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FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1964-1968, Volume XXIX Korea
Department of State |
Korea Honolulu, April 16, 1968. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, International Meetings and Travel, [Meeting with Park], April 1968. Secret. The paper indicates the President saw it. SUBJECT Background Following your December 21 luncheon meeting with Park in Canberra, Ambassador Porter worked out agreement that the Koreans would deploy an additional brigade (approximately 6,000 troops) and 5,000 civilians to Vietnam. The civilians would free 5,000 logistic troops now in Vietnam for combat duty, and the result would be an additional light division. With the January raid and resulting tension, Park shelved this, with our tacit consent, and has never sought National Assembly approval. Nonetheless, we have gone ahead with a substantial part of the commitments we offered in the negotiations. All told, we had offered direct support and equipment costs for the light division totaling approximately $88 million, plus additional military assistance totaling about $45 million. Of the latter, we have already gone ahead with virtually the whole, including the $32 million counterinsurgency package described to you at this morning's briefing. As a matter of practical fact, all these items made sense, and we would have found them reasonable in any case. However, you should note that the $32 million has been funded from DOD funds under an authority that exists only where there is a relationship to Vietnam. Thus, there is basic truth in what General Wheeler says--that we have performed a lot already, while they have not moved on their side. Park's problem is quite simply that he is not at all sure of getting Assembly approval, in the face of a general feeling that Korea needs its forces at home. Porter has reported since that they might now ask for additional commitments. Moreover, as General Wheeler pointed out this morning, the $12 million worth of equipment now set aside in Okinawa for the Korean light division contains many items of highest priority for South Vietnamese armed forces. Suggested Talking Points 1. Suggest you start by feeling Park out on his Assembly problem, while making it absolutely clear to him that the additional forces would be most useful. 2. If he asks for additional commitments from us, you might point forcefully to the very large totals we are now providing under MAP and service funds this year, shown in Tab A attached./2/ The total is about $292 million. You could, of course, say that you would study additional requests within reason. /2/Attached but not printed. The breakdown of support consisted of $160 million, including around $12 million for the light division, in 1968 MAP funds; $100 million in supplemental MAP funds; and $31.2 million for the counterinsurgency package. 3. If he takes the opposite tack--saying that he simply cannot get Assembly approval unless things really cool down in Korea this summer--suggest you at least point out clearly how much we have already done under our commitments, and note that this presents us with something of a Congressional problem--particularly for the $32 million. You might go on to explore the possibility suggested by Secretary Rusk--that they increase their forces in Vietnam simply by delaying rotation or by "rounding out". While Park has a commitment to his Assembly to get specific authority for additional major units, he once before evaded this by a "rounding out" that amounted to about 2500 men. If he could use the same technique--up to perhaps 5000 men--it would be most useful. General Suggest strongly that you take up this topic privately with him. If he has his Ministers in the room, the price would go up, and he paint himself into a bad corner. Finally, we have already agreed--at his request--that the subject will not be mentioned in the communique or in any press backgrounder. We stuck to this agreement this morning and told the press that so far as we knew, the topic would not come up. Obviously, he would be highly sensitive to any implication that he agreed to an increase at this meeting. However, he is also well aware of the need--and he now has a general request for more forces direct from Thieu. WPB
193. Telegram From the Embassy in Korea to the Commander in Chief, Pacific (Sharp)/1/ Seoul, April 16, 1968, 0335Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 1 KOR S. Secret; Immediate; Specat. Repeated to the Department of State for Bundy, which is the source text. 5708. Ref: Seoul A505./2/ /2/Airgram A-505 from Seoul, April 10, transmitted a briefing paper prepared by the Korean Ministry of National Defense entitled "Problem Areas in the Republic of Korea Defense." In addition to a Foreword, Conclusions, and two annexes, the paper addressed five areas: (A) Defense of ROK, (B) ROK Force Improvement Plan, (C) Home Reserve Forces--Armament, (D) ROK Force Levels, and (E) $100 Million Package. (Ibid.) 1. In ref airgram I transmitted ROK MND plan he proposed surface at aborted Honolulu meeting of April 7. I assume MND will now bring it up at April 17 meeting. I want to bring this plan to your attention now since Bonesteel has sent message to Sharp on it./3/ In view of his message, I felt it would be useful to you to have in advance conclusions of politico-military assessment prepared by Embassy on the MND plan and ROK strategic intentions./4/ Will have full paper with me at Honolulu for you and others to read and ponder. Following paragraph contains conclusions:/5/ /3/Not found. /4/Porter forwarded a copy of the staff analysis, "ROKG Strategic Intentions and Military Planning--A Politico-Military Assessment," to the Department of State as an enclosure to Airgram A-521, April 16. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 1 KOR S) /5/The numbers in brackets reflect the paragraph numbers used in the original document. The Embassy also sent two press articles to the Department of State containing reports of Pak's comments to reporters en route to Honolulu. The articles, one from the Korea Herald and one from the Korea Times, both April 18, had in the Embassy's view "an interesting relationship to the line of thought reflected" in this staff analysis. (Airgram A-535 from Seoul, April 19; ibid.) 2. "22 [21]. The April 5 MND plan would provide a force structure and equipment capability vis-e-vis North Korean which would: A. Give the ROK ground forces an advantage in quantitative combat power, an advantage considered to be beyond the needs of a purely defensive mission, assuming adequate US augmentations. B. Enable the ROK Air Force to match more nearly the combat strength supported by a hardened base structure as possessed by North Korea, and give ROKAF a higher capability for surprise quick strike action. C. Greatly increase the Navy/Marine offensive capability by establishing about a division size amphibious force with a commensurate increase in shore bombardment means, as well as a significant surface striking force. 23 [22]. The implementation of the April 5 MND plan would provide the ROK with an increased military capability which could, without US support or sanction, engage in retaliatory actions of greater scope and magnitude against the North. 24 [23]. If logistic needs were accumulated in advance or logistic support from some source assured, the force structure contemplated in the April 5 MND plan could tempt the ROKG to undertake a preemptive attack against the North in the belief that it could win a relatively short war. 25 [24]. There are therefore grounds for serious concern that the ROK national leadership may be contemplating military moves which may range from substantially larger retaliatory actions to a preemptive strike against the North to effect reunification. A move of the latter type would be initiated at an appropriate time but prior to the anticipated overt military action by the North. The ROKs may in fact be counting on another dramatic raid by the North Koreans to provide the provocation for a justifiable retaliatory move which the proposed force structure would permit developing into a full-scale assault on the North. 26 [25]. ROK national leadership believes that if reunification can be effected rapidly by military means, the great powers will not intervene and will accept the fait accompli. 27 [26]. Full US support of the April 5 MND plan, as we interpret it, is not justified in terms of present US objectives in Korea because it could lead to a military force capable of independently taking courses of action inimical to the US national interest. 28 [27]. Since there are adequate indicators that the North Korean military capability has, in the relatively recent past, been significantly improved and its total defense posture enhanced, and if, as the ROKs expect, the North will attempt to unify Korea by overt military means in 1970 or possibly sooner, the ROK/US defense posture requires improvement. To effect a defense posture capable of holding north of Seoul, in addition to the availability and timely arrival of envisaged US augmentation forces, certain elements of the plan would, if implemented, contribute to this objective. Extensive hardening of forward positions is necessary: improvements in infrastructure for army, navy and air force needs should be undertaken, particularly construction for airfield dispersal and hardening and to support an air LOC; facilities to permit rapid receipt and forward movement of external combat and logistic support should be provided; selected improvements in mobility and communications for the existing force structure are required; and, though not mentioned in the April 5 plan, the availability in the area and largely under US control, of ammunition war reserves for all services should be assured." Porter
194. Summary of Conversations Between President Johnson and President Pak/1/ Honolulu, April 17, 1968, 10:10 a.m.-12:30 p.m. and 5-6:30 p.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Korea, Memos, Vol. VI. Top Secret; Nodis. The two Presidents met in the Library of Kaiser Estate, Koko Head, Honolulu. Prepared by Read from a lengthy memorandum of conversation. (Memorandum from Read to Rostow, April 29, and memorandum of conversation; both ibid.) This summary was forwarded by Rostow to the President, who reviewed and corrected the text; see footnotes 2 and 3 below. Pak also met with Vance and Wheeler in Honolulu April 17 1:15-4:15 p.m. The focus of their discussion was the situation in Vietnam and the need for additional Korean troops there. (Memorandum of conversation; ibid.) 1. Open Invitation to Park to Visit US President Johnson advised President Park that another visit by the latter to the United States would be well received by the US people, and President Johnson would welcome Park and send a plane for him at any time he wished to visit with President Johnson. 2. Additional ROK Military and Civilian Manpower Commitment to SVN (a) US View--At Canberra on December 21, 1967, President Park indicated willingness to send 5,000 civilians and 6,000 additional troops to South Vietnam; the equivalent of a light division. On the basis of the ROK commitment in Canberra, US assistance in equipment amounting to $88 million and additional military assistance of $45 million was earmarked from defense appropriations for the use of the additional ROK troops to be sent to Vietnam. $32 million of DOD funds for counterinsurgency equipment had been utilized for this purpose, and that counterinsurgency equipment plus $30 million other equipment is waiting in Okinawa for the use of the new ROK light division. Many of these items of equipment are of highest priority, and if additional ROK troops cannot use them, the USG must ship them to SVN for use by the ARVN. (b) ROK View--President Park said it would be "impossible" for him to send more active soldiers to South Vietnam at present because of the situation in South Korea. He said, however, that it would be possible for the Republic of Korea to send one combat group (regimental combat team) numbering 5,000-6,000 men from rear areas in South Vietnam and to have them replaced by civilians. Park said about 1500 ROK soldiers are rotated every month and it would be possible in about three months to send 5,000 civilians to SVN. He agreed to set July 1 as the target date. There is a possibility that the ROK might send more troops in the future but not under the present circumstances. If the military strength of ROK forces in South Korea is strengthened, however, it would be possible to send one or two additional ROK divisions to SVN. At a later point President Park said he would like to send 6,000 additional troops but he had just barely organized the local reserve corps in South Korea whose members must undergo training so he must wait until summer to see how the situation develops. The National Assembly will not (now) approve the troop dispatch proposal. When President Park "feels relieved at a certain stage" he will send the additional troops to Vietnam. 3. Proposal for ROK Extension of SVN Duty Tours President Johnson suggested that before January 1969 the period of service of ROK troops already in Vietnam be extended and he observed that this action would have the effect of increasing ROK military strength in Vietnam by one division. Park will consider this proposal. The President hoped to have Park's reply by the time Thanom (5/8-9) and Gorton (5/27-28) visit the US in May. 4. Bombing of North Vietnam President Park spoke in favor of removing all restrictions against enemy targets in North Vietnam. 5. Situation in Korea (a) US View--The Administration has sent an Aid to Korea Budget Bill totaling some $400 million to Congress. Mr. Vance recommended an extra $100 million/2/ for Korea, which Congress has not yet acted on. The Administration is asking that part of the $100 million go toward activating one air squadron. The President noted that we had sent to Korea some squadrons already and called up reserves because of the Korean situation, which should have been destined for Vietnam [sic]. With the increased air power in Korea President Johnson thinks that South Korea is capable of defending itself from/3/ North Korea in all the services military capabilities and he does not think that North Korea will stage a large scale attack now. /2/The President circled the figures $400 and $100 and noted "400 includes 100." /3/The President deleted the words "superior to" and substituted "capable of defending itself from." He also deleted the remainder of the sentence following the conjunction "and." (b) ROK View--The ROK is grateful for the added appropriation request but does not "feel at ease with this amount" since North Korea aims at creating a second Vietnam in South Korea. President Park considered ROK air power superior and ROK naval strength about equal to North Korea. He feels that since North Korea has tens of thousands trained guerrillas, the ROK army must strengthen defense in rear areas. He feels that ROK army fire power is "far inferior to North Korea's." He would like to strengthen the ROK air force and he needs US assistance for the strengthening of the local reserve corps. 6. ROK Investment in US Securities President Johnson asked whether ROK could make short term investment in US bonds and securities in the amount of $50 to $100 million and said this purchase would be helpful in having Congress approve a $230 million military aid bill. President Park did not respond directly but noted that the total ROK national budget is only about $1 billion.
195. Intelligence Information Cable From the Central Intelligence Agency/1/ TDCSDB-315/01422-68 [location not declassified], April 23, 1968, 1520Z. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Korea, Cables, Vol. VI. Secret; Priority; No Foreign Dissem; Controlled Dissem; No Dissem Abroad; Background Use Only. Country: South Korea DOI: 18-20 April 1968 Subject: President Pak's Critical Reaction to the Honolulu Conference ACQ: [1 line of source text not declassified] Source: [5 lines of source text not declassified] 1. [1-1/2 lines of source text not declassified] said that President Pak Chong-hui was deeply disappointed by, and critical of his meetings with President Johnson at the Honolulu Conference. President Pak, during a private discussion with Chief Presidential Secretary Yi Hu-rak and Defense Minister Ch'oe Yong-hui on 19 April, said he felt President Johnson attempted to evade the key issues of military assistance to Korea and a formal revision of the ROK-U.S. Mutual Defense Treaty. President Pak said he sensed President Johnson has lost considerable political power and influence since his announced decision not seek re-election. He said President Johnson no longer exercises effective authority over Congressional actions on foreign military and economic assistance programs. 2. As a result of his discussions with President Johnson, President Pak said he could not consider sending additional ROK combat troops to Vietnam in the foreseeable future. ([less than 1 line of source text not declassified] implied that President Pak made this decision after it was clear to him the U.S. Government was unwilling to offer substantially increased military assistance, in addition to the $100 million pledged by the Cyrus Vance mission in February 1968.) 3. [5- 1/2 lines of source text not declassified] 4. Yi Hu-rak was extremely critical and outspoken against President Johnson after Present Pak briefed him on the results of the two meetings with President Johnson. Yi said the ROK can no longer rely on the U.S. for long-range military assistance. 5. [3 lines of source text not declassified] said on 11 April, prior to the Honolulu Conference, that President Pak was willing to dispatch another ROK division to Vietnam provided North Vietnam showed clear evidence of disinterest in real peace negotiations, and provided the U.S. gave specific assurance of provision for weapons adequate to modernize the ROK army and detailed procedures removing domestic "redtape" and opposition to ROK military aid. 6. [1 line of source text not declassified] report class Secret/No Foreign Dissem/Controlled Dissem/No Dissem Abroad/Background Use Only.
196. Telegram From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State/1/ Seoul, May 2, 1968, 0700Z. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Korea, Memos, Vol. VI. Confidential; Exdis. Attached to a May 2 memorandum from Rostow to the President that indicates that the President saw the telegram. 6043. For Bundy from Ambassador. 1. Two weeks after the Honolulu meeting of the two Presidents, it is possible to assess its effect in Korea. If there is no pronounced, or even noticeable change in Korean thinking as a result of the meeting, it can be said that the top echelon, especially President Park, derived a considerable sense of achievement from it. Drawing their inspiration from the top levels here as usual, press and public alike seem to feel considerably reassured in the ever-vital matters of American support for this country, and the sensitivity of the American President to their problems. As this is the effect we were striving to achieve, success of the meeting seems clear. 2. This is not to say that such successes have any permanent character. It is in the nature of this people and their leaders to require assurances and gestures periodically, and this will be especially true while North Korean pressure is maintained, and while candidates for U.S. Presidency discuss solutions for Viet-Nam problem in terms which cause uneasiness here and in other parts of free Asia. 3. The fact of a day-long meeting of American and Korean Presidents would have its own considerable impact here, but this was supplemented by a communique at Honolulu which provided considerable support for ROK Government in matters of internal security and investment--certainly the areas of greatest concern to the Korean President. Park is said to be in something of a glow about this, and if that is true it is understandable because no one accuses him of giving anything in return. Even the opposition, not noted for its perception or objectivity, feels required to stand publicly on the position that the communique contained nothing new, or was more or less the same as previous pronouncements. This is hardly political fare to arouse the interest, or the fears, of the Korean public. 4. In ROKG eyes, the contribution of the country, i.e. fifty thousand troops to the Vietnam problem, has found clear expression of American appreciation in this bilateral meeting, placing American/ROK relations on the special plane the ROKs think they merit. What the other allies think of this is of little concern to ROKs as long as proper inference is drawn here--and ROKG has seen to that. The Vietnamese, Thais and Australians may now proceed singly or collectively to Washington, but the ROKs have had their day with our President and they appreciate it. Porter
197. Editorial Note The Korean National Assembly addressed the issue of the Homeland Reserve Force in early May 1968. The opposition New Democratic Party had already publicly recorded its opposition, expressing fears that the force could be used for political purposes and stating that existing military and police units were sufficient to meet threats from the North. (Airgram A-480 from Seoul, March 28; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 12 KOR S; and telegram 6054 from Seoul, May 2; ibid., POL 23-3 KOR S) After attempts to reach a compromise on the issue failed, the New Democratic Party boycotted the National Assembly, leaving the matter to the Democratic Republican Party to debate and pass. The Assembly passed modified legislation creating the Homeland Reserve Force on May 10. (Telegrams 7031, May 6, and 7144, May 10, from Seoul; both ibid., POL 23-3 KOR S) The legislation incorporated several provisions proffered by the opposition party, such as giving the police rather than the military authority over the unit and preventing the unit from participating in political activities. (Telegram 7144 from Seoul, May 10; ibid.) The Embassy prepared a detailed summary of the legislation that outlined and analyzed its provisions. (Airgram A-604 from Seoul, May 23; ibid.)
198. Action Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/ Washington, May 9, 1968, 2 p.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Korea, Memos, Vol. VI. No classification marking. SUBJECT Attached is a Zwick-Gaud/2/ request for your approval to proceed with a $15 million loan to the Korean Reconstruction Bank, the major source of development finance for Korean industry. The Bank has helped spur the rapid growth of the manufacturing sector, which increased output by 18% in 1966 and 22% in 1967. /2/Two memoranda attached but not printed. The Korean Government will increase its own subscription to the Bank by $23 million. The proposed loan would be the last AID loan to Korea in FY 1968 for a total of $30 million, as against $61 million last year. Proceeds from this loan are to be used exclusively to buy machinery, equipment and services in the United States. Treasury agrees that the loan would have a minimum adverse effect on the U.S. balance of payments. State also concurs in the loan. I recommend that you approve the proposed loan. Walt Approve/3/ /3/This option is checked.
199. Telegram From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State/1/ Seoul, May 14, 1968, 0130Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 32-4 KOR. Secret; Limdis. 7178. Ref: A. State 159444;/2/ B. Seoul 7146./3/ /2/In telegram 159444 to Seoul, May 7, the Department of State requested further information concerning Embassy reports discussing "(a) ardor of ROK leadership to reunify country, perhaps by military adventure, and (b) belief of ROKG that if confronted by fait accompli of this type great powers would not intervene." (Ibid., DEF 6 KOR S) /3/Telegram 7146 from Seoul, May 10, summarized remarks made by the Vice Foreign Minister at a press interview at which he stated, among other things, that Korea had no intention of using force to unify the country. (Ibid., POL KOR S) 1. It is not very difficult to specify evidence to support existence of Korean ardor for reunification (Ref A). Problems in this connection arose as far back as 1953 with Syngman Rhee and resurfaced again recently as result of Blue House raids and other current forms of NK pressure. The Vance mission correspondence sheds considerable specific light on the subject, as well as on ROK view of the improbability of great power non-intervention. To this we add our assessment of current atmosphere based on our knowledge of personalities at the decision-making level. 2. The desire to reunify this country runs very deep. It is the natural impulse of a homogeneous people living in one half of a divided nation, and this impulse is only strengthened by fact that many ROKG leaders are Northerners. If our telegrams of late have contained reminders of this sentiment, it is because we are currently injecting more military hardware into the ROK armed forces, and I want to be sure that all concerned have in mind the various [garble] and implications of ROK preparedness. 3. My emphasis has not been on ROK ardor or anger at NK provocations. They are but parts of the education. Whether ardor, anger or frustration can trigger action we wish to prevent depends largely on capability, and therefore whether the problem of unification becomes more or less acute in months or years ahead would seem to depend in large part on the type of equipment we furnish. It is timely to examine this subject because ROKs will probably table a substantial additional military aid program request at meeting of Defense Ministers later this month./4/ /4/Fulfilling one of the provisions of the joint communique issued at the conclusion of the Vance Mission to Seoul, the Joint U.S.-ROK Defense Meeting was held in Washington on May 27 and 28. Related documentation is ibid., DEF 1 KOR S; POL 7 KOR S; POL 7 US; and in the Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Korea, Memos, Vol. V. 4. It is of course a welcome development that the Foreign Ministry, perhaps not unmindful of Defense Ministers' Meeting, announced that it has instructed ROKG embassies to assure all that ROKG has no thought of anything other than peaceful reunification of the country (Ref B)./5/ We have not yet heard that assurances have actually been conveyed to you, but in any case the announcement did not evoke any notable public approbation or attention here. Perhaps that was because Foreign Ministry opinion would not be decisive, nor very influential, in such a matter. /5/On July 4 the Prime Minister told Porter of the establishment of a Ministry of Unification that "would supervise research and collate general information on problems of reunification." In response to Porter's inquiry as to whether the official announcement about the new ministry would "mention their attachment to peaceful reunification," the Prime Minister conceded the importance of the point without committing himself further. (Telegram 8360 from Seoul, July 5; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 15-1 KOR S) 5. None of this, I am sure, will be construed as meaning that we are hesitant about further contributions to the defense of the ROK. We believe in the preservation of the results of constructive work and the valuable position we have here. We believe that our future moves should be carefully considered in this context, especially as they affect the capability of the ROK forces, both offensive and defensive. Porter
200. Special National Intelligence Estimate/1/ SNIE 14.2-68 Washington, May 16, 1968. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, National Security Council History, Pueblo Crisis, 1968, Vol. XI, Background Documents. Secret; Controlled Dissem. According to a note on the cover sheet, the Central Intelligence Agency, the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State and Defense, and the National Security Agency participated in the preparation of this estimate. All members of the USIB concurred on May 16 except the representatives of the Atomic Energy Commission and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, who abstained because the subject was outside their jurisdiction. THE LIKELIHOOD OF MAJOR HOSTILITIES IN KOREA Conclusions A. We believe that, under present circumstances, Pyongyang does not intend to invade South Korea. Nor do we believe that, at least for the next year or so, Pyongyang will take actions that it considers involve high risk of provoking a new Korean War./2/ /2/The intelligence community had uncovered no signs of preparation for war in North Korea, despite reports to the contrary gathered from diverse sources. The President was kept apprised of the situation in Korea and received copies of those reports. (Memoranda from Rostow to President Johnson, May 4 and 24; CIA, Intelligence Information Cables TDCS-314/07456-68, May 3, TDCS-314/07314-68, May 3, TDCS-314/07385-68, May 13; all ibid., Country File, Korea, Cables, Vol. VI) B. We do believe, however, that Pyongyang is engaged in a determined effort to apply its own version of the doctrine of "peoples' war": to provoke incidents along the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) and to carry out terrorist attacks throughout the South in hopes of creating a situation which would, in time, shake the ROK Government's control of the nation. C. Pyongyang might be tempted to go well beyond incidents along the DMZ; e.g., it might attempt to seize and hold a piece of territory south of the DMZ or stage a raid into South Korea with fairly large forces. In general, however, we believe that Pyongyang would consider such moves too risky, especially any attempt to hold South Korean territory. D. Hence, in the short term, the principal danger is that of miscalculation; i.e., that the North Koreans will press so hard that Seoul will order large-scale retaliation. In this case, Pyongyang would be likely to respond with commensurate force, and there would be an increasing chance of escalation into major hostilities. Discussion 1. The seizure of the Pueblo and the attack on the presidential mansion in Seoul, both in late January 1968, were followed by a period of relative quiet. Since mid-April, however, North Korean harassment and infiltration in the area of the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) has intensified, and it appears that saboteurs have again been active in Seoul. With the advent of favorable weather, we expect guerrilla teams to begin moving down the coasts of South Korea in a renewed effort to establish bases in the mountainous hinterland./3/ On the propaganda front, the bellicose line adopted by North Korean Premier Kim Il-song at the October 1966 Korean Labor Party Conference has been maintained, with somewhat greater truculence since the Pueblo incident. It is apparent, therefore, that we are entering another cycle of North Korea's campaign of violence and intimidation against the ROK. /3/The ROK continued implementation of a counterinfiltration program begun in 1967. (Telegram from Seoul, March 25, National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 23-7 KOR S; airgram A-547 from Seoul, April 26, POL 23-3 KOR S; and airgram A-549 from Seoul, April 30, DEF 1 KOR S) In mid-1968 the Country Team studied South Korean counterinfiltration measures and prepared an analysis of internal security needs. (Airgram A-742 from Seoul, August 2; ibid., POL 23-1 KOR S) 2. We have reviewed the available evidence and concluded once again that, under present circumstances, Pyongyang does not intend to invade South Korea. Nor do we believe that, at least for the next year or so, Pyongyang will take actions that it considers involve high risk of provoking a new Korean War. This judgment rests in part on our view of how North Korea would assess its prospects in a new war. Despite the emphasis on modernizing its armed forces, on training reserves and increasing local militia, and on the protection of key installations against air attack, Pyongyang almost certainly would not expect to overrun South Korea or to escape serious damage in the North. The ROK Army is superior in numbers; Pyongyang would almost certainly consider that the presence of US forces virtually assured their participation and their reinforcement if necessary; and North Korea itself would require material support, and probably manpower, from China or the USSR./4/ Thus, any plans for a deliberate attack leading to a renewal of the Korean War would require the assurance of support from the USSR, China, or both. Under present circumstances, it is extremely doubtful that Pyongyang would receive any assurances in advance from either Communist power that the support required for a large-scale conflict in South Korea would be available. /4/See Annex: North and South Korean Forces. [Footnote in the source text.] 3. More directly, we do not see indications of preparations of the nature and scope we would expect to see if North Korea were planning war or expected it in the near future. There is, for example, no evidence--in this nation of chronic shortages--of unusually large imports of food or medicines, or other unusual international transactions. There have been rumors of increased draft calls, mobilization of reserves, unusual troop movements and deployments, and the buildup of stockpiles near the DMZ, but none of these or similar indicators of impending large-scale action are supported by reliable evidence. The "war is coming" tone of letters from North Korea to Japan appears to reflect official propaganda; such letters almost certainly suit the regime's purposes since all outgoing mail is carefully censored. Finally, if North Korea were planning a surprise attack, it would seem unwise to foment tension and keep the ROK and the US on the alert. 4. Nor do we believe that the North Koreans are trying to provoke the ROK into a resumption of major hostilities. Pyongyang might hope thus to activate its defense treaties with China and the USSR, and also to avoid condemnation by world opinion. But we do not believe that the North Korean leaders would expect either the USSR or Communist China to cooperate in a "counterattack" that could overrun the South. 5. We do believe, however, that Pyongyang is engaged in a determined effort to create the conditions for a "peoples' war" in South Korea. We also believe that Pyongyang currently rates the risks of this enterprise as not very high. The North Koreans probably view the US involvement in Vietnam and the resultant discord in the US as limiting the military capabilities and the will of the US to support any serious ROK retaliatory ventures against the North. US restraint in the Pueblo affair probably strengthened this view, and North Korean intelligence probably has a reasonably accurate picture of Washington's pressures on the ROK to forgo strong retaliatory measures in the Blue House and other affairs. 6. Thus, Pyongyang probably feels reasonably safe in creating incidents along the DMZ and in carrying out terrorist attacks throughout South Korea. These serve to give some credence at home to its claims of "imperialist aggression" and a developing resistance movement in the South. Pyongyang also intends them to embarrass and distract the ROK Government and to cause a loss of confidence in its leaders which could, in time, loosen their control of the nation. Meanwhile, these actions have caused some misunderstanding and strains between the ROK and the US. 7. Pyongyang might be tempted to go well beyond incidents along the DMZ. It might, for example, attempt to seize and hold a piece of territory south of the DMZ or stage a raid into South Korea with fairly large forces. We do not entirely rule out such actions. They would depend on how Pyongyang judged the probable reactions of the US and ROK. In general, however, we believe that Pyongyang would consider such moves as too risky, especially any attempt to hold South Korean territory. 8. Kim's present course of action vis-e-vis South Korea dates from 1966, although some indications of long-range preparations for intensified action were visible earlier. After several years of economic difficulty at home and consistent failure to capitalize on political unrest in the South, the frustrated Kim attempted to inject some dynamism into his regime by securing tighter control over the government and driving the population to greater efforts in its behalf. He seems to have succeeded in pruning much of what he considered deadwood from the government, the party, the military, and the economy; a series of low-keyed purges has reduced his leadership group to a handful of trusted comrades; and Kim has demanded and is receiving personal adulation on an unprecedented scale. 9. Public participation in the regime's many new programs has been fostered (along with acceptance of hardships) by nationalistic exhortations to prepare for "the foremost revolutionary task"--i.e., a Communist takeover of the South and reunification on Pyongyang's terms. In Kim's doctrine, the success of the revolutionary struggle in the South requires parallel efforts to build up the revolutionary base in the North, to improve its economy so that it will impress the southerners, and to strengthen its defense against the day when reactionary forces in the South, in desperation, strike northward. It is apparent that to make this line credible requires, at a minimum, some evidence of revolutionary struggle in the South and a demonstrably aggressive enemy along the DMZ. War tensions apparently prevailing among the northerners are evidence that the regime has achieved some degree of success in its indoctrination program. 10. This does not mean that North Korea will be satisfied with the mere semblance of a revolution in the South. Pyongyang's violent actions in 1967, coupled with its longstanding campaign of political subversion in South Korea, attest to the seriousness of its purpose. But Pyongyang probably has little expectation of developing a revolutionary movement in the South in the near term. North Korean theoreticians tend to emphasize the inadequate basis for revolutionary action in the South and the time and energy required to develop one. Thus, the leadership probably views its current efforts as part of a long-term campaign to upset the political equilibrium in the South, meanwhile strengthening in some measure the existing Communist clandestine apparatus there. 11. It is possible that North Korean leaders have persuaded themselves that political and military conditions in the US and in Korea, as well as in Vietnam, make this year the best time for a radical intensification of this revolutionary strategy. In our view, however, North Korea is not committed to any particular sequence of moves nor to any firm timetable. Pyongyang's propaganda, in contrast to the statements of captured North Korean infiltrators, has invariably been vague on timing; the phrase most frequently used is "within our generation." The North Korean plan of action appears similarly flexible; ROK and US defense measures and other responses, and the demonstrated effectiveness of various types of North Korean operations are the prime considerations. At any rate, to serve Pyongyang's current strategy, the campaign of violence need only continue; there seems to be no requirement for escalation to the level of major hostilities. 12. In this situation, the principal danger in the short term is one of miscalculation--i.e., that North Korea, in the process of probing ROK and US resolve, will overplay its hand and that an increasingly exasperated President Pak will order large-scale retaliation. Pyong- yang's response in this situation would be difficult to predict with any degree of confidence. On the one hand, the North Koreans might feel that they had to accept the ROK retaliation because, at this juncture, the risk of major hostilities would seem too high. It seems more likely, however, that they would feel compelled to respond with commensurate force. Though North Korea would probably stop short of actions certain to provoke a full-scale war, the proximity of hostile armies would make the situation highly volatile and war could result. 13. In such a crisis, decisions in Pyongyang and Seoul on any further moves would probably be affected, and perhaps decisively, by the attitudes and advice of their major allies. In our view, neither the USSR nor Communist China would consider a war in Korea to be in its interest. Without flatly refusing Pyongyang all military support, they would probably encourage North Korea to limit hostilities. 14. The Longer Term. In any case, a tense and risky situation is likely to continue in Korea well beyond the one year period of this estimate. Kim Il-song is a relatively young man; he appears to be in firm control in the North; and his hard-line views are likely to hold sway there for many years. Of critical importance will be the ability of the ROK people over the years to stand united against Communist subversion, and the ability of ROK forces to cope effectively with North Korean harassments. ROK confidence in the face of these long-term threats will depend heavily on the US posture in the Far East./5/ /5/This report was part of a larger effort to evaluate and respond to the situation in Korea. The Department of State, the CIA, and the Strategic Air Command explored alternatives such as "raids, sabotage or other activities across the border which might either (a) deter the North Koreans or warn them of a stiffer attitude on our part, or (b) provide a safety-valve for pent up ROK frustration, or both." The Pentagon also examined ways to defend against a range of potential actions by North Korea, and the intelligence community sought to close gaps in information about North Korea. (Memorandum from Brown to Katzenbach, May 14; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL KOR S-US)
Annex NORTH AND SOUTH KOREAN FORCES 1. The North Korean Army has a strength of about 345,000. It is probably at full strength, with a larger proportion in combat units than US/ROK forces have. North Korean troops are disciplined, highly trained, and alert. By their standards they are probably combat-ready. We do not know to what extent, if any, their heavy ground equipment is currently being replaced or augmented by the Soviets. With the exception of assault rifles and some new rockets, Soviet-designed weapons of World War II continue to predominate. Present stockpiles appear sufficient to support offensive action for at least a month. 2. The South Korean Army has some 532,000 personnel and the marine force numbers about 31,500. Of the total forces, some 50,000 are in Vietnam. ROK units are limited by old equipment, shortages of spare parts, and very austere supply levels. The two US divisions in Korea are under strength and not rated as having attained combat-ready status. 3. On balance, we estimate that neither side has the ability to conduct a sustained attack (i.e., for six months) or achieve a decisive advantage without substantial outside logistical support. 4. The North Korean Air Force could provide a strong defense against air attack. It has some 450 jet fighters--380 Mig-15/17s, 7 Mig-19s, and at least 60 Mig-21s. Almost all of the Mig-21s have probably been delivered over the past two years. Over the past three years, the number of surface-to-air missile (SA-2) sites has increased from 2 to 20. There are also 80 IL-28 jet light bombers, which, with its fighters, provide North Korea an offensive capability unmatched by the ROK Air Force. The ROKs have about 200 fighter aircraft, predominantly F-86s, but about 60 F-5 supersonic fighters have been introduced. The ROK Air Force has been heavily reinforced since the Pueblo incident by the basing of some 150 US supersonic jet fighters in South Korea. 5. The North Korean Navy is essentially a coastal patrol and inshore defense force. Its main offensive strength includes at least 4 "W"-class submarines, at least 7 "Komar"-class guided missile boats and associated Styx missiles, and 3 "Shershen"-class fast patrol boats. The "Komars" and "Shershens" have probably been provided by the USSR over the past two years or so. North Korea also has 39 other motor torpedo boats, and there are at least 2 cruise missile coastal defense complexes. The ROK Navy is also primarily a coastal patrol force; it has about 60 ships, including 4 destroyer types, 6 fast attack transports, 10 mine-sweepers, 20 patrol ships, and 20 amphibious ships.
201. Paper Prepared by the Policy Planning Council of the Department of State/1/ Washington, June 15, 1968. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Senior Interdepartmental Group Files: Lot 70 D 263. Secret. According to the preface, the study originated from a recommendation made by Vance after his trip to Seoul in February. The Department of State, the Department of Defense, the Joint Staff, the CIA, AID, and the Bureau of the Budget contributed to the paper, although no agency was "in any way committed to the analysis and recommendations presented in the study." SIG members were asked to review the study prior to a SIG meeting to discuss it. (Memorandum from Arthur A. Hartman to SIG members, June 26; ibid.) The paper was reviewed in the Department by the East Asian and Pacific Interdepartmental Regional Group (EAP/IRG), which discussed some of the problems inherent in the study on July 25, including the timing of several actions, funding of ROK forces, and potential withdrawal of U.S. forces from Korea. Minutes of the meeting, prepared on August 2, and a summary of IRG comments, prepared on August 6, are ibid. Jenkins sent Rostow the study and relevant documentation under cover of a September 16 memorandum prior to the September 19 SIG meeting. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, Senior Interdepartmental Group, Vol. 7, 43rd Meeting, September 19, 1968) The JCS reviewed the study and opposed its military components and recommendations in an August 21 memorandum to Clifford. (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD/OASD/ISA Files: FRC 91-0017, Korea 092 [Sensitive]) U.S. POLICY TOWARD KOREA Abstract Despite the substantial success of US policies in Korea, the need to change our approach is increasingly evident. The ROK's economic progress is no longer dependent on our massive economic aid, and ROK political development is increasingly incompatible with the deep involvement we have had in Korean economic and, at times, political decisions. At the same time, the more belligerent behavior of North Korea has given us a new incentive to re-examine our security posture in Korea. The US cannot simply congratulate itself on a job well done and walk away. A rapid disengagement--political, economic, and especially military--could pull the props from under much of what our blood and treasure have helped to build. Political and economic disarray, or worse, would probably be produced in the ROK. The signal conveyed to the Communists by a brusque military pull-back, especially if it were coupled with a bad outcome in Viet-Nam, could be disastrous. The US must long retain a real though diminishing role in support of the ROK. It is not realistic to hope that the animosities which focus in Korea can soon be abated by some form of peaceful reunification, nor should we expect Japan to replace us in our Korean role. In fact, the modest contribution to ROK security which Japan may make is probably contingent on our continued lead in both political and military matters. Our policy choices in Korea are thus really rather narrow and center largely on security considerations. We can: (a) continue our support for a gradual increase in ROK defensive capabilities or (b) seek through substantial additional resource inputs to give the ROK rather quickly the capability of handling an all-out North Korean attack with only US logistic support. Considerations of cost aside, the second of these strategies is clearly preferable. We could in this way rapidly adjust our military, as well as our political and economic, policies to the growing self-reliance of the ROK. More important, this strategy would in a few years time all but eliminate the risk that US combat forces would have to be committed to help the ROK repel a new North Korean attack. Even in terms of cost, the first of the above strategies would probably have no advantage. At projected military assistance levels, the growth in ROK defensive capabilities would be very slow. The reduction in US force levels in Korea would have to be correspondingly gradual, thereby prolonging the heavy burden of their maintenance as well as the risk of their involvement in a new war. The return of the ROK forces from Viet-Nam will open the way to a strengthening and restructuring of the ROK military and to the phased withdrawal of the bulk of US forces from Korea. It will not be difficult to make ROK ground forces--and the ROK navy--more than a match for the North Korean army and navy. In fact, the North Koreans may already be overmatched on the ground and the sea, though there is not the margin of safety one might wish. A ROK ground force of about 20 divisions (equivalent to what they would now have if the two divisions in Viet-Nam returned to replace the two US divisions in Korea), modest equipment modernization, and improved logistic infrastructure are needed. The balance is quite different in the air. The North Koreans acquired a large air force after (and in violation of) the Armistice, while the ROK has leaned heavily on US air support. Although the US could bring the ROK to "parity" in air strength, it is probably unnecessary and undesirable. Unnecessary, because much of the North Korean air force is obsolete and of dubious effectiveness in supporting an all-out assault on the ROK, and because US air strength would in all relevant contingencies be able to redress any unexpected reverses. Undesirable, since numerical parity would be extremely costly to provide and maintain and could simply lead to an accelerated arms race on the peninsula. We should therefore support only a modest expansion of the ROK air force from 11 to 13 tactical fighter squadrons and concentrate on modernization of existing units and improvement of base facilities. [2 lines of source text not declassified] Remaining US forces would ultimately consist of headquarters staff, military advisers, and personnel in selected logistic units. Our economic strategy will depend in some degree on which approach we choose in the security field. If we do not make an intensive effort to build up ROK military strength, but keep our forces in Korea somewhat longer, there will be less pressure on the ROK economy, and our economic aid can taper down more rapidly. If, as this paper recommends, we make the intensive effort, there may be corresponding strains on the ROK and our aid phase-out should probably be somewhat deferred. Moreover, there are still major uncertainties in the ROK's economic future and we should terminate Development Loans and Military Budget Support only after the critical presidential election of 1971. We still have some influence on political decisions in Seoul, and we should retain the tools which give us that influence until the ROK is past the 1971 hurdle. We should recognize, however, that our position is already very different from that of some years ago and should not try to transform our old role as a flying instructor into that of a permanent copilot. The major steps in carrying out the preferred strategy might look something like the following: FY 1970. Return of one ROK division from Viet-Nam and phase-out of supporting assistance. FY 1971. Return of remaining ROK troops from Viet-Nam, making possible the resumption of the MAP Transfer Program. FY 1972. Development Loans and Military Budget Support phased out. Shift of MAP to soft-term credit sales begun. The US 2nd Division would be withdrawn from Korea. The UN Command might at this point relinquish operational control of ROK forces, except in emergencies. FY 1973. PL 480 local currency sales ended and remaining PL 480 sales made on long-term dollar basis. The US 7th Division would be withdrawn from Korea. FY 1974. PL 480 Title II program (rural development) ended. FY 1975. Modernization of ROK military structure substantially completed. [1 line of source text not declassified] All of these steps of course, depend to various degrees, on developments in the interim. Several major questions may fairly be raised concerning the preferred strategy: Would the ROK accept it? Would it increase the risk of a ROK attempt to re-unify Korea by force? Could the required resources be found for the projected build-up of ROK defensive capabilities? And, finally, what about the Chinese threat? Concerning the first question, ROK leaders will be unhappy over the withdrawal of the two US divisions and the prospect that other forces would eventually follow, but in time they would realize that they had no rational alternative but to go along. The danger of a "March North" seems minimal: there are few fanatics among ROK leaders, and we can probably continue to rely on ROK dependence on US logistic support to inhibit any rash adventures. We should, however, support a primarily defensive posture for ROK forces, and we should continue to make clear that our guarantee does not apply to hostilities arising from ROK attack. The resources problem may be the most difficult of all, but its solution would be facilitated after the end of major hostilities in Viet-Nam by the withdrawal of the US divisions from Korea, which will result in very large savings and will more than offset the added expenditures required by the preferred strategy. Also, the ability of the ROK to pay for its own defense is increasing, modest amounts of non-lethal military assistance may be forthcoming from Japan, and any excess equipment after Viet-Nam would further reduce costs. Fortunately, Chinese participation in a new attack seems unlikely, so long as the US maintains its present security commitment to the ROK, backed up by both a nuclear deterrent and the ability to deploy forces to Korea if the need arises. The strategy proposed here would increase the ROK's ability to fight a delaying action against a combined Chinese-North Korean attack, but even a very large build-up of ROK capabilities at great expense to both the US and the ROK could not eliminate the need for US combat forces. No strategy is without its problems including the one advanced here. This strategy nevertheless offers the best hope of reducing our vulnerability to direct involvement in any new Korean war without making such a war any more likely than it is today. We would preserve our major interests in Korea while moving to a new relationship in which the ROK is no longer a dependent client but a full-fledged, self-reliant ally. [Here follows the five-part study comprising 70 pages. Part I is entitled "US Interests and Objectives in Korea," Part II, "Major Problems in Korea Over the Next Decade," Part III, "Assessment of Strategic Alternatives," Part IV, "The Preferred Strategy," and Part V, "Recommendations." Also included were annexes A-F. Annex A is entitled "Present US Commitments," annex B, "Current US-Korean Relations," C, "Major Problems in the ROK," D, "North Korea's Prospects," E, "Reunification," and F, "Contingencies."] [Continue with the next documents]
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