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FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1964-1968, Volume XXIX Korea
Department of State |
Korea 182. Letter From the Ambassador to Korea (Porter) to the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs (Bundy)/1/ Seoul, February 27, 1968. /1/Source: Department of State, Bundy Files: Lot 85 D 240, Ambassadors' Private Correspondence, 1967-1968. Secret. Attached to a March 4 memorandum from Bundy to Rusk, indicating Bundy sent a copy to Katzenbach, Berger, Brown, and the Korea Country Director. Dear Bill: 1. I think there are several lessons we should draw from events of the past month. We have tended to be pleased about economic progress in South Korea over the past few years, and our satisfaction at this has to some degree obscured the fact that we have concurrently been nourishing a tiger, which is becoming difficult to restrain and confine: It looks to me now as though Park's desire to go north is not much less acute than his adversary's intention, some day, to move south. As you know we had a difficulty with Syngman Rhee, too, at one point, back about 1954, when he thought the moment had come; but since that year we have gradually allowed ourselves to ignore the implications of our military aid policy in this country. 2. It is as clear as day that both sides are now preparing to have quite a slapping match during the coming Spring and Summer. Let's hope we can keep it at that level, though the effect of a major humiliation for one or the other in the form of a successful assassination or demolition will be hard to contain. In such event, we here know whom we will go for and, while we do not have from you yet any comment on useful restraints to impose on our friends, you may be sure that we will use everything that seems necessary in the circumstances. 3. The moment of danger in these matters comes, not a week or ten days later, but during the twenty-four to forty-eight hours immediately following the incident, when the elements of humiliation, face, criticism and anger prevail. One may ask for a special envoy later, but the immediate problem is to apply and maintain restraint. The purpose of the envoy, as I saw it, was to get across to Park, from President Johnson himself, that there was no likelihood of our following them into blind, emotion-packed reprisals, and of course, I wanted to subject someone with ready access to our President to the kind of gut reaction that I was encountering. It was not difficult for Vance to evoke from Park, who was only too cooperative in this sense, all that was needed to enable him to carry home a clear personal account of the danger. Vance is a cool, practical person, and it was a pleasure for both Bonesteel and me to work with him. 4. The immediate aftermath of the Vance visit has been a lessening of tension. The President vented his spleen, a special envoy was sent by President Johnson, $100 million more were in the kitty, and Park feels secure in the knowledge that he is probably right--the NK's will try again, perhaps even while they diddle us with the Pueblo affair. The President is not churning up press or public the way he was a couple of weeks ago, but he is not letting them forget, either, that he has warned the United States that our policies will encourage Kim Il Sung to believe that more activity can be safely carried on. While he and the Government have allowed things to simmer down, please understand that there is no fundamental change in their outlook or their intentions. The military chiefs closely imitate the President's attitude, but there is much muttering and rumbling at the middle levels. The exercise now for the Bureau, if I may say so, is to think out ways and means of transforming the tiger from one which would take over the northern jungle, to one which would defend his own den, and I would begin with fuel and ammunition supplies while giving special attention to the type of hardware flowing into this country./2/ One of the remarkable things about Korea, something closely connected with American sentimentality, is that it is almost impossible to control, or even be consulted about, great quantities of aid that flow into the country. /2/In a March 4 memorandum transmitting this letter to Rusk, Bundy doubted the United States could control such deliveries "to exert any leverage on South Korean retaliatory impulses," but added that he would discuss the matter with the Department of Defense and others. (Ibid.) In late March the Department of State considered transferring ground ammunition worth as much as $100 million to Korean forces, but Porter opposed that action and advocated periodically supplying the Koreans with limited amounts of ammunition. (Telegram 138433 to Seoul, March 29, and telegram 5410 from Seoul, April 1; both in National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 19-8 US-KOR 5. Then there is the Pueblo palaver, which causes as much disquiet among allies for its ineffectiveness, as it does in our consciences for its humiliating character. It is a curious thing that while we permit ourselves to be the victims of a policy of provocation-short-of-war, we do not use the same tactics against those who strike the first blow. It is becoming clear that the short-of-war formula is a masterful one, which can slowly but surely erode such prestige as we have. In the modern world, we are caught between the power of nuclear weapons, which world opinion forbids us to use, and the art of guerrilla warfare in which we are uninstructed. Our conventional arms cannot, as I think many now see somewhat more clearly, prevail over the latter. And where conventional air-sea (as distinct from land) arms could be used in limited, appropriate fashion to discourage those who harass us, this is ruled out by the belief at home that our people, lulled by creature comforts, will prefer no-reaction-at-any-cost. And our people will prefer that, I think, until events make clear that it is their children who will pay the piper. No sensible person would advocate general war in retaliation for a Pueblo, but it is clear that measures short of war could evoke, if not immediate satisfaction in this specific case, some caution on the part of our adversaries that in future might spare us similar experience. 6. I hope the Bureau was better informed about the location of Pueblo than I was. Certainly, even I, with my limited technical knowledge and perhaps limited political understanding, would have promptly moved such a vessel out of waters contiguous to NK after the Blue House raid. I will go so far as to say that technical knowledge of the field in which they were working would have led me vehemently to question the need for putting them into such waters in the first place. The moral here is quite clear: We should be told what is floating around, or over, or through, our areas of responsibility. We just might have something to contribute which could save us a deal of trouble. I went over this rather thoroughly with Cy Vance, and I think the message has been delivered. 7. I will spare you lengthy comment on Viet-Nam this month. There is no pleasure at all in assessing correctly that melancholy situation. But brace yourself, because more is coming. Too few seem to grasp that, to an enemy whose environment is the night, more men mean more compounds and therefore more big targets to hit. Sam's appointment as D.A./3/ is something Saigon needs in its present state of mind. He will be wrestling with a many-headed hydra, but it is an all-absorbing task, like none other in the Service. Undoubtedly he will be there during a very trying period, and I and all the others wish him Godspeed and success. /3/Samuel D. Berger was appointed Deputy Ambassador to Vietnam. 8. I hope to begin traveling toward the end of March, as I want to look over the anti-infiltration measures being taken along the coastline. As you may know, the problem is always to see what one wants to see, rather than what our friends want to show. But I think we'll manage. 9. As I consider the problem of restraining the ROKG, I wonder whether I should invoke the assistance of Moon Myung, Founder and High Reverend of the Unification Church, into which he intends to absorb all other Christian churches, under his own spiritual guidance. (I hope he gives the Pope a job.) The other day, Moon organized a mass wedding of members of his congregation--247 couples--at Citizen's Hall. Announcing from the stage that they should all consider themselves married, he then forbade them to engage in "love acts" for 40 days! When asked by reporters the reason for this "inhuman restraint," Moon declared that it was necessary "because Christ prayed in the desert for 40 days and that's THAT!" If I could only determine whether Moon's edict was obeyed (I have some doubts about it, myself) we might find a government post where he could exercise his ability to restrain their desire to go north--a much easier task than the one he set himself on the wedding day, I think! Sincerely, Bill
183. Telegram From the Commander of United States Forces, Korea (Bonesteel) to the Commander in Chief, Pacific (Sharp)/1/ Seoul, February 29, 1968, 1028Z. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Korea, Cables, Vol. V. Confidential; Eyes Only. Repeated to Wheeler and to CINCUSARPAC, Hawaii. Passed by Wheeler to Rostow, Clifford, Rusk, and to each of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. KRA 745. Subject: ROK Concepts for Home Defense Militia. 1. The rapid development over the past week or ten days of the emphasis being placed on the homeland reserve by President Park is both interesting and significant./2/ /2/On February 20 the Korean Cabinet passed a decree implementing a 1961 law permitting establishment of a local reserve corps. The homeland reserve force was to be supervised by the Minister of National Defense, who could delegate authority to local police officials for use against armed infiltrators at the local level. (Airgram A-406 from Seoul, February 26; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 23-3 KOR S) 2. Beginnings of this emphasis appear to stem from events and discussions during Vance visit. Park's and ROKG total emphasis then was on retaliation and on need for vastly increased MAP, costing over a billion dollars. At that time we repeatedly pointed out there was a third area which needed attention and this was ROK self-help and immediate improvement, using what they had now, of counter-infiltration resources (military and police) and internal security organization, augmented as feasible by incoming CIGCOREP and USOM aid. I pounded this theme also with ROK JCS, MND and PM. We pointed out that ROK with population of 30 million, very large armed forces and rapidly expanding national police was not exactly helpless in face of NK subversive threat. At same time ROKs got some clear warnings that US was not going to be dragged into war precipitated by unilateral ROK "retaliation." 3. For a long time ROKs have been greatly interested in Israel's defense organization, reserve forces, kibbutz, etc./3/ In last several weeks Israeli MA and several other Israelis have been seeing a lot of senior ROKs. /3/Pak's first public statements addressing these themes came on February 7, when he announced plans to arm the nation's veterans and older reservists to always carry a rifle. The Embassy viewed Pak's comments skeptically, given the government's weapons-control policy and fear of assassination. (Telegram 4085 from Seoul, February 8; ibid., POL 23-7 KOR S) A few days later the Defense Ministry announced an extension of the length of active service from 30 to 36 months in the army and marines and from 36 to 42 months for the Navy and Air Force to meet internal security needs. (Telegram 4227 from Seoul, February 14; ibid.) 4. Whatever is genesis of emphasis on using reserves or militia for internal security, President Park began to use the theme in speeches and press pronouncements beginning about ten days ago./4/ Precise theme has varied in details but generally stresses need for ROKs to build more self-reliant defenses, need for moral or "spiritual" reorientation of all citizens to realize defense of ROK, particularly against subversive and terrorist operations, is responsibility of all citizens and that they cannot ask allies to take care for them of this most elemental aspect of national existence. He has used "need for a more independent national defense" in some speeches, but at least for now, we do not interpret this to mean disengagement from UNC OPCON or any less dependence on US for help in defense of Korea against overt, large scale Communist aggression. /4/In a February 16 meeting between U.S. and Korean military authorities the Minister of National Defense expressed a similar interest in the Israeli approach of training and equipping its population to supplement regular armed forces and enhance its defenses. (Telegram 4311 from Seoul, February 17; ibid., POL 7 US/VANCE) 5. In terms of potential NK threats against ROK both from overt and from unconventional forces, I believe Park's approach makes sense. He is not, we think, derogating from US/ROK alliance and clearly hopes for continued MAP support for modernization at about current levels to face overt threat, which he does not believe to be so imminent as subversive threat. At same time, however, he is now plugging to fight the subversive threat on maximum ROK self-help. He seems to be trying to tighten the internal defenses and give them a greater and more cohesive capability to handle the many thousands of trained raiders and guerrilla teams which NK has built up. He obviously does not want to risk NK possible effort to harass interior of ROK along lines North Vietnamese are trying in Vietnam. 6. In view of magnitude of dual threat--overt and covert--being built up by North Koreans and in light of great economic progress in ROK, not to mention huge investments of US in ROK in war and peace, I think President Park's new approach makes sense and is in US national interest as well as ROKs./5/ /5/The Embassy also urged policymakers in Washington to fund the program. Porter argued that Pak's commitment to the homeland reserve force represented a significant shift in his approach to the North Korean threat from retaliation to self-defense. (Telegram 4634 from Seoul, March 3; ibid., DEF 19-8 US-KOR S)
184. Memorandum to Holders of Special National Intelligence Estimate Number 14.2-67/1/ Washington, February 29, 1968. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, National Security Council History, Pueblo Crisis, 1968, Vol. XI, Background Documents. Secret; Controlled Dissem. According to a note on the cover sheet, the Central Intelligence Agency, the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State and Defense, and the National Security Agency participated in the preparation of this estimate. All members of the USIB concurred with this estimate on February 29 except the representatives of the Atomic Energy Commission and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, who abstained because the subject was outside their jurisdiction. NORTH KOREAN INTENTIONS AND CAPABILITIES WITH 1. Events since last September tend to confirm the conclusions of SNIE 14.2-67,/2/ that North Korean activities will include a campaign of military harassment in the DMZ area, continued attempts to infiltrate guerrilla teams, and the dispatch of terrorist and sabotage missions. The raid on the Blue House represents the most dramatic and flagrant manifestation of the campaign begun in late 1966 to disrupt political order in South Korea, to tie down large ROK forces, and to encourage insurgency in the South. North Korean handling of the Pueblo crisis reflects an intention to heighten tensions and exploit US preoccupations with Vietnam. Kim Il-song's recent speeches indicate he is still determined to maintain a bellicose posture. /2/Document 130. 2. These developments have hardened Seoul's attitude and increased the likelihood of a major ROK reaction to North Korean harassments. The North Koreans probably believe that the US will impose restraints on the ROK and will be reluctant to escalate its own responses in Korea. The North Koreans now probably see great and continuing opportunities to exacerbate relations between Seoul and Washington. 3. We continue to believe that Pyongyang realizes that an intensification of incidents and attacks could escalate to the point of open warfare. We still estimate, however, that North Korea does not plan to invade South Korea and will not deliberately provoke hostilities on a scale which would amount to a resumption of the war. 4. Nevertheless, the general situation in Korea is more dangerous than it was last fall, since the possibilities of miscalculation are greater. The North Korean attitude is more openly truculent than at any time since 1953. The raid against the Presidential residence indicates that the North Koreans are willing to run high risks; they must have been aware that assassination of President Pak would have provoked a major ROK retaliation. They may be counting heavily on US preoccupation with Vietnam, and on the deterrent value of their own mutual defense treaties with China and the Soviet Union. 5. We believe that North Korea is pursuing an independent policy. Pyongyang probably does not consult with Moscow and Peking on the tactical development of its policy against the ROK and the US. North Korea's relations with China are cool, and thus Peking's influence is quite limited. In any event, we believe Peking does not want to be involved in a new Korean War at this juncture. As for the USSR, recent events have probably forced it to pay somewhat more attention to developments in Korea. We believe that the USSR does not want a major war in the area. In the event of a crisis in Korea, the Soviets would probably be reluctant to apply immediate pressures on Pyongyang, lest they jeopardize the position they have built up there. And in any case their influence would not necessarily be decisive. However, we believe that if major hostilities seemed imminent the USSR would try to exert some restraint over North Korea. 6. Additional evidence since our last estimate suggests that North Korea will continue its efforts to establish guerrilla bases in the South. But we believe that their prospects for success in this endeavor remain poor. 7. We now believe that the North Korean Navy has at least four "W"-class submarines, at least seven "KOMAR"-class guided missile boats and associated Styx missiles, and two "Shershen"-class fast patrol boats. Eighteen surface-to-air missile (SA-2) sites, [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] have been identified. Otherwise, the general level of equipment and strength of the North Korean forces is as described in Annex I of SNIE 14.2-67.
185. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State (Katzenbach) to President Johnson/1/ Washington, March 7, 1968. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Korea, Memos, Vol. VI. Secret; Nodis. The report was forwarded to the President under a March 7 covering memorandum from Rostow that indicates that the President saw the memorandum. Paul Nitze and I are impressed with the continuing dangers of the Korean situation. With the improvement of weather at the onset of spring, the North Koreans may well launch further infiltration forays with serious material and psychological consequences. Furthermore, any likely settlement formula at Panmunjom would probably be resented by the sensitive ROKs. We therefore believe that we should push ahead with the implementation of the Vance Recommendations, improving our own posture in respect to Korea and endeavoring to build upon the degree of trust and confidence re-established by his Mission. His recommendations fall into four broad categories which I believe can be approached as follows: 1. U.S. Posture
With the assistance of a small inter-agency group I am taking a very close look at where we are and where we should go in respect to both Koreas./2/ I intend to submit a report on this matter by 1 May. /2/The Korean Study Group, consisting of representatives from the Department of State and the Department of Defense, held an organizational meeting on March 5 and agreed to consider adding a representative from CIA and from AID/ECON. (Memorandum for the record, March 7; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL KOR S-US) John Walsh of the Executive Secretariat wrote to Porter on March 10, advising him of Korean developments and attaching a copy of Katzenbach's memorandum. (Ibid.)
Recommendations by the Joint Chiefs of Staff concerning personnel requirements for improving the security of our [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] weapons sites are currently under review in the DOD. Study by the Joint Chiefs of Staff is continuing to determine whether additional physical security measures should be taken. This study will be completed by 1 April 1968.
Additional counterinfiltration items are being delivered to Korea with airlift of most critical items authorized. Many critical items are already in Korea. An operations analysis study in support of DMZ security and counterinfiltration efforts is in progress. Included in the FY 1968 supplement of $100 million is an additional sum, yet unspecified, for counterinfiltration items.
General Bonesteel has been authorized to keep Ambassador Porter fully informed of all reconnaissance activities scheduled for the vicinity of Korea.
To improve our secure communications between Washington and Seoul, on Saturday, 20 February, a secure teleconferencing system was established connecting the Departments of State and Defense with the American Embassy and General Bonesteel's headquarters. Also, on 20 February, the Department of Defense dispatched by air the necessary equipments and technical engineering personnel to establish a secure voice system to connect several key State and Defense facilities in Seoul, and these, in turn, with Washington. 2. Influencing South Korea
We wish to arrange promptly a meeting between the ROK Ministry of National Defense and our Department of Defense, preferably in April in Hawaii. Paul Nitze plans to head our delegation and CINCPAC would be directly involved. This would be portrayed as a direct follow-up on the Vance Mission and would be designed to pull the ROKs closer to us and to keep the ROKG calmed down. Their desire to retaliate will inevitably increase if the North Koreans step up their raids as the weather improves.
In accordance with Vance's recommendations, and if you approve, I wish to authorize Ambassador Porter to invite Prime Minister Chung to visit the United States this spring./3/ /3/The President approved extending the invitation.
Under Secretary of the Navy Baird plans to visit a number of East Asian countries in April. We will include Seoul on his schedule as an additional political input./4/ /4/An earlier version of the memorandum included the possibility that Rusk would visit Seoul following the SEATO meeting in April. (Memorandum for the President, March 4; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL KOR S-US) While in Asia for the SEATO, ANZUS, and Seven Nation meetings, Rusk met briefly with Foreign Minister Choi to discuss those meetings and bilateral issues. (Telegram 143511 to Seoul, April 8; ibid., POL 15-1 KOR S)
The North Koreans have already accomplished part of their objective of diverting the ROKs from their economic effort and frightening-off foreign investment. In continuation of Vance's efforts, we are attempting to keep the ROKs focused on economic development and endeavoring to buttress up American investment intentions. I will be in touch with George Ball on this subject.
The Air Force's Office of Special Investigations (OSI) has trained and equipped the personal Presidential guards of the Heads of State of the Philippines, Bolivia, Thailand, and the Republic of Vietnam. In view of President Park's intense fear over his own safety, and that of his family, we asked Ambassador Porter to offer OSI training to President Park's personal protective force. President Park was highly appreciative of the offer and arrangements are now being made to initiate the OSI training and equipage program within the next three weeks. 3. Influencing North Korea The Pyongyang Government is difficult to influence under any circumstances but the problem is compounded while they hold the Pueblo crew as hostages. Yet, as Vance recommended, we must endeavor to bring political pressure to bear on them. We have already approached the Russians about the dangers of the current Pyongyang course and our difficulties in restraining the South Koreans in face of continuing provocation. We have urged them to use what influence they have to persuade the North Koreans to agree to a reasonable settlement of the Pueblo issue and to ease tensions in the area. We have made somewhat similar approaches to the Japanese and British and will endeavor to expand our bilateral approaches to other countries. If we can obtain the release of the crew, we would be in a better position to peel off our political gloves in an effort to indict Pyongyang as a threat to peace. This might include calling a Security Council Meeting on the subject. 4. Military Assistance Vance has made a number of military assistance recommendations including increased MAP levels in the next few years. These are under study and we will report in a separate memorandum our recommendations regarding future military assistance programs for Korea. Nicholas deB Katzenbach
186. Telegram From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State/1/ Seoul, March 8, 1968, 1045Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-3 VIET S. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Repeated to CINCPAC. A typed copy of the telegram was forwarded to President Johnson with a March 9 memorandum from Rostow. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Korea, Memos, Vol. V) With reference to discussing the matter with Pak, President Johnson penned at the bottom of Rostow's memorandum, "Why not meet him in Korea--LBJ". 4784. Subj: Additional ROK Troops for Vietnam. 1. For second week in a row, Prime Minister deliberately raised subject of additional ROK troops for Vietnam. (See memo of conversation dated Feb 29, 1968.)/2/ This time he began by asking whether U.S. would increase number of troops being sent to Vietnam. Ambassador said he believed we would be at level of about 525,000 men in very near future. Prime Minister said he thought that was good, but didn't U.S. need more Korean troops. Ambassador replied that we do and that, as he had indicated a week ago, he intended to approach ROKG on this subject again soon. Had Prime Minister's thoughts on this developed since our last mention of it, Ambassador asked. /2/Memorandum of conversation not found, but the conversation is summarized in telegram 4572 from Seoul, February 29. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-3 VIET S) 2. The Prime Minister then outlined an elaborate scenario, indicating that he had been thinking about this subject since our last meeting, which involved the following: he said that he had excellent information to effect that within next year or so, Prime Minister Sato of Japan would request U.S. to return Okinawa to Japan. This would give Sato a political advantage he would need to stay in power and to permit U.S./Japan Defense Treaty to remain in effect after 1970. Meanwhile in Vietnam the war would be continuing, and he agreed with the Ambassador that this was a crucial year in Vietnam and there would be a continuing need for more troops to exert maximum pressure on the enemy. 3. After stressing that he was giving only his own ideas and had consulted no one, the PriMin said that an American victory in Vietnam is a victory for Korea, and an American defeat in Vietnam a defeat for the ROK. Under certain circumstances, PriMin believed, ROK might be persuaded to send an additional two divisions and perhaps more. However, this could only be managed through a meeting between President Johnson and President Park, perhaps in Hawaii. At that meeting (or perhaps beforehand) PriMin thought U.S. should state its willingness to: (A) Provide necessary financial assistance to permit ROK to place its three ready reserve divisions, which are now fully equipped, on active duty. (B) U.S. should then bring the seven ROK rear area security reserve divisions up to the equipment levels of regular ready reserve divisions. This could be done at an equipment cost of about nine million dollars for each division. (C) U.S., with reversion of Okinawa in mind, should construct a large air base on Cheju-do for use by such sophisticated aircraft as the F-4. 4. If this could be done, PriMin continued, President Park would probably be willing to send two regular divisions to Vietnam, perhaps replacing these regular active duty divisions in Korea with the three activated ready reserve divisions. In addition, by following through on previous proposal to employ five thousand civilian reservists in logistical jobs in Vietnam to enable the dispatch of previously discussed light ROK division, it would then be possible to increase number of ROK troops for Vietnam by two divisions and the two-regiment light division. This would make a total of five ROK divisions in Vietnam. 5. Comment: PriMin carefully characterized foregoing as entirely his own idea, which he has discussed with no one. It seems clear, however, that from refinements contained in this presentation, and from scope of his proposal, that he has been thinking about this subject since our last meeting, and that he has quite probably discussed it with others, possibly including the President. I responded to all this by saying that we would think about this and would discuss subject with him again in near future. 6. I would appreciate your thoughts and suggestions for use in follow-up I should make on this subject. Also, questions which you would wish to have clarified in connection with it. 7. General Bonesteel has seen this message and requests copy be routed to CINCPAC. Porter
187. Information Memorandum From the Chairman of the Korean Task Force (Brown) to Secretary of State Rusk/1/ Washington, March 12, 1968. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Fleck and cleared by Steadman (DOD). Copies were sent to Katzenbach, William Bundy, and Habib. SUBJECT REFERENCE /2/Document 186. The memorandum indicates that Rusk saw this telegram, a copy of which was attached. The Situation 1. ROK Prime Minister Chong Il-kwon has suggested to Ambassador Porter the possibility that the ROKG might be persuaded to send to Viet-Nam two combat divisions in addition to the light division which President Pak has already agreed, in principle, to deploy. The Prime Minister's proposal is set forth in detail in Seoul's 4784, a copy of which is attached. Although Chong stated that this proposal is entirely his own idea, it is possible that he has discussed it with President Pak and other ROKG officials. 2. The pros and cons of this proposal are discussed below. Because a decision on this subject will have an impact upon our budget and upon equipment modernization for GVN and US forces, I do not believe any decision can be made regarding it until equipment availabilities are sorted out and decisions made regarding US reserve call up and possible additional deployments to Viet-Nam. Discussion 3. The Prime Minister has proposed that the ROKG deploy to Viet-Nam two regular ROK Army divisions, one light division (two regiments), and 5,000 civilian reservists (the latter to free 5,000 ROK logistic troops in Viet-Nam for combat duty). The result would be a total ROK force in Viet-Nam of about 97,000 men, including five ROK Army combat divisions, and 17 divisions in Korea. In conjunction with these deployments, according to Chong, the US Government, in addition to equipping, supporting, and paying the overseas allowances of deployed forces, would be expected to: a. Finance the mobilization to active duty in Korea of the three Ready Reserve divisions (estimated cost $23 million); b. Provide equipment to bring the seven ROK rear area security reserve divisions up to the level of regular Ready Reserve divisions (estimated cost $63 million); c. Construct a large air base on Cheju Island (as a possible eventual replacement for Okinawa when that island reverts to Japanese control). 4. ROK-US negotiations for the deployment of the light division and 5,000 civilians have already virtually been completed, with the exception of the issue of pay scales for the civilians. Equipment which could be used for this light division (or for US or GVN forces) is available in Okinawa. However, the ROKG has not yet sought National Assembly approval of this deployment. 5. Deployment of two additional divisions would also require approval by the Assembly and its approval is by no means to be taken for granted. 6. In conjunction with the despatch of the light division, we have agreed to provide to the ROKG: two destroyers, 12 helicopters, one battalion of 8-inch howitzers, operating and maintenance costs of 8 additional battalions constituting a counter-infiltration strike force, a $32 million counter-infiltration program, and financial support for the light division and 5,000 civilians. Delivery on these commitments is proceeding on schedule. Total one-time cost of this package is estimated at $54.7 million, with an annual recurring cost of $77 million. 7. Implementation of the Prime Minister's proposal would have the following advantages: a. It would provide two additional combat divisions for Viet-Nam over and above the light division the ROKs have already agreed to supply; b. It would be a strong demonstration to the North Koreans that their efforts to deter the ROKG from further participation in Viet-Nam had not only failed but had resulted in increased ROKG participation; c. It would strengthen the ROK armed forces in Korea. 8. Possible disadvantages include the following: a. Availability of major items of equipment, such as the M-16 rifle and helicopters, is so limited that a choice would have to be made between arming US reserves activated, ARVN troops, or the two ROK divisions; b. It would require major augmentation of US logistical personnel in Viet-Nam (roughly one American for every three Koreans); c. The style of ROK operations in Viet-Nam is such (i.e., virtually to take over the government of the areas in which they operate) that doubling the size of the ROK forces might have a significant adverse effect on Vietnamese attitudes; d. Such a large increase in the level of ROK forces in Viet-Nam (from 49,000 to about 97,000) would greatly strengthen the ROKG's demand and expectation for active participation in strategic planning regarding the Viet-Nam conflict, in planning for peace negotiations and in the negotiations themselves. In this regard, we should bear in mind that the ROKs even now take a hard line in expecting a military victory in Viet-Nam and they would not double their forces unless they were determined to pursue this outcome. Thus US-ROK relations might be complicated and frictions might result which could have an inhibiting effect on ROKG participation in post-Viet-Nam activities elsewhere in the area. e. Cost--$141 million one-time cost (without including any estimate of the cost of building an airbase on Cheju-do) and a recurring cost of $387 million. (Both figures include the cost of the light division and 5,000 civilians.) 9. We have had preliminary discussions of the Prime Minister's proposal with DOD/ISA. Our tentative conclusion is that, unless the equipment shortage is so acute that the equipment now in Okinawa and presently earmarked for the light division will have to be limited to US or ARVN use, Ambassador Porter should be instructed to seek the early deployment of the light division and 5,000 civilians, without prejudice to the proposal to deploy two additional divisions. Decision regarding the latter will, we assume, have to await decisions regarding further US deployment. 10. This course of action, involving two Assembly approvals, might make the second approval of the two additional divisions more difficult if this proposal should turn out to be desirable and feasible. However, the light division could be deployed soon while the two divisions proposal is highly tentative and at best will take weeks to negotiate and months to implement. We conclude that it is the wise course to proceed with what has already been agreed and not entangle it with this more complicated new proposal./3/ /3/Paragraphs 1-10 were repeated in an undated action memorandum from Bundy to Rusk, a copy of which was sent to the Department of Defense, where Warnke forwarded it to Clifford with a covering memorandum indicating that he concurred with the recommendations contained therein. (Memorandum from Warnke to Clifford, March 12; Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD/OASD/ISA Files: FRC 73 A 1250, Korea 370) 11. We are requesting Ambassador Porter's considered views on the two division proposal, including his reactions to the specific pros and cons listed above./4/ /4/Transmitted to Porter in telegram 128972 to Seoul, March 13. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-3 VIET S)
188. Telegram From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State/1/ Seoul, March 15, 1968, 0105Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-3 VIET S. Secret; Priority; Exdis. 4907. Subject: Additional ROK troops for Vietnam. Ref: A. State 128972;/2/ B. Seoul 4784;/3/ C. Seoul 4572./4/ /2/See footnote 4, Document 187. /3/Document 186. /4/See footnote 2, Document 186. 1. We believe Dept has correctly identified main advantages and disadvantages of PriMin's proposal for major augmentation of ROK troops in Vietnam. We could elaborate further on these in terms effect of proposal on NKorea's aggressive plans and possible miscalculations, ROK/Vietnamese relations, command and control in both Vietnam and ROK, and ROK expectations with respect to conduct and settlement of Vietnam conflict, but Dept doubtless aware all these permutations. 2. Our own reaction to PriMin's proposal is that he has been trying to pass us a message. As we interpret it, he is saying that circumstances in both Vietnam and ROK have been drastically altered by Tet offensive and Pueblo/Blue House raid, including their aftermath, and question of additional ROK forces for Vietnam now has to be viewed from entirely new perspective: that ROKs want us to make all-out military effort to settle Vietnam conflict once and for all, and would be willing under certain conditions to participate in such major effort. The ROKs are genuinely concerned. They are worried that VC and NVN may force compromise solution in UN if war carries on until U.S. elections. This would then, they feel, encourage Asian Communists to try concentrate next on ROK. 3. We believe he is also telling us that because of new circumstances previous understanding on despatch of light division alone would be regarded as piecemeal effort by ROK public, and Assembly and ROKG would have difficulty in supporting it now. He is hinting that ROK public accepts everything we have promised and implemented since Blue House raid/Pueblo incident, including light division quid pro quo items, as response to new situation here and that quid pro quo offered in exchange for light division would no longer be sufficient to justify political risks of proposing this relatively minor increase in ROK contribution. He is pointedly stressing that what is needed to obtain further ROK participation in Vietnam is very dramatic program--call for a larger ROK troop contribution matched by a larger U.S. aid program--which will clearly strengthen, as opposed to maintain, ROK military strength in country. 4. Extent to which PriMin's proposal has Park's backing is difficult to assess with certainty. If Park has been exposed to this plan, we doubt that it has been in more than general way. We feel that at this juncture proposal should be considered as being essentially PriMin's without Park's approval. Proposal, if implemented, has serious budgetary implications for ROKG--a factor which would be of lesser concern to PriMin but would give Park pause because of potential impact on economic development programs. We suspect origins of PriMin's proposal are to be found in his recent activities in Defense and mobilization planning. In this connection PriMin is aware ROK armed forces are working on concept of 30-division force by early 1970's which involves converting rear area security divisions to ready reserve divisions, and problem is how to get equipment for these additional ready reserve divisions. PriMin may feel that in light recent press stories on need for additional forces in Vietnam, we are preparing put pressure on ROKG for more than light division and if ROKs take initiative with generous offer, U.S. would respond in same generous vein. 5. Park's current attitude on light division despatch and related timing consideration is not clear. National Assembly action is major consideration. Under present planning, Assembly will meet in mid-April for one month, reconvene early July for one month, and then convene in early September for year-end session. Reverberations of Blue House raid/Pueblo/Vance mission are still strong enough to make Park hesitate about going to April session for troop despatch authorization unless he can put it forward in rather elaborate context of additional American troop contribution, clear indication that ROK forces will be built up at home and as result of agreement at highest U.S.-ROK levels. If none of these factors present, believe Park would wait until July to seek authority for light division only. Nature and intensity of NK infiltration by July, and ability of ROKs to contain it, would also have important bearing on this. 6. For more precise estimate I would have to probe much further than I have been able to so far to get clear picture of what lies behind PriMin's proposal and extent to which it is supported by President Park, and to learn Park's current attitude toward despatch of light division only. I feel we may have to open up a line of discussion fairly soon if we are to get ROK troops of any size before end of summer. As indicated in previous para much depends on what U.S. is going to do. Porter
189. Editorial Note President Johnson planned to travel to Honolulu on April 4, 1968, for consultations with various officials on the situation in Vietnam following the Tet Offensive and the President's initiatives outlined in his Address to the Nation on March 31. (For text, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1968-69, Book I, pages 469-476.) President Pak had accepted an invitation to meet with President Johnson in Honolulu on April 7. Following the assassination of Martin Luther King, Jr., on April 4 and the subsequent civil disorders that erupted in Washington and other major urban centers, President Johnson postponed his trip and scheduled meeting with President Pak. Rescheduling the Presidential meeting was complicated by circumstances in Korea. President Pak was reluctant to agree to meet with President Johnson after learning he would first meet with President Thieu of South Vietnam. President Pak believed that to meet under those circumstances would cause him to lose face and would create the impression that he was merely a follower, rather than a leader of high stature. Korean officials also worried that the presence of both Presidents Pak and Thieu "would make it look to world that President Johnson had brought to Honolulu two leading objectors to bombing pause policy in order to force them into line and accept bombing pause publicly announced by President Johnson on March 31." (Telegram 5637 from Seoul, April 11; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 7 US) President Pak strongly opposed President Johnson's decision to halt the bombing in Vietnam and seek a negotiated settlement with North Vietnam. (Intelligence Information Cable, TDCS 314/06457-68, April 17, and Intelligence Information Cable, TDCS 314/06455-68, April 17; Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Korea, Cables, Vol. VI) President Pak was also affected by President Johnson's announced withdrawal from the upcoming U.S. Presidential election. The Embassy learned that President Pak, who valued his close, personal relationship with Johnson, was upset that he received no advance information about the President's announcement. Intelligence reports characterized President Pak as "depressed deeply over President Johnson's decision not to seek re-election and the possible ramifications on future U.S. security policies toward Korea and Asia." President Pak reportedly repeated frequently that with President Johnson in office "for the first time in Korean diplomatic history, a major world power had treated Korea on an equal country-to-country basis." (Intelligence Information Cable, TDCS 314/06457-68, April 17; ibid.) Facing the loss of a strong supporter of Korea in the White House, President Pak and other Korean leaders were uneasy about the upcoming change in U.S. leadership. (Telegrams from Seoul and memoranda from Rostow to the President, April 11 and 12; ibid., International Meetings and Travel, Honolulu, [2 of 2]; ibid., Country File, Korea, Vol. VI; and National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 7 US) President Johnson, who arrived in Hawaii on April 15, greeted President Pak at the Honolulu airport the evening of April 16 (see footnote 1, Document 191), and the two met the following day; see Document 194. President Johnson met with no other Asian leader while in Hawaii and returned to the United States on April 18. (Johnson Library, President's Daily Diary) Remarks by both Presidents as well as the joint communique issued at the conclusion of their meeting on April 17 are in Department of State Bulletin, May 6, 1968, pages 574-577. Extensive documentation on the meeting is in the Johnson Library, National Security File, International Meetings and Travel, Honolulu [2 of 2]; ibid., [Meeting with Park], April 1968; ibid., Special Head of State Correspondence, Korea, January 1, 1968 to November 30, 1968; ibid., Country File, Korea, Cables, Vol. VI; and National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL KOR S-US; and ibid., POL 7 US.
190. Telegram From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson in Texas/1/ Washington, April 13, 1968, 1706Z. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, International Meetings and Travel [Meeting with Park], April 1968. Secret. CAP 80808. Following are summary briefing notes for Honolulu meeting with President Park. We shall have a big black book with us on Monday. Major Topics Park has three things on his mind: A. Your personal decision/2/ and its effect on US policy in Asia. /2/Reference is to the President's decision not to seek reelection. B. Korean defense and other problems. C. The Viet-Nam situation and negotiations. A. US Policy in Asia Park has shown great unhappiness over your personal decision and has even expressed the feeling that he should have been consulted, as an old and true friend. Above all, he fears that without your leadership the US may abandon the Asian policies it has been following. Thus, he would deeply appreciate your full comment on the political situation at home and what it means for our policy in Asia. B. Korean Problems 1. Retaliation for further North Korean incidents. Although the North Koreans have not engaged in significant incidents since mid-February (when an upsurge did occur last year), Park and all the Koreans remain anxious. You will recall that Park pressed Vance very hard indeed for a general undertaking that we would join him in immediate retaliation in kind. He strongly implied the ROKs would go it alone if we did not join. Suggest you stick to Vance's position--that we are prepared for joint discussion in the light of the facts of each case. However, we cannot get away from the fact that any reprisals could build up rapidly and even threaten major hostilities. You understand how the Koreans feel, but they must reckon that any major hostilities are not in their interest any more than ours, and that, in view of our major responsibility to help in their defense, we must be fully consulted. 2. Building Up ROK Defenses. Park will probably describe significant and recognized defects in the equipment of his armed forces and counter-infiltration agencies. We are in fact proceeding rapidly under the MAP program, and have worked out agreement on the uses for the $100 million pending supplemental appropriation. These take into account his expressed desires./3/ In addition, we have now moved approximately 150 US aircraft to Korea. /3/The $100 million supplemental-aid package approved by the Embassy, the Korean Task Force, the Department of State, and the Department of Defense consisted of an F-4D squadron, small arms for the homeland reserve force, support for the Korean National Police, and M-16 rifles for designated counterinfiltration units. (Memorandum from Warnke to Clifford, March 11; Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD/OASD/ISA Files: FRC 73 A 1250, Korea 091.3 MAP) Differences between Pak and his Defense Minister over the proposed package led to the latter's dismissal from office. Documentation on the internal controversy and the aid package is ibid. and National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 15-1 KOR S; POL 33-6 KOR N-US; POL 7 US/VANCE; DEF 19 US-KOR S; and DEF 19-8 KOR S. Suggest you be prepared to go over these actions, on which we will have details. 3. Maintenance of US forces in Korea. Park may request assurance that US forces, including the additional aircraft, will not be withdrawn from Korea without his consent. We have told them many times that we have no plan to reduce the general level of our ground forces--by implication as long as they have forces in Viet-Nam. We have given no assurance on the additional aircraft. Suggest you repeat that we have no plan to reduce our ground forces under present circumstances, but avoid going further than promising full consultation both on the aircraft and on any later plan concerning ground forces. 4. Amendment of Defense Treaty. Park and other Koreans have pressed us for an amendment of the treaty to make it automatic in the event of aggression. They have drawn a parallel with declarations we have made in the Philippines--that an attack there would necessarily involve our forces at the outset. Suggest you point out flatly that any amendment of the treaty is out of the question, and that any declaration would have the same Senate problems. At the same time, you can tell them flatly that they can count on us if aggression actually takes place. 5. 16-Nation Declaration. Park and other Koreans have pressed us to join them in getting a reaffirmation of the declaration made in 1953 by 16 nations--that they would act in the event of aggression and that hostilities would not necessarily be confined to Korean territory. We have told them that we ourselves fully support that declaration, but that others--such as the French and even the British--would not go along with reaffirming it today. We have pointed out that, in the absence of unanimity or very close to it, a strong effort to get reaffirmation would be a net minus. Suggest you stick to this position. (Our soundings, even with such as the Thai, confirm our fears that we don't have the votes.) 6. Pueblo Case. As you know, Park is worried that our private meetings could imply recognition of the North Korean regime. He is worried that we may go too far in the direction of apology. And he regrets that we did not take tougher action after the seizure. Suggest you calm his fears about recognition--tell him that we will continue to keep him fully informed--and be prepared to review with him our proposed conditional apology, to which he has not objected. Repeat at the same time that we are not going to apologize for any alleged actions which we cannot independently confirm. As to more forceful action, suggest that you note that we have examined many actions, but have concluded that little ones would be mere pinpricks, and that any major action (for example, against the North Korean Air Force) would almost certainly mean major hostilities. He understands this bind, even though he does not like it. C. Viet-Nam Issues 1. Additional ROK Forces. Thieu has now formally asked the Koreans for more forces. We have been discussing a light division with them since last fall, and also 5,000 additional civilians. Park is prepared to discuss these matters, but does not want them in the communique--and we have agreed. We are uncertain at this point what position to recommend. Both the 5,000 civilians and the light division make sense from a military standpoint, and would have major political advantages for us. However, the DOD tentatively thinks that providing for equipment for these forces may cut across our top priority for ARVN, at least this summer. We need to hammer this out before you leave. 2. General Situation. Park has just had an optimistic report on the military situation from his own General Chae. He will want to compare notes across the board. 3. Negotiations and ROK Participation. We have assured the Koreans that they will be fully consulted both in contacts and talks. They have no plan to be at the site of contacts, but will certainly send a representative to the site of the talks and will be looking for some form of participation at that stage. We have not yet discussed with them our position during the contacts, nor have we gone into any detail on our substantive position in the talks. Suggest that: A. You be prepared to go over the instructions to Ambassador Harriman fully, but without showing him the actual document (which does not refer to ROK participation being nailed down in the contacts). B. You assure him categorically that our position in the talks will be based on the Manila communique and the 14 points. We stand on the Geneva Accords for both Viet-Nam and Laos, and on conditions for free choice in the South.
191. Telegram From the Embassy in Korea to the Commander in Chief, Pacific (Sharp)/1/ Seoul, April 16, 1968, 0205Z. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Korea, Cables, Vol. VI. Top Secret; Specat Exclusive; Immediate. Repeated to the Department of State for William Bundy. Rostow added a handwritten note at the top of this telegram that reads: "Mr. President: This Porter cable suggests why it may be useful to meet Park tonight. Bill Bundy strongly recommends. Courtesy may make it easier to be tough on the new demands and the light division." The President went to the airport to greet Pak upon his arrival in Honolulu the evening of April 16. (Ibid., President's Daily Diary) 5706. 1. I am sure you have in mind fact that Park reacts sensitively to special attentions shown him on such occasions as the Honolulu meeting. If it is intended to move him forward on question of additional troops, it is vital that consideration be given to gestures indicating personal esteem of President Johnson for him. 2. I do not believe that the problem of additional troops is as difficult for him as he and his associates pretend, but their attitude does lend emphasis to para one above, and there will of course be substantial, perhaps outlandish, price tag attached. Park's thinking on subject will also be conditioned by his estimate of probable outcome of our presidential election. Porter [Continue with the next documents]
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