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FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1964-1968, Volume XXIX Korea
Department of State |
Korea Pueblo Crisis 212. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union/1/ Washington, January 23, 1968, 0855Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 33-6 KOR N-US. Secret; Flash; Exdis. Also sent to Seoul and repeated to Tokyo. Drafted by Bundy; cleared by Brigadier General Steakley and in substance by Rusk and McNamara; and approved by Gendreau (S/S-O). 102940. Literally Eyes Only for Ambassador. From the Secretary. 1. Captain of small Navy trawler-class surface ship, USS Pueblo, has reported that at approximately 0010 our time tonight,/2/ his vessel, according to his report, clearly outside any definition of territorial waters, was taken under fire with small number of badly wounded casualties. Vessel was then surrounded by North Korean naval craft which had been firing on it, and our last report from Captain was that he was being either towed or escorted into Wonsan harbor, roughly 25 miles distance. /2/The time given is approximately 2:10 p.m. Korean Standard Time on Tuesday afternoon, January 23. Eastern Standard Time is 14 hours behind Korean Standard Time and Greenwich Mean Time is 9 hours behind Korean Standard Time. Numerous detailed chronologies based on transmissions from the Pueblo were prepared in the days and weeks following the seizure of the ship to document the exact sequence of events and time frame involved as precisely as possible. Defense Intelligence Agency, Special Intelligence Summary, "Situation Regarding USS Pueblo," DIASIS 24-68, January 24, contains an analysis of the seizure of the Pueblo and a chronology of events. (NSA, Center for Cryptologic History, Historical Files, V. Initial Reaction, Box 4) Chronologies are also in the Johnson Library, National Security File, National Security Council History, Pueblo Crisis 1968, Vol. I, Basic Study and Presidential Decisions, and ibid., Vol. III, Day-by-Day Documents, Part One. 2. Seoul, through UNC, should immediately seek MAC meeting. We understand you have already done so in connection with Seoul incidents, and although we are not clear whether attack and seizure can be construed as armistice violation, we would propose to use MAC channel in any event./3/ /3/In telegram 102967 to Seoul, January 23, the Department instructed Porter to inform the ROKG of the incident; see footnote 2, Document 145. 3. Moscow should immediately reach Gromyko or highest available official to present facts and to express in strongest terms our view that Soviets should be in touch with North Koreans to obtain immediate release of vessel and appropriate care for wounded men. You should point out strongly that incident is bound to raise serious tension with North Koreans and must quickly become public. We believe Soviets should act at once to convey our position and strongest protest to North Koreans and should bring their influence to bear in the interest of avoiding any further consequences. 4. You may point out to Soviets that vessels of this type have been in international waters in this area for a considerable length of time and you may note, as you think appropriate, that its mission is similar to that of Soviet trawlers active in many parts of the world including close proximity of USA. 5. In addition, Moscow should convey facts immediately to Wilson party/4/ with suggestion that Wilson raise matter urgently with Kosygin. /4/Reference is to British Prime Minister Harold Wilson who was visiting Moscow at that time. 6. All publicity on this matter will be handled from Washington. Orders to this effect have gone to military commands involved and you should hold matter on closest possible basis both before and after any announcement here. Rusk
213. Notes of Meeting/1/ Washington, January 23, 1968, 12:58-2:30 p.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, Tom Johnson's Notes of Meetings, Pueblo I. Top Secret. Drafted by Tom Johnson. The meeting was held in the White House. SUBJECT Secretary McNamara told Clark Clifford/2/ that "this is what it is like on a typical day. We had an inadvertent intrusion into Cambodia. We lost a B-52 with four H-bombs aboard. We had an intelligence ship captured by the North Koreans." /2/Clifford was at this time Secretary of Defense-designate. Clark Clifford asked, "May I leave now?" The President asked if there had been any reaction from the Soviets on the ship incident. Rostow said a message was coming up now. Secretary Rusk said the Soviets had advised the U.S. Government that they had nothing to do with the incident and that the U.S. Government should talk with North Korea./3/ /3/The Soviet response is in telegram 2550 from Moscow, January 23. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 33-6 KOR N-US) Secretary Rusk said the problem of rescuing the ship and its crew is considerably different from retaliation resulting from an attack. The President asked what are the alternatives. The President said he was sure they included: 1. Hitting the North Koreans with U.S. forces The President said he was anxious to know exactly what happened. Secretary McNamara said he had no explanation other than the information that the ship was in international waters, more than fifteen miles out. Secretary Rusk said that his department is studying the Armistice Agreement on the definition of international waters. He said there is a close relation to waters "contiguous" to North Korea, but the armistice does not define new international boundaries for the high seas. Where the ship was before the incident is unknown. General Wheeler said this was not necessarily the case. Using a map, General Wheeler pointed to the position of the ship at 9:25 the night before and at 12 noon it was 25 miles off shore and 16 miles away from the nearest land associated with North Korea. Secretary McNamara said it was unclear whether or not the ship had strayed into waters near the coast of North Korea prior to the incident. Secretary Rusk said the North Koreans put out a very bitter statement charging the U.S. Government with spying and aggression. General Wheeler said the North Koreans charged us with engaging in acts of aggression. Secretary McNamara said the alternatives included picking up units of the North Korean fleet or units of the North Korean army along the DMZ or re-enforcing U.S. troops in South Korea. He said we could fly U.S. aircraft from the states to re-enforce units currently stationed there. Secretary McNamara said if this incident indicates any new threat on South Korea, this would be [un]desirable because North Korean air power is stronger than South Korean air power. The opposite is true of ground forces. Another alternative is to send additional naval forces. CIA Director Helms said this incident is one in a series of increased harassment. He cited the recent plot against Blue House and many violations along the demilitarized zone. [Here follows a brief discussion of a B-52 crash in Greenland.] Returning to the ship incident off North Korea, Secretary McNamara said there was a period beginning about 10 p.m. in which DoD is not aware of exactly what happened aboard the ship. Secretary Rusk said the commander of the ship did not ask for air cover or help or did not try to get out of the area quickly. General Wheeler said at 12 o'clock Korean time (noon) the ship encountered a North Korean patrol boat. The Pueblo indicated it was a hydrographic ship when approached. At 13:45 hours the message came back that the ship was being boarded. General Wheeler said the machine gun aboard the ship was not uncovered. The General showed the President a photograph of the ship. Director Helms said he advised the Senate Foreign Relations Committee this morning of information about the incident. Secretary Rusk then read from a cable which was brought into the meeting on a session which Ambassador Thompson had with the Soviets in Moscow. The Soviets said this was not their problem. They said the presence of U.S. troops in South Korea is a source of tension. They said they would not take action on the matter./4/ /4/Thompson met with Soviet Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs Kuznetsov on January 23 to discuss the facts surrounding the incident. (Ibid.) The President asked what other channels are open to us. Secretary Rusk said the Mixed [Military] Armistice Commission meets at midnight tonight to discuss the attack on Blue House. We will raise the matter of the ship at that time. The President asked what has been the reaction of the South Koreans? Secretary Rusk said the Minister of Defense chided us for urging them not to retaliate when they are attacked and yet now finding ourselves caught in this situation. It is unclear whether our men were wounded by self-destruct devices or by enemy fire. General Wheeler said the man who lost a leg was engaged in blowing up equipment. He said the use of the term "wounded" seemed odd unless enemy fire was involved on some of the casualties. The President said we need to see what our options are in this situation. Secretary McNamara said he had a couple of people working on this under Paul Nitze. Secretary Rusk said the North Koreans may want to trade these sailors for infiltrators who have been captured crossing into South Korea. The President said he thinks that this incident is related to the whole picture. He said he would not be surprised if something happened in Berlin to coincide with what is going on in Vietnam and in Korea. [Here follows a brief discussion of the situation in Vietnam.] Walt Rostow asked should the incident be referred to the United Nations, involving the ship. The President said this would be protective and would show a lack of malice on our part. Secretary Rusk said we might like to take this to the Security Council. First, we should see what comes from the Mixed [Military] Armistice Commission. Director Helms said the Soviets have their own ships of this kind including two ships off the Korean coast to keep an eye on the Red Chinese. In addition, they have one ship off Guam. [Here follows a discussion of various unrelated matters.]
214. Telegram From the Commander in Chief, United Nations Command, and Commander of United States, Korea (Bonesteel) to the Commander in Chief, Pacific (Sharp)/1/ Seoul, January 23, 1968, 1405Z. /1/Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Pueblo, 23 January 1968 to December 1968. Secret; Immediate; Noforn. Repeated to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and passed to the Department of Defense, the White House, the Department of State, and the Defense Intelligence Agency. 231405Z/UK 50223. Subject: Briefing of ROK Minister of Defense on Pueblo incident (S). 1. (S) C/S UNC/USFK briefed ROK MND at about 1830 I, 23 Jan 68, local (0930 Z) after approval received for classified briefing. MND was emotionally irate and indicated US had done little after North Korean raid aimed at assassination of President Park except call meeting at Panmunjom and take normal operational steps, but because of Pueblo incident brought F-105's into Osan without prior ROK knowledge, was moving Enterprise, and seemed to be ready to risk war. 2. (S) He said would refrain from retaliatory raids against North Korea for time being, but if North Koreans made other significant raids, he would promise nothing further. 3. (S) He commented it would be wrong to cancel Armistice Commission meeting set for 1100 hours tomorrow because it had been announced publicly with purpose to protest vicious attack on President's mansion, Seoul.
215. Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence Helms to Secretary Defense McNamara/1/ Washington, January 23, 1968. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Korea--Pueblo Incident, Vol. I, Part B (through January). Secret; Sensitive. Also sent to Nitze, Rostow, Rusk, Katzenbach, Bundy, General Carroll, Hughes, and General Carter. Rostow sent this memorandum under a January 23 covering note to the President indicating that it contained Helm's "personal assessment." Rostow's note indicates that the President saw the memorandum. SUBJECT 1. Per McNamara's request, the Director of Central Intelligence herewith submits a preliminary assessment of the Pueblo incident./2/ /2/In advance of Rusk's luncheon meeting with the President on January 23 INR prepared an assessment containing conclusions similar to those in this document. (Memorandum from Greene to Denney, January 23; Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, NK Seizure of USS Pueblo, INR/OD, January 1968) 2. Since the fall of 1966, North Korea has been pursuing a tougher, more aggressive policy toward South Korea and the US. Pyongyang has deliberately heightened tensions along the DMZ, landed infiltration teams inside South Korea, and has been more aggressive in shooting incidents involving South Korean fishing vessels and patrol boats. This policy is probably intended by the North Korean leadership primarily as a demonstration against US and ROK action in Vietnam./3/ /3/See SNIE 14.2-67, "North Korean Intentions and Capabilities with Respect to South Korea," dated 21 September 1967. [Footnote in the source text; see Document 130.] 3. The attempt of an armed North Korean infiltration team to attack the presidential mansion in Seoul was the most conspicuous exploit of this North Korean policy thus far. Now the seizure of the USS Pueblo adds a direct involvement with the US in an unusually dramatic way. 4. In our view the two incidents were not planned jointly. The attack in Seoul almost certainly involved considerable advance planning. It is unlikely that the attack was timed to coincide with the seizure of the Pueblo, which did not begin patrolling until 10 January. 5. Nevertheless, the circumstances of the Pueblo's capture indicate that the North Koreans acted deliberately. If the local North Korean commander was exceeding his instructions, there was ample time for Pyongyang to countermand his actions. 6. What is known thus far does not suggest that the North Koreans are deliberately creating a pretext for hostilities. At this stage, however, regardless of whether they planned for it or not, they are probably now prepared to face a period of sharply heightened tensions. They claim, and they may believe, that the Pueblo was within their territorial waters. They will undertake a heavy propaganda exploitation of the affair for some days at least. They will probably not release the crew or the ship promptly unless they judge that the US will resort to retaliatory action, such as an air attack against the patrol craft involved in seizing the Pueblo. 7. Pyongyang will be aware that the ROK on its own motion will probably undertake some violent retaliation for the episode in Seoul, presumably in the DMZ. The prospect of this will probably cause the North Koreans to exercise some caution in handling the further course of the affair. 8. If tensions rise sharply, the Soviets seem bound to take a hand at least privately. They will almost certainly advise the North Koreans to terminate the episode at an early date.
216. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Korea/1/ Washington, January 23, 1968, 2121Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 KOR/UN. Secret; Flash. Repeated to CINCPAC for POLAD and the White House. Drafted by Fleck and Berger; cleared by Steadman, Meeker, Bundy, Rostow, and Read; and approved by Rusk. 103144. Ref: Seoul 3562./2/ /2/In telegram 3562 from Seoul, January 23, the Embassy referred to the upcoming MAC meeting called to protest the Blue House raid and indicated that, due to time constraints, it preferred to raise the Pueblo issue at a subsequent meeting. (Ibid.) In response the Department of State instructed the Embassy to raise the issue at the January 24 MAC meeting. (Telegram 103026 to Seoul, January 23; ibid., POL 33-6 KOR N-US) 1. Senior UNCMAC member should make strong, dignified and hard statements on both North Korean raid on Seoul and on seizure of Pueblo, keeping both in balance so as not to give South Koreans feeling we attaching more importance to latter. 2. If North Koreans question validity of raising Pueblo under Armistice Agreement, you are to ignore question and avoid argument on this. Wish you to concentrate on fact that raids and Pueblo seizure, following last year's harassments in DMZ and raids, are part of a new pattern of North Korean belligerence and aggressive actions which dangerously increase tensions in this area. If they are persisted in, they will have the most serious consequences to the maintenance of the Armistice and to the preservation of peace in Korea. North Koreans should be warned that these acts cannot be perpetrated with impunity. 3. Leave it to you to work out statement on raiders. With respect to Pueblo you are to draw on DOD statement and State Dept. Spokesman's statement ignoring approach to Soviets, and stressing the following:/3/ /3/Initial statements issued by the Departments of Defense and State on January 23, as well as President Johnson's address to the nation on January 26, are in Department of State Bulletin, February 12, 1968, pp. 189-190. a. Pueblo was in international waters at 39 degrees
25'05" North, 127 degrees 54'09" East. 4. You should end presentation with the following words: I have been instructed by the U.S. Government/4/ to say the following directly to you. The events of last year, and especially the last few days, have put new complexion on the situation in Korea. The North Korean regime has embarked on campaign of provocation, sabotage, and assassination in violation of the Armistice Agreement and international law. The Republic of Korea and the United States threaten no one. If the North Korean regime persists in this campaign, which can only endanger the peace of this area, the responsibility for the consequences will rest with the North Korean regime./5/ /4/The Department of State underscored the importance of the statement being made on behalf of the U.S. Government, even though U.S. participation in the MAC was as a representative of the United Nations. The Department insisted that the statement refer to the "US and US alone," because Washington did "not want to highlight UNC capacity and thus stimulate UN delegations in New York to question our right to speak in this capacity." (Telegram 103324 to Seoul, January 23; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 KOR/UN) /5/A U.S. observer described the atmosphere of the meeting as "not tense" and the North Koreans as chatting and acting "generally in jocular manner, laughing outright at statement of US demands" presented by Rear Admiral Smith in response to the Blue House raid and the Pueblo incident. A summary of the meeting was transmitted in telegram 3597 from Seoul, January 24. A verbatim text of Smith's statement is in telegram 3608 from Seoul, January 25, and a translation of the statement made by the North Korean Senior Representative, General Pak Chang Kuk, is in telegram 3624 from Seoul, January 25. (All ibid.) Rusk
217. Summary Minutes of Meeting/1/ Washington, January 24, 1968, 10:30-11:45 a.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of Bromley Smith, Meeting of Pueblo Group, January 24, 1968, 10:30 a.m. Top Secret. Notes of this meeting were also drafted by George Christian. (Ibid., Meeting Notes File, Meeting at State on Pueblo) When McNamara informed the President of this meeting and its participants in a phone conversation earlier the same morning, the President suggested that Clifford also attend, explaining that "he ought to learn it, cause it's gonna be heavy." (Ibid., Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of Telephone Conversation between President Johnson and McNamara, January 24, 1968, 9:18 a.m., Tape F68.01, PNO 1) SUBJECT PARTICIPANTS Secretary McNamara Under Secretary Katzenbach CIA Director Helms Walt Rostow Prior to the beginning of the meeting, George Christian raised the question of how to deal with the press. In response to his question as to what should be said about our going to the Russians with the request that they ask the North Koreans to return the Pueblo and its crew, it was suggested that he say the U.S. has been in touch with Moscow, is not satisfied with the Russian response and will be in touch with the Russians again. The suggestion was made that the press could be told that Ambassador Goldberg was seeing U Thant this morning. As to what could be said about U.S. reaction to the incident, it was suggested that he say the capture of the Pueblo, because it was a matter of great gravity, was being closely studied prior to the President's decision on his course of action. Secretary McNamara said the purpose of this meeting should be defined and further organizational arrangements decided. He felt that we should try to answer three questions:/2/ /2/In his phone conversation with the President that morning McNamara raised the importance of the three questions. In response to the President's query concerning the actions of the Pueblo's commander, McNamara replied: "Mr. President, I honestly don't know. I called Nick [Katzenbach] this morning and later Walt [Rostow] and said I think we need a Cuban Missile Crisis approach to this, and, goddamn, we ought to get locked in a room and you ought to keep us there, insist we stay there, until we come up with answers to three questions: What was the Korean objective? Why did they do it? Secondly, what are they going to do now--blackmail us, let it go, you know, what? And, thirdly, what should we do now? There are a whole series of things we've thought of here--quarantine them, steal one of their ships, etc., etc., etc. But we just have got to act quickly. I don't think we can let the day go by before reporting to you our at least tentative views on those three questions." The President commented, "I told Walt that I thought we ought to have done that beginning at 2 o'clock night before last and yesterday and then today too," to which McNamara responded, "I think you're right." (Ibid.) 1. What were the North Koreans trying to do by capturing the Pueblo? Secretary McNamara suggested that an organization similar to that which handled the Cuban crisis should be set up. He felt we needed to close promptly the gaps in our knowledge and to gather the considered views of those attending the meeting so that recommendations could be made to the President before midnight. He said we must respond firmly and promptly to the North Korean action. Under Secretary Katzenbach suggested an interdepartmental group under the chairmanship of Deputy Assistant Secretary Berger. In response to a question by Mr. Rostow, Secretary McNamara said the seriousness of the incident was made clear by our belief that the North Koreans are not about to give up the Pueblo soon. Director Helms, in answer to the question of why the Koreans captured the Pueblo, suggested two motivations: 1. To hinder the movement of Koreans to South Vietnam, and He referred to several reports from Bloc sources concerning proposals to open a second front in Korea. He also had a report that China would like to see the war in Korea reopened. He concluded that their present estimate was that the North Koreans would not reopen the war now but would make the situation as tough as possible for us. He said essentially it is a question of whether we or they have the tougher will. Secretary McNamara doubted that the North Korean purpose was to reduce the level of Korean forces in South Vietnam. He said that there were 1,200,000 free world forces in South Korea, and that the risk involved in capturing the Pueblo was much too high if the purpose was to effect the level of forces by 10 to 15,000 troops. He wondered whether they did not have another objective which involved tying down the U.S.--a much more serious objective. Mr. Helms said he agreed that one objective would be to create the appearance of a second front which would reduce U.S. freedom of action. Mr. Rostow pointed out that the Soviets had this objective in the Middle East crisis but that it hadn't worked very well. Mr. Helms called attention to the response of Soviet Foreign Office official, Kuznetsov, when asked by Ambassador Thompson to convey our concern to the North Koreans. He noted that Kuznetsov replied negatively without reference to anyone and without promising to consult his superiors./3/ It was obvious that the Russians knew what was going on in North Korea. Secretary McNamara agreed that the Russians were knowledgeable. /3/As reported by Thompson in telegram 2550 from Moscow, January 23. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 33-6 KOR N-US) Mr. Berger said it may well be that the Russians assumed we could not respond very effectively to North Korean provocation and that they agreed that the North Koreans should take advantage of the "target of opportunity," i.e., the presence of the Pueblo off North Korea. Secretary McNamara responded that there is a great deal we can do, including mining, conducting a quarantine, blocking shipping into North Korea, etc. Mr. Berger said that possibly the North Koreans wanted to create a second Vietnam. They knew that we were holding down the South Koreans who are anxious to retaliate for recent North Korean raids. Both Secretary McNamara and Mr. Helms agreed that this was a possible motivation for the action. Mr. Rostow said that possibly they were thinking that the U.S. would be reluctant in an election year to make a major response involving such actions as calling up the reserves. It is possible that they are challenging us and trying to make our problems more difficult. He noted that their action had already led us to divert the aircraft carrier Enterprise from South Vietnam by putting it into the Sea of Japan off North Korea. He said it is possible that the attempt to assassinate President Park was part of this plan. Mr. Katzenbach described the action as a calculated attack on a target of opportunity. He noted that the North Koreans didn't know the Pueblo was coming their way before the 10th of January. After that date they may have planned to capture it, acting when the Pueblo was off Wonsan. He said that what the North Koreans do now depends a great deal on what the U.S. does. He doubted that the North Koreans would return the ship or the crew. The North Koreans, according to an intercept, will hold the crew for ten days at least in order to interrogate them. General Wheeler noted that the North Koreans had held some of our pilots for a year and had treated them very roughly before releasing them. Secretary McNamara added that the fact that they will be holding the U.S. crew increases the seriousness of the situation. Deputy Secretary Nitze said the North Korean motivation might be their hope that pressure on us might lead us to take a weaker position on Vietnam negotiations. Thus, it might be necessary for us to ask Congress for additional authority to take military action in order to make clear to the Soviets that they must not misunderstand our attitude toward the Pueblo incident. Secretary McNamara said if their effort was aimed at tying our hands in other areas, they had succeeded since we cannot move in South Vietnam until the Pueblo incident is resolved. Both Mr. Christian and Mr. Rostow mentioned the large number of telegrams from private U.S. citizens which had already been received by the White House. These messages, spontaneously sent, were demanding immediate U.S. action. Mr. Rostow suggested that the North Vietnamese [Korean] action may have been timed with the North Vietnamese military action at Qhe Sanh. Mr. Katzenbach doubted the relationship. The North Korean Premier, Kim Il-Song, is opposed to negotiation of the Vietnam war. If there is a relationship, he did not understand why the Russians were opposed to doing anything about North Korea. Mr. Rostow said he assumed that the Soviets knew of the North Vietnamese action. Considerable pressure was being exerted on us, both in Vietnam and in Korea. Mr. Helms commented that North Korea wants to be in the hands of neither the Russians or the Communist Chinese. Mr. Rostow added that Soviet influence is more effective in North Korea than it is in North Vietnam. One far-out possibility was that the North Korean action was prompted by the Chinese in an effort to cross up the negotiations on Vietnam. Mr. Helms commented that the attack on the South Korean President's home had been planned for at least two years. Mr. Katzenbach said the most plausible position is that the Pueblo incident was a North Korean action which had been undertaken with the consent of the Russians and Communist Chinese. Mr. Rostow restated his view that the Pueblo incident may be tied in with numerous Communist actions in the Pacific area. He added that the Russians may have been interested in getting the equipment from the Pueblo. Mr. Berger said that the North Koreans may be stepping up harassment of all kinds. It could be that the Soviets knew of the North Korean campaign and decided against interfering. All agreed that the North Koreans will hold the ship and the crew and that they will not respond to diplomatic pressure alone. Mr. Rostow reviewed some of the diplomatic actions being taken or which could be taken: 1. Ambassador Goldberg is to see UN Secretary General U Thant at 11:00 A.M. He is to try to interest U Thant in a solution of the Pueblo incident but is not to request the Secretary General's good offices./4/ /4/Goldberg provided a summary of his meeting with U Thant in telegram 3481 from New York, January 24, at which U Thant expressed a willingness to use his good offices to seek Soviet views about the Pueblo incident. U Thant told Goldberg that since "North Korea is '75 per cent in Sov camp'" the Soviets should be contacted first. U Thant also observed that the incident underscored his belief that the United Nations should have North Korean and North Vietnamese observers. (Ibid.) 2. We could take the issue to the UN Security Council in order to buy time in which a decision can be made as to what U.S. military action is to be taken. There would be no expectation that a solution could come out of the UN Security Council meeting. 3. A letter from the President to U Thant might be used to give the Secretary General a sense of the gravity of the situation. The letter would link North Korean infiltration, including the Blue House effort, to the Pueblo capture. 4. A second effort to enlist the Russians in promoting a solution might consist of a Presidential letter to Kosygin. Secretary McNamara said we must first decide what we will do. Mr. Berger pointed out that although Korean President Park has agreed not to retaliate for the present, the Koreans will do so no matter what we say if harassments continue to increase. General Wheeler said our commander in Korea is already deeply concerned and had asked whether he should play the current situation hot or cool with the Koreans. General Wheeler said he was not now prepared to recommend specific military actions but we could do any or all of the following: 1. Reinforce our military strength in South Korea and in the area nearby. We could send additional air and naval units to Korea and to areas closer to Korea. One question was whether we could use Japanese facilities in this reinforcement activity. If we can, it would make a great deal of difference. Mr. Berger replied that we could use Japanese facilities. Mr. Katzenbach said we should consider sending a Presidential letter to Sato or possibly a Presidential emissary. 2. We could use our naval preponderance in the area, both surface and under sea, to do any of the following: a. find North Korean shipping at sea which could be seized or sunk. The purpose would be to seize or destroy something of value to North Korea which was at sea. b. blockade North Korea by mining selected harbors, either with standard mines or with MARK 36 bombs. Submarines could also be used in this effort. c. punitive activities against North Korean coastal ocean-going traffic and the blocking of all such traffic. d. air and naval strikes against selective targets. The port of Wonsan was a tough target because it was well defended. Railroad and POL storage were other targets. e. a raid in force on an isolated outpost along the Korean DMZ. Although General Wheeler did not favor this suggestion, he said it would be possible to destroy such an outpost and capture the garrison. f. photo reconnaissance should be undertaken before any other action. A drone unit had been moved to Okinawa and RF 4 planes are in South Korea. These could be used if weather permits. Mr. Helms said that Black Shield could be available for use within 24 hours./5/ /5/Black Shield missions consisted of intelligence-gathering overflights to conduct photographic reconnaissance. A memorandum prepared by the Directorate of Intelligence, CIA, January 29, assessing the results of the Black Shield mission over North Korea on January 26 and discussing the photographic information obtained by the flight is in the Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Korea--Pueblo Incident--Miscellaneous, Vol. I. Secretary McNamara suggested two general types of action: 1. A general military movement into the Korean area which would signal our present intentions and be an indication of things to come. 2. A buildup of U.S. military forces which could include the call up of military reserves and a request of Congress to authorize the extension of the terms of service of those now in the military. Mr. Rostow said one thing we might do would be to direct the South Koreans to seize the Soviet hydrologic ship which is now following the Enterprise. This action would be symmetrical with the North Korean action and it would get the South Koreans involved in the situation. Mr. Nitze said such an action would provide an obvious reposte; i.e., the Soviets might shoot back. Mr. Clifford asked whether there was any merit in trying to get the ship back. General Wheeler responded that this would be very difficult to do because of the air defense around Wonsan and the shallow waters of the port. Mr. Katzenbach said an effort to get the ship back would create psychological problems, i.e., that we placed greater value on the ship than on the personnel. General Wheeler said that he hated to see a U.S. ship in the hands of an enemy. In addition, there was some equipment still on board the ship, including a computer which would be compromised. He repeated that an effort to sink the Pueblo by submarine would be very difficult because of the shallow water. An air attack on the ship would encounter stiff North Korean resistance. Secretary McNamara said there were three areas in which action should be taken: 1. on the diplomatic track; 2. reinforce our total military strength, using existing Presidential authority such as extending the term of military service; 3. applying U.S. military power in the area such as restricting foreign shipping, the use of mines, blockade, etc. Mr. Katzenbach said one idea would be to put another U.S. ship in the area where the Pueblo was seized and give this ship full air and naval protection. This would indicate that we believed we had a right to put the Pueblo where it was, but also have a beneficial effect on U.S. prestige. General Wheeler said the U.S.S. Banner would be available for such a mission. Mr. Helms said that for some weeks we have wanted to know more about North Korean troop dispositions. However, the State Department had opposed a Black Shield mission. Current developments would probably alter this earlier judgment. Mr. Rostow said we should put in writing what we know about the incident, what things we are not sure about, and then instruct the intelligence community to focus on whether the Pueblo incident is related to Qhe Sanh or the attack on the Blue House; also, whether the motive is diversionary. Secretary McNamara agreed with this method of proceeding. He thought we should have a plan for photo reconnaissance, including authorization of a Black Shield mission, by the end of the day. Mr. Rostow said that at the 1:00 P.M. NSC meeting, we should be prepared to report to the President on the work already done--the intelligence situation, the reconnaissance option, diplomatic moves, reinforcing military moves, including existing Presidential powers. He said that military and diplomatic moves should be used to convey to the North Koreans and the Russians that they have miscalculated the effect of the Pueblo incident on the U.S. In addition, we should initiate a military build-up on the scene. Mr. Katzenbach suggested that we must answer the question: "What next." All agreed that before we start down the road, we must carefully look at where it will end. Mr. Clifford said the North Koreans will say that the Pueblo was within their territorial waters. He asked how we could prove to everyone that the ship was in international waters. Mr. Katzenbach noted that the South Koreans seized a North Korean ship some 40 miles offshore. General Wheeler added that this was a case of hot pursuit; therefore, would not be applicable to the Pueblo incident. There followed a discussion of how we could prove the exact location of the Pueblo. The ship had been on its track since January 10 but had maintained radio silence. It had instructions to go no closer than 13 nautical miles from shore. Mr. Clifford asked whether we could use intercepts to disprove the North Korean claim that the Pueblo was within its territorial waters. Mr. McNamara said we would have to use such intercepts because of the seriousness of the actions we would be taking. He added that we would need the fullest justification for our action which would have to be based on proof of the exact location of the Pueblo when it was attacked. Mr. Nitze added that the North Koreans had 83 of our military personnel to brainwash and possibly make confessions. Turning to the photo reconnaissance problem, Mr. Nitze noted that one pass with the Black Shield was quite safe but two or three passes would make it vulnerable. Mr. Berger asked what we would do if the North Koreans fired on the photo reconnaissance plane. General Wheeler noted that the North Koreans have been practicing with SAMs against targets flying at altitudes used by Black Shield. The drone would create no problem but its reconnaissance was of a limited usefulness. Mr. McNamara added that Black Shield was essential. Mr. Rostow reviewed the work to be done by 1:00 P.M. and the papers to be prepared for the group when it meets again at 6:00 P.M. in State Department. Mr. Helms will have the reconnaissance plan. Defense will list our military capabilities for action in the area. Existing Presidential authority will be compiled by Defense. CIA will prepare intelligence refinements including why the Koreans took the action and what their present intentions are. State will prepare the diplomatic options and the decisions to be taken in this area. State will also prepare the basis for U.S. action and its presentation to the public. An overall scenario or plan of action will be pulled together by State. Mr. Clifford said in his view the question was whether the loss of a U.S. ship with its crew was worth a major military confrontation with North Korea. Secretary McNamara felt that by this afternoon we would be able to narrow the options open to us to apply military pressure. We could probably reach agreement on how the North Koreans would react and what we would do, depending upon their further reaction. However, it is necessary to give the North Koreans promptly a clear message of our firmness. Mr. Christian asked that consideration be given to whether the President should inform the public as to what we are doing.
218. Notes of Meeting/1/ Washington, January 24, 1968, 1 p.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, Tom Johnson's Notes of Meetings, Pueblo II, 1:00 p.m. Top Secret. Drafted by Tom Johnson. The meeting was held in the Cabinet Room at the White House. A memorandum of this meeting was also prepared by Harold H. Saunders, and summary notes of this and a brief meeting following the NSC meeting were prepared by Bromley Smith. (Both ibid., National Security File, National Security Council Meetings, Vol. IV, Tab 62, January 24, 1968) SUBJECT PART I The President: The Security Council meeting was set up before the ship incident. I want Secretary McNamara to bring you up to date on this matter. In addition we have asked Cyrus Vance and Lucius Battle for their opinions and judgments on Cyprus. Secretary McNamara: All of you know the information which has been published. I will not go over any of that. We do not know what happened except that this incident was pre-planned. The earliest date on which it could have been planned was January 10 since this was the first time the North Koreans knew that the ship would be in the area. Three things are clear: 1. It was a conscious effort to provoke a response or a lack of response. 2. The Soviets knew of it in advance. 3. The North Koreans have no intention of returning the men or the ship. I view this situation very seriously. There are three key questions which are unanswered: 1. Why did they do it? 2. What will they do now? 3. How should we respond? The President: Did the skipper ask for help? General Wheeler: There was a message from the ship "These fellows mean business. SOS. SOS." His next message was that they were boarding the ship. At 1200 (noon) the first North Korean vessel made contact with the Pueblo. One hour later, 3 other North Korean vessels appeared and several MIG fighters were seen overhead. It is important to remember that we have harassments of this type all the time. The skipper probably considered it just that--an harassment--until between 1:00 and 1:45. This was when he recognized it as a very different situation from a normal harassment. At 1:45 he sent out the call for help. Convert that to Eastern Standard Time, the first encounter was at 2200 (10:00 p.m. EST). This was when he was ordered to "heave to or I will open fire on you." At 2345 (11:45 EST) Pueblo radioed she was being boarded. At 2354 (11:54 EST) the first SOS came. We ceased to hear from the Pueblo 31 minutes later. The President: Were there no planes available which were prepared to come to the aid of this vessel? Every press story I have seen this morning said that U.S. planes were only 30 minutes away. Secretary McNamara: Air defenses in the Wonsan area are extensive. If we had sent airplanes to support and intercept, it is likely that these extensive air defense measures would be brought into play. In addition, it is necessary to consider the time of day and the approach of darkness. General Wheeler: Aircraft would have needed to refuel in the air. Twilight comes at 5:09. Darkness comes at 5:38. There were only 3-1/2 hours of light. The Commander of the Fifth Air Force issued an order to dispatch aircraft but then reversed the order because of the approach of darkness and the superiority of enemy forces in the area. Secretary McNamara: The North Koreans have a large air base in Wonsan. Walt Rostow: We need to get together on these times. I have a document which agrees with yours that the first contact was at 2200. I have that the first SOS was received at 2328. McNamara said this was 2354. I have information that the ship went off the air 0032. Secretary McNamara said the ship went off the air at 0025. For a matter of historical accuracy, we need to determine what is the correct time. The President: I want you to assemble for me all the facts on this matter. Until now, I have been under the impression that the ship did not ask for help. Get all the facts and document them well so I can study this matter further. Secretary Rusk: The negative reaction of North Korea and the Soviet Union was to be expected. One would expect the Soviets not to take responsibility. The reaction of the North Koreans last night at Panmunjom was consistent with what I had expected. There are two conclusions: 1. It looks as if this incident was pre-planned. 2. The Soviets may have had advance notice of what was planned./2/ /2/On January 24 the Bureau of Intelligence and Research issued Intelligence Note 67, which concluded that the Soviet Union "appears to have been caught unawares by the Pueblo incident," based on a lack of evidence suggesting that "Moscow instigated the North Korean seizure of the Pueblo or that Moscow even knew in advance that the incident would take place." In terms of Moscow's response to the incident, the report suggested "that the USSR wants to avoid all direct involvement in the present differences between the US and North Korea." (Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Pueblo, 23 January 1968 through December 1968) An Intelligence Memorandum issued by the CIA on the same day rejected Chinese involvement and concluded that the Soviets were behind neither the Blue House raid nor the seizure of the Pueblo. (Intelligence Memorandum No. 0580/68, "Confrontation in Korea," January 24; ibid.) The President: What were the reasons for it? Secretary Rusk: It could be a number of things. They may be trying to put additional pressure on us with reference to Vietnam. They may be trying to open up a second front. I do not see much in it unless they had either of these two objectives in mind. The President: Have you fully briefed the members of Congress? General Wheeler: General Brown already has talked with Senator Russell. He will see Senator Mundt, Senator Dodd and Senator Thurmond later today as directed by the President. Senator Russell seemed satisfied with the explanation given him today by General Brown. He was unhappy that an American ship was taken without a shot being fired on our side. The House Armed Services Committee was briefed this morning at its regular meeting. I will give the President a full report on that as soon as possible. The President: All of the Committees will begin investigations of this incident once it cools down. Should we do anything to head this off? Secretary McNamara: Until we know precisely what we are going to do, I do not recommend meeting with the Congress. They are not interested as much in what happened, which I think has been explained, as in what we plan to do. Secretary Rusk: In my meeting with the House Foreign Affairs Committee this morning, they were outraged at the action by the North Koreans. They realize it is a very serious matter. They were understanding and were not pushing any particular course of action. The President: What other ways are there for us to find out more about exactly what happened? General Wheeler: We will receive additional information for continued research by NSA on intercepts. In addition we will learn more from statements by the North Koreans and the Soviets. Leonard Marks: From North Korean press reports, it is obvious they are trying to create the following impressions: 1. They want to create fear among the South Koreans. 2. They are trying to create the impression that increased infiltration will take place. 3. They are making very flat statements about this being a "spy boat" which was carrying on hostile actions. Richard Helms: I would agree with what has been said. This appears to be an effort by North Korea to support the North Vietnamese in their efforts. They want to distract attention from Vietnam. The President: They may also want to detain the Carrier Enterprise. The President then read the Reuters wire account of an alleged confession by Commander L.M. Bucher, Captain of the Pueblo. The text of alleged confession is attached at Appendix A./3/ /3/Not printed. Secretary Rusk: We should analyze the tapes to determine if this is Bucher. I frankly do not see how they could get a U.S. Navy Commander to make statements like that. The President: Look very closely at this record. (General Wheeler and Secretary McNamara said this was being done.) Secretary McNamara: It is important to remember that we did not know where this ship was prior to the time of this incident. Our best reports are that the ship was outside of territorial waters. The President: Is there much chance of error? Secretary McNamara: Admiral Moorer, Chief of Naval Operations, said there is less than 1% chance of error in daylight conditions such as existed at the time. The radio intercepts of the North Korean craft placed them in the same area reported by the Pueblo: that was between 15-1/2 and 17-1/2 miles from shore. Richard Helms: Our fix is 15-1/2 to 17. Both of these figures are outside of territorial waters. Secretary McNamara: The ship did destroy some of its classified equipment. We do know that not all classified equipment was destroyed. The President: How much of a problem does that create for us?/4/ /4/On January 24 the Director of the NSA cabled two reports to the Special Security Office of DIA and the JCS evaluating the impact of the loss of the ship and its equipment. Regarding the effect on communications security, the Director stated that the capture of the Pueblo represented "a major intelligence coup without parallel in modern history." Similarly, the overall loss and impact on U.S. ability to conduct signals intelligence was deemed "very severe." (Both in Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Korea--Pueblo Incident, Codeword Material, Vol. I, Part B [through January]) An NSA analysis prepared after the crew had been returned and debriefed concluded that "The unnecessary capture of excess equipment and materials was the most significant loss sustained in the cryptographic area." ("Cryptologic-Cryptographic Damage Assessment: USS Pueblo, AGER-2, 23 January-23 December 1968"; NSA, Center for Cryptologic History, Historical Files, Carton VIII) Secretary McNamara: This is much less of a problem than the diplomatic problems and the prestige. Walt Rostow: The confession by the Captain appears to have been written by the Soviets. This is not the language of an American ship captain. The Soviets may have had a hand in drafting it. Secretary McNamara: The impression that the Soviets were informed in advance is supported by their actions in Moscow. When Ambassador Thompson went to the Soviets, he received a Soviet position on this quite promptly. It is unlikely that the Soviets could have reached [received] the information about the incident, conferred about it, and then taken a position so quickly without advance knowledge that the incident was to take place. Richard Helms: This is a very serious matter. It appears the North Koreans are doing this in support of the North Vietnamese against us. It looks, at this time, like collusion between the North Koreans and the Soviets. It appears to be another attempt to divert us from our efforts in Vietnam. Last August, the Polish Military Mission went to North Korea. It was learned [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] that the North Koreans have sent 30 pilots to North Vietnam. They also gave the North Vietnamese 10 MIG-21's. North Korea wants to do all it can to help the North Vietnamese. In addition, they want to keep the ROK from sending more troops to assist the South Vietnamese. [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] said the Soviets are putting pressure on North Korea to take some of the pressure off Vietnam. They advised that 2500 North Korean officers have been trained for sabotage and terrorism in South Korea. The President: Would not it be wise now that we have definite information where the incident occurred to tell Senator Fulbright so that he will be more responsible about his statements?/5/ /5/The memorandum for the record of this meeting by Saunders indicates that the discussion continued, focusing first on the Cyprus problem and then on the situation in Vietnam. At the conclusion of the meeting McNamara suggested the Pueblo Group meet to discuss a response to the confession apparently made by Commander Bucher. According to notes by Bromley Smith that brief meeting ended with Nitze being given responsibility for preparing a statement for release that evening. [Continue with the next documents]
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