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FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1964-1968, Volume XXIX Korea
Department of State |
Korea 164. Editorial Note On February 8, 1968, Ambassador Porter received instructions from the Department of State to "inform President Pak in confidence that we are giving urgent consideration to sending an envoy to talk with him." (Telegram 112452 to Seoul, February 8; Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Korea--Pueblo Incident--Cactus IIa, Cactus Seoul Cables, February 10 to February 28, 1968) The action was in response to a request made by Korean Foreign Minister Choi through Ambassador Kim to Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Berger on January 31. The Foreign Minister believed that by sending a special presidential envoy to Korea to address the crises brought on by the Blue House raid and the seizure of the USS Pueblo the United States would demonstrate its commitment to South Korea and affirm the strength of the bilateral relationship. (Memorandum of conversation, January 31; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 33-6 KOR N-US) When informing the United States Embassy in Seoul of this conversation, Deputy Assistant Secretary Berger noted the Department of State's initial reluctance to send an envoy out of concern that the move "would arouse wide speculation as to why he was sent and why normal channels were to be reinforced, and even rumors that we contemplating military action." (Telegram 109068 to Seoul, February 2; ibid., POL 7 US) Ambassador Porter also expressed reservations, noting that sending an envoy to Korea presented no clear advantage to the United States. (Telegram 3902 from Seoul, February 3; ibid., POL 7 US) Although the South Korean request initially received a cool reception, the Department of State and the White House continued to consider the request as events unfolded within Korea. In telegram 120315 to Tokyo, February 24, briefing the Ambassador on a possible mission, the Department noted that the raid on the Blue House followed by the Pueblo incident had "caused consternation within the ROK and emotional fury on the part of the ROKG leadership, particularly President Park, who became increasingly obsessed with the desire to strike back across the DMZ." U.S. diplomatic efforts to address the crises in the United Nations and through the Military Armistice Commission caused the South Korean leaders to view U.S. intentions with increasing suspicion. Within a short period of time relations between the United States and the Republic of Korea had seriously deteriorated. In light of those developments, President Johnson decided to send a special envoy to South Korea. (Ibid., POL 7 US/VANCE) On February 9 President Johnson wrote to President Pak confirming the appointment of Cyrus R. Vance as special envoy. Vance's instructions from the President were to discuss "current common problems, to inform himself on the current critical situation, and to report back to me his findings and recommendations." (Letter from President Johnson to President Pak, February 9; Johnson Library, National Security File, Head of State Correspondence, Korea, Park Correspondence, Vol. I) Immediately after release of a White House announcement of the appointment, Vance left for Korea. He was accompanied by Colonel Abbott C. Greenleaf, Military Assistant to the Deputy Secretary of Defense, and by John P. Walsh, Deputy Executive Secretary, Daniel A. O'Donohue, Foreign Affairs Officer, and Maria E. Gardosik, Secretariat Assistant from the Department of State. The Vance mission arrived in Seoul on February 11 and departed on February 15. (Vance Mission to Korea, Chronology, February 8-15; ibid., Country File, Korea--Pueblo Incident, Vance Mission to Korea (A), February 9 to 15, 1968) The importance of and the delicacy surrounding the Vance mission's objectives of easing tensions and buttressing U.S. relations with the Republic of Korea was underscored by the Department of State's rejection of the request by the Embassy in Japan for Vance to return to the United States via Tokyo to brief the Japanese on his findings in Korea. (Telegrams 5513 from Tokyo, February 10, and 113554 to Seoul and Tokyo, February 11; both National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 7 US/VANCE) In addition, Ambassador Porter, General Bonesteel, and Vance agreed that the latter should travel directly from Seoul to Washington, rather than proceeding to Saigon as President Johnson wished, so that the purpose of the mission was not diluted by other stops and issues. Because of the "depth of emotions in Seoul" and to eliminate any risk of affronting President Pak and other Korean leaders, Vance was to report the findings of his mission personally to President Johnson immediately upon his return to the United States. (Message from Rostow to Vance, February 13; ibid.; and telegram from Vance to Rostow, February 14; Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Korea--Pueblo Incident, Miscellaneous, Vol. I)
165. Telegram From the Commander in Chief, Pacific (Sharp) to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Wheeler)/1/ Honolulu, February 9, 1968, 0405Z. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Korea--Pueblo Incident, Vance Mission to Korea (B), February 9 to 15, 1968. Top Secret; Priority; Noforn; Specat Exclusive. Repeated to COMUSKOREA, CINCUSARPAC, CINCPACFLT, and CINCPACAF. 090405Z/RUHKA 1165. Joint ROK-US UW Group. A. COMUSKOREA 010655Z Feb 68 (PASEP)./2/ /2/Not found. 1. With regard to the development of a joint ROK-US UW Group, as recommended in ref A, I asked Gen Beach for his comments. He has submitted the following analysis in which I concur. 2. The growing impatience of the South Koreans with lack of US direct action and our declining prestige as a result thereof are recognized. The question to be addressed is whether a combined ROK-US unconventional warfare (UW) planning staff and the conduct of black operations will effectively stem this criticism without engendering more serious problems for the United States. This question must be reviewed in light of other significant measures being undertaken, including the major increase in MAP, the air movement of CIGCOREP equipment, and the permanent stationing of additional US forces in the ROK. 3. Is the US willing to collaborate in deliberate violations of the Armistice Agreement of 1953, and if so, will UW operations against North Korea (NK) have any reasonable prospects for success? The advantages-disadvantages of the establishment of a ROK-US UW planning group are as follows: Advantages: A. The ROKs have a capability in UW already developed and may employ it unilaterally. A combined UW planning staff may bring operations more under US control. B. UW operations are less expensive in personnel, equipment, and funds (gold flow) than purely defensive measures. They are, however, no substitute for such defensive measures. C. North Koreans understand retaliation and may slow down their incursions if successful UW operations can be conducted. D. The establishment of a combined planning group may help convince the ROK top level that the US will not tolerate NK provocations and it may raise US prestige with ROK leaders. It may temporarily pacify them. E. If the ROK leaders are convinced, some controlled and favorable public reaction in the ROK is possible. F. Controlled black raids are not likely to provoke initiation of hostilities and they might forestall ill-conceived ROK retaliation efforts. G. Possible training advantages could accrue for US UW personnel. H. If successful, UW operations may increase our intelligence holdings on NK. I. The probability of success, although low, would be improved with US participation in planning. Disadvantages: A. Establishment of a combined UW planning group effectively commits the US to eventual conduct of UW operations. To plan but never implement such operations would further lower ROK leaders' opinion of US resolve. It would convince the ROKs that unilateral action is the only answer. B. Conduct of black operations would violate the Armistice and, if exposed, would subject the US and ROKs to violent NK propaganda attacks in international media and forums. C. Types of UW operations of most impact would require deep penetrations. The NK security environment, unlike that in the ROK, makes prospects for success very remote. (1) Experience with pure intelligence operations, which run less risk of exposure than UW, has demonstrated the difficulty of penetration and travel in NK. In 1963 all US intelligence penetration operations and support to ROK operations were cancelled because agent loss rates exceeded 50 pct. Resumption of combined-intelligence operations in late 1964 reduced the loss rate but only one successful deep penetration has been conducted in past three years. (2) Results of six known retaliatory piston-type operations conducted unilaterally by ROK agencies since October 1966 are not known but they have failed to dissuade NK from its aggressive infiltration program. D. Because of necessary close hold on UW planning and operations, the ROK public would not be influenced favorably toward the US. Unsuccessful operations would be exposed publicly by NK and ROK public opinion would be adversely affected. Overt strengthening of US-ROK defense forces would better serve to influence ROK public opinion. E. US operations are unlikely to dissuade NK from its program of aggressive infiltration. Agents have been trained, plans and reconnaissance have been made and the NK leadership is callous toward its losses and lack of success in 1967-68. NK will continue and possibly step up its activities. ROK-US UW operations essentially would become revenge motivated. F. UW forays across the DMZ would cause a tightening of NK security efforts to the detriment of US-ROK intelligence operations. G. UW operations are counter to US policy and to the current JCS and CINCPAC policy of the "iron hand in the velvet glove." H. ROK-US UW operations that are compromised and exposed would have very adverse political repercussions in the United States and the free world. I. Guerrilla, subversive and their counter-type training have been in progress in Communist countries for more than a decade. Under the current situation in NK, it is unlikely that ROK-US efforts in this field could achieve any measurable success. J. US collaboration in planning joint UW operations but without implementation would strengthen the ROKs present conviction that their dissatisfaction with the US is justified. K. Exposure of UW operations will further adversely affect relations with the USSR and will prejudice relations with our allies and neutral nations. L. UW operations will divert ROK-US efforts to an area which even if successful has very little prospects of calming situation. In fact, such operations may well aggravate the tension which now exists. 4. Conclusions: A. The benefits to be derived from US participation in a combined ROK-US UW planning group are likely to be of limited value in satisfying ROK leadership and public of [1 or more lines of text missing on the source text]. [B.] tion of other overt measures being taken to enhance the ROK- US defense posture will be more effective in restoring confidence in US determination. C. There is very little prospect that meaningful UW operations can be successfully conducted in the tight security environment of North Korea. D. Participation by US in the planning and conduct of UW operations against NK entails a major reversal of US policy without the promise of commensurate returns. E. Our US-ROK policy, patience and steadfast determination over the past 15 years have been instrumental in preventing the reopening of hostilities in Korea and reducing the possibility of WW III. Emotional retaliatory actions will risk deterioration of present US discussions and may negate the gains achieved in the ROK over this long period. 5. Continued emphasis should be placed on keeping key military leaders advised of measures that the US is taking to strengthen the US-ROK defense posture. 6. Concurrently, ROK leaders should be warned of where the ROK stands without US backing. It should be made clear that the US will not start WW III on the basis of NK provocations of the present scale. They should be reminded that the ROK itself has much to suffer if hostilities are renewed. 7. Efforts must be continued to convince the ROKs of the benefits of enlisting world opinion against the illegal aggressive actions of the Kim Il Sung regime. ROK-US launched UW operations would risk forfeiture of the advantageous reputation that the ROK now enjoys. 8. CINCPAC recommends that development of a joint US-ROK unconventional warfare group to conduct operations in and against North Korea be held in abeyance and not approved at this time.
166. Telegram From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State/1/ Seoul, February 9, 1968, 0955Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 33-6 KOR N-US. Secret; Immediate; Nodis; Cactus. 4121. Ref: State 112452./2/ /2/See Document 164. 1. I called on PriMin this morning to discuss with him our plans for open and closed meetings. Foreign Minister also present. 2. Chong was obviously pleased at thought we would have open meeting, which might provide photographs and new comment sufficient to obscure in part at least fact of closed meeting. Foreign Minister again declared ROKG opposition to closed meetings which I countered with statement of our need keep this channel open. 3. They pressed me hard on question of envoy, saying his early arrival crucial in present situation. For first time they seemed as much concerned about President Park's state of mind as with Assembly and public opinion. I told them that matter of envoy being considered and I might have something to say to them in near future. They then went off to see the President. 4. After their interview with him, Foreign Minister asked me to come very urgently to his office. He was alone and obviously in very agitated state of mind. He was still concerned about closed meetings and read me statement which he said he had written down at President's request and which expressed ROK insistence that we hold only open sessions of MAC at Panmunjom. If open sessions are inconvenient in our effort for regaining wounded and crew of Pueblo and U.S. Government needs to continue closed meetings, ROK Government insists that ROK officer should accompany UNC representative to closed meeting. Their position has not changed on this. The Foreign Minister said he did his best but President used "very strong words" and position remained unchanged. 5. I said it was incomprehensible to us how ROK friends could insist on a move which would close the only channel available to us. Their alternative to this, as he knew, was to face their public opinion in Assembly, announce the full consultation we had had on this subject and state their agreement with us. He pleaded that at least we postpone the next closed meeting until after the envoy's arrival. (Comment: On this last point I need to know your wishes soonest for we are withholding request for both open and closed meetings until hearing from you.)/3/ /3/The Department of State rejected the request, emphasizing that it was imperative that the United States "proceed with private seniors meeting as often as necessary to keep heat on North Koreans." (Telegram 112650 to Seoul, February 9; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 33-6 KOR N-US) 6. Choi then made lengthy statement on very frustrating position that ROK Government finds itself in. "We have six hundred thousand men and we are not doing anything," he declared, obviously reciting President's line. (This was new for him. Hitherto he has been concerned only about Panmunjom meetings.) He declared President's position is intolerable and that President does not know what United States will do if another NK raid takes place. Choi declared that we should quickly "negotiate pieces of paper" which will state exactly what would happen in way of retaliation in such circumstance. He said there should also be a direct joint public warning to NK stating clearly what would happen if there is another incident. This man was so distraught after his visit with President that I merely commented mildly that if we did what he said we would be signaling our intentions in a way which could benefit only the adversary. He said he could resign but that would not solve anything and he wanted to impress upon me that the things he was saying to me might be a "last warning." 7. Here I recalled to him my statement to the President, to the Prime Minister and to the Foreign Minister earlier that in any circumstances regardless of provocation we expect full advance consultation on any measures they might envisage. He said that President Park kept repeating that every time he mentions need for retaliation I talk about advance consultation and the President feels very frustrated. I said that might be true but we have obligations to each other which we must not forget. Porter
167. Paper Prepared in the Department of State/1/ Washington, undated. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Korea--Pueblo Incident, Vance Mission to Korea (B), February 9 to 15, 1968. Top Secret. Attached to a February 9 memorandum from Rostow to President Johnson. Rostow's memorandum indicates that the President approved the instructions for Vance, which had also been approved by Rusk. MISSION OF CYRUS R. VANCE Special Instruction You should arrange for a secret conversation with President Park with only his interpreter and/or personal assistant, Yi Hu-rak present. You should decide who should accompany you. You are to convey the following in any manner and with any elaboration you deem desirable. 1. The immediate release of the USS Pueblo and its crew is required to reduce quickly the tension in the area and the danger of war. This is of transcendent importance. But there is another aspect that is extremely important to President Johnson. 2. The country and the Congress have welcomed the President's restraint in the face of this great provocation, just as it has welcomed President Park's restraint in the face of the Blue House raid. If the crew and the vessel are not returned quickly, this will not only become a very serious matter between the U.S. and the North Koreans, but it can become a very serious matter on the American political scene. President Park knows the problem of free elections. This is an election year in the U.S., and the issue could become a major one in the campaign in such a way as to affect U.S.-ROK relations and our position in Southeast Asia. This is the second reason why the U.S. must do its utmost and use every possible means to obtain the immediate release of the crew and the vessel. The private meetings channel is at present the only one which offers any prospect of obtaining release and we must give it every opportunity to show whether it will produce results. We cannot throw this matter into open meetings of the Military Armistice Commission, or insist on a Republic of Korea representative attending the public meetings, which would certainly produce a breakdown of these talks. 3. The President is deeply appreciative of the closeness of the exchanges which have been taking place in this very grave situation. It reminds him of the close and continuing contacts between President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill during World War II and he wants to keep it that way. The President understands President Park's domestic problems and he wants President Park to understand his. There is no substitute for this personal trust and confidence at a time like this. 4. We are not going to abandon the Republic of Korea when the USS Pueblo and its crew are returned, but we will remain in Korea in even stronger force than before. President Johnson urges President Park to be calm and patient, not to permit any of his officers to engage in rash acts which might lead to fighting on the DMZ, which would create a wholly new set of problems and dangers and strains on our alliance, as well as interrupt the great progress that the Republic of Korea has been making under President Park.
168. Telegram From the Commander in Chief, United States Forces, Korea (Bonesteel) to the Commander in Chief, Pacific (Sharp)/1/ Seoul, February 9, 1968, 1337Z. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Korea--Pueblo Incident, Vance Mission to Korea (B), February 9 to 15, 1968. Top Secret; Noforn; Eyes Only. Repeated to Wheeler who passed it to Rostow, Rusk, Helms, and each of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Attached to a February 9 memorandum from Rostow to President Johnson. KRA 0513. 1. I have been deeply disturbed over last several days at growing irrationality in certain areas ROKG, most especially in President Park himself. Inputs in last day have confirmed that Park is almost irrationally obsessed with need to strike now at North Koreans, with sort of "apres moi le deluge" philosophy accentuated by our secret talks with NK at Panmunjom. You will see, I trust, AmEmb's and [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] reports on today's developments/2/ but these are confirmed to some degree by inputs from MI sources indicating directives for planning for immediate retaliation in event NK raids, and info from CS/ROKAF that he fears he may receive orders from Blue House for unilateral air strikes, which he knows would be suicidal. We are taking all feasible preventive measures, which cannot be 100 percent, and I feel, or at least hope, ROK Chiefs of Staff would disobey such orders, due to numerous talks with them, except after violent NK provocation. /2/See Documents 166 and 170. 2. However unreasonable Pres. Park's obsessive drive may appear to Washington, I wish to state frankly that we have given him no real idea of what we intend to do or alternative courses, and so I believe we have brought large part of it on ourselves. It is absolutely essential, to my mind, that we give certain ROKs, including chiefs of services, some concept or strategy as to what we intend to do. They know we are making contingency plans, but they do not know what, where, when or why and in meantime our actions are highly confusing to them. Responsible ROKs, and I include military chiefs among these, are scared at recent turn of emotions in Pres. Park's and a few others' minds. They know full well that ROK cannot survive without genuine US support. But they have no clear idea what we mean to do, and suspect we do not either, on next phases of action. This is not fear only of US compromise but equally that we might take some militarily provocative action that would precipitate war without their having taken even most elemental steps to safeguard their population or to mobilize their military strength. The only plan that we advance to ROKs is first a peaceful try to get back Pueblo crew (which does not impress anyone here as moving very fast especially since we seem to be withdrawing military power) while we build military power, then second, if Pueblo crew not returned some sort of action. 3. One Korean wag characterizes our concept of "the steel fist in the velvet glove," as "the silken fist in silken glove."/3/ /3/Reference is to the U.S. policy adopted toward the North Koreans in the wake of the seizure of the Pueblo; see Document 237. 4. Our inscrutable policy combined with Kim Il-Song's speech last night on 20th anniversary of Korean Peoples Army (reported by FBIS and on news service broadcasts) in which he says, among other things, that "situation shows war can be touched off by US imperialists any moment"--these two factors do not help ROK sanity at moment. (We can see effective psywar of nerves in Kim's speech, but not all ROKs are so "sophisticated.") 5. UNC/USFK have studied CINCPAC TS Noforn message 030154Z Feb 68/4/ and believe US military contingency planning is fine but can find in it no inkling of strategic concept we could express to ROKs which would enable them to know what mobilization or civil defense planning or implementation steps to take [garble] when to take care of their 30 million people, their homes or their industry. Only guidance I have is State message saying do not let them mobilize their reserve divisions at this time. I fully agree with guidance, but would like to be able to give ROKs some rationale. /4/Not found. 6. Noforn messages we get do not seem to appreciate there are at least three, not one, unknowns in situation here. Most seem oriented primarily on what would happen if NKs took certain overt initiatives. We in USFK are not flapping here, but we would like some greater consideration of, first, what if ROKs take unilateral initiatives. Second, what if NKs deliberately provoke ROK unilateral initiative, and third, what if US actions, which we have not conveyed to ROKs in sufficiently timely fashion, provoke unexpected NK reaction. ROKs are most scared of possible NK unconventional guerrilla raid offensive and believe this inevitable if US does not take strong stand soon. 7. I have tried for some days now to express in more formal language the Mad Hatter's tea party atmosphere among high-level ROKs here. Forgive my reverting to the vernacular, but most seriously it will be very important that Cy Vance come here prepared to answer in some way the questions of what the US is prepared to do, particularly re stopping NK infiltration threat by threat of force if necessary, and the what, when, where and why type of questions including some of ROK mobilization and civil defense. He should also be prepared, if necessary, to talk turkey re unilateral ROK retaliation at this time. Finally, if we could turn the visit into a sort of a minor session like Roosevelt-Churchill strategy talks at Argentina early in WWII some constructive results may be obtained. What is happening in Saigon is not making Pres. Park any more calm. 8. I have not shown this message to Amb Porter tonight but will show him first thing tomorrow.
169. Memorandum Prepared by the Department of State/1/ Washington, February 9, 1968. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 33-6 KOR N-US. Secret. A handwritten note on the memorandum reads: "Pres. approved & added points directly to Vance 2/10. BHR [Read] from WWR [Rostow]" A typed note on the memorandum indicates it was approved by Rusk. SUBJECT 1. To persuade President Park that we attach as much importance to the North Korean provocations against South Korea as we do to the return of the USS Pueblo and crew. 2. To make Park understand we do not see the issue in Korea as a double problem, one involving the U.S. in its attempts to obtain the release of the USS Pueblo and its crew, and one involving the Republic of Korea in the face of North Korean provocations. The provocations against the Republic of Korea are a problem for both countries, not just the Republic of Korea, and the USS Pueblo is not just our problem but requires South Korean cooperation to be resolved. 3. To explain to Park that we are committed to using peaceful means to resolve both sets of problems and until we have clearly abandoned hope for a peaceful settlement we must reserve judgment as to further courses of action. 4. To ask Park publicly and privately to associate himself with our view that he too seeks a peaceful solution. 5. To obtain a reaffirmation that the authority of General Bonesteel and the chain of command will be absolutely observed. 6. To impress on Park that just as we will not take unilateral reprisal actions against the North Koreans in the present, tense situation without full advance consultation with him, we expect that no unilateral reprisal actions will be taken by the Republic of Korea, organized or spontaneous, without full advance consultation with us, and to inform him that such ROK actions could well alienate American and world opinion and destroy the very foundation of both the ROK case and our case and endanger support for our alliance. 7. To convince Park that we must pursue private meetings with the North Koreans to obtain release of crew and vessel, until we are convinced that further talks of this kind are fruitless and we must look to other courses of action. 8. To make Park understand that the attachment of a South Korean to the private meetings is impossible because the North Koreans will not accept it and if we make an issue of this it will terminate the private meetings. 9. To make Park understand that open meetings of the Military Armistice Commission will not solve either the provocation problem or the Pueblo. It is a propaganda forum. 10. To make Park understand that when the Pueblo Case is settled we will not return to the status quo but by our actions in providing additional military and counter-infiltration assistance and by keeping augmented forces in and around South Korea we will display our determination to stand with the ROKs. 11. To stress to President Park that the continuing public evidence of differences between us, any threat to return units from Viet-Nam, any indication of unilateral action by South Korea against the North will only play into the hands of the North Koreans. 12. To show Park that we have played the game with him in full trust and confidence and we expect full trust and confidence from him.
170. Message From the Central Intelligence Agency Seoul, February 9, 1968. [Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD/OASD/ISA Files: FRC 91-0017, Korea 092 (Sensitive). Secret; Eyes Only. 3 pages of source text not declassified.]
171. Telegram From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State/1/ Seoul, February 10, 1968, 0350Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 33-6 KOR N-US. Secret; Flash; Nodis; Cactus. 4129. Ref: State 111264./2/ /2/Document 159. 1. I went to Blue House this morning to receive letter which President Park proposed to send to President Johnson in reply to message contained reftel. After reading text I said that as friend I wanted to make some comments to him and particularly with regard to phrases demanding immediate retaliatory action and warning of punitive action by UN forces if NKs do not acknowledge their aggression, apologize and give guarantees for future. I said such phraseology was not well designed to meet problems of my President and I had suggestions to offer. (These suggestions of course involved considerable toning down and elimination of phraseology, and after hour and half of wrangling I finally induced him to hold letter and reconsider entire approach.) 2. He burst out on several occasions declaring that I was emasculating all of his ideas. I said all of his ideas expressed orally had been transmitted and were receiving attention highest levels in Washington, but I had to emphasize to him that it was a mistake to put these things in writing. To mention but one complication reference to the UNC automatically involved many friendly nations and this had to be considered very carefully. I left them (President and SecGen) with understanding they would redraft letter but I am not sure that Park will not reinsert phraseology which he personally inserted in first place. It may be that they will hold the letter until after Vance visit or may even try to hand it to Vance to carry to the President. 3. He expressed appreciation President Johnson sending Mr. Vance here but made it clear that he is hoping for some indications of decisive course of action. 4. We will transmit text of draft letter separately for your information. I repeat it was to be redrafted and was not signed when I was at Blue House. 5. To enable CINCPAC to properly estimate atmosphere suggest, if you perceive no objection, that it be re-transmitted to him./3/ /3/Transmitted in telegram 113573 to CINCPAC, February 10. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 33-6 KOR N-US) Porter
172. Telegram From the Commander in Chief, Pacific (Sharp) to the Commander of United States Forces, Korea (Bonesteel)/1/ Honolulu, February 10, 1968, 0400Z. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Korea--Pueblo Incident, Military Cables, Vol. II, February 1968 to March 1968. Top Secret; Noforn; Eyes Only. Repeated to Wheeler who passed it to Rostow, Rusk, Helms, and to each of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 100400Z. A. COMUSKOREA KRA 0513/091337Z Feb 68;//2/ B. CINCPAC 030154Z Feb 68 (Genser)./3/ /2/Document 168. /3/Not found. 1. In various dispatches, the latest of which is Ref A, you have expressed a need to inform the ROKs of our strategy in the present situation. In paragraph 5 of Ref A you indicate that you believe US military contingency planning as expressed by CINCPAC in Ref B is fine but can find in it no inkling of a strategic concept you could express to ROKs. 2. In the wealth of dispatches regarding the current situation, which are too numerous to tabulate, it would seem to me that our strategy is clear. I will give it to you briefly as I see it. The United States intends to accomplish the return of the Pueblo crew by diplomatic means without becoming embroiled in a second front war in Korea. We also hope to have the Pueblo itself returned through diplomatic means, although return of the ship is less important than return of the crew. We do not intend to take any military course of action for return of the Pueblo crew because we know of no action that offers any promise of getting the Pueblo crew back alive. The buildup of air and naval units is designed to support our diplomatic efforts while at the same time increasing our readiness. 3. You have not been permitted to discuss our strategy with the ROKs because such discussion would run the risk of upsetting our careful and deliberate course of action. When the United States decides to use its military force, if it does, you will be notified in time that you may further notify the ROKs. Until that time you will need to keep higher levels of the ROK Government calmed down to the best of your ability. 4. The United States does not want any unilateral action by the ROKs which would upset negotiations for return of the Pueblo crew or involve the United States in armed action in Korea. It should be further apparent that United States Armed Forces are fully employed in Vietnam and that people of the United States are not prepared to see their country involved in a second war. 5. I am sure you realize as I do that we have no intention of allowing the ROKs to get us involved in a war of their choosing, and we expect to control the situation to insure that they don't. Our participation in any armed action that they start is not automatic. One of your greatest chores at the moment is to keep things calmed down and under control and I realize perfectly that you are not able to convey much information to the ROKs that will assist you in satisfying them. 6. US strategy as I have outlined it to you in the paragraphs above is not the result of any specific guidance from the JCS but rather my own estimate.
173. Telegram From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State/1/ Seoul, February 10, 1968, 0410Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 33-6 KOR N-US. Secret; Flash; Nodis; Cactus. A retyped copy of this telegram was given to President Johnson under a February 10 covering memorandum from Rostow that indicates the President saw the telegram. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Korea--Pueblo Incident--Cactus IV, Cactus Miscellaneous Papers, February to December 1968) 4131. Refs: A) State 111264 B) Seoul 4129./2/ /2/Documents 159 and 171. 1. Following is text of letter which President Park proposed to send President Johnson in response to latter's letter (reftel). Ambassador's comments on letter and his meeting with President contained Ref B. Following text is provided on FYI basis only. Letter was not signed by Park and although Yi Hu-rak may anticipate that we will transmit it, it has no official standing./3/ /3/The letter, February 9, sent to President Johnson contained minor differences from this text. A translation of the official, signed letter is in the Johnson Library, National Security File, Head of State Correspondence, Korea, Park Correspondence, Vol. I. 2. Begin text. Dear Mr. President: Yesterday, I received your kind letter which has given details of your views again through Ambassador Porter. I understand your view that the Pueblo incident, a question of immediate concern to you, should be dealt with separately "in somewhat different perspectives" and with differing tactics from the longer run question of ensuring the security of the Republic of Korea as you have termed. However, the North Korean commandos' intrusion into Seoul has given such a particular and serious impact upon my people that an alien would find it hard to grasp it fully and the indignant feelings of my people against the North Korean Communists seem to have reached the apex. Although it is understandable to me that you are seeking an earliest possible solution to the question of the Pueblo, you will no doubt know that my personal understanding cannot be equated with that of my fellow countrymen as you may have experienced yourself in dealing with various problems such as the Vietnam war. If Your Excellency considers it absolutely necessary to have further closed meetings with the North Koreans in order to have the crew of the Pueblo back, it is likewise necessary for us to have your assurances on the following points: 1. The problem of the North Korean raiders' incursion on Seoul, as separate from the question of the Pueblo, will be brought before the Military Armistice Commission meetings in the immediately near future. 2. And we lodge a protest with the North Koreans; press them to admit the aggressive act, apologize for it and pledge that such an act will not be repeated in the future. 3. In case the North Koreans refuse to accept this:/4/ /4/The final version contained the added phrase "and change their attitude." A. The United Nations forces take an immediate retaliatory action;/5/ /5/This paragraph was changed to read: "The Republic of Korea and the United States Forces take an immediate retaliatory action in accordance with the provisions of the Mutual Defense Treaty between the two countries." B. And at the same time, issue a formal warning to them that the United Nations forces will take immediate punitive action should they continue to make resort to such actions in the future./6/ /6/This paragraph was revised to read: "And at the same time, issue a formal warning to them that the Republic of Korea and the United States Forces will take immediate punitive action, if the North Koreans make resort to such actions again in the future." These, I believe, are the minimum measures/7/ for ensuring the security of the Republic of Korea. /7/In the final version the word "required" was inserted here. I know Your Excellency is concerned with the security of our country more greatly than anyone else and are taking measures/8/ to strengthen our national defense. This I appreciate always. /8/This phrase was changed to read "and have taken measures." But a fact remains that the infiltrations by the North Koreans into the South have increased, not decreased, since the Armistice although we have done our utmost to strengthen our defense capability. Therefore, I want you to understand the increasingly keener awareness among my people that increased defense capability alone will not/9/ be complete in solving the problem of our security. /9/This section was modified to read "that strengthened defense alone will not." If we are to dissuade the North Koreans from their aggressive acts, simultaneously assuaging the wrath of my people, we should make the North Koreans fully recognize our resolute determination that we will not allow them to commit an aggressive act without subjecting themselves to/10/ immediate punitive action. /10/In the final letter the word "our" was inserted at this point. What I have so far outlined above is related to the measures for ensuring the security of my country, for which you have shown such a great concern, and I do not think that there may be any point of disagreement with you. In summation, I am sure, that the security of the Republic of Korea rests on: 1. Strengthening/11/ our defense capability to such an extent where we maintain an absolute supremacy over the North, and /11/At this point in the final letter the word "of" was inserted. 2. Driving it home to the North Koreans that an aggressive act will be met with immediate, stern punitive action. If the North Koreans feel free that they can act on a premise that aggression against the South can be committed with impunity, no increase in our defense capability will give complete solution to our cardinal problem, an effective guarantee against any re-invasion by the North./12/ /12/President Johnson responded to this letter on February 28 in the aftermath of the Vance visit to Seoul. The President wrote that Vance had thoroughly discussed the issues contained in this letter while in Seoul and immediately upon his return had made recommendations for the President to consider. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Head of State Correspondence, Korea, Park Correspondence, Vol. I) With my warmest good wishes, Sincerely, /s/Park Chung Hee. End text. Porter
174. Telegram From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State/1/ Seoul, February 10, 1968, 1110Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 33-6 KOR N-US. Secret; Immediate; Nodis; Cactus. A typed copy of this telegram was given to President Johnson under a February 10 covering memorandum from Rostow that indicates that the President saw the telegram. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Korea--Pueblo Incident--Cactus IV, Cactus Miscellaneous Papers, February to December 1968) 4142. Subject: ROKG Plans for Vance Visit. 1. Stating he acting on instructions from FonMin, MOFA International Affairs Bureau Director called Pol Counselor to his office to discuss subjects ROKs will wish to raise with Vance. 2. He led into this subject by stating that ROKG is placing great expectations on Vance's visit, which could be real turning point in ROK/US relations. He said ROKG and entire Korean people hoped that Vance, a special emissary of President Johnson, would not let ROK down, and in this context he referred to "failure" of 1953 visit under similar tense circumstances by Asst Secty Walter Robertson. 3. He then alluded to the fact that MOFA had been instructed by Blue House to prepare position paper for Vance and general outline of joint Park/Vance communique and USG/ROK joint declaration. He said that latter two should deal with three major points: A. The question of Operational Control: He said that ROKs understood need to have CINCUNC retain operational control of ROK forces but that there should be some change in rules of game. It seemed strange, he said, to ROK that when intruders penetrated deep into ROK territory, ROK military commanders should have to seek CINC's permission to use ROK combat troops to destroy intruding forces. System should be changed to permit ROK commanders immediately to deploy against intruders, perhaps notifying CINCUNC that ROK forces had been withdrawn from his operational control for such purposes. Furthermore, when intruders ventured into ROK territory and were engaged by ROK and US forces, rules of game should permit application of principle of hot pursuit; ROKs should not have to stop south of MDL. B. Punitive Measures: US and ROK should make it clear to enemy and to rest of world that they will not permit North Korea conduct aggressive acts against ROK without fear of retaliation. US and ROK should announce that if intrusions continue, they will physically punish NK by striking at root source of NK aggression. Not only should this warning be made unequivocally clear in words of the governments, but some punitive action must be taken next time North Koreans strike. He suggested that NK guerrilla training camps might make suitable targets and said that if they were wiped out it would not mean local much less general war. C. US Commitment: He said that most sophisticated Koreans are aware that President Johnson has authority to order US forces into combat without explicit Congressional approval and that ROK and RVN would not exist today were this not so. ROK populace, however, suffers from trauma from Korean War which has been reopened by US unwillingness to take military action following Blue House raid and Pueblo incident. People doubt that US will actually commit its forces to defend them in case NK aggression continues and are especially concerned over language in Mutual Defense Treaty which says that each party will act in "accordance to its constitutional process." What is needed, he said, is some flat statement in document to which USG is party which spells out fact that President Johnson can commit US forces without time-consuming Congressional debate and approval./2/ /2/In a later discussion with Porter the Foreign Minister referred to a 1953 secret agreement between the United States and Korea of which Porter had no knowledge. (Telegram 4177 from Seoul, February 12; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 33-6 KOR N-US) Other ROKG officials and the Korean media made reference to a U.S. arrangement with the Philippines as well as to the NATO agreement, both of which committed the United States to respond automatically to any acts of aggression against those partners. The Koreans wanted the same type of unequivocal statement in their defense agreement with the United States. (Telegram 4159 from Seoul, February 12; ibid.) The Department of State responded that the U.S. Government had "made no secret defense commitments to either Korea or Philippines" quoting official statements that an armed attack against the Philippines would be considered an armed attack against the United States, which it believed the Koreans may have had in mind when making their demands. (Telegram 113906 to Seoul, February 12; ibid.) The issue continued to be raised by Korean officials. (Telegram 4596 from Seoul, February 29, and airgram A-431 from Seoul, March 7; both ibid., DEF 4 KOR S-US) 4. Pol Counselor led him carefully through all the difficulties which surround each of propositions. Director agreed that ROKG was aiming high, but held firmly to position that something dramatic of nature he had described must come out of Vance's visit. Porter
175. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Korea/1/ Washington, February 11, 1968, 2335Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 33-6 KOR N-US. Secret; Immediate; Nodis; Cactus. Drafted by Rusk, cleared by Rostow and Houdek (S/S), and approved by Rusk. The TOVAN and VANTO designator was used to identify cable traffic to and from Vance in Seoul. 113671. TOVAN 12. Eyes only for Vance from Rusk. 1. Please ask Ambassador Porter to show you my Nodis 110828/2/ as background for your talk with President Park. /2/Document 157. 2. The views contained therein are a fair reflection of the problems of public and Congressional opinion toward Korea which we would have here if the Koreans themselves are not careful. This type of material should not be used by you as a direct threat from one President to another but it should be used with great force to expose the kinds of problems which our President will face in trying to maintain our support for the Republic of Korea. On that basis, you can be very tough indeed because the problems are real. 3. If the matter of reduced ROK participation in Viet-Nam comes up, you should not hesitate to point out that that would require a reduced US participation in Korea. A ROK division in Viet-Nam can only be replaced by a US division now in Korea. Further, Viet-Nam is where the battle is, and from a military point of view the problem of infiltration can be handled by the large forces present in South Korea. Of course, if North Korea launches an all-out invasion, that is another ballgame. But it is not in our interest, or in the interest of the Republic of Korea, to have another all-out war in Korea. Hence, it is folly for the South Koreans to take steps which would translate an infiltration problem into general hostilities. It's easy to get into such hostilities but very hard to bring them to a successful conclusion./3/ /3/President Johnson also wanted to instruct Vance to "request Korean permission for Westy [Westmoreland] to redeploy Korean forces if necessary; and indicate urgency of requirement for extra Korean division in Viet Nam." (Memoranda from Rostow to President Johnson, February 12; Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Korea--Pueblo Incident, Vance Mission to Korea(B), February 9 to 15, 1968) Rusk opposed adding the issue to those already to be raised by Vance. The President agreed "most reluctantly" to send this cable without an instruction to raise the question of the additional division. (Memoranda and draft telegram, February 12; ibid., State Department Cables, Vol. II, February 1968) 4. If President Park attempts to extract commitments which go beyond the terms of our Treaty of Alliance, you should state quite simply that no alteration of that treaty lies within the constitutional power of our President. The treaty stands as agreed and is the primary source of the Republic of Korea's ability to maintain itself as a secure and independent nation. It is elementary, for example, that our President cannot remove the phrase "in accordance with its constitutional processes" from a Treaty of Alliance. We cannot entertain suspicions about the loyalty of the United States to its alliances at a time when we have just lost 900 killed in a ten-day period in Viet-Nam in the course of demonstrating our fidelity. 5. Your object is to combine an assurance to President Park of our steadiness and seriousness of purpose with an understanding on his side that we, too, have national interests engaged in the safety of his country and in peace in Northeast Asia. We expect from him the same degree of cooperation that he expects from us. If we each have internal public problems, which differ somewhat, the point is that our two Presidents should in consultation decide how to proceed in a way to deal with both sets of problems. We cannot give overriding priority to his problems if, by doing so, we undermine the very basis of US support to the Republic of Korea. 6. All this means (a) we must maintain our war effort in Viet-Nam (b) we must use available channels at Panmunjom to free Pueblo and crew (c) we must act together to insure security of Korea (d) we must not take action on our side to convert infiltration problem into a major war if it can be avoided and (e) we must each give leadership in our own countries to press and public opinion in the interest of our common purposes. Rusk [Continue with the next documents]
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