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FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1964-1968, Volume XXIX Korea
Department of State |
Korea 219. Telegram From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State/1/ Seoul, January 24, 1968, 2105Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 33-6 KOR N-US. Secret; Flash; Exdis. 3600. From Ambassador Porter. Ref: State 103652./2/ /2/In telegram 103652 to Seoul, January 24, the Department of State requested Porter's assessment of why the North Koreans seized the Pueblo and what might be expected from them in the future. (Ibid.) 1. General dearth of hard info on North Korea here makes it difficult to judge NK motivations and interests./3/ In case of Pueblo, it is more difficult for us to make judgement since we do not know how long Pueblo was in area and what its actions and equipment were. /3/In the view of the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, the North Koreans, being "an extremely security conscious nation," seized the Pueblo "to silence a US collector, embarrass the US and improve North Korea's image," conclusions drawn "largely because of its plausibility and the lack of evidence to substantiate the seizure as part of an overall plan to initiate hostilities or motivated by other reasons." The assessment discounted the possibility that North Korea acted under instructions from Moscow and fully rejected any involvement by Communist China. (Telegram from the Chief of Staff, Air Force, to the Strategic Air Command, January 24; Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Pueblo, 23 January 1968 to December 1968) 2. Pueblo incident and Blue House raid are clearly related. Once Seoul raid had been successfully carried out, North Koreans, uncertain of what actions we and ROKs might take, may have desired to remove major source of information on their own countermeasures. In so doing, North Koreans may well have had Israeli action against USS Liberty in mind./4/ Although there has been some speculation that action was taken to provide KPA with major "victory" for its 20th anniversary February 8, it seems unlikely to us that North Koreans would have taken such grave risk for propaganda purposes alone. /4/The intelligence-gathering vessel USS Liberty was deployed in the eastern Mediterranean on May 23, 1967, in response to mounting tensions in the Middle East that culminated in the Six-Day War between Israel and its neighboring Arab states in June of that year. While in international waters off the coast of Israel and the United Arab Republic, the Liberty came under attack through a series of misunderstandings and errors on June 8 first by Israeli jet bombers and then by Israeli torpedo boats. Although heavily damaged and its crew decimated, the Liberty sailed to sanctuary. A history of the incident was written by the National Security Agency/Central Security Service, Attack on a SIGINT Collector, the U.S.S. Liberty, United States Cryptologic History: Special Series, Crisis Collection, Vol. 1 (1981). 3. While timing of Pueblo seizure is related to Seoul raid, there is complex of reasons why NK would undertake both. In this, Vietnam plays central role. Kim Il-Sung has long advocated greater Communist assistance to NVN and his latest pronouncement, calling for "more positive actions" to aid Hanoi, was carried by AP on Jan 18. At time when all aspects of Vietnam struggle are intensifying, NK leadership may well have felt that they could make no greater contribution to Communist cause and to their own purposes in Korea than to take bold actions designed to reduce support in ROK for augmented or even continued participation in Vietnam, to take advantage of current political difficulties of and to further reduce public confidence in Pak govt, and to shake mutual confidence between U.S. and ROK. Bold action could also, of course, create a diversion in Korean peninsula and force U.S. to divert military resources from Vietnam effort and stimulate additional domestic and overseas pressures against U.S. Asian policy. 4. Forecasting NK actions is risky game. Certainly their past conduct in refusing to release our helicopter in 1965 and returning pilots only after lengthy negotiation, plus their pattern of treatment of ROK fishermen, gives no ground for optimism that they will react favorably by releasing vessel and crew immediately. We are more inclined to believe that they will attempt to exploit their possession of ship and crew to maximum extent from both technical and propaganda points of view. After these purposes have been ably served, they will probably return crew, but under conditions of considerable humiliation to U.S. 5. Although activities of past few days may cause them to proceed with caution, we can expect North Koreans to continue to carry out their basic plan for increased subversive effort against ROK this year, especially if they are not penalized in some way for these two coups. Their propaganda is attempting to make it appear that major revolt is already sweeping South, which they must sustain by action. 6. NK will not permit any action by us to go unchallenged. They seem confident and sure of themselves and appear convinced that we have neither capability nor determination to deal with them while so heavily engaged in Vietnam. Porter
220. Minutes of Meeting/1/ Washington, January 24, 1968, 6 p.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of Bromley Smith, [Meeting on Pueblo Crisis, January 24, 1968, 6:00 p.m.]. Top Secret. Drafted by Bromley Smith. The meeting was held in Katzenbach's office at the State Department and ended shortly before 7:30 p.m. (Ibid., Rusk Appointment Book) SUBJECT Secretary McNamara: The President does not now have the power to extend the tours of duty of military personnel without legislation. He does have the power to call up reserve units without Congressional action and without declaring a national emergency. It would be no problem to move promptly to Korea substantial forces consisting of Army, Navy, and Marine Corps planes (100 to 300). This would be easy and relatively riskless, and should be done. We have considerable flexibility in force movements, call-ups and application of force. We could also restrict commerce or mine selected ports. Under Secretary Katzenbach: It is important to distinguish between symbolic movement of forces and actual use. The former does not commit you, the latter does. Secretary McNamara: We must distinguish between (a) the call-up of forces; (b) the movement of forces; and (c) the actual use of our forces. There will be time between the call-up of forces and the movement of these forces for diplomatic activity. Secretary McNamara: There are airfield limitations on the number of planes which can be handled, but we can put in about 300 maximum. General Wheeler: The Enterprise can be kept where it is and by the 29th can be reinforced by the Kitty Hawk. There are 130 strike aircraft on the two carriers. We can also bring in additional destroyers and cruisers. Some would have to cross the Pacific, but we could end up with a substantial augmentation. Secretary Rusk: Was the alleged confession of the Pueblo's captain a voice broadcast?/2/ /2/Bucher read a confession over Radio Pyongyang. (Ibid., National Security File, Country File, Korea--Pueblo Incident) Director Helms: Yes, but the recording made in Okinawa was not good. The tape is en route here. The accent was American but the language was stilted and unlike that which an American would use. Secretary Rusk: Diplomatic moves available to us in the next 48 hours include the use of the UN Security Council. There are difficulties but also much reason in the idea. The United Nations has had a special relationship to Korea, and there has been a long history of association with the problem. There is a preliminary obligation to refer the matter to the United Nations before taking military action. This is not exactly a Charter provision, but is in the atmosphere of the Charter. We did so in the Cuban missile crisis before heading for a military confrontation. It is one way of putting prestige factors in the refrigerator for a few days. Security Council debate affords a framework in which contact can be made with the other side without engaging major prestige. We should try diplomacy by going to the Council at once. We are not yet ready to move militarily to meet an enemy response to our initial military action. Council consideration could also afford an important breathing spell in public feeling. Assistant Secretary Sisco: We have a paper outlining two possibilities./3/ /3/Not further identified. Sisco also prepared a paper containing three potential options for approaching the UN: 1) submitting a factual report to the Security Council; 2) requesting the good offices of the Secretary General; and 3) consulting with a few key members of the Security Council and with the South Koreans prior to convening the Security Council. (Memorandum from Sisco to Rusk and Katzenbach, January 24; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 33-6 KOR N-US) One, the Secretary General to undertake good offices to see what he can do through private talks. There is some indication that he would be willing to try. This would take a long time and any result is unlikely. Meanwhile, in the Security Council we might seek statements from friendly governments urging release of the ship and the crew. This might be one way of proceeding for the next two days in the Security Council, simply aiming for the series of statements with no other UN action. The second possibility would aim for a resolution calling for the release of the ship and crew and might possibly inject the Secretary General into the issue. Many problems would be encountered in pursuing the latter course. We have seven sure votes. To get a majority is problematical. We would face a Soviet veto. During a Council debate, we would be able to mobilize support. Special Assistant Rostow: In the Cuban missile crisis we did not get into the United Nations until we had made our move. There is a danger that if we go into the Security Council, we would find ourselves blocked from taking military action. In the Cuban crisis we faced the danger that the UN would freeze the status quo. The UN resolution might state that actions were to be taken without use of force. This could prevent or hinder our freedom of action. We also have to be careful not to get the South Koreans up in arms by a lack of adequate response. Secretary Rusk: This is somewhat different from the Cuban crisis. Then, the presence of the missiles was not generally known. We were able to announce the presence of the missiles at the time we announced our action. Here, the basic facts are already known concerning the Pueblo affair. We could work out with the UN that we would be bound not to act for only so long. We may even need a Soviet veto. Mr. Sisco: The analogy is closer to the Tonkin Gulf incident. We convoked the Security Council, made statements, but asked for no formal action. General Wheeler: Is it possible to go to the Security Council even if we ask for no formal action without getting the Secretary General into the act? Mr. Sisco: Yes, but some would surely want to involve him. Secretary Rusk: We would not tell Council members we did not want formal action. We might indeed want to press a resolution to a vote which might involve the veto. Mr. Rostow: The question is how do we get out of it if it does not work? Mr. Katzenbach: In the Cuban crisis, the OAS was insulation from the United Nations. Secretary Rusk: Would we be strong in the United Nations on the issues in this case? Legal Adviser Meeker: Yes. We could have used all force to prevent the capture, according to international law. No legal theory is wholly satisfactory, but here we have strong grounds--self defense--stronger if we first take it to the UN./4/ /4/Meeker set forth his analysis of the legal aspects of the Pueblo incident in a memorandum to Rusk, January 24. A second analysis by Meeker, January 26, approached the issue using the hypothesis that the Pueblo entered North Korean territorial waters at some point. (Both Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, NK Seizure of USS Pueblo, INR/OD, January 1968) Secretary McNamara: I am concerned about the question of territorial waters, and our inability to support this without adequate evidence. We have January 10-22 to account for (in addition to indications that at the time of seizure, we were indeed outside territorial waters by a safe distance). The captain's alleged statement indicated he had been in territorial waters. Should we be worried about the "hot pursuit" argument? (Mr. Katzenbach said "hot pursuit" was not involved.) Secretary Rusk: We might consider demanding that the captain be produced at the Security Council. We could be in difficulty if captured documents included, for instance, statements from the crew saying that they went under the Soviet guns and took pictures anyway. Secretary McNamara: I do not know whether we were in territorial waters at some point or not. Is there any concern that the log would show that the ship was in territorial waters? Secretary Rusk: We can, of course, produce the orders (for whatever they may be worth). Mr. Meeker: The North Koreans claim 12 miles, as does the Soviet Union. Warships may not be subject to seizure, anyway, even in territorial waters if they do not engage in hostile action. Secretary Rusk: At the United Nations, at least there would be pressures to settle the matter. And no one could believe that the matter is likely to be settled unless we get our ship and men out. General Wheeler: Can we put heat on the Soviets to help settle this matter? Secretary Rusk: Yes, unless the Soviets want to open a second front in Korea. Mr. Nitze: There would be nothing inconsistent in taking the first two actions recommended by Secretary McNamara, i.e., calling up forces and moving forces, and also taking our case to the United Nations. Secretary Rusk: That is agreed. We must be braced for anything. The call-up of forces makes our diplomacy more creditable. For instance, the call-up of reserves had an immediate effect on the Russians in the Berlin crisis. If we go to the United Nations, can we be entrapped by the other side taking no action while we end up being inhibited in taking the actions we want to? Mr. Sisco: This danger should prove to be manageable in the UN. Probably the most we would encounter would be a resolution inhibiting in a general sense our action, but we could probably avoid even that. Mr. Rostow: If we go to the UN, it is essential to include the attempt to assassinate President Park. Secretary Rusk: The first thing to do tonight is to get off a telegram to the Koreans asking them to agree to a letter to the Security Council on both subjects. Then we can talk with New York about when to convene the Security Council. Mr. Clifford: We need a period to quiet down the feelings which have been engendered. Going to the Security Council would be the best avenue to do this. I do not know how strong our case would be. The North Koreans would probably continue to say that we had violated their territorial waters. It is possible that they might build a better case than we could. If we move precipitately with military force, it might turn out that we had a hard case to prove. Submission of our case to the Security Council has the value of doing something, of recognizing that world body, and of permitting the American people to quiet down in the next 4 or 5 days. This is possibly but the first in a series of incidents. This one is not as sharp as I would like to see it. We should get ready for the next one which may be clearer. I am concerned about using this incident as the basis for major military actions. As in the case of the USS Liberty, this is not a clear case./5/ If we can find a way out with face, we should do so. There will probably be a better case later on. /5/See footnote 4, Document 219. Secretary Rusk: If the North Koreans come in with conclusive proof that our ship was in territorial waters, we could say in the Security Council that we regretted that action and that now they should give back our men and our ship. Mr. Berger: And about the attempt to assassinate Park? Secretary Rusk: They should be called upon to stop such actions. If the UN debate slops over to debate on Vietnam, that is all right, too. Mr. Katzenbach: The Pueblo was almost an unarmed ship. If we were doing something wrong they could have protested. We presented no immediate threat to them. In the previous case of the USS Liberty, it could have been an immediate threat. Secretary McNamara: How long would we be in the UN? Secretary Rusk: Two or three days or we could spin it out longer. Mr. Sisco: This would depend partly on whether we limit efforts to debate only. If there were a resolution, it would draw things out. Mr. Warnke: Does self-defense wear out? Mr. Meeker: Self-defense after a time "wears out". It begins to get stale. Secretary Rusk: We have a much cleaner case than Clark Clifford implied. But if we go to the United Nations, it is important that we not go defensively. Secretary McNamara: I am reluctant to use military force unless we see what we gain and what we lose. I believe we have a good case. If our people do, too, and we do not react, there could be a serious effect on the Vietnam situation. It is not clear what would come after the UN. Mr. Katzenbach: Time spent in the UN costs less than time spent any other way. Secretary Rusk: The pressure on us is that our men and our ship are in Wonsan. Secretary McNamara: If the talk in the UN goes on for two months, then we can't use military force. The UN is okay if it is not dragged out. Mr. Rostow: We have to move forces so as to act as a counter force to UN Talks. We should let the Soviet Union know that we base our actions on the doctrine of self defense. This doctrine will be part of our case in deciding what action must follow if we do not get satisfaction. Secretary Rusk: A telegram from Ambassador Porter says that the two incidents (Pueblo and attack on Park) are clearly related./6/ The North Koreans will keep up harassments. Then they will probably return the ship and personnel but under circumstances which will make it as humiliating as possible for the United States. This could result in undermining our support in South Vietnam. Porter expects increased penetration and subversive activities by North Korea. /6/Document 219. Secretary Rusk: Berger and Sisco should draft a message to Seoul so that tomorrow we can go to the Security Council. We should also send a circular cable to the Korean troop club. If the situation leads to renewed fighting between North and South Korea, we want these people to be interested and to get nervous. We want them to say something to the Russians or to the North Koreans or to any others where they could help build pressure. We should give the 16 nations full details. Mr. Berger: We often brief the 16 here. Secretary Rusk: All right, plus the letters. We should talk with Sato. We should also probably make a new approach to the Soviet Union. We can wait for a fuller report from Prime Minister Wilson, but if that is not satisfactory, or if Wilson did not take the matter up with the Soviets, we should press hard again. Mr. Katzenbach: On Sato, the question is how it is to be done, since we will be using Japanese facilities if major military steps are taken. If we got General Max Taylor to talk with Sato, it would be more dramatic, if that is what you want. Mr. Berger: We were thinking in terms of an interim approach to Sato, asking the Japanese to express concern to the Soviets. Secretary Rusk: Now let us talk of other moves. What sort of ship is the Banner? General Wheeler: The Banner is a COMINT collector. It is now on the west coast of Japan. Mr. Nitze: It would take about four days for the Banner to get into position off Korea. General Wheeler: We should not undertake this without ample naval escort and air cover. If there is action, the odds should be on our side. The Banner is now in port in Japan for changes of its codes. Secretary Rusk: Replacing the Pueblo with the Banner is in range as a gesture. Secretary McNamara: We might buy some time by saying that we are replacing the captured ship. Such action would add a risk but would convey a message that we are not deterred by the capture of the Pueblo. Secretary Rusk: We might want the Banner to rendezvous with the Enterprise. Mr. Katzenbach: If we put the Banner in the same place as the Pueblo was, it will demonstrate our right to do this and our power to do it. The disadvantage is the possible impact on United Nations members if it makes people nervous. Mr. Nitze: Such action would help us in the Security Council. Secretary Rusk: Let us consider B, C, and G as preparatory moves./7/ As far as the end of the trail is concerned, the use of military force would make us feel better about it, but does not get our ship and our men back. We do not want to take on a second front if we can avoid it. We might consider passive interference with the port of Wonsan. /7/The options were set forth in an Index prepared for this meeting. In addition to Diplomatic Options--approaching the UN, Sato, and the Soviets--other possible actions were: a) sending in the Banner; b) deploying air and naval forces; c) making reconnaissance flights over North Korea; d) interfering with North Korean shipping; e) blockading selected North Korean harbors; f) making selected air strikes; and g) calling up military reserves and extending the term of military service. (Korean Crisis, Index, attached to list of preferred actions stemming from the meeting, January 24; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 33-6 KOR N-US) Secretary McNamara: It can be done with mines but it does invite escalation. Secretary Rusk: We have a better chance of getting our ship and men back before rather than after using military force. Secretary McNamara: Using the Banner would reduce our loss of face and reduce the necessity to use force if we do not get back our ship and men. It will have a lesser effect if we delay. Secretary Rusk: We don't know yet the intentions of the North Koreans. An air cap over the Banner would be necessary. We can't have disaster again. I understand that North Korea has substantial air power. Our cover has to be big. What should be the extent of our call-up of reserve planes? Secretary McNamara: Our purpose should be demonstration. There should be quite a few. We should call up at least 250 planes. Four hundred were called up at the time of the Cuban crisis. Mr. Rostow: I am not recommending it, but the most symmetrical suggestion I have seen is to have South Korea pick up a Soviet ship. There is one similar to the Pueblo in the region. Secretary Rusk: We would, however, be acting just as outrageously as the North Koreans. Mr. Rostow: Blocking the harbor is a warlike act, too. We do not want to appear weak to the American people by doing no more than beg in the United Nations. Secretary McNamara: The point Walt makes is well taken. It is not only the reaction of our people which we must take into account but also that of the Asians. The North Koreans have attempted an assassination, taken our ship, humiliated our captain. The Soviets do have a vessel doing the same sort of thing and we do not do anything about it. We cannot continue too long without acting. General Wheeler: (In response to a question from Secretary Rusk.) There is quite a bit of air patrolling in the Korean DMZ. There are also photo and ELINT missions from time to time. Secretary Rusk: It is important that we make clear that what we do in Korea will not reduce what we are doing in Vietnam. We might pick up North Korean merchant vessels, but there are only a few such ships, according to these reports. We might, however, influence Japan in the direction of economic sanctions. Secretary McNamara: This might have political effect, but it would have little economic effect because the Russians would step in. Secretary Rusk: We should gin up our friends to make statements decrying the North Korean action. NATO should have an interest in this affair, too. Secretary Rusk and Secretary McNamara recommended the following actions to buy time: Adding 250 planes to those already based in the area and the call-up of 250 reserve planes with crews. General Wheeler: The Banner should join the Enterprise. Aerial reconnaissance should include the use of drones plus Black Shield. Director Helms: I recommend that we run three reconnaissance flights in one day and get it done. Seventeen minutes for Black Shield on one flight. Secretary McNamara: We must indeed fill in the gaps on our intelligence if we contemplate military action. If we have a three-pass mission the first time, there would be a very low loss rate expected. I favor the three-pass mission. Secretary Rusk: That is okay, but I have not been greatly impressed with drones. General Wheeler: That is wrong. They take excellent pictures. Eight of the last ten have survived. One met with mechanical failure and one was shot down. Secretary McNamara: Another benefit in using them is political. Secretary Rusk: Do they take better photographs? Director Helms: Slightly better. Secretary Rusk: I see an advantage of taking a quick look at Wonsan. We ought to have the Task Force examine items B, E, and F in the index outline. We should be able to say that we have checked these out thoroughly. We are not prepared to recommend yet, but we should at least know where we are concerning these. Mr. Katzenbach: We have the wraps on South Korea now but we do not know how long we can keep them on or indeed how long we will want to. General Wheeler: General Bonesteel has been urging restraint on the South Koreans who have plans to make retaliatory raids. South Korean officers have been instructed not to let General Bonesteel see these plans. His question is whether we want to play the South Koreans cool or hot. At the present time, he is playing them cool. Secretary McNamara: We should continue to try to keep the South Koreans cool, at least during the Security Council debate. Mr. Rostow: We should consider the Park proposal to take out by air attacks the North Korean training bases. Bromley Smith
221. Notes of Meeting/1/ Washington, January 24, 1968, 7:50-8:25 p.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, Tom Johnson's Notes of Meetings, Pueblo III. Top Secret. Drafted by Tom Johnson. The meeting was held in the Cabinet Room. SUBJECT PARTICIPANTS The President opened the meeting by reading a memorandum from Bob Fleming on the network press coverage at 6:30 p.m. (Attachment A.)/2/ /2/Not printed. Secretary Rusk: We met early tonight. We have received a message from Ambassador Porter in Korea. He thinks the Pueblo incident and the Blue House plot are connected with North Korean support for North Vietnam. We propose the following diplomatic action: 1. We should take this matter to the Security Council. In the United Nations there is a long and strong background for our position in Korea. This would gain time for us. It also would give the Secretary General reason to proceed with private discussions. I think we should take it there, although it is likely that no resolution will pass. 2. Send a telegram tonight to the Republic of Korea to get their agreement on what should be put to the United Nations. 3. Go to the 16 countries who as part of the UN forces had troops in Korea. We should inform them of the situation and get them nervous about it. We should alert them to the possibility of a renewed crisis in which they are involved. 4. We should go to Prime Minister Sato of Japan. He has substantial trade with North Korea. He may be able to bring some leverage to bear with North Korea. 5. We should go back to the Soviets and tell them that their first response was not enough. The President: I think we should get Ambassador Goldberg down here tomorrow morning for an 8:30 breakfast. Can all of you make it? Secretary Rusk: Secretary Fowler and I are having breakfast tomorrow to go over our positions prior to meeting with Wilbur Mills. The President: Why don't the two of you come to the breakfast and then talk afterwards about your problem. Dean, ask Goldberg to jot down his notes and recommendations. Tell him I do not have confidence in the UN but I do have faith in him (Ambassador Goldberg). I want him to know that we are not going to make decisions about things to put to the UN without him here. Secretary McNamara: We do want moves which will buy us time. I propose the following steps: 1. Proceed to move armed forces from the U.S. and other places in the area to South Korea and South Korean waters. I propose moving about 250 aircraft in addition to those that are aboard the Enterprise. The President: Why don't we move the Enterprise back to Vietnam. We do not want them thinking we are diverting from our responsibilities there, do we? Secretary McNamara: The Enterprise can remain off Korea without any effect whatever on our actions in Vietnam. It was going to the Gulf of Tonkin to supplant and not supplement any operations. We can keep the carrier it was to replace on station off Vietnam. The President: Are you sure that we have enough air power and support to take care of the situation at Khesanh? Secretary McNamara: We do have a problem, but I am reasonably confident that what General Wheeler and General Westmoreland have reported is satisfactory. The President: What's the strength of the North Korean air force? Secretary McNamara: They have approximately 400 jets compared to 200 jets in South Korea. The President: How does the aircraft we are sending compare with the North Koreans'? Secretary McNamara: Our aircraft would be superior to the bulk of their air force. We propose to send, roughly 63 Air Force F-4's; 33 Marine F-4's; 50 F-100's; 50 A-4's; 30 F-8's; 22 F-105's; and possibly some other aircraft. The F-4's and most of the other planes do have bombing capacity. My second recommendation is that the President has authority to call up units of the reserves. I recommend that we activate selected Air Force and Marine units. There will be approximately 200 to 300 Air Force units involved. All of these units are in a high state of readiness. This would be calling up to active duty approximately 250 aircraft. These would become part of the strategic reserve taking the place of the 400 regular jets which we will have the capability of sending to South Korea. The President authorized the Secretary to begin making initial plans and draw up the necessary papers for the dispatch of the aircraft to South Korea and the activation of the units suggested. The President stressed that he would authorize more than what has been suggested if it is considered necessary. He said he would prefer to have more than enough to take care of whatever job might be required. Secretary McNamara: I propose, although there is some difference of opinion on this, that we move the USS Banner in to replace the Pueblo off North Korea. We are planning to send it into the area to join the Enterprise so that if we decide to move, it will be in position. If we decide to replace the Pueblo with the Banner we should be prepared to cover it with air and other support units. The President: First, Bob, I want you to be prepared to move and be ready to make these decisions effective after the breakfast tomorrow morning. 2. Take the tentative steps which are required to get ready for this action. 3. I would send 300 planes. Get more than you think you really need. "Be ready to go when you come out of this meeting." Secretary McNamara: We also would like to send Oxcart flight over North Korea tomorrow. The President approved this action. Secretary Rusk: Also under consideration is sending a drone over Wonsan. However this has not been recommended to the President. If we put the Banner back on station, we must have adequate cover for it. A second incident in which we come out second best would be disastrous. The President: What about the B-52's? Should we send some in? Secretary McNamara: They can operate easily from Okinawa. Flying time is only about 2-1/2 hours. Walt Rostow: At what level do we propose to reapproach the Soviets on this subject? Do we reapproach them at the Thompson-Gromyko level? The President: I see no difference in this situation than in the one in which Kosygin messaged me raising hell over Israel. The President then sent Tom Johnson into the Oval Office to get the hot line messages which had been exchanged during the Middle East crisis./3/ /3/See footnote 4, Document 219. The President read portions of Chairman Kosygin's initial message to President Johnson on the situation in the Middle East. Secretary Rusk: I think a message to Kosygin from the President would be appropriate at this time. The President: Go ahead and draft a message tonight for dispatch tomorrow. Make it strong. Walt Rostow suggested that the message be sent through the hot line. The President: I will not use the hot line on this. We will send it as quickly as possible by cable. The President asked Clark Clifford if he expected any problems during the testimony on Thursday before the Congress. Clark Clifford: I expect no real problems, although Senator Tower made a comment today that he was disappointed at the appointment. The Senator said he thought the President would now also be running the Defense Department as he is now running the White House and State Department. The President asked Secretary McNamara if he had appointed a board to thoroughly investigate the Gulf of Tonkin incident. Secretary McNamara: Yes, a special representative was sent to review the matter. In addition the Navy appointed a special panel to investigate it. We will have good men to testify if called upon.
222. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Japan/1/ Washington, January 25, 1968, 0029Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 33-6 KOR N-US. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Repeated to the White House. Drafted by Berger; cleared by Katzenbach, Nitze, and Read; and approved by Rusk. 104628. For Ambassador from Secretary. 1. Seek immediate appointment with Sato and inform him that with President Pak's concurrence we are taking Korean situation to Security Council. Ambassador Goldberg has asked for Council meeting January 25. We know Japan will be prepared to support our efforts in UN. We are also continuing our efforts with Soviet Union (this very secret) and others./2/ /2/In a January 25 letter to Sato President Johnson expressed concern about North Korea's raids into South Korea and seizure of the Pueblo, indicated that Japan would be kept informed of U.S. intentions, and asked that Sato "consider approaching the Soviet Union in order to impress on them your own serious concern with the developing situation and also to consider what approaches you might make to the North Koreans, or actions you might make, to impress on them the seriousness of the situation." (Telegram 104284 to Tokyo, January 25; ibid., POL 15-1 KOR S) In response Ambassador Johnson learned that Miki would speak to the Soviet Ambassador about Japan's concerns arising from North Korean actions. (Telegram 4998 from Tokyo, January 25; ibid.) Sato replied to the President's letter by stating that Japan had been in contact with the Soviets and was considering additional ways Japan might assist in solving the crises. (Letter from Sato, January 30; ibid., POL 33-6 KOR N-US) 2. We are also considering certain limited military precautionary moves. These would include movement of additional air and naval units from US to South Korea. Amount of US air currently in and around South Korea is minimum we need and we want to strengthen this against contingencies. 3. We are also considering but have not yet decided to move 15 B-52's from US to Okinawa and wish Sato to know of our planning and possible decision in advance. This very secret for his information. 4. We mean for time being to explore and exhaust all diplomatic possibilities before considering what further moves need to be made. 5. We recognize Japan's intense interest and indirect involvement in moves we make vis-a-vis Korea. We are not in belligerent mood and mean to make our moves carefully and deliberately. Rusk
223. Notes of Meeting/1/ Washington, January 25, 1968. /1/Source: Johnson Library, Tom Johnson's Notes of Meetings, Pueblo IV, 8:30 a.m. Top Secret. Drafted by Tom Johnson. The meeting was held at the White House. SUBJECT PARTICIPANTS Mr. Rostow: We have just received a message from President Park of the Republic of Korea. He is pleased that we are taking the matter to the Security Council and raising both the Pueblo incident and the Blue House incident./2/ /2/Pak's message was relayed in telegram 3626 from Seoul, January 25. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 33-6 KOR N-US) At the UN we can urge the following: --Urge that the ship and men be returned. --Urge the North Koreans to behave with respect to the 38th Parallel. --Urge a resolution for return of the ship. We must not do anything which would tie our hands in the United Nations. Ambassador Goldberg: Going to the Security Council will give us time. There is a danger of getting our hands tied. The South Koreans also are sensitive to the North Koreans being heard before the United Nations. The President: What are the gambles we take by going to the UN? Ambassador Goldberg: It is best to urge a resolution demanding the return of the ship. I do not recommend a resolution asking the UN to condemn the action of the North Koreans. We should ask the UN to support a return to the Armistice Agreements. Of course the Soviets will veto that resolution, but taking this action will satisfy the diplomatic needs./3/ /3/Telegram 104660 to USUN, January 25, details these guidelines and transmits a draft resolution. (Ibid., UN 3 SC) Goldberg's letter to the president of the Security Council, his statements made to that body on January 26 and 27, as well as a UNC report on Korea are in Department of State Bulletin, February 12, 1968, pp. 193-200. Although the Pueblo seizure was discussed by the Security Council, no vote was taken on a resolution. Instead the Council adopted a Canadian proposal suggesting the matter be discussed privately between members. Negotiations were held on January 28, but not resumed, and the matter was not returned to the Security Council for consideration. (Yearbook of the United Nations, 1968, pp. 168-173) It is interesting that Malik will be the Soviet representative today. You will remember that he was absent on the last vote which sent the UN forces to Korea. You can be certain that he will not be absent this time. As I see it, we will get the following votes: United States--Yes Ambassador Goldberg said France has always been with us on the Korean issue, but he considered it questionable whether or not they will vote with us now. The President urged that we send a message to President Ayub Khan of Pakistan telling him that we definitely need their support on a matter of this importance. However, the President and Ambassador Goldberg noted that Pakistan has problems with China and may vote no. The President: Was the Turner Joy an intelligence ship? (This was one of the ships attacked during the Gulf of Tonkin.) Secretary McNamara: The Turner Joy and the Pueblo are not the same type of ship. They do have some collection devices. Ambassador Goldberg: Returning to the UN votes, Korea has been a UN matter since 1950. We do need Pakistan's vote. A Pakistani is president of the council. He expressed great personal support for us in a conversation yesterday./4/ He is in a delicate position. /4/A summary of the conversation was transmitted in telegram 3481 from USUN, January 24. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Korea--Pueblo Incident, USUN Cables, Vol. I, January to March 1968) There is another alternative. We could use the good offices of the Secretary General. He has indicated some willingness to do this. We could put a time limit on the Secretary General. In the Security Council we could do much the same thing (put a time limit on it). I would take the matter to the Security Council tomorrow. I think we should call for an urgent session. We may not get a resolution, but it will take care of our diplomatic situation. The President: Why did the Soviets say in this message that they have passed along our position to North Korea?/5/ /5/Reference is to telegram 2566 from Moscow, January 25, given to the President earlier that morning, which reports that Kuznetsov told Thompson that the North Koreans were informed of Thompson's approach to the Soviets immediately after the seizure of the Pueblo. (Memorandum from Rostow to the President, January 25; ibid., Vol. I, Part B [through January]). Secretary Rusk: It looks like an added measure on their part. On the matter of the UN, a resolution which would be hostile to the U.S. would not receive more than 3 to 4 votes. Ambassador Goldberg: Do we push a resolution to a vote? I would think we would do this only if we have 9 votes. The President: Our primary objective is to gain time, to give all concerned an opportunity for reasoning together. It will give the Soviets time to bring influence to bear on North Korea if they will. I want to raise a question about sending a carrier and other aircraft in. Doesn't this raise a challenge to the enemy? Ambassador Thompson says in his cable that this action seems paradoxical. I think that is worth considering. How will the North Koreans, Soviets, and the Chinese react to the show of force? Won't it lessen our chances of getting the ship and the men out rather than increase them? What I am asking is this: What's our objective as far as all of this, particularly the action before the UN? As I see it, our objective is to: 1. Spread out our actions before the UN to show them how serious this matter is and to show them how we have been mistreated. 2. Give us time to try to work something out and to give the Soviets an opportunity to try to bring their influence to bear on the North Koreans. 3. Show the world we are not bellicose. But there may be a conflict in our doing this before the UN and our sending new planes over there. Can't the Enterprise take care of the situation for a few days? Secretary McNamara: We do need more air power in the area if we are attacked. I see no difference between us having the Enterprise already there with increased air power available and putting in what we need to have to take care of the situation. We already have built up our position with the placement of the Enterprise in the area. To do what Ambassador Thompson has suggested (not putting any additional forces in there) would mean pulling the Enterprise off station. The President: Secretary McNamara, you look at where you are going to get units and tell me the minimum time that it required to move in an emergency. Secretary McNamara: I have all of that information now, Mr. President. In addition I have an Executive Order for the President's signature which will authorize the call up of the reserve units (Attachment A)./6/ /6/Not printed. The text of the statement informing the public of the call-up of Air Force and Navy reserves made by the President on January 26 is in Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1968-69, Book I, p. 77. In addition I have two press releases which I want George Christian to review and change if necessary. The first press release announces the call up. The second press release announces the actual sending of additional units to South Korea. We can move the USS Kitty Hawk into the area without public knowledge. She is only two days steaming-time away. The Joint Chiefs feel very strongly that they do not want to move the Enterprise. It would be wasted effort to replace it with another ship. We propose sending 303 air craft to South Korea. We propose to call up 332 air craft. Ambassador Goldberg: I would recommend not making public announcement of the call up. I think you should go ahead with the action without public announcement and we will do everything to settle this matter diplomatically. However, the call up will strengthen my position before the UN and will show the seriousness of the situation. I do not see any conflict between the call up and what we will be doing diplomatically. In that I disagree with Ambassador Thompson. Walt Rostow: As I see it, international law states that the seizure of a ship of the high seas justifies counteraction and equivalent reprisal. The President: Walt, I do not want to win the argument and lose the sale. The President then read again the Thompson cable. He stressed the sentence "They (the Communists) always react negatively to a show of force."/7/ /7/In telegram 2566 from Moscow, January 25, Thomson included this statement after commenting that "the presence of our naval force off Wonsan will make it virtually impossible for the North Koreans to return our vessel and crew," and the show of force would hinder the Soviets from acting as an intermediary or quietly exerting influence on the North Koreans to ease the crises. (Memorandum from Rostow to the President, January 25; Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Korea--Pueblo Incident, Vol. I, Part B [through January]) Walt Rostow: Mr. President, this was not the lesson of the Cuban missile crises or the Berlin crises. Secretary McNamara: The North Korean air force has substantial superiority over the South Korean air force. If we have trouble we need to reenforce. The President: But when we send out vast armada, won't the Soviets and the Chinese say that they must be ready to protect their little brothers? Won't this really increase the tension? Is this a move to defer South Korea? What are we going to do after the aircraft are there? Where does all of this lead us? Secretary McNamara: I think we will be closer to doing something diplomatically with a call up than without. I would recommend the call up today. I would defer public knowledge of the actual movement of the aircraft. For your information, I ordered diverted 10,000 tons of bombs enroute to South Vietnam. We do not have sufficient bombs in South Korea. However, we must announce the call up. This will leak. Men have to be called from their homes. There is no way it would hold. Secretary Rusk: I would announce the call up today. I would go before the Security Council with the matter. By tomorrow evening, we can announce that we are actually sending these squadrons to Korea. Ambassador Goldberg: I would proceed with stand-by arrangements without announcement. We will parallel these efforts with diplomatic discussions. Secretary McNamara: The President must sign an Executive Order. There is no way we can do this (make the call up) without public announcement. George Christian: It would not hold to try to keep from having a public announcement. Secretary Rusk: The North Koreans may have decided to make a try at South Korea. We must jar the North Koreans loose from the idea of taking South Korea. This call up may do just that (prevent the North Koreans from thinking about offensive action against South Korea). The President: Bob (Secretary McNamara), we must assume they have calculated what our response will be to this. Will this action (calling up reserve units and sending aircraft to South Korea) jeopardize our position elsewhere, particularly in Berlin? Secretary McNamara: No, we have other units here and a number of units in Europe. In this country we have aircraft we could move to Berlin. In my opinion, we are in very good shape. The 332 aircraft that we are calling up are cats and dogs, but the 303 aircraft which are being sent to South Korea are in very good shape. The President: What can we do to bring Congress in on this? We have got to have a good discussion to see if the Fulbrights represent this country. If they do, we are committing a grave error to send men out. You remember how much trouble we got into on the Tonkin Gulf incident. I think that Senator Dodd, Senator Thurmond and Senator Russell will balance off what might be said by Senators Fulbright, Mansfield and others. Secretary McNamara: The President has the authority to call the reserves. It would be valuable to ask for legislation extending the tours of duty of those now serving. The President: That legislation would put the boys (U.S. troops) on their side. We must keep them on our side. Secretary McNamara: The best action we could ask for in the Congress would be for involuntary extension. It would permit us to keep on active service a sizeable number of highly qualified personnel. Ambassador Goldberg: Have you consulted with Congressional leaders? The President: We need to go to the Congress on this matter. Secretary Rusk: I do not recognize Senator Church by the statement he made today. He virtually asked for a declaration of war against Korea. He is a hot Korean supporter. The President: I am sure one of the reasons is that he has a Pocatello, Idaho, boy captured out there. What concerns me is this. When we get the planes out there and all of the forces you have recommended, what do we do then? Secretary McNamara: The lowest form of military action is the minding of the coast of North Korea by air. They do have some ports of significant value, but in Wonsan. They do have patrol craft at Wonsan. Secretary Rusk: What about grabbing some of their ships? Secretary McNamara: We cannot find any of their ships. They have only 4 small vessels and they aren't of much consequence. The President: As I see it, these are the steps we should undertake: 1. Take our case to Pakistan and ask them to be with us on this matter 2. Send a message to Park. Tell him that the North Korean side probably will be heard if the matter is raised before the UN. 3. Bob (Secretary McNamara), sit down with the Joint Chiefs and see what we can ask of the Congress in the way of legislation to get an overt action by them in support of our show of force. 4. Get a letter to Kosygin explaining our position and the need for their doing what they can in this matter. 5. Send a message to Prime Minister Sato of Japan outlining the situation. 6. Put our view before all our ambassadors and attaches. We should meet again about noon (the meeting was scheduled for 1:15 for lunch in the Family Dining Room). I want to get Senator Russell's judgment. He wants the Senate to go back on record in support of what we are doing. Let's not let the Congress say we are going to war without consulting them. Dean (Secretary Rusk), let's get the Cabinet back together to discuss Ambassador Roth's new proposal. It looks as though he has sold the proposal to Mills. I am concerned about financial panic in this country. Roth and Mills think this will stop everything except the textile business. Secretary Fowler has done a good job. Don't shove him. He is under a terrific strain. Secretary Trowbridge went to the hospital last night with recurring chest pains. I am afraid he may have another heart situation. He had a heart attack two years ago. Secretary McNamara then discussed the Executive Order which would call to active duty units of the Air Force Reserve. The President: I would put in the letter to Kosygin that "I do not know what North Korea has in mind but I do know that neither you or I want to increase world tensions in this area." The complete text of the message to Chairman Kosygin is attached as Attachment B./8/ /8/Reference is to Document 224. Secretary McNamara and General Wheeler should get the U.S.S. Kitty Hawk moving. Also get your unit Commanders alerted. "Anytime you have a world crisis we must have our tanks loaded, our caps on and our planes ready. Let's not be accused of being unprepared." [Continue with the next documents]
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