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FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1964-1968, Volume XXIX Korea
Department of State |
Korea 202. Information Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/ Washington, June 19, 1968, 10:30 a.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Cambodia 5E(3), November 1968 to January 1969. Secret. Mr. President: Herewith Sec. Clifford argues that we should not proceed with the dispatch of the 5,000 Korean civilians to Vietnam because of the high budgetary cost in allocating the equipment held on Okinawa to expedite the reequipment of the GVN forces. He also argues that to accept the civilians would make it more difficult to get the additional 6,000 combat troops which were to have been part of the 11,000 light division from Korea. This item is on the lunch agenda today. Walt
Attachment Department of Defense Paper Washington, June 18, 1968. Additional ROK Deployments to Vietnam Last fall, the South Korean Government agreed to deploy an additional light division to South Vietnam. They proposed to send 5,000 ROK civilians to replace an equal number of present support troops. In addition, 6,000 combat troops were to be sent to make up the light division total of 11,000. During the conversations in Honolulu, President Park reaffirmed the commitment to supply additional combat forces but contended that it was not feasible for him to proceed to secure the National Assembly's support for this deployment at this time. He urged, however, that we go ahead with the deployment of 5,000 ROK civilians and the conversion of that number of ROK support forces to the combat role. Intelligence reports indicate that Park's assessment of the political situation eliminates any chance that he will dispatch additional combat forces to Vietnam now or within the foreseeable future. However, the ROK Government continues to press us to agree that they should send the 5,000 civilians to Vietnam. It seems clear that they view this arrangement as a way to obtain high paying jobs and to earn additional foreign exchange. Korean Defense Minister Choi raised this matter with Secretary Clifford and Secretary Nitze during his visit here last month./2/ In response to his argument that the question of the 6,000 additional combat troops could be dealt with separately and later, he was told that this decision could only be made by the President. /2/Choi visited the United States May 27 and 28. Documentation covering that visit is in the Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD/OASD/ISA Files: FRC 73 A 1250, Korea 337. It is recommended that we not now agree to the dispatch of these additional ROK civilians and that this be delayed until such time as the ROK Government is prepared to send additional combat troops. This recommendation is supported by the following reasons: 1. These 5,000 civilians have always been part of the package for an additional ROK light division of 11,000 men. If the package is now divided and the civilians separately approved, the chances, already slim, of later obtaining the additional 6,000 combat troops, are probably much diminished. 2. Because the ROKs view this as a monetary transaction, they have asked for comparatively high pay scales for these civilians. At their "asking" price, the total wages for 5,000 additional ROK civilians would cost the U.S. about $22 million annually. Ambassador Porter thinks it would take at least $15 to $18 million annually to satisfy ROK political and economic requirements. However, Ambassador Bunker and Admiral Sharp recommend we pay no more than $4 to $5 million annually. Wages for a comparable number of ROK military personnel in Vietnam, including overseas allowances paid by the U.S. and base pay and allowances paid by the ROK Government, would be about $5 million annually. Wages paid in Korea for a comparable number of ROK civilians in equivalent jobs would be about $4 million annually. The Korean asking price for the lowest grade civilian would be about $4,000 per year, compared with about $800 per year earned by a ROK soldier in Vietnam for an equivalent job and about $600 per year earned by a ROK civilian in Korea in a comparable position. We continue to receive congressional and public criticism of U.S. payments to Korean troops and civilians currently in Vietnam. We are criticized for hiring "mercenaries" and for giving Korean civilians preferential consideration over U.S. and other TCN personnel. If we now accede to either the Korean asking price or Ambassador Porter's recommendation, the resultant bonus paid to these additional Korean civilians in Vietnam could generate more public and congressional criticism at home. 3. Combat equipment for 5,000 additional ROK forces would be required. This is equipment identical with that which we are attempting to provide to the GVN forces on a priority basis and any provision to the ROK would result in a one-for-one slippage in the timing of our efforts to make the GVN capable of assuming a larger role in the war. This problem of priorities would also exist in the follow-on support for these forces. The major equipment for a full ROK light division (11,000 men) is still being held on Okinawa. If we do not now agree to the dispatch of the 5,000 civilians, all of this equipment should now be released to expedite the reequipment of the GVN forces. If the ROK Government should later decide to go ahead with the deployment of the light division, at least 90 days would be required to ready these forces. The necessary equipment could be reconstituted in from 90 to 120 days. Accordingly, the release of the equipment at the present time would not result in any appreciable delay if a deployment decision is reached later.
203. Memorandum From the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Atomic Energy (Walske) to the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Nitze) Washington, August 8, 1968. [Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD/OASD/ISA Files: FRC 73 A 1304, Korea 471.61. Top Secret. 2 pages of source text not declassified.]
204. Report Prepared by the Department of State/1/ Washington, August 14, 1968. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 23-7 KOR S. Secret. Attached to an August 14 memorandum from Read to Rostow that states the report was prepared in response to a request from the President. Rostow forwarded the report to the President by telegram. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Korea, Memos, Vol. VI) SITUATION IN NORTH KOREA The posture of the North Korean regime remains extremely hostile, but there are no discernible indications that they are considering an all-out attack on South Korea or even a large-scale provocation of some sort./2/ The frequency of incidents along the DMZ, which had been considerably lower this year than last, has risen in recent weeks. The character of these incidents has, however, not altered. /2/The Embassy prepared frequent reports on North Korean infiltration and subversive activities. Those assessments are in the National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 23-7 KOR S. Despite the continued propaganda attacks on US and our South Korean "puppets",/3/ we have not observed any changes in North Korean military dispositions which would indicate that an attack is likely. Their posture is such that we might have little or no warning of an attack over the DMZ but its prospects for success would be dim. President Pak and his colleagues, who were extremely nervous some months ago, now seem confident that the US and ROK forces can handle any contingency. Talk of an "Israeli-type" lightning blow from the North is less frequently heard. Nor are the ROKs talking about the need to retaliate against provocations. /3/An analysis of North Korean propaganda efforts revealed increased activity "designed largely to provoke anti-American sentiment and to enhance the image of the DPRK." (Intelligence Note 424, June 3; ibid.) Provocative infiltrations through the DMZ and attacks on our patrols have continued, but the incident and casualty rates since February are well below 1967. Small groups sent to reconnoiter military targets are most common. Infiltrations by sea, a real worry last year, have been close to zero this summer, though a few may have taken place undetected. Since late July DMZ incidents have increased in frequency but it is too soon to say if this is a brief flurry or a disquieting trend. In sum, we do not believe the North Koreans are planning any large-scale operation which would risk provoking a war. Tension remains high, however, and the Intelligence Community is keeping the closest watch on the situation.
205. Action Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/ Washington, October 9, 1968, 7 p.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Korea, Memos Vol. VI. Confidential. SUBJECT You asked me to look further into the Purcell amendment and the rice package for Korea. The Purcell amendment requires, in the case of the PL-480 credit portion of the sale, that the Koreans make an additional cash payment to cover U.S. expenses and other specified uses, unless you determine this would be inconsistent with the objectives of the Act. The recommendation is that you so determine. These are the reasons: 1. The PL-480 rice is part of a 400,000 ton package that has an exceptionally good commercial portion. --245,000 pounds, valued at almost $42 million, is under PL-480 terms: This includes the usual 5 percent cash down payment and the balance payable in dollars over forty years. In itself this is a shift for Korea from local currency to dollar repayable terms. This shift is in accordance with the objectives of the Act. --100,000 tons, valued at $17 million, is a straight commercial CCC transaction repayable in dollars in three years, one-third each year. --55,000 tons, valued at $9 million, is for cash. 2. It would have been possible to apply the straight cash portion of the transaction to the PL-480 part of the package. This would have met the Purcell amendment requirement but would have been less advantageous to us. We would have gotten these dollar receipts over the course of a year but under the present package, we receive the cash payment immediately. Furthermore, the commercial part of the package would be smaller. This would be inconsistent with the stated objective in the Act to build up commercial markets. 3. As the previous memo pointed out,/2/ we are competing with the Japanese. The Koreans, mindful of their long-term interest, might be pushed further but we cannot be sure. There would be a risk. In any event, there would be more delay and some balking at reopening what seemed in the preliminary negotiation to be a fair deal for both of us. /2/Reference is to an October 2 memorandum with attachments from Rostow to President Johnson. (Ibid.) Our prospective rice surplus situation is a further point. If the 400,000 ton Korean sale does not go through, this rice would be added to our carryover at a storage cost of almost $3 million a year. In addition, we would lose the immediate budgetary and balance of payments gain of the cash part of the sale. In the legislative history, Purcell and the full Agriculture Committee made it clear that the amendment was a best effort rather than a mandatory provision. Furthermore, in executive session, the Committee said that this and other amendments should be applied with maximum flexibility in the case of Korea and Vietnam. A Purcell waiver on this agreement should cause no problem on the Hill. I believe that waiver of the Purcell amendment on this deal is consistent with the objectives of the Act and justified on commercial grounds. I recommend you approve negotiation of the agreement./3/ /3/Rostow added a handwritten notation at the bottom of this memorandum that reads: "The agreement will be negotiated if you approve. The actual signing of the waiver will come to you only after the negotiation is completed. W." Walt Approve/4/ /4/The President approved the recommendation and added: "if you [Rostow] consult and is approved by Purcell and Poage." In an October 11 memorandum Rostow informed the President that Poage and Purcell approved the package and the waiver and that negotiations with Korea would begin. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Korea, Memos, Vol. VI)
206. Intelligence Note From the Deputy Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Denney) to Secretary of State Rusk/1/ No. 829 Washington, October 22, 1968. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 32-4 KOR. Secret; No Foreign Dissem. SUBJECT Several recent developments have suggested that Pyongyang is trying harder than usual to be represented in this year's UN debate on the Korea question. The DPRK's annual statement on the unification issue contained a softer approach to the UN,/2/ and an attempt has been made to have the representation issue taken up as a procedural matter rather than as part of the Korea question debate, with the aim of enhancing North Korea's chances of being invited. Cambodia, Syria, and other delegations friendly to Pyongyang have submitted a draft resolution inviting North Korea without preconditions. Should a North Korean delegate actually go to New York, Pyongyang's verbal aggressiveness might be abated somewhat, but adverse effects would probably accrue both in Seoul and in the U.S. /2/See IN-755, "North Korea States UN Position," September 25, 1968 (Secret; No Foreign Dissem). [Footnote in the source text. According to that document, the North Koreans traditionally "rejected the UN's competence and authority to deal with the Korea question on the grounds that the UN was `reduced to a belligerent' in the Korean war." They adopted a posture of blaming the United States for misusing the UN and professed their respect for the aims of the UN Charter and insisted on being invited to represent Korea in that body as the only legitimate government of that nation.] Better Behavior from Pyongyang? The seating of a representative in New York might cause the North Koreans to modify somewhat their strategy for achieving unification. Pyongyang's willingness to participate in UN discussion of the Korea question should imply an appreciation of the importance of maintaining a good UN image. While the DPRK Government would probably continue to carry out DMZ harassment activities and infiltration attempts throughout the South at what have become "accepted" levels, and would still hope thereby to undercut ROK political and economic stability, it may be more circumspect with regard to serious provocations, such as last January's Blue House raid and the Pueblo seizure. Pyongyang's foreign relations could not but benefit from the participation of a North Korean delegate in New York, even though substantive DPRK positions in the Korea debate would gain little support. Assuming its envoy would be able to carry out his ceremonial and propaganda responsibilities without any serious gaffes, his mere presence in New York would be regarded by many new nations in the UN--nations which did not exist at the time of the Korean war and have little appreciation of the roots of the Korean problem--as tantamount to an official UN stamp of legitimacy for the Pyongyang regime. Repercussions in Seoul. Since Koreans generally are more concerned with the matter of representation per se than with the substance of the Korea question in the UN, a decision to permit North Korean representation would have a traumatic impact in South Korea. For years the Seoul press has been apprehensive about the so-called "UN formula" for achieving unification, on grounds that unification cannot possibly be realized through the UN, and also that continued, unimaginative reliance on the UN by the ROK Government will eventually redound to Pyongyang's advantage. Despite their lack of constructive alternatives to the UN formula, the Government's critics would give forth with loud cries of "we told you so." Indeed, it may be expected that Pyongyang's strategy in trying to have its representative invited to New York includes its hopes that such an occurrence would cause the South Korean people to lose faith in their government's ability to defend ROK interests in the UN--and in the willingness of the US to help protect those interests. We could anticipate, moreover, that the ROK Government would try to pass off much of the responsibility for such a debacle onto the US. There would certainly be some degree of official unhappiness expressed to us through the Foreign Ministry. The South Koreans tend to believe that their acceptance of US advice on the handling of the invitation issue each year entitles them to hold us responsible for the voting results. This problem is compounded by the tendency of Kim Yong-sik, Chief ROK Observer in New York, to submit vague and self-serving reports to Seoul regarding his role in the joint US-ROK-allied strategy sessions. He apparently wishes to convince his home government, if necessary, that some decisions are reached without his concurrence or over his objections. Problems for the US. Aside from the matter of US-ROK relations, other difficulties would confront us if a North Korean were to attend the UN debate. Not the least of these is the problem of his security. Between the Korean war and the events of last January, a group of super-patriotic citizens--or perhaps some South Korean residents here--would not have to grope to justify expressing antagonistic feelings toward a Pyongyang official. Anti-North Korean protest demonstrations could be difficult to control. But beyond this basically administrative problem is the question of our stature in the UN and our prestige in general. We have long resisted attempts by nations sympathetic to Pyongyang to prevent South Korean participation in the UN and, recently, to force a North Korean delegate into the proceedings. To many nations unfamiliar with the complexities of the problem it would seem that the US had finally lost the fight. Coming after the Pueblo seizure and subsequent propaganda exploitation of the crew, this would create more political and propaganda problems for the US, both at home and abroad.
207. Intelligence Note From the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Hughes) to Secretary of State Rusk/1/ No. 870 /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 23-7 KOR S. Secret; No Foreign Dissem; Controlled Dissem. Washington, November 8, 1968. SUBJECT North Korean armed infiltrators landed on both coasts of South Korea over the weekend of November 1-3. The two seaborne operations mark the end of a virtual hiatus in coastal infiltration during most of 1968./2/ /2/This incident was followed by the North Korean capture of 16 South Korean fishing boats and 76 fishermen on November 8 and 9. The Korean Desk officers believed that the actions were perpetrated so that the North Koreans could "obtain the intelligence they need in mounting infiltrations by sea." (Memorandum from Leonard to Bundy, November 8, attached to a memorandum from Rostow to the President, November 9; Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Korea, Memos, Vol. VI) Coordinated Intrusions. Two North Korean infiltrators were sighted in the morning of November 1 near Sosan on the west coast of South Korea. Later in the day, a ROK force sweeping the area killed two intruders in a firefight. A cache of equipment, including dynamite, was discovered nearby. No further infiltrators were subsequently detected in the area. Two days later on November 3, a series of firefights broke out in the DMZ, one of them in response to a platoon-sized North Korean penetration. These incidents, and possibly the west coast landing, were evidently diversions staged in support of an unusually ambitious commando team landing midway down the east coast of the ROK. A suspicious boat was detected during the evening of November 2 off the east coast, but managed to elude capture after putting commandos ashore undetected near the town of Ulchin. The next day, armed North Korean agents moved into a small village in broad daylight, conducted propaganda sessions and distributed large sums of ROK currency (later reported to be counterfeit), and released the villagers a few hours later. One villager was killed, and three more civilians were later reported dead at the hands of the intruders. In response, ROK security forces cordoned off a large area and had killed nine of the intruders as of November 8. The South Koreans appear confident of apprehending all the intruders, although the difficult terrain has slowed the task. There are conflicting reports of the total number of intruders, some of which put the original group at 30, while others speak of simultaneous landing of two 30-man teams./3/ /3/A later analysis stated that about 120 armed infiltrators entered South Korea in the November operation. Of that number, a reported 107 had been killed, 7 were in ROK custody, and the rest were presumed to have perished from exposure to harsh winter conditions. (Intelligence Note No. 53, January 30, 1969; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 23-7 KOR S) The incident and its aftermath spurred the South Koreans to undertake a review of their counterinfiltration policies and organizations. (Telegrams 11631, December 6, and 11920, December 23, from Seoul; both ibid.) Infiltrators' Mission. Until these two seaborne infiltrations, only three instances of North Korean agent landings along the ROK coast had been detected in 1968 despite our expectations of a higher number. The commando group was the first specially trained large group to attempt penetration of the ROK since the January 1968 raid on the Presidential Palace in Seoul. (In the January raid the intruders infiltrated through the DMZ.) The tactic of propagandizing villagers is new. It was evidently planned in advance, judging by the supply of counterfeit currency brought by the agents, their reported photographing of villagers and their requiring the villagers to put their thumb prints on a paper as a sign of allegiance to the communist cause. Supplies of propaganda leaflets and North Korean Workers Party membership applications were also discovered in the area. Thus it seems that maximum psychological impact was one of the goals of the North Korean team. In a larger sense, the mission may have been designed to test the feasibility of winter guerrilla activities in the ROK patterned after Viet Cong tactics. The South Korean Defense Minister ventured this opinion in addressing the ROK National Assembly November 6, and it has been suggested privately by other ROK officials./4/ So far it appears that the east coast operation has met with complete uncooperativeness on the part of the local populace, which has always proved to be the flaw in North Korean efforts to foment guerrilla activity in the ROK. /4/Some ROK officials believed the actions were timed "to coincide with the US declaration of a bombing halt on North Viet-Nam," a policy criticized by the ROK and SVN. Some also believed that the Ulchin raid "was a trial effort before carrying out large-scale guerrilla warfare against the ROK" following the pattern established by the Viet Cong of "trying to 'liberate' villages one by one." (Memorandum from Leonard to Bundy, November 8, attached to a memorandum from Rostow to President Johnson, November 9; Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Korea, Memos, Vol. VI)
208. Telegram From the Commander in Chief, Pacific (McCain) to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Wheeler)/1/ Honolulu, November 16, 1968, 0538Z. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Korea, Memos, Vol. IV. Secret; Noforn; Eyes Only. Repeated to COMUSKOREA and DIA and forwarded by Wheeler's office to Rostow, Rusk, and Helms. 160538Z. The Korean Situation. 1. From all appearances, Kim Il-song is accelerating considerably his drive to unify Korea on Communist terms. Coming at a time when the Vietnam situation is in a state of flux, Kim's strategy of subversion and terror could have serious implications for the PACOM. Realizing that trying to predict the whys and wherefores of Kim Il-song's behavior is a risky business, I am, nevertheless, taking this opportunity to pass on my views on the Korean situation. 2. On the dangerous side, I see Kim implementing a Korean-style "Vietnam strategy" to foment revolution in the ROK. For the first time we are experiencing in the winter months a surge of rear-area, guerrilla-agent actions combined with intensified DMZ activities. This may well be Kim's opening, and what he may consider to be decisive, drive to establish a viable infrastructure of revolution in the South. I am confident that the South Koreans, with our help, are capable of dealing effectively with Kim's threat, but I am also concerned that his failure to subvert the ROK may lead him to further rash actions. The chance that the ROKs could be provoked or would be more inclined to take unilateral action is now increased greatly. 3. Although we have not been able to establish a direct relationship between the actions occurring in Vietnam and those in Korea, I am concerned that events in each place may be correlated and coordinated in future Communist strategy and military actions. Kim probably has fairly accurately assessed the general scheme of things in Southeast Asia. He will use every opportunity originating in SEA to increase tension in Northeast Asia. For instance, there is considerable uncertainty regarding North Korean actions if the Vietnamese Communists were now to embark on a renewed country-wide offensive activity. The termination of hostilities and the resultant draw-down of friendly forces in Vietnam also could be viewed by Kim as an opportune time to cause trouble. The vision of a revitalized ROK power base could lead Kim to hasty action in a "now or never" drive to subvert the ROK or even to attempt a reunification of the Koreas by force. This situation could hold a number of possibilities for miscalculation by the Communists. 4. Trying to predict North Korea's behavior, however, can lead us down some dark passages. There are constraining factors which are bound to inhibit Kim's efforts to unify Korea. He appears strong militarily but is not in a position to take over South Korea by his own forces alone. Kim speaks stridently and is inclined to take risks and there is a chance that he can miscalculate, but I do not believe he is wholly irrational. We can expect him to be deterred at least in some degree by the risks to his country and to himself of initiating open conflict. 5. On balance, we expect that Kim will do everything in his power to subvert South Korea short of open hostilities. He could become particularly dangerous if he feels his timetable for subversion is running out. My people are constantly and closely watching the Korean situation. 6. Very respectfully and warm regards.
209. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ Washington, November 20, 1968. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 19-8 US-KOR S. Secret; Limdis. Drafted by Bardach. SUBJECT PARTICIPANTS 1. General Bonesteel desired to discuss a number of subjects prior to his departure on vacation at Cape Cod. The following are the salient points of the discussion: MAP Level 2. General Bonesteel expressed concern about the inadequate level of this year's MAP, and felt we might face a crisis of confidence with the ROKs despite the fact that such a crisis is not warranted. Ambassador Brown said that the change of administration might probably provide an opportunity for raising this subject with the new Secretary of State. It could, for example, be included in a "first ninety-days" issues paper. General Bonesteel responded that he thought the Pentagon would go along with raising this subject with the new administration. General Bonesteel continued that he had given considerable thought to various ways of filling the gaps. With the bombing halt, he felt that there might be a possibility to transfer Viet Nam weapons for use by the Homeland Reserve forces in the ROK. Two of his men were exploring this in Saigon at the present. Another idea would be to get some US destroyers to patrol the south coast. He said that he had a gut feeling that the other 16 nations who participated in the Korean War might be able to help, for example Australia and New Zealand could send ships. However he was not advocating this very strongly. Ambassador Brown responded that we would have to move cautiously on involving the Australians in the Korean military assistance picture. 3. Asked about the effect of this year's MAP reduction General Bonesteel said it would probably affect the supply of 20 light helicopters and cut off half a squadron of F-5's. Ambassador Brown asked whether the ROKs might be willing to cut out some of the F-4's. General Bone- steel said he had discussed this possibility with Mr. Warnke but that they had not reached a definite conclusion. Ambassador Brown felt that an approach to the ROKs on the F-4's would be a question of timing. 4. General Bonesteel mentioned the high annual maintenance costs as being central to the MAP problem. He thought that the Pentagon would support a restoration of this year's cut in next year's program. If such a restoration could be achieved, General Bonesteel would give priority to replacing old artillery with new pieces. He would also fill out the F-5's that have been programmed for this year. 5. General Bonesteel said he could use our support in pushing on the MAP pipeline for Korea which he said amounted to about $200 million. In particular he wants trucks moved more rapidly to the ROK. MAP Transfer 6. General Bonesteel said we should get the MAP Transfer Program back on the track. He recognized that our commitment to the Koreans made this difficult but that we might raise with them the possibility of transferring certain selected items to the Korean budget. There were a number of items such as cement on which there might be as much as a 60 to 75 percent savings in costs. 7. After a brief discussion of the current status of our PL 480 local currency generations, General Bonesteel said that there should be closer coordination between consideration of economic development and defense requirements in the ROK. Ambassador Brown agreed that we should take a close look at the local currency generations for military budget support. Retaliation 8. General Bonesteel said that he had just received a cable from General Friedman reporting continued high level concern in the ROKG on why they (the ROKs) have to sit back and take all the North Korean provocations. General Bonesteel felt that although President Park won't march to the Yalu, there was a continuing feeling in the ROK that the punishment should fit the crime; he believes this issue needs to be given further attention. General Bonesteel said that he continues to feel that there is a potential of carefully directed retaliatory actions by the ROKs as a means to allow them to let off steam. 9. Ambassador Brown replied that we had discussed this subject with General Depuy, who had not been encouraging. General Bonesteel responded that the General had never been in Korea. 10. (We showed General Bonesteel the Embassy's cable reporting President Park's conversation with Codel Roybal in which Park had taken a more relaxed attitude about the North Korean harassment and ROK retaliation)./2/ /2/Not further identified. In early 1969 Pak remarked to Bonesteel and Porter that "his warnings about ROK retaliation were `for political purposes.'" Pak stated that minor infiltrations helped "to keep ROK units on their toes," but admitted that if several actions occurred simultaneously the "matter would become serious nuisance." (Telegram 44 from Seoul, January 8, 1969; ibid., POL 23-7 KOR S) In a New Year's statement appearing in the pro-government Kyonghyang Sinmun on January 4, however, the Prime Minister took a very hard line on the question of retaliation and emphasized his belief that the ROK should act against North Korean provocations. (Telegram 18 from Seoul, January 7, 1969; ibid.) North Korean Provocations and ROK Counter-Infiltration Effort 11. General Bonesteel said his fundamental assessment of the North Korean threat remains the same, that North Korean aggressiveness is increasing, and that Kim Il-sung is making North Korea an armed sanctuary. He feels that there is a danger of miscalculation on both sides and that the North Korean efforts are oriented to provoking the ROKs into retaliation. Such a situation could lead to more substantial moves on either side and blow up into major hostilities. General Bonesteel said that he had been trying to be "ahead of the curve" of the increased North Korean hostile actions with the limited resources available to him. He feels that 1969 will be a period of decision for us to reverse the curve. General Bonesteel is concerned about an arms race between the North and the South and feels that the best way to deal with the situation is to be effective at the DMZ and effective in countering infiltration in the interior. 12. Asked how he was planning to increase the effectiveness of the DMZ defenses, General Bonesteel said that he was trying out several new ideas for which he hopes to obtain Service funding. He said he had been working on scientific means to beef up the fence and that a joint US-ROK team was at present studying this matter. He mentioned that better lighting of the fence would serve as an effective deterrent and that the Australians had a device that would serve this purpose. General Bonesteel also felt that there should be more US support to deal with the sea infiltration problem but he did not go into details. He did, however, mention his request for additional US security companies--a total of 2,000 men--and said that DOD was reluctant to take action on his request because of US balance of payments considerations. He said that he appreciates the US balance of payments problems, but wondered how super-sensitive this problem really is, observing that there was a limit when such considerations should cease to be an overriding factor. 13. General Bonesteel also felt that it was important to have the Department's support on getting some more men to the regular US forces in Korea. The four US battalions on the DMZ were having a difficult time and although our record was better than the ROKs in this regard, both he and the ROKs were concerned about this situation. General Bonesteel explained that at present US troops were at 70 percent of strength and the strength of the KATUSA were at 80 percent. It would take 8,500 additional men to bring his forces up to 90 percent of full strength and it would be most useful to effect such an increase in order to deal with the rear area security problem./3/ Here too, he felt, balance of payments considerations were inhibiting DOD action. He had discussed the matter with Mr. Nitze who had reacted with expressions of concern about the high cost of maintaining US soldiers abroad. Finally, General Bonesteel said that his fundamental view was that we must build up our forces in the ROK now in order to withdraw them later on. /3/The Joint Chiefs requested an additional 8,500 troops for Korea in January, in February, and most recently in October. (Memorandum to McNamara, October 17; Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD/OASD/ISA Files: FRC 73 A 1250, Korea 370) Evaluation of North Korean Intentions 14. General Bonesteel feels that the intelligence community has not evaluated North Korea on a totally integrated basis and strongly supports a new SNIE./4/ He added that every time his staff has had a look at the North Korean situation, he has observed that the Russians are doing quite a bit more, notably assistance to North Korean airfields. He had also seen evidence that MIG-17's were being changed to MIG-21's. /4/SNIE 14.2-69, "Confrontation in Korea," January 30, 1969, concluded that North Korea did not intend to invade or to provoke major hostilities with South Korea or with the United States. The report maintained that during the next few years South Korea would prove an inhospitable environment for North Korea guerrilla bases and that the North would continue provocations against the South, thus risking retaliation by ROK forces that could potentially lead to the outbreak of general hostilities. The actions of and the situation in both North and South Korea could be influenced by the position of the major powers--the United States, the Soviet Union, and Communist China--as well as by a settlement of the Vietnam conflict. (Department of State, INR/EAP Files: Lot 90 D 110, SNIE 14.2-69) 15. General Bonesteel continues to be concerned about the overall military capability of North Korea. He is also concerned about the congestion at our airfields which makes it difficult to flush out our planes rapidly. According to his calculations all airfields in the ROK, except Taegu, could be reached by the enemy with only 7 minutes notice./5/ /5/In a Top Secret segment of this conversation Bonesteel "agreed that the present location of the nuclear weapons [in South Korea] could create a most serious situation." But he advocated leaving the weapons in place to avoid sending "the North Koreans the wrong signal and [encouraging] them on new adventures." (Memorandum of conversation, November 20; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 12-2, KOR S) Korean Production of M-16's 16. General Bonesteel said that the Department of the Army Survey Team had been impressed by the ROK capability to produce M-16's, that the Koreans could manufacture the rifle for $50 apiece compared to the US cost of about $130 apiece. A Defense Department loan of $40 to $60 million would, however, be necessary to finance a ROK facility. General Bonesteel felt that we should move rapidly on this project and noted that interest in helping the ROKs establish an arms production capability had been expressed by the Israelis.
210. Action Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/ Washington, November 22, 1968, 6:26 p.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Korea, Vol. IV. Confidential. SUBJECT Attached is a Zwick-Poats-Freeman request/2/ for your authority to negotiate a $112 million 1969 assistance package with Korea, composed of an $82 million P.L. 480 agreement and $30 million in AID program assistance. /2/Not printed. P.L. 480 The P.L. 480 sales agreement would provide approximately 650,000 tons of wheat, 270,000 tons of corn (over a three-year period), 160,000 bales of cotton, 34,000 tons of inedible tallow, and 10,000 tons of lard. In previous years P.L. 480 Title I sales have been entirely payable in local currency. The present package provides for 60% for local currency sales and 40% for convertible local currency 40-year dollar credit. The credit sale includes a 30% payment the first year. That payment, plus a 29% U.S. uses payment of the local currency sale, will meet one-fourth of our estimated expenditures for Korean currency in 1969. AID Program The proposed AID program includes a $10 million program loan and a $20 million Supporting Assistance grant in support of the economic stabilization program. This is $10 million below the 1968 level. This continued phasedown is possible because of Korea's dramatic economic growth in recent years. Congressional Amendments State/AID reports that Korea continues to satisfy the requirements of both the Symington and the Conte-Long amendments. The Purcell amendment requires that payment be made at the time of delivery in an amount to cover U.S. needs, except when it would be inconsistent with the purposes of P.L. 480. Our local currency requirement in Korea for next year is estimated at $65 million in excess of the receipts from the local currency sale and other sources. Clearly a payment on that order cannot be expected from Korea, and would indeed be inconsistent with the purposes of P.L. 480. Under the present proposal Korea would make a Purcell payment of $10 million. A higher payment would be difficult to negotiate, and seemingly unwise to attempt, along with the $30 million expected in commercial sales and the $15 million in payment derived from local currency sales. Balance of Payments All AID funds would be tied to procurement in the U.S. The list of commodities would be selected to assure additionality./3/ /3/Next to this statement Rostow added "Joe Fowler concurs." Recommendation: That you authorize negotiation of the proposed AID and P.L. 480 programs./4/ /4/Following this recommendation President Johnson wrote "OK L." Walt
211. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State (Katzenbach) to President Johnson/1/ Washington, December 23, 1968. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 1 KOR S-US. Secret; Sensitive; Nodis. SUBJECT Last February, upon his return from Seoul, Mr. Vance recommended to you that we reassess our policy toward Korea. You asked me to take responsibility for this task. This assessment has been going forward under the direction and supervision of the Senior Interdepartmental Group./2/ /2/Reference is to the study, "U.S. Policy Toward Korea," June 15; Document 201. As a result of the work, the issues are now well understood./3/ A considerable amount of highly technical analysis--economic, military and political--remains to be completed but these studies, too, are now well under way./4/ Thus, we should be able to present your successor with incisive, well-grounded policy options and with detailed program recommendations to carry out these options. /3/The SIG members met to discuss the paper on policy toward Korea on September 19. A September 9 Issues Paper and an undated Briefing Paper were prepared in advance of the SIG meeting. Copies of those documents as well as minutes of the SIG meeting are in the Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, Senior Interdepartmental Group, Vol. 7, 43rd Meeting, September 19, 1968 and National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Senior Interdepartmental Group Files: Lot 70 D 263. /4/Katzenbach sent a memorandum to SIG members on September 26 directing the initiation of an interagency study based on the issues raised and points of agreement derived from the September 19 SIG meeting. (Ibid.) This memorandum is in the nature of an interim report--to tell you what we have accomplished to date and what remains to be done. Importance of Korea I need not dwell on the extent of our Korean involvement and its dangers. Our intelligence both as to intent and capability needs improvement,/5/ but it does seem clear that North Korea remains aggressively bent on swallowing the South. Over the past year Pyongyang has significantly stepped up its provocative actions. South Korean patience is running thin. We are tied to South Korea's defense by treaty commitments and perhaps even more by history. Our military presence in Korea still numbers over 50,000. [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] Last year we provided some $350 million in military and economic assistance (plus the special $100 million military assistance appropriation you sought of the Congress). /5/A letter from Katzenbach to Helms, November 30, discussing options for an effective intelligence program in Korea as well as similar documentation focusing on the intelligence issue are ibid., Central Files 1967-69, POL 1 KOR S-US. We should be proud of our efforts in Korea. The Koreans have used our assistance well. Their economy is growing at near fantastic rates and the prospects for ultimate viability are excellent. Korean military forces are among the best in the world, as their 50,000 troops in Viet-Nam more than attest. Our Objectives in Korea Our objectives in Korea are: --To keep South Korea out of hostile hands; Some Tentative Conclusions The conclusion which I and the other members of the SIG draw from this record is this: There must be no question about the strength and importance of our commitment to the security of South Korea in the face of an aggressive adversary. But, as time goes by, it is appropriate to reconsider the question of whether our present posture decided many years ago is still an optimal one for meeting our commitment. The answer could well turn out to be that it is. But the SIG believes that there is here a real and pressing question of national policy and strategy which will bear further examination by the next Administration. --The Republic of Korea (ROK) has made great progress in all areas. Increasingly, she has the strength--and should be encouraged--to stand on her own two feet. --Our knowledge about North Korean military capabilities is limited and may not be altogether reliable. This raises questions about what the military balance--with and without United States forces--actually is and how, if necessary, it should be improved. --Our present policy effectively ties down in Korea two United States divisions, which are not available for use elsewhere. They require substantial expenditures for support both in Korea and the United States. --Our present posture leaves us little choice as to whether and how to become involved on the ground in the event large-scale hostilities reoccur on the Peninsula. Whether or not we consciously change our strategy, the United States will face important decisions in Korea over the next few years. Sooner or later, the ROK divisions in Viet-Nam will return home. We will have to make choices on the kinds of force structures--both ROK and U.S.--we should maintain. The prospects for the Korean MAP--so essential to our defense policy toward Korea--are uncertain and we need to consider whether to try to transfer this program completely to the Defense Department budget. Some of our policy options re- quire considerable lead time (e.g. MAP), and the new Administration will have to act soon if the United States wants to maintain these options. Uncertainties There are a number of uncertainties which hinder reaching definitive conclusions on any changes in policy: --First, as already indicated, our limited intelligence makes it difficult to estimate the precise nature of the threat to South Korea. --Second, there is the even greater difficulty of determining the likely effect on North Korean, USSR, and Communist Chinese attitudes, intentions, and policies, of any change in our military posture. --Third, the outcome in Viet-Nam may affect the general climate in East Asia including Korea. --Fourth, the 1971 Korean Presidential election raises serious questions about the continuation of political stability in Korea. --Fifth, our position in Japan or Okinawa--now essential to Korea's defense--could well be eroded in coming years. Some Key Issues The critical problem to resolve is whether it is possible to substitute improved Korean combat forces in whole or in part for our forces now in Korea and still maintain a combined ROK-U.S. strength adequate to provide deterrence and, if necessary, deal with the likely military threats. This question in turn raises a host of subsidiary questions. --Is the United States combat presence, 15 years after the Korean War, an irreplaceable element of deterrence against North Korean attack? --If our forces are reduced or withdrawn, will we be politically able in the United States to reintroduce them should hostilities again break out? --How much of a South Korean defense is needed to replace United States forces and what will it cost? What kind of United States force capabilities would we want to keep in readiness against certain major military contingencies such as a combined Chicom-North Korean attack? [1 line of source text not declassified] --Is it feasible to reduce the margin of uncertainty about North Korean military capabilities by a stepped-up intelligence effort? --What would be the effect of a United States troop withdrawal from Korea on our position in Asia? In addition, there are several subsidiary questions: --To what extent is a "trade-off" between US and ROK forces compatible with our objectives for Korean political stability and development? --Similarly, what share of the cost of its own military needs can we ask the ROK to assume without impairing her now very favorable economic prospects? --And, finally, how can we obtain the necessary funds to assist the ROK in a multi-year program for the improvement of her forces? Remaining Efforts I have listed only some of the more fundamental problems involved in any policy change. They are not easy to resolve. To deal with them in an orderly manner we need a more detailed look at these and similar problems. The SIG has commissioned an interagency group to assess them and to determine, as precisely as the subject allows, the technical, and political feasibility, requirements, costs, advantages and disadvantages, of various policy options in Korea. The end-product of our whole review effort will be alternative five-year programs for ROK and United States forces and for United States economic and military assistance programs which can serve as the basis for decision-making by the new Administration. Parenthetically, I am hopeful that the interagency study effort will also shed light on how to improve our whole approach to integrated country planning and programming in areas where security, economic, and political considerations so greatly overlap. The Deputy Secretary of Defense and the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence concur in this memorandum. Nicholas deB. Katzenbach [Continue with the next documents]
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