korea. 11. The Ambassador commented that any pay raise, especially one that included adjustment of civil service pay, would have to be financed substantially out of ROKG revenues. Therefore, there would have to be concerted approach to the problem both within the ROKG and between the U.S. Government and the ROKG. The U.S. Government was not willing to make available additional funds for this purpose until such a concerted attack had produced a feasible solution, consistent with stabilization objectives. It was our belief that a substantial pay raise could be accommodated from prospective revenues that would accrue to the ROKG and still leave funds for other important objectives. The Minister replied that he had frequently raised this problem with Mr. Chang Ki-yong, Economic Planning Minister, but Chang was not willing to stand up and talk for military expenditures. When Chang thinks he is going to have additional funds, he is reluctant to have the funds set aside for military expenditures that would be losing money which could be expended for other objectives. The Ambassador asked whether Mr. Chang knew of the Ministry's request for 30 million dollars from the U.S. for a pay increase. Noting that he had not spoken directly to Mr. Chang about it, the Minister replied that the EPB generally agrees with the proposal on the condition that "we get the money from you." The Minister then said that if the U.S. would give only 20 million dollars, he perhaps could get Chang to make available the remaining 10 million dollars. 12. The Ambassador tried to conclude this phase of the discussion by noting that he would ask the Economic Planning Minister to look at the problem and would say that the U.S. was prepared to work cooperatively on the problem. The military budget was a very important part of the total budget, very basic, and we, General Howze, Mr. Bernstein, and the Ambassador, would not like to see a large increase in revenues go entirely for non-military uses with nothing for an increase in military pay. The Minister said he appreciated such support from the U.S. side but that he needed not only moral support, but direct tangible assistance. 13. The Minister asked whether the Ambassador's refusal of his request applied only to what was asked for in cash, or to supplies of wheat as well. He said he needed more than U.S. help in raising ROKG revenues and if he could not get help, he would have to take up residence in the United States. The Ambassador again explained that the U.S. could not take action on a proposal that was not completely worked out and approved by the ROKG. He pointed out that this could not be considered simply as a military problem. Finally, he stressed that the problem must be worked out here and not in Washington. He explained that Washington was not prepared to negotiate with the Minister on any concrete problems or issues. Concrete results would emerge from the President's meeting with President Pak. However, these results would embody substantive decision reflected in the communique and agreed between the two governments here in Seoul before the President leaves for Washington. 14. The Minister then spoke of his concern for the defense of Asia, not just of Korea. He hoped that Ambassador Brown would continue to reflect his views to Washington. The Ambassador was so powerful in Washington that no tree could resist his push. The ROK forces were on the very point of starvation. There was a saying in Korea that no tree could sustain the blows of the ax. The Minister had struck only two blows and he intended to cut the Ambassador eight more times in order to get some relief on the MAP transfer and some assistance on the military pay increase. Ambassador Brown replied that he was used to being hacked at. 15. The Ambassador asked the Minister if he still planned to stay over in Washington for several days after President Pak departed. The Minister said that in view of Washington's attitude, it might not be worth while for him to stay; President Pak would decide. Once again the Ambassador assured the Minister that he would be welcome but could not expect to conduct any business talks with defense officials while he is in the United States. [Continue with the next documents]
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