NOTE: External links to other Internet sites should not be construed as an endorsement of the views contained therein.
| The State Department web site below is a permanent electronic archive of information released prior to January 20, 2001. Please see www.state.gov for material released since President George W. Bush took office on that date. This site is not updated so external links may no longer function. Contact us with any questions about finding information. NOTE: External links to other Internet sites should not be construed as an endorsement of the views contained therein. |
 |
FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1964-1968, Volume XXIX Korea
Department of State |
Korea Seoul, January 15, 1966, 0630Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 27-3 VIET S. Secret; Limdis. Repeated to CINCPAC for POLAD, Tokyo, and Saigon. 735. Subj: Korean Troops for Vietnam. 1. In course of wide-ranging conversation with DCM January 14 Presidential Secretary Yi Hu-rak had number of interesting things to say about how Korean Govt views U.S. request for additional Korean forces to be sent to Vietnam. 2. Yi said U.S. request for additional division and brigade had come as something of a shock to President. President, Yi said, was quite proud of his prompt and effective response to U.S. earlier request, speed with which Tiger division and Blue Dragon regiment were despatched to Vietnam and disciplined and courageous performance of forces in Vietnam. According to Yi President never expected to be confronted with another request so soon. However he responded affirmatively out of friendship for President Johnson and a strong feeling of loyalty to U.S. engendered during his state visit to Washington last May. At same time he had grave misgivings about Korean public reaction to being asked so soon for such a heavy additional contribution. In Yi's own words President feels that despatch of additional forces requested will "overload Korea" but he is anxious to comply if politically feasible. 3. With such mixed attitude Yi said President feels he has to proceed cautiously and only after taking careful political soundings. President not only wants to be sure that Korean public will not feel they are being asked to do too much. He also thinks it important to be able to represent and defend Korean's involvement in Vietnam as clearly in the ROK's own interest. 4. President feels, according to Yi, that it is in interest of ROK to oppose communism anywhere in East Asia. In his own view this is sufficient justification for Korean intervention in Vietnam provided that intervention does not endanger security of ROK and does not impose an economic burden. However President does not feel such justification will be sufficient in presenting matter to National Assembly. Average Korean does not really see war in Vietnam as direct threat to security of ROK. On contrary he believes diversion of ROK forces to Vietnam weakens defenses of ROK while at same time inviting retaliation from north. To overcome this probable reaction to despatch of any further ROK forces to Vietnam President feels he will have to be able to demonstrate in National Assembly that there are corollary and significant benefits to ROK. 5. These corollary benefits should meet two conditions. They should be easy to explain to Korean public as flowing directly from Korean involvement in Vietnam and they should be large enough to convince Koreans that U.S. properly appreciates sacrifices that Korean people are making to assist in Vietnam. Yi then cited as an example question of death and disability benefits. Korean people would not be able to understand he said if U.S. was stingy in matter of death and disability benefits. U.S. would have to be prepared to be extremely generous in matter of death and disability benefits for those Koreans killed or wounded in action. 6. Yi concluded this portion of conversation by reminding DCM that sixty-six was an election year. Yi said that he was fairly confident that President would be reelected in sixty-seven if all went well, particularly, in view of weakened and divided state of the opposition party. President was however worried that opposition to despatching additional troops to Vietnam would snowball and become issue around which opposition leaders could rally to attack government and possibly have a decisive effect on election outcome. 7. Comment: We believe Yi who is close to President Pak was expressing with reasonable accuracy how President assesses problem presented by our latest request for ROK troops. Question remains when he will be able to take final decision. Judgement as to public and political reaction can probably be made over course of three weeks remaining before Pak leaves for Southeast Asian trip, since possibility of additional troop despatch gradually becoming known and will be hinted at in Pak's opening address to National Assembly next week. Whether and when terms and amount of support U.S. willing to offer "in appreciation" will seem sufficient to Pak will depend on progress of current negotiations which are still in opening phase. With positions two sides far apart, we are exerting every effort to get favorable decision before Pak leaves on trip and will let you know as soon as possible what we believe will be necessary to get it. Brown
73. Telegram From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State/1/ Seoul, January 21, 1966, 1010Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 27-3 VIET S. Secret; Priority; Limdis. Repeated to the Department of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff, CINCPAC for POLAD, Tokyo, and Saigon. 757. Troops for RVN. Ref: (A) Deptel 703;/2/ (B) Emb A-272;/3/ (C) Emb A-275;/4/ (D) Emb A-276;/5/ (E) COMUSK 5436;/6/ (F) Embtel 758./7/ /2/See footnote 2, Document 69. /3/In airgram A-272 from Seoul, January 17, the Embassy forwarded copies of a January 13 letter from the Korean Minister of National Defense to General Beach detailing Korean requests submitted in exchange for providing additional troops for Vietnam. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 27 VIET S) /4/See footnote 3, Document 71. /5/Airgram A-276 from Seoul, January 19, transmitted copies of General Beach's reply to the Korean requests submitted on January 13. A copy of the airgram without attachments is in National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 27 VIET S. /6/Not found. /7/Telegram 758 from Seoul, January 21, contained the Embassy's draft letter to Pak explaining the terms the United States was prepared to offer in exchange for a Korean division and brigade for Vietnam. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 27-3 VIET S) 1. CT feels that we have now progressed as far as we can in separate discussions with MND and DPM. FonMin reports that both are dissatisfied and are advising President that US responses to date inadequate to justify favorable decision. President, DPM, MND and FonMin are leaving Feb 7 for two weeks and target dates of April and July for arrival of new forces in RVN are receding rapidly. Time has therefore now come to try to bring matter to a head and seek decision from President who basically favorable and is neither accurately nor objectively informed by either MND or DPM. 2. It is unnecessary to elaborate theme that this early request for doubling ROK forces in RVN, coupled with fact that acceding to it will, at best, involve some temporary degradation present ROK military strength at home (Deptel 703 para 2),/8/ presents President Pak with genuine political problem which we must help him meet. /8/In paragraph 2 of telegram 703 to Seoul, January 8, the Department of State instructed Brown to explain to Korean officials that by meeting the U.S. objective of sending a brigade by April and a division by July to Vietnam "it may be necessary for the ROK to accept some temporary lessening of TE of the ROK active forces in Korea until shipments of equipment and supplies can reach Korea for the activation of reserve units, the reconstitution of support and service elements, and the reconstitution of ready reserve units." The United States would, however, provide the needed equipment as soon as possible. (Ibid., POL 27 VIET S) 3. We feel that a definitive offer should now be presented. If there is to be any chance of favorable decision even by President Pak before Feb 7, it should be as generous as possible. Our concept of that offer is set forth in draft letter to FonMin (Ref F), as supplemented by General Beach's letter to MND of Jan 18 (Ref D encl). 4. This offer will involve solid amounts of money. Amounts so paid here, however, are as directly spent for the prosecution of the war in RVN as those spent for maintenance of our own forces there. But for categories of accounting they would be charged to RVN and would be swallowed up in the cost of that great effort. In any event, if we are to get an extra division and brigade we must be prepared to pay for them. The amounts involved, while substantial, are small in comparison with the cost of doing the job ourselves. 5. I propose to hand this offer to the Foreign Minister, if and as soon as you approve it, hopefully early next week, stressing stakes involved and need for early ROK decision, before President leaves if possible. While chances of President's submitting matter to Assembly before he leaves on Feb 7 is diminishing as each day passes, it would be very desirable to get favorable decision by President before Feb 7 in order to permit necessary military planning to proceed within government during his absence. 6. ROKs may well come back with assertion that they need more. As a fall-back position CT recommends that we be prepared, if it will clinch the deal, to add a 25 percent increase in per diem for ROK forces in RVN. 7. Would appreciate Washington approval soonest, so we can expedite decision here./9/ /9/In telegram 758 to Seoul, January 22, the Department concurred with most of the Embassy's recommendations. The major points of divergence involved the amount of death and disability payments to be paid and a potential increase of 25 percent in the per diem rate paid to ROK troops serving in Vietnam. (Ibid.) Brown
74. Telegram From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State/1/ Seoul, January 22, 1966, 0415Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 27-3 VIET S. Priority; Limdis. Repeated to Tokyo, Saigon, CINCPAC, and the Department of Defense. 762. Troops for SVN. 1. Foreign Minister called in Ambassador Jan 21 to discuss progress troop negotiations. He stated both MND and DPM dissatisfied at what they consider lack of progress and failure to get anything from US but "vague assurances and things already certain". They do not feel they have enough on which to face Assembly. 2. FonMin asked if need for further ROK units was really urgent--things were quieter in SVN and large US reinforcement had arrived. It might be well to have a pause in the negotiations to allow the Korean negotiator to "save face." 3. Amb reiterated urgency need, and said FonMin clearly not fully informed on magnitude and specificity US offers. If these offers were presented as the positive contribution which they are, instead of being disparaged, they could have highly persuasive effect on Assembly. FonMin could expect definitive offer early next week which would further clarify US position and should enable ROKG then to make its decision. 4. Comment: This is of course part of ROKG pressure on us for larger concessions. Report of MND and DPM personal dissatisfaction and negative attitude with President is probably factual. 5. DCM also stressed to Yi Hu-rak Jan 22, urgency Presidential decision before departure SEA trip. Yi said President feared US "something plus" would not be big enough to impress National Assembly. DCM expressed confidence that US offer would give President what he needed. Brown
75. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (McNaughton) to Secretary of Defense McNamara/1/ I-20628/66 Washington, January 27, 1966. /1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD/OASD/ISA Files: FRC 70 A 1265, Korea 370.02. Secret. Attached to a January 27 transmittal note from Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Alvin Friedman to McNamara. In that note Friedman indicated that McNaughton harbored significant reservation about paragraph (a) of his memorandum and intended to fight its implementation unless absolutely necessary. (Ibid.) SUBJECT Negotiations for the ROK division/brigade are now at the point where Ambassador Brown will submit almost immediately a negotiating letter to ROK stating a fairly firm US position on what the US will offer for these forces. Based upon this submission, there is a good chance that we will obtain an ROK decision in principle to dispatch the troops and to submit a request to the ROK National Assembly promptly after President Park's return in mid-February from a trip to Southeast Asia. The negotiating letter is within the authority the various Washington agencies gave to the Ambassador. However, the US offers still are substantially short of some ROK requests. Among the DoD items, two require your action: (a) ROK request for increased overseas allowances. MND Kim has pressed hard for a 100% increase. This would increase the annual cost of ROK troop allowances in SVN by $24 million to total of $48 million (either MAP or Service-funded, depending upon disposition of pending legislative proposals). Ambassador Brown and General Beach agree to hold the line on this issue for the time being in the letter to be submitted to ROK, but state that they require fall-back authority to accept a 25% increase ($6 million annually). I recommend that you authorize our acceding to the 25% increase but that we withhold giving Ambassador Brown this authority until a point in the negotiations at which he can indicate to us that our accession will "cinch the deal." (b) ROK request for additional military equipment. MND Kim has requested about $65 million of additional equipment. Many of the items are already included in the 1967-71 MAP plan for Korea. Ambassador Brown and General Beach recommend that we consider adding to the previously authorized "modernization" package ($10 million in each of FY66 and FY67) items costing $6.88 million as follows: (1) One DD ($3.24 million); (2) Six 155 mm howitzers and prime movers ($0.09 million); (3) Armored bridge launch vehicle ($.81 million); (4) One assault transport ship ($1.02 million); (5) S-2A anti-infiltration patrol aircraft ($1.72 million). I recommend that you authorize an increase in the FY67 Korea MAP for the S-2A aircraft, the 105 howitzers and the bridge launch vehicle. These items appear to be best suited to priority requirements of the ROK forces. (Note: On his visit here two weeks ago the ROK CNO repeatedly showed interest in the S-2A aircraft (to be ROKAF-crewed) but made no mention of a DD or of an assault transport.) If you approve, the result will be to increase the $10 million FY67 "modernization" package by $2.7 million, the cost of the above three items./2/ /2/Both recommendations were approved by McNamara on January 28. John T. McNaughton
76. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Korea/1/ Washington, January 27, 1966, 7:51 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 27-3 VIET S. Secret; Immediate; Limdis. Drafted by Boyes at (DOD) and Fleck; cleared by Fearey, Poats (AID), in draft by Rubin, Heinz, and Friedman (all DOD), in draft by Baker (JCS), in draft by Gibson (DASD), and for substance by Rowan (BOB), and Cooper at the White House; and approved by Berger. Repeated to CINCPAC for POLAD, COMUSKOREA, COMUSMACV, Tokyo, and Saigon. 777. Joint State/Defense/AID Message. Ref: A--Deptel 703, rptd info Tokyo 1980, Saigon 1944, CINCPAC unn;/2/ B--Seoul's 758, rptd info Tokyo 267, Saigon 105, CINCPAC 252;/3/ C--Deptel 758, rptd info Tokyo 2131, Saigon 2120, CINCPAC unn;/4/ D--Seoul's 779, rptd info Saigon 112, CINCPAC 265;/5/ E--Seoul's 767, rptd info CINCPAC 260, COMUSMACV 7;/6/ F--Deptel 767, rptd info Tokyo 2155, Saigon 2145./7/ /2/See footnote 2, Document 69. /3/See footnote 7, Document 73. /4/See footnote 9, Document 73. /5/Telegram 779 from Seoul, January 25 transmitted the terms negotiated between the Embassy and Korean officials. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 27-3 VIET S) /6/Telegram 767 from Seoul, January 24 provided a summary of the conclusions and recommendations of a Joint U.S.-ROK Military Committee investigation into death and disability benefits for Korean military personnel. (Ibid.) /7/Telegram 767 to Seoul, January 25, responded to the proposals contained in the Embassy's draft letter to Pak explaining the terms the United States was prepared to offer in exchange for sending additional Korean troops to Vietnam. (Ibid.) Korean Troops for South Viet-Nam. 1. Following is approved draft letter based on refs a, b, c, and d which you are authorized forward to Foreign Minister ROKG at your discretion. This letter will be implemented when ROKG agrees to dispatch of one brigade and its support/service units in April 1966 and one division and its support/service units commencing in July 1966, except that the death gratuities and wounded-in-action benefits (outlined para 2 below) may be put into effect prior to this ROKG agreement if you so desire. 2. You are authorized in case of death gratuities, disability and wounded-in-action benefits for ROK military personnel in South Viet-Nam to make retroactive and future payments based on twice those rates, and no more, shown in the Fall 1965 U.S.-ROK Joint Study on Death Gratuities and Wounded-in-Action Benefits (ref E). The payments will be made in U.S. dollars using same procedures as for payment of overseas allowances for ROK military personnel in SVN, and utilizing MAP GVN or at some later date the appropriate U.S. DOD budget. (Retroactive payments estimated as of January 17, 1966 to be $164,000.) Prior to payment by COMUSKOREA, Minister of National Defense shall submit request which includes names of wounded-in-action beneficiaries or survivors and amount to be paid each. All records of payments and requests for payment will be kept as permanent records by COMUSKOREA. CINCPAC is requested to furnish ASAP dollar amount required now for retroactive payment and desired amount for February 1966 payments. 3. Text of approved letter follows: "We have now had very useful discussions and exchanges of ideas on the question of the conditions under which additional ROK forces might be dispatched to RVN with yourself, the Deputy Prime Minister, and the Minister of National Defense. I think that we now understand more clearly your concerns in this matter and that the time has come to bring the threads of the matter together so that you will be able to make your decision. The basic considerations were enunciated by President Park in his talks with Vice President Humphrey and myself. These are that the integrity of Korea's defense should not be impaired and that no new economic burden should be imposed upon Korea. It was also agreed that there should be some net benefit to Korea for the deployment of these extra forces. Our proposals for dealing with these basic considerations are contained in my memorandum to the Foreign Minister of January 12 and General Beach's letter to the Minister of National Defense of January 18./8/ As a result of our further discussions we are now able to make these proposals somewhat more precise and to add somewhat to them. The proposals in these two memoranda are still valid. Rather than repeat them in detail I will sum up what the United States is prepared to do as follows: /8/Neither found, but their contents are summarized below. A.1. To equip as necessary and finance all additional won costs of the additional forces deployed to RVN. A.2. To pay overseas allowances to these forces at the scale now being paid the Tiger Division, which, as you know, is as much as thirty times that currently being paid ROK forces in Korea even after the recent pay raise and approximately four times the pay of RVN troops. It covers all their expenses and has allowed for substantial remittances. A.3. To provide death, wounded-in-action, and disability gratuities resulting from casualties in Viet-Nam at double the rates recently agreed by the Joint U.S.-ROK military committee as being fully appropriate. A.4. To equip, train, and finance complete replacement of the additional forces deployed to RVN. A.5. To provide communications facilities for exclusive ROK use, the character of which is to be agreed between U.S. and ROK officials in Seoul and Saigon. These facilities will meet requirements for communicating with your forces in RVN. In addition, to provide 4 C-54 aircraft to the ROKAF for support of your forces in RVN. A.6. To provide over the next few years substantial items of equipment for the modernization of ROK forces in Korea on the basis set forth in General Beach's letter of January 18 to the Minister of National Defense. A.7. To provide for the improvement of military barracks and military sanitation facilities from proceeds of MAP excess sales as set forth in General Beach's letter of January 18 to the Minister of National Defense. A.8. To contribute to filling the requirements determined by the two governments to be necessary, following completion of a joint U.S.-ROK study, for the improvement of the ROK anti-infiltration capability. A.9. To provide equipment to expand the ROK Arsenal for increased ammunition production in Korea. These undertakings, together with those already made in connection with dispatch of the Tiger Division to RVN and backup provided by the general U.S. commitment to Korea's defense, will fully meet the need for maintaining the security of Korea. B. To avoid new economic burdens for Korea, the United States is prepared, in addition to paying all overseas expenses of the units to be deployed and the allowances referred to above, to release additional won to the Korean budget equal to all of the net costs of the deployment of these extra forces and of mobilizing and maintaining in Korea the activated reserve division and brigade and support elements. Thus, the deployment will involve no extra costs to the ROK budget and will involve large benefits in foreign exchange through troop remittances and payment of gratuities. C. To provide a substantial net benefit to the Korean economy the U.S. is prepared additionally: C.1. To suspend MAP Transfer Program for as long as there are substantial ROK forces, i.e. at least two divisions in RVN, with off-shore procurement in Korea in FY 67 of items suspended in FY 66 plus those on the FY 67 list. This will provide substantial budgetary relief and foreign exchange earnings for Korea. Regarding off-shore procurement, the United States Government will review this matter and make a further determination for FY 68 at an appropriate time. C.2.A. To procure in Korea insofar as practicable requirements for supplies, services and equipment for ROK forces in RVN and to direct to Korea selected types of procurement for U.S. and RVN forces in RVN in cases in which: I. Korea has production capability, II. Korea can meet specifications and delivery schedules, III. It may be reasonably determined that Korean prices are fully competitive with other possible sources in the Far East, and IV. The procurement conforms to DOD gold flow regulations. Supplies, services and equipment which meet this definition will be listed on a `natural source' list from which procurement will be made exclusively from Korean sources without soliciting bids from non-Korean producers. C.2.B. To procure in Korea, in competition only with U.S. suppliers, as much as Korea can provide in time and at a reasonable price, a substantial amount of goods being purchased by AID for use in its project program for rural construction, pacification, relief, logistics, and so forth, in RVN. Payment for such goods will be by special letters of credit which tie these earnings to purchases in the U.S. Special regulations have already been adopted to permit commercial importation into RVN of galvanized iron sheets processed in Korea with AID funds. C.2.C. To the extent permitted by RVN, to provide Korean contractors expanded opportunities to participate in construction projects undertaken by USG and American contractors in RVN and to provide other services. Korean contractors have already demonstrated competitive ability in these fields. Additionally, parallel employment of skilled Korean civilians in RVN can provide sizeable foreign exchange earnings. C.3. To increase its technical assistance to ROK in the general field of export promotion. C.4. To provide AID loans over and above the $150 million figure agreed in May 1965 as suitable projects are developed subject to the same considerations which apply to the $150 million commitment. C.5. If justified by performance under the 1966 stabilization program, and subject to further review in Washington, to provide [$]15 million of program loans in 1966, which can be used for the support of exports to RVN and for other development needs. We believe, Mr. Minister, that these proposals and assurances are not only fair, but generous, and should provide the basis for an effective presentation to the Korean people. We hope that on this basis the ROKG will be prepared to dispatch an additional brigade to RVN in April and a division force commencing in July 1966. I need not stress that the matter is urgent and the stakes very high, for Korea as well as the Free World." 4. FYI. Your concern with respect to the possibility that procurement to be placed in Korea might not be substantial is fully understood here. Apparently the volume of procurement presently coming from the U.S. Army Procurement Agency is not substantial. However, from present planning information available here, we are confident that the amount of procurement which can be placed in Korea in the future as a result of the proposed "natural source listing" will, in fact, be substantial. In any event it is not possible to make specific commitments as to dollar volume until the necessary "natural source" list has been developed and reviewed here. We strongly urge that list be submitted soonest. In compiling list, it is important to provide a "general order of magnitude" estimate of the quantity or dollar volume of production expected to be within the capability of Korean industry to produce for export to RVN. [End FYI.] 5. Regret we unable authorize twenty-five percent increase in per diem rates or additional $6 million modernization add-ons (ref D, paras 1a and 1d)./9/ /9/The text of the letter was slightly modified in the following weeks, and the final version was presented to and accepted by the Foreign Minister on February 25. (Telegram 930 from Seoul, February 22, telegram 893 to Seoul, February 24, and telegram 944 from Seoul, February 25; all in National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 27-3 VIET S) Slight modifications made to the final version to conform to Korean requests are contained in telegrams 971 from Seoul and 931 to Seoul, both March 5. (Ibid.) Brown's letter of March 4 to the Minister of Foreign Affairs documents the U.S. military and economic commitments to made to South Korea. The letter was handed to the Minister of Foreign Affairs on March 7, and a sanitized version was published in the Korea Times and the Korea Republic on March 8. The letter from Brown and related documentation on the issue are attached to airgram A-352 from Seoul, March 9. (Ibid.) The complete text of Brown's letter is printed in The Investigation of Korean-American Relations, Hearing Before the Committee on International Relations, 95th Congress, 2d Session, Appendixes to the Report, vol. I: Background to the Investigation of Korean-American Relations and Conduct of the Investigation; Listing of Congressional Documents Frequently Cited, Supporting Documents. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1978), pp. 544-545. Rusk
77. Telegram From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State/1/ Seoul, February 1, 1966, 0915Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 27-3 VIET S. Secret; Priority; Limdis. Also sent to DOD and repeated to Saigon, Tokyo, CINCPAC for POLAD, and COMUSMACV. 805. ROK Forces for RVN. 1. I met with Yi Tong-won morning February 1. He announced immediately that his govt had decided "in principle" to accept the proposals contained in our letter of January 29./2/ Accordingly, President had ordered that detailed military planning and preparations be started with a view to meeting our April and July deadlines. As we knew, these had been under way jointly with COMUSK since beginning of week. /2/When Brown presented the letter contained in Document 76, the Korean Foreign Minister's response seemed promising. (Telegram 800 from Seoul, January 29; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 27-3 VIET S) Discussions between Embassy and ROKG officials over the next few days, however, led Brown and members of his staff to believe that the Koreans were "nearing decision but hoping to go on squeezing out more concessions right up to the wire." Their impression was buttressed by a "barrage of calculated press leaks hinting at decision to send only a regiment on grounds U.S. concessions inadequate justify additional division." (Telegram 803 from Seoul, January 31; ibid.) 2. However President does not wish to announce the decision until after his return from Southeast Asia trip on February 17./3/ Yi asked therefore that we strive together to give impression that negotiations are continuing. /3/In a follow-up telegram, Brown recommended that a message be sent to Pak, preferably from President Johnson, thanking him for his decision and expressing understanding for his decision to announce it only after returning from his trip. (Telegram 806 from Seoul, February 1; ibid.) A letter from President Johnson incorporating Brown's recommendations was subsequently given to Pak. (Telegram 793 to Seoul, February 2, and telegram 818 from Seoul, February 3; both ibid.) 3. Although President has agreed to despatch requested additional force, FonMin asked that we give consideration to following requests of ROKG which however are not put forward as conditions. A. Per Diem Allowances. Yi says that this has become a politically sensitive matter. Both opposition and some members of DRP are arguing strongly for increase in allowances. Yi had resisted such arguments on grounds that ROK soldiers in Vietnam are much better treated than RVN troops. However MND insists that this is true only of officers and senior enlisted grades, but not of soldiers in lower grades, and he feels ROKG would be very vulnerable if it could fairly be said that ROK GI's were being paid less to fight in RVN than RVN GI's. B. Additional Development Financing. DPM Chang Ki-yong is very unhappy at U.S. unwillingness to announce additional commitment. FonMin had argued with DPM that U.S.D.L. commitment really open-ended, with actual amount of financing dependent upon ROKG ability to come forward with suitable projects. Still it would be helpful if our willingness to make additional loans after $150 million is fully utilized could be stated more explicitly. C. Program Loans. DPM is unhappy with $15 million offer and with encouragement from Yi Hu-rak want to hold out for $30 million. He also wants commitment untied to stabilization program with no mention of further Washington review. 4. According to FonMin, DPM also complaining about our refusal even to discuss his requests for funds for education and remuneration for property utilized by UN forces. FonMin had persuaded President that these requests were undignified and irrelevant. DPM also professes not to understand our undertaking in regard to procurement for Vietnam and is afraid that they are excessively qualified by such references as "natural source," "reasonably competitive price" and "selected types." 5. I expressed deep appreciation on behalf of U.S. Govt and asked him to convey this at once to President Pak. I said I understood fully the reasons for deferring any announcement until after the President's return and said that I would entreat Washington to guard against any premature disclosure. I went on to say that we would consider points which he had raised and expressed further appreciation for his statement that these points were not to be regarded as conditions. On question of allowances I said that we had recently learned that in some cases ROK soldiers in Vietnam in lower enlisted grades might receive less than their Vietnamese counterparts, especially those with large families and in certain assignments. We were trying to get more information about this. I undertook to look again at language of our proposal on development loans. FYI: I had in mind possibility of a somewhat revised offer along lines of Embtel 792 and Dept's AIDTO unn reply thereto./4/ On program loans I said I doubted very much if we could modify our proposal. In regard to procurement arrangements, I stressed difficulty of blanket a priori commitment and assured FonMin that we were doing everything to bring about favorable opportunities. This was something that we would be working at continually with ROKG officials. /4/In telegram 792 from Seoul, January 27, the Embassy recommended authorizing a development loan of up to $10 million with which the ROKG could purchase heavy equipment to perform contract work in Vietnam or for U.S. forces in Korea. In AIDTO 1399 to Seoul, January 31, the Department of State indicated that the Embassy's alternative proposal was being considered in light of various contingencies and restrictions. (Both ibid., POL 27-3 KOR S) 6. At this point FonMin assumed a conspiratorial air and said, "Now, Mr. Ambassador, we must stage a little play." He assumed we had noticed that he was utilizing the press to create impression that negotiations with us were difficult and going slow. Certain obstacles had been reported in the press which, as we knew, had actually been removed by our proposal. Such a stratagem was necessary and would have to go on for some days longer so that when President's decision was announced the Korean public would think that their govt had extracted great concessions from the U.S. by end of strenuous bargaining. To elaborate this impression, he was asking the Vice Minister to hold a series of meetings with the DCM. He himself would continue to report little progress to the press. Immediately upon the President's and his return from Southeast Asia he and I would meet again, the decision would be announced and immediately submitted for Assembly approval. I indicated that I would cooperate within the limits of propriety, but urged that he not carry the stage play so far that the Korean public would have an exaggerated expectation of the results and then be disappointed. 7. FonMin also asked for my cooperation after President's decision has been announced in making results of negotiations seem impressive to Korean public. He has in mind some kind of joint statement which would not embody whole contents of our letter of January 29, but merely those highlights, such as death benefits, MAP transfer suspension, modification of "buy American" policy, which seem so important in Korean public opinion. The statement would also stress that Korea was acting in its own interest and in common defense rather than as result of financial bargaining with U.S. At that stage ROKG did not want it to appear that its forces were being used as mercenaries. The favorable concessions which had in the previous act been extracted from the U.S. with such difficulty would at this stage be represented as spontaneous actions of U.S. expressing our appreciation for sacrifices being made by ROK. Comment: 8. I believe we have attained our goal even if we are unyielding on the points on which FonMin sought our reconsideration. I do however feel that U.S. as well as ROKG would be vulnerable if ROK soldiers are paid less than RVN soldiers. We are asking USMACV for further facts. When these are received will submit our recommendations as to whether any adjustments should be made in our rates of per diem allowances. We may wish also to propose some modifications in language though not substance of our proposals on both development and program loans. 9. As we had begun to suspect (Embtel 804)/5/ FonMin has been applying himself not only to actual negotiations but in his inimitable way to preparing climate of public opinion for a decision, the political hazards of which should not be underestimated. We must give him credit and, within limits set by our own standards, try to help him. If to our Western eyes there appears to be some inconsistency between the themes of act one and act two of his proposed play, we should not be too concerned. I gained the distinct impression that, while DPM may feel that he lost out somewhat, President and ROKG as a whole feel that our offer is fair and even somewhat better than some of them expected, so that decision was taken in any atmosphere of self-respect and good will which has value for our future relations. /5/Telegram 804 from Seoul, January 31, contained summaries of press reports on the U.S. response to the conditions set forth by the ROKG before Korean troops could be sent to Vietnam. Initial positive reports were soon followed by reports of negative responses within the ROKG. The Embassy believed the Foreign Minister was responsible for creating the impression that the "USG is cold toward much of what ROKG considers essential and justifiable," while bringing the "press to point of accepting troop request as fact." The Embassy speculated "that FonMin engaged in audacious piece of news management which could redound both to his and to our benefit." (Ibid., POL 27-3 VIET S) Brown
78. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson/1/ Washington, February 3, 1966, 6:25 p.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Korea, Vol. III. Secret. SUBJECT The attached memorandum from Bill Gaud/2/ asks your final approval of a commitment to make a $15-million program loan to Korea during FY 1967, as part of the deal to get another Korean division and brigade into Vietnam. The loan commitment is $5 million higher than we would probably make in normal course, but is much cheaper than any of the items on the long list the Koreans requested. Moreover, Park must show that he got something from us if he is to sell his electorate on the idea of a second division. /2/William S. Gaud, Deputy Administrator of the Agency for International Development. I gave conditional clearance to the program loan component, subject to your confirmation, in order to allow Win Brown to negotiate with Park. As you know, Park has now agreed, and you have sent him a letter of thanks. This is the last loose end. I recommend that you approve Gaud's request. McG. B. Approved/3/ /3/This option is checked. A notation on the memorandum indicates that the loan was also approved by Rusk on February 4.
Attachment/4/ Memorandum From the Administrator of the Agency for International Development (Bell) to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) Washington, January 25, 1966. /4/Secret; Limit Distribution. SUBJECT Ambassador Brown's negotiations with the Korean Government for the dispatch of an additional Korean division and brigade have reached the point where he needs by tomorrow authority to present a packaged counter-proposal to the very excessive Korean demands, in the hope of completing the negotiations before the departure of President Park and other government officials on a Far Eastern tour February 7. Ambassador Brown has been acting under instructions which recognize the likely necessity of some forward commitments of A.I.D. support including a modest increase in Supporting Assistance if necessary. In addition, his instructions permitted assurance of special procurement opportunities for Korean exporters to supply A.I.D. project programs in Vietnam. The Korean Government has asked for enormous increases in Supporting Assistance and Development Lending and a commitment to these higher levels for the next five years. The Ambassador has rejected these demands, but obviously needs to make some concessions if the negotiations are to be concluded successfully. Acting upon our understanding of the President's desire for an early agreement to provide the additional troops and within the spirit of his pledge of U.S. long-term assistance to President Park last May, we have concurred (with a qualification noted below) in Ambassador Brown's proposed counter-proposal to the Korean Government which provides that A.I.D. will: 1. Exclude all suppliers except U.S. and Korean from bidding on certain items which A.I.D. is buying for its project operations in Vietnam. This restricted procurement list will be composed of commodities which we have found to be within Korea's capacity to produce satisfactorily and in exportable quantities. 2. In addition to the $150 million Presidential development loan program promised last May, finance additional acceptable development projects of an unspecified amount and during an unspecified time period, subject to the same considerations of availability of funds, legislation, and A.I.D. self-help criteria which apply to the $150 million program. (This commitment is actually no more than a restatement of the Presidential Communiqué of last May with President Park of our anticipation of undertaking additional projects when the $150 million had been obligated.) 3. Release from local currencies presently available to A.I.D. of the modest net added cost to the Korean budget of the movement of the troops to Vietnam and of the maintenance of their replacements in Korea. 4. Support the Korean stabilization and development program, if the Korean Government is fulfilling its commitments under that jointly defined program, by providing a program loan of $15 million in FY 1967. (At the same time we expect to reduce the grant Supporting Assistance by $10 million.) We had planned for FY 1967 a program loan of about the same size as, or possibly $5 million larger than, the recently approved $10 million loan. This new commitment, conditioned on stabilization performance, thus represents no significant departure from our plans, but it does limit our ability to withhold the loan next fiscal year on grounds other than failure to comply with the Stabilization Agreement. Only item 4, the program loan commitment, requires White House clearance under the present guidelines. Because of the urgency of Ambassador Brown's need for authorization, Bill Gaud discussed this matter with you last night and got your conditional agreement, subject to later reference to the President. Accordingly, we have qualified our concurrence on item 4 as being subject to further Washington review to be undertaken immediately. Will you please seek the President's endorsement of this item so that we may withdraw the condition limiting the Ambassador's authority on this point. Mr. Berger concurs in this memorandum. William S. Gaud/5/ /5/Printed from a copy that indicates Gaud signed for Bell.
79. Telegram From the Consulate in Hong Kong to the Department of State/1/ Hong Kong, February 13, 1966, 0850Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 27-3 VIET S. Secret; Priority; Limdis. Repeated to Seoul, COMUSKOREA, Saigon, and CINCPAC. 1489. From Ambassador Brown. Ref: Def 3869 (0 120017Z) to Hong Kong./2/ Korean Troops for RVN. /2/Not found, but telegram 833 to Seoul, February 11, also sent to Hong Kong for Brown, advised that the message from McNamara to Beach discussed a "requirement of 10,376 ROK forces to support and service ROK contingent already in SVN plus additional contingent on which ROKG now acting." It also instructed that the Koreans were not to be informed of the need for additional troops. (Ibid.) 1) In absence opportunity consult with General Beach, I have no basis for comment on military necessity additional ten thousand ROK troops envisaged in reftel. 2) I am however, horrified at thought of now suddenly asking ROKG for even more troops. 3) We asked for a small medical unit and got it (a few hundred). We asked for a much larger non-combat unit and got it (2000 men). We then asked for a combat division and got it (20,000 men). After an embarrassingly short interval we asked for a further combat brigade and division, and we seem to have it (about 30,000 men). Now, before we have even given the Koreans a chance to solidify their decision on the last brigade and division, we are contemplating asking them for ten thousand more. 4) When will this end? 5) If I were a Korean, such a request would seem to take Korea much too much for granted, and to try to impose far too great a burden on her. This would mean almost 60,000 Korean troops in SVN, two to three times as great a proportion of their population as we, the only other substantial contributor, are providing. 6) In the absence of a fuller and better rationale than I have yet seen for such a request, I would strongly recommend against it. Quite aside from the merits, such a piecemeal approach is most unfortunate./3/ /3/The Embassy and Beach were also opposed to asking the Koreans for 10,000 additional troops. The Embassy noted that a "new request will lead Koreans to assume that US has open-ended requirement for Korean troops in RVN. ROKG will feel correspondingly justified in making open-ended demands on U.S. We seem to be taking their willingness to commit large numbers of young men for granted so long as we are willing to defray expenses." The Embassy also pointed out that a new request could jeopardize the ROK commitment to send a division and a brigade promptly to Vietnam. (Telegram 869 from Seoul, February 14; ibid.) 7) It may well be that if "rounding out" is necessary, the Koreans will ask for it later themselves as General Choi did for the extra regiment he wants. This would be OK and much better than a request by us. Rice
80. Telegram From the Embassy in Korea to the White House/1/ Seoul, February 23, 1966, 0945Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 7 US/HUMPHREY. Top Secret; Flash; Nodis. 230945Z. Eyes Only for the President from the Vice President. 1. I have just concluded a twenty hour visit to Korea with gratifying results./2/ In my discussions today with Prime Minister and President/3/ they informed me that the President had communicated yesterday to the Cabinet and the leaders of the Government Party (DRP) his decision to deploy an additional army division and brigade to Vietnam. After my departure this will be announced publicly and a bill be introduced in the National Assembly authorizing the government to take this action. /2/Vice President Humphrey, in Asia to consult with various heads of state, briefly visited Seoul in response to a request made by the Korean Prime Minister to Brown. Brown endorsed the suggestion, stating that the visit would enhance Pak's prestige and authority at home and strengthen support for sending troops to Vietnam. (Telegram 849 from Seoul, February 10; ibid.) /3/Telegram 942 from Seoul, February 24, also contains a summary of Humphrey's visit. (Ibid.) Memoranda of four conversations between Humphrey and Korean officials on February 22 and 23 were transmitted in airgram A-338 from Seoul, March 2. (Ibid.) 2. Last night (February 22) I attended a dinner given by the Prime Minister in my honor along with Governor Harriman, Ambassador Brown, Ambassador Hand and Mr. Valenti. In addition to the Foreign Minister, Minister of National Defense and other government officials, the Prime Minister had invited prominent members of the government and opposition parties. After dinner the party leaders asked me a number of pointed questions of our purposes and prospects in Vietnam. I informed them about the Honolulu Conference and about our current strategy in Vietnam. I assured them of our determination to keep South Vietnam free and to fight to win against Communist aggression there. The Prime Minister assured me today that these discussions with the leaders of both parties in the National Assembly will be of great assistance to the government in winning both public and National Assembly approval for the deployment of additional forces. 3. The bill authorizing the additional forces is now being drafted in the Ministry of National Defense and after approval by the National Security Council will be submitted to the National Assembly within a few days. The Government leaders appear to have no doubt that the measure will be passed very quickly. Governor Harriman and I both urged on the ROKG officials the greatest possible speed in the deployment of additional forces in order to help General Westmoreland in his current campaigns against VC centers of strength. 4. The ROK leaders emphasized to me that their support for US actions in Vietnam was not only a matter of moral obligation but also of Korean self-interest in assuring the common defense against Communist aggression. Not unexpectedly Foreign Minister Yi asked pointed questions about our conditions for a negotiated settlement in South Vietnam and voiced desire for ROKG participation in any future summit conferences of the Honolulu type about Vietnam. He gave three reasons for his government's desire to be represented in future conferences: (a) the already heavy commitments of the ROKG in VN; (b) the experience the ROKG could contribute in negotiating as well as fighting with the Communists; and (c) the promotion of the ROKG's prestige internationally, which would be helpful not only to the ROK, but to US as well. I responded on this point by saying that I thought this was constructive and helpful suggestion and that I would recommend to you that it be given most serious consideration. 5. I met with President Pak this morning. Prime Minister, Deputy Prime Minister, Ministers of National Defense and Foreign Affairs and Chief Presidential Secretary were present. [Here follows Pak's report of his discussions with officials in Thailand, Malaysia, and Taiwan.] 9. Pak said that the opposition statements in the US particularly from Members of Congress, were important reasons why there was a somewhat "dubious" attitude toward the US and a feeling that the US policy was "unclear", not only in the three countries he visited, but also rather widely in Korea. The statements led "some of the people", he said, to believe that in due course the US would pull out of VN without a firm result. He characterized as "irresponsible" statement about neutralization of SVN, negotiations with the VC, or putting VC into a coalition government. Pak vigorously underlined a statement that "it would be the greatest mistake the US could make" if the US failed to achieve its objectives in VN. 10. I personally reassured Pak as well as his Ministers separately that negotiations would take place only with Hanoi and that the VC could be conceivably represented only if Hanoi invited them to sit as members of their delegation; that we had no intention of telling the Vietnamese who to put into their cabinet; that President Johnson's position was supported by an overwhelming majority both of the people and of the leadership. I told him we hoped we could avoid any direct conflict with the ChiComs because we think it would endanger the peace of the world and might lead to a world war, but if the Chinese moved against US with massive forces the Chinese would have to suffer the consequences. I made it very clear that the policies we pursue are designed not to bring China into the struggle, however. 11. I [garble--again?] reassured the President of our strong commitment to protect their national security in the event of an attack from the North and thanked him for the leadership that he was exerting and in particular for their commitment in SVN. We agreed at the conclusion that there would be no announcement as I left about any troop despatch, that we would merely have a general statement covering the general subject of the conversation. 12. Pak looks more relaxed and confident than when I saw him two months ago. He obviously feels reassured about the strength of our commitment and is willing to back that feeling by the despatch of troops over rather considerable opposition in his own country. 13. I expressed appreciation for Pak's understanding and support of our policy and for his sending Korean troops to SVN, and promised him that we would keep him fully informed about our plans and actions. We considered Korea as an ally and equal and proposed to treat her as such. Brown
81. Editorial Note On February 28, 1966, the Korean Government publicly announced its decision to provide one regiment and one division to Vietnam. The government submitted its request for approval to dispatch additional troops to the National Assembly on March 2. Although conceding uncertainty about winning support for the action from the opposition People's Party, the Embassy was "reasonably confident" that the majority Democratic Republican Party would pass the resolution. (Telegrams 947, 954, 960, and 965 from Seoul, February 26, March 1, March 2, and March 3, respectively, all in National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 27-3 VIET S) As the Defense and Foreign Affairs Committees of the National Assembly began considering the resolution, leaders of the People's Party announced their opposition to the request because of concerns that providing more troops would weaken Korea's defenses, concerns also expressed by members of the government party. In an effort to assuage those fears and buttress U.S. security commitments to Korea, support began to congeal around efforts generated by Assembly members of both parties to revise the United States-Korean Mutual Security Pact as a precondition to dispatching additional troops. The revision called for ending U.S. Constitutional requirements preventing an immediate U.S. response to a conflict in Korea and for prohibiting any decrease in U.S. troop strength in Korea without first obtaining Korean approval. Both the Korean Government and the Embassy attempted to head off the movement by underscoring the totality of the U.S. commitment to Korean security. (Telegrams 965, 970, and 976 from Seoul, March 3, March 4, and March 7, respectively; all ibid.) Earlier in the year the Department of State had authorized Ambassador Brown to inform the Koreans that the United States would not reduce its military presence without first consulting the Government of the Republic of Korea, if the latter dispatched additional troops to Vietnam. (Telegram 703 to Seoul, January 8; ibid., POL 27 VIET S) But in response to the treaty question, the Department of State notified the Embassy that the United States could not revise the defense treaty with Korea, not only because of constitutionally mandated procedures, but also because the treaty contained the same formulations and standard wording used in all major defense treaties. The proposed revision of the treaty with Korea could call the provision contained in numerous other agreements into question. (Telegram 950 to Seoul, March 10; ibid.) Ambassador Brown provided the Foreign Minister with several letters addressing the security issue and reiterating the totality of U.S. policy toward the defense of Korea. (Airgram A-368 from Seoul, March 24; ibid.) On March 11 Ambassador Brown submitted to President Pak a letter of appreciation from President Johnson for his decision to send additional troops to Vietnam. The letter was written in an attempt to advance and accelerate approval of the resolution. (Telegram 937 to Seoul, March 8, and telegram 990 from Seoul, March 9; ibid.) After receiving the letter, President Pak noted that approval of the resolution might be delayed because of opposition within the National Assembly, but indicated that the situation "would not delay despatch of troops since military preparations are proceeding according to schedule." (Telegram 1000 from Seoul, March 11; ibid.) After a late-night session of intense debate lasting until 3 a.m., the National Assembly voted on the resolution on March 20. The Assembly approved the resolution by a vote of 95 to 27 with 3 abstentions. (Telegram 1046 from Seoul, March 20; ibid.) On June 1 the Korean Minister of National Defense announced that the White Horse division would be sent to Vietnam in August and an additional 5,000-man unit would be furnished to support all Korean troops in Vietnam. He also noted that by October 1966 the Republic of Korea would have 45,000 men in Vietnam. (Telegram 1377 from Seoul, June 3; ibid., POL 27-14 KOR/UN) [Continue with the next documents]
Volume XXIX Index | Foreign Relations Online | Historian's Office | Department of State | Secretary of State |