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FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1964-1968, Volume XXIX Korea
Department of State |
Korea 224. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union/1/ Washington, January 25, 1968, 1627Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 33-6 KOR N-US. Top Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Drafted at the White House, cleared by Rusk, and approved by Read. 104325. Ref: Moscow 2566./2/ Please deliver soonest to Gromyko following message from President Johnson to Chairman Kosygin: /2/See footnotes 5 and 7, Document 223. "January 25, 1968 Dear Mr. Chairman: On previous occasions you and I have discussed with each other the duty of all great powers to exercise their maximum effort to maintain the peace. On this basis I am urging your most serious personal attention to the irrational action of North Korean authorities in seizing the USS Pueblo in international waters in the Sea of Japan. This calculated action by North Korea is almost literally without precedent in modern times and cannot be accepted. It was engaged in no hostile action, it was clearly in international waters and was seized under circumstances which we find literally intolerable. You yourself have similar ships in various parts of the world, including at least one now present in the Sea of Japan, and could not accept action of the sort perpetrated by the North Koreans. I was disappointed that Mr. Kuznetsov, in a conversation with Ambassador Thompson, seemed to brush the matter aside as something which does not involve Soviet responsibility. This does not reflect the true responsibilities of our two governments for the reduction of tensions and for the prevention of conflict. This act of provocation by North Korea has created a deep sense of outrage among the American people. I do not know what North Korea has in mind in this situation. But, recalling our conversations at Glassboro, I am sure that we must agree that our common interests in preserving world peace would not be served by increased tensions in this area of the world. I am taking the liberty of addressing this frank message to you in the hope that you will use whatever influence you have in Pyongyang and press them to release immediately the USS Pueblo and its officers and men. I hope you will find it possible to be responsive to our concern. Sincerely, Lyndon B. Johnson." Rusk
225. Notes of Meeting/1/ Washington, January 25, 1968. /1/Source: Johnson Library, Tom Johnson's Notes of Meetings, Pueblo V, 1:26 p.m. Top Secret. Drafted by Tom Johnson. The meeting was held in the family dining room at the White House. SUBJECT PARTICIPANTS The President discussed the draft letter to President Park of Korea. That letter is attached as appendix A./2/ /2/Document 151. Walt Rostow: I would like to ask a few "devil's advocate" questions: --How much time do we use up by our actions at the U.N.? --Do we have control of the time situation if we get involved in U.N. debate? --What is the danger if we go to the U.N. for some sort of humiliation? (What is the possibility of the resolution resulting in some humiliating statements?) --How much danger is there in a resolution for us? Ambassador Goldberg: We are not in control at the time completely. We can say this is a matter of utmost urgency. We can say that we will have 24 hours and that time is of the essence. We can control the time within reasonable limits. In addition, we can wind up the Security Council exercise on Monday or Tuesday. Then we can knock it off or extend it according to our wishes. Walt Rostow: There are less fish hooks in this if we do not go for a resolution. Secretary Rusk: We ourselves need time to get our aircraft and other forces to the area, to talk with Congress, and to give the Soviets an opportunity to bring their influence to bear on the North Koreans. Secretary Katzenbach: I do not think the Security Council will tie the Korean incident to Vietnam. The non-communists will not want to discuss it. Ambassador Goldberg: We will not be able to keep Vietnam out entirely. Walt Rostow: We just received information that a North Korean aircraft is flying to Moscow with two men and 792 pounds of cargo aboard. This could be equipment taken from the Pueblo. It is suggestive that the Soviets were in on this. Secretary Katzenbach: Could CIA pick up on film the area where the boat is, via satellite photography? CIA Director Helms: We are programmed for that area. Secretary McNamara: Shouldn't we send a vessel to the area where the Pueblo dumped overboard its equipment to dive for it? General Wheeler: Based on radio messages, we have information that the North Koreans are diving for it at this time. Secretary Katzenbach: Couldn't we get photographic evidence showing the spot where the divers are located and also the coast line. This would be absolute proof of the ship's position and the fact that the ship was also outside territorial waters. Richard Helms: If we send a plane up there he had better be ready for a fight. They have MIGs flying cover for the divers, I am sure. Secretary McNamara: The particular plane that we will fly over they will not be able to fight because of the nature of the aircraft. Of course, if there were other aircraft sent, there likely would be aerial interception. Richard Helms: We will send the plane tonight our time, which is early morning there. What we get will depend on the climatic conditions. Secretary Katzenbach: Do you think the stuff that was thrown overboard was damaged sufficiently to make it of no value? Secretary McNamara: I doubt it. We just do not know. The President: What is the answer why the Air Force cancelled the orders? Secretary McNamara: It was because of darkness and the time before darkness made the effort marginal. Also, there was a substantial enemy force there. So the commander felt he should not do it and cancelled the order. The President: Dean and Bob, what should we do? Secretary Rusk: I would recommend going ahead to the Security Council. Ambassador Goldberg: I could go to the Security Council tonight and ask for an emergency session. I would call on the President of the Security Council, give him a letter, and release the letter. The President: What do we do from there? Secretary Rusk: We've gone to Kosygin. We've gone to Sato. This will get the Secretary General in it. Indonesia, also, has been contacted. The ambassadors of the 16 countries which had troops in Korea are being contacted. The President: How do we get the ship and the boys back? Secretary McNamara: 1. We need authorization to extend duty. 2. We need authorization to call up individual reservists. This would give us something to get a vote on in the Congress. We could ask for special authority to increase aid to the Republic of Korea. I would ask Congress to validate authority to call up civilian aircraft if we are short on transport. The President: Clark, how did your testimony go this morning? (Mr. Clifford was called to testify on his nomination to the Senate as Secretary of Defense.) Clark Clifford: I think I got through the testimony all right this morning. Secretary McNamara: The request to extend tours and call people from the reserves is a good one. We could use this legislation. Secretary Katzenbach: Would this legislation give authority or would it actually activate units? Secretary McNamara: It would give the President authority. I would request authority to call up about 150,000 reservists. Secretary Katzenbach: A request for $100 million in aid does not serve the purpose at all. The President: Now that all of you have said that, what I want to know is how we are going to get that ship out. Secretary McNamara: What I recommend immediately is that we ask for authority to call up individual reservists, not units. Secretary Rusk: We also must face the situation of infiltration. General Wheeler: We must be in a position to cope with any eventuality. Secretary Rusk: Remember that North Korea has a 1961 alliance with the Soviet Union and China. Secretary McNamara: The Joint Chiefs want an extension of the terms of service. The Marines lose 1600 trained men per month. Mr. President, you improve quicker the quality of our armed forces by extension of tours than by any other method. 2,500 men a day leave the service. The President: When we get all our men out there and all these planes out there and all these extensions, what do we do then? Secretary McNamara: Mr. President, we are not prepared to make a recommendation on that today. Secretary Rusk: I have reservations about the Tonkin Gulf resolution unless the other side forces our hand. Ambassador Goldberg: As a layman, I would like to give you one reaction you may want to consider. I think we want to avoid taking steps which would make it look as if we are seizing on this incident to plug up all the loopholes that are existing in our current military posture. We do not want it to appear through any of our actions that we are using this to fill the gaps on our military program. Secretary McNamara: Arthur, the facts just will not support that view. If I do not need these men I will not ask for them. We do not have gaps on our forces we have to fill. Secretary Katzenbach: Won't they relate this to Vietnam (the extension of military tours). General Wheeler: We could carry on with our rotation in Vietnam at the same time we do what is necessary in Korea. Secretary McNamara: I can assure you that we have no plans whatever to extend tours in Vietnam absent Korea. In fact, we think that one of the reasons why morale is so high in Vietnam is because of the limited tour of duty. We think it is a good system. Director Helms: Isn't there a shortage of U.S. officers in Korea? General Wheeler: There is a world-wide shortage of Captains and Majors throughout the army. (The President was interrupted by the telephone. He talked for several minutes with Senator Dirksen. After the conversation ended the President reported that he had told Senator Dirksen that we will take whatever diplomatic moves that are available, that we will meet whatever needs the military has, and then we will make decisions about our courses of action. I told him our principal interests were in getting the ship back and in getting the boys back. We must come up with a way to get that ship back.) Secretary Katzenbach: Mr. President, the only way to get that ship out with the crew is talking through diplomatic channels. We must make it clear that this is the wiser course for North Korea. It is only through diplomatic channels that we will get them out. We must show them that this matter is sufficiently serious to release the ship and the crew. I think we should take our steps fairly slowly. We should see how we are doing in the United Nations before we ask for broader authority in Korea. Secretary Rusk: We cannot shoot the men out of there. The North Koreans do not have vessels on the high seas that we can seize. Director Helms: The only North Korean we have in our possession is the number two man in the North Korean news agency who defected. His point of view is that they will exploit the incident and then turn the ship loose for humanitarian reasons. The President: That is about the same thing the Ambassador to Korea said. Ambassador Goldberg: They do have territorial shipping. Assuming they have ships plying at coastal waters, couldn't we seize one of these? Secretary McNamara: They have only four, and they are of very little importance. Ambassador Goldberg: Grabbing anything of theirs is permitted by law in limited retaliation of this act. However, sowing mines is an act of war. This would not be considered retaliatory. Secretary Katzenbach: Military action alone does not get them back. Seizing a couple of ships does not get them back. I think they are more concerned about what we may do. This is more important than taking some limited action so that they know what our response is. You are worse off when they do not know what you might do. Secretary McNamara: We would like to move certain forces to the area. We need to pace ourselves. The Chiefs would like to move 26 B-52s, 15 to Okinawa and 11 to Guam. The President: Go ahead and send the B-52s. Secretary Rusk: We should touch base with Sato before we do this. Walt Rostow: Ambassador Goldberg called this an incident. What is important is the North Korean policy and what is behind that policy. We know this is new pressure against South Korea and ourselves. If we are to act we must be prepared for any action they may take. The President: What else do you have in mind, Bob? Secretary McNamara: I would move other aircraft to the area. The President: Why not move them out? Secretary McNamara: I think for two reasons we should delay in moving the aircraft. It reduces our effectiveness of approach at the U.N. We are not contemplating any action right away. Dick Helms: We do not see any signs of a major offensive action by the North Koreans into South Korea. Ambassador Goldberg: I would like to address myself to the points raised by Bob McNamara. He is the man who will be responsible if our diplomatic efforts at the U.N. fail. I think to make military moves would not bother me. As the letter to Ayub Khan said, we do want to settle this matter by diplomatic means if possible./3/ /3/See footnote 7, Document 228. I see some positive signs that would be provided by the military action (of sending air units to South Korea). Secretary McNamara: Let's get Sato's permission first. We'll then move the B-52s. Secretary Rusk: Let's do not call it permission. It is notification. The President: We must move up our forces to awaken the people to the danger. I would move our forces to the bases we already have. I would move them without saying much. I would be guided by the views of the military. Let's get our defenses in position. The intercepts show North Korea is going into full mobilization. I would not send the B-52s out to bomb North Korea but I would put them into position. The Chiefs think they should be moved. We have got to have our hand out and our guard up. Secretary Rusk: I am inclined to agree with Arthur that the military moves will support our diplomatic efforts at the U.N. It will show the urgency and the seriousness of the matter. Secretary McNamara: It is easy then. We will move the B-52s this afternoon. Secretary Rusk: I do not see why you have to announce these units squadron by squadron, and give our battle plan. Secretary McNamara: It will leak all over the place if we don't. George Christian: I always feel like we should give all the information we can on a matter like this. Our position looks rather weak when we fail to give the units and later it leaks out all over. The President: Clark, what is your judgment on this whole situation? Clark Clifford: It has been my experience that when a situation of this type arises the public is first outraged. Later they change their mind. If anything, I have a feeling that we need to proceed with caution. The situation about the ship is rather fuzzy in my mind. I have great concern about us getting out word of mobilization in this country. Suppose tomorrow that the North Koreans announce that they are mobilizing. Then we really build this situation up. Then, what if we do nothing? I am not comfortable with this large military build-up. We may find that the matter will simmer down a lot during the U.N. discussion. I feel I should urge great caution in this matter and that we should proceed accordingly. If it appears we pose a threat to North Korea and do nothing, we are in a very difficult situation. Secretary Rusk: If North Korea goes crazy and launches an attack we couldn't do very much. General Wheeler: I would agree with that. The South Korean airforce is very weak compared with North Korea. Secretary McNamara: But we must remember that we have the Enterprise and that it could retaliate with substantial force. There is a place where you get into a very critical position with this build-up. The President: Then it becomes do we do something or nothing. What is your judgment, General Wheeler? General Wheeler: I would like to proceed with positioning our force in South Korea as recommended. I would place 170 land-based aircraft in the area. I would proceed to station the U.S.S. Kitty Hawk off North Korea. I would put her on the coast available to us. This would give us 300 carrier aircraft and 150 land-based aircraft. This would give us ample aircraft to protect us against any eventuality. The President: Why now? General Wheeler: We can move the aircraft quickly, but we have to have at least 18 hours to give the pilots a night's sleep and to provide some time to shake down on the bases. We must move maintenance units and spare parts. It would be four to five days before all of the units are operationally ready. The 26 B-52s will give us heavy strike capability if preemptive strikes begin. The President: General Wheeler, how do you appraise our actions in light of what effect they will have on North Korea? What I am saying is, is it worth it to have your extra assurance when it may be viewed as a great provocation? General Wheeler: First I do not think we can take the B-52s away from Vietnam. General Westmoreland faces a very serious situation. In recent cables he has asked for 120 B-52 mission capability per month. We are doing that. We should reach that level by February 1. It would be imprudent to draw down on Westmoreland's supply of B-52s. He is about to have the most vicious battle of the Vietnam war. B-52s have an all-weather capability. If other aircraft area unable to fly, the B-52s become very vital in support of our ground forces. To the larger question, all military schools teach us that military power is in existence to enhance our foreign policy capabilities and to preserve the internal security of the United States. I think that more military moves would support our diplomatic efforts that are our first order of business. But we should be prepared to move on the other front if the need arises. Some would regard this as a provocation, I am sure. I know the Soviets would. I believe that it will prove to friend and enemy alike that there is determination on the part of the United States to do everything it can on both the diplomatic and the military front if necessary. Public sentiment does change, but while we are moving on the diplomatic front we must be prepared to do something else if necessary. Secretary McNamara: We will alert our B-52s. We can get by with not announcing this. By alerting them tonight, we can reduce the lead time. The President: Buzz, what you are saying is that you do not know what you will be called upon to do but you do know that if we take the B-52s away from Westmoreland that this would be inappropriate. You believe we should put in the others to be ready in the event of an attack. General Wheeler: That is correct, sir. You will recall that in 1950 the North Koreans moved in artillery and moved across the DMZ. I would not discount the possibility of this happening again. I would want the B-52s and the fighter bombers to back up the ground forces. The President: What you would do is have them so they could pulverize the enemy before they got across the DMZ if necessary. General Wheeler: That is correct, sir. Also they are continuing their infiltration across the DMZ. The most symbolic act of the infiltrators was the attack on Blue House. President Park said he would stand still for a reasonable time. But I think Park will retaliate if there is another Blue House incident or something of that type. I would like to have my units there in case they are needed. If diplomatic efforts fail there will be pressure to take retaliatory actions against North Koreans. We must be ready to react to what they might do. Although we don't like to imagine it, there could be a restart of the Korean War. I asked the President to approve moving the units in the soonest possible time. --We should place the Kitty Hawk in the Japan area in
the next four days. Ambassador Goldberg: These military actions will create a sense of urgency for the U.N. to act. The only time those guys (the representatives to the United Nations) will do anything is when they have to. Clark Clifford: Buzz Wheeler makes a very logical case. But it disturbs me deeply. I think the President must proceed on the basis of probabilities and not possibilities. I think the North Koreans are not able to mount a massive military activity. They are engaged in harassments. We should not send fleets of our aircraft to Korea. I think that is wrong. I think this heightens tension and builds it up. If North Korea is planning something important that could then begin the provocation for us moving. I would get the planes and crews ready here at home. But our moral posture will be better if the North Koreans move first. I am deeply sorry about the ship and the 83 men but I do not think it is worth a resumption of the Korean War. The President: We know what we will do if we had these planes out there and if North Korea attacked. What do we do if we get the planes out there and North Korea does not attack? That is something we must consider. [1 paragraph (1 line of source text) not declassified] I want to get some of the Joint Chiefs of Staff opinion as to why they believe they need the aircraft there now if we do not expect an attack. Of course we should authorize Ambassador Goldberg to go to the U.N. and present our case. Let's meet again tonight at 6:30.
226. Notes of Meeting/1/ Washington, January 25, 1968, 6:30-7:45 p.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, Tom Johnson's Notes of Meetings, Pueblo VI, 6:30. Top Secret. Drafted by Tom Johnson. SUBJECT ATTENDING WERE THE FOLLOWING The President: What recommendations do you have? General Wheeler: We are looking at four or five military possibilities: 1. The placement of mines in the Wonsan Harbor. This would require substantial air action to handle the situation properly and require neutralization of air fields in the area. We would have to destroy the Wonsan military facilities. It is probable that we would require naval aircraft for support. 2. Mine other North Korean ports. We would select two or three important ports. The same problems requiring the need for air support would be present. 3. Interdict coastal shipping. For this we also need heavy air cover. 4. Strike any one of a list of targets in North Korea by air or by air and naval gun fire. Hopefully we will have better photographs of North Korea after a reconnaissance mission tonight. 5. Replace Pueblo with another ship protected by ample air and naval cover. Anything else would require substantial military action. The suggestion has been made that we seize North Korean ships. But they have no large ocean going craft. And we do not know where the four small vessels they have are located. The President: What are we going to do with the aircraft that we plan to send to South Korea. Will they be there for purely defense purposes in case of further incidents? General Wheeler: They would be there in the event that a decision was made to take reprisal action against North Korea in addition to their defensive value. Secretary McNamara: If the North Koreans were to release the ship and or the crew in ten to twelve days the only thing we would have suffered would be humiliation. If we decide to replace the Pueblo with the U.S.S. Banner, we will need air support to protect it. If we do not get the Pueblo back the President would want full air power there to take care of any massive response. In my judgment, mining would be the smallest increment of military action. Under Secretary Katzenbach: We could keep their shipping and their patrol boats in the Wonsan Harbor. Secretary McNamara: To do that we must have air cover and naval craft. Under Secretary Katzenbach: The North Koreans have made gains right away. I believe they regard this action as a low risk effort. They have shown that they can do this. They may underestimate our difficulties elsewhere or place a high value on causing us more difficulties in this area. There is some indication this may be what they want to do. They are seeking to make life much more difficult for us. There is no evidence (Richard Helms also confirmed this) that the North Koreans want to start another war. They may be willing to return the crew and the ship. They may get something from the equipment aboard the ship. But this still leaves us with the fact that they took a tug at Uncle Sam's beard and got away with it. I would put a high probability factor on their returning this ship. The President: Well, what do we do now? Under Secretary Katzenbach: I would prefer to see the screw turned on North Korea. In gradual steps we would move aircraft to South Korea. It makes good sense to move in the fighter bombers for the reasons Buzz (General Wheeler) has given, and also to show the North Koreans and the United Nations the seriousness of the situation. I would send in a squadron of aircraft tomorrow. Then send in other planes on Saturday and more on Sunday. I do have a question about the B-52's. If you send the B-52's to the area without any public knowledge there is not much punch that this gives to the diplomatic effort. If we send the B-52's to the area with public knowledge that this is connected to Korea it may be too big. This may be too much. But you do increase the potential of the United Nations doing something by sending in the fighter bombers. The President: What is the practical effect of this? Under Secretary Katzenbach: I think that will get rid of the issue quicker. By moving the aircraft in gradually you will get more out of it than by doing it all at one time or by not doing it at all. The President: The incident, Pueblo seizure, may be more than a pinprick. In my judgment this must be coordinated with what is happening in South Vietnam. (Stepped up attacks on U.S. units in Vietnam along with major North Vietnamese and Viet Cong build ups.) Secretary McNamara: I agree with that, although I have no real evidence of the connection. I view this situation very seriously. The great danger that we must avoid is that the Soviets and the North Vietnamese will interpret something that we do as a sign of weakness. If we show weakness and are not firm, I think it will prolong the Vietnam war substantially. Clark Clifford: I would like to view this matter differently. Let us assume for the moment that our only goal is to get the men and the ship back. What would be the best way to achieve that end? If we get the ship and the men back without taking substantial military action the President will get credit for restraint. We may have gotten a hair pulled from our beard. I would be ready to sacrifice that hair because our options are limited at this time. We must be ready for the next try. We have very few alternatives at this point. So, again I ask what are the best ways to get the ship and the men back. The President: I see little hope that the United Nations will yield anything productive. We do need to show that this is a very serious matter. We must show to the North Koreans and their brothers that they must avoid the confrontation. We need to show our plan in the United Nations and display some muscle to back up that plan. Tommy Thompson (Ambassador to Moscow) said the Communist never react well to a show of force. That was not the lesson learned in the Middle East and in the Cuban Missile Crisis. We must not let them misjudge our strength so that they will be encouraged to do this type of thing again. Personally I would like to find some of their ships and do the same thing to them which they have done to us. What about some other alternatives that we have not discussed such as the South Koreans taking offensive action across the DMZ. The North Koreans have been doing a lot of infiltrating and harassment, so why not reciprocate? General Wheeler: The ROK are eager to go into North Korea on hit and run raids like those taken into South Korea by the North Koreans. We have exercised great restraint on the South Koreans to the point where the South Koreans will no longer tell our American General the ROK plans. Under Secretary Nitze: Mr. President, we discussed the fact that the Pueblo threw overboard classified equipment. Another alternative is for us to send a destroyer into the area where the gear was thrown overboard. The destroyer would have divers aboard to bring the gear up. This is completely legal and it is possible that the North Koreans would take action against this vessel. If they did we would be in a good position in the eyes of world opinion to retaliate. We do not know if they are trying to recover that gear themselves. The President: I thought we had an intercept that showed that they are trying to recover the material with divers. Isn't that true Walt? Walt Rostow: That is correct. We had an intercept today which indicated they are diving in the area. Secretary Nitze: There will be an ox cart mission tonight which should give us some additional information about that. Walt Rostow: Our alternatives are basically two: 1. Actions to get the ship back. We should search all photographs and look for their ships. Personally I would not be opposed to seizing a Korean ship flying a Polish flag. We should strain for ways to find their ships and determine operational methods to place mines without knocking out their airfields and other facilities used for defense. Of course we must be fully prepared for what counter actions the North Koreans might be prepared to take. The President: Would you address yourself to the question presented by Clark Clifford: What will produce the ship. Walt Rostow: A conviction by the North Koreans that they will run into more trouble than it is worth. That will produce the ship. They think we are strained and tied down in Vietnam. Therefore a measured show of force is appropriate. I feel we should put in additional air power for the following reasons: A. We need increased air power in the Republic of Korea anyway. This incident dramatizes the deficiency of the aircraft in South Korea. It was surprising that we only had four planes there and that they were "out to lunch." B. If this effort fails and we undertake to disgorge the ship, we still need heavy air cover. The President: The only thing you know is to put more aircraft there. Is that the answer to Clark's question? Thompson says this will make them more entrenched. Under Secretary Katzenbach: What I believe Ambassador Thompson had in mind was that we should not say "hand over or else." They are tough little bastards. I do not think Tommy had in mind a series of steps to make North Korea know that we are about to do something and that we mean business. I think a measured show of force supports our diplomatic efforts. You can tell publicly--I do not think it has been mentioned before--that we are giving South Korea two destroyers. You can move in the B-52's. In my judgment all of these actions support our diplomatic efforts. We can start by saying that no North Korean shipping will come out of two or three harbors. By blocking them off, we take reversible steps. In other words these are steps that do not require that we take additional steps. We should not let the North Koreans think that the Security Council is the way we have planned to deal with this. They must know we are prepared to take further actions, military ones if necessary. The President: You and Bob McNamara work out a schedule of movements for the aircraft to South Korea. What do you say in answer to Clark Clifford's question. What do we do if this is our whole objective. Secretary McNamara: We must protect ourselves from permitting the North Koreans and the North Vietnamese and the Soviets getting the belief that we are weak. I would go back to Kosygin. I think the Soviets knew of this or if they did not they have enough influence to shape the conduct of North Korea. I would not deal in a belligerent, public way, but I would show them that it is essential to give up the ship and the men. Director Helms: What is wrong in telling the North Koreans they must get the ship to us by a certain date or face the consequences. The President: The simple answer to that is that we do not want a war with the Chinese and the Soviets. General Wheeler: Here is a proposed schedule for movement of tactical air. We are talking about an order of 8 days using forces in West Pac. In the first three days you would have 28 F-104's, 14 reconnaissance aircraft and 28 F-105's. Two days later you would have the bulk of the U.S. strike force. This would be 28 F-105's, 18 F-100's and 17 F4D's. After seven days you will have initial combat readiness. Under Secretary Katzenbach: When will this become public knowledge? General Wheeler: As soon as the units begin to move out. These things are very easily discernible from the movement of men and equipment. The President: I do not see what is wrong with sending out the 28 fighters and the 14 reconnaissance planes now. Under Secretary Katzenbach: I think that is fine. Secretary McNamara: What you want is a series of movements. I do not think we need to make a decision tonight on this. I would recommend mid-day tomorrow. The President: I do want to space this out (the movement of aircraft into South Korea) but I want President Park to know that we are going to do this. Secretary McNamara: We can do this easily. Clark Clifford: Mr. President, in a discussion we had yesterday at the Department of State I presented a view. Since you were not there I would like to give it here. I do not think our case with reference to the ship is a strong one. The North Koreans have a better case on where the ship was. They were there. We weren't. This was a "spy ship". There is a general feeling in the world that if you catch a spy you do him in. The North Koreans can say that we invaded their waters. We do not have a clear case to support. We must not issue an ultimatum. The odds are they would tell us to go sell our papers. Like blackmail, it is no good if you publicize it. It will become public knowledge we are sending in planes. The North Koreans have indicated something more may be coming. We do want to be prepared and ready for that. I recommend that we approach the Soviets again. I recommend that we go to the United Nations. I suggest that we start a quiet build up. We should send another message to Kosygin. The North Koreans may conclude they have gotten as much out of this incident as they can. Frankly I can stand a minor set back to our position rather than to take action which may lead us into another war. The capture of a spy ship is not worth us going to war. The President: Okay, let's get a spaced-out movement. Secretary McNamara: I will get the orders prepared tonight. We can issue them tomorrow at mid-day. The President: I ask all present to assemble again at 11:00 a.m. on Friday./2/ /2/January 26. Under Secretary Katzenbach: We went to the Red Cross and asked them for the release of the ship's crew and also for the return of the body of the dead sailor. I thought we should do this regardless of what other action we are taking.
227. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State/1/ Moscow, January 26, 1968, 1150Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 33-6 KOR N-US. Top Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Received on January 26 at 8:46 a.m. 2585. Ref: State 104325;/2/ Moscow 2579./3/ /2/Document 224. /3/In telegram 2579 from Moscow, January 26, Thompson informed the Department of State of his scheduled appointment with Gromyko to present the President's message and asked that the matter not be publicized, since the Soviets were "more inclined to be helpful if they are not exposed to the charge of collusion with us or of twisting the arms of their little brothers." (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 33-6 KOR N-US) 1. I delivered to Gromyko President's message to Kosygin at 12:45 today. After reading message, Gromyko asked me if I had anything to say orally. I replied I had nothing to add to what I had said in my conversations with Kuznetsov, about which I assumed Gromyko was informed. 2. Gromyko said he would, of course, transmit message to addressee, and Soviet leadership and government would be informed of its contents. By way of preliminary comment, however, he said he hoped US Government would take sober position in this matter and not succumb to momentary sentiments which, as also indicated in President's message, now evident in US. Situation, facts as well as consequences, should be weighed very carefully. He said that for obvious reasons he did not wish to discuss at this time possible Soviet answer to message. 3. Stressing that he was now speaking outside context his preliminary remarks, Gromyko expressed deep regret US vessels took such liberties. Asserted US military command apparently sees nothing wrong in US vessels coming close to shores, cities, and installations of other countries. US military command seems to be in habit of disregarding interests other states. For example, Soviets had sent numerous notes to US containing specific data about location, time, and identification numbers US aircraft which had buzzed Soviet ships but in each case US gave standard reply that Soviet information not in accordance with facts. This reduced government-to-government communications to level where they could not be regarded as serious. 4. Repeating I had little to add to what I had told Kuznetsov, I pointed out US concerned about pattern of incidents along DMZ in Korea, with latest such incident having been infiltration 31 North Korean agents into South Korea. Coming on top of this, Pueblo incident could not but add to seriousness with which we viewed situation. 5. Gromyko asserted other side had information and facts re infiltration of agents in Korea which were of entirely opposite nature, but he did not wish dwell on this. He concluded by stating President's message would be studied and reply conveyed to us in due course. 6. In response my question when Kosygin due back from India, Gromyko said Kosygin would be in India another two or three days and might stop for day or two in Afghanistan on his way back. Thompson
228. Notes of Meeting/1/ Washington, January 26, 1968, 11:08 a.m.-12:02 p.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, Tom Johnson's Notes of Meetings, Pueblo VII, 11:00 a.m. Top Secret. Drafted by Tom Johnson. The meeting was held in the Cabinet Room at the White House. The time of the meeting is from the President's Daily Diary. (Ibid.) SUBJECT THOSE IN ATTENDANCE WERE Prior to the President's arrival the following agenda was agreed upon: 1. An intelligence situation report by Richard Helms. 2. A diplomatic situation report by Under Secretary Katzenbach. 3. A summary of the military proposals on aircraft movement and other actions by Secretary McNamara and General Wheeler. 4. A discussion of the merits of a Presidential address to the Nation. 5. More discussion on Clark Clifford's question of Thursday, "How best to secure the return of the Pueblo if diplomacy fails." Secretary McNamara: We should not plan on any military action in less than seven days. General Wheeler: That is correct. That time will be required to get all of our units on the ground and make them combat effective. Secretary McNamara: We should have working sessions periodically to discuss these matters. We may do this without the President. I suggest that we ask the State Department to call these meetings. We should have one a day. Let's work out a system like we had in the Cuban Missile Crisis./2/ /2/On January 26 an interagency Korean Working Group and a State Department Korean Task Force were formed and headed by Berger. (Memorandum for the Korean Working Group, January 26; ibid., National Security File, Country File, Korea--Pueblo Incident, Miscellaneous, Vol. I) At 11:00 a.m. the President joined the meeting. I. Intelligence Situation Report Director Helms: On the overflight last night, the Soviet and North Korean radar picked up this flight. There was no effort to intercept it although it made repeated photographic runs. We did get photographs. I expect a photographic report from Japan later today./3/ /3/On January 29 the Directorate of Intelligence issued a memorandum containing a preliminary assessment of information gathered by a Black Shield flight over North Korea on January 26. An analysis of the photographs showed "no unusual air or naval deployments," but "North Korean surface-to-air missile defenses appear to be in a high state of readiness." The overflight photographed the Pueblo in Wonsan Bay. The ship had no visible damage and was guarded by three patrol boats armed with Komar missiles. (Ibid.) [3 paragraphs (7 lines of source text) not declassified] II. Diplomatic Situation Report Deputy Secretary Berger: The Goldberg text is now being worked on (Goldberg text attached as Appendix A)./4/ /4/Not printed; the text of Goldberg's January 26 statement is in Department of State Bulletin, February 12, 1968, pp. 194-198. --The Japanese were contacted. They replied that this is a very grave situation./5/ /5/Document 222 discusses the approach to Japanese officials. Ambassador Johnson subsequently met with Ushiba to review Korean developments. Johnson was informed that Miki would contact the Soviet Ambassador in Tokyo to express his government's concerns about North Korean actions. (Telegram 4998 from Tokyo, January 25; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 15-1 KOR S) In a January 30 letter Sato responded to President Johnson's message by expressing his own fears and concerns about the situation in Korea and his commitment to cooperating with the United States to settle the Pueblo crisis and North Korean guerrilla actions. (Telegram 108777 to Tokyo, February 2; ibid.) --We have no reply as yet about our notice that we would be sending additional B-52's to Okinawa. --The Indonesians have told their Ambassador in North Korea to urge the release of our ship and crew./6/ /6/In telegram 4279 from Djakarta, January 26, Ambassador Marshall Green informed the Department of his meeting with Indonesia's Minister of Foreign Affairs Adam Malik, who promised to contact immediately "his ambassador in Pyongyang instructing him to inform NK authorities of Indonesia's concern and to urge immediate release of Pueblo and crew in order to prevent situation from deteriorating further." (Ibid., POL 33-6 KOR N-US) --The Pakistanis have assured us of their support in the U.N./7/ (The President asked if Berger is certain of this. The President said he had a different reading of the text. The President asked "Did he sign on?") Berger said, not exactly. /7/Reference appears to be to President Johnson's letter to Pakistani President Ayub Khan and the reply thereto. Johnson's letter requested that Ayub instruct his UN Ambassador, who was also President of the Security Council, to support "a simple resolution of the Security Council expressing concern about the grave situation, calling for strict observance of the Armistice Agreement, and requesting the immediate release of the United States crew and vessel." (Telegram 104475 to Rawalpindi, January 25; ibid.) In reply, Ayub stated that "Ambassador Shahi is in touch with other members of the Security Council and we earnestly hope that consensus will emerge amongst the members of the Council on the best means to meet the situation." (Telegram 2969 from Rawalpindi, January 26; ibid.) --The tenor of most of the replies have been friendly./8/ The President asked if there was any report on the nine members of the United Nations Security Council. Mr. Berger said there had been no report on their positions. /8/The Department of State sent telegrams to all Ambassadors informing them of the facts surrounding the Pueblo incident and Blue House raid and asking that they request their host government to express support for the United States by, but not limited to, approaching the USSR and, where appropriate, North Korea. (Telegrams 104818 and 104819, both January 26; ibid.) By the evening of January 26, when a summary of responses received thus far was given to him, the President noted "we have too few replies and our Ambassadors don't seem to have much clout. Please follow thru for reports from all posts." (Memorandum from Smith to the President, January 26; Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Korea--Pueblo Incident, Vol. Ia, Part B [through January]) Walt Rostow: The Security Council meets at 3:30 p.m. The President: Let me see the draft of the Goldberg statement. Secretary McNamara: Has there been a response from Moscow yet? Under Secretary Katzenbach: Yes, Gromyko was negative. They showed some concern. He was less negative than Kuznetsov. They urge restraint. They said they hope we will not over-react to this. The President: May I see the cable on the Soviet discussion? (Ambassador Thompson's cable is attached as Appendix B.)/9/ /9/Reference is to Document 227. The President: Is there any chance whatever that this ship was in territorial waters? Secretary McNamara: It is possible, but the chances are less than 50-50. General Wheeler: The ship has the best navigational gear we have. North Korea has a rugged coastline. Because of this we can get a good fix by radar. Admiral Moorer has said that it is very improbable that the vessel was even a mile from where it ought to be. In addition, the intercepts of North Korean radio traffic confirm that the North Korean ships which intercepted the Pueblo were in the same area the Pueblo reported as its location. Secretary McNamara: The only thing which would have brought the Pueblo inside of the territorial waters was the possibility that they were getting a very good intercept and needed to move closer to get a better product. The President: Do you have anything more to report on the men and the equipment. Secretary McNamara: We have nothing more on this. Director Helms: There is nothing either way. General Wheeler: There was a North Korean press message which said that the crew should be tried and punished as criminals. Under Secretary Katzenbach: We interpret this as their response to our calling up reserves. The President: Do we harass Soviet ships? Secretary McNamara: Yes, they harass us too. This is almost a way of life on the high seas. The President: Let's be more careful about all of this. Secretary McNamara: We will reassess the whole thing. Under Secretary Katzenbach: I thought there was a case of our buzzing a ship in Haiphong Harbor. Secretary McNamara: That was a photo reconnaissance mission to see if the ship was damaged as alleged. III. Military Proposals Secretary McNamara summarized in handwriting his schedule for aircraft movements. (Attached as Appendix C.)/10/ /10/Not printed. --Sunday--13 --Two days later, we will send in 18 aircraft from Vietnam. These are 18 aircraft which are being replaced and will not be sent from Vietnam until their replacements arrive in Vietnam. The 26 B-52's will bring the total to 347 aircraft including those aboard the U.S.S. Enterprise. We would like a decision on this whole matter today. This action will leak. We will try to hold it as tightly as possible, but when men and units begin to move the press gets wind of it. Secretary McNamara reviewed with George Christian the proposed answers to questions concerning the aircraft movements. The President approved the answers. (Attached as Appendix D.)/11/ /11/Not printed. Secretary McNamara: We would like to alert the units today for movement. The President: Is this what you want now General Wheeler? General Wheeler: Yes sir. The President: Does State agree with this? Under Secretary Katzenbach: Yes we do. The President: Clark, do you agree with this? Clark Clifford: I have no objection. The President: What do we say now to the Congress? Secretary McNamara: Mr. President you have before you a list of authority which we would like to require from the Congress in relation to the Pueblo incident. These are as follows: 1. Authorize the extension of all enlistments, appointments, periods of active duty, and other periods of obligated service of Regular and Reserve members of the Army, Navy, Marine Corps and Air Force. Reason required--Extension of tours of duty involuntarily is the quickest way to achieve any needed expansion of force strength. Such extension will add 2200 trained personnel per day. This can be authorized by Joint Resolution. 2. Authorize the call of all individual Reservists. Reason required--Department of Defense Appropriation Act, 1967,/12/ authorizes the President to order units of the ready Reserve of an armed force to active duty. Authority to call individuals from units is required in order to fill gaps in units on active duty with personnel possessing special skills. Moreover, extension of tours of those presently on active duty would be inequitable unless individual Reservists are subject to call. This, too, can be accomplished by Joint Resolution. /12/PL 89-687, October 15, 1966, 80 Stat. 980-998; the Appropriation Act of 1968 actually covered the fiscal year ending June 30, 1968, however. See PL 90-96, September 29, 1967, 81 Stat. 231-249. 3. Expand South Korean military assistance program by $100,000,000. Reason required--The MAP request for Fiscal Year 1968 was cut 40%. This made it impossible to expand the military assistance given to South Korea, although such expansion is warranted in view of their troop contribution in South Vietnam and the increased level of harassment by North Korean forces. A supplemental appropriation under the Foreign Assistance Act will permit the funding of destroyers, helicopters and artillery and facilities needed for counter-infiltration purposes, and the necessary modernization to increase the defense capabilities of ROK aircraft, vehicles, anti-aircraft equipment and patrol craft. In addition, it will fund the required increase in ammunition levels. The President: How many times have we authorized the extension of enlistments and periods of active duty? Secretary McNamara: Many times. The President: Get me the number of times we have done it and the reasons for each. Secretary McNamara: We will do that. The President: We can only call units now? Secretary McNamara: This is correct. We can only call units. This request would permit the authority to call individuals from units in order to fill any gaps in units on active duty with personnel possessing special skills. The President: How many men does this affect? Secretary McNamara: Roughly 150,000. The President: How much was cut from the military assistance program? Secretary McNamara: The Fiscal Year 1968 request was cut 40%. The President: Nick (Under Secretary Katzenbach) how do we get an expression from the Congress on what our policy should be in regard to Korea? George (George Christian) we must make certain that in the future we notify the Congress before the press announcement is made. There are a few people who are mad because they were not advised of the call up action yesterday. Secretary McNamara: Mendel Rivers is mad. The President: Mansfield is also bellyaching about it. Secretary McNamara: I called Mansfield. Under Secretary Katzenbach: If you go all the way down the road you need nothing short of a Tonkin Resolution. The President: The Tonkin Resolution wasn't very effective. Fulbright is against a resolution of any kind. We should discretely show the Congress copies of the mutual security acts between North Korea and the Soviets. I thought we should have had a resolution on the Israel situation. We have a new ball game with the Foreign Relations Committee. Let's do what we can to bring them along a little bit. Let's give some thought to how we can get Congress in on it. We need more than a toast--that is all we have on the Israel situation. If they (the Congress) murder us on Vietnam with all those facts including SEATO and the Tonkin Gulf Resolution, what are we going to do in a situation like this. Secretary McNamara: I agree. We need strong Congressional support. The President: I have always tried to put Congress in on the take-off as well as on the landing. If the Dominican Republic means nothing, if the Tonkin Gulf means nothing, what do we do here. We do not want to exercise power and authority without the support and approval of the Congress. Let's discuss with Senator Fulbright and Senator Russell what ways we should approach this matter. At some point we are going to be called upon to put up or shut up. I want Secretary McNamara to set up a meeting with Senator Russell and take Buzz (General Wheeler) along with you. Nick (Under Secretary Katzenbach) you do the same with Senator Fulbright and Senator Mansfield. Also I want you (General Wheeler) to get General Goodpaster to go over this with President Eisenhower./13/ /13/See Document 239. Memoranda of other briefings as well of Rusk's comments to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on January 26 are in the Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Korea--Pueblo Incident, Vol. I, Part B (through January) and ibid., Vol. Ib, Part A (beginning February). In a letter to Rusk on February 1 Fulbright posed 20 questions on the Pueblo situation. A substantive, all-encompassing series of reports replying to those questions was sent to Fulbright on March 20. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 33-6 KOR N-US) Get him to ask Ike what is our best constitutional way to proceed. Paul, (Secretary Nitze) do you have any thoughts on this? Secretary Nitze: The key here is Senator Fulbright. He wants to put the Executive Branch in a position where they cannot make a move without the approval of his Committee. The President: Bromley, (Bromley Smith) get me the dates and exactly what we did in the situations leading up to the Dominican Republic and the Tonkin Gulf. Get them to me right away. Now let us address ourselves to the question of what we do if diplomacy fails. Walt Rostow: We really cannot do that until we see what happens in the United Nations. In addition we need to get a read-out on photo reconnaissance. The President: I want you to get your very best dreamers on this right away. Are there no economic sanctions we can take? Walt Rostow: We will set up a special task force on this. The President: Get your very best people working on this. Secretary McNamara: Mr. President, we should remind you of something we pointed out before the President entered. It would not be appropriate to take any military action in less than seven days because of the need to get our units there and get them combat effective. The President: We also should keep in close touch with the Korean Embassy. Park may be about to blow something and we would be involved. The President: What about a television address to the Nation?/14/ /14/See footnote 6, Document 223. George Christian: The point of concern is that the President has said nothing publicly on this matter, although I would not recommend any television now, I would think the President might want to consider dropping something into a speech. Under Secretary Katzenbach: We must remember that Goldberg is coming up on television for the next two or three days, so there will be plenty of Administration talk. The President: I want you to give Rusk and Goldberg an outline of what to say in their speeches. All of you remember that we brought those Russian ships in a while back. They paid $60 fine and were freed. Our ship, the Pueblo, was not in Korean territorial waters. We had no time to do anything to prevent it from being towed in in the one- and-a-half hour period. Let's be prepared to answer every question that is being raised by people like Time Magazine and answer them factually./15/ /15/The President met with Hugh Sidney of Time magazine and Jack Horner of the Washington Star in the Oval Office that evening from 7:30 to 8:45 p.m. for a confidential, unattributed discussion of the Pueblo crisis. (Notes of the President's Meeting, January 26; Johnson Library, Tom Johnson's Notes of Meetings, Pueblo Backgrounder) George Christian: One of the principal questions was why the ship was not protected./16/ /16/General McKee, Commander of the Fifth Air Force, stationed in Japan and responsible for responding to Pueblo's distress calls, undertook an investigation and concluded that "no air cover and no strip alert was provided because none was requested." The Fifth Air Force was not notified of the ship's mission at the time the mission was approved nor upon execution of the ship's orders. Only a few intelligence and operations officers had any knowledge of the mission and they and other Fifth Air Force personnel were not prepared to respond during the seizure of the Pueblo. (Telegram from 5AF to CINCPACAF, January 25; ibid., National Security File, Country File, Korea--Pueblo Incident, Vol. I, Part A [through January]) The President: This is simple. We cannot provide an Armada over every ship we have. The Russians do not have their ships protected. George Christian: Another question they are raising is why there was not more air power in Korea. Secretary McNamara: We do not have planes assigned to protect these types of ships. This is an advantage that the initiator had. They also had MIGs overhead. General Wheeler: We could pick up six trawlers off our shores today if we wish. They don't protect their ships. This type of thing goes on all the time. Clark Clifford: If these ships were covered by air, their effectiveness would be reduced substantially. Walt Rostow: There are probably 50 incidents of harassment each year. Secretary McNamara: The Pueblo would have been much more prepared if he had been inside territorial waters. The fact that he was unprepared reinforces the fact that he was outside territorial waters in international territory. The President: All of you should meet regularly and get as well organized in this situation as we were in the Cuban Missile Crisis. Get your best people working on this. Let's not have us charged with failure to deal with the situation properly. [Continue with the next documents]
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