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FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1964-1968, Volume XXIX Korea
Department of State |
Korea 101. Telegram From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State/1/ Seoul, November 22, 1966, 0315Z. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Korea, Memos, Vol. IV, January 1967 to August 1967. Top Secret; Priority; Exdis. Passed to the Department of Defense. Attached to an undated memorandum from Jorden to Rostow in which Jorden expressed his complete agreement with Brown's views and advocated against pushing "the Koreans too hard. None of our other friends has nearly as good a record. A good deal more would not be unreasonable for the Australians, New Zealanders, Filipinos, Thai, Malaysians--to say nothing of our 'staunch' European friends." 2756. Eyes only SecState and SecDef from Ambassador. Ref: State 88135./2/ I have discussed reftel with General Bonesteel. We fully understand the importance of securing further forces to man the proposed activity in the SVN DMZ, and the time urgency involved. /2/Document 100. We consider the following considerations to be relevant. 1. After President Johnson's visit President Pak personally gave a firm assurance to the Korean people that no further Korean combat troops have been requested or are being considered for SVN./3/ /3/On November 10 Pak announced during an informal press conference that the ROK would not provide additional combat troops to serve in Vietnam. (Telegram 2589 from Seoul, November 13; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 27-3 VIET S) 2. This assurance has been received with satisfaction by all political parties and by all sections of Korean opinion, which have been unanimous in expressing opposition to the despatch of further Korean combat troops to SVN. 3. The fact that the further contribution suggested reftel would consist of volunteers would not make their despatch acceptable. The Koreans will feel that troops that will be assigned to frontline duties and have to fight are combat troops, whether volunteers or conscripts. Many are already arguing that the volunteer rear area guard and logistic units now being considered will also have, in effect, a combat mission. 4. No preparations for recruitment, training and deployment of a volunteer division could be made without public knowledge. 5. A key point made by President Johnson in his discussions in Seoul was that he was not here, nor for that matter had he made his Asian trip, to ask our allies in Vietnam to increase their forces there. He stressed that he wanted them to understand Westmoreland's problems--put themselves in his shoes--and think about what they could do to increase their effort in Vietnam. He went on to say that after elections in the U.S. and Korea we would have to work on this problem. 6. Pak, on his part, pointed out to President Johnson that he expected to be given a rough time before next year's elections by his political opposition because Korea was the only Asian nation with a large troop commitment in Vietnam. In saying this Pak was reflecting the feeling of many Koreans that Korea has already made a disproportionate force contribution to the Vietnam effort. Pak, no doubt in a sincere desire to be forthcoming, did respond to President Johnson's suggestion of calling up ROK reservists for combat duty in Vietnam as an aspect of easing the unemployment problem. Here again, however, the context of the discussion was that this was something to be discussed after elections. 7. You will recall that President Pak was visibly shaken by our request for a second division so soon after his agreement to send the first, mainly because of the political difficulties with which the despatch of the first division was confronting him. Pak is facing an election in May. To win it, particularly by a sufficient margin to establish him in firm control, may not be as easy as many like to think. The Korean people have accepted the fact that their government decided to send ROK forces to Vietnam and are proud of their record there. This should not mislead us into believing that ROK support of VN is a popular active cause in this country. Opposition leaders are already calling for some form of withdrawal of the ROK forces now in SVN. For Pak to agree now to send more combat troops, particularly in the face of his recent public assurances, would undoubtedly damage his election chances. It might even cost him the election. 8. Moreover, no one, not even Pak, knows what may happen between now and the election, either on the domestic scene, or in SVN, or along the DMZ./4/ Pak does not know what pledges he may feel it necessary to make to his people in order to get re-elected. He cannot accurately predict the power position in which he will find himself after elections because he does not know the margin by which he will be re-elected, nor the degree of DRP support which he will have in the new Assembly. Thus he is in no position to make a pre-election commitment for further troop despatch which is worth anything even if he wanted to do so. /4/Brown had previously informed Washington that political problems surrounding the dispatch of more troops had been compounded by the increase in the number of incidents along the DMZ, a combination that significantly diminished any possibility that more Korean troops would serve in Vietnam. (Telegram 2613 from Seoul, November 14; ibid., POL 27 VIET S) 9. Therefore, for President Pak now to receive a request for more combat troops would, I am convinced, seem to him an embarrassing and unfriendly disregard for his political problems, which are well known to us. 10. Re para 7 reftel, the Koreans will not think it reasonable, but rather most unreasonable, that a country of Korea's small size and limited resources should be asked to contribute to the South Vietnamese war as large a proportion of their population and armed forces as a great power like the U.S. This is especially true of a small country directly [across] the DMZ from a substantial and well-armed North Korean force and almost next door to vast ChiCom forces. 11. The Koreans feel that they have already made a disproportionately great contribution to the war in SVN. When they refer to the fact that their contribution in terms of percentage of population is approximately the same as that of the U.S., they are emphasizing how exceedingly great their contribution is, not how reasonable it is. They feel that any pressure for further combat troops should be applied to gain a more equal contribution by other Asian and Pacific countries which they consider equally affected by aggression in Vietnam and which do not have a long frontier with the Communist countries manned by opposing armies. 12. An unexpressed major premise of the argument in para 7 may well be that the present Korean forces in Korea are too large. Whatever we may think of this, the Koreans simply do not agree. On the contrary, both government and public feel that their present forces should be stronger than they now are in light of the increased risk they feel they have incurred by their contribution in SVN. 13. The arguments in para 7 would seem particularly outrageous to the Koreans if coupled with any indication that we would be reluctant to provide them with iron-clad assurances of continued long term support and pay generously for any further contribution out of our vastly superior resources. Even if the government wished to avoid this attitude they could not get away with it with their assembly, press and public opinion. You will recall that President Pak had to ask for an "economic plus" to get Assembly approval of the second division. 14. Very importantly, it appears to me that we are in danger of seeming to take the Koreans for granted and of trying to do it on the cheap. They will recall that, as I mentioned in my message from Hong Kong last February (Hong Kong 1489 to Department),/5/ we first asked for a small medical unit and got it. Then we asked for non-combat troops and got 2,000. Then we asked for a combat division and got that. Before the ink was dry on the agreement for the first combat division we asked for a second combat division and ultimately got that. Now we would be asking for another 16,500 combat men. The Koreans will wonder when and where this will end and why others are not pressed to do likewise. /5/Document 79. 15. If we wish continuance of the attitude of whole-hearted support we are now getting from the ROKG in SVN, we will be well advised to avoid any action which would make them feel that we are taking undue advantage of their willingness to cooperate, or are giving insufficient weight to their concern about the security problems which they feel they now face and which they are sure will persist for them even after a settlement in SVN. 16. Consequently, it is my conviction, in which General Bonesteel concurs, that the best way to preserve the chances of securing our objective of further combat troop contribution from Korea, is to wait to raise this question with Pak until after the election. 17. If we ask President Pak for more combat forces now we risk a flatly negative reply, coupled with a personal sense of being imposed upon which would mar the [garble--effect of?] President Johnson's visit, especially on Pak personally, and endanger the sincere support we are now receiving from the Koreans in Vietnam. 18. Pak will probably be expecting such a request after election. He may be disposed to cooperate providing he can get what he would consider adequate remuneration and particularly long-term security assurances. His demands on these points will be large and will undoubtedly include genuine and speedy modernization of the ROK armed forces. We will have to be prepared to be very forthcoming. 19. After election Pak will be in a better position to respond affirmatively if he wants to do so. Even then a favorable response is by no means a certainty. What is much more certain is that if we make a request to him prematurely at a time when he is likely to consider it an imposition and when it would be politically impossible for him to accede, we would prejudice any changes which may exist of getting a further combat contribution from Korea later on./6/ /6/In telegram 2760 from Seoul, November 22, Brown pointed out that the ROKG, at the behest of the United States, had shifted its focus to providing noncombat assistance to Vietnam and that an expanded Korean role in Vietnam could only be nonmilitary in nature. Brown added that "it is now beyond the realm of possibility that this added involvement could, after election, contribute to a psychological climate in which it might be possible to get further troop contributions." (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 27-3 VIET S) 20. I have considered recommending that I be instructed to go to Pak, tell him of our new project and the forces needed to man it, and simply ask him, without pressure or formality, if he could help now, or later. In view, however, of the considerations described in this message, including the fact that Pak is really in no position to make a meaningful commitment even if wanted to, I decided that even such an approach would simply be embarrassing to all concerned, had nothing to gain for us and possibly much to lose. 21. General Bonesteel concurs in all respects. Brown
102. Telegram From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State/1/ Seoul, November 29, 1966, 0830Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 27-14 KOR/UN. Secret; Priority; Limdis. Repeated to USUN and Moscow. 2881. Refs: Seoul's 2687,/2/ 2856,/3/ 2857;/4/ USUN 2348,/5/ 2591;/6/ Seoul's A201, dtd November 17./7/ Korea Debate in UN. /2/Telegram 2687 from Seoul, November 17, reported on the increasingly violent incursions within and across the DMZ by North Koreans; see footnote 3, Document 99. /3/Telegram 2856 from Seoul, November 28, discussed problems associated with use of radio broadcasts by the Voice of the UN Command (VUNC) as a means of psychological warfare. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, RAD 6) /4/See footnote 4, Document 99. /5/In telegram 2348 from USUN, November 15, Goldberg expressed his concerns about the UNC being used to broadcast U.S.-sponsored messages to North Korea and Communist China. He urged that such broadcasts "no longer be made in name of UN Command." (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, RAD 6) /6/In telegram 2591 from USUN, November 23, Goldberg reported on information he received from an intelligence source "that USSR is concerned about military maneuvers by US and ROK forces currently underway in South Korea." The source revealed that "Hanoi and Peking have been putting pressure on Eastern Europeans to 'open second front' to relieve pressure in Vietnam. Similar request went to North Korea." The Soviets feared that Chinese influence within the North Korean Army could provoke continued actions along the DMZ. (Ibid., POL 32-4 KOR/UN) /7/See footnote 3, Document 99. 1. Evidence to date appears to indicate NK regime and its supporters are conducting better organized and apparently more vigorous assault on US-ROK position in Korean unification debate than in previous years. On basis reports of NK and other Communist propaganda output we suspect there may be a new tactic employed by NK and Soviet Bloc this year, namely, to seek to eliminate UN presence in Korea (UNC and UNCURK) or, at minimum, during course of debate so impugn integrity of these UN agencies that next year Soviet effort in UNGA may have more sympathizers. 2. The Department is fully aware of actions taken by NK and Soviets, both within and outside the UN framework, to enhance the prospects for defeating US/ROK position on Korean item and is in better position to evaluate prospects of Soviet success if the debate follows traditional pattern. However, if the Soviets have estimated they cannot win confrontation with us on basic reunification issue, they may decide on gaining only limited goal this year. One way to tilt the scales in their favor is by attacking integrity of UN presence in Korea, particularly if they can demonstrate abuses and actions by UN instrumentalities that UN members would disapprove or at a minimum frown upon. 3. It seems to us that an approach of this type by Soviets would focus on the following three areas: A. Military Armistice Agreement Violations. (1) Radio Pyongyang and other Communist propaganda outlets have placed growing emphasis on allegations of US-ROK violations along DMZ. As Department aware, we have indications that there probably have been a small number of forays across the MDL by ROK armed forces. The NK regime probably has photographic and physical evidence to prove that such attacks by ROK forces occurred. (In a number of NK raids into the ROK area, they have stripped ROK and US bodies of personal belongings and pocket litter. This type of item, which is difficult to fabricate, would make dramatic evidence to support NK charges.) Soviets or other Bloc country could introduce charges of Armistice Agreement violations by UNC forces during Korean item debate and then produce evidence provided by NK to prove charges. Since ROK forces are under UNC operational control, the Soviets could then make case in the UNGA that UN forces themselves are violating the armistice agreement which they pledged to uphold and urge withdrawal UN presence. (2) In meeting these charges, we could, of course, point to the NK violations, particularly the spate of incidents along the DMZ in late October and early November. In this connection, it is necessary for us to bear in mind that we cannot prove with any evidence, nor for that matter do we have intelligence information, that military personnel of the North Korean armed forces conducted those raids. The best we can argue is that such incidents were either the consequences of crossings by North Korean intelligence agents or infiltrations conducted by NK armed personnel, probably from the Reconnaissance Bureau. It may be a fine point but it is important to be aware that Reconnaissance Bureau personnel are civilians, though uniformed, and not NK armed forces personnel. Some elements of the Reconnaissance Bureau, however, are under the operational control of the NK field command. In brief, we have no evidence or intelligence information to charge that the NK regime breached the Military Armistice agreement by undertaking actions into ROK territory with military personnel of the NK armed forces. (3) The distinction between the NK violations of the DMZ and the ROKG violations may be a fine one but we believe that those members of the UN who are unenthusiastic or are fence sitters on the Korean items may be less outraged by violations of the DMZ made by espionage and civilian reconnaissance agents than they would be by an out-and-out violation of the agreement by purely military personnel from regular military formations. B. Abuse of UN Authority. Reports from a number of posts indicate that the NK regime and other Communist nations have seized upon the fact that a ROK unit landed in Vietnam, carrying a UN flag. We expect that the Soviets and others will be looking for other evidence of such unauthorized use of the UN name, its flag or other symbol as ammunition to argue against the UN presence in Korea. The Soviets may well seize upon VUNC as another example of an unauthorized activity conducted in the UN name. C. UNC: Operational Control of ROK Forces. (1) The Soviets could also seize upon UNC operational control of ROK forces for exploitation. They could point out that the UNC, a UN instrumentality, has operational control over the armed forces of a non-UN nation, an action going beyond the authority of the UN resolution. Though this practice has existed since the Korean War. We are unaware of any action by the UN, per se, to authorize it. (2) We should also be aware that the UN resolution called only for a "Unified Command" and the phrase "United Nations Command" does not appear in any UN resolutions. "UNC" appears to have been adopted at the beginning of the Korean War as a name for the "Unified Command" solely as a unilateral action by the US and, though unchallenged over the years, is, nevertheless, without UN sanction. 3. In this era of UN peace-keeping forces in various parts of the world, the UNC is an anomaly in terms of its relationships to the UN. Admittedly the Korean arrangement is unique in that the UN placed the Unified Command "under the United States," requested the US to appoint a commander and requested the US to make reports to the Security Council, all in recognition that major hostilities were underway. Now that hostilities have been over for thirteen years, the Soviets could argue that the pattern established for other UN peace-keeping forces in their relationships with the UN should be followed or UNC should be stripped of its UN cloak. 4. It can be argued that much of the foregoing is based on "hairsplitting" and highly legalistic contentions. Nevertheless, if the Soviets wish to obfuscate the basic issue during the Korean unification debate, they could, by adopting any or all of the approaches outlined above, hit us in areas where we are vulnerable and would be on the defensive. Given the sense of ennui on the Korean item that USUN reports is present among some UN members and the lack of interest in this item on the part of many new UN members, this new approach by the Soviets could attract new and undesired type of interest, particularly since the US would be cast in the wrongdoer's role. In a forum such as the UNGA, arguments based on highly legalistic interpretations often find more favor than those based on moral justification. 5. We recognize that the foregoing is speculative but it is within the realm of possibility. Because it is potentially, and could be sufficiently, damaging, we believe that thought should be given to the tactics we and the ROKG should use in reply. It also raises the question as to whether we should initiate actions, at the UNGA, such as charging the Communists with violations of the DMZ in order to preempt the possibility of their charging us with violations. 6. Department and USUN in better position to determine whether any action should be taken. We have not discussed any of the foregoing with the Foreign Minister since the Ministry does not appear to be aware of the ROK forays across the MDL. If the above speculation appears reasonable, the Department may wish to discuss matter on a personal and private basis with ROK Foreign Minister to insure that he is aware of dangers and to assure his advice on tactics. Brown
103. Editorial Note On December 1, 1966, Korean officials presented to Ambassador Brown the Korean Government's proposal for providing additional assistance in Vietnam. The plan, entitled "Proposed Support Program to Pacification Plan of RVN," consisted of three components: (1) "Support for Stable Life of VN People," centering on refugee resettlement; medical assistance and social welfare programs; development of agriculture, fishing, and light industry; cultural exchanges and a campaign against illiteracy; and a village project; (2) "National Construction: Rehabilitation and Construction of Military Establishments," a civilian service corps consisting of Korean workers; and (3) "Assistance to Military Efforts," with Korea providing a civilian paramilitary unit to carry out support duties within Vietnam and training for Vietnamese military personnel at facilities within Korea. (Telegram 2970 from Seoul, December 3; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 27 VIET S) After reviewing the proposals, the Embassy concluded that component (1) "fit well into the Vietnamese 'Revolutionary Development' Program," addressed several important needs, and could be advantageously fulfilled by the Koreans, who were "more likely fit readily into and more apt gain acceptance of local Vietnamese societies" than Caucasians from the United States or elsewhere. The Embassy considered component (2) both a continuation of current programs and a significantly more ambitious, and unrealistic, project envisaging between 20 and 50,000 Korean workers being sent to Vietnam as laborers. The Embassy acknowledged the potential value of providing military training to Vietnamese in Korea, but believed the planned paramilitary unit would appear to be an escalation of Korea's military role in Vietnam and unnecessarily create political opposition to President Pak. (Telegram 2971 from Seoul, December 3; ibid.)
104. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ Washington, December 1, 1966. /1/Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, East Asia and Pacific General File, Weekly Staff Meetings, August through December 1966. Secret. Drafted on December 5. McAfee sent this memorandum to Hughes, Denney, and Evans. SUBJECT /2/Agenda at Tab A. [Footnote in the source text; attached but not printed.] PARTICIPANTS Korea Mr. Colby said that his staff had done an analysis of the recent upsurge in North Korean attacks across the demilitarized zone and had come to the conclusion that these attacks might signal the adoption of a new North Korean policy which might culminate in an all-out attack./3/ The fact that the North Korean party had recently held a congress during which they decided to draw away from the Chinese Communists, but without joining up with the Soviets, seemed to support this conclusion. Mr. Colby said he was not fully persuaded of the correctness of this analysis; Mr. Bundy agreed that the situation did not appear to have developed to a point warranting these judgments. Mr. Bundy went on to say that General Bonesteel had vigorously argued for the conclusion that the North Koreans had adopted a new aggressive policy. The General also called for some retaliatory action to protect his troops. One could sympathize with the General, but here again Mr. Bundy did not find himself in agreement. Mr. Bundy said, however, that he thought perhaps the General was right in believing that the North Koreans were attacking and trying to infiltrate South Korea in order to do what they could to disrupt the April elections. The opposition in South Korea had been claiming for some time that South Korean strength was not sufficient to protect the country. The North Korean strategy appeared to be tailored to aid the opposition. /3/[text not declassified] (Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Country Files, East Asia and Pacific General File, East Asia Reviews, 1964-1966) [Here follows discussion of China, Vietnam, Japan, Malaysia, and the Philippines.]
105. Letter From the Ambassador to Korea (Brown) to the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs (Bundy)/1/ Seoul, December 13, 1966. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, DEF 19 KOR S-US. Confidential. Dear Bill: SUBJECT Following up on our conversation with the Secretary in Tokyo on December 6,/2/ I enclose a self-explanatory table provided by General Bonesteel, showing authorized, assigned and on-board strength of U.S. Eighth Army in Korea as of the end of each month for the period December 31, 1965 through November 30, 1966. /2/Rusk visited Tokyo December 5-7 to meet with senior Japanese officials. You will note that as of November 30 the on-ground strength was 43,748, on an upward trend from a low of 38,711 on September 30, and with a projected on-ground strength of 49,000 for December 31, 1966. If this figure can be reached and maintained, and especially if the quality mix in terms of specialties is such as to fill some of our more glaring present deficiencies, we should be in reasonably good shape. We have little hope of getting a good mix, however./3/ /3/In a second letter to Bundy, December 13, continuing discussion of U.S. Army strength. Brown stated that "one of our main problems here was that even when we had enough bodies we did not have people with the right qualifications and experience. The result, therefore, is that the combat effectiveness of the forces is far less than would appear from their numerical strength." Brown attached an in-depth study of the problem done by Bonesteel. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, DEF 19 KOR S-US) You can see how disturbing the trend from March through September and even October was to all of us here. I hope that the assumption in the last paragraph of the enclosed table is correct. We should keep close tabs on it both here and in Washington. It was good to see you. All best wishes for Christmas and the New Year. Very sincerely yours, Win
Attachment EIGHTH US ARMY STRENGTH POSTURE 1. Below are listed Eighth US Army strengths as of the end of each month for the period 31 December 1965 through 30 November 1966.
2. Projection for December 1966 from Department of the Army is: Assigned--51,800 Department of the Army has given no projections for strength beyond December 1966; however, it is assumed that Eighth US Army will be maintained at approximately 51,000 assigned during the period January-June 1967.
106. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ Washington, December 19, 1966. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL KOR S-US. Confidential. Drafted by Fleck and approved in S on January 4. The memorandum is Part I of II. SUBJECT PARTICIPANTS Tong Won Lee, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Korea The Secretary of State The Korean Elections 1. In response to the Secretary's question whether the outcome of the voting on the Korean item would affect the elections, the Foreign Minister replied that a defeat would have had a profound negative impact on the government's position./2/ In his opinion, neither Yu Chin-o nor Yun Po-son had much chance of defeating President Pak, but "an election is an election." He believed that the main issues in the elections would be Korean participation in Viet-Nam and ROK-Japan relations. The Secretary asked whether the recent smuggling case would have an effect. Lee replied affirmatively, stating that the two primary factors in that case were President Pak's determination to treat the culprits on a legal rather than a political basis and the widespread popular interest in effective government. /2/The U.S.-ROK-UNC resolutions on the Korean items were all upheld. Details of the resolutions and voting results are in Yearbook of the United Nations: 1966, pp. 138-146. Bilateral Ministerial Meetings 2. The Foreign Minister proposed that his government and the United States initiate annual bilateral ministerial meetings similar to those held by the United States with Japan and Canada. Since the U.S. representatives visited Tokyo once a year for this purpose, there was no reason why they should not proceed to Seoul during the same trip. The existing lines of communication between the ROK Government and the United States Government were excellent; therefore, such meetings would bring no additional substantive benefits. They would, however, make a good public impression and would heighten the prestige of the ROK Government. The Secretary's assent to this proposal would be a Christmas souvenir for the ROKG. The holding of the first such meeting prior to the Korean elections would be a helpful gesture by the United States which would give President Pak "a shining face" prior to the elections. 3. The Secretary replied that he hoped this proposal would not be made publicly. He wanted the Foreign Minister to know that he believes such meetings are not a very efficient way in which to transact business. The agenda has a tendency to become overcrowded and there is usually insufficient time to cover the agenda items properly. The Secretary said he would think about Lee's proposal but he was convinced that individual talks with individual ministers were a highly preferable way of transacting business./3/ /3/In a summary of this conversation, Rusk noted: "We do not favor this proposal and believe it would be particularly inopportune and almost impossible to arrange prior to Korean elections." (Telegram 105138 to Seoul, December 19; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL KOR S-US) U.S. Assistance to Pak's Election Campaign 4. The Foreign Minister then asked that the United States Government make some public gesture which would be interpreted in Korea as support for President Pak in his campaign for reelection. The Secretary asked if public opinion in Korea regarding the United States would be helpful to the government in the elections. Lee replied that this would definitely be the case and that the Secretary had seen for himself during President Johnson's recent visit to Korea the deep feeling for the United States which existed among the Korean populace. Ambassador Kim added that, in his opinion, the U.S. attitude toward President Pak and his administration will determine the results of the election. Later, as the Foreign Minister was leaving, he asked when the Secretary was planning to visit Seoul. The Secretary replied that he had no immediate plans for doing so inasmuch as he had just been there. The Foreign Minister urged the Secretary to consider the possibility of going to Seoul and publicly praising Pak's leadership, prior to the election./4/ /4/The second part of this discussion focused on Vietnam, ASPAC, SEATO, and developments in China. (Memorandum of conversation, Part II of II, December 19; ibid.) The Foreign Minister discussed similar topics in a meeting with McNamara on December 19. (Memorandum of conversation, December 22; Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD/OASD/ISA Files: FRC 70 A 4443, Korea 091.112)
107. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Smith) to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow)/1/ Washington, January 19, 1967. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Korea, Vol. IV. Top Secret. According to an attached memorandum from Donald Ropa of the NSC Staff to Smith, January 19, both he and Walter Jenkins of the NSC Staff did not object to the proposed telegram. For your clearance. This cable replies to Win Brown's reluctance to ask Park now to commit another Korean combat division to Vietnam in 1967. It asks Brown's views on the suggestion that he get Park's tentative commitment now, before the Korean elections, to deploy another division later this year. BKS
Attachment/2/ Draft Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Korea Washington, undated. /2/Top Secret; Exdis. The telegram as sent was not found, but it was apparently transmitted to Seoul. Exclusive for Ambassador and info General Bonesteel--eyes only--from Bundy and McNaughton. Refs: A. Seoul's 2756. B. Seoul's 2760. C. State 88135./3/ /3/Document 101; footnote 6, Document 101; and Document 100, respectively. 1. We recognize and accept cogency of arguments you advance in refs A and B. We are aware of public statements by President Pak and MND Kim that no more ROK troops will be sent to Viet-Nam. Also aware of Pak's December 17 press conference statement that military aspect of Viet-Nam war has passed crest and that there no longer any doubt who will win./4/ We recognize political difficulties with which Pak would be faced if we asked him to publicly commit more troops prior to June elections. We also understand dangers of seeking private commitment from Pak now to be made public following elections. /4/A summary of Pak's comments was transmitted in telegram 3258 from Seoul, December 20. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 15-1 KOR S) 2. Nevertheless, our primary objective for additional ROK contributions to Viet-Nam is to secure more combat troops. We are concerned that too rapid negotiation or acceptance of Korean officers of non-military or para-military additional participation in Viet-Nam may lead ROKG to believe our desires can be satisfied by such programs. On other hand, we have noted your comment para 5 ref B that such additional involvement might contribute to psychological climate making possible additional military contribution after elections./5/ While we see merit in some of the ROKG proposals, our final positions regarding U.S. financial support for them will depend importantly upon President Park's attitude toward despatching an additional division to Viet-Nam later in 1967. That division is what we really want. /5/In paragraph 5 of telegram 2760 from Seoul, November 22, 1966, Brown wrote that with regard to expanded Korean involvement in Vietnam "the only path which appears likely to be successful is the non-military one. It is now beyond the realm of possibility that this added involvement could, after election, contribute to a psychological climate in which it might be possible to get further troop contributions." 3. Problem is complicated by fact that U.S. deployments to Viet-Nam may level off after mid-1967. Public discussion following ROK elections of despatch of additional ROK troops might thus coincide with publicity regarding stabilization of U.S. effort in Viet-Nam. 4. It occurs to us that one approach to solving this dilemma would be for you to have frank informal chat with Pak. In course of conversation you might make following points: a. As President Johnson, Premier Ky, and General Westmoreland have indicated, more Free World forces are necessary in Viet-Nam to bring struggle to early favorable conclusion; b. Accordingly, President Johnson has decided to increase U.S. forces there during CY 67 to level 35 percent above that existing at time of Manila Conference. This for President Pak's private information and no one else. This will result in participation in Viet-Nam of about 25 percent of all U.S. ground forces by end CY 1967 and we would be hard pressed to further increase ground forces, in view commitments elsewhere, including Korea. About .27 percent of U.S. population will be involved in Viet-Nam by end 1967. An equivalent Korean contribution in Viet-Nam would be in excess of 70,000. c. Additional troops will be needed for various purposes. One requirement will be for troops to man a physical barrier in SVN south of the DMZ, for which plans now being developed. Size and character of additional manpower requirements for this barrier will depend on decisions yet to be made on the form the barrier will take. U.S. and GVN forces will both be employed in this undertaking but Korean anti-infiltration training and experience could be particularly valuable in this type of assignment. This is one possible area for employment of additional Korean troops; d. USG welcomes ROKG proposals to send non-military or para-military forces to participate in SVN pacification program. We hope agreement can be reached on arrangements both useful in SVN and beneficial to ROK. However, we regard such participation as additive to, rather than as substitute for more combat troops; e. The USG would be prepared to support additional troops in whatever form was most desirable from ROKG viewpoint; f. We hope ROKG could provide as soon as possible after ROK elections an additional division, perhaps composed of volunteer veterans; g. USG knows that Pak is confronted by elections and that this makes it difficult for him to make any commitment now. However, in order that we may make our fiscal, manpower and other plans for 1967 we are at this time asking if President Pak would be prepared to make a tentative commitment for the despatch of another division to Viet-Nam later in 1967. 5. Request your comment on approach suggested para 4 above or any alternative suggestions you may have for expediting ROKG decision to send another division to Viet-Nam.
108. Telegram From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State/1/ Seoul, February 22, 1967, 0325Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-3 VIET S. Secret; Priority; Exdis; Louisiana. Repeated to Saigon. 4420. Subj: ROK Troops to Vietnam. 1. Prime Minister has told us that he and Min of National Defense, as result recent visit to Vietnam, have concluded that marine brigade now in Vietnam should be reinforced by one additional battalion, provided it could be equipped and supported by U.S. Subject had not been discussed with President but PriMin plans see President this week and to recommend additional marine battalion. 2. To avoid difficulty with National Assembly additional company would be attached to each marine battalion in Vietnam as replacement /reserve company. Some time after elections, companies would be reassembled and fourth battalion formally constituted as part of marine brigade. PriMin feels pre-election despatch in manner he suggests would be within present National Assembly authorization. 3. Comment: If President approves despatch of additional marine battalion,/2/ question will undoubtedly be raised with us promptly by ROKG on financial and equipment support for additional unit. Assume in light of discussions here during President Johnson visit and messages in this series, that U.S. would welcome additional marine battalion and that we would be prepared to provide equipment and financial support for that unit along lines governing second despatch of ROK forces to Vietnam. /2/In telegram 4443 from Seoul, February 23, the Embassy advised that Pak approved sending three additional replacement/reserve companies for the marine battalions already in Vietnam. (Ibid.) 4. MND has also told CINCUNC of his plans send additional marine battalion to Vietnam. Press also hints of further troop despatch as result PriMin visit to Vietnam (see Seoul 4413)./3/ /3/Telegram 4413 from Seoul, February 21, discusses press coverage of the Prime Minister's visit to Vietnam, particularly media speculation that Vietnamese leaders had requested additional Korean troops. (Ibid.) In a February 23 conference with visiting Vietnamese journalists, however, Pak stated that Korea "faces `one million' North Korean troops along DMZ and cannot afford to deploy additional troops to Viet-Nam." (Telegram 4470 from Seoul, February 24; ibid.) Brown
109. Memorandum From the Representative to the United Nations (Goldberg) to President Johnson/1/ New York, undated. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Rusk Files: Lot 72 D 192, Secretary's Miscellaneous Correspondence. Secret. Attached to a March 9 letter from Goldberg to Rusk transmitting the memorandum as a supplement to Goldberg's "oral report to the President on my trip to Asia" and noting that he "restricted its distribution because of its sensitive nature to the President" and to Rusk. SUBJECT Because of my responsibilities in connection with the Outer Space Treaty, I was able to visit only five countries on the first leg of the trip to Asia and to spend a shorter time in each one than I would have desired: one day each in Korea, Taiwan and the Philippines, two and a half days in Japan, and three days in South Vietnam. IV. Korea In Korea, I talked to both the President and the Prime Minister with candor about the difficulties of preventing some action within the UN which would denigrate Korea's standing in the international community; I noted that composition of the UN is far different now than it was in the 1950's; that many Afro-Asians were inclined to avoid taking sides in disputes they see as US-Soviet "cold war" disputes; that others are tempted to side with North Korea to encourage its continued movement away from Peking toward Moscow; and, finally, that our intimate connection with Korea can mean that African dissatisfaction with the US on issues vital to them, but quite extraneous to the Korean problem, can adversely affect African support of the joint US-Korean position on the Korean problem. I believe this explanation, plus assurances I gave that US is not prepared to sacrifice Korean interests in the UN or elsewhere for the sake of getting along with the Soviets, has helped to dispel suspicion among the Koreans that our doubts about continuing with the same tactics on the Korean question in the UN may stem from a desire to reach a detente with the Soviets and a willingness to sacrifice Korean interests in the process.
110. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ Washington, March 14, 1967, 12-12:40 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 7 KOR S. Secret; Nodis. The meeting took place in the Oval Office. The Prime Minister, accompanied by the Minister of Defense and the Minister of Commerce, visited the United States March 14 and 15. U.S. objectives of the visit were to maintain close and warm relations with the ROK, to continue bilateral U.S.-Korean relations on Vietnam, to assure Korea of continued U.S. military and economic support, and to demonstrate U.S. support for Pak. (Memorandum from Rusk to Johnson, March 11; ibid., POL 15-1 KOR S) A summary of the topics discussed and the U.S. responses was transmitted in telegram 157793 to Seoul, March 17. (Ibid., POL 7 KOR S) A joint statement issued at the conclusion of this meeting is in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1967, pp. 775-776. PARTICIPANTS The President welcomed the Prime Minister to his office and told him that he wanted to talk privately before they joined the rest of the official party in the Cabinet Room. The President wanted to tell the Prime Minister that, of all the nations he had visited during his Asian tour last fall, he enjoyed Korea the most. He wanted the Prime Minister to tell President Park and the Korean people how impressed he was with the courage, friendship, gallantry, and love of freedom evinced by the people of Korea. Moreover, General Westmoreland has said that there are no finer fighting men in Viet-Nam than the Korean troops there, and the President wanted the Prime Minister to tell the mothers of these fine boys just how proud we all are of the job they are doing in Viet-Nam. The President said he would be going to Guam to discuss matters of personnel, planning and the pacification program with Ambassador Lodge and General Westmoreland; he would be leaving next Saturday night (March 18). The President was aware that the Prime Minister had been in Viet-Nam not long ago and would want to hear the Prime Minister's impressions of the situation there. The President said he wanted to talk about what Korea might be able to do in Viet-Nam after the Korean elections--not only explore the possibility of sending more military forces, but also civilian groups. The President noted the great contribution which Korea has already made in Viet-Nam: he said it had been an impossible job, which the Koreans had done magnificently. The problem now, the President said, is to get our men out of Viet-Nam as soon as possible. It is not only essential to finish the military job quickly, but also to work toward building up civil institutions--creating a proper environment for elections and transferring power to a civilian government. In this connection, the experience of the Koreans in recent years will be of great value to us and to the Vietnamese. We need to concentrate on the civilian programs. The President said he was hoping for more help in this regard from Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, and others. The President asked the Prime Minister's views regarding this matter. Continuing, the President pointed out that he was sending Mr. Ball to Korea on March 16./2/ The President said he was very anxious that this mission be successful, since it is of vital importance that we find ways to promote American private investment in Korea and trade between our two countries. The President said he would be talking with Mr. Ball and the members of the mission prior to their departure, and would underline to them the importance of what they could do. /2/Ball, an executive at the Lehman Brothers investment firm, headed a group of business representatives from 23 companies and 3 banks visiting Korea. The Embassy and Ball deemed the mission highly successful, because most of the representatives expressed an intent to invest in Korea or to study investment potentials further. (Telegram 5130 from Seoul, March 28; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 7 US; and letter from Ball to President Johnson, May 16; Johnson Library, National Security File, Special Head of State Correspondence, Korea, April 1, 1967 to December 31, 1967) The President then asked the Prime Minister for his views on Viet-Nam. The Prime Minister conveyed to the President the warm personal regards of President Park. The Prime Minister said that the President was now known to all Koreans, even in the smallest villages. [Here follows discussion of Vietnam.] The Prime Minister then presented to the President a personal letter from President Park. (The letter concerned modernization of Korean military equipment, US assistance in supplying Korean food to Korean troops in Viet-Nam and Korean participation in the pacification program.)/3/ /3/A copy of Pak's March 8 letter, attached to a March 14 letter from Fleck to Rear Admiral Lemos is in National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 7 KOR S. The President told the Prime Minister that we would consider immediately the points raised in President Park's letter. He said he would consult with Secretary McNamara on the question of supplying Korean troops and on military equipment immediately. Regarding the pacification program the President told the Prime Minister that this would be a subject of conversation during his Guam talks with General Westmoreland and that our new ambassador would be in touch with the Korean Government to see how we can join together in our efforts. The President asked the Prime Minister when the Korean elections would be held. The Prime Minister replied that the elections were scheduled for May 3. The President asked if the Government were having any troubles. The Prime Minister replied that, although the opposition was now united, President Park was very popular and respected by the people. The Prime Minister expected that President Park would enjoy a majority of a few million votes. The President asked if Viet-Nam were a difficult issue for the Government. The Prime Minister said it was, but that the normalization of relations with Japan was the biggest issue for the opposition. The President asked if President Park would make it all right; the Prime Minister said that he would--with President Johnson's help. The Prime Minister said that he wanted to discuss the modernization of Korean forces, and had three specific requests: (a) The Prime Minister requested that Korean helicopter pilots be trained for duty in Viet-Nam in conjunction with Korean forces there. The Prime Minister noted that, at present, American helicopter pilots are being used to transport ROK troops, but said that the problem of language was hampering the efficiency of this operation. The President said he would talk with the Defense Department about this problem. (b) The Prime Minister referred to the recent sinking of a Korean navy vessel by a North Korean shore batteries and said that Korea needs one more destroyer. The Prime Minister said there was a danger that the North Koreans would intensify their espionage and other military activities in the pre-election period. The day before the Prime Minister left Korea (March 9) three North Korean agents had been apprehended. The Prime Minister believed that more and more of these agents would be sent down to the South as the elections grew nearer. The Prime Minister repeated his request for a "small" destroyer as soon as possible. He said the destroyers presently in service in the Korean navy had been in use since 1946 and were the oldest type still in operation. Their speed was only in the 18-24 knot range, and they were simply not competitive as compared with North Korean naval equipment. (c) Referring to President Park's letter to the Prime Minister described to the President the importance to Korean troops of kimchi, which he said was vitally important to the morale of Korean troops. The Prime Minister said that, when he had been in the United States at the Command and General Staff College he had longed for kimchi even more than he had longed for his wife back in Korea. Similarly, the Korean troops in Viet-Nam vitally needed their kimchi. Last Christmas President Park had sent some kimchi to the troops in Viet-Nam, paying the expense out of his own pocket. To supply sufficient quantities of kimchi would cost something like $3-4 million per year. The Prime Minister apologized for raising what he said appeared to be a minor matter but said that President Park had specifically asked him to mention the problem to President Johnson. As President Johnson started to proceed to the Cabinet Room, the Prime Minister said he had one last request to make. In view of the importance of developing the Korean economy--which President Johnson himself had often stressed--it is vital that Korean exports to all parts of the world be increased, especially to the United States. The Prime Minister proposed that an annual meeting of the Korean Minister of Commerce and Industry and the US Secretary of Commerce be instituted. The Prime Minister said that this matter is very important to his Government. The President said that we will accept this proposal. The President and the Prime Minister ended their private conversation at this point, proceeding to meet with the rest of the official party in the Cabinet Room. [Continue with the next documents]
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