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FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1964-1968, Volume XXIX Korea
Department of State |
Korea 92. Telegram From the Commander in Chief, Pacific (Sharp) to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Wheeler)/1/ Honolulu, October 10, 1966, 0115Z. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Korea, Cables, Vol. III, November 1965 to December 1966. Secret; SPECAT. Repeated to CINCUARPAC. Passed to the White House, Department of Defense, Department of State, and Defense Intelligence Agency. 100115Z. Exclusive for General Wheeler info General Beach from Admiral Sharp. US-ROK Relations (U). 1. In view of Gen Beach's recent Korean tour I feel that his message to me which follows re US-ROK relations is of particular significance. "1. There have been a series of events within the past several weeks that cause me concern with respect to our relations with the Koreans. Because of my past and continuing interest in Korea, I wish to bring to your attention my views concerning the importance of ensuring that the relationships between our government and the Republic of Korea, particularly with respect to the armed forces of our two countries, are maintained as closely and as strongly as they have been in the past. 2. I am referring to a series of announcements, both official and unofficial, which may give the Koreans reason to believe that the US is losing interest in Korea. These events have added impact on the Koreans when taken in context with their desirable but tough decision to support, actively, US undertakings in SVN. Among the items which cause this concern are: A. Senator Russell's recent suggestion that a US division be withdrawn from Korea. While I recognize that Senator Russell's statement does not represent national policy, it was taken very seriously by the ROK Govt, particularly in view of his important position in the Senate. When the ROK Govt resolved to provide combat troops in RVN, they had official assurance that the US would not change its force structure in Korea without prior consultation. In addition certain assurances were given to the Korean Govt with respect to improving the strength and equipment of the ROK army to accommodate their deployments to SVN without weakening their defensive posture in Korea. B. Temporary personnel drawdowns levied on Eighth Army in order to support timely deployments to VN have been taken to mean a decreased interest in our contribution to the defense and strategic importance of Korea. C. Our continued delay to provide the ROK Govt with a formal document agreeing to an upward adjustment and approved force levels, or some other agreement to compensate for those ROK forces deployed to SVN, is undoubtedly being taken by the ROK as a sign that we may renege on our agreements. D. While not a direct US responsibility, the recent Govt of Turkey (GOT) decision to reduce their UN contingent to a token force was strongly opposed by ROKG and their effort to get the GOT to reconsider the action did not, in the ROK view, receive any strong US support. The rumored Swiss withdrawal from the ICC is still another indicator of declining international interest in the problem of Korea. The current move on the part of the Ethiopians to withdraw is yet another indication of diminishing international interest. There appears to be a constant lessening in the UN presence in Korea. This is extremely important since it is from the UNC that the US acquires OPCON of FROKA. No doubt if erosion of multi-national commitment continues, we will reach a point when ROK will reevaluate their position concerning UNC OPCON of FROKA. 3. Korea remains a strong and staunch ally but, like any newly emerging democratic nation, requires frequent reassurances of our interest and support. We cannot appear to minimize the importance of their in-country requirements. The Koreans join us in the recognition of the strategic importance of the Korean peninsula to the Western world at this particular point in time. Overshadowing as it does the industrial heartland of Communist China, Korea stands in ChiCom eyes as a strong free-world threat to this vital area. This hard, cold fact is a principal element of deterrence in the power balance between free world forces and the Chinese Communists. The retention of our strong strategic posture in Korea is essential to the overall balance of power in the Pacific and East Asia. Any actions that we take which give the appearance of diminishing the value to us of Korea's strategic position must be avoided if we are not to permit Communist China greater freedom of action in Asia. We cannot, apparently or actually, degrade the importance, the strength or the resolve of the Koreans as valued partners in a joint endeavor. 4. Accordingly I feel that it is essential that all of us on the PACOM team be aware of the potential problem which seems to be developing from the chain of events enumerated above. I feel that we should, through both political and military channels, make our superiors in Washington aware of the need to fulfill in a complete and timely manner, our commitments and assurances to the ROKG. I am convinced that we must evaluate all force-level actions with respect to Korea in terms of their likely interpretation by the Koreans as sign posts of our determination and resolve to maintain a multi-lateral position of strength in Korea." I concur with thoughts expressed in Gen Beach's message and recommend that we take every opportunity to stress the need to fulfill our commitments and assurances to the ROKG.
93. Telegram From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State/1/ Seoul, October 19, 1966, 0233Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 7 US/JOHNSON. Top Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Repeated to Manila Eyes Only for Secretary and Bundy and passed to the White House. 2122. Ref: State 67927./2/ /2/Telegram 67927 to Seoul, October 18, reported on McNamara's impression during a recent visit to SVN that the ROK might consider sending more troops, possibly another division, to Vietnam. It also requested the Embassy's views on that possibility as well as whether the question should be broached by President Johnson when he visited Seoul. (Ibid., ORG 7 OSD) 1. I can think of no surer way to destroy the good effects of President Johnson's visit here than for us to raise the subject of more Korean forces for SVN either during his visit here or in Manila./3/ /3/President Johnson attended a summit conference in Manila October 24-26 to discuss the situation in Vietnam with Asian heads of state; he made a state visit to Seoul October 31-November 2. In advance of the President's Asian trip the CIA issued an intelligence report, "Security Conditions in Five Countries of the Western Pacific Area," evaluating the potential for violence against the President in Australia, New Zealand, Thailand, Malaysia, and South Korea. (SNIE 40/50-66, October 13; Department of State, INR/EAP Files: Lot 90 D 110, SNIE 40/50-66) 2. The visit here is one of comradeship, of tribute to Korea's accomplishments, of hope for Korea's future, of highlighting Korea's example as one of hope for others in Asia. To ask for more troops would be to transform it in President Pak's, and later in Korean public's eyes into a case of highlevel arm-twisting. 3. President Pak in his talk with me on October 17 (Seoul 2089)/4/ set what he considers to be the tone of the visit. A request for more troops would come as a severe personal shock to him. The good relationship which Pak feels now exists between him and President Johnson is a great asset for us and should not be endangered. /4/In telegram 2089 from Seoul, October 17, Brown reported that Pak had no particular problems to discuss during the Presidential visit and believed "his only purpose would be to ensure the warmest possible welcome for President Johnson." (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 7 US/JOHNSON) 4. There is no basis here to corroborate indications that Korean military in SVN support deployment further Korean combat troops there. Certainly it does not represent President Pak's thinking nor that of senior Korean military here. 5. I do not believe that President Pak or his government, or the National Assembly or the people of Korea are ready to send more combat troops to SVN. On the contrary, many Koreans already fear that they may be asked to do so. These fears have been expressed publicly as well as privately. Much public stress is being laid here on the fact that Korea already has a higher proportion of its population fighting in SVN than the US. 6. Any suggestion of request for further combat troops would leak sooner or later, would become major election issue, and would add heavily to President Pak's domestic political difficulties, which should not be underestimated. 7. Therefore I most earnestly recommend that this subject not be raised through any channel, either during President Johnson's visit here or in Manila. 8. General Bonesteel concurs. Brown
94. Memorandum of Conversation Between President Johnson and President Pak/1/ Manila, October 23, 1966, 7:15-8 p.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of Walt W. Rostow, Asian Trip, Memoranda of Conversations, October-November 1966. Secret. Johnson and Pak were in Manila to attend the conference on Vietnam. Their conversation took place in Johnson's suite. [Here follows a brief notation recording that President Johnson met privately with President Marcos of the Philippines prior to meeting with Pak.] MEMBERS OF PARTY The President questioned General Park at some length on what he thought might come out of the conference. His response came to this: We must leave no stone unturned in persuading our enemies that we remain determined that our will has not weakened; but also that we are prepared for peace. The President then responded as follows: First, he wished to recognize President Park for his role in bringing about the conference, and to express his gratitude for the troops he has sent. They have been magnificent soldiers and a great tribute to their nation. Second, he wished to tell President Park of his respect and pride for what has been accomplished in Korea in economic, social, and political development. It gives us great hope that something like that success story might emerge in Vietnam. We seek peace. The President did not have too much hope right now that negotiations could happen. He is also aware that if we seem too anxious in this conference, our position might be misinterpreted in Hanoi as a sign of weakness. Finally, the President said that there must be no leaks. There are those who would wish to pull us apart. We remain united and must stay that way. The President went on to say that he wished the world to know also that those closest to the danger are also strongest for our present course of action. He wants a clear signal to Hanoi that might gain the sympathy of all the world from this conference. We shall not escalate or threaten or blackmail. But we must altogether--not merely the U.S. but those closest to the danger and making the most sacrifice--send a strong signal: This war can't be won in Washington or Seoul as the war in 1954 was won in Paris. We must demonstrate, above all, our unity and staying power while also indicating our willingness to go from the battlefield to the conference, provided they reciprocate. We must influence the world to tell Hanoi: You cannot win; there is no sense in going on this way. We also wish to let the world know there is an Asia--an Asia where most of the people live--where hunger, disease, and poverty are the greatest. We still remain concerned with, and committed to, Europe, but we also know there are new men, new leaders, in Asia, like the new leadership in Korea, who are determined and capable and whom we can support. The President wants from his trip and the conference an awareness around the world that a new face has been placed upon Asia. London, Paris, and Bonn remain important; but so are Seoul, Tokyo, Manila, Singapore, etc., important. The President then said that he had been fighting discrimination in the U.S. and he does not believe that discrimination should be practiced among nations. The President then turned to his struggle for health, education, and higher incomes which must be pursued not merely because it is right for people to live better, but because in poverty, ignorance, and disease are the root causes of war. The President is interested in getting the Germans, French, British, and others, through this conference and this trip--through the highlighting of the progress in Korea and in other places--to put a new spotlight on this area. In short, the President believes, first, we must remain united at this conference; secondly, we must demonstrate our determination that we shall not pull out and that Hanoi cannot win; third, focus the world's attention on the problems of Asia: the new Asia, with new leaders and new programs, such as the Asian Development Bank, the Mekong Valley development program, etc. As the President said in Australia: You cannot impose freedom on people who don't want it; but if they love liberty and freedom, we will stay with them and support them. If they don't want freedom, the U.S. can look after itself and meet the threat at Honolulu. [Here follows conversations between President Johnson and other Asian leaders.]
95. Telegram From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State/1/ Seoul, October 25, 1966, 0940Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 32-4 KOR/UN. Secret; Priority; Limdis. Repeated to Bangkok for the Secretary and Bundy and USUN. 2237. Ref: State 69284./2/ US/ROK Discussions in Seoul: Korea in UN. /2/Telegram 69284 to USUN, Seoul, and Moscow, October 19, discussed the Soviet attempt to debate the Korean item at the United Nations and to issue an invitation to North Korean representatives. (Ibid.) 1. Our one really serious current disagreement with the Koreans concerns the handling of the Korean item in the UN. President Pak and his government feel that it is of vital importance to them in this election year to make a good showing in the UN without weakening their traditional formula. They are likely to raise this with the Secretary or possibly with the President in Seoul, and they probably will want to deal with it in the communique. For reasons given below, I think we should seriously consider raising it with them even if they do not take the initiative. 2. The problem is not only a disagreement on tactics to be employed in New York, but, more serious for US-ROK relations, it is a ROK conviction that the US is growing weary of this problem and is not pushing Korean interests as vigorously as the ROKs might reasonably expect from their most important ally. This feeling, which has recently reached a new peak, colors the ROK reaction to our every suggestion on tactics, leads to closed minds on their part with respect to our suggestions, and, unless we can restore Korean confidence in our understanding of their position and basic support for their objectives, can increasingly impair our overall relations. 3. To ROKG and Korean people, UN provides sanction of ROKG as only legal Government in Korean peninsula and basic framework within which ROKG functions as active member of international community. Voting pattern on Korean item is scrutinized by Korean press as measure of ROKG diplomatic efforts for entire year. 4. The Koreans feel passionately about the illegitimacy of the North Korean regime and have consistently refused to contemplate any direct contact with it. They interpret any action by US or others, particularly the UN, which tends to give any legitimacy to this regime, as a denigration of their own internationally established sovereignty. They have dug themselves in on a hard line of opposing any form of invitation to the North Koreans for discussions in New York, not only for the reasons just expressed, but because they feel that if they were in the North Korean's shoes they would recognize that it would be internationally good tactics for the North Koreans to accept an invitation to express their views and they do not want to give them any opportunity to do so. They look at this question from a purely Korean viewpoint and tend to ignore the important problems and responsibilities which the US faces in the UN, of which the Korean items is only one. They tend also to underestimate the difficulties and risks involved for themselves in refusing to modify our tactics on this issue. If the choice is between a less favorable vote on the substantive resolution and any invitation to the North Koreans which might conceivably be accepted, the ROKs would choose the former. 5. This is a question of emotion, which has been growing deeper over time and is now dangerously strong. It is enhanced by our failure to oppose the separate inscription on the UN agenda of a Soviet item on Korea calling for withdrawal of US forces and dissolution of UNCURK. It fits into the pattern of ROK thinking that they should not have their fate determined by great power interests and they suspect that we are reluctant to support the position they advocate because of desire to reach a broader accommodation with the Soviet Union 6. The most recent manifestation of this attitude occurred when an Embassy officer attempted on October 22 to discuss the Department's suggestions for GA tactics (reftel)/3/ with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs International Relations Bureau Director Pak Kun. The moment Pak perceived the direction of the Department's thinking, he interrupted with a thirty minute emotional speech on the question of basic US unwillingness to support the Korean position, which precluded any rational discussion of the Department's suggestions. /3/The U.S. Embassy official was following the Department of State's guidance suggesting that representatives from both Koreas be seated in the United Nations as long as North Korea "first unequivocally accepts competence and authority of UN, under Charter, to consider the Korean question." At the same time, the United States would continue to urge its traditional position of supporting the UN presence in Korea. The Department also suggested approaches to North Korea by the United Nations and UNCURK as well as by the ROKG suggesting a unification conference. The United States expected all overtures to North Korea would be rejected, but believed its tactics would expose North Korean intransigence, which would quiet both the North Koreans and the Soviets. 7. It would obviously be impossible and indeed undesirable to attempt to discuss strategy or tactics at the UN with the Koreans during the President's visit. Nevertheless, the visit will provide an opportunity which it is important for us to seize, to try to re-convince the Koreans that the US does indeed share their objectives with respect to the Korean item in the UN, that suggestions for changes in tactics are put forward as a genuine effort to meet Korean objectives in the light of the realities of the situation, that we have not grown weary of the struggle to protect their fundamental interests, and to give the Koreans a better idea of some of the difficulties which could be presented for them by rigid adherence to a static formula in a changing UN situation. 8. If through personal talks with the Secretary in Seoul or perhaps even the President the old atmosphere of confidence and mutuality of interests on fundamentals could be reestablished, future discussions on tactics and strategy in the UN with the ROKs could be more fruitful, and a potentially serious source of discord between us could be avoided. Brown
96. Memorandum of Conversation Between President Johnson and President Pak/1/ Seoul, November 1, 1966. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of Walt Rostow, Asian Trip, Copies of Memos, etc. Secret. The memorandum indicates that the staffs of both Presidents were present. President Park began by expressing his satisfaction at the Manila Conference and its various documents./2/ He said the central problem was to get others to join in the Declaration. The grand objective must be to build on the principles of Manila a Pacific area community, including Japan, Malaysia, Indonesia, the Republic of China, and Canada. /2/Documents from the Manila Conference are in Department of State Bulletin, November 14, 1966, pp. 730-735. He urged President Johnson to take the initiative; but he added that first we must have success in Vietnam. He turned then to the problem of the defense of Korea at the DMZ. He looks for no aggression from the North, but faces chronic problems and incidents. In response to President Johnson's request for an example of incidents and incursions, he replied the North Koreans tended to create incidents at times when there are other events taking place in Asia; for example, at the time of negotiations in Japan there were student riots in Korea; before the Manila Conference; before President Johnson's visit./3/ He concluded that at the moment these incidents are an irritating factor, but not a serious danger. If fighting increases in Vietnam, there may be increased and more sustained pressure at the DMZ. /3/Border incursions occurred during the early morning hours of November 2, while President Johnson was in Korea. In two separate incidents ROK and U.S. patrols encountered and engaged armed units from North Korea. One of those encounters resulted in the death of one South Korean and six U.S. soldiers and the wounding of several others. The attacks brought the number of border skirmishes occurring since October 15 to 29. (Telegram 2416 from Seoul, November 2; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 27-14 KOR) When investigating the matter, U.S. personnel in Korea confirmed that on October 26 ROK forces had initiated a raid against a North Korean outpost. (Telegram 2417 from Seoul, November 2; ibid.) On November 3 Brown expressed his disapproval of that action to the Korean Prime Minister as being against U.S. policy to uphold the armistice agreement and harmful to the prestige of the ROK in the UN and the court of public opinion. (Telegram 2441 from Seoul, November 3; ibid.) Brown reiterated that message in a conversation with the Prime Minister on November 17, when discussing ROK actions in the DMZ. (Telegram 2691 from Seoul, November 18; ibid.) He then turned to the importance of keeping U.S. strength at its present level in Korea. The development by the Chicoms of nuclear weapons makes the U.S. force necessary as a credible deterrent. Foreign Minister Kishi of Japan said that if the U.S. began to withdraw from Korea, the Socialist movement would gain greatly in Japan. The size of the Korean armed forces is beyond the capacity of the Korean economy, but they must be given first priority. As for the economy itself, there had been a high rate of growth in recent years, quite remarkable for a developing nation. The rate of inflation had decreased. They were placing great hope and faith in the next 5-year plan, in which they expected to raise per capita income to $200; reduce unemployment; move toward self-sufficiency and a decline in abnormal external assistance. In particular they wished to encourage private capital to come to Korea. Korea was a place with a stable economy, and is prepared to welcome private capital. These, he said, are his central priorities. President Johnson said we share his view that the Manila Conference was a success. We had dispatched Ambassador Harriman to enlist the understanding and support of others. The most important achievement of Manila was that those closest to the danger were most concerned. The image had grown in the world--and in the United States--that we were the only ones concerned, and this was dangerous. After Manila, the multilateral nature of the concern and the course of action in South Vietnam would be better understood. We all must not repeat the mistake of the 1930's; but the local people must resist aggression seriously. This demonstration is critical in American political life. There is no problem with Korea, which is putting up proportionately as much as the U.S. But there are relatively few troops from New Zealand, Thailand, the Philippines, and Australia. The President underlined that he had not come to Asia to raise troops, but that Park had struck at the heart of the problem in posting his questions. The longer we "dance away" from facing the problem, the greater will be our future difficulties. He (President Park) has an election in 1967; President Johnson, in 1968. Our people will support us if we are whole-hearted. The opposition will be greater if we appear half-hearted. The President noted a decline in the percentage of popular support for our Vietnam policy, and added: "We are not moving fast enough for our people." We have all got problems in our countries at the level of headaches or a slight fever; but the place where there is a heart attack with a nation about to die is Vietnam. If aggression is not contained there, it will quickly spread over the whole area. Westmoreland says it can't be contained without six to seven hundred thousand troops. If we had not present firepower and mobility, we would require many more. The measurement of requirements at the technology of five years ago is now out of date. What is relevant is the total power we can apply. In fact, because of new technology, we have greater strength everywhere we are committed than we did five years ago; for example, in Germany and Korea. Nevertheless, we shall need more men in Vietnam, and all of us must think how we can act promptly and decisively in Vietnam. The Korean people should know that we have no plans to alter present strength here, although the effective power of our forces has sharply increased. Summing up, President Johnson repeated his statement that we have no plans to alter our present strength in Korea, but added that future planners must look at effective strength and not numbers of men. The President added we should think of Westmoreland and how we would feel if we were in his position and asked help of the governments: what would we wish the governments to do? President Park then asked Mr. Rostow to examine some of the economic problems of Korea while he is here./4/ The President said that he would ask Mr. Rostow and Ambassador Brown, in whom he had unlimited confidence, to look into these matters. If Rostow and Brown didn't know more about economic problems than he did, the Government was wasting a lot of money. /4/Rostow met with Korean Minister of Finance Kim Hak-yol on November 1. Kim outlined areas in which Korea could assist Vietnam, such as by providing medical-service teams. He also stated that "if the United States could and would pay for them, Korea could also provide technicians in agricultural extension, textiles, and electronics." Rostow suggested Korea could be very helpful in postwar planning and development. Kim also asked for U.S. support for Korea's Second Five-year Plan and gave Rostow a summary proposal for the economic development of Korea that included projects requiring U.S. assistance and loans. (Memorandum of conversation, November 1; Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Korea; Memorandum of conversation from Rostow to the President, November 3; ibid., Korea, Memos, Vol. III, November 1965 to December 1966) President Johnson said that, next to President Park, he was the man most interested in the future of Korea. It could not be otherwise. As long as Dean Rusk is Secretary of State, the President of the United States must be interested in Korea. Secretary Rusk had invested a good many years of his life here. The President then noted that if they didn't break up the meeting (being three-quarters of an hour late), Marvin Watson would throw a Molotov cocktail on the table. As the two Presidents walked to the door, President Johnson said that on military matters they were fully in agreement. On economic matters we would explore and see what we could do within limits on aid imposed by the United States Congress. Walt
97. Editorial Note While in Seoul President Johnson also met with the Deputy Prime Minister on November 1, 1966. The following day he met again with President Pak for a farewell call and spoke briefly before the National Assembly. The Embassy reported that the President's trip was highly successful in easing fears about the U.S. commitment to Korea and Vietnam and in bolstering relations between the United States and the Republic of Korea. (Telegrams 2461, November 4, and 2614, November 14, from Seoul; both in National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 7 US/JOHNSON) The texts of President Johnson's public statements in Seoul as well as the joint communique released at the conclusion of his visit are in Department of State Bulletin, November 21, 1966, pages 770-780. The President's statements are also in Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1966, Book II, pp. 1283-1296. Secretary of State Rusk and Assistant Secretary of State Bundy also accompanied President Johnson to Korea. Secretary Rusk held an unrecorded discussion with the Korean Prime Minister during a Presidential reception on November 1. The Prime Minister later mentioned to Ambassador Brown that he had discussed the possibility of using Korean veterans in Vietnam with Secretary Rusk. Assistant Secretary Bundy met with President Pak's Protocol Secretary on November 2. (Telegram 2534 from Seoul, November 9; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 7 US/JOHNSON) Assistant Secretary Bundy also spoke with the Foreign Minister, who discussed the Korean items in the United Nations and indicated that the "ROK is strongly opposed to any invitation to North Koreans" and "would prefer even significant loss of votes on the items to any change in present tactics." The Foreign Minister "cornered" Assistant Secretary Bundy during the departure ceremonies at the Seoul airport to give him a memorandum discussing the Korean view of the U.S. approach to the Korean items at the United Nations. (Telegrams 3346 and 3348 from Bundy in Tokyo, both November 4; both ibid., POL 7 US/BUNDY) To strengthen confidence that the United States continued its unequivocal support for Korea at the United Nations, the Department of State decided to revert to the traditional positions advocated by the Republic of Korea. (Telegram 85320 to the United Nations Mission in New York, November 15; ibid., POL 32-4 KOR/UN)
98. Intelligence Memorandum/1/ No. 1620/66 Washington, November 8, 1966. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Korea, Memos, Vol. III, November 1965 to December 1966. Secret; No Foreign Dissem/Background Use Only. Prepared by the Office of Current Intelligence of the Central Intelligence Agency and coordinated with the Office of National Estimates. ARMED INCIDENTS ALONG THE KOREAN DMZ 1. The attack by uniformed North Korean troops on 2 November 1966 against a US patrol unit south of the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) was apparently in retaliation for a South Korean (ROK) raid a week earlier. Although there has been a marked increase in North Korean harassing attacks along the DMZ since mid-October, these actions probably do not reflect a decision to engage in wholesale violations of the armistice agreement. The targeting of the 2 November raid against American troops suggests that Pyongyang was seeking to force the US to prevent any repetition of the raid on 26 October by some 30 ROK troops into the DMZ. 2. There is no evidence that the North Koreans intend to open a "second front" in the Vietnam War. However, it is possible that the North Koreans believe that heightened tensions along the DMZ would serve as a warning to the ROK and the US against further deployments of ROK troops to Vietnam and demonstrate North Korean support of Hanoi to other Communist states. 3. There is no indication that this upsurge of violence was related to President Johnson's visit to South Korea. Recent interrogation of apprehended agents indicates these attacks had been planned long before the President's Asian trip was announced. 4. Neither statements by North Korean leaders nor Pyongyang's propaganda suggest an intention to divert US attention from Vietnam. Kim Il-song's major policy statement on 5 October, although it made the customary offer to send "volunteers" to Vietnam, contained no threat to open a "second front" in Korea and the US commitment to Seoul probably remains an effective deterrent to such action. 5. South Korean military officials probably hoped that the ROK raid, which is claimed to have cost the enemy some 30 casualties and may have penetrated through the DMZ into North Korea, would boost morale lowered by North Korean incursions. Although the UN commander and the US ambassador have warned the South Koreans against repetition of such incidents, there is a danger that they will undertake carefully concealed reprisals if they suffer further personnel losses. 6. The North Korean presentation at the Military Armistice Committee meeting held on 4 November at Panmunjom followed the traditional propaganda pattern. The senior North Korean representative made no direct mention of the ROK raid, probably out of reluctance to call attention to North Korean vulnerabilities or to raise the question of North Korean casualties. He did accuse the UN side in general terms of numerous border violations. 7. The recent upsurge of violence by North Korean infiltrators suggests at least a temporary shift of mission from intelligence collection and subversion to harassment. In the past, infiltration agents--usually in civilian clothes--rarely engaged in fire-fights except when challenged by the ROK military or security services. Since mid-October, however, infiltration teams have deliberately sought out and attacked ROK forces. These probing operations may have been designed to test the effectiveness and reaction of South Korean forces deployed along the DMZ as well as to undermine troop morale. 8. North Korean agent operations along the DMZ have been conducted with varying intensity since the armistice agreement in 1953. In the past year, larger teams and more heavily armed operatives have been used. Agent teams began concentrated operations in the ROK last May. After the abnormal period of inactivity in September and early October probably caused by heavy rains and agent losses, North Korean infiltrators carried out seven surprise attacks against ROK troops in a five-day period beginning on 13 October. By 2 November, ROK and US forces had suffered some 36 fatalities (six US) in 40 incidents this year as compared with 20 Korean soldiers killed in 55 incidents in 1965 and four in 32 incidents during 1964. 9. The harassment along the DMZ is expected to taper off during the next few weeks as the foliage disappears and snow begins to fall. Normally, agent operations during the November-February period are infrequent because of bad weather.
99. Telegram From the Commanding General, United States Eighth Army, Korea, and the Commander in Chief, United Nations Command, Korea (Bonesteel) to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Wheeler)/1/ Seoul, November 10, 1966, 0817Z. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Korea, Cables, Vol. III, November 1965 to December 1966. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Repeated to Sharp and Beach at CINCPAC and to General Johnson, Chief of Staff-Army, Washington; forwarded by the Defense Intelligence Agency to Helms at the Central Intelligence Agency, Rusk at the Department of State, and Rostow at the White House. KRA 1795. [5 paragraphs (35 lines of source text) not declassified]/2/ /2/Richard G. Ciccolella was the Senior Member of the United Nations Command, Military Armistice Commission. The Embassy sent memoranda of his conversations [text not declassified] to the Department of State as enclosures to airgram A-199, November 17. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 27-14 KOR) [3 lines of source text not declassified] NK side has shown no effort to cooperate, in fact has deliberately frustrated every constructive suggestion made to permit the Commission to do its intended job. [4 lines of source text not declassified] His second comment, in regard to NK and Chinese illusions that US was hopelessly bogged down, was that the facts were that war in Vietnam was really being fought with only part of our power and without mobilization. We are fighting it without calling up a single reservist, let alone reserve units. US has available large number of reserve divisions, many of which have been brought to high readiness, backed up by tremendous pool of other trained reservists. US had not used the military power deployed to Vietnam as anyone could see by the restraint our air alone is exercising. He suggested [5-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]. Before coming out here I discussed with you the strategic importance of Korea as a significant element in the overall deterrent against the ChiComs (and North Koreans) more overtly intervening in South East Asia. I suggested that, even though completely supporting the concentration of our resources to meet Vietnam requirements and the needs of the training base, we should be careful not to let the military power of our Korean element of our overall strategy vis-a-vis Communist China fall to the point where its credibility is affected. Except in the area of army aviation, particularly helicopter pilots, where we are scheduled to fall severely below a safe minimum, and in ammunition war reserves, particularly illuminating rounds, I am not gravely concerned at our military capability here to fight a major conventional action not involving massive ChiCom reinforcements. You know status of possible US reinforcements better than I. However, it is not what we can do but what the ChiComs and North Koreans think we can do that will affect their further actions regarding Vietnam. The North Koreans and to a degree the ChiComs, unlike the Soviets, do not have an intelligence and analysis capability enabling them to arrive at a sound evaluation of either our intentions or our real military capabilities if emergency powers were granted the President. There follows an interesting tidbit for what it is worth. It was said by a reporter of the North Korean Central News Agency to our source during a conversation [3 lines of source text not declassified]. The reporter said: "We want to know if they (President Johnson and President Park) have discussed sending more troops to Vietnam. You see we are ready to send our troops at any time whenever Vietnam (North) wants our participation. Should a war break out in Korea the US won't be able to send its troops to Korea since it's so deeply involved in the Vietnam war." The incident involving US troops of the 2nd US infantry division was the most vicious and flagrant violation of the Armistice Agreement and of ROK territory in many years./3/ It may have been staged as a test. If we react to this flagrant violation only by the protest at Panmunjom and without any tangible indication of an increasing capability to improve our forward area security, we may reinforce the current North Korean and ChiCom misconceptions. /3/Reference is to the border incursions on November 2; see footnote 3, Document 96. Airgram A-201 from Seoul, November 17, contained a UNC report outlining casualty-causing incidents occurring along the DMZ and elsewhere in the ROK between 1961 and November 2, 1966. For the period 1961 to 1965 the number of casualties was listed by year, while the incidents in 1966 were briefly described and the number of casualties given. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 32-4 KOR/UN) Airgram A-203 from Seoul, November 18, contained a report prepared by the Korean Foreign Ministry describing the incidents and resulting casualties occurring along the DMZ during October 1966. (Ibid.) In telegram 2687 from Seoul, November 17, the Embassy also forwarded a summary of recent incidents along the DMZ, the Korean responses, the implications of the incidents, and the actions taken by the Embassy. (Ibid., POL 27-14 KOR) Our ability to effectively cope with the NK aggressive killer-patrol actions in or near the DMZ is not as good as I'd like it to be. There are three major reasons: (a) the NK flagrant violations of the DMZ while we abide by it and require the ROK's to do likewise; (b) the basic military difficulty of reacting effectively against guerrilla hit and run tactics at NH's initiative, usually at night, in a 150 mile band of generally rugged terrain covered now with fairly dense vegetation and natural cover and from which the DMZ offers an immediate sanctuary (this is what is very seriously intensifying ROK frustration, anger and desire to make retaliatory raids);/4/ and (c) inexperienced soldiers and junior leaders. /4/In a telegram, KRA 1804, November 12, Bonesteel reported having received information [text not declassified]. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Korea, Vol. III) [text not declassified] (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 27-14 KOR/UN) The objective of U.S. policy was "to prevent further escalation of tension, to de-escalate if possible, and to ensure the ROK troops do not violate Armistice Agreement." (Telegram 85861 to Seoul, November 16; ibid.) The above is for your background and information. I have had two conferences on improving effectiveness of DMZ and adjacent operations with C/S, ROKA and CG's I Corps and FROKA, one on 28 October and one a couple of days ago. I started staff working several weeks ago to get under way an integrated analysis of DMZ situation to consider together enemy tactics and, on our side, possible improvements in organization, materiel (including any new ideas from US R&D and CDC), tactics and techniques, training, lessons learned from Vietnam and here, and so on. This is now under way with a joint US and ROK analysis team. All commanders are also looking at more immediate steps feasible to take with resources here. I have no particular thoughts as to what tangible evidence of our power potential which we can show NK's except, as we are all trying to do, to clobber some of the NK patrols if incidents continue. We may use more night illumination ammo outside of DMZ. Perhaps the early provision and use south of DMZ of a few Hu-1D's each with a battery of searchlights--such as we understand are being tested in Vietnam--might be a sort of little thing to show US is not stretched too thin. At least, the ROK's would feel bolstered by some tangible evidence of US recognition of problem.
100. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Korea/1/ Washington, November 19, 1966, 6:56 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret; Priority; Exdis. Repeated to Saigon and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Drafted by Steadman (DOD), cleared by General Brown (JCS), and by Shostal (S/S), and approved by Bundy. 88135. Exclusive for Ambassador Brown Eyes Only. State/Defense message. 1. We are planning to build a physical barrier in South Vietnam south of DMZ. Current plans are for construction to commence in mid-February with a targeted completion date of late May. This is a highly classified and sensitive matter. 2. A nine infantry battalion division plus logistic element augmentation (about 16,500 men) will be required to man the hilly and rugged, intermittent western portion of this barrier. 3. We note that Pak told President that it would be easy to reactivate almost immediately a division of recent army veterans for combat use. We wish now to pursue with Pak this concept of an anti-infiltration Korean division, possibly made up of veterans. While Pak could be told about the barrier, our intention would be to say in wider circles only that the Korean division would be "to help prevent infiltration through the DMZ." 4. We recognize that it might be necessary to put such a volunteer ROK division into a special category with greater pay and benefits than received at present by ROK troops, that such special treatment might create morale problems among already deployed third-nation troops, and that we would have to face a Korean attempt to increase the 600,000 troop ceiling. 5. Obtaining this anti-infiltration combat division is of utmost importance in view of limits on other manpower availabilities. It is obviously not the same as the civilian logistics service corps concept. That idea needs substantial refinement before a definitive comment on its merits can be made. And presumably would be dropped at least for the time being if 16,500 additional ROK combat troops supplied. 6. New ROK division ideally should be in SVN not later than 1 April 1967. While we recognize that upcoming elections in Korea might make impossible dispatch of regular ROK troops by that time, we wonder whether purely volunteer status of new division would make early recruitment and deployment possible. In any event, in order to program construction and US deployments it is highly desirable to secure commitment from Pak not later than 1 January 1967 that deployment could be made by 1 July 1967. 7. By mid-1967 about .25% of US population will be in SEA actively engaged in war in Vietnam; an equivalent Korean contribution would be about 72,500 men. Further, by mid-1967 over 20% of US ground forces will be in SVN; Korean equivalent would be over 100,000. We conclude that it is entirely reasonable to expect further Korean combat contribution to SVN and that it should not be necessary for US to pay too stiff economic or political price for this contribution. 8. Please give us your recommendations on how best to achieve objectives outlined above. In arriving at your position you may discuss this telegram with General Bonesteel only. Address response Eyes Only for SecState and SecDef. Rusk [Continue with the next documents]
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