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FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1964-1968, Volume XXIX Korea
Department of State |
 |
Washington, December 29, 1967.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Special Head of State Correspond- ence, Korea, April 1, 1967 to December 31, 1967. Secret; Nodis.
SUBJECT
Follow-up to your Canberra meeting with Korea's President Park
You promised to give Park by January 1 our most forthcoming position in regard to his security needs. In return, Park promised to do his utmost to get additional ROK troops to Vietnam by March 1. Attached is a package which makes good on our commitment./2/ It consists of:
/2/The package was approved by the Departments of State and Defense as well as by AID and sent to Rostow with an explanatory memorandum from Read, December 28. (Ibid., Head of State Correspondence, Korea, Park Correspondence, Vol. I) None of the attachments is printed.
1. A letter from you to President Park which Ambassador Porter would deliver personally on January 1.
2. Detailed instructions to Porter which he would present to Park after Park has read your letter.
3. Instructions to CINCPAC on how to pay for this package of additional assistance. Also attached are the pertinent messages which give the background for the package we are recommending.
I believe it is a good package.
1. They ask for two destroyers: we are giving them one out of the Fleet Reserve for spring delivery and are reactivating another and will deliver it as early as possible. (Cost--$6 million not counting the value of the ships.)
2. They ask for three helicopter companies: We are giving them one for delivery in 1968, and this is difficult in view of helicopter shortage in Southeast Asia. (Cost--$3 million. In addition we have delivered 18 helicopters to Korea in the last two months and all of these will be available for counter-infiltration service.)
3. With our military, the Koreans worked out a counter-infiltration counter-guerrilla plan which requires a great deal of new equipment. We are approving the plan and agreeing to provide the needed equipment. There may be some difficulty on delivery dates but we are undertaking to do our level best to deliver as much as possible by the spring. (Cost--$32 million.)
4. The Koreans want MAP support for 8 additional ROK battalions for use in counter-infiltration activities: We are agreeing to use Korean MAP to support these units.
5. They ask for additional artillery: We are agreeing to provide one battalion of self-propeller 8-inch Howitzers for 1968 delivery. This is less than they ask for, but probably as much as they expected to get. (Cost--$3 million.)
6. They ask to set up a 5,000-man civilian logistics corps in Vietnam at highly advantageous pay scales: We are agreeing to the creation of the 5,000-man corps and will negotiate the pay scale level. These civilians will replace Korean soldiers now on logistics duty. (Cost--an additional $5 to 20 million depending on the pay scale.)
7. They ask that we support their additional forces for Korea--a light division of 11,000 men along the same lines as their recent deployment: We are agreeing. (Cost--$62 million.)
We are not agreeing to:
1. Their request that we provide heavy equipment for the construction of a limited access divided multilane super highway from Seoul to Pusan.
2. Their request for one F 4C air squadron. We are agreeing to look into the possibility of using some Korean pilots in Vietnam.
I recommend that you:/3/
/3/The President approved both recommendations. The text of his letter to Pak as well as instructions to Porter and CINCPAC were forwarded in telegrams 91815 and 91816 to Seoul and telegram 91817 to CINCPAC, all December 31. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 19-8 US-KOR S) A copy of the signed letter from President Johnson to President Pak, December 31, is in the Johnson Library, National Security File, Head of State Correspondence, Korea, Park Correspondence, Vol. I.
1. Approve the letter.
Approve
Disapprove
See me
2. Approve the instructions to Ambassador Porter.
Approve
Disapprove
See me
Walt
142. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/
Washington, January 5, 1968.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, 1967-1969, 5D(2), Allies, Troop Commitments and Other Aid. Top Secret.
SUBJECT
More Korean Troops for Vietnam
The Korean response to our New Years Day package is extremely good so far./2/ There are, of course, some things still to be worked out, but as Ambassador Porter puts it "these do not present major problems in connection with the dispatch of troops."/3/
/2/In telegram 3214 from Seoul, January 3, Porter provided a detailed discussion of his meeting with the Prime Minister and the Minister of National Defense on January 3 and of their response to the U.S. proposals. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 19-8 US-KOR S)
/3/Among the outstanding issues was the Korean proposal to replace 5,000 troops with civilian personnel. Documentation covering subsequent discussions of that issue is ibid., POL 27-3 VIET S.
They do, however, want some help with their domestic Parliamentary problems. The Prime Minister and the Defense Minister want to come to Washington to see you "for a few minutes," preferably around the middle of January. The visit would be publicly described as further discussion of the Vietnam situation. They want no conversations with any other officials and no official greetings or ceremonies.
The purpose of this trip is to move the Prime Minister and Defense Minister in the front of this problem so that Park can take the position that they have convinced him of the need for more troops in Vietnam. Put another way, it takes the emphasis off your conversations with Park in Australia and reduces the ability of the Parliamentary opposition to argue that Park jumps when you say "frog."
State is against the visit (draft cable at Tab A)./4/ State thinks it:
/4/None of the tabs is printed.
--would stimulate worldwide speculation as to what had caused the urgent and mysterious trip;
--would involve the President too directly in Korean domestic political squabbles;
--would make the dispatch of additional troops too directly a response to the U.S. President's wishes rather than the result of Korean determination to do its full share. I do not agree with State's position. 11,000 men are important to us, and if a brief interview helps Park with his domestic hurdles, we should try to accommodate him.
I believe that such a visit would be put in a better light, however, if the Koreans went to Saigon first, "became convinced there of the need" and thereupon were asked by Park to consult with you.
Although State seems not to be confident that the visit is Park's idea, Porter (Tab B, last paragraph) comments: "There is no doubt that President Park sees this as a device to move the Prime Minister and the Minister of National Defense to the forefront in coming Assembly consideration, and to permit Park himself to adopt a position of having been convinced of the need for more troops by the Prime Minister and the Minister of National Defense as a result of their Washington consultation."
I think we should have Ambassador Porter make certain that the visit is desired by President Park. If that is the case, I recommend that you squeeze his emissaries into your schedule even though I know that mid-January is a very bad time for you.
The options are set forth below for your decision.
Walt
If President Park wishes, I will see them./5/
I agree with State's position. Discourage the visit.
See me.
/5/This option is checked; however neither minister made the trip.
143. Editorial Note
On January 6, 1968, President Pak presided over an emergency conference on internal security at the Korean Army Headquarters at Wonju. In public statements President Pak announced that the conference would focus on combating an expected "tenfold increase in [North Korean] agent infiltration whose purpose is all out guerrilla warfare." The President reportedly called the meeting to discuss counterinfiltration measures and to promote a new Civil Defense Bill scheduled for legislative consideration. Approximately 160 senior officials from the national and provincial governments, the military and police, and the Korean Central Intelligence Agency attended the well-publicized conference. (Telegram 3308 from Seoul, January 9, National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 23-7 KOR S) The Embassy later reported that the meeting was intended to generate a high level of publicity "to impress NK with readiness of ROKG to deal with infiltrators and other subversive activities, to alert Korean people to seriousness of NK infiltration threat this spring, and to dramatize to Korean people preparedness of Pres. Park and ROKG to protect security of ROK." (Telegram 3447 from Seoul, January 17; ibid.)
In addition to furthering those objectives, the Embassy reported that the government intended to use the Wonju meeting to "create public climate in favor of controversial Civil Defense Bill." (Ibid., and telegram 3308 from Seoul, January 9; ibid.) The Embassy advised that the pending bill was "almost unanimously condemned by press and academic groups for wide powers it gives govt. and consequent fears for individual rights." The political opposition had voiced its intention to defeat the bill when it came before an upcoming special session of the National Assembly. (Telegram 3308 from Seoul, January 9; ibid.)
The conference produced a revised counterinfiltration plan establishing interagency control under the overall authority of provincial governors and the Prime Minister to meet specific threats. According to the Prime Minister, the program would advance Korean interests in "maintaining civilian control over counter-infiltration operations" and in "limiting use of troops and their contact with local population during operations." (Telegram 3447 from Seoul, January 17; ibid.) In the days following the conference the Minister of National Defense outlined to the Korean press additional counterinfiltration measures, including creating new rapid-response teams and helicopter and patrol-boat units, installing new radar systems, as well as constructing a fence across and defoliating the DMZ. (Telegrams 3350 and 3476 from Seoul, January 11 and 18, respectively; both ibid.)
144. Editorial Note
In the late evening hours of January 21, 1968, approximately 30 well-trained and well-armed North Korean infiltrators perpetrated an attack on the Blue House, killing several South Koreans civilians and members of the Korean National Police. At least five North Koreans were killed by defensive gunfire, and at least two were captured and taken into custody. (Telegram 3532 from Seoul, January 22; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 23-7 KOR S) According to an excerpt of the interrogation of one of the infiltrators, the mission was to enter the Blue House, to kill the security forces encountered, "to chop off President Pak Chung Hee's head and to shoot to death his key subordinates in that building." (Telegram 3649 from Seoul, January 26; ibid.) The United Nations Command responded by immediately calling for a meeting of the Military Armistice Commission to protest the action. That meeting was scheduled for January 23. (Telegram 3532 from Seoul, January 22; ibid.) Hostile encounters between North Koreans and combined United Nations and Republic of Korea forces continued for several days after the incident at points along the Demilitarized Zone. Documentation concerning those encounters is ibid.
Less than 48 hours after the raid on the Blue House, North Korean forces seized the U.S. intelligence-gathering vessel USS Pueblo on January 23 and arrested its crew. The United States protested the incidents at the UN Security Council and met with North Korean representatives at the Military Armistice Commission in Panmunjom in an attempt to gain release of the ship and crew. Documentation focusing on the interaction between the United States and the Republic of Korea concerning involvement of the Security Council and the United Nations in the Korean situation and the role of North Korea in that forum is ibid., POL 27-14 KOR/UN; POL 23-7 KOR S/UN; and POL 33-6 KOR N-US. For documentation pertaining to the seizure of the Pueblo and the detainment of its crew, see Documents 212 ff.
In addition to bringing both incidents before the UN Security Council, the South Koreans requested that the United States and the 15 other military participants in the Korean War reaffirm their commitment to the defense of the Republic of Korea as set forth in the 1953 Armistice Declaration. Although the United States willingly declared its commitment to the Republic of Korea, it opposed pressing the other nations to do so. The United States believed, since the international situation had changed during the intervening years, that a unanimous declaration of support reaffirming the Declaration was unlikely, undesirable, and could only demonstrate to the North Koreans and other Communist countries a deficiency in international support for positions advanced by the United States and Republic of Korea within the United Nations. (Telegram 113543 to Seoul, February 10; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 KOR/UN) Subsequent discussions between the United States and the 15 countries demonstrated the general reluctance of those nations to reaffirm the Declaration. (Telegram 120026 to Seoul, February 23; ibid.) Although apprised of that situation, South Korean representatives continued to discuss their request with the countries in question. Although many were sympathetic to Korea's plight, few were prepared to satisfy South Korea's wish. Documentation detailing Korean efforts and U.S. responses to that request are ibid., POL 33-6 KOR N-US; POL 27-14 KOR/UN; POL 17 KOR S-US; and POL 27-3 KOR S.
145. Telegram From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State/1/
Seoul, January 24, 1968, 1031Z.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 33-6 KOR N-US. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. President Johnson received a retyped copy of this telegram attached to a January 24 memorandum from Rostow stating, "This will give you the flavor of President Pak's reaction to recent events in Korea." The memorandum indicates that President Johnson saw it. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Korea, Cables, Vol. V)
3598. For the Secretary. Ref: A. State 102967; B. Seoul 3571./2/
/2/Telegram 102967 to Seoul, January 23, instructed Porter to inform the ROKG of U.S. intentions to act through the UNC and MAC as well as to enlist the assistance of the Soviet Union in urging the North Koreans to release the Pueblo and its crew. Porter was also told to advise the ROKG "in strongest terms against any attempt at action against North Korea in retaliation for Seoul raid," particularly in light of the added tensions arising from the Pueblo seizure. In telegram 3571, January 24, Porter reported on his forceful conversation on those matters with the Korean Prime Minister, who, in turn, briefed Pak. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 33-6 KOR N-US)
1. President Park reacted strongly to representations made to Prime Minister to effect that ROK Government avoid reprisals against North Koreans. He asked me to call this afternoon and kept me for hour and half. He opened with request for statement of position as I knew it, with emphasis on Pueblo incident. I recounted facts as they have been transmitted to us as well as attitude we took in MAC meeting this morning. I also told him of naval movements and said he could rely on us to remain in contact with him as this affair developed./3/
/3/Documentation on the MAC meetings with the North Koreans and the movement of naval vessels into the region is in the compilation on the Pueblo crisis.
2. Park commented immediately on fact that we had asked North Korea for apology and immediate return of the ship. To this we should have added, he said, that we wanted assurance that there would be no more raiding of any kind into South Korean territory. I said UNC had asked for MAC meeting because we wanted to get at North Koreans on subject of the raid, and the ship affair had developed later. He could be sure that raid would figure prominently in exchange at Panmunjom though we had no precise indication from ROK Government prior to my conversation with him as to what it desired. Park said that the problem would become acute when North Koreans say first, that there was no raid, that attack on Blue House in Seoul was simply a peoples' uprising; and second, when they reject our request for apology and refuse to return the ship. If we try to minimize the affair from then on, American prestige will fall greatly as matter has gone too far on both sides.
3. I said the matter has to be considered very carefully and that we must think about rather than react immediately to the enemy's initiatives. The enemy had taken these actions at times and in places of his own choosing. He was not undoubtedly in an alert posture, and there were many reasons why we should not accommodate him. It was this which led us to make representations to the Prime Minister this morning on subject of reprisals.
4. Park said vehemently that we seemed to be more worried about reprisals by ROK Government than we are about getting satisfaction out of North Koreans. He said he respects the UN Command and the wishes of the American ally and he will not undertake unilateral reprisals at this point. He wanted to make it very clear, however, that retaliation will become inevitable if there are any more attacks by the North on South Korea. He said objective of the raid was to kill the President and his family and they had very nearly succeeded. He knows that there are 2400 additional men in North Korea with similar training and purpose. These men have been taken from North Korean Army and given special training. They are located in six centers and he would like to strike them and eliminate entire unit in one blow. He said he is convinced that this will have to be done sooner or later or they will come down here again and again, striking at many different targets.
5. Park said that if United States gets no satisfaction in matter of the Pueblo we should strike North Korean naval ships along east coast after first neutralizing North Korean air power. The South Korean Government would be glad to cooperate in such a venture.
6. When he paused I said his friend President Johnson would be pleased to have his assurance that there would be no unilateral action against the North by the ROK Government. I said we understand that he has been subjected to great provocation but that he would be measured in United States and everywhere else throughout the non-Communist world by restraint he shows in these difficult circumstances. He repeated again his view that we are going to have to do something because of the attitude we have taken in demanding apology and immediate return of the ship, and he wants added to that in any way we can get it across that there must also be assurance to the South Korean Government that there will be no more forays from the North. He is convinced that if we have to act against North Korea, Chinese internal troubles will keep them from moving provided they are given assurance that there will be no threat to their territorial integrity.
7. Meeting terminated on note of reiteration that ROK Government would engage in no unilateral reprisals in connection with this incident. I assured him that we would consult fully with him as developments occur.
8. Comment: I think we have what we want from him in the way of assurance, but if there is another incident all bets are off. I suggest you consider brief message from President Johnson to Park admiring his restraint and statesmanship and assuring him of close cooperation and consultation.
Porter
146. Telegram From the Commander in Chief of the United Nations Command and of United States Forces, Korea (Bonesteel) to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Wheeler)/1/
Seoul, January 24, 1968, 1240Z.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Korea--Pueblo Incident, Events Leading up to; . . . . Secret; Immediate; Limdis; Specat; Exclusive. Also sent to CINCPAC.
241240Z/UK 50245. Specat Limdis for Admiral Sharp and Gen Wheeler. Subject: North Korean Posture (U).
1. (S) This is an attempt by me to draw some conclusions regarding North Korean posture from events of last few days.
2. (S) First conclusion is that these events, the strident outpourings of propaganda from Pyongyang echoed from Moscow, and North Korean statements at today's Armistice Commission meeting all tend to confirm previous reports from this headquarters that North Koreans intend to wage in earnest an advanced version of "porous warfare" combining unconventional warfare, continuously reiterated propaganda themes, psychological warfare and subversion and sabotage. The pattern seems clearly to indicate that Kim Il-Sung is a determined practitioner of the concepts advanced by Che Guevara in his article on "Many Vietnams" published 12 August 1967 in the Tricontinental, a publication of the Havana-based "Afro-Asia-Latin American People's Solidarity Organization." There are also additional evidences that he still suffers from belief that U.S. military effort so extended in support of Vietnam that U.S. unable adequately assist ROKs, except perhaps by nuclear weapons which he seems to believe would not be used in current context of dissidence and antiwar feeling in U.S.
3. (S) The Blue House raid on night of 20-21 January confirmed in accurate detail the previous intelligence reported from here that North Koreans had trained and developed "30 man suicide teams." Information obtained from the one agent captured indicates 2400 men in special units had been under arduous training for two years and that later raids may be undertaken by teams of company size. Credibility this sole captive not corroborated from other sources established but he has provided much information and retraced on the ground the infiltration route of his team with confirmatory external evidence.
4. (S) Current propaganda blasts adhere strictly to same basic themes reported from here over past year. Essentially the two themes are: (a) U.S. imperialists with Park Chung Hee puppets are aggressors vying to provoke new Korean War and (b) subversive and guerrilla raids south of DMZ are manifestations of revolutionary South Korean patriots and not conducted by North Koreans.
5. (S) Continuing evidence crop up in both North Korean actions and statements that Kim Il-Sung may be suffering from serious miscalculation as to U.S. capacity to react in Korea at same time war continues in Vietnam. This contains seeds of real danger if credibility of U.S. deterrent against overt action remains in doubt.
6. (S) Our estimate of North Korean capabilities and effectiveness of their "porous war" tactics is undergoing continuing reevaluation and we attribute even high capabilities now than previously given them. I am considering at the moment employing another battalion plus from the 7th U.S. division to reinforce local defense capabilities of Nike/Herc sites and special weapons storage areas. There have been today numerous fire fights and sightings of smaller agent groups in I Corp area north of Seoul, probably remnants of the original Blue House raiding team. A number of casualties have been suffered by both sides. We anticipate increasing team infiltrations in near future to include agent boat landings. In this connection, in my discussion with ROK MND this morning I found him seriously concerned at what he called his "underestimation" of numbers and effectiveness of well-trained North Korean teams. He wishes to present to UNC/USFK in near future plan for rotating mobilizations within rear area security divisions to provide 16,000 men for coast watching and associated counter- landing operations. Will report later on this when concept clearer.
7. (S) In summary, I believe North Korean pattern of operations is proceeding along lines previously predicted in numerous messages from here and as briefed in Washington at army commander's conference, USIB, etc. My concern, however, is that while some of our predictions have seemed "far out" the North Korean actions have exceeded them and at higher tempo.
8. (S) The original North Korean objectives of: (a) diverting efforts from Vietnam, (b) harassing ROK economic development, and (c) the underlying theme regularly stated by Kim Il-Sung of encouraging South Korean revolutionaries and achieving unification--on Communist terms--before or in early 70's seem to be making headway, at least with respect to the first two objectives.
9. (S) In light of above, recommend expeditious decision regarding some augmentation U.S. Eighth Army, particularly for local security reinforcements. We are also reviewing sea infiltration threat and may soon recommend that to extent feasible ROK Navy and Air Force resources involved be further supported by additional U.S. Navy sea surveillance flights and possibly assistance of two U.S. destroyers.
147. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Korea/1/
Washington, January 25, 1968, 0325Z.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 KOR/UN. Top Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Drafted by Rusk; cleared by Berger, Rostow, and McNamara; and approved by Rusk.
104293. Eyes Only for the Ambassador from the Secretary. In addition to UN matter for you to discuss with President Pak described in separate telegram,/2/ you should tell President Pak that President Johnson feels complete solidarity with the Republic of Korea in this tense situation and wishes to be sure that we both are prepared for all contingencies. You should also inform Pak that his agreement to exercise restraint while we are sorting things out is greatly appreciated here.
/2/In telegram 104283, January 25, Porter received instructions to discuss with Pak the U.S. view "that it desirable and advantageous for US to call for early meeting of UNSC to consider North Korean seizure of USS Pueblo and its crew and recent North Korean terrorist attacks in Seoul." Porter was also to give Pak the draft text of the letter Goldberg would submit when requesting the meeting. (Ibid., POL 33-6 KOR N-US) In reply Porter reported that Pak agreed with the potential advantages of bringing the matter before the Security Council and expressed satisfaction that not only the Pueblo incident, but also the Blue House raid would be brought before the United Nations. (Telegram 3626 from Seoul, January 25; ibid.) The text of Goldberg's January 26 letter is in Department of State Bulletin, February 12, 1968, p. 199.
The President is considering an immediate decision to send promptly a large number of US land-based and carrier-based aircraft (perhaps 250-300) to Korea and immediately adjacent areas. Please ask President Pak under condition of the greatest secrecy whether this deployment would create any problems for him. Naturally, the accommodation of additional aircraft in the Republic of Korea would be worked out through established channels. The immediate question is whether President Pak sees any major political problems in such a deployment. You may also tell him that this augmentation would represent no diversion whatever from Viet-Nam and would be promptly replenished in the US itself. You must underscore with him the secrecy of this possibility and treat it with the utmost discretion in your own Mission.
Request reply Nodis ASAP./3/
/3/In telegram 3623 from Seoul, January 25, Porter relayed Park's appreciation for the President's support and his willingness to accept the additional aircraft. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 KOR/UN) Rostow forwarded the telegram to President Johnson, noting that sending the planes to Korea "could have a calming effect there--at least." Rostow's memorandum indicates the President saw the telegram. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Korea--Pueblo Incident, Vol. I, Part A [through January])
Rusk
148. Telegram From the Commander in Chief of the United Nations Command and of United States Forces, Korea (Bonesteel) to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Wheeler)/1/
Seoul, January 27, 1968, 1025Z.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Korea--Pueblo Incident, Military Cables, Vol. I, January 1968. Secret; Immediate. Also sent to CINCPAC.
271025Z UK 56313. 1. General Bonesteel sends.
2. I met with the ROK JCS this morning (270200Z). I started out by saying now it more important than ever that ROK and US military work closely together with mutual trust and confidence. One objective Communist actions is to disrupt excellent US/ROK relations. I then updated them, on broad basis, of US actions within bounds of cautions contained in numerous incoming action messages. I had not received guidance regarding informing them on drone flight/2/ by time of meeting so excluded same.
/2/Flights over North Korea were authorized to gather information on the whereabouts of the Pueblo and its crew.
3. Important points made by ROKs were as follows: First, need for them to be adequately and timely informed on US intentions because they affect their mobilization planning, national emergency planning, martial law plans and numerous other vital plans conducted by ROK Government.
4. Second point was expression of strong feeling at all levels of the republic, that US at our governmental level had taken no adequately drastic action following attempt attack on President and Blue House. However, seizure Pueblo we had reacted drastically. They all expressed views along this line, making plain their object was not obstructive but that they were speaking as real friends of the US in whom they have great faith and trust. They reiterated nevertheless that actions taken by US in and from Korea should stress point that we view attack on Blue House--"The national symbol of the republic"--equally as important as Pueblo. They said mere oral protestation to this effect would not correct Korean opinion but that we should take immediate, tangible steps such as "air lifting immediately into Korea increments of CIGCOREP equipment," make firm announcement of commitment to deliver destroyers and other actions which can be taken within days.
5. The third point was expressed by all in one way or another. This is importance of taking clear, punitive action to teach Kim Il-Sung a lesson. Defensive action only within ROK alone would, they said, insure continuation and increase in North Korean infiltration and raids up to 10 or 100 times current levels. Several expressed concern that US would mount massive effort until Pueblo and crew returned but then would not continue to press to insure the stop of North Korean subversive war, they feared build-up and carrier task force would be retracted from Korea and vicinity when Pueblo incident settled. This, they said, would have grave effect of ROK/US relations and only encourage Communists. I attempted allay their fears and pointed out none of resources which might be directed to Korea were being supplied from Vietnam.
6. All the chiefs seemed deeply to appreciate the meeting and their expressions above were obviously sincere and well-meaning. They unquestionably need more information on basic US intentions with regard both Pueblo incident and Kim Il-Sung's subversive war activities. None seemed alarmed over imminence North Korea would take overt large-scale aggressive action unless these develop as result continuing actions.
7. I would like to operate on basis of informing ROK JCS on close-hold basis of all intended moves we plan to make except those in which message traffic explicitly prohibits discussion with ROKs. I will proceed on this basis unless I hear to contrary.
8. I wish to emphasize, from other sources as well as ROK JCS, that concern lest US reaction is only in regard to Pueblo is widespread and serious in many circles of ROK Government and public. I concur in ROK statement at end para 4 above and recommend feasible action to this end.
149. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Systems Analysis (Enthoven) to Secretary of Defense McNamara/1/
Washington, January 31, 1968.
/1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD/OASD/ISA Files: FRC 73 A 1250, Korea 370. Secret.
SUBJECT
Service Proposals to Increase U.S. Army Strength in Korea (U)
There are three Service requests now pending which deal with increasing U.S. Army strength in Korea:
1. General Bonesteel has asked CINCUSARPAC for an increase of 5161 in the U.S. Army Korea ceiling. His message of January 21/2/ cites two reasons:
/2/Not further identified but summarized below.
a. "To improve our capability to cope with the expected increase this spring in enemy infiltration and sabotage tactics";
b. "To improve and maintain a credible deterrent posture to cope with the enemy's increasing improvement in conventional war capability."
2. On January 25 the JCS/3/ recommended that you increase Army strength in Korea by 8,500 to raise operating strength from 79 percent to 90 percent of TO/TD. (The 11,000 KATUSA are not counted.)
/3/Reference is to JCSM-53-68 to McNamara. (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD/OASD/ISA Files: FRC 73 A 1250, Korea 370)
Note: Their calculations are wrong, as will be made clear below.
3. On January 29 the Secretary of the Army/4/ presented four alternatives to you for increasing strength in Korea, ranging from 5,200 to 18,500. The first coincides with General Bonesteel's request. The others are based on the JCS "manning level increase" concept. The Secretary of the Army recommended that any increase approved for Korea be matched by an increase in Army end-strength.
/4/Not further identified.
Comments
1. "Manning Level" Increases. (Please see the attached chart.)/5/ Keying a Korean augmentation to an increase in manning level of the aggregated TO/TD structure spaces is not sound. Last year we thought we had about 65,000 TO/TD in Korea. As the result of the Army's efforts to account for all of its TO/TD structure, about 6,000 more TO/TD structure spaces have been found in Korea. (This did not result in an increase in the total structure for which we are buying equipment. Compensating reductions were made elsewhere to assure consistency with our division force planning factor and the DPM control figures.) The Army commander in Korea is probably not even aware of the total TO/TD strength which he has. He simply uses the people he has and makes adjustments in his force structure to maintain his principal combat units at a reasonable manning level. Some low priority structure is undoubtedly "deactivated" or kept at very low manning, perhaps even cadre status.
/5/None of the attachments is printed.
The sensible questions to ask here are: (1) What are the jobs that the Army in Korea must do that it's not doing now? and (2) How many more people (if any) does it take to do them? To answer these questions requires a careful audit of the status of each unit and a description of its job. Manning level increases might be justified on an individual unit basis, but certainly not across the board.
2. Army End-Strength Increases. There are several points to be noted.
a. We don't know how much the transient population can be reduced from current Army projections through control of leave taken during PCS moves. There are different levels possible, depending on the degree of national emergency and the inconvenience to which we are willing to subject personnel.
b. We believe that the training establishment is larger than necessary, but we don't know how much.
c. An increase in end strength would not help to provide an immediate augmentation in Korea, owing to the lead time in generating trained strength. However, steps that could be taken are: (1) an arbitrary contraction of the transient population; (2) extension of tours in Korea (4,000 men leave there each month); and (3) diversion of planned SEA deployments temporarily to Korea.
3. Whether to Increase Korea. General Bonesteel says that the enemy is getting stronger and is planning to step-up infiltration and sabotage. He says nothing about how much the ROK Army has improved. It seems inconceivable that the ROKs can't take care of themselves, at least against the North Koreans. It also seems inconceivable that 52,000 U.S. troops can't protect themselves and their equipment.
Recommendations
There are two courses of action: (1) deny the JCS request on the assumption that the U.S. and ROK forces now in Korea should be able to handle the situation; (2) defer the JCS request pending their analysis of the force structure and presentation of a unit-by-unit justification of increases./6/ Enclosed are alternative memoranda for you to send to the JCS and the Army.
/6/McNamara supported the second option and notified the appropriate military officials of his decision in a February 1 memorandum. The JCS submitted their analysis of the requested increases to McNamara on February 21. The request was repeated in November, but on November 30 Nitze informed the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the decision would be deferred because of on-going studies of the issue. (All in Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSA/OASD/ISA Files: FRC 73 A 1250, Korea 370)
You asked about the possibility of earmarking a specific group of forces in CONUS for quick deployment to Korea, but holding them here until the need was clear to send them. I believe this solution would not meet General Bonesteel's request head on. He characterizes his need (or at least the part that deals with sabotage and infiltration) as a gradually increasing one, rather than one which would develop suddenly. Nevertheless, such a force certainly could be organized and quick-deployment plans developed.
Alain Enthoven
150. Telegram From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State/1/
Seoul, February 3, 1968, 0245Z.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 33-6 KOR N-US. Secret; Immediate; Nodis; Cactus.
3901. Ref: State 106085./2/
/2/Document 237.
1. Principal item discussed by President Park during my call on him (at his request) yesterday evening was along lines previously conveyed to you, i.e. their pessimistic view of likelihood that they, and perhaps U.S. as well, will get no satisfaction from North Koreans. This time, however, something new was added: He said that if ROKG does not get guarantee that NKs will desist from their aggressive activities, and there is another incident, ROKG will take retaliatory measures.
2. Park said he knew that the Communist side is hoping to bring about a split between US-ROKG cooperation, and that uncoordinated measures would make American Congress and people unhappy, but basic fact of matter is that unless and until North Koreans are hit sharply they will continue to create disturbed conditions and kill his people.
3. I said he knows my government is taking many steps to strengthen the position here. Whatever circumstances may prevail, and regardless of very real provocation to which ROKG has been and may yet be subjected, we are counting on full and complete consultation with him and his government prior to any action they might be considering. This was what we had been careful to do with them in the present crisis and we expect no less from them. The seriousness of uncoordinated action lay in fact that it would undermine mutual confidence and its bad effects could outlast that of any particular incident. (President Johnson's statement on Park to press yesterday just received. It is most useful at this point and is being taken to Park immediately.)/3/
/3/These comments were made during a news conference on February 2. (Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1968-69, Book I, pp. 155-163.)
4. Park said he did not mean to impart doubt of his closest ally in any way, but he does have worries as to the position ROKG will be in, particularly if Pueblo and crew returned and North Koreans continue their raids on the South. I reminded him of statement I had made to him (which was based on para six of reftel), NKs will clearly understand that Pueblo and crew are not end of problem and that we will remain equally concerned about gravity of armistice violations. I said I hoped his army had been instructed to avoid incidents along DMZ. He said that army has strict instructions in that sense and that we have his assurance that there will be no ROK unilateral action in present circumstances. The remarks he had just made apply to the future position, I said I had made our position as clear as I possibly could.
5. Comment: This exchange was very firm, but without heat. He was telling me and I was telling him. His remarks reflect hard line of many of his ministers, party elements and the generals. We are the counterweight to the type of pressure they are exerting. I expect our views will continue to prevail unless there is another severe raid though there is always danger that ROK unit will make unauthorized thrust across DMZ. There may be a certain amount of bad humor and discontent here later, but that should pass as we implement MAP and other programs already under way.
Porter
151. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Korea/1/
Washington, February 4, 1968, 0006Z.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Head of State Correspondence, Park Correspondence, Vol. I. Secret; Priority; Nodis. Drafted by the Korean Task Force, cleared by Read and Rostow, and approved by Rusk.
109821. Please deliver following message dated February 3, 1968, from President Johnson to President Park:
Begin text:
Dear Mr. President: The attempt to assassinate you and your family and our Ambassador is the latest and most shocking act against your country by the North Korean communists. I thank God that this unspeakable attempt has failed.
That the leaders in Pyongyang would order such a desperate measure shows their awareness of what your courageous leadership has meant to your country. I doubt that their failure will bring any respite in their efforts to introduce armed agents into your Republic, and to cause as much trouble as possible.
These attacks on your country have greatly increased during the past year, and you and I have done a lot to improve your ability to deal with them. I know you have given much thought to new ways in which this infiltration can best be met, and I, too, have been thinking of more ways to help you. Several of my top advisors have been working on this matter with even greater urgency than before, and I hope to be able to share our specific ideas with you at an early date.
I want you to know that we are urgently considering how to strengthen the equipment of your forces to meet this increased campaign from the North. I am giving this my personal attention and expect to be in touch with you soon about this matter.
You have been kept fully informed of the details of the recent seizure by the North Koreans of our naval ship, the Pueblo, and its crew. I know you share our concern. We shall continue to press hard for the earliest possible release of these men and their vessel. If progress toward this end is not soon forthcoming, we shall have to consider what additional measures will be necessary and appropriate.
I have no doubt that the increased incidents along the Demilitarized Zone, the seizure of our ship and the recent effort to attack you, are part of North Korea's program to create maximum tension in the area. They may hope, thereby, to help their friends in Hanoi. They may think that by raising tension in Korea they can force us to divert our attention from the campaign of aggression against South Viet-Nam. They will not succeed in that effort. The movements of planes and ships to the Republic of Korea in these last days have been from our active forces in the United States and in the Pacific. None has been taken from Viet-Nam.
The events of this past week in Viet-Nam have demonstrated anew how important it is for us all to remain strong there and to stand fast. I have no doubt we shall continue to do so. And we shall continue to stand strong and together in your country against any efforts, however desperate, by the regime in the North.
Our mutual objectives of peace, security and progress in Asia require us to make it entirely clear to the men in Pyongyang and in Hanoi that terror and lawlessness will not succeed and that their diversionary tactics will have no effect.
I am particularly grateful that we have been able to keep in such close contact through Ambassador Porter, who has been able to keep me current with your views. In these difficult days for both our countries, it is good to be able to share one's thoughts with a trusted friend and ally. Sincerely, Lyndon B. Johnson
End text.
Rusk
152. Telegram From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State/1/
Seoul, February 4, 1968, 1344Z.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Korea--Pueblo Incident--Cactus II, Cactus Seoul Cables, January 29 to February 9, 1968. Secret; Immediate; Nodis; Cactus. Attached to a February 4 memorandum from Rostow to President Johnson, that indicates the President saw it.
3935. Ref: State 109821./2/
/2/Document 151.
1. President Park was clearly moved by message contained reftel. I have not seen him affected in this way before now and he made no effort to hide his feelings as he heard President Johnson's solicitude for him and his family, lengthy discussion of mutual problems and finally the warm reference to him as trusted friend and ally. One may occasionally make him smile and even laugh, but it is a very rare thing to see his emotions stirred as they were by the President's message.
2. He kept me for almost two hours, during which I took occasion to brief him on the US/NK meeting this morning./3/ He was greatly interested in fact that NK rep put questions to US concerning augmentation of our air and naval forces, and troop alert. He said this another indication of their preoccupation with strength and their need to ascertain whether it might be used against them. He feels they will probe to determine our intentions and if and when they believe we have additional measures in mind, they will meet our demands for return of Pueblo and crew. They will not alter their policy of deliberate humiliation of US, he said, if they do not sense determination on our side.
/3/Admiral Smith, representing the UN Command, and General Pak, head of the North Korean delegation, met in closed meetings at the Military Armistice Commission to discuss issues relative to the Pueblo and the release of its crew.
3. He asked me what I thought. I said it looked to me as though the NKs may be approaching something like the North Vietnamese "you-stop-the-bombing-and-we'll-talk" ploy. In their case the NKs may tell us "you-withdraw-your-naval-and-air-strength-from-ROK- and-we'll-talk-about-your-ship-and-crew." In neither case, of course, was there much prospect of anything substantial. I said this was my off-the-cuff reaction and was not an official estimate, as I had not yet heard from you on the subject.
4. Park said we must be careful, that they had proved time and again that they cannot be trusted. Humiliation of the US is their goal, he said, and "your prestige is ROK prestige."
5. He then took up matter of public opinion, and the National Assembly view of the situation, all of this along lines known to you, but with certain ideas added. He remarked that the NK/US private meetings are stirring up adverse comment here and expressed a preference (I would not say it was stronger than that) for future meetings in public, or, if closed meetings continue to be necessary, a ROK representative should be present. Public meetings, or closed meetings with a ROK officer present, would do much to reassure the public. Fact of matter, he said, is that ROK side of problem, i.e. DMZ violations and raids by NK, not being discussed in any forum at present.
6. I said that he knew we deeply appreciated his patience in all these matters, and his concurrence in meetings we found it desirable to have. He can see key position occupied by men of Pueblo in this problem and his understanding of that enabled us to sound out the adversary when other channels had failed. It is sometimes necessary, I went on, for Presidents to withhold information temporarily in the public interest, to face press and public criticism while they are doing so, and this seemed to be one such case. I would of course transmit his comments and, as he knew, they would command attention at our highest levels.
7. I said I would comment now, however, on the matter of a public MAC meeting. These usually turn into propaganda displays and as such cause important matters to be drawn out for weeks and months longer than might be necessary were they dealt with in closed session. True, as he said, the correspondents could be present and could at least publicize our statements. Trouble is, they usually give as much time and space to the propaganda of the adversary and we end up no better off. I would sound out my people on this general subject and would come back to him. (See comment below on advisability of trying to set up open MAC meeting to discuss DMZ violations only.)
8. I did not comment on suggestion that ROK might be present at closed meetings. We are likely to make more progress with NKs if there is no ROK presence at these meetings.
9. Comment: Please give me your views on desirability of another open MAC meeting on DMZ violations only. It is possible that such a meeting would evoke NK riposte with Pueblo statement, but also possible, if we made no mention of Pueblo, that they would take that as indication we wish continue private talks with them on that subject. What I am trying to do is find device which will meet Park's public opinion (Assembly, party, intellectuals, military) problem here without interfering with our NK contact on Pueblo.
10. It would also help us greatly if you could arrange early delivery to Kimpo Airport by largest airplanes available of substantial amount of counterinsurgency items already promised ROK, if they are presently available. We would take care to have adequate presence of elements mentioned above, as well as all elements of local and foreign press. This kind of thing, if properly handled, might also aid us in our palaver with the NKs. Please comment soonest on this possibility.
11. The excellent support you have given me has made all the difference at this end.
Porter
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