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FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1964-1968, Volume XXIX Korea
Department of State |
Korea 82. Telegram From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State/1/ Seoul, March 18, 1966, 0745Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 27-3 VIET S. Secret; Priority; Limdis. Repeated to the Department of Defense, COMUSMACV, CINCPAC also for POLAD, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 1039. Troops for RVN. Ref: [A.] Deptel 971;/2/ B. HongKong's 1489 to Department./3/ /2/Telegram 971 to Seoul, March 16. (Ibid.) /3/Document 79. 1. Reftel A requests comments on proposal for "low key" approach to Korean military in Vietnam on the subject of approximately 10,000 additional Korean logistical and supply forces. 2. I believe that any US effort to push the ROKG for additional forces would be most untimely and could have unfortunate consequences for us here. Even if such approach were in "low key" and were made in SVN, it would, of course, immediately become known to ROK Government, which will just be emerging from highly difficult struggle to obtain Assembly approval for despatch additional brigade and division and which has through MND in past few days given categoric assurances that no more than a total of 40,000 troops will be deployed to SVN. This struggle, the exacerbation of relationships with us which has unfortunately accompanied it, and the strains which it has generated within the DRP as well as between government and opposition, will render atmosphere towards even hint of suggestion by US for further Korean contribution most unpropitious. US already being criticized for too much pressure. 3. We must remember that we have already pressed Koreans hard and to them unacceptably fast (Ref B). We must understand that Korea is not an inexhaustible source of supply for troops for SVN, that people's emotions are deeply involved, that there is substantial national anxiety about extent to which Korea has already gone. We must allow time for these emotions and this concern to settle. We must give Korean people time to catch their breath after two crucial and close decisions involving Korean lives and security. We should let them choose their own time and pace for requesting any reinforcements. 4. That General Chae, COMROKFV, at least, is thinking along the lines of Ref A indicated by the fact that he has proposed, with COMUSMACV concurrence, a force structure for the deployment of the division and RCT of approximately 30,000--about 8,000 above current plan. Most of these are logistic forces similar to those included in the 10,000 man proposal. COMUSMACV representatives now meeting in Korea express a strong desire for the additional logistic package proposed by General Chae, but recognize the attendant problems on the Korean scene and are working toward agreement on the 22,500 man force structure. Gen Rhee, CG Field Support Command, ROKFV, is now negotiating package with MND, JCS and ROKA. He has pressed for the 30,000 man force, but is understood to have scaled his requirement down to the 26,000-27,000 level. Apparently MND and ROK JCS show no sympathy for any increase above 22,500. We should, for the time being at least, let the ROKs work this one out for themselves, and avoid any implication of US stimulus or pressure for this move. 5. In the event of a ROK proposal for an increase over the 22,500 man dispatch, some additional quid pro quo would be required. As a minimum, MND is expected to request replacement of military personnel with US funded civilians since the ROK military contend they are already faced with serious problem of insufficient manpower to support the planned expansion. 6. I therefore consider that any further US approach on this subject at this time would be adverse to US interest, and recommend against. However, if the MND with President Pak's approval should later make such a proposal, the US could then safely support it. 7. I cannot too strongly emphasize how unfortunate it would be for our interests in this country if even a hint that we were considering the possibility of further Korean troops should ever get into the press in Washington, Saigon, or Seoul. 8. General Beach concurs. Brown
83. Letter From the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (McNaughton) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Bundy)/1/ Washington, April 9, 1966. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, DEF 15-3 KOR S-US. Secret. Dear Bill: I do not concur in Ambassador Brown's recommendation, addressed to both of us in Seoul's 1102,/2/ that we modify the criminal jurisdiction provision in the Korean Status of Forces Agreement. As you will recall, the present jurisdiction formula was very carefully worked out over a period of long negotiation as the most practical solution for meeting Korean political sensitivities on the one hand and for assuring the protection of our service personnel on the other. Although not the optimum solution from the Defense viewpoint, Secretary McNamara accepted, over service and JCS objections, Secretary Rusk's recommendation that the German formula provides the best vehicle for accommodating Korean and United States needs on this difficult issue. /2/In telegram 1102 from Seoul, April 1, Brown detailed Korean concerns about the SOFA agreement. (Ibid.) An April 8 Intelligence Memorandum issued by the CIA, entitled "Pending US-South Korean Status-of-Forces Agreement," also discussed the situation in Korea and the problems hindering Korean acceptance of the agreement. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Korea, Vol. III, November 1965 to December 1966) We also cannot accept Ambassador Brown's understanding that there is no legal difference between the German formula, as now embodied in the Korean agreement, and the NATO-Netherlands arrangement he proposes to substitute. The Korean proposal (in effect, the NATO-Netherlands formula) was rejected because of the substantial differences between the German and NATO-Netherlands arrangements. Our Embassy was carefully instructed to emphasize these differences, i.e., the substantive and procedural requirements before a waiver recall may be effected under the German formula, in order to impress upon the Koreans that we expect great restraint in the recall of waivers. Nor can we agree that the German formula is discriminatory toward Korea. As its name implies, the German formula governs the exercise of jurisdiction over the large number of U.S. forces in the Federal Republic and should not be an unacceptable precedent in Seoul. We also have indications that the Koreans would like to reopen other articles (e.g. the claims and labor articles)./3/ Any relaxation of our position that the negotiation is complete is certain to bring in its wake other Korean requests for the modification of provisions which already reflect minimum U.S. positions. I question the desirability of reopening the negotiation of issues on which the U.S. has very little give. It may, on balance, prove more embarrassing to the ROKG to be unsuccessful in an attempted renegotiation than to conclude the present agreement which has the obvious merits of reflecting a respectable precedent and being a decided improvement over the existing Taejon arrangement. /3/In telegram 1172 from Seoul, April 18, the Embassy reported that the Korean Foreign Minister told Brown he wanted to reopen negotiations on all three disputed articles--criminal jurisdiction, claims, and labor. The request came in response to information received about the SOFA agreement reached between the United States and the Philippines, which, in the Foreign Minister's view, had been given "preferred treatment on criminal jurisdiction" based on the NATO-Netherlands formula. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, DEF 15-3 KOR S-US) In our view, the foregoing considerations outweigh the grounds on which Ambassador Brown bases his proposal, and I suggest we send the attached reply./4/ /4/A note on the letter indicates the draft telegram to Seoul was not attached. It has not been found. Regarding the telegram as sent, see footnotes 2 and 4, Document 84. Sincerely, John
84. Telegram From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State/1/ Seoul, April 26, 1966, 1010Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, DEF 15-3 KOR S-US. Secret; Priority; Limdis. Repeated to CINCPAC for POLAD. 1214. For the Secretary and Assistant Secretary Bundy from Ambassador. SOFA. Ref: A. Deptel 1118./2/ B. Embtels 1200 and 1201./3/ /2/The Joint State-Defense message transmitted in telegram 1118 to Seoul, April 22, informed the Embassy that the criminal-jurisdiction article in the SOFA with Korea could not be modified and set forth the reasons on which that decision was based. (Ibid.) /3/In telegrams 1200 and 1201, both April 23, the Embassy argued for reopening the SOFA negotiations to assuage Korean concerns that the current agreement was substandard to SOFAs negotiated with other Asian countries, notably Japan and the Philippines. (Both ibid.) 1. I am sending you this message, in order to be sure before carrying out instructions contained in para two reftel A,/4/ that the highest levels in Washington concerned not just with SOFA but also with the U.S. position in Vietnam are fully aware of what in my judgment will be the adverse consequences of the position stated in reftel A. I also would like to be sure that ref Embtels, which crossed ref Deptel in transmission, have been considered. /4/Paragraph 2 of telegram 1118 instructed the Embassy to "inform FonOff we regard negotiation completed and agreement reached fair, balanced, and workable." Washington's decision derived from the perception that the current SOFA balanced Korean and U.S. needs and interests and that, although it was a good agreement, there would always be some political opposition to SOFA in Korea with or without further revisions. (Ibid.) 2. Under normal circumstances I would fully concur with the position taken in ref Deptel that the host government should now agree to proceed with an agreement reached after such difficulty. We do not, however, face normal circumstances. The situation here has altered considerably since the SOFA was negotiated and to the Korean mind this is complete justification for a different attitude towards it. Whatever high officials may have said in the past, SOFA as it now stands is not politically acceptable here and the ROKG at least will not see it to their advantage to sign the SOFA and try to get it through the Assembly well before the elections. They have already served notice, both in the press and privately to us, that they do not intend to do so. The argument that similar agreements have been concluded with Germany and China and other arguments in para 2 of ref Deptel will, I am afraid, not be persuasive here, valid as they may appear to us. 3. The mood in Korea today is one of uncertainty and some apprehension insofar as the war in Vietnam is concerned. The recent disturbances and shaky position of the government of SVN, fears as to the consequences of SVN elections, doubts as to what the U.S. would be prepared to settle for in SVN, fanned by incomplete and sometimes distorted press reports about statements by high U.S. Government officials, all are the subject of anxious discussion which in the end come back to Korea's relationship to the U.S. People are beginning to question whether a further division should be sent this summer in view of the changed situation in VN and fears as to changes in U.S. policy. There seems to be a growing uneasy feeling that the U.S. has somehow got Korea into a dangerous situation and doubt as to whether we are going to stand by to help. 4. Moreover, election time is approaching in ROK and most economic and political decisions, including foreign policy decisions, from here on in will be determined by political, i.e., campaign considerations. U.S.-ROK disagreement over SOFA would very probably supply the "gut" national issue which is thus far lacking. Sovereignty and national prestige is the most sensitive issue in Asia. U.S. reluctance to re-open negotiations and our refusal to accept modifications in criminal jurisdiction provision will be seized upon eagerly by press and opposition and built up as evidence that present ROKG cannot satisfactorily manage ROK relations with U.S. which goes its own way regardless of sacrifices made by ROK to help U.S. in Vietnam. Opposition parties would be supplied with a rallying cry which could easily unite them and with which they could, if they desire, call students into the streets to demonstrate. One can imagine also the glee with which Communist propaganda will seize upon and elaborate this theme in its propaganda to this country. All of this is beyond ROKG's ability to control and, as we have pointed out, there is real danger that ROKG will feel it must take an initiative. 5. An atmosphere of frustration and exasperation with the U.S. is not an atmosphere conducive to ROK public support for the despatch of further troops to VN. I am not prepared to say that the government will not fulfill its commitment, as President Pak is deeply engaged, but an uproar about U.S.-Korean relations arising out of SOFA would create very real problems for him, particularly if troubles in Vietnam are not satisfactorily resolved and ROK casualty rates begin to mount. 6. As indicated in ref Embtels, we continue to believe that the interests of our servicemen would be fully protected if we are forthcoming with respect to criminal jurisdiction and that other ROK demands can be contained to our satisfaction./5/ /5/Documents submitted by the ROKG requesting renewed SOFA negotiations and containing proposed changes in the criminal-jurisdiction, labor, and claims articles were transmitted in airgram A-467 from Seoul, June 10. (Ibid.) 7. My personal conviction and the unanimous judgment of my colleagues, both military and civilian, that if we take the action directed by ref A we will create a situation in this country which at best will leave scars on our whole relationship and be something which will arise constantly to plague us, and at worst could involve a really serious breach in our good relations with this country, possibly anti-American student demonstrations and damage to the ability, perhaps even the desire, of the government to continue its current policy of unwavering support of the U.S. Brown
85. Editorial Note After the National Assembly voted on March 20, 1966, to approve the resolution enabling Korea to dispatch additional troops to Vietnam, Foreign Minister Yi Tong-won once again turned his attention to planning the Foreign Ministers Conference in Seoul. On March 22 the Japanese announced their decision to attend the conference. As a result of the timely intervention of Thai Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman, several Asian countries were persuaded to attend the conference, and a preparatory meeting to determine the agenda was held in Bangkok in April. (Memorandum from D.W. Ropa to Rostow, June 7; Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Korea, Vol. III, November 1965 to December 1966; and telegram 1065 from Seoul, March 23; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 7 KOR S) The Ministerial Meeting for Asian and Pacific Cooperation (ASPAC) was subsequently held in Seoul June 14-16, 1966. In telegram 1465 from Seoul, June 16, the Embassy forwarded the text of the joint communiqué issued at the close of the meeting. (Ibid.) Afterward the Korean Foreign Minister characterized the meeting as the "beginning of new era in Asia-Pacific area leading to growing sense of regionalism and greater [garble--chance?] of solidarity among participating nations. Results of conference far exceeded anything he expected and consequently he very proud about role Korea played." (Telegram 1472 from Seoul, June 18; ibid.) The Department of State also viewed the meeting as an "impressive achievement of Asian statesmanship" and welcomed "the constructive and forward-looking initiatives taken by the conference." (Telegram 1365 to Seoul, June 17; ibid.)
86. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ Washington, June 16, 1966. /1/Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, East Asia and Pacific General File, East Asia, FE Weekly Meetings, January through July 1966. Secret. Drafted on June 21. Koren sent this memorandum to Hughes, Denney, and Evans. SUBJECT /2/Agenda at Tab A. [Footnote in the source text; attached but not printed.] PARTICIPANTS [Here follows discussion of Laos, Malaysia, and Singapore.] Korea [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] said that his chief objective was to stiffen the South Koreans against increasing North Korean subversive efforts. These efforts involved the recruitment of agents in South Korea and the sending across the DMZ of infiltrating groups. He had recommended to the South Korean police a stepped-up effort to arrest agents and collaborators and to round up infiltrating groups. This would require some improved police equipment, largely in the communications and armaments field. Police at the present time were unable to communicate from region to region with sufficient rapidity. They were also considerably out-gunned by the infiltrating North Koreans. The South Koreans, through tapping President Park's contingency fund, had come up with $50,000 for the purchase of equipment. They probably could raise a somewhat larger sum [1-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]./3/ /3/An internal security program had been developed and reviewed by the Country Team in Korea that provided for coordination of anti-infiltration efforts by establishing a national command control center, improving communications systems, and training special forces. Pak agreed to provide $125,000 from Blue House funds to acquire equipment, and the Country Team approved the use of $250,000 in AID funds for communications equipment and some weaponry. (Telegram 1542 from Seoul, June 30; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 23-7 KOR S) [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] said that there were four recent clashes between the South Korean police and North Korean infiltrating groups. The South Koreans had been out-gunned in each of these fire-fights. During one of them a North Korean agent had been captured. He told of the intelligence training of his class of 82 members. The class had been divided up into four groups, one for each area of South Korea. These groups had been further subdivided into teams of three or four men who were heavily armed and were to be infiltrated into South Korea, some by land, others by sea. In response to inquiries by Mr. Bundy, [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] said that [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] Kim Chong-p'il whom [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] still regarded as a possible "comer" in Korean politics. [1 line of source text not declassified]. Kim continued his scheming and it was clear that if the president made too many mistakes Kim would "get him." Asked if this was a short term prospect, [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] said that [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] thought not, that Kim was continuing to bide his time while developing a political following./4/ /4/Periodic reports submitted by the Embassy on Kim Chong-pil's activities since returning to Korea in December 1964 are ibid., POL 12 KOR S and POL 15-1 KOR S.
87. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ I-24635/66 Washington, June 22, 1966, 2:35-3:40 p.m. /1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD/OASD/ISA Files: FRC 70 A 4443, Korea 091.112. Secret. Drafted by Boyes and approved by McNaughton on June 28. The meeting took place in McNamara's office at the Pentagon. SUBJECT /2/Kim was invited to Washington because of the important part he played in achieving National Assembly approval of dispatching additional troops to Vietnam. (Telegram 1111 from Seoul, April 5; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 7 KOR S) Kim was in Washington June 22-June 25 and, in addition to McNamara and McNaughton, met with Humphrey, U. Alexis Johnson, Berger, and the Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force. A summary of these conversations is in Secretary of Defense telegram 5496 to CINCPAC, June 28. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Korea, Cables, Vol. III, November 1965 to December 1966) PARTICIPANTS Defense Department Side Korean Side 1. Military Ceremony. Full military honors ceremony was rendered Minister of Defense Kim upon his arrival at the Pentagon at 1420 hours. Secretary McNamara presented the Minister with the Legion of Merit (Degree of Chief Commander). 2. General. The Minister spoke in English throughout the visit. He expressed President Park's appreciation for continued US assistance to the Republic of Korea and the efforts of the Secretary to enhance the morale of Korean forces. Secretary McNamara said that President Park deserved special credit for the Korea-Japan Normalization Treaty which has already done much for improving relations in that part of the world. He added that General Westmoreland praised highly the performance of the Korean troops in South Vietnam. The Minister said that the efforts of General Westmoreland, Ambassador Brown, and General Beach had done much to ensure the fighting capabilities of the Korean troops in Vietnam who were happy to be fighting alongside American troops as they had done once before in Korea. [Here follows discussion of South Vietnam.] More ROK troops for SVN was put forward by Ambassador Kim. He said that about 25% of the ROK combat troops are assigned guard duties in rear areas. He said that the Koreans want these troops to fight, and, therefore, are thinking about offering reserves to take over rear area positions so as to release ROK combat forces to fight. He said that Korea has many reserves, strongly dedicated, well-trained, and unemployed. The Secretary said that was worth exploring further. He would be willing to see Minister Kim before he left or to see the Ambassador at a later date. If Kim preferred, he could put the idea through regular channels. (Subsequent conversations with MND Kim and Economic Minister Kim, Korean Embassy, Saigon, indicated the Koreans are proposing to offer former Korean military reserves as civilians, for rear area service and security jobs, backing up both US and ROK forces.) The Secretary said forces in SVN will soon total 300,000 and that the US will continue to increase its forces in SVN. These troops will be removed when no longer necessary, but the US would not at that time permit a vacuum to be created. The Chinese Communists would fill in any vacuum. He said that US installations and construction in SVN might give the Vietnamese a feeling that the US plans to stay. This appearance worried him. The Secretary said that the Korean proposal to provide Korean reserves to SVN would be helpful to increase the number of Asian faces in SVN and would help to offset the large American presence there. The Secretary said that both the Vietnamese and the Viet Cong were suffering terrible casualties. He said the Vietnamese political institutions were weak. With these factors in mind, he asked for Minister Kim's thoughts on the possible length of the war. Kim said that this was a difficult question. First, the power in-country must be put in one man's hands, who would, unfortunately, be called a dictator. This could not be helped during these difficult times. Second, the military must be unified behind this leader and the many internal frictions overcome. He said the period of the war is difficult to predict until these steps are taken. He believed at this time, there are too many factors--leadership, political stability, military stability--to give any predictions. [Here follows discussion of bombing North Vietnam.] US-SVN Public Relations. In response to the Secretary's request for other thoughts of Kim on Vietnam, the Minister said that he thought that there is a need for the US soldiers in SVN to have a greater capability to respond quickly with food and other comforts for refugees and survivors of areas or villages taken under attack. The ROK soldiers always take some of the extra rice furnished by the Vietnamese Government and provide this rice to refugees and survivors. The ROK soldiers are also told to dig wells and take on chores in the damaged areas quickly to avoid hardships on the people. The Americans have lots of equipment and materials but they do not respond quickly to the people's needs. The Minister said he was not criticizing but only passing on what his ROKFV commanders told him. The Secretary said this was a good point and he would look into it. Korean Economy and Defense. The Secretary said he was very pleased with the continuing improvement in the Korean economy. Minister Kim said that there was some improvement but that the Korean economy is based on agriculture. The weather plays a major role in the Korean economy since it directly affects agriculture. Last year Korea was fortunate in having good weather. This is the first year's harvest (spring 1966) in which no rice crisis occurred. Ambassador Kim said the Korea economy is moving upward but will "plateau" in the next few years. This plateau period would be followed by some gradual improvement, the extent of incline being dependent on a number of factors. Ambassador Kim expressed concern that the US, seeing an improving Korean economy, would decrease its grant aid. He said Korea's grant aid has dropped from $300 million to $60 million. The Secretary said that it is necessary to consider the over-all number of grant-aid commitments of US and to realize that other needy countries must be helped. Their situation is much less favorable than that of Korea. The Secretary said that we must look at the Korean economy and the ROK defense budget. He is concerned about the soldier to population ratio; continuing in the present manner is not good for Korea in the long run. He was not suggesting a change now in view of the SVN situation and the present Korea economy. He thought that Korea and the US must begin to think about the size of Korean forces relative to North Korean forces, and US forces. Our forces must be considered with the size of the ROK Army. The effects of a large army on the Korean economy must be studied. The Secretary said he thought, personally, Korea's economy was being hampered by the size of its armed forces. Minister Kim said the geographical position of Korea made the people worry about their security. He said the capabilities of China and North Korea cannot be overlooked. If the ROK military is reduced, the people will be reluctant to invest their savings in the country. The US presence in Korea also gives the people confidence in Korea's future. If these conditions are removed, the people will be reluctant to do anything about Korea's development. The Secretary said that he understood this situation. He likened it to West Berlin where the people would be reluctant to invest without the presence of strong military forces. The Secretary said he still believed it necessary to explore, together, the correct size of the ROK armed forces and at the same time the methods which might be used to convince the Korean people that reduction in force levels can be undertaken without endangering the country. He proposed that he and MND Kim continue to look at the problems of force size and Korean economic development together, and to hold further discussions on it in the future. Kim's Views on Various Policies. The Secretary suggested that he and Minister Kim discuss, after the black-tie dinner (Secretary McNamara's home, 22 June), the following: US policy on Red China (admittance to UN, US relations with, etc.), the Role of Japan in the Future, India, the Conference in Seoul-ASPAC and its possibilities, and the general security of the Far East./3/ /3/A memorandum of Kim's meeting with McNamara and McNaughton on June 25 is in Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD/OASD/ISA Files: FRC 70 A 6648, 333 Korea.
88. Editorial Note High-level Korean officials wanted a finalized Status of Forces Agreement between the Republic of Korea and the United States ready for signing when Secretary of State Rusk visited Seoul July 8 and 9, 1966. Secretary Rusk attended the SEATO meeting in Canberra, traveled to Manila and Taipei, and attended the meeting of the United States-Japan Committee on Trade and Economic Affairs in Kyoto prior to visiting Seoul. In Seoul the Secretary met with the Foreign Minister, Prime Minister, and President Pak. Memoranda of Secretary Rusk's conversations, as well as a summary of his discussion with President Pak on July 9, are in National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Conference Files: Lot 67 D 305, ANZUS/SEATO, F.E. Trip--Manila, Taipei/Seoul, Vol. 20, Seoul. In the weeks leading up to the visit Ambassador Kim urged officials at the Department of State to work toward achieving final agreement and signature on the Status of Forces Agreement. (Memorandum of Conversation, June 21; ibid., Central Files 1964-66, DEF 15-3 KOR S-US) After the United States studied Korea's proposed changes to the agreement submitted in early June 1966, the Departments of State and Defense ultimately agreed to modify the criminal-jurisdiction, claims, and labor articles of the current agreement, thus addressing some of Korea's primary concerns. (Airgram A-467 from Seoul, June 10; ibid; and memorandum from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara, June 24; Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD/OASD/ISA Files: FRC 70 A 6648, 250 Korea) The most important change to the criminal-jurisdiction article, the final version of which repeated the wording used in the Status of Forces Agreement between the United States and Pakistan and incorporated the desired NATO/Netherlands formula. The final wording clarified to Korea's satisfaction the application of military law to United States forces stationed on its territory. (Letter from Brown to McNaughton, July 13; ibid.) Although primary jurisdiction remained with Korea and required the United States to request a waiver in any individual case, Korea was required to notify the United States of its desire to exercise that jurisdiction in cases of importance. (Korean SOFA Problem, July 7; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Conference Files: Lot 67 D 305, ANZUS/SEATO, F.E. Trip--Manila, Taipei/Seoul, Vol. 20, Seoul) Secretary Rusk, Ambassador Brown, and Korean Government officials signed the agreement on July 9 in Seoul, and it went into effect February 9, 1967. Copies of the signed agreement and related documents were forwarded to the Department of State in airgram A-13 from Seoul, July 12. (Ibid., Central Files 1964-66, DEF 15-4 KOR S-US) The text of the agreement is printed in 17 UST 1677. The statement made by Secretary of State Rusk at the time of the signing is in Department of State Bulletin, August 1, 1966, pages 183-184.
89. Memorandum From William J. Jorden of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson/1/ Washington, August 15, 1966. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Korea, Memos, Vol. III, November 1965 to December 1966. Confidential. SUBJECT Dave Bell asks authority to go ahead with a $12 million AID loan to the Korean Reconstruction Bank (KRB) (see Tab A for Bell's proposal)./2/ /2/Neither tab is printed. This loan partially fulfills your $150 million commitment to President Park made in May 1965. The loan will enable the KRB to expand its financing of medium-size industrial firms. It is part of a carefully developed industrial promotion program. We share the financing load of the KRB with the Korean Government and the Germans, and we expect the Japanese to be involved soon. As conditions of the proposed loan, AID is requiring the KRB to make some internal organizational changes, to improve its financial analysis branch, and to use better accounting procedures. Our loan would be used solely to finance U.S. capital goods and services. It will encourage the use of U.S. industrial equipment by Korean medium industry. Secretary Fowler agrees that the balance-of-payments effects of this loan will be minimal. State and Treasury concur in the AID recommendation. The Bureau of the Budget also recommends approval (see letter from BOB Director Schultze (Tab B). I recommend that the loan be approved./3/ /3/President Johnson approved the proposal, and noted "See that Fowler conditions are met." Fowler added a note to Schultze's letter recommending that AID "seek priority consideration for worthy sub-borrowers who would use the dollars for goods which would promote future U.S. commercial exports now ordinarily purchased commercially elsewhere." He also stressed "the need for some highly competent U.S. trade-oriented people on our AID mission in Korea." William J. Jorden /4/Smith signed under Jorden's typed signature.
90. Letter From the Ambassador to Korea (Brown) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Bundy)/1/ Seoul, August 26, 1966. /1/Source: Department of State, Bundy Files: Lot 85 D 240, East Asia General. Secret. The letter indicates that Bundy saw the document and had a copy of it sent to Rusk, Katzenbach, Rostow, Kohler, and Harriman. Dear Bill: Last November 2,/2/ I wrote you of my impression that a new climate of beliefs and attitudes was beginning to emerge in Korea and I reflected upon its implications for the future. The transformation of the Korean national attitude from one of doubt and dependency to one of increasing self-confidence and hope, which was reported in that letter, has since deepened and become even more of an influence on national and individual action. /2/This letter contained a lengthy commentary on political, social, and attitudinal developments within Korea. (Ibid., Ambassador's Private Correspondence, 1964-1966) In that letter I wrote principally in terms of individual and internal attitudes--what individual Koreans and the Korean Government were doing and hoped to be able to do about the development of their own country and their own personal fortunes. Today I want to place more stress upon Korea's new conception of its relationship with the outside world, a theme which has become increasingly important in the counterpoint of motivation and concern in Korean thinking. For Korea is no longer, and probably never again will be, the hermit kingdom which it had been for so many years. Korea has traditionally been a country which looked backward rather than forward, looked inward rather than outward, evaded or deflected relationships with other countries rather than initiated or influenced them. People have thus tended to think of Korea, indeed Koreans tended to think of themselves, as an introverted people, suspicious of outside influences, fighting to maintain their national individuality and ancient heritage in the face of enormous pressures from countries far more powerful than Korea. Today we see a Korea actively claiming a position in the outside world; energetically seeking to assert its influence; sincerely expecting, as a matter of right, that greater powers should consult it and respect its opinions. Today we see in Seoul a procession of distinguished state visitors from all over the world; the Tunku from Malaysia, the Prime Minister of South Vietnam, the Foreign Minister of Japan, the heir apparent in Taiwan, the Foreign Minister of the Malagasy Republic, the Foreign Minister of Argentina, the Vice President of the United States, the United States Secretary of State, the leader of the German Bundesrat, the Foreign Secretary of Great Britain, the Foreign Minister of Australia. The Presidents of Germany and of the Philippines are expected soon and the Indonesian Foreign Minister has said he would like to come. There is an almost automatic assumption that President Johnson would visit Korea should he decide to travel to the Far East. We find the Koreans, who for years have been laboring under a self-imposed version of their own Hallstein doctrine in their diplomatic relations with other countries, showing signs of flexibility. Shortly after the overthrow of the Communist Party in Indonesia in the fall of 1965, they began actively to consider and then to approve the establishment of a Consulate General at Djakarta, while a North Korean Embassy is still there. Nevertheless they saw that it could be practically useful to them to establish relationships right away with the new, more pro-Western Indonesian regime. This same flexibility is influencing their thinking and attitudes toward Ghana and other professed neutralist nations. We see the Korean Foreign Minister planning visits to several Latin American countries and we observe intense Korean diplomatic activities in every corner of Africa seeking representation. We have the Foreign Minister of Korea stating that he is anxious to hold a conference of the nations providing troops for South Vietnam, not because of any substantive business that needs to be transacted in this manner, but as a means of demonstrating to the world that the United States is not alone in its struggle in Vietnam and has important Asian support. Perhaps most dramatic, we see the Koreans initiating and acting as host to a conference of the Foreign Ministers of ten Asian nations, not seeking a military alliance, not seeking aid, not seeking support for any purely Korean policy or interest, but providing a forum in which Asian nations can meet together as Asians, get to know each other and begin in a quiet way some concerted attack on Asian problems of mutual interest. This conference did not include just the natural allies of Korea and those whose thoughts run along the same lines, such as China or South Vietnam, but included Japan and Malaysia and, had the Indonesians wished it, Indonesia. When ASPAC opened, President Pak made a keynote speech which was wise and impressive./3/ The Foreign Minister presided with dignity in the open meetings and acted with skill and consideration during the negotiating sessions. The substance of the communiqué and the degree of the agreement was a surprise to all the outside world and to many of the participants. /3/In an August 17 letter to Bundy, Brown traced Pak's transformation from an aloof and insecure military dictator into an effective and respected national leader and statesman. (Ibid., East Asia General) It is true that the conference probably never would have happened if it had not won the enthusiastic and skillful support of Thanat Khoman, and that the participation of Japan was in large part simply a desire to be nice to the Koreans and to help out in the process of normalization so recently and painfully achieved. But the Japanese, for whatever reason, did come and Khoman did help, and the Conference did take place. The effect of ASPAC on Korea, of course, has been important. For the first time in its entire history, Korea finds itself in a position of having initiated an international activity, participated in by most of the free world countries of Asia, including the greatest, a traditional enemy, which was by all tests a substantial success. The worlds of trade, commerce and finance also now offer new horizons to the Korean mood and imagination. A Korean construction company is building a highway in Thailand on a job won in international competition. Korean companies are dredging harbors and moving cargo along the Vietnamese coast. Koreans are pushing their exports not only in Japan and in the United States, but in Southeast Asia and Scandinavia and Africa and Europe with surprising success. Korea is seeking to accede to GATT. An Asian Development Bank is proposed and Korea is active in the process of its establishment, ready to contribute more than its proportionate share of the required assets and anxious to have a position in its executive direction. Korea has repaid a debt of $10 million to the National City Bank of New York. The Government of Korea is promulgating a five year economic development plan which officially contemplates the decline and ultimate abolition of supporting assistance and PL 480 food grants during the period of its life and seeks to find foreign capital prepared to invest in Korea's economic future. Thus, to a new self-confidence has been added a new outlook and a new attitude toward the outside world in which Korea now conceives of herself as playing an important part. This outlook is different in quality and motivation towards Asia, the United States, and the rest of the world. This is natural and derives from Korean self-interest. Korea's attitude towards Europe, Latin America, and Africa are naturally dominated by great distances, differences in culture and unrelated histories. Its interests are limited and are viewed primarily in terms of two questions: the Korean question in the United Nations and trade. Active diplomacy to win the support of as many as possible of the newly emerging African nations for the Korean position in the United Nations is only common sense. Developing trade ties with Europe and with Africa and Latin America is similarly sensible. But with respect to Asia, Korea appears to be interested not only in its immediate self-interest, but also in playing a part in policy developments in the area. In the short space of two years Korea has come to believe that it has both the ability and the right to have a voice in Asian policy--political, military and economic. It is willing to pay its way as is shown by its troops in Vietnam, by its contribution to the Asian Development Bank, and by its active participation in the planning for future practical activities of ASPAC. The Koreans conceive of the free Asian countries as having a responsibility for dealing with Asian problems. They feel that it would be desirable for them to do so without the interference or sometimes even the participation of the United States. They recognize, of course, that the United States has a vital and tremendous interest in Asia. They recognize that Asian power vis-a-vis the communists is negligible, certainly at present, unless supported by United States power. Nevertheless, they feel that it is desirable for all concerned that Asians should take initiative and carry responsibility with respect to their problems. They see no incompatibility between this independence of thought and action and the United States interest. This emergence of Korea from its eremitic attitude of mind adds still another dimension to our relationship, which will involve problems as well as opportunities. These we will attempt to analyze in more detail as the shape of things to come emerges more clearly. But certain things can now be said in general. The success of Korea's ventures into external relationships has of course added greatly to the self-confidence reported in my earlier letter and to the Korean sense of independence. We have a very special relationship with the Koreans. The Republic would not exist had it not been for us. We make possible its military establishment. We participate in all major economic decisions of its Government. In the central sanctum of the Economic Planning Board there are always Americans. Each provincial Governor has an American advisor. We have unusual intelligence liaison arrangements. The American military review and pass on virtually every aspect of the Korean defense budget. Everywhere one goes in Korea there are Americans in key places. These men are frequently "advising" men senior to them and as competent as they are. Sometimes their major function is to provide a counterweight to undesirable Korean political pressures. Thus far, to the credit of all concerned, the relationships have been easy and mutually rewarding. We are still needed, and badly needed, in many places and on many problems. But it cannot be expected that this very intimate and special relationship, so pervasive and so all embracing, can continue, or indeed should continue, as the process of economic growth, political maturity, and international competence proceeds, particularly if it does so at the rapid pace which has characterized the last two years. The problem can perhaps be stated by saying that we have an abnormally close and abnormally good relationship with the Koreans. How can we best move to a close and good relationship with the Koreans that approximates more nearly the type that normally exists between two friendly sovereign nations? Here in Seoul we have for some time been attempting gradually to establish the psychological and physical basis for this adjustment. It can, I believe, fairly be said that an appreciable element in the recent growth of Korean self-confidence has been United States stress on the need for increasing Korean initiative and responsibility. For example, we have tried to arrange things so that we comment on their proposals rather than vice versa. This was at first purely political window dressing. It has now become substantive fact. We have encouraged wider Korean contacts with other countries and international institutions. We have helped them develop and establish the institutional arrangements which will enable them better to stand on their own feet. We have placed increasing responsibility on Korean military leaders. But the umbilical cord has not yet been cut, and its actual and visible severance will be a slow process and a delicate one. It will have to be done in such a way as to avoid the impression that we are reducing our interest or any assistance that is legitimately needed. It is a process which may be resisted at times by the Koreans themselves. It will be wise for us not to view this process as against our interest, nor to conceive of it as constituting the loss of an influence which we could hope to retain. I do not think that the time has yet quite come for anything much to be done overtly about this. But the time will come, probably sooner than later, and we, as well as the Koreans, must be mentally and psychologically prepared so that we can be in control of the adjustment of relationships as it develops. Sincerely yours, Win
91. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs (Berger) to the Ambassador at Large (Harriman)/1/ Washington, September 22, 1966. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 32-4 KOR/UN. Secret. Drafted by O'Donohue (FE). SUBJECT Background 1. In its July 21 memorandum on the Korean unification problem,/2/ the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea (DPRK) suggested convening of a Geneva-type conference for the "peaceful settlement of the Korean Question." In its proposal, put forth in the context of the long time DPRK unification position, the DPRK suggested that such a conference could discuss means of attaining a lasting peace in Korea and realizing its peaceful unification. The North Koreans proposed that the conference be attended by representatives of North and South Korea as well as equal numbers of interested governments nominated by each side. They did not explain what the conference would do and continued to insist that outside powers including the UN had no right "to interfere in the internal affairs of Korea." /2/Excerpts from the July 21 memorandum are in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1966, pp. 705-707. 2. Since the issuance of the July 21 memorandum the call for an international conference has been a continuing theme in the North Korean propaganda and various diplomatic approaches on the unification question but without any softening of the North Korean terms for unification (withdrawal of foreign troops, unsupervised national elections et al.). The latest major public statement was Vice Premier Kim Kwang-hyop's September 8 speech in which he mentioned the conference proposal in a low key--while reiterating the standard North Korean unification line. 3. The USSR has publicized the North Korean conference proposal. It requested the UN Secretary General to circulate the July 21 memorandum and in a September 12 broadcast chided the U.S. for having "categorically repudiated" the DPRK conference proposal. In conjunction with the other bloc members, the Soviet Union has also proposed a separate UNGA agenda item on "the withdrawal of all American and other foreign troops occupying South Korea under the UN Flag and the dissolution of UNCURK." (The USSR had previously proposed a similar item in 1962.) 4. To date there has been no measurable international reaction to the North Korean conference proposal at the UN or elsewhere. The Republic of Korea has publicly dismissed the North Korean call for a conference as a propaganda gesture. The Department spokesman in response to a question commented only that our position in support of the competence and authority of the UN to deal with the Korean question was well known. He did not comment directly on the North Korean conference proposal. Present Situation 5. We have no evidence at present that the North Korean proposal has caused weakening of international support for our traditional position on the Korean question (UN-supervised elections throughout the peninsula and seating of the ROKG alone in the General Assembly's Political Committee for the debate on the Korean question)./3/ However, it is clear that the North Koreans, with the support of the USSR, have embarked on a major propaganda campaign which has as its objectives a.) demonstrating that the U.S. and the ROK fear any serious moves toward unification of Korea; b.) highlighting the fact that large numbers of American troops are still in Korea thirteen years after the year of the Korean conflict; and c.) capturing the tactical initiative on this question, weakening UNGA support for the US-ROK position./4/ /3/U.S. policy objectives with regard to the Korea item at the UN were "to preserve ROK's favored international position vis-à-vis North Korea, to maintain UN presence in Korea, and to retain UN role in Korean unification on terms acceptable to ROKG and US, with maximum support among GA members." (Telegram 1873 to USUN New York, February 5; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 32-4 KOR/UN) /4/While not clearly related to the North Korean proposal, abstention of nine Afro-Asian countries on inscription on the GA agenda of our Korean item is another portent of increased difficulties at this year's session. [Footnote in the source text.] There has been no indication, however, that the North Korean conference proposal is, in fact, a serious substantive initiative to achieve unification nor has there yet been any overt move to contrast our position on the Korean question with our Viet-Nam policy statements regarding negotiations or troop withdrawal. 6. Privately the ROKG has interpreted the North Korean proposal as a tactic to insinuate a new element into the continuing ROK domestic debate on unification, as well as a gambit to weaken UNGA support for the traditional approach to the unification problem. Since there is as yet no demonstrable evidence of loss of international support, the ROKG has not conceded the necessity of changing our traditional tactics. It has emphasized that particularly because of the 1967 elections the Korean unification question must be handled as in the past, emphasizing the competence and authority of the United Nations on the unification question and the ROKG's favored international position. The ROKG also believes that a positive response on its part could weaken its international position (the ROK is recognized by seventy-five countries, North Korea by twenty-five) by tending to equate the two regimes. 7. While the North Korean proposal has not so far generated any visible reaction, we believe that the conference proposal might elicit sympathetic reactions from some UN members, particularly neutralist countries, seriously complicating our approach to the Korean question at the 21st UNGA and, more generally, could put the ROK and ourselves on the defensive publicly and internationally. Flat rejection of the North Korean proposal could also appear inconsistent with the continued U.S. endorsement of a conference on Viet-Nam, despite dissimilarities in the present situations in Korea and Viet-Nam. 8. Based on the existing wide international support for the Republic of Korea, we and the South Koreans are now in a position to take the tactical play away from the North Koreans on this issue, without jeopardizing our substantive position. In considering future responses to the North Korean-bloc conference proposal, particularly in the UNGA, we believe that both we and the ROKG could adopt a public position which would: a. make clear that the ROK and the U.S. are ready and willing to sit down with the North Koreans to discuss implementing relevant UN resolutions on unification whenever the North Koreans announce their readiness to accept UN competence and authority; b. emphasize that the UN forces (including American troops) in Korea under UN resolutions are there to preserve peace and security in the area and that we are prepared to withdraw our forces when the conditions for a lasting settlement have been fulfilled; c. point out that our position in support of the UN formula for unification in fact assures that the Korean people will have the right to self-determination; d. expose the North Korean unification proposals for what they are: propaganda devices which would deny to their own people the right to self-determination, in contrast to the UN formula which calls for a democratic election process verified by the UN; e. point out that the North Koreans, in their propaganda and in their clandestine efforts to infiltrate the ROK, have as their sole objective the overthrow of the democratically-elected government and the social structure of the south. Infiltration of North Korean agents and DMZ incidents continue and the North Korean propaganda continues to attack the Park Government in the most vitriolic terms attempting to incite its overthrow. 9. The public position outlined above would: a. show that we are not afraid of negotiations but will not compromise on the principles set forth by the UN (free national elections under UN supervision); b. demonstrate ROKG confidence in its ability to defend its own interests; c. highlight North Korea's continuing refusal to accept the UN (or any outside) role in unification; d. preserve the US/ROK substantive position on the unification question, but in a more publicly defensible context. 10. In response to the Soviet resolution regarding the withdrawal of UN forces from Korea and the dissolution of the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea (UNCURK), we should make the following points: a. The UN forces in Korea are there as a result of communist aggression in 1950. b. These forces are there under UN Security Council resolutions reaffirmed annually since that time. c. The presence of these UN forces, including the American troops, is the major element in stabilizing a potentially dangerous point of confrontation between the communist bloc and the free world. The proof of this is in the record since the Armistice in 1953. There has been no aggressive action on the part of the UN forces and their presence has effectively deterred any resumption of hostilities in the area. d. Under the shield provided by these forces, both the Republic of Korea and Japan have made significant economic and political progress. We are, of course, prepared to withdraw our remaining forces from Korea when the conditions for a lasting settlement have been fulfilled. Their withdrawal before such a settlement has been reached would not contribute to peace and security in the region but rather lead to heightened tensions in an area which has been militarily secure since the end of the Korean conflict. e. UNCURK is a political organ created by the United Nations to facilitate the unification of Korea. It has not been able to perform its function because of the North Koreans' intransigent refusal to accept any UN role in the Korean unification question. f. UNCURK continues, however, to play a useful role in observing the political developments in the ROK and, if the North Korean Regime desires, it exists as a channel for discussion of the unification question. [Continue with the next documents]
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