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FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1964-1968, Volume XXIX Korea
Department of State |
Korea 122. Editorial Note Vice President Humphrey visited Seoul June 30-July 3, 1967, to attend the inauguration of President Pak July 1. The Vice President and President Pak met privately on June 30 for an hour and 15 minutes during which time the Vice President briefed President Pak on President Johnson's meetings with Soviet Prime Minister Kosygin at Glassboro, New Jersey, on June 23 and 25 and discussed with him the situation in Vietnam. President Pak expressed his support for U.S. policy in Vietnam, stating that in his view the conflict could be resolved by: "1) continuing military pressure on the enemy; 2) careful support of the process of building constitutional government and of the pacification program; 3) opening of all avenues of discussion and dialog toward a possible peace settlement in Vietnam." (Telegram 7076 from Seoul, June 30; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 7 US/HUMPHREY) In addition to attending the inauguration ceremonies on July 1, Vice President Humphrey met with Prime Minister Sato for a wide-ranging discussion of the Glassboro summit, the Middle East, and economic issues. (Telegram 24 from Seoul, July 2; ibid.) He also met with members of the South Vietnamese delegation. The primary focus of their discussion was the political situation and upcoming elections in South Vietnam. (Telegram 20 from Seoul, July 1; ibid.) The only untoward incident occurring during the inaugural program involved members of the New Democratic Party broadcasting over loudspeakers in close proximity to inauguration ceremonies. The Embassy reported that President Pak "was personally insulted and nation humiliated in front of foreign dignitaries by conduct of NDP." (Telegram 280 from Seoul, July 17; ibid., POL 15 KOR S) An ill-conceived remark about the incident was erroneously attributed to Vice President Humphrey and widely reported by the media in Korea and in the United States, causing him personal embarrassment and distress. (Telegrams 61 and 69 from Seoul, both July 5, telegram 98 from Seoul, July 6, and letter from Humphrey to Rusk, July 15, among others; all ibid., POL 7 US/HUMPHREY) On July 2 Vice President Humphrey met with President Pak and Prime Minister Chung, as well as Vice President Yen of the Republic of China and Prime Minister Sato of Japan. The 1 1/2 hour meeting, labeled by the media as the "Little Summit," focused on concerns about Communist China and its emergence as a nuclear power. (Telegram 29 from Seoul, July 2; ibid.) The following day, July 3, the Vice President met with Vice President Yen for a discussion of regional issues, including Vietnam. (Telegram 48 from Seoul, July 4; ibid.) Humphrey also paid a farewell visit to President Pak. They reviewed comments made at the Little Summit and matters pertaining to Vietnam, particularly the upcoming elections, the pacification program, and security matters. (Telegram 47 from Seoul, July 4; ibid.) Vice President Humphrey submitted on July 6 a detailed report to President Johnson and Secretary Rusk discussing his trip to Korea. The report summarized his discussions in Seoul, recorded his impressions of the Asian leaders with whom he met, outlined the relevant issues important to each Asian leader, and contained policy recommendations. On Korea, the Vice President recommended giving high priority to Korean requests for security and communications equipment to assist in the fight against North Korean infiltration, granting generous technical and economic assistance in case Korea decided to furnish additional troops for Vietnam, continuing support for the Korean Institute of Science and Technology as well as for educational exchange programs between the United States and South Korea, and using "United States leverage and assistance in the political field" to foster the continued development of constitutional democracy in the Republic of Korea. (Memorandum from Humphrey to the President, July 6; Johnson Library, National Security File, Name File, Vice President, Vol. II) The Vice President received a detailed commentary on the points raised in his report from Secretary Rusk in which Rusk noted that the Vice President's recommended actions relative to Korea were already being implemented or under consideration. (Memorandum from Rusk to Humphrey, July 28; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 7 US/HUMPHREY)
123. Memorandum From Alfred Jenkins of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow)/1/ Washington, July 26, 1967. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Korea, Vol. IV. Secret. SUBJECT State, Defense and CIA have now all agreed that a SNIE is desirable as Bonesteel recommends in paragraph 15 of the attached telegram. I am told that the terms of reference for the SNIE should be arrived at before the week is over, that it will take about two weeks to write it, and perhaps another two weeks to coordinate and clear the results. We can expect the end product near the first of September./2/ /2/Document 130. Ambassador Porter has requested, however, that the Country Team message, also referred to in para. 15, be held up until his arrival August 9. Sam Berger was not inclined to believe the situation was quite so serious as Bonesteel implies. Ben Fleck observed that while the Country Team in Seoul was in substantial agreement as to the seriousness of the situation, there was not full agreement as to what should be done about it. Perhaps the SNIE will be beneficial to their thinking as well as ours. This seems to fit the picture of heightened tension all around Communist China's periphery. I doubt that these days North Korea is concerting its plans in any way with Peking. They may, however, be taking advantage of heightened tensions by acting concomitantly. In doing so, they can indicate support for their Vietnamese ideological brothers, at least be in line with China in its anti-American policy, and not be irritating their Soviet friends in the process. They would seem to be out to cause maximum trouble short of precipitating any real confrontation with us. AJ
Attachment/3/ Telegram From the Commander in Chief, United Nations Command, Korea and the Commander of United States Forces, Korea (Bonesteel) to the Commander in Chief, Pacific (Sharp) Korea, July 21, 1967, 1207Z. /3/Secret; Eyes Only. Repeated to Generals Wheeler and Johnson in Washington; General Beach, CINCUSARPAC, Hawaii; and General McKee in Japan; and passed to Bundy and Jorden at the White House; General Carter, Director, NSA; and Helms, Colby, and Jack Smith of the DDI at CIA. KRA 1579. Following message passed to you for your info per DIA. Subject: Situation in Korea as of mid-July 1967. 1. Events here since my last summary in my KRA 1374 dated 25 June 1967/4/ have continued at a somewhat intensified pace. /4/Not found. 2. Internal political affairs are well covered by current Embassy cables. There appears to be little hope for DRP compromise with opposition and internal scars of June 8 elections are by no means healed. 3. In regard to North Korean actions, it becomes clearer as time moves on that a significant effort is underway to try to apply subversive war against the ROK. 4. An interesting facet of this derives from review and analysis of NK statements at Panmunjom and the parallel NK propaganda line pushed out increasingly since last autumn for Pyongyang, Moscow and NK embassies world wide. The theme has two parts. First is that the imperialistic Yankees and their ROK puppets are trying to reopen the Korean War to take pressure off Vietnam and are flagrantly violating the armistice to provoke such an event--and the North Koreans are prepared for such a war so that if it occurs they will annihilate us. (Of note in this regard is that interrogations of recently captured agents reiterate NK view I reported in my KRA 1795 of 10 Nov 66/5/ that NK's evaluate US as so overextended in support Vietnam that we would be unable adequately to reinforce Korea in case of war.) The second part of propaganda theme is constant repetition of the big lie to the effect that none of the aggressive actions along DMZ or in interior of ROK are result of NK activity. On contrary they reiterate monotonously that this is all due to South Koreans who are fighting to throw off Yankee yoke; i.e., it is an indigenous, Korea-style "Vietcong" activity. Absurdity of this in light repeated proof that all actions are by North Korean agent/guerrillas does not faze them. /5/Document 99. 5. I consider this propaganda line the tip-off to the growing seriousness of North Korean intentions and capabilities. NKs seem seriously embarked on a large scale effort to try to develop a subversive war in ROK and I think it now timely for us to conscientiously review the bidding on policies re North Korea, on how and what US and ROKs should be prepared to do if NKs escalate their subversive activities, and on priorities re MAP and AID assistance to ROK. North Koreans are arrogantly disavowing their flagrant and large scale violations of the armistice in what seems to be an effort to build acceptance by world public opinion for their intensification of hostile subversive acts with little or no risk to them for their de facto abrogation of the armistice. They are, in other words, carefully trying to make the US and rest of world accustomed as a matter of course to steadily increasing hostile action against ROK at no great risk to North Korea, in same way that in Vietnam the Geneva Accords and Vietnam DMZ were eroded and bypassed by Communists in effort to delay timely and effective free world reaction and confuse the real issues. All this jibes with speeches and directives by Kim Il-sung from his March 65 requirement for more effective espionage activities against ROK, in context of how Mao's Chinese Communists had "liberated" China by guerrilla action and how guerrillas in Vietnam were "successfully" carrying out their mission, through to his policy address of 5 October 1966, when he stressed the need for expanding preparations for war and adopting more aggressive tactics in anti-ROK operations to achieve earlier unification of the "fatherland."/6/ /6/A discussion of the points made by Kim Il-sung in his October 1966 address is in Intelligence Note No. 94, February 2, 1968. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 32-4 KOR) 6. Intelligence indicates NKs have now trained in special unit schools and have available for dispatch some 1200 or more specially selected agent-guerrilla personnel. Some instructors have been in Vietnam. All are capable of conducting subversion, espionage, agitation, and supporting or carrying out militant guerrilla action. More are currently in training. In addition they have been carefully training for two years 500 subversives in each of the nine NK provinces for guerrilla activity in a target ROK province assigned to each of the NK provinces. This adds up to 5,000 or more specially trained thugs. We must also take into account their 4,070-man reconnaissance brigade, a special-forces-type unit capable of being employed in guerrilla operations. Thus total available for future NK subversive utilization adds up to about 10,000. 7. Current para-guerrilla action in interior of ROK is now clearly confirmed to be test of ability to operate in current ROK environment and reconnaissance to support later large-scale real guerrilla action. We call current activity "para-guerrilla" because so far sabotage and widespread terrorism has not been practiced. One interrogated captive has said [garble--current] plan is to start active phase of sabotage, blowing up railroads, bridges and buildings, terrorism, etc., next year but perhaps later this year if conditions permit. Another has said they may put in up to 400 agents this year. NKs appear at this time to be able to land para-guerrilla teams from their fast boats almost at will. [5-1/2 lines of source text not declassified] 8. Detected para-guerrilla activity has now developed in three areas: Taebaek-san, West Chiri-san, and west of Ulsan. Every day there are sightings, contacts and firefights. Box score since 1 January from actions in interior of ROK, excluding DMZ and contiguous areas, is: firefights 63; North Koreans 81 KIA, 33 captured; ROKs (ROKA, KNP and civilians) 40 KIA, (including four or five farmers murdered), 88 WIA. These figures do not include another sizeable number of agents and collaborators picked up by normal police action. We have identified in action about a dozen teams of from seven to sixteen NKs each but are hard put to figure how many overall actually have been introduced so far, but might be as many as twenty. Rainy season now beginning will facilitate SEA infiltration if NKs wish to continue buildup. ROKs with our support are giving them a really rough time and civil population is being extraordinarily helpful. With difficulties of getting food and of resupply, plus loyalty to ROK of the people, the para-guerrilla effort so far this year has faced real difficulties. 9. Embassy and UNC for past year or so have taken position that internal security of ROK against agent and subversive activity should be function of ROK civilian security and police agencies, with ROK military supporting internal operations only when necessary while concentrating on trying to stop infiltration through DMZ or by interceptions at sea. We have emphasized internal security should be prime responsibility of ROKG not UNC though we of course willing to help when needed. President Park now considers trend of NK subversive activity potentially dangerous to sense of security of ROK as well as to its economic investment programs and progress. He has in past week called together senior cabinet members a number of times and put heat on ROK CIA and Korean National Police to rapidly build up better internal security capability and to reduce required support by military. KNP has long way to go, however, so I have authorized temporary use of one-and-a-third active divisions from FROKA reserve for counterguerrilla action in Taebaek-san and Chiri-san areas in effort to be so effective against NK testing this year as to discourage next year's intensification. 10. Activities of ROK 32nd division in Taebaek-san and 16th regiment of 8th division near Chiri-san in conjunction with KNP has been pretty good so far but several suspect areas not covered. We are converting our annual US/ROK special forces exercise "Doksoori" from a guerrilla/counterguerrilla maneuver to a real counterguerrilla action to begin right after the rainy season and, with support from ROK troops and police, to sweep the extremely rugged parts of Chiri-san and other suspect areas. I consider this effort extremely important to assure no undetected NK test enclaves survive the summer. Embassy [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] and ROKs enthusiastically support the concept. 11. Actions along DMZ are also continuing with increasing viciousness with more planned, small-scale attacks being made. Firefights are occurring almost every night. A few days ago three more U.S. soldiers were killed. This year's score along DMZ to date: firefights 69; NKs 64 KIA, 2 captured; ROK/US 35 KIA, (including 6 U.S. KIA), 87 WIA. Irritating factor is that in last few weeks NK along DMZ are improving their kill ratio. 12. Following show overall figures:
13. ROK MND Kim under personal direction of President Park is effectively coordinating ROK military support to civil internal security agencies. He repeatedly has asked our assistance to expedite deliveries of counterinfiltration materiel already programmed. He believes with me that we must be as nearly totally effective as possible in meeting this year's testing by NKs to discourage next year's effort, but also thinks as I do that overall NK intentions and investment in resources are such that they will take greatly increased and classically destructive guerrilla actions next year regardless of hard time this year. He is afraid of possibility they may switch from testing to destructive action later this summer. I have told him we all are trying to speed up delivery of useful materiel such as fast boats, commo equipment, coast surveillance radar, searchlights, helicopters and miscellaneous items. He also hopes the new DD and APDs will be available for use against NKs 1968 activity. 14. We are conscientiously trying to carry out instructions to keep Korean situation and DMZ quiet and out of press sensationalism. But I believe increased NK activity has reached point where this cannot be effected much longer. In fact, because of NK propaganda theme mentioned above and their blatant violations of armistice, we should now bring it out in the open by a planned psy war and counter-propaganda campaign showing the scope and intentions of NK action and falseness of their propaganda. 15. Because of the Commie propaganda theme and because of clarifying intent of NKs to energize subversive warfare, I reiterate recommendation that, in effect, an SNIE on North Korean subversive and conventional war capabilities and intentions be produced expeditiously, and additionally that IRG actively review current policies regarding US/ROK collaborative effort and countermeasures we should be prepared to take. Embassy and my staff are working up a Country Team message with some recommendations in this regard. 16. Have just heard of Clark Clifford's and Gen. Taylor's mission to Asian/Pacific countries contributing forces to Vietnam./7/ North Korean intensification of activity here may add to difficulties for ROKG to contribute significant additional combat forces to Vietnam. /7/The White House announced on July 20 that Clifford and Taylor would travel to Saigon to assess the war effort and visit the countries with troops in Vietnam for consultation and to discuss additional manpower needs. They spent August 2 and 3 in Seoul.
124. Telegram From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State/1/ Seoul, August 3, 1967, 1420Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 7 US. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Repeated to Saigon and CINCPAC. 552. From Charge. Subject: Clifford/Taylor Visit. 1. First meeting with Prime Minister, Deputy Prime Minister, Foreign Minister, Minister of National Defense and Minister of Health and Social Welfare was devoted to listening to their views on conduct of war in Vietnam. In terms basic purpose Clifford/Taylor Mission, this meeting produced no significant developments beyond PriMin's hawkish views on countering North Vietnamese forces in DMZ and bombing of Haiphong. Meeting being reported by separate memcon./2/ /2/Not found. 2. After meeting briefly with President at which time Clifford/Taylor outlined their proposed manner of presentation to the President and other ROK officials, group joined PriMin and Cabinet members mentioned above. Steadman and Charge present on US side with Clifford and Taylor. Yi Hu-rak, President's principle secretary, also joined meeting. 3. Clifford opened discussion explaining why President Johnson had sent Clifford/Taylor Mission, and what purpose of mission was in meeting with other Vietnam allies and with President and ROK ministers. He then asked Taylor give his report on Vietnam war. [Here follows discussion of the conduct of the Vietnam war.] [5.] Clifford continued that President Johnson understands that if the war continues the US must bear the major burden and US is prepared to carry the main share of men and costs. Clifford went on to describe the budgetary problems and tax increase requirements confronting President Johnson. Clifford stressed that if President Johnson is to be able to get Congress to approve and the American people to go along with this necessary tax increase, he must be prepared to answer the question of what our allies are doing in the way of additional effort. If he has to answer negatively, he will not get what he feels is needed for the US to be able to bear the main brunt of the battle and meet most of the cost of the struggle. Clifford continued that we are building up our forces in Vietnam to 480,000 and that President Johnson recognizes that we are going to have to increase these forces by very substantial amounts. The American people will want to know what our allies are sending since many of the people feel that the nations of Southeast Asia and the far Pacific area are closer to the danger than we are./3/ /3/President Johnson reinforced many of these points in a follow-up letter to President Pak on August 17. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Special Head of State Correspondence, Korea, April 1, 1967 to December 31, 1967) 6. Clifford concluded saying that the mission had presented this statement of facts to each nation visited and the team recognized that each nation must make its own decision. President Johnson wants each to know what the situation is as he sees it so that these facts can be taken into account as each nation decides what its decision should be. President Johnson wishes it made clear that he is not requesting troops on behalf of US. The US will handle its problems and do its part. President Johnson wished, however, that as each nation's leader looked at the problems in his own enlightened self interest, he should know what the US views are. President Johnson recognizes that President Pak has problems but suggests, however, that the problems of the war in Vietnam are transcendent. He hopes President Pak will place them first during his considerations. President Johnson appreciates this is a matter on which President Pak cannot make an immediate decision. The allies cannot rest on contributions to date but must go on to make additional contributions so that the allied military leaders can have the men and tools to get the job done. Taylor added that now is the time to do everything we can to show Hanoi the firmness of the allies and their intention not to permit a war of attrition to develop. We need to show Ho Chi Minh that the allies are prepared to put in the necessary resources to bring the war to an early termination. The group then broke up for lunch. 7. After lunch Clifford/Taylor met with Pak. Foreign Minister, Yi Hu-rak and Charge also present. Pak asked Clifford/Taylor to express thanks to President Johnson for sending them to give report on the Vietnam war efforts. He has high regard and respect for President Johnson's resolution to finish the Vietnam war rapidly in spite of many problems facing him. Pak stated he feels morally obligated to extend help so far as he can. He wished to say frankly that in view of the domestic situation it difficult to come up with decision at this time. One reason is that the majority of Korean people since the earlier dispatch of ROK forces to Vietnam are concerned over their own security. The last time the ROK sent troops the majority of the people supported the government but now they express worries and apprehensions about ROK security if more troops dispatched. The recent increase in North Korean agent and infiltration activity has added to these apprehensions and concerns of the people over their own security. Pak acknowledged that we have the same objective of settling the war as rapidly as we can and he will give due consideration to how ROKG can contribute. He fully appreciates US cannot take on whole burden and he will look into seeing how he can share in it. 8. Taylor then suggested that during these considerations ROKG take into account the order of priorities set out by General Westmoreland--(1) the basic need is for combat infantrymen and there is a requirement for more infantry divisions, including a ROK division; (2) there is a need for additional support units for ROK troops; and (3) there is a need to make arrangements which will provide ROK civilian technicians and laborers to support the Vietnam effort. 9. Pak indicated that General Chae had asked for supporting units and for the dispatch of ROK air force units for air/ground operations. Both requests were now being studied by ROKG./4/ Pak then pointed out that the earlier dispatches of troops required National Assembly approval. However, he thought that in the case of support units he might be able to get away without seeking Assembly approval. In case of additional combat units it will be necessary to get National Assembly approval and he is faced with a difficult position on this point since the opposition is boycotting the Assembly./5/ /4/ROKFV Commander Lieutenant General Chae Myung-shin later spoke to Korean journalists in Saigon, stating that for Korea to send additional combat troops and an air force unit to Vietnam would enhance ROK defenses because of the combat experience acquired by the troops in Vietnam. (Telegram 693 from Seoul, August 11; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-3 VIET S) /5/On July 27 George S. Newman, Charge d'Affaires ad interim, met with the Prime Minister in advance of the Clifford-Taylor visit. Regarding additional Korean troops, the Prime Minister mentioned the political deadlock and stated that the situation must first "return to normal and there needs to be a cooling off period" before a decision could be made. He pointed out that "a matter of such importance could not be submitted to a one-party Assembly," for the political opposition had already indicated it would resist sending additional combat troops to Vietnam. (Memorandum of conversation, July 27, attached to a letter from Newman to Bundy, July 28; ibid., POL 7 US) 10. Clifford in concluding meeting pointed out that President Johnson felt close friendship and excellent working relationship existed between himself and President Pak. Clifford then suggested that Pak after he had finished his deliberations and reached his conclusions might wish to write directly to President Johnson, sharing these thoughts with him. President Pak replied that he would be happy to do so./6/ /6/In his July 27 conversation with Newman, the Prime Minister suggested that the question of additional troops would best be handled between President Johnson and President Pak. In his subsequent letter Newman urged Bundy "to give serious thought to the use of this tactic if and when we have to ask for additional Korean troop contribution. I become more convinced that at the right time this can be the key to success." (Ibid.) 11. Comment: I feel that visit here has been useful and profitable. Pak understands our problems and wants to help but he has his problems. He may be prepared to help out in near future on support units and civilian technicians. On major combat troops, however, his domestic political problems are a major stumbling block and he did not predict when that will be solved. It is certain he will do nothing on this front until things here are back to normal on political front. 12. Pak's references to concerns of the people over ROK security relates to the price for any combat troops sent to Vietnam. It means they will have to be replaced here and modernized at US expense. We can expect the price to include something to help ROKG counter North Korean agent and infiltration activities. Though it did not come out in our discussion there are likely to be other requests in economic and possibly political area to make any future combat troop dispatch more palatable and acceptable to Korean people. 13. With reference to summit meeting they felt any idea of meeting is good but should be looked at after VN elections to decide on timing and place. Newman
125. Telegram From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State/1/ Seoul, August 23, 1967, 0945Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 23-7 KOR S. Secret; Limdis. Repeated to the Department of Defense and CINCPAC for POLAD. 912. For Bundy and Berger from Porter. Subj: ROK Internal Security. Ref: Seoul 818./2/ /2/Telegram 818 from Seoul, August 18, contains a Country Team message outlining the threat North Korea posed to the ROK and the latter's attempts to counter it. The message concluded that North Korea's goal was "to destroy public confidence in ROK, force withdrawal U.S. forces and unify Korea on Communist terms." It noted that North Korean subversive activities had increased to unanticipated levels and could only be expected to escalate, with large-scale operations expected in the spring of 1968. (Ibid.) 1. Since my arrival I have had an intensive and careful look at the internal security problem here. I have gone into the matter at considerable length with Gen Bonesteel and USOM as well as Emb [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] officers. The CT assessment contained reftel has my full endorsement. I particularly want to underscore the urgency of meeting the problem now and with vigor and ingenuity. The CT elements have a well developed and thoroughly integrated concept of how to deal with the threat and have been working closely with all agencies, civil and military, of the ROKG. The ROKG is moving on the problem and in the right direction. We need to move with them if our help is to be meaningful and timely. 2. The government, particularly Pres Pak, see the task of dealing with the agent/infiltrator problem as one for which the civilian agencies must be properly equipped and trained and not one which should be permitted significantly to divert the attention and energies of the armed forces from their primary mission along the DMZ and the offshore waters. We have strongly encouraged this attitude at all levels in the government. If this attitude and momentum is to be sustained and the goals achieved, the ROKs will need selective help from us in a timely manner. The help we provide now, though unanticipated when our programs were first developed, can prevent more serious problems later that will be far more costly to eliminate. 3. In the next few days, USOM will be submitting urgent program changes relating to the Korean National Police (KNP)./3/ These are critical for the effective development of the police is the key to maintaining the civilian agency orientation in coping with the agent/infiltrator problem that Pres Pak wants. (I understand he talked at great length on this point during the lunch he had with Clark Clifford and Gen Taylor.) I am not urging a normal police improvement program but one with a specific purpose and goal--stopping a serious NK agent/infiltrator threat to the ROK that is on the doorstep and before it moves into the house in serious proportions. It is from this perspective that I urge you and Poats and Bullitt to consider the USOM recommendations. They have my full support. /3/Not found. 4. As part of the effort to equip the KNP field units to deal with agent/infiltrators, ROKG has made KFX available to CAS for the purchase of weapons on an urgent basis. We must have authorization [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] for certain weapon and ammo purchases and [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] action to give the ROK request a high supply priority. [2 lines of source text not declassified] I consider fulfilling the ROKG request a matter of the highest priority and that I would be sending you word of my deep concern over the importance of speedily providing the weapons and ammo the ROKG wants and needs for the police./4/ To have ill-equipped police teams operating in the mountain areas of this country against the well-trained, well-equipped NK agent infiltrators will only result in serious friendly casualties and invite doubts on the part of the populace as to whether their government can deal successfully with the threat from the North. /4/At a meeting attended by Bundy, Berger, [text not declassified] on August 31, it was reported that the requested weapons had been obtained and would be delivered to the Korean police as soon as the Koreans paid for them. (Memorandum from Trueheart to Hughes, Denney, and Evans, September 1; Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, East Asia and Pacific General File, East Asia, FE Weekly Meetings, 1967) 5. I am looking into the training aspect of the KNP effort and will shortly have a recommendation which may need your support./5/ /5/Further information on this topic not found. 6. On the military side, General Bonesteel has submitted a restatement of his urgent needs for US and ROK forces (COMUS/K msg UK 59745) and his staff and ours are working up comprehensive counter-infiltration concepts with the requirements involved. His restatement has received the endorsement of CINCPAC (CINCPAC 1922092 Aug). I fully support COMUS/K's request and consider its fulfillment a vital part of the total effort if it is to succeed./6/ /6/COMUS/K and CINCPAC messages not found. 7. I cannot stress too strongly the importance of helping Pres Pak to take those measures that are needed to assure his people that the North does not pose a threat to ROK security that the ROKG cannot deal with and, more importantly, to demonstrate concretely that the government has the means to prevent an NK subversive threat of any significance from developing in the ROK. If he cannot create this sense of confidence and assurance, we are likely to find that other objectives of his in which we have a vital interest are severely prejudiced and possibly imperiled. We must do what is necessary now to help Pak if we are to succeed in achieving our other objectives./7/ /7/In telegram 27837 to Seoul, August 26, Bundy expressed his full agreement with Porter's and the Country Team's recommendations and stated that the matters were being given priority attention. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 23-7 KOR S) Also in late August the Embassy, Department of State, and UN Mission decided to prepare a White Paper documenting North Korean violations of the DMZ for presentation to the General Assembly. Documentation on the UN presentation is ibid., POL 23-7 KOR S, POL 23-7 KOR S/UN, and POL 27-14 KOR/UN. The report submitted to the United Nations on November 2 is in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1967, pp. 788-790. Porter
126. Editorial Note On September 4, 1967, President Pak met with Ambassador Porter and informed him that Korea would attempt to fulfill President Johnson's request for additional troops for Vietnam. The size of the contingent to be furnished awaited the results of a report that President Pak had requested from his Minister of National Defense. (Telegram 1120 from Seoul, September 5; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-3 VIET S) The Embassy, however, believed that President Pak intended "to supply up to another division." (Telegram 1121 from Seoul, September 5; ibid.) In his talk with Ambassador Porter as well as in a subsequent letter to President Johnson, President Pak outlined domestic problems affecting his ability to dispatch additional troops abroad. Those problems involved public concerns about Korea's own security and defense capabilities, particularly in light of the escalation in incidents along the Demilitarized Zone and in North Korean infiltration activities. President Pak also indicated that any final decision depended on the extent to which equipment and anti-infiltration support promised in conjunction with the dispatch of Korean troops to Vietnam in 1966 had been furnished. (Telegram 1120 from Seoul, September 5, and letter from President Pak to President Johnson, September 8; both ibid.) The Embassy prepared periodic reports on the progress made in implementing commitments made to Korea in 1966. Airgrams and telegrams addressing that topic are ibid., DEF 19 US-KOR S and DEF 19-3 US KOR S.
127. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ Washington, September 15, 1967. /1/Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, East Asia and Pacific General File, East Asia, FE Weekly Meetings, 1967. Secret. Drafted on September 19. Sent to Hughes, Denney, and Evans. SUBJECT /2/Agenda at Tab A. [Footnote in the source text; attached but not printed.] PARTICIPANTS Korea [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] said that the infiltration of North Korean agents across the DMZ, or by sea on both the East and West coasts, is the major current problem for the Republic of Korea./3/ [2 lines of source text not declassified] Present plans calls for the establishment of 123 nine-man teams which would be trained in the establishment of information networks and the setting up of ambush points. The teams would be equipped with some automatic weapons and radios. There would be some cross training so that if one or two members of the team were killed the team could still carry out all its functions. It was hoped that by March 1968 the number of teams could be doubled. The eventual ceiling for these units would be in the neighborhood of 3,000 men. The program is now handicapped by the failure of the Korean government to budget for the increased expenses of equipping the teams and by the inability of American radio companies to supply satisfactory radio equipment fast enough. What had once been a major problem, the question of military as against police control of the units, had been resolved favorably in [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] view; that is, in favor of the police. /3/Reports indicated that in 1967 there were "more than 300 DMZ incidents compared with 42 in 1966" and "nearly 300 US/ROK casualties compared with less than 70 in 1966." (Research Memorandum REA-40, September 17; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 23-7 KOR S) In addition, "there were more DMZ firefights and by far more United Nations Command casualties in August [1967] than in any other month since the armistice." (Memorandum from the Defense Intelligence Agency to McNamara, September 11; Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD/OASD/ISA Files: FRC 72 A 2468, X-Korea 370-64) [1-1/2 lines of source text not declassified] said that agents that had been captured had made it clear that current infiltrations were to test out South Korean defenses and that the agents were to find the "soft spots" and then return to North Korea in September and prepare for an intensified effort next Spring./4/ /4/INR intelligence analysts attributed the increased activities to North Korea's desire to force unification under terms favorable to Communist rule, a diminishing possibility in view of South Korea's enhanced political and economic position and improved military capabilities. They also pointed to the influence of the Vietnam war, arguing that increased border activity was intended to discourage the ROK from sending additional troops to Vietnam. (Research Memorandum REA-40, September 17; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 23-7 KOR S; and ibid.) [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] said that [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] had surveyed briefly several of the new economic development projects in South Korea and had come to the conclusion that most of these projects were highly vulnerable to North Korean sabotage. [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] had recommended stationing of security units from the Korean armed forces at all of these developments./5/ /5/The Korean Minister of National Defense called a high-level military conference on September 14 to discuss ways to intensify security in the ROK in the wake of two incidents of sabotage perpetrated on South Korean train lines. Proposals included building a barrier across the DMZ, assigning military units to guard railways, power plants, and similar facilities, and strengthening security forces by adding unemployed veterans to their ranks. (Telegram 1371 from Seoul, September 15; ibid., POL 23-7 KOR S) Mr. Fleck questioned [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] with respect to the alleged North Korean espionage net among South Korean students in Europe and the United States. [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] replied that there appeared to be a valid case against some 68 teachers and students who had been arrested. The North Koreans appear to have concentrated on medical doctors who were trained abroad. [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] added that the North Korean object did not appear to be purely espionage but that long range political action working toward the eventual reunion of North and South Korea was also involved. [1 paragraph (4 lines of source text) not declassified] [Here follows a discussion of operations on Taiwan.]
128. Telegram From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State/1/ Seoul, September 19, 1967, 0755Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-3 VIET S. Secret; Priority; Exdis. 1402. Dept please pass DOD and CINCPAC. From Ambassador. Subj: Additional ROK Forces for Vietnam. Ref: State 37911./2/ /2/In telegram 37911 to Seoul, September 15, Bundy asked Porter to provide information concerning the request for additional ROK troops for Vietnam. (Ibid.) 1. After careful weighing of Korean factors and atmosphere, I am submitting following proposal for Dept/DOD consideration in connection with current MND study, requested by Pres Pak, of numbers of additional troops which might be sent to Vietnam and method of recruiting them. In presenting this proposal my aim is to (1) get more ROK troops to Vietnam; (2) minimize the cost impact of the additional ROK contribution on our own budgetary and foreign exchange burden in immediate future; and (3) improve domestic position of ROKG to extent which will permit it to take necessary action in Assembly and evoke public support for dispatch of more troops. 2. We have previously explained why we must help Pak overcome domestic political obstacles in this connection. Our task is not becoming easier because boldness of NK sabotage of DMZ and pressure on DMZ itself is creating (as it is undoubtedly designed to do) in public mind much uneasiness about ROK ability to defend itself. Moreover, when railroad sabotage is carried out miles south of DMZ and relatively close to nation's capital, it involves face and builds up ROKG desire for riposte. In circumstances, question naturally arises whether new military manpower should be used at home rather than in defense of country two thousand miles away. 3. My concept on timing is to make known to Pak that as soon as he has considered MND report mentioned above that I would like to discuss it with him. If atmosphere suitable I would at that time say we have been giving much thought to matter of his need to reassure assembly and public about security of country, particularly in relation to possible troop dispatch. 4. I would tell Pak that I was authorized, in consideration of an additional troop dispatch, to say that the US was prepared to/3/-- /3/In reply the Departments of State and Defense suggested allowing the Koreans to present their demands first "rather than open the bidding ourselves." (Telegram 42939 to Seoul, September 23; ibid.) A. Equip those forces and finance the net additional won costs of the forces deployed; B. Equip, provide for training and finance forces in Korea to replace those agreed forces being deployed to Vietnam; C. Help meet the threat of NK infiltration by providing expeditiously specific equipment and assistance to improve land and sea border security systems maintained by ROK military and to improve the capability of civilian internal security agencies to detect and eliminate NK infiltrators; and D. Agree that ROK forces serving in VN when hostilities ceased would retain and return home with special equipment we have loaned to them for combat operations in VN./4/ /4/Telegram 42939 also authorized Porter to make general references to items 4A, 4B, and 4C but to withhold mention of the proposal in item 4D because of the potentially negative Korean response to it and because the dollar amounts involved could not yet be determined. 5. In presentation of above I would point out that first two items intend make sure ROK defense capability not lessened and no economic burden placed on ROK economy due to dispatch. Third item designed to meet in timely manner intensified NK infiltration threat and to provide tangible and visible evidence to Korean people to reassure them of ROKG's ability deal with NK threat. Last item aimed at enhancing ROKG long-term defense posture. 6. Please have in mind possibility that ROK may consciously or sub-consciously expect to retain equipment on loan to them in VN and may adopt a "thank-you-for-nothing" attitude. Much of equipment they are using in VN would of course be well worn at time of implementation of any such agreement but we would not expect this to be major factor in their consideration of proposal. Similarly they are very likely to feel that the "anti-infiltration" help is something we would do anyway, given our concerns over ROK security, our treaty commitments and our pledges. 7. I submit the above suggestion which I consider to be a barebones minimum for even a token additional contribution because it meets considerations cited para one above. These proposals should induce Pak to begin thinking in specific terms and possibly undertaking necessary initial preparations of public opinion for another dispatch. Among ROK military elements above arrangements would probably be regarded with favor, and Pak is not insensitive to opinion from that quarter. We would ensure that ROKs do not miss point that by contributing more troops now they can expect to enhance their own defense capability during post hostilities period when MAP can be expected to phase down markedly. Please note that I have not included in my suggested offer anything that touches on the economic side and that the offer is "de minimis" insofar as ROK military modernization is concerned. How much further we go in any offer should, in large part, depend on the size of the additional ROK dispatch. 8. We would like to try these proposals on for size and they should at least evoke their counter-proposals. I am particularly interested in seeing what they come back with in the economic area which may be the real key to the problem. If they renew their proposal that we negotiate logistics and tech assistance package for VN, I would state our willingness to negotiate such, as indicated President's message to Pak, but I would point out that VN approval of ROK-US agreement in that sense not likely during next few months at least in view changing patter [pattern?] of govt and Assembly in VN and that proposal for "anti-infiltration" help their retention of equipment used in VN much more useful to assure public that govt dealing effectively with problem of ROK security. 9. Please let me have your comments or questions as soon as convenient. I wish to stress that my suggestion in para four is only an opener to get the process moving with an air of specificity about it. If the ROKG is thinking in terms of one-half to a full division, my package will not come close to meeting the bill. Porter
129. Telegram From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State/1/ Seoul, September 19, 1967. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Korea, Vol. V. Top Secret; Exdis. Attached to a September 21 memorandum from Rostow to President Johnson that indicates the President saw it. The source text is the retyped copy given to the President. Telegram 1392 is in National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 23-7 KOR S. Text of Cable From Ambassador Porter (Seoul, 1392) SUBJECT On September 16, General Bonesteel in his capacity as Commander in Chief, United Nations Command, briefed President Park Chung Hee at the latter's request on the Demilitarized Zone infiltration problems and North Korean subversive activities. The briefing lasted over one hour and was attended on the Korean side also by the Minister of National Defense and Yi Hu-Rak. Brig. General Huffman was also present. General Bonesteel first briefed the President, following an outline in English and Korean which had been distributed. President Park listened attentively. The outline covered: (1) enemy threat, both conventional and subversive war aspect; (2) actions taken by friendly elements with regard to increased Demilitarized Zone incidents; (3) actions taken regarding North Korean agent and guerrilla activities in the interior; and, (4) future cooperative self-help, mutual support and development of further plans. When the briefing was finished, the President himself spoke at length. He stated that he and the people of Korea fully respected and supported United Nations Command authority over the Republic of Korea Armed Forces and he had full confidence in the United Nations Command's ability to carry out its mission for defending the Republic of Korea. The President indicated he agreed with General Bonesteel's detailed views on anti-infiltration operations and was well satisfied with actions taken or being taken. He would like to see comprehensive requirements plan now being completed worked out as soon as possible and hoped that it would stop enemy infiltration through the Demilitarized Zone and along the coast. The President said that he had been a division commander along the Demilitarized Zone and fully understands the problem. A full effort would limit enemy activities but would not, he feared, stop them completely because of the great length of the coast line and the Demilitarized zone. He said he would like to get at even more basic factors. The basic problem is that the North Koreans do not intend to abide by the armistice nor will they. Unless they give up their announced goal, we can expect further intensification of efforts to cause sabotage and subvert the Republic of Korea next spring and on indefinitely. The difference between United Nations Command and North Korean operational concepts is as follows: Our concept is defensive--to defend the Republic of Korea against aggression; North Korean concept is offensive--to wage subversive aggression against the Republic of Korea, to reconnoiter and attack industrial and military installations and to create continuously what damage to the feeling of security of the South Korean people that they can. They will do this so long as they feel that it can be done at no risk to North Korea and from the sanctuary the United Nations Command provides by unilaterally abiding by the armistice. The President said that during the past fourteen years, there have been about 5,000 significant North Korean violations of the armistice. As for our side, he said, he would have to admit to some few violations by Republic of Korea. These occurred because of the hatred engendered by North Korean attacks on our soldiers. However, the ratio of violations is several hundred to one on the enemy side. Whenever the North Koreans violate the military demarcation line, the President said, all the United Nations Command has done so far is to table the complaint at Panmunjom, where the North Koreans categorically deny it. For the last 14 years, the United Nations Command has abided by the armistice while the North Korean side has ignored it. The President believes that we must do our best to capture or kill every North Korean infiltrator into the Republic of Korea in order to make enemy abandon his plans. He foresees, nevertheless, that this alone will not stop the North Koreans and he expects more violations along the Demilitarized Zone and increased efforts to sabotage industrial and military installations. We should, he said, do more than table the problem at Panmunjom. The President said he believes that counter-measures are most important to stop North Korean attacks, whenever the North Koreans violate the armistice they must be made to pay by retaliation./2/ /2/On September 4 CINCUNC received information about ROK retaliatory raids into North Korea along the DMZ and reminded the Minister of National Defense of U.S. opposition to retaliatory acts. (Telegram 1136 from Seoul, September 5; ibid.) Porter also voiced concern about the forays to the Prime Minister, stressing that such actions undercut the ROK's position at the UN, provided fodder for North Korean propaganda, undercut General Bonesteel's authority, and jeopardized U.S. Congressional support for military assistance to Korea. (Telegram 1311 from Seoul, September 13; ibid.) The President went on to make the following interesting statement. He said that he respects the fact that Republic of Korea forces are under the operational control of the United Nations Command and therefore retaliations will never be done without due coordination with the Command. However, unless the United Nations Command undertakes strong measures, the people of Korea will complain increasingly against the Korean Government. We have, he said, almost 600,000 men in the armed forces. If no counter-measures are taken, the people's patience will wear very thin. The President then said he would be very grateful if General Bonesteel would tell him what countermeasures the United Nations will take if the enemy continues and intensifies his attacks. General Bonesteel stated that he was sure the President understood his position. That he is a soldier and he follows orders and that his mission was very clear, that he was not only to defend the Republic of Korea against Communist aggression but also to enforce the armistice. He had to agree that there was a plausibility to the President's evaluation of North Korean intentions but that the matter was a most complex one and that there were many factors of great policy import to Korea and to U.S. involved in this question. General Bonesteel said that he thought that the name and the meaning of the "United Nations Command" is highly useful and important to the Republic of Korea, especially in these days of Communist activity over much of Asia. It should be remembered that the United Nations Unified Command in Korea was established by the Security Council of the United Nations in 1950. The United States Government had been designated as the executive agent for the Security Council to direct the operations of the Unified Command in Korea. The composition of the United Nations has changed greatly since 1950. Undoubtedly, one of many reasons for the increased North Korean activity was a hope by the Communists that they could at some time in the proximate future get the U.N. General Assembly to repudiate the United Nations Command in Korea. Since the matter was of such great importance and so complex, unilateral action by the Republic of Korea would be bad and it would be wisest course for the President to discuss the matter with the personal representative of President Johnson in Korea, that is, Ambassador Porter. General Bonesteel said he felt it important both for Korea and the U.S. that the integrity of the United Nations Command be preserved. It might not be impossible to find other adequate answers to President Park's expressed concept but this should be done by explorations in greatest confidence with Ambassador Porter. President Park, he felt sure, appreciated that President Johnson himself had troubles with small but vocal elements of the U.S. public and that there were many critics of U.S. policy towards Vietnam who confused some of the American public. Certainly the wisest course would not be to totally abandon to the Communists the full initiative to do what they wished, but it was a fact that it would be hard to preserve and continue the United Nations Command in Korea if the Command were party to violating the armistice. President Park stated he fully understood General Bonesteel's position. He said he did not mean to imply that the United Nations Command should take the total retaliatory reaction against North Korean aggression. However, he felt if the North Korean actions continued to increase, authority should be given to the Commanding Chief of the United Nations Command to wage coordinated, carefully controlled, small-scale retaliatory action. He said he would talk to Ambassador Porter about this. The President went on in an apparently philosophical mood and said that it was his frank view that the United States Government applies too many restrictions and red tape on the authority of U.S. theater commanders. This, he said, applies also to Vietnam. His next sentence, as interpreted into English, went to the effect that the U.S. Government might lose something but so does the Republic of Korea through continued and vicious North Korean aggressions. The North Koreans, he said, are fully aware of the heavy U.S. commitments in Vietnam and believe the U.S. does not want the extension of another front in Korea. Hence, the North Koreans feel relatively safe against retaliation. He thought the North Koreans do not want open hostilities but felt secure against risk in the subversive actions they were now taking increasingly. In closing the meeting, the President said that the matter requires most serious thought and a prudent approach. However, only positive and appropriate counter-measures will stop the North Koreans./3/ /3/Porter concluded from his comments that Pak intended to put the U.S. "on notice that northward actions by ROK personnel will continue at a greater pace and with greater vigor than in the past, with or without U.S. cooperation." The United States could expect to be informed of South Korean incursions after they occurred, so that U.S. forces in Korea could be prepared for possible retaliation by North Korea. Porter recommended reminding Pak of U.S. disapproval of ROK incursions and requesting "ROK discuss with UNC means of making North Korean actions more costly for NK elements as they occur." (Telegram 1483 from Seoul, September 22; ibid.) Bundy concurred with Porter's recommendation and stated that the matter was being given "urgent attention" in Washington. (Telegram 45165 to Seoul, September 28; ibid.) On October 11 Porter discussed his approach with Pak, who was receptive to meeting North Korean actions as they occurred. (Telegram 1797 from Seoul, October 11; ibid.) [Continue with the next documents]
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