NOTE: External links to other Internet sites should not be construed as an endorsement of the views contained therein.
| The State Department web site below is a permanent electronic archive of information released prior to January 20, 2001. Please see www.state.gov for material released since President George W. Bush took office on that date. This site is not updated so external links may no longer function. Contact us with any questions about finding information. NOTE: External links to other Internet sites should not be construed as an endorsement of the views contained therein. |
 |
FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1964-1968, Volume XXIX Korea
Department of State |
Korea /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 7 KOR S. Secret. Attached to airgram A-550 from Seoul, May 13. The meeting was held in the Prime Minister's Office. PARTICIPANTS The Prime Minister said he had asked us to come because the government had received a request from the government of South Viet Nam for combat troops. He wanted to make it quite clear that the ROKG wanted to send combat troops and to make its contribution to the defense of Southeast Asia. They were about to begin consultation with leading members of the Assembly on this subject. There were, however, certain problems with the Assembly which had been illustrated at the time when approval of the dispatch of 2,000 non-combat troops had been requested. The opposition at that time had asked what assurances the government had received from the United States to guard against the difficulties which would be created for Korea by sending these troops, for example additional risk of aggression from the north. Specifically they had raised the following points: 1) Had the government been able to get a commitment from the United States to revise the 1953 defense treaty so that an attack on Korea would be regarded as an attack on the United States? To this the government had replied that this was not necessary because the presence of substantial US forces in Korea was in itself a guarantee of US action, since those forces would themselves be the subject of any conceivable attack. 2) Had the government received an assurance from the United States that it would not withdraw any of its forces now stationed in Korea? 3) Had the government been able to secure a repeal or extension of the MAP transfer program? To this the government had replied they had not, but the US Government had agreed to make certain adjustments in the program which would be helpful. 4) Had the government taken steps to get an increase in the level of MAP to compensate for the sharp decrease which had taken place in recent years as result of which the Korean forces were inadequately equipped even to defend their own country, much less to go off to help in SVN. To this the government replied they were constantly in touch with US authorities about military assistance. In any event they did not feel that the dispatch of troops to SVN was a matter for bargaining with the US, but was a moral obligation on Korea's part. The Prime Minister said there were many questions raised by the opposition on the earlier occasion of troop dispatch and that they would all come up again with renewed force when the government presented the request to the Assembly for authorization to send combat troops. It would be very helpful if certain assurances could be given to the President while he was in Washington and reflected in the communique so that he would be in a strong position to answer any such questions. The situation was further complicated by the fact that the government was already pressing the Assembly for ratification of the settlement with Japan and encountering serious difficulties. The Prime Minister repeated that the government was determined to send combat troops and was not in any way bargaining with us about this. He was simply asking for help to enable the President to be able to do it. The matters on which the President would like reassurance in Washington, in addition to those raised by the opposition, were the question of a pay raise for the armed forces, which was desperately needed, and increased trade with SVN. If the President could come back also with assurances on these two points, it would be very helpful. It was true that President Johnson had singled out President Pak for special personal courtesies such as sending his private airplane to Seoul and scheduling a fine parade for the President in New York City. These were greatly appreciated. But if the President simply went to the United States and was cordially and honorably received and came back without anything specific to show for his visit, this would not help. The Prime Minister said that he did not think the allotment of $150 million of DLF funds over the next few years would make much impression on the Korean public, particularly since it would be realized only in small amounts in view of our insistence on projects. He recalled that when he had been Ambassador in Washington $70 million had been allotted for one year, but because of lack of projects only about $40 million had been realized. He was afraid that this would happen again and that the government would be criticized by the opposition because of it. I said that the Prime Minister had expressed himself with his customary lucidity and frankness, and I hoped he would allow me to be equally frank. I would try to be equally clear. But first of all I would like to know exactly what the SVNG had asked for and whether I could see a copy of the letter from the SVNG. This was produced and was simply a brief two paragraphs saying in effect "additional combat troops would be very helpful here and we would appreciate your sending combat troops at your earliest convenience." There were no specifics as to the nature or quantity of the units being requested nor any indication of the job they would be expected to do. I said that as the Prime Minister undoubtedly knew, when Ambassador Lodge was here he had told President Pak that we had been discussing with the SVNG the possible need for additional troops and he had told President Pak that a request for a regimental combat team might be forthcoming. He had not then made any such request. I said that this letter had been sent by the SVNG without our knowledge, and that when it had been sent I had been asked by Washington to speak to the President immediately about it. I had done so on the evening of May 7 before the government had received the letter. I had told President Pak that while we believed that dispatch of a Korean regimental combat team to SVN would be desirable, we appreciated that this might cause him serious political difficulties, particularly with respect to the ratification of the agreement with Japan, and that I had been instructed to tell him that we would not ask him to take any action which in his view should cause him serious difficulties in that connection, and that a delay in action on this request until after the ratification would not in our view cause serious difficulty. I very much appreciated, and I knew our government would very much appreciate the desire of the Korean government to contribute combat troops. Our position on timing was as I had stated to President Pak. I said that I was well aware of the matter raised by the opposition and likely to be raised by them again. I felt that the answers given by the government on the previous occasion had been exactly right. I particularly welcomed the Prime Minster's statement both to the Assembly and to me today that the ROKG did not wish to bargain on this matter. We agreed that this was not a matter for bargaining and we did not propose to bargain. As I had explained to the Minister of National Defense on May 6,/2/ and as I had explained to the Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Mun Tok-chu, it was not possible under our constitutional system for the President to change the treaty commitment which we had with Korea, even if he wished to do so. Moreover he could not make any commitment to keep any specific number of troops in any specific locality for any specific period of time. Nor could he give assurance of the maintenance of any specific level of military assistance. /2/See Document 42. He could, however, and would gladly do so, give very positive assurance to Korea of the continued military support of the United States. The form in which we proposed he should do so was contained in the draft communique which we had given to Mr. Mun as our suggested revision of the Korean draft./3/ We were also prepared to recommend to Washington some wording changes suggested by Mr. Chang Sang Mun to Mr. Doherty yesterday at his meeting with Mr. Mun which were designed to increase the sense of urgency of our commitment. We felt that the language of our draft was a very strong and powerful assurance which should clearly comfort the Korean people. /3/Documents tracing the negotiations on the contents of the communique released at the conclusion of the Pak visit are in National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 7 KOR S. I had not been able to persuade Washington to go any further on MAP transfer than the memorandum which I had given the Prime Minister some weeks ago. If the President continues to feel very strongly on this matter I could only suggest that he bring it up personally in Washington. So far as Secretary Rusk, Secretary McNamara and Mr. Bell were concerned we could go no further. I repeated to the Prime Minister what I had said to the Minister of National Defense. (See Memorandum of Conversation enclosed with Embassy's A-550)/4/ about the pay raise question.) /4/Reference should be to airgram A-551 from Seoul; see Document 42. I said that we already working on expanding opportunities for Korean trade in SVN; that we are hopeful of significant results and that we are prepared to consider recommending to Washington that some reference to this matter be included in the communique. I said that all of us in Seoul would do our best to try to get the highest possible level of military assistance of the Korean forces and that I was encouraged that aid to Viet Nam had now been separated from the regular MAP legislation, thus I hoped lightening the burden on the regular MAP program. I said that we thought $150 million of new development money under the most favorable terms available anywhere in the world was a real contribution; that the speed with which it was used depended entirely on the Korean government and that we were prepared to provide more as soon as it was used up. If some language change could be made to make it clearer that this money was all immediately available, we would be glad to consider it. I feel that if the matter were presented to the Korean public in this light it would be appreciated by them. I said that I welcomed the discussion which we had just had because I felt that it brought into focus things which had been said on both sides many times. I felt that we now had had sufficient discussion of the issues; that everyone on the American side had a very clear idea of what the Korean government wanted and why. I thought the time had now come to get down to actual language. On this the ball was entirely in the Korean government's court. We had considered the Korean first draft and had presented our ideas on what we thought the language should be. If the Koreans had any specific suggestions to make I hoped Mr. Mun would make them in his meeting this afternoon with Mr. Doherty. I felt that no useful purpose would be served in further general discussions. The Prime Minister said he understood that we could not for constitutional reasons give the NATO commitment, but if MAP transfer were to be pressed further he assumed there would be no difficulty in the Minister of National Defense doing so in Washington. (I said it would have to be done by the President.) The Prime Minister said that the government would shortly present to us a program dealing with the pay raise problem; that he appreciated my explanation of the DLF matter and would suggest some language to improve the impression for the Korean point of view, and that he agreed we could get down to work on actual drafting. Mr. Mun said that my explanation of our constitutional problems had clarified the reasons for some of our positions and he would certainly take these into account and would have specific language to suggest to Mr. Doherty. Mr. Lee Hu-rak came in just about the time we were discussing the DLF fund, and said that the phrase "over the next few years" was troublesome. He also noted that our communique omitted reference to trade and again raised the question of a commitment to maintain our present level of troops. I said that the last was not possible, but that we were prepared to recommend deletion of the phrase he found troublesome and mention of trade in the communique. Comment: It was obvious that all present were very disappointed. Gloom started to descend very obviously as soon as I mentioned that we were not pressing for action on combat troops to Viet Nam before the ratification of the agreement with Japan, and thickened as I proceeded, this despite the fact, which I pointed out several times, that I said nothing which had not been said to each of them many times before./5/ /5/When summarizing this conversation, Brown also commented that "it has been clear for some time both from intelligence sources and from my conversations with MND that ROKG at Cabinet level was hoping to use request for combat troops to RVN to wring some concessions from us on the points mentioned above in connection with President Pak's visit to Washington." Brown believed, however, that the conversation brought Korean "expectations to more realistic levels." (Telegram 1175 from Seoul, May 13; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, DEF 19 KOR S-VIET S)
44. Memorandum From James C. Thomson of the National Security Council Staff and the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson/1/ Washington, May 14, 1965, 5:25 p.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Korea, Park Visit Briefing Book. Secret. SUBJECT The attached paper from State requests your approval for the inclusion of a specific $150-million Development Loan commitment, over the next few years, in your joint communique with President Park next Tuesday./2/ /2/Attached but not printed. Tuesday was May 18. The President approved the proposal and added a handwritten notation: "Also asking Horning, McPherson, Busby et al. if they can't make some imaginative, substantive contribution for the communique." Horace Busby, Jr., and Donald F. Horning were Special Assistants to the President and Harry C. McPherson, Jr., was Special Council to the President. This item will be one part of a generalized assistance package designed to reassure the Koreans of our continued support despite the imminent conclusion of a Japan-Korea settlement. The sum in question is no more than we would normally plan to provide over the next three years. Furthermore, the communique will of course stipulate that the provision of such funds will be "subject to applicable legislation and appropriations." Although it is unusual to cite a specific figure in connection with such a visit, both Embassy Seoul and the various Washington agencies are strongly convinced that Park has urgent need of such a quantified commitment in order to cope successfully with the acute fears of his opponents and of large sections of the Korean people that we are on the verge of abandoning their country to Japanese control. In these circumstances, it would seem appropriate to make this exception to our general custom of avoiding such figures in a State Visit communique. JCT Jr.
45. Telegram From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State/1/ Seoul, May 14, 1965. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, DEF 15-3 KOR S-US. Confidential; Priority. No time of transmission appears on the telegram. Also sent to the Department of Defense and repeated to Tokyo, Taipei, Manila, CINCPAC for POLAD, and SJA USARPAC. 1191. Ref: Embtel 1190 rptd Tokyo 423, Taipei 77, Manila 182 CINCPAC 181./2/ For Bundy from Ambassador. /2/Telegram 1190 from Seoul, May 14, transmitted the proposed text of the labor provision to the SOFA agreement being negotiated with Korea. It provided for a 70-day period of compulsory arbitration before workers actually went on strike, denied certain categories of workers the right to strike, and limited the right to strike in times of emergency. (Ibid.) 1. The long and painful chapter of SOFA negotiations is drawing to a close. Only one real obstacle remains. The means of surmounting it with satisfaction and respect on both sides are set forth in reftel. 2. The obstacle in question is our hitherto adamant insistence on a provision denying Korean employees of US forces the ultimate right to strike and the equally adamant refusal of ROKG, unanimously and vocally supported by public, legislative and editorial opinion to agree to this prohibition. 3. Long and strenuous negotiations have convinced us that we have no hope of getting the Koreans to agree to such a clause. Its enforceability is highly questionable. It would provide an instance of what all Koreans of whatever party will rightly or wrongly consider injustice and discrimination and which those who wish us ill both in Korea and elsewhere can and will exploit to our disadvantage. 4. The Korean Government would find it most difficult successfully to defend this clause before its Assembly and public opinion. It does not appear in any of our other SOFAs, not with China, nor with Japan, nor with the Philippines. 5. This is a matter of public discussion in Korea now. If agreed to, there is serious likelihood of a strike against this clause when it is announced. The government, which is genuinely anxious to help us avoid strikes, could not oppose this one. 6. The proposal contained in reftel gives real, and we think sufficient, protection for our interests. It even provides for a qualified no strike clause under conditions of need, but does so on a basis which the ROKG will be able to support us. We will need this support in such a case. 7. I am convinced that the Koreans cannot be pushed further on this point. I believe that the clause we propose is in the best interests of the US, both in terms of the SOFA itself and in terms of our overall interests in Korea and elsewhere. I believe that with this clause in hand we can now get satisfactory agreement and close the deal. Without it there is little or no chance of agreement. 8. I therefore endorse the reasoning of the negotiating team contained reftel and recommend Washington's speedy acceptance of this proposal. 9. For CINCPAC: General Howze concurs. Brown
46. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson/1/ Washington, May 17, 1965. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Korea, Park Visit, May 1965. Secret. SUBJECT The following topics appear particularly appropriate for your personal talk with President Park, with only interpreters present. We are taking steps to be sure that Park is aware you may wish to lead off this way, and that his interpreter will be someone in whose discretion he has complete confidence. 1. Additional ROK force contribution to South Viet-Nam. As you know, the Honolulu meeting included discussion re a possible Korean regimental combat team (4000 men or so) some time in the next two months, with the possibility that at a later phase the ROK force might be expanded to a division. Ambassador Lodge and Ambassador Brown have discussed with Park only the possibility of the RCT only. Park has responded that this would take serious thought, and we have been most anxious not to let this possibility become public in Korea, because of its possible impact on his major political problem of getting ratification of the agreement with Japan. We suggest you refer to the RCT possibility but indicate that you are well aware of his political problem. This would be the right occasion to draw him out as to just how he does see his political situation and its impact on further ROK combat force contributions in South Viet-Nam. You will certainly wish to lead off by thanking him warmly for the contribution they have already made. In this connection the South Vietnamese Government has conveyed a formal request to Park for additional Korean forces, and we have consulted with Park to head off publicity. This request itself does not change anything, as the South Vietnamese (who acted without telling us) will certainly not press unless we urge them to. The real question is whether Park can now bite off the issue of additional troops--requiring formal Assembly approval--at the same time that he has his major fight on ratifying the Japan settlement. 2. Additional Project. We are looking urgently for a special proposal arising directly from these talks, such as the joint medical project at the time of the Sato visit. The best bets appear to be introduction of the Peace Corps into Korea, and/or an expansion of English-language training in Korea in the interests of world-wide communication. Your staff and we will have final recommendations on this at your briefing session at 4:30. 3. Status of Forces Agreement with Korea. We do not recommend that you raise this topic. However, Park might do so in your private session. We recommend that you refer this matter to my conversation the following morning, saying only that we want to do the right and fair thing. The first two topics are in addition to those covered in the basic memorandum to you,/2/ some or all of which could also be covered in the private session as you see fit. Park will undoubtedly benefit from a substantial private talk with you before you join the larger group in the Cabinet Room, and we would see no problem in your extending the private session as much as you and he feel wise. /2/A May 13 memorandum from Ball to President Johnson outlined the major points President Johnson and Pak would likely discuss. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 7 KOR S) The major points made in Ball's memorandum were also delineated in a memorandum from Thomson to Johnson; see Document 47. Dean Rusk
47. Memorandum From James C. Thomson of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson/1/ Washington, May 17, 1965, 4 p.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Korea, Park Visit Briefing Book. Secret. SUBJECT President Chung Hee Park has come to Washington for one paramount reason: he seeks the strongest possible indication from us, both through our courtesies to him and through tangible evidence of continuing U.S. assistance, that we have no intention of abandoning Korea to Japanese control in the wake of a Japan-Korea settlement. Whatever reassurance we can give him will ease the severe problems he faces in gaining the support of his people for the ratification and acceptance of such a settlement. Personal Factors: Park is a shy, intelligent man born of a farm family, he has spent most of his life in his nation's armed forces. He is said to be self-conscious of his height and therefore initially rather formal and stiff; he can respond to informality, however, once he feels at ease. His one form of recreation is horseback riding. As you know, you met Park when he came to this country in November 1961 shortly after seizing power by a military coup: you met him again when he came to President Kennedy's funeral. In the attached memorandum/2/ (which you have already seen) State has suggested certain topics that might arise in your talks. Here is a brief review of the major points: /2/See footnote 2, Document 46. 1. Japan-Korea Settlement: Both parties have made great progress, and a basic treaty has been initialed; it should be signed within a few weeks, and ratification will probably come in July. We are deeply gratified with this progress, and Park's determination has been the chief ingredient. A settlement should bring a new and mutually productive relationship between two complementary economies and two natural allies. 2. Assistance to Vietnam: The Koreans now have 2,200 troops in Vietnam (including a military hospital unit, 10 karate instructors, an engineer battalion, a LST, and an infantry battalion to provide security for these forces). We are deeply grateful for this assistance--given despite strong opposition from Park's political opponents. The GVN has now asked for further Korean troops. It is our judgement that a decision on such additional forces should be delayed until Park overcomes the acute problems he currently faces in pushing through a Japan-Korea settlement. (For your information: the Koreans had hoped to use the question of further troops in order to pry major additional concessions out of the U.S. Government during the Park visit; for this reason we should avoid specific discussions at this moment.) 3. U.S. Aid to Korea: Park will want all the reassurance we can give him on our continued economic support. We propose to include in the communique a general aid pledge: to finance Korea's essential imports, to make available $150 million in development loan funds over the next few years, to continue technical assistance and training, and to keep up our Food for Peace aid. (Walt Rostow returned from Korea deeply impressed with their economic progress.) 4. U.S. and Korean Force Levels in Korea: The Koreans have wanted a very specific commitment from us to maintain our forces in Korea at their present level. They also seek our commitment to maintain sufficient assistance to keep their 600,000 troops at the present level. All we can say in response is that our commitment to their defense is absolute under the 1954 Mutual Defense Treaty, and that we would certainly consult with them on any changes in force levels which might be dictated by our regional and global requirements. 5. Map Transfer Problem: The Koreans have been disturbed by our "MAP transfer" program since 1960--an effort to transfer the procurement there from the MAP to the Korean budget on materials that are obtainable on a commercial basis in Korea. Although we have delayed and softened certain aspects of this program, we cannot meet the Korean request in toto but are willing to indicate in the communique that certain adjustments have been made in order to ease the impact on the Korean economy. Other Items: Park will urge that we move towards a speedy conclusion of a Status of Forces Agreement. We are very close to such an agreement under a formula modeled on our agreement with Germany; and we can assure him that we share his desire to see this matter speedily resolved (but not during the course of his visit). Park may also raise the issue of Korean unification. Here our position is his, namely that unification will be possible only through the U.N. formula of free elections under U.N. supervision. James C. Thomson, Jr./3/ /3/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
48. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ Washington, May 17, 1965, 5:15-5:51 p.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Korea, Memos, Vol. II, July 1964 to August 1965. Secret. Drafted by Crane, and approved by the White House May 28. The meeting took place in the Oval Office. The time and place of the meeting are from the President's Daily Diary. (Ibid.) Earlier in the day the President and Mrs. Johnson hosted the arrival ceremony for Pak, his wife, and members of his party on the South Grounds of the White House at 11:40 a.m. (Ibid.) The remarks made by Presidents Johnson and Pak at that time are in Department of State Bulletin, June 14, 1965, pp. 950-952. SUBJECT PARTICIPANTS President Johnson said that the U.S. planned to extend all possible aid to Korea. It planned to keep its troops there, and no reduction of troop strength was contemplated. However, if there were an adjustment, President Park would be the first to know about it, and full consultation would be held beforehand. President Johnson congratulated Park on the happy progress of the Korea-Japan negotiations and said that he considered President Park to be the chief ingredient in the success of these negotiations. He felt that it was due to Park's leadership that things had been going so well. He realized that it had been a very tough and touchy problem. He felt that conclusion of the Korea-Japan treaty would also assist our mutual effort in Viet-Nam. President Park said he felt that the Korea-Japan negotiations could be concluded within a month, by early or middle June. He said that there were certain irresponsible people who were trying to block the negotiations, but he felt his public relations and other efforts would ensure conclusion of the agreement. President Johnson congratulated President Park on his assistance in the struggle in Viet-Nam, and said, with reference to that aid that we would keep in Korea a military strength equivalent to that at present so that, in accordance with our commitments under the 1954 treaty,/2/ Korean security would not suffer. /2/The Mutual Defense Treaty between the United States and the ROK was signed at Washington on October 1, 1953, and went into effect on November 17, 1954. (5 UST 2368) President Johnson then emphasized how much more difficult it was now to get aid through Congress than it had been 20 years ago when the aid program first began. He said that the 2,000 Korean troops that had been sent to Viet-Nam in his opinion had helped save the aid bill in Congress. He asked President Park whether he felt additional Korean troops could be sent to Viet-Nam from Korea. President Park stated that the Korean Government would have to study that matter. The people in Korea were worried whether they might not invite further activity from North Korea if they weakened the line by sending too many troops to Viet-Nam. However, he said that he personally would like to send more troops to Viet-Nam. President Johnson then asked President Park if he could send one division. If President Park could raise the commitment to one division, this would help a great deal in the struggle there. President Park repeated that it was his personal feeling that Korea could make larger commitments of troops to Viet-Nam, but this would have to be studied by his Government, and he could not make a commitment on it at this time. President Johnson said that at the present time he was searching for a diplomatic solution in Viet-Nam. He also hoped that eventually there could be a solution to the problem of the unification of Korea; but this would have to be done under the UN formula of UN supervision of free elections. President Johnson said he wanted to tell the Korean Government that aid would be assured to that country and that the U.S. would finance essential imports and development loans, technical assistance, and food for peace. The impression the American Government had of Korea had never been better. After his visit to Korea, Dr. Rostow had reported great progress in the economic field. President Park said he hoped very much that there would be no indication from Washington that there would be any withdrawal of UN troops from Korea. This sort of talk made it very difficult for him to help in Viet-Nam, because his own people became very disturbed any time there was any talk of withdrawal of UN troops from Korea. President Johnson referred to the strong support in the Congress for his Viet-Nam program and said he would see to it that Korea's security is ensured, that troops and money enough will be provided to ensure this in accordance with the 1954 treaty. He said that, if any troops were to be removed from Korea, it would only be done with prior consultation. President Johnson said he believed that, if they can get an agreement or some basis for agreement in South Viet-Nam, this would also relieve the pressure from North Korea. He hoped that the Australians, the Filipinos, and New Zealanders would all help in Viet-Nam and he also hoped to get a Korean division into Viet-Nam so that they could get a total of 70,000 to 80,000 troops in Viet-Nam from various nations to be able to win there. On the status of forces agreement President Johnson stated that Ambassador Brown was working on that problem and that we would follow the same formula as was used in Germany. This had worked very well in Germany and should work well in Korea. He was glad the negotiations were going ahead well; but he did not think they could be concluded during this State Visit. President Park said that he thought these negotiations had gone on too long and were becoming a major irritant to many of his people, particularly the Opposition. He hoped President Johnson would break into the negotiations with an order to somehow bring them to a speedy conclusion. President Park said 1967 was the last year of his first economic development program and that a second five-year development program was planned. Koreans would need continued assistance from the U.S. to help them with this. President Johnson spoke of the $100 billion foreign aid which the U.S. had given since World War II to countries overseas and the 160,000 U.S. casualties which we have suffered since World War II. He said there were many people in Congress who had opposed spending this $100 billion. The way that some countries acted made it very difficult to get aid out of Congress. He said that when Sukarno burns USIA libraries and offices, people in Congress are of a mind to cut off all foreign aid. He considered Korea's conduct very helpful. He said that Park's policy in Korea went all the way in backing up the Viet-Nam effort, and again he stated that this was a great help to him and that it improved the military situation in Viet-Nam. Asked whether the Koreans had asked any other nations in Asia to help out in Viet-Nam, President Park said no they had not. President Johnson said the U.S. feels the same way about its commitments in Viet-Nam and Korea, and feels that Korea has been the greatest assistance in helping to bring pressure to bear so that other countries like Australia and New Zealand would come in. Britain, he realized, was very much occupied in Malaysia. The President concluded by repeating the hope that Korea would increase its commitment to one division.
49. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ I-6696/65 Washington, May 18, 1965. /1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD/OASD/ISA Files: FRC 70 A 3717, 333 Korea. Confidential. SUBJECT Secretary McNamara was President Park's guest for breakfast this morning at Blair House. The President appeared at 0830, and the conversation continued until 0945. Also present for the US, in addition to Secretary McNamara and myself, were: General Wheeler (CJCS), Lloyd G. Hand (Chief of Protocol), Lt. General Beach (CINCUNC Korea Designate), Ambassador Brown and Paul Crane (Interpreter). Present on the Korean side, in addition to the President, were: Chung Hee Park (President of the Republic of Korea), Key Young Chang (Deputy Prime Minister), Sung Eun Kim (Minister of National Defense), Chong Kap Kim (Chairman, National Assembly Armed Services Committee), General Chang-kuk Chang (Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff), Hyun Chul Kim (Ambassador) and Hu Rak Lee (Secretary General to the President). The following two points were worth noting: 1. With reference to military pay, Secretary McNamara stated that, just as we will not tolerate inappropriately low pay for our military forces, we would not expect the Koreans to tolerate such low pay for their military forces. He said that he did not conceive of paying the forces too little in order to finance military equipment or to permit MAP transfers. He suggested that the Koreans and Americans conduct a joint study on Korean military pay. Ambassador Brown concurred in the suggestion./2/ /2/The Minister of Defense submitted a formal request for the formation of the committee on June 17, just after General Beach assumed his duties as Commander of U.S. Forces in Korea on June 15. On June 19 Beach agreed to form the committee and recommended that membership be limited to U.S. and ROK military representatives empowered solely to examine Korean military pay levels. (Airgram A-641 from Seoul, June 30; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, DEF 19 US-KOR S) The committee submitted its findings and recommendations on July 22. The committee determined that a 100 percent pay increase for noncareer personnel and an 83.5 percent increase for career NCOs and officers were justified. (Airgram A-84 from Seoul, August 27; ibid.) 2. With respect to MAP transfers, Secretary McNamara stated that it is our view that the transfers can be absorbed by the Korean economy but agreed that the transfer program should be reviewed each year in the light of the condition of the Korean economy. John McN
50. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ Washington, May 18, 1965, 10 a.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Korea, Memos, Vol. 11, July 1964 to August 1965. Confidential. Drafted by Norred and approved in S on May 25. The meeting took place in the Secretary's Office. SUBJECT PARTICIPANTS Korean Side American Side Secretary Rusk said that he wished to extend to President Park a cordial welcome to the Department of State. He regretted he had not been able to remain at the White House the previous evening to say good-bye, but he had worked in his office until 5:00 a.m./2/ He and his staff and associates were available for any matters the President might wish to raise. He suggested, however, that they might address themselves to the Joint Communique. /2/The previous evening Rusk and his wife attended the State Dinner at the White House held in honor of Pak. (Ibid., President's Daily Diary) Rusk apparently returned to his office to monitor events in the Dominican Republic. President Park thanked Secretary Rusk. He said he had had a very good talk with President Johnson the previous day, and had found that President Johnson had a good understanding of the Korean situation. There remained, however, several problems that should be discussed. President Park said that President Johnson on the preceding day had agreed that there were no serious problems remaining on the status of forces agreement negotiations. On reduction of UN Forces in Korea, President Johnson had said that he hoped there would not be any reduction, but if there were it would be discussed fully with the Koreans beforehand. Secretary Rusk commented that we were in agreement on what should be said on this point--that the U.S. would continue to maintain powerful forces in Korea. He also reminded President Park that President Johnson in his welcoming speech on President Park's arrival had said that the U.S. would stand side by side with the Koreans as long as a danger exists. President Park reported that at breakfast with Secretary McNamara and others, he had discussed the "MAP transfer" problem, which has an effect on the Korean economy and morale. He said he hoped that this problem would be carefully considered in the Communique. He then referred to the phrase "over the next few years" which qualified the $150 million Development Loan funds in paragraph 9B./3/ He said he understood the appropriation and executive processes that would be involved in use of those funds, but that its inclusion in a public Communique would invite Opposition criticism of his Government. /3/The joint communique released at the conclusion of Pak's visit is in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1965, pp. 779-781. Status of Forces Agreement Negotiations Secretary Rusk said he always enjoyed talking with President Park because they were clear in their expressions to one another, and did not waste time. He suggested they address themselves to the status of forces negotiations. Secretary Rusk said he had a statement to make on those negotiations, and he asked that his remarks be interpreted sentence by sentence. Secretary Rusk said that we should all be pleased to note that several major issues had been resolved during recent weeks. A number of important issues remained to be resolved, however, so it did not seem possible to agree upon the text of an agreement during President Park's stay. It seemed that two principal differences remained--on the criminal jurisdiction and labor articles. With respect to the criminal jurisdiction article, the Secretary said we had gone as far as we could go on the waiver proposal and trial safeguards, and he believed that the Korean Government should try to meet our position on these two points. We were not expressing any lack of confidence, the Secretary went on to say, in the legal systems of the two countries. Our attitude had nothing to do with special arrangements, such as those of the 19th Century period which gave so much trouble. We were not raising issues with regard to tourists, businessmen, or others who were in Korea on a voluntary basis. But where we required men under compulsory military service to serve in Korea--taking farmers from Kansas and workers from Pittsburgh--we believed they have the right to protection in situations where they inadvertently have difficulty. The formula we had proposed is the one in effect in Germany where the U.S. has over 200,000 troops, and which has worked well on both sides. It would be difficult to explain why this formula would not be acceptable in Korea. We hoped the Koreans could meet us on this point. On the labor article, the Secretary said we were prepared to accept the Korean proposal on the right of Korean employees to strike if a labor dispute was not resolved by the end of a 70-day period. A Joint Committee would designate certain essential categories where the right to strike would not be exercised. If the Korean Government was willing to agree to our proposals on the waiver and trial safeguards, then we could announce that agreement in principle had been reached and agreement on the remaining issues could be reached in the very near future. President Park agreed. "MAP Transfer" Program Secretary Rusk then referred to the differences of view regarding reference to the "MAP transfer" program in the Joint Communique. He suggested a further addition to paragraph 5 of the Communique, as follows: "It was agreed that the program should be reviewed each year in light of the condition of the Korean economy." President Park agreed. Development Loans "over the next few years" Secretary Rusk said that we all understood what was intended with regard to the Development Loan funds of $150 million, that the language should not be interpreted as a one-year commitment. It was difficult because on the Korean side there were popular sensitivities, while on our side there was the caution of the U.S. Congress. Last year Korea used $26 million in development loans, while this year it has used $46 million. It was important that the development loan language in the Communique not be interpreted as a one-year figure, as this would cause us difficulties. We try as a matter of general policy to avoid specific figures in communiques with distinguished foreign visitors. We had made an exception in this case because of our strong interest in Korea and in the success of its Government. We would like to meet the Korean needs on this point. He suggested that the words "over the next few years" be deleted from the second sentence of paragraph 9B of the draft Communique, and inserted in the fifth sentence. This should help the Korean side, although it would cause us some difficulty. Secretary General Lee commented that this would still leave these difficult words in the Communique. He suggested they be rephrased to make reference to U.S. constitutional requirements and U.S. procedures. Secretary Rusk pointed out that in the fifth sentence, the words would apply also to the additional monies to be made available which would clearly be available over a period of years. Secretary Rusk added that to use a specific figure, to say that the funds would be used as rapidly as possible, and to say that other monies would then be made available would give us serious difficulties with Congress, if it appeared that the funds were to be used in one year. We were prepared to say the funds would be used as rapidly as possible. He hoped the Koreans would be able to accept the words "over the next few years" in the latter part of the paragraph. Secretary General Lee said that, if the commitment were put this way, it would be vague and meaningless to the Korean public. It would weaken the whole impact. The Secretary said there must be some misunderstanding of what we propose. Under our proposal the $150 million would be used as rapidly as possible. Then after that is used we anticipate the provision of additional loan funds. Obviously the combination of the two comprises a commitment extending over the next few years. We might find language without the use of any figure. We might just refer to continuing development loan backing for the Korean Government with no reference to amounts or time. But when we say we will provide $150 million as soon as possible, and then more, that seems the best formulation for the Korean Government. If we say that, we need the phrase "over the next few years" or an unlimited blank check would be implied which we could not explain to our own people. Secretary Rusk made the point that it seemed to him that the basic point to be made was that a Korea-Japan agreement would not mean that the U.S. would run away. We were trying to say so eloquently, and it seemed to him that $150 million was an eloquent figure. Secretary General Lee said that he believed it would be better not to use the figure if that required the qualifying words "over the next few years". He said it was well understood that the Korean Government would not use the funds in one year, or extend the use over an indefinite number of years. Ambassador Brown commented that the Communique would say not that $150 million would be used over the next few years, but that $150 million plus additional monies would be used in such a period. It should be easy to explain that. Secretary Rusk said he was concerned lest there be too wide a gap between the explanations of the Communique by the Korean and U.S. Governments. The Korean Government should be able to explain to its Assembly that the U.S. had created a fund of $150 million, which would be used as rapidly as possible, and then more monies would be available. This should make it clear that the U.S. was not losing interest in Korea. At this point the Secretary said he had some matters to discuss with President Park alone. He suggested they step across the hall into his office, and let the other members of the party try to resolve language differences in the meanwhile. In the absence of President Park and Secretary Rusk, the other participants reached agreement on the following changes: 1) The following sentence was to be added to paragraph 7: "He confirmed that U.S. military and economic assistance to Korea would continue to be extended, as set forth in paragraph 9 below, after normalization of Korean-Japanese relations." Accordingly, the following closing words of the first sentence of paragraph 9 would be deleted: "after the normalization of relations between Korea and Japan." 2) The words "over the next few years" would be deleted in the second sentence of paragraph 9B, and the fifth sentence of that paragraph would be rephrased to begin as follows: "Such development loan funds would be made available, in accordance with annual legislation and joint economic judgments, to finance. . . ." Upon their return, Secretary Rusk said that the Korean Government was getting the money, and would it not give the U.S. Government the words? President Park said he did not understand all the words in the Communique, but he was prepared to trust the U.S. Government. Where would we be if we did not trust one another? Secretary General Lee asked whether it would not be possible to drop the words "in accordance with annual legislation and joint economic judgments". Secretary Rusk said the U.S. could not drop them. Secretary Rusk suggested that each side name a coordinator to agree upon the approved text, and named Mr. Green for the U.S. President Park named Acting Foreign Minister Moon for Korea. [Continue with the next documents]
Volume XXIX Index | Foreign Relations Online | Historian's Office | Department of State | Secretary of State |