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FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1964-1968, Volume XXIX Korea
Department of State |
Korea 229. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State (Katzenbach) to President Johnson/1/ Washington, January 26, 1968. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Korea--Pueblo Incident, Vol. I, Part B (through January). Secret. Attached to a January 26 memorandum from Rostow to President Johnson in which he noted that Katzenbach "seeks to convince you that things are in somewhat better shape than you may think; and--basically, he is right." The memorandum indicates that the President saw it. SUBJECT The following is a brief description of what we have under way on the Pueblo: On the Diplomatic Front: --Reactions to our representations abroad are still coming in. We are sending you our analyses of them as soon as they are prepared. (I have already sent you 15 and will send you more in the morning.)/2/ /2/Memoranda from Katzenbach to the President, undated and January 30, updating the responses to the demarches are ibid. Responses were also recorded by the Korean Task Force in daily situation reports. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 33-6 KOR N-US) --The Japanese have suggested that we agree to the formation of a fact-finding commission made up of the USSR, Japan and an undetermined third country. They propose that this commission determine the facts in the Pueblo case and make recommendations for resolution. We see many flaws in the proposal (e.g. it doesn't handle the problem of North Korean infiltration into South Korea)./3/ /3/Earlier that day the Japanese Ambassador met with Rusk and gave him a paper containing the proposal. On January 29 he discussed the proposal in a meeting with Katzenbach. The proposed approach was also the subject of discussion between Ambassador Johnson and Japanese officials in Tokyo. Memoranda of conversation, cables, briefing papers, and similar documentation on this topic, January 26 to 31, are ibid. --We have persuaded the Swiss and the Swedes (who, along with the Czechs and the Poles, make up the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission) to make inquiries about the status of the Pueblo crew. We have gone to the Czechs and the Poles to see if they will agree to go along with the Swiss-Swedish approach. --At our request, the International Red Cross has agreed to make inquiries about the Pueblo killed and injured. The IRC has also agreed to ask for the return of the bodies of the dead, but feels that it can't yet ask for the return of the crew. That will be the next step./4/ /4/Documentation detailing U.S. approaches to the International Red Cross and the latter's contacts with North Korea are ibid. --We are examining the pros and cons of another MAC meeting. We will have a recommendation for you on this tomorrow. --We are studying another appeal to Communist countries with diplomatic representation in North Korea. If we feel there is a chance that any of them can influence Pyongyang we will go back at them again. --We are looking at the merits and demerits of sending a special Presidential emissary to capitals that might exercise some influence on the North Koreans. We will have a recommendation for you in a day or two. --We are considering whether we can put indirect pressure on the North Koreans (e.g. getting others to cut their trade). --Buzz Wheeler will report tomorrow on about a dozen possible military actions we can take directly against North Korea (none of these now look very promising). --I have another group trying to come up with assorted proposals of a less provocative nature than air strikes, etc. We are looking into the feasibility of some action particularly directed against North Korean units in North Viet-Nam. In the UN: --Goldberg will begin consultations tomorrow on a possible resolution. We can use this as a tactic--if we want to--for prolonging Security Council consideration. --It was clear from the debate today that the Soviets have no taste for an extended debate. If we want to keep things going in the UN we will have to avoid coming to a vote on any resolution (since this would mean a Soviet veto). My strong recommendation is that we keep the issue alive in the Security Council for a while. If the debate is closed off without a satisfactory result, it will mean heavy pressure on you to take other steps. On the Intelligence Front: --Dick Helms is studying possible ChiCom attitudes and reactions to various U.S. steps against North Korea. He also will report tomorrow on the location of the North Korean merchant and fishing fleets./5/ /5/The Office of National Estimates prepared two memoranda, both January 26, on the Korean situation that examined possible courses of action to end the Pueblo crisis and confront North Korean aggression. "Possible Developments in the Korean Situation" discussed three options for dealing with the situation: 1) continue exerting diplomatic pressures while advancing military preparations; 2) retaliate militarily; and 3) develop a new U.S.-ROK approach involving selective retaliation against North Korea. "Communist Reaction to Certain US Actions" noted that both the Soviet Union and Communist China had thus far refrained from direct involvement in the Korean situation. The analysis concluded that, although both nations would be alarmed by direct U.S. military activity against North Korea, neither would retaliate directly unless their territorial security were seriously threatened or breached. The paper cautioned, however, that U.S. military threats were unlikely to achieve an early resolution of the Pueblo crisis and could risk expansion of hostilities. (Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC History, Pueblo Crisis, 1968, Vol. III, Day-by-Day Documents, Part 3) --The preliminary results of our intelligence collection effort over Wonsan are in. We have pictures of the Pueblo which seems to indicate that no external damage has been done to the ship. We can't tell, however, what equipment has been removed. There is no evidence of salvage operations at the point where the Pueblo was seized. Public and Congressional Relations: --We are preparing additional materials for you on how best to handle our public and Congressional relations. I also have given several groups the task of coming up with proposals on how best to influence the USSR and Eastern Europeans. There have been several indications today that the Soviets--whatever their public utterances--are beginning to take the matter seriously. We are looking for ways to keep pressure on the Soviets. (Note: We have just received a report--on which you will get more details in the morning--that an Eastern European source here says that the North Koreans will release the Pueblo crew on Monday and then scuttle the ship. We are now assessing the reliability of this information.) Nicholas deB. Katzenbach
230. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State/1/ Moscow, January 27, 1968, 1458Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 33-6 KOR N-US. Top Secret; Flash, Nodis. Received on January 27 at 10:50 a.m. 2604. 1. Following is our translation of Kosygin's reply to President's message./2/ /2/The reply was given to Thompson by Gromyko, who dismissed the veracity of U.S. military statements declaring the Pueblo was in international waters when captured and cautioned that U.S. threats to North Korea could be counterproductive. (Telegram 2605 from Moscow, January 27; ibid.) 2. Begin text. Dear Mr. President: I have received the text of your message which was handed by Ambassador L. Thompson to our Minister of Foreign Affairs on January 26, 1968, concerning the incident involving the American naval intelligence vessel Pueblo near the shores of the Korean People's Democratic Republic. 3. Allow me to say with the utmost directness that we cannot share the interpretation of events which is presented by the American side. Information available to us attests to the fact that the American naval intelligence vessel Pueblo was detained by Korean authorities not in international waters but in the territorial waters of the KPDR while carrying out certain intelligence operations. This is the main thing, it is here where the entire essence of the affair lies, and therefore the responsibility for the incident falls entirely on the American military command, which acted contrary to the generally accepted norms of international law protecting the inviolability of the territories of states and their territorial waters. 4. But since this is so, it is the US which must take steps to find ways of settling the incident and, in any event, not do anything that could add fuel to the fire. You yourself expressed in your message the conviction that the interests of preserving universal peace would not be served by increased tension in that area. 5. However, how can this be reconciled with the fact that during the past few days in the US the situation is being heated up, irresponsible voices calling for a "return strike" against the KPDR and calls for the use of arms and force are being heard? Those who make such statements are apparently little concerned about what all this can lead to. 6. How the American military look at the principles of international law, and in particular the principle of the freedom of navigation, is well known, if only by the fact that US military aircraft are buzzing systematically Soviet and other vessels on the high seas. We have repeatedly drawn the attention of the US Government to the fact that this is fraught with the possibility of military incidents, but the buzzing operations have continued to this day. Recently even more serious cases have taken place where American aircraft subjected Soviet merchant vessels to bombing and strafing. And, incidentally, a very calm attitude, to put it mildly was then demonstrated in the US with respect to these facts, although they involved human losses and major material damage. 7. But now, when an American naval vessel has been detained because it penetrated foreign territorial waters, a noisy campaign is being developed in the US, which, judging by everything, has the support of the American Government. Otherwise, how can one understand the report that a Seventh Fleet detachment consisting of the nuclear carrier Enterprise, destroyers and other vessels has been ordered to move in the direction of the KPDR? 8. The Soviet Government believes that in connection with the incident which has arisen near the KPDR coast, it is most important to analyze the situation soberly and not to succumb to emotions which can lead one to where perhaps he does not even intend to go. 9. You, Mr. President, have expressed a desire that the Soviet Government respond to your anxiety in connection with this incident. In our view, the shortest and the most reliable way for settling it is not to allow precipitous actions, and this would create a more favorable atmosphere. 10. We are convinced that the promptest possible settlement of the situation would be in the interest of all sides. Such settlement must be based, of course on complete respect for the sovereignty and independence of the Korean People's Democratic Republic. Any attempts to apply methods of pressure with respect to the KPDR can only complicate the possibilities for a settlement. 11. We have informed the Government of the Korean People's Democratic Republic of your message. 12. Respectfully, A. Kosygin. January 27, 1968. End text. Thompson
231. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State/1/ Moscow, January 27, 1968, 1500Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 33-6 KOR N-US. Top Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Received January 27 at 11:14 a.m. 2606. Ref: Moscow 2604, 2605./2/ /2/Document 230 and footnote 2 thereto. 1. I think we can take some encouragement from fact that despite Kuznetsov's first statement to me that Soviets would not act as intermediary, Soviets in fact have transmitted two messages to Pyongyang. I am also struck by Kosygin's statement that Soviets believe quick settlement of incident is in the interest of all sides. 2. Gromyko gave every appearance of being convinced that incident took place in territorial waters. If we could tell Soviets that we are prepared to make available to them copy of tape recording of report of Korean subchaser reporting its position this could dispose of that part of the argument, although I doubt Soviets would accept such offer and would say such tapes could easily be faked. 3. While possibilitiy exists that Soviets were party to this affair, my judgment, based on their handling of the problem up to now and the general situation, is that they were not. They are clearly concerned over the way the matter is blowing up which tends to limit their freedom of action. Their distrust of our military is certainly genuine. 4. Anything we can do to convince them that our purpose is simply to settle the incident and get our men and ship back would be helpful. For example, if we could find a way to let them know, perhaps in any reply President may make to Kosygin, that we have taken steps to calm down South Koreans, this would be useful. It would also increase Soviets possibility to pressure North Koreans if we could put Enterprise out of the area or at least from the vicinity of Wonsan. I think we must take Gromyko's warning to me seriously. Thompson
232. Telegram From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State/1/ Seoul, January 27, 1968, 1720Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 KOR/UN. Secret; Flash; Exdis. Repeated USUN. 3702. Ref: A. Seoul 3696;/2/ B. Seoul 3697./3/ Country Team Message. /2/Telegram 3696 from Seoul, January 27, discussed a suggestion by the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission that Admiral Smith request information about the health and welfare of the Pueblo crew through the Joint Duty Officers at Panmunjom. All NNSC members would also submit a message, sent in their capacity as "reps of countries which have traditionally dealt with victims of international conflicts," requesting similar information. (Ibid.) /3/In telegram 3697 from Seoul, January 27, the Embassy reported the views of the NNSC toward the potential resolution of the Pueblo crisis through negotiations with North Korea. The Swedish and Swiss members of the commission, based on a conversation with the Communist members, concluded that the North Koreans could be prepared to discuss the crisis through the UN structure at Panmunjom and appeared to expect an official apology, perhaps with the intention of humiliating the United States. (Ibid.) 1. Shortly after midnight Jan 28, Swiss member NNSC (Barbey) telephoned following information, which he had received from Communist member NNSC, to senior member UNCMAC: Between 2000 and 2100 hours January 27 the Communist members of NNSC met with MG Pak Chung-kuk, senior member KPA/CP/side of Military Armistice Commission. Pak requested them to transmit following official and unofficial messages from him to senior member UNCMAC. The messages, in Korean, were translated into English by KPA, then taken by Polish and Czech NNSC members to Swiss and Swedish members. Official message follows: "Govt of North Korea thinks that solving question of ship and crew is impossible when made by threatening or using force. If the United States will try to use force to free the ship, KPA will answer with the same means and it is risk that instead of freeing the crew they would get only bodies. It is quite possible to solve this problem if USA will acknowledge that the people of the ship are prisoners of war and if US will show willingness to negotiate or discuss in a normal way when one side would like to have prisoners back."/4/ /4/When drafting a reply to Kosygin's message, Rostow received and forwarded a copy of this cable to the President. With reference to Pak's comments suggesting the crew be returned as prisoners of war, Rostow commented that that approach could be "the quickest track," but would require pacification of the South Koreans by keeping some of the recently transferred aircraft in the ROK and by increasing U.S. funding of anti-infiltration measures to improve ROK security. He further advised the President: "Sir: This is the break. The problem is how to do it with maximum dignity." (Memorandum from Rostow to the President, January 27; Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Korea--Pueblo Incident, Vol. Ia, Part A [through January]) 2. The following unofficial message was given to Pole and Czech obviously for transmission also: "Now the Captain recognizes his criminal acts . . . /5/ The crew are in very good condition. Although they acted as enemies in our coastal waters and committed a crime, those who are wounded are under normal medical care. The body of one killed is preserved. Further details about the situation of the crew members could be obtained through direct contact between both sides." /5/Reference is to Bucher's alleged confession broadcast by Radio Pyongyang on January 25. 3. Comment by Swiss member: This is interesting in that only two days ago Pak told his NNSC members "Even if not in territorial waters the ship was acting against us." 4. Comment: Most unusual feature of foregoing is that Pak chose to use NNSC as channel. We can only surmise that Communist members NNSC had earlier passed request for info on crew members to him, despite statement to contrary to Swiss and Swede (Ref A). Experience with Pak at MAC indicates he would not have taken this action without instructions from Pyongyang. Porter
233. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Korea/1/ Washington, January 28, 1968, 0152Z. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Korea--Pueblo Incident--Cactus IV, Cactus Miscellaneous Papers, February to December 1968. Secret; Flash; Nodis; Cactus. Repeated to USUN. Drafted at the White House, where it was cleared by the President; cleared by Berger and Walsh; and approved by Katzenbach. 106065. Ref: Seoul's 3702./2/ Following is text of reply to be made by Senior MAC Member: /2/Document 232. "1. I have received the message which you (Major General Pak Chung-kuk, Senior North Korean Member of Military Armistice Commission) sent me through the channels of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission. 2. My reply is as follows: The policy of the United States Government with respect to the S.S. Pueblo and its crew was publicly stated when the President of the United States on January 26 said, 'We shall continue to use every means available to find a prompt and peaceful solution to the problem.'/3/ /3/The statement is from the President's televised address to the nation; see footnote 6, Document 223. 3. The crew of the S.S. Pueblo are United States Naval personnel, acting under orders of the United States Navy. Two of them are civilian scientists, specialists in hydrographic work. You have captured these men by force of arms. At the very least, they are entitled to the protection of the Geneva Conventions of 1949, to which you subscribe. 4. I am relieved to receive information through unofficial channels that they are good condition, the wounded are receiving normal medical care, and that the body of the one who died is preserved. 5. It has been suggested that further details could be obtained through direct contact between both sides. I therefore request that the names of the injured and dead be provided us through the Joint Duty Officer, and I request an immediate meeting of the Senior Members of both sides to discuss and resolve this matter promptly. We are agreeable to either a private or open meeting." 7. Use Nodis Cactus in this series. Rusk
234. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Korea/1/ Washington, January 28, 1968, 0208Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 33-6 KOR N-US. Secret; Flash; Nodis; Cactus. Repeated to USUN. Drafted by Meeker; cleared by Berger, Rostow, and Walsh; and approved by Katzenbach. 106066. Ref: State 106065./2/ Further instructions follow: /2/Document 233. 1. In meetings with North Korean side of MAC you should make business-like, dispassionate presentation of US positions. In answer to any North Korean harangue or propagandistic argumentation, you should give calm and factual response, setting forth US views plainly and firmly. 2. North Korean side may press argument that Pueblo was in territorial waters. You should respond with following points: a. Pueblo under US Naval orders to stay at least 13 nautical miles from coast and thus would not enter any waters that North Korea claimed as territorial sea; b. At time when Pueblo was hailed by North Korean submarine chaser, Pueblo radioed her position as 39-25.2 North Latitude 127-55 East Longitude--a position more than 15 nautical miles from nearest North Korean territory, Ung Do Island; c. At exactly the same time, North Korean submarine chaser Number 35 radioed to shore its position as 39 degrees 25 minutes North Latitude 127 degrees 56 minutes East Longitude--a position approximately one mile further East and seaward from that reported by Pueblo; d. At time of boarding, North Korean vessels reported the position as further East, at 39-26 North Latitude 128-02 East Longitude. 3. North Korean official message said, "It is quite possible to solve this problem if USA will acknowledge that the people of the ship are prisoners of war." We are not sure what they mean. This may be intended as an admission that the Pueblo crew was engaged in warlike activity. Or it may be intended as a ploy to bargain for the return of North Koreans. Accordingly our language avoids specific reference to prisoners of war, and you should avoid phrase or acknowledgment, and try to minimize issue, simply repeating that they were taken by force and are at least entitled to the protection of Geneva Conventions of 1949. If this point proves troublesome, you should say these are highly technical and legal matters, and you would like clarification of what they mean, so as to study matter further. 4. North Korean official message refers initially to "question of ship and crew" but later to "willingness to negotiate or discuss in a normal way when one side would like to have prisoners back." US position, of course, is that both vessel and crew are to be returned and you should seek to deal with both together. However, there is obviously a priority in physical return of crew from North Korean custody and, realistically considered, arrangements for return of crew could be more rapidly carried out than necessarily more complicated arrangements for return of vessel. 5. If North Korean side should refer to prospect of criminal trial or penalties for crew members, you should point out that no basis exists for prosecution and that any such action would be contrary to Geneva Conventions of 1949 and threats this nature not helpful in search for peaceful solution. Rusk
235. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/ Washington, January 28, 1968. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Korea--Pueblo Incident--Cactus IV, Cactus Miscellaneous Papers, February to December 1968. Secret; Nodis; Cactus. The memorandum indicates that the President saw it. Mr. President: The attached cable from Ambassador Porter indicates clearly his problem with our proposed procedures so far as Park is concerned. As indicated to you yesterday we have a problem of reassuring Park and the South Koreans on the infiltration problem. By leaving some of the aircraft in Korea and increasing military aid--notably, if we are going to get our extra division for South Vietnam. Secretaries Rusk and McNamara will have been informed and be ready to discuss a reply by 9:00 AM. We will shortly send up to you State's proposed reply to Porter which suggests: 1) go immediately to Park without an interim message to the North Koreans; 2) tell him our strategy is to take these issues one at a time; 3) indicate specifically our willingness for later meetings on the question of infiltration and increased military aid. W. W. Rostow/2/ /2/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
Attachment/3/ Telegram From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State Seoul, January 28, 1968, 0923Z. /3/Secret; Flash; Nodis; Cactus. Repeated to USUN. 3706. Country Team Message. Ref: (A) State 106065;/4/ (B) State 106066;/5/ (C) State 106070;/6/ (D) USFK Message UK-50285 DTG 261115Z./7/ /4/Document 233. /5/Document 234. /6/Telegram 106070 to Seoul, January 28, instructed Porter to inform the ROK Foreign Minister, or if necessary Pak himself, that ROK insistence on appearing before the Security Council could be used to divert attention from the Pueblo seizure and Blue House raid to a debate on invitations to both North and South Korea. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 23-7 KOR S/UN) /7/Not found. 1. We deeply concerned over adverse impact procedure suggested Refs (A) and (B) would have on US/ROK relations. As we have reported, ROKs from President on down are convinced that our actions and statements since Pueblo incident simply do not recognize extreme gravity of threat to internal security and political position of ROKG represented by Blue House raid and North Korean determination to increase subversive effort. 2. We have not informed ROKG of exchange between ourselves and North Korea through NNSC members. Despite security precautions we cannot keep this from them for very long. We have already received anguished approach from Foreign Ministry voicing suspicion that we are attempting to contact NK directly at other locations, notably Warsaw, and that we therefore intend to confine negotiations to retrieval of Pueblo and crew. We have ample evidence that suspicions are also growing at highest levels that once we succeed in obtaining release of ship and crew, we will withdraw force augmentations and leave ROK problem in status quo ante Pueblo with no improvement in President Park's political or security problems. We have had broad hints that ROKs are talking among themselves of possible withdrawal ROK armed forces from operational control CINCUNC and, because of concern over reopening of hostilities here, return of ROK troops from Vietnam. We do not believe they are serious, but fact that senior ROKs imply such consideration is indicative of psychological climate we must deal with here. Should ROKs learn that we have requested meeting of senior members MAC solely to discuss Pueblo incident, as suggested Refs (A) and (B), without parallel effort on intrusion problem, results could be explosive. 3. Moreover, whatever subject matter, believe it would be highly inadvisable to express willingness to hold open MAC meeting. Presence of press and other witnesses at open meeting would impel Pak to put on propaganda show and attempt to place US in most humiliating light possible. 4. Accordingly, urgently request we be authorized to follow procedure outlined below: (A) Immediately send KPA/CPV senior member first four paras of reply contained Ref (A) plus para 5 ending after words "joint duty officers." Such reply is currently being translated and prepositioned for immediate delivery by secure means. By limiting this reply to request for information on condition of crew members, we would also provide NNSC opportunity to follow through with letter they suggested to us yesterday (Seoul 3697)./8/ /8/In telegram 3697 from Seoul, January 27, the Embassy reported on the NNSC's views of resolving the Pueblo crisis. Although it contained no specific reference to a letter, the telegram noted that the Communist members of the NNSC suggested negotiations could be arranged by means of "messages through Joint Duty Officers of Panmunjom" or through a private MAC meeting. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 KOR/UN) (B) Ambassador will seek soonest possible appointment with President Park to inform him of dealings which have already taken place through NNSC and of request for information on crew by senior member UNCMAC. Ambassador will state that senior member UNCMAC is also requesting a private senior member meeting to discuss problem of obtaining release of Pueblo and crew and to impress on North Koreans in most forceful terms gravity of situation posed by continuing North Korean infiltration. If President insists that UNCMAC senior member demand guarantee from North Korea that there will be no further intrusion, Ambassador will respond that it probably impossible to obtain. However, to ease President's very real concerns, request Ambassador be authorized if necessary to inform him that USG will do following: (1) Retain substantial proportion of force augmentation in and near Korea until such time as developments indicate infiltration threat and its attendant political and psychological problems materially lessened. (2) To provide tangible evidence that we are doing something directly for the ROKs, USG will airlift available CIGCOREP items as requested in Ref (D), which USFK is passing separately directly to Dept. (3) Acknowledge firm commitment on spring delivery first destroyer, which heretofor has been tied to additional dispatch of ROK troops to Vietnam. We are under no illusions that these items, if agreed, would entirely eliminate pressures on US arising from Park's internal political position. They may ease pressures for time being, however, if carefully publicized. (C) Senior member UNCMAC will then send separate message to senior member KPA/CPV side requesting private senior member to senior member MAC meeting. Request update guidance contained Ref (B). 4. Ambassador will raise problem of ROK attendance at UNSC (Ref C) at time he makes approach mentioned para 4(B) above. Porter
236. Telephone Conversation Between President Johnson and the Representative to the United Nations (Goldberg)/1/ Washington, January 28, 1968, 11:38 a.m. /1/Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of Telephone Conversation between President Johnson and Goldberg, January 28, 1968, 11:38 a.m., Tape F68.01, PNO 2. Secret. This transcript was prepared by the Office of the Historian specifically for this volume. Goldberg: [The recording of this conversation begins at this point.] which I think ought to be at night and not during the middle of the day, 'cause I think, you know, people look at it. Advance a proposition of this type, you say that--you have said to the American people that you want this settled by diplomatic means, if possible. You have also said that the ship and crew must be returned, and you adhere to that statement. Now, you are prepared, if the ship and crew are returned promptly, to then submit the--you would say, that we are satisfied on the basis of incontrovertible evidence, which has been now made public, that this ship was in international waters. Nevertheless, you are prepared to submit the entire matter, after the ship and crew are returned, to the International Court of Justice and abide by the results. If our case is not what we said it was, we would make appropriate reparations to them. If our case was as we said it was, they should make appropriate reparations to us. It would seem to me that such a statement from you--they'll turn it down, Mr. President. Although in one instance--I've been researching the precedents over the weekend--there was a situation in the Corfu Channel case where Britain and Albania got into a problem about intrusion upon international waters and where the Albanians mined the Corfu Channel. And they agreed at that time it should go to the Court--the British ship was damaged--and the Court ordered the Albanians to pay damages. Now, there is great virtue--you know, our public and the world opinion believes very much in the judicial process. All fair-minded people think, "Submit matters to courts and courts decide it." A proposition like that put by you in a solemn declaration to the American people and to world opinion would, I think, have a tremendous impact. Anybody who would then say that you were not acting with restraint, etc., could not say it. This is a far better proposal than [Senator] Mike Mansfield's silly proposal that even though the ship was in international waterways we ought to lie to get our men back. That's just asinine. [The President can be heard chuckling in the background.] But for you to put a proposal saying that "You return our men and the ship; however we will undertake--we will put the case to the International Court. We're prepared to do it promptly upon the return, and we will abide the results of that decision." Now there's a Russian on the Court, so they can't say the Court's stacked against 'em--and a Pole. But on the whole, the Court is pretty--not badly disposed. President: How many on the Court? Goldberg: Let me see-- President: Give me a number. Goldberg: Fourteen, I think. I haven't got the exact number, but I could easily get it for you. It isn't bad from our standpoint. It's got Latin Americans, it's got the Australians, it's got British judges, its got--we've got a good judge in Phil Jessup. I don't think we would do badly. And our evidence, the one we have been developing, is good evidence. President: Where does this Court sit, in Geneva? Goldberg: In The Hague. And we would have to invoke the Court. They sit whenever their jurisdiction is invoked. And we would, you could say, we would ask the Court as a matter of urgency to make this determination. President: Did you talk to Rusk or Nick about it? Goldberg: No, I have not yet talked to anybody, 'cause I didn't want to start anything without-- President: I think it's worthy of pursuing. I wish you would talk to 'em/2/ or I'll talk to 'em later in the day. I think that would be very good. I think you did well up there. Now, what do you do tomorrow? /2/Goldberg discussed the matter with Rusk, prompting Meeker and Sisco to set forth the advantages and disadvantages of taking the matter to the Court in a memorandum to Rusk and to the President. (Memorandum from Meeker and Sisco to Rusk, January 28, with attached memorandum from Rusk to the President; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 33-6 KOR N-US) Goldberg: I'm--as far as I'm concerned, if we can not get some agreement, which I doubt we can get, I'm going to kind of wind up this exercise. I'm not going to put a resolution forward, which we, you know, would be vetoed. That isn't going to help us. And push the Russians to a veto. So that, my view would be that I would--we've done, I think, what we ought to do down here and that is we have stated our case and now the responsibility is on the Council to come up with a--some help. President: What are they gonna do? Goldberg: Not a damn thing, just between us. They'll fiddle around. But I'll know better today. I'll see the Russian today and see if I can get a reading from him that's any different from what Tommy has got in Moscow. I'll put it straight to him, "Do you fellas want to defuse the situation? Then you ought to put your weight to a simple"--what I have in mind is to say to him, "You don't have to have a resolution. Let's get the President of the Council to propose that there be--the ship and so on be returned and say the Council will be prepared to carry on further to consider the matter, and so on." But, I know as I read the telegrams I doubt that the Russians would agree to anything. And then we'd let it be known that this is the reason why they can't do anything. I don't want to risk a resolution. See, we got a good vote on inscription, and I think it's much better to let it be where everybody is trying to use some--individually--some diplomatic pressure-- President: What'd you lose, three votes? Goldberg: On the resolution itself? President: On the inscription, yeah. Goldberg: On the inscription we just lost three votes--Russia, Hungary, and Algeria. Now, that's a pretty good posture to leave it in. I wouldn't want to lose support as we go down the line. So that--but, I'll have a better reading. I'm gonna send all the-- President: Talk to Nick or Dean. Let them get into this. We're going to have to do something when you get through there, and we sure don't want to be--we don't even have our people out there. We couldn't do anything if we wanted to militarily, so we're gonna have to do something in between. Goldberg: That's right. And this would--of course, the best avenue out there--I don't know whether you saw this--I prodded our people to respond quickly. The best avenue out there to get our boys back is this Neutral Nations Supervisory Committee. President: Yeah, they're working that carefully. Goldberg: Yes. We got 'em working now. Their--those--that consists of the Swedes, the Swiss, the Poles, and the Czechs. And we sent a wire last night to get them working. They--the--see, the--I--it's very important if you haven't seen the message--you might ask Walt to get it for you--to see that the North Koreans sent a message through that commission. President: Yeah, we read it and we replied./3/ /3/See Documents 232 and 233. Goldberg: You read it? President: Yeah, and we replied. Goldberg: I didn't know. There's so much traffic. And you saw the reply? President: Yeah, yeah. Goldberg: Yes. That's the best avenue-- President: We worked on it all afternoon. Goldberg: Yes. Well, I should have realized that you'd be on top of that. President: Here's one they're just trying to get out to Seoul now in reply to some of their worries. They just sent it in while you called. [At this point, the President read the entire text of a draft telegram to Seoul.]/4/ /4/The draft consisted of paragraphs 1-12 of Document 237. The draft telegram along with a transmittal memorandum from Rostow to the President, January 28, is in the Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Korea--Pueblo Incident--Cactus I, Cactus State Cables, January 28, 1968 to February 10, 1968) Goldberg: I think that's very good. I have-- President: I see nothing inconsistent with it--with what you suggested. Looks like its fits in pretty well. Goldberg: It fits in very well. President: You do that, and I'll be back in touch with you. Goldberg: Thank you. President: You talk to them. Goldberg: And I hope to see an Ambassador coming in to see me, and I'll follow the same line. President: Thank you. Good bye. Goldberg: Thank you.
237. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Korea/1/ Washington, January 28, 1968, 2055Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 33-6 KOR N-US. Secret; Flash; Nodis; Cactus. Repeated to USUN. Drafted by Berger; cleared by Rostow, McNamara, Rusk, and Katzenbach; and approved by Walsh. A draft version was approved by the President and read by him in its entirety during a phone conversation with Goldberg, who also approved its contents; see Document 236. 106085. Ref: Seoul's 3706./2/ /2/See the attachment to Document 235. 1. We fully understand nature of problems and believe we can meet all of them with following approach. 2. It is apparent that North Koreans now realize full possible consequences of their actions and that Soviets have almost certainly told them to defuse situation. Easiest way for them to immediately ease acute tension and anger is to return Pueblo crew, and possibly vessel. It is imperative in ROK and our interest that nothing be done to interfere with this and that we make it as easy as possible for them to get off hook. To raise assassination and raider problem as you suggest at same meeting will only complicate and delay solution to all our problems. 3. The North Koreans will probably talk tough and try to humiliate us and ROK. If they do we should let them rant and ignore it. The velvet glove approach is the best, for there is a steel fist in it, and the North Koreans know it. We should not call their attention to it or make any threats, or at this juncture even call excessive attention to the gravity of the situation. They know how grave it is. We should be business like and non-contentious. 4. We expect the first round of talks will produce the release of the crew. Admiral Smith should try obtain vessel as well. The North Koreans may ask UNCMAC to sign a receipt for the men, as they did in the helicopter case, on which is written confession of guilt that they were engaged in espionage and violated territorial waters. UNCMAC should not be drawn into polemics, and only state quietly and repeatedly that North Koreans have their view of matter and we have ours. He is not authorized to sign a statement of the kind they are asking for. 5. If they insist on apology we should reply all our data indicate no violation. If after crew is released and we talk with Bucher and other crew members we find that the vessel was within the territorial waters claimed by North Korea we will make this fact public. 6. You can say to Park that as soon as the men are released, or if the release is long-delayed, announcement will be made of our intention to keep augmented forces in the area in view of North Korean campaign against the ROK. Also you may tell Park we are considering substantial additional MAP for the ROK to strengthen their anti-infiltration and military forces. We will also announce that two destroyers will be provided Korea, with date for delivery of first. You can tell Park that we will airlift available CIGOREP items as practicable, and will give this program same priority as we give Viet-Nam. 7. Para 6 is for Park alone and must not be published in any way. 8. We would think that when these announcements are made they will give ample assurances to Park and his military leaders and people who are concerned and interested. These announcements will be accompanied by request by UNCMAC for further senior level meetings with North Koreans to press insistently for an end to the North Korean violations in the DMZ and infiltration. 9. President Park is a military man, wise and a realist, and the approach to him should be made in these terms. The enemy is about to retreat from one of its exposed positions. When we take that we will move on the next ones. 10. You should see Park soonest and outline relevant parts of above strategy emphasizing this represents President's own views on how next moves should be made. Admiral Smith's message should be held for time being. If meeting with Park results in his concurrence or acquiescence, Admiral Smith should proceed to deliver message to NK MAC. However, if Park strongly objects our approach you should come back with Flash message. 11. On message to be sent to NK MAC, revise para 5 as follows: "5. It has been suggested that further details could be obtained through direct contact between both sides. I therefore request that the names of the injured and dead be provided us through the Joint Duty Officers. Further I request an immediate meeting of the Senior Members of both sides to discuss the modalities for resolving this matter promptly." 12. We suspect that North Koreans will want private meeting initially, and perhaps throughout, and under cover of that say we insisted on private meeting where we confessed our sins. It should be made clear in initial contact that we prepared to agree to either open or closed sessions whichever they wish. 13. There are great domestic problems and interest in this situation as well as those of world-wide implication. We are sensitive to the Korean problems and have gone very far to meet them but we cannot permit ourselves become satellite of ROK./3/ /3/Printed from an unsigned copy.
238. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union/1/ Washington, January 28, 1968, 2104Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 33-6 KOR N-US. Top Secret; Priority; Nodis. Drafted by Malcolm Toon, Country Director, Soviet Union Affairs; cleared by Helms at CIA and Read; and approved by Katzenbach. 106086. For Ambassador Only. 1. It seems obvious from your meetings with Gromyko and others that Sovs regard official contacts on Pueblo case awkward and even annoying because of inevitable attendant publicity. Same considerations would apply to contacts with charge here. 2. Nonetheless, it is essential we remain in close communication with Sovs to stress gravity of situation. While we are hopeful success diplomatic approaches, it is always possible that at later juncture we may wish to warn them of actions we may be compelled to take in order to obtain release of men and vessel. Purpose then would be to insure that Sovs understand limited objectives such action and thus avoid miscalculation by other side. 3. Hot line is, of course, secure private channel, but we believe this would be inappropriate for warnings of impending action as indicated para 2 since Sov prestige would be engaged and they would feel compelled respond. Its use subject daily inquiry here and confirmation would escalate public concern. 4. Accordingly, we now giving consideration to establishment, at appropriate time, of clandestine channel on Scali-Fomin pattern used during Cuban missile crises. Helms has proposed we use Kulebiakin, top KGB official in US as well as Dep Sov UN PermRep. Our spokesman would be reliable non-official, perhaps Wm. S. White, who would be carefully controlled and authorized inform Kulebiakin he acting on precise instructions and at specific request of Secretary on behalf of President if this deemed necessary in light existing circumstances. 5. We do not believe necessary or appropriate officially to inform Sovs in advance of establishment of contact. We can assume knowledge of contact will be relayed by Kulebiakin through his channels to top Sov officials. At some later point, it might be desirable for you to convey quietly to Gromyko your knowledge that channel exists and is operative. 6. Would appreciate your views by opening of business Monday (EST)/2/ on desirability such move and its timing, and if you concur in need, on modalities as set forth paras 4 and 5./3/ /2/By January 29 at 8 a.m. EST. /3/Printed from an unsigned copy.
239. Memorandum for Record/1/ Washington, January 29, 1968. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Name File, Eisenhower, Dwight D. Secret. The memorandum indicates that President Johnson saw it. SUBJECT As requested by General Wheeler on 26 January, I talked by telephone with General Eisenhower on the 27th. General Wheeler had asked me to raise with him, at the President's request, several key questions concerning the North Korean seizure of the Pueblo. The President was concerned over problems that might face him if he were impelled at the end of diplomatic efforts concerning the Pueblo to take some kind of military action. The two key questions would be: What actions could be taken; how should the Congress be associated with these actions (the experience in the Dominican Republic and in Vietnam is pertinent). In presenting these questions to General Eisenhower I stressed that the discussion was entirely confidential and that he was in no sense being put "on the spot". His initial comments were exploratory and tentative. Later he offered specific suggestions. He first asked if North Korea has much maritime trade. I told him it was limited but that they do a good deal of fishing. He then asked if any thought was given to a quarantine, commenting that this would be about the least provocative of any military action and that, if it did not suffice the Congress would then have to consider stronger action. He thought it was important to act "while the iron is hot" and while the Pueblo affair is fresh in peoples' minds. He said we should be careful not to demand or threaten anything that we can't back up. Next he raised the possibility of bombing the bridges over the Yalu. I pointed out that these lie on the border with Red China, and that this action would tend to be a challenge to the Chinese. I suggested that there might be critical points on the communications routes south of the Yalu. He commented that a key question is whether we would be prepared to use atomic weapons, particularly since these would give assurance of destruction of bridges, for example, and could be utilized in places where no civilian losses would be involved. General Eisenhower said that if he were sitting in the President's place he would have the staffs consider every possible thing that might be done, not excluding anything out of hand, as a basis for top level consideration and decision. He commented that he doesn't see much danger of a nuclear holocaust arising over this affair. (I had previously mentioned to him the treaties of the USSR and the ChiComs with the North Koreans.) He thought that the Russians and the Chinese would be guided by their own interests. After further discussion he said his idea would be to take action generally as follows and generally in the order indicated: a. Quarantine b. Strengthening of defense arrangements along the DMZ (possibly including some patrolling into North Korea). c. Attack of some critical targets along the North Korean main lines of communication. d. Movement of U.S. air reinforcements into Korea; action to bring the whole command in South Korea to a feasibly high state of readiness; ground units should be brought up to strength, but without bringing in additional major units. He did think that the plan to take these actions should be spelled out to the Congressional leadership. It could be pointed out that some of them at least could be initiated on the President's own authority but that, in a matter of this kind it is important to have the Congress associated with the President, and that this is why he is consulting them. The Congressmen should be asked to keep specific details confidential, although the general intentions would of course become known. Finally, General Eisenhower said that we should do everything possible to press for action on the diplomatic front and in the U.N. Security Council, and should even ask for a special session of the General Assembly if we thought anything useful could be achieved. He would intensify the bombing in Vietnam to a maximum at this time, and let it be known that this step up was related to the North Korean incident. He concluded by asking me to convey to the President his personal hope for the President's success in this matter. G [Continue with the next documents]
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