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FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1964-1968, Volume XXIX Korea
Department of State |
Korea 263. Telegram From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State/1/ Seoul, February 4, 1968, 0355Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 33-6 KOR N-US. Secret; Flash; Nodis; Cactus. 3925. Subj: Summary of Panmunjom Meeting February 4. 1. Pak opened by referring to Smith's prepared statements at previous meeting, saying that some points were not clear and that therefore he had a few questions. 2. His first question referred to Smith's request for meeting in atmosphere free from compulsion (see Seoul 3890 for Smith's exact words)./2/ Deliberately using words "free from compulsion" out of context, Pak stated that discussion would indeed have to be conducted in an atmosphere free from compulsion but that coercive atmosphere has been created by US side. He made point that US side had sent Pueblo into their territorial waters and had not apologized, but had instead threatened NK by armed forces. Specifically, US had concentrated vessels of the Seventh Fleet, including nuclear-propelled carrier Enterprise, in vicinity NK territory. (Pak's interpreter said in English "in our territorial waters"; Pak's statement in Korean, however, differs from this version. We are carefully checking language.)/3/ Pak referred also to introduction numerous fighters and bombers to ROK, issuance of standby orders to US troops and puppet ROK army thereby keeping them in state of complete combat readiness. /2/According to telegram 3890 from Seoul, February 2, Smith said: "I have requested this meeting in order to discuss with you in an atmosphere free from compulsions created by publicity the very serious situation which results from the fact that you have possession of the United States Ship Pueblo and also its crew." (Ibid.) /3/The verbatim text of the February 4 meeting quoted Pak as saying, "the nuclear-propelled carrier Enterprise in (toward) our territorial waters." (Telegram 3927 from Seoul, February 4; ibid.) Pak asked whether he could understand that Smith's reference to atmosphere free of compulsion implies that US will eliminate atmosphere of compulsion that it has created. Pak then referred to fact that at 261st MAC meeting Jan 24 Smith had failed to apologize for great criminal act and instead made a coercive statement demanding immediate return Pueblo and crew, and had reserved right to demand compensation./4/ Pak asked whether he could understand that Smith's statement at last meeting (Feb 2) implies that Smith denounces these coercive statements. /4/The verbatim text of Smith's remarks on January 24 was transmitted in telegram 3608 from Seoul, January 25. (Ibid., POL 27-14 KOR/UN) 3. Stating that he was making his second inquiry, Pak referred to fact that Smith had stated at Feb 2 meeting that Pueblo not under command of CINCUNC, but was unit of US Pacific Fleet, and that Pueblo case was without precedent. Pak asked whether he could understand that this means case is to be dealt with as matter between two sides--DPRK and USA. He added that if this understanding is correct and US side appoints representative of USA, NK side would also appoint representative of DPRK. 4. Pak concluded his presentation by adding that if Smith not prepared to answer these questions now, "he may answer later." 5. Smith responded that questions Pak had posed contained many technical issues which Smith will refer to appropriate authorities for guidance. 6. Smith then stated that he had additional information to give Pak, whereupon he read into record text of numbered para one of State 109693/5/ modified as follows: a. Number of machine guns on board Pueblo changed from three to two; b. Mistranslation of Pak's statement regarding mission of Pueblo constituting a most flagrant violation of Armistice Agreement was corrected to reflect language contained in Seoul 3913;/6/ c. Paragraph dealing with position of Pueblo at time of boarding was changed to read as follows: "five minutes later the Pueblo reported being boarded by North Korean personnel at 1345 hours. Five minutes later North Korean submarine chaser no. 35, in company with the Pueblo, reported its position as 39-26 N, 128-02 E, even farther from the nearest Korean land." /5/Document 262. /6/Telegram 3913 from Seoul, February 3, corrected errors to the verbatim text of the first Senior Members MAC Meeting. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 33-6 KOR N-US) 7. Pak replied with standard language about futility of trying to explain away aggressive acts which have already been made clear. He then added that this case cannot be solved in this manner. 8. Indicating that he did not wish to discuss matter further, Pak stated that he had raised serious matters at this meeting and that if Smith will study seriously and provide answers, he would be prepared to hear them. He ended by remarking, "Let's conclude and meet later to have a talk." 9. In response, Admiral Smith again requested information regarding names of Pueblo dead and wounded, to which Pak responded that as he had stated at last meeting, he had not yet got any mission to inform Smith of them. He reiterated suggestion to meet again and have talk. Smith then said "I agree" and meeting concluded. 10. Comments: A. NK side made notable effort to be polite and was cooperative during meeting. There was no sign of irritation over absence of US apology, such as was evident at Feb 2 meeting. B. Pak and his interpreter took great pains to insure that there was no misunderstanding of wording. Their most significant statement had been carefully prepared in advance./7/ /7/Based on North Korean comments made at the meeting, the Department of State instructed the Embassy to submit a written request to the North Koreans for information on dead and wounded crew members. (Telegram 109841 to Seoul, February 4; ibid.) Porter
264. Memorandum From the Director of the Korean Task Force (Berger) to Secretary of State Rusk/1/ Washington, February 4, 1968. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 33-6 KOR N-US. Secret. SUBJECT I. 1. At the Second Meeting of Admiral Smith and General Pak, the North Korean side put forward two principal demands: a. The US should "eliminate the atmosphere of compulsion it has created" by concentrating Seventh Fleet and US air power in the vicinity of North Korea. b. Since the Pueblo was not under CINCUNC, the matter of Pueblo's seizure should be dealt with on a government-to-government level, i.e. by representatives of the US and the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea (DPRK). II. "Elimination of Compulsion" 2. The North Korean statement about eliminating the "atmosphere of compulsion" is clearly a demand for the withdrawal or reduction of our military buildup in the Korean area. It raises two kinds of questions: a. What do we say at the next meeting? b. Can we and should we agree to make any changes in the disposition of US forces in the area as a token of our "sincerity" and our desire to get down to business? 3. The first question is a matter of tactics for the next meeting. The second question is more fundamental. What we Say 4. In raising this question General Pak has twisted Admiral Smith's words at the first meeting of the Senior Members. Admiral Smith had referred to our desire for a meeting to discuss the Pueblo case in an "atmosphere free from the compulsion of publicity." This distortion should be pointed out at the next meeting. It should then be emphasized that if there is an atmosphere of tension and a buildup of military forces in the area, it is because of increasingly aggressive acts by the North Korean armed forces such as the infiltration of spies and saboteurs, the raid on the ROK Presidential palace and finally the seizure of the Pueblo. If North Korea exercises restraint vis-a-vis the ROK and if it releases the Pueblo and crew, tensions will be reduced, and the US will be able to draw appropriate conclusions and act accordingly. 5. At the next meeting also, we should repeat our request for the names of the dead and injured, suggesting that if the North Korean authorities are unwilling to make even this small and compassionate gesture they cannot be serious about reducing tensions. What we Do 6. Meanwhile we should be considering what to do after the next meeting. Pak complained that the US has threatened North Korea by sending the Seventh Fleet (including specifically the Enterprise) into the vicinity of North Korean territory, by introducing "numerous fighters and bombers" into the ROK, and by placing US troops and the ROK army in a state of complete combat readiness. The following actions should conceivably be taken to evidence our desire to get things moving: a. Move Enterprise task group south to East China Sea. Our view is that the simplest and safest initial gesture would be moving Enterprise task group south. This movement would probably be made known almost immediately to the North Koreans by the USSR. Such movement could be made without operational difficulty and without placing our forces too far away to be useful or threatening. Such moves would be less visible to the ROKG and easier to explain than withdrawal of air units from the ROK or a standdown of the Eighth US and ROK armies. When to Do It 7. The main question is whether to make a gesture of withdrawal in the current phase, i.e. while the North Koreans are still building their case, releasing confessions and stating conditions, or to wait until they have put everything on the table, the issues are further crystallized, and some action may be needed to break a deadlock and prevent negotiations from coming to a stop. Recommendation Issue orders to the Enterprise task group to begin steaming south but delay execution of the orders until after the next meeting, when a final decision on this action would be taken. III. Raising the Level of Negotiations 8. At the February 4 meeting General Pak referred to Admiral Smith's statement (at the February 2 meeting): "and additionally the ship was not under the Commander-in-Chief of the United Nations Command." Pak asked whether this meant that the case is to be dealt with as a matter between the two sides--the DPRK and USA; if this understanding is correct and the US side appoints a representative of the USA, the North Korean side would also appoint a representative of the DPRK. 9. The North Koreans appear to have picked up the UN Command point in order to make a bid to raise the level of discussion on the Pueblo to government-to-government. In addition to the general objections we would have to any such shift, it would pose two special problems with the ROKG:/2/ /2/In telegram 3973 from Seoul, February 5, the Embassy reported growing dissatisfaction with the U.S.-North Korean meetings at Panmunjom within the ROK. National Assembly leaders and political spokesmen saw the secret talks as an affront to the ROK and an infringement of its sovereignty and complained that President Pak was not informed about the meetings in advance. In an editorial, the government-owned newspaper Sinmun portrayed the negotiations as "'tantamount to betrayal' of ROKG since it not consulted in advance and because North Koreans treated as equal." The article repeated President Pak's comment that the ROK did not have unlimited patience in dealing with North Korea, called for a withdrawal of ROK troops from Vietnam, recommended the ROK regain operational control of its military, and "urged ROKG to take independent retaliatory action, if necessary." (Ibid.) a. The issue of recognition and status for Pyongyang. 10. We believe that at the next meeting in Panmunjom Admiral Smith should clarify his statement to assert that while in the US military command structure the Pueblo was not under CINCUNC, it was nevertheless part of the forces in the area of the United States, it was there in pursuance of the efforts of the CINCUNC to maintain peace, and it is the United States which provides the unified command of United Nations forces for Korea pursuant to the United Nations Security Council resolution of July 7, 1950. Admiral Smith would then go on to say that he, as Senior Member of the MAC on the UN Command side, represented the United States Government fully in regard to matters involving military forces related to peace and security in Korea. He would also recall the position taken by the North Korean side that the MAC was the appropriate forum for discussing the Pueblo seizure. A suggested statement is attached./3/ /3/Not printed. 11. The North Koreans might nevertheless persist in its demand for appointment of government-level representatives to deal with the Pueblo. If they should, we would then have to consider whether we would want to meet them part way on this issue by a device such as (a) giving Admiral Smith another hat as special US representative, or (b) sending an additional US Government representative to Panmunjom to sit with Admiral Smith and take part in discussion on the Pueblo; any such representative should be auxiliary to Admiral Smith and not independent of him, and the talks should remain in the MAC framework at Panmunjom. (In this connection, you may be aware of Arthur Goldberg's suggestion, made yesterday, that a lawyer be sent from Washington to work with Admiral Smith and assist him in the discussions.) IV. Tactics 12. The failure of the North Koreans to provide the names of our injured and dead at this second meeting should be hit hard at the next meeting. We have asked Admiral Smith to put in a request through the Joint Duty Officer immediately, and also to consider using the good offices of the NNSC members in their private capacities in view of their offer to do this if we failed to obtain any information at the first meeting. 13. If we have not received an answer before the third meeting, Admiral Smith should open with an insistent demand for their names as a token of their good faith in these negotiations. They have, in effect, asked us for the withdrawal of the Enterprise as a token of our good faith. If they are not prepared to make the simple gesture, we certainly should not make the very visible larger one. 14. This second meeting is rather ominous, and we should consider sending the letter to Kosygin if we are still on dead center after the third. The letter would say that we have gotten nowhere in these meetings. The North Koreans whose activities produced the present state of tension continue to say it is we who are threatening. Kosygin has asked for restraint. We have exercised restraint. As a further gesture, and depending on how we assess the third meeting, we might tell him we are moving the Enterprise south. 15. It is our turn to ask for the next meeting. If we are ready with our instructions by 5:00 p.m. today (7:00 a.m. Monday, Korea time), we could ask for the meeting for 4:00 p.m. Monday, Korea time. The North Koreans would then either have to accept or propose a later time, hopefully Tuesday.
265. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Korea/1/ Washington, February 4, 1968, 2201Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 33-6, KOR N-US. Secret; Flash; Nodis; Cactus. Drafted by Doherty; cleared by Berger, Walsh, Meeker, Steadman, and Sisco; and approved by Katzenbach. 109854. Ref: State 109842./2/ /2/Telegram 109842 to Seoul, February 4, advised the Embassy that the Department of State was preparing responses to the two North Korean demands made at the last meeting. (Ibid.) 1. Following are texts of statements recommended for use by Admiral Smith at next meeting of Senior members. 2. Believe Smith should open with statement as follows on North Korean accusation that we have created atmosphere of compulsion: Begin Verbatim Text: a. At the last meeting you said that the release of the crew and vessel Pueblo should be discussed in an atmosphere free from compulsion. Let me repeat that the US Government seeks a peaceful solution of this matter. You have stated that our side has created an "atmosphere of compulsion." Admittedly, there is an atmosphere of tension in this area, but that atmosphere is related to actions by North Korea. Account must be taken of increasingly aggressive actions by North Korean armed forces such as the infiltration of spies and saboteurs across the DMZ over the last 14 months, the raid on the Presidential palace in Seoul, and finally the seizure of the Pueblo. b. There is, therefore, a direct way to reduce tensions and eliminate the "atmosphere of compulsion" to which you refer. The armistice agreement must be faithfully observed. The North Korean Government should release immediately the Pueblo and its crew. Tensions would be reduced and the United States would be able to draw the correct conclusions. End Verbatim Text. 3. Smith should then repeat demand for names of dead and wounded if they have not already been given. We simply cannot understand why the North Korean side persists in refusing simple humanitarian request of this nature. Refusal without reason aggravates tensions. 4. In response to North Korean effort to get us to put discussions on govt-to-govt level, Smith should use following carefully prepared language: Begin Verbatim Text: a. General Pak at the meeting of February 4 referred to my earlier statement that the Pueblo was not under the command of CINCUNC, that it was a unit of the US Pacific Fleet, and that the case was without precedent. b. First, let me recall what I actually said on the question of precedent. These were my words: "The action of North Korea in seizing the ship was completely without precedent, and it was illegal because the ship was in international waters, . . ." c. Obviously, I was referring to the fact that seizure of a warship in peacetime in international waters, in contravention of international law and accepted international practice, is quite unprecedented. d. Next, let me clarify the place of the Pueblo in the US military command structure. I stated that the vessel was not under the command of CINCUNC because the line of command for the vessel ran from the US naval command in the Pacific rather than through CINCUNC. The Pueblo was, of course, a commissioned ship of the United States Navy, and as such a part of the armed forces of the United States. The need for the Pueblo's presence in the Sea of Japan arose from increased tensions in Korea caused by the actions of your side, and was in support of the mission of the forces on our side which is to maintain peace and security in the area. e. As for my position as Senior Member of the MAC on our side, I am here as the representative of the United States Government and authorized by USG to discuss Pueblo matter./3/ /3/In telegram 109876 to Seoul, February 5, the following was substituted for this paragraph: "As for my position, I am the Senior Member of the MAC on our side and I represent the United States Government with full authority to discuss the release of the U.S.S. Pueblo and its crew." The Senior Member was instructed to make clear his position as representing, but not as a representative of, the U.S. Government in this matter. (Ibid.) f. Finally, your side has already recognized that the MAC machinery is appropriate for discussion of the Pueblo seizure. Your side has done so in the statements of spokesmen and in the action of holding the meetings we have had. Accordingly, we do not see what special representatives could do in these discussions that you and I cannot do. If your side has anything specific in mind, would you elaborate? End Verbatim Text./4/ /4/In telegram 109856 to Seoul, February 4, the Department of State further advised that, should the North Koreans ask if the U.S. demand for an apology and compensation had been withdrawn, Smith should refer to his previous statements and reiterate the demand for release of the ship and its crew. (Ibid.) Rusk
266. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State/1/ Moscow, February 5, 1968, 0020Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 33-6 KOR N-US. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. 2684. Ref State 109851./2/ /2/In telegram 109851 to Moscow, February 4, Rusk sent Thompson the draft text of a proposed letter from President Johnson to Kosygin. (Ibid.) 1. I believe Soviets who want Koreans attend Budapest meeting and who consider their own prestige engaged by our show of force will not bring strong pressure on North Koreans unless we tell them we are withdrawing our recently added naval forces from the area. From my recent talk with Dobrynin/3/ I am sure there is strong division here between civilian and military leaders and on issue of this kind very unlikely Presidium would overrule military. If President could tell Kosygin he was taking his advice Soviets would bring most intense pressure on Koreans but of course effectiveness cannot be guaranteed. If however, Koreans failed in such circumstances to return ship and crew and we took forceful action believe Soviets would not intervene. /3/See footnote 3, Document 260. 2. If this cannot be our policy present text is fine. 3. Although I realize South Koreans want reassurance, Gromyko is right in saying our ships ineffective against infiltrators. Removing our additional forces would certainly cause Soviets to press North Koreans to reduce this activity and almost certain lack of Soviet support would prevent any bigger adventures. Thompson
267. Telegram From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State/1/ Seoul, February 5, 1968, 1045Z. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Korea--Pueblo Incident--Cactus II, Cactus Seoul Cables, January 29 to February 9, 1968. Secret; Flash; Nodis; Cactus. Attached to a February 5 memorandum from Rostow to the President in which Rostow characterized the meeting as "inconclusive" and suggested a prompt decision be made "about the Moscow message in the light of Tommy's cable." See Document 266. Rostow's memorandum indicates the President saw the telegram. 3970. Subj: Summary of Panmunjom Meeting, Feb. 5./2/ /2/A complete, verbatim text of the meeting is in telegram 3974 from Seoul, February 5. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 33-6 KOR N-US) 1. RAdm Smith opened meeting by reading verbatim text of statement contained para 2, State 109854,/3/ concerning atmosphere of compulsion. Before reading his statement, Smith passed to Pak two copies in both English and Korean. Pak and his advisor read statements intently while Smith was speaking. /3/Document 265. 2. Pak, reading from prepared statement, responded that at Feb 4 meeting Smith had given explanation distorting facts to make it appear that Pueblo had been in international waters and crew had committed no crime. Said charge Smith had just made had nothing to do with Pueblo matter and reserved right to express position in future. Referring again to his Feb 4 statement about compulsive atmosphere having been created by US side, Pak advised Smith to answer later after seriously studying his statement. He then requested answer to his second question at Feb 4 meeting (whether case was to be dealt with as matter between DPRK and USA, since Smith had stated Pueblo not under UNC command and case was without precedent). 3. Smith responded by again requesting names of Pueblo crew who are dead and wounded. 4. Pak, again reading prepared statement, contended that purpose of these contacts is to arrange means of discussing matters related to Pueblo case. Said that if Smith wished to solve matter "practically", it proper that representative from both sides appointed by DPRK and US should meet among themselves. He again requested clear answer to his question in Feb 4 meeting in this connection. 5. Smith, saying he would address that subject shortly, then read prepared statement referring to fact that he had requested info on names of Pueblo dead and wounded by written and oral means without result, ending with statement that US simply cannot understand why NK persists in refusing simple humanitarian requests of this nature; such refusal, without reason, aggravates tensions. 6. Smith, stating he was responding to Pak's second question at Feb 4 meeting, read verbatim text of statement contained para 4, State 109854, as amended by State 109876./4/ As with first statement, Smith provided Pak copies in English and Korean, which were again avidly read. /4/See footnote 3, Document 265. 7. Pak replied after long lapse, during which he made extensive penciled changes in his prepared text and combined latter with notes he had made on written copy of Smith's statement. He said that Smith in his last statement had stated he represents Govt of US in handling Pueblo case. Asked whether he could understand that US side admits Pueblo case is matter to be handled by DPRK and US and that Smith represents US Govt. 8. Smith rejoined that he did not feel he could improve on statement he had just read, which prepared by US Govt. 9. Pak, after deleting several lines and making brief addition to prepared statement, said he noted "your acknowledgment" that Pueblo case is matter to be handled by DPRK and by US Govt and that Smith represents US Govt. Asked whether Smith agreed with this understanding. (Foregoing was spoken very slowly and deliberately by interpreter.) 10. After repeating statement about his inability to improve on words given him by US Govt, Smith stated that "I will agree that I am acting for US Govt." After reviewing his statement, Smith added that he saw nothing in statement which states that US Govt will deal directly with DPRK as such. 11. Pak responded with notation of fact that Smith had stated he represents US Govt with full authority to deal with Pueblo case. He suggested conclusion this meeting and "Let's have a talk when we meet again." 12. Smith said that before concluding he wished make additional point. He then read prepared statement containing suggestion that future meetings be held at 1400 hrs (as suggested State 109852)./5/ Smith then said he had given Pak replies to his questions of previous day, that he had nothing further, would await Pak's reply, and suggested recess. Pak stated he noted what Smith had said. Meeting recessed at 1631 hrs. /5/Dated February 4. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 33-6, KOR N-US) 13. Comment: Meeting was very businesslike. Pak was obviously unhappy over what Smith said but remained polite. Obvious that his principal interest, for which he was well prepared, was to attempt to lead Smith into statements to effect that this was govt to govt negotiation. Both sides left door open for further sessions, and we expect that Communist side will shortly call next meeting. Pak did not in any way indicate awareness of contents Rusk/McNamara Meet The Press interview./6/ It is possible that knowledge of contents of this interview had not been passed to him prior to meeting, or that Pyongyang is still studying its implications. /6/Rusk and McNamara appeared on the television news program on February 4. An unabridged transcript of the broadcast is in Department of State Bulletin, February 26, 1968, pp. 261-272. Porter
268. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union/1/ Washington, February 6, 1968, 0003Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 33-6 KOR N-US. Secret; Priority; Nodis. Drafted by Rusk; cleared by Read, Rostow, and McNamara; and approved by Rusk. 110351. Literally Eyes Only for the Ambassador from the Secretary. Deliver soonest to Kosygin if possible following message dated February 5, 1968, from President to Kosygin: "Dear Mr. Chairman: I can tell you very simply why additional U.S. military forces are in the area of South Korea and the Sea of Japan./2/ For many months infiltration from North Korea across the Demilitarized Zone has been increasing. There were about 50 incidents initiated by the North Koreans in 1966; there were almost 600 in 1967. We have reports that there were some who were trying to persuade North Korea to open a so-called second front. We are fully aware of the threatening public statements made by the leaders of North Korea themselves, including the recent statement by Premier Kim Il-sung that-- 'We must accomplish the South Korean revolution, unify the fatherland in our generation, and hand down a unified fatherland to the coming generations. We must quickly make all conditions ripe for the realization of the unification of the fatherland.' /2/With the exception of this sentence, this and the following two paragraphs of the letter were sent to Porter, who was instructed to read the text to Pak alone and to stress that the information was being passed in strictest confidence. (Telegram 110350 to Seoul, February 6; ibid.) Recently two events occurred within a few days of each other which we were forced to take with the utmost seriousness. A North Korean mission of specially trained officers was intercepted in Seoul with orders to assassinate President Park, the American Ambassador, and their families. Second, a vessel of the U.S. Navy was seized in international waters in an action which is almost literally without precedent in modern times and which violated a rule of law in which you and all other maritime nations have a great interest. This act has deeply stirred and outraged the American people. Surely you need not look beyond these developments to understand why we felt it necessary to augment our forces. Quite frankly, we do not know what North Korea has in mind. We do know what we have in mind; namely, that North Korea will not be permitted to direct its military forces against South Korea and that American flag vessels are not to be seized on the high seas. As far as the Pueblo matter is concerned, you and I seem to agree that a prompt settlement is in the common interest. This can only mean, of course, the prompt return of the Pueblo and its crew. We see no reason why this action could not be taken within the next two or three days through the channels now established at Panmunjom. If the ship and its crew are promptly returned, it is obvious that tension in the Korean area would be sharply reduced and the forces there could then assume a more normal posture. We must, of course, continue to watch and take seriously any continued acts of infiltration directed against the Republic of Korea. I am glad to have your candid views. On the assumption that you and I agree that we want peace in that area and that we will both work to that end, I can tell you that I have directed that there be no further build-up of our air and naval forces at this time. In addition, I am directing one of our aircraft carriers and accompanying vessels to move somewhat southward. Sincerely, Lyndon B. Johnson" Septel follows on developments at Panmunjom./3/ /3/A summary of the fourth MAC meeting was sent to Moscow in telegram 111562, February 7. (Ibid.) Rusk
269. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State/1/ Moscow, February 6, 1968, 1515Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 33-6 KOR N-US. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. 2708. Ref: State 110351./2/ /2/Document 268. 1. I delivered the President's message to Kosygin at 3 p.m. today. 2. Upon hearing translation of message, Kosygin asked me to convey his thanks to President. At same time he wanted me to tell President that it was difficult for him to understand this situation. When a vessel got into territorial waters of other nations, matter should be resolved in accordance normal procedures. As US itself had said, Soviet vessels, although admittedly they were fishing vessels, had intruded in US territorial waters. US had seized vessels, put captains to trial, and levied fines which USSR then paid. Similar incidents had taken place in Norwegian territorial waters, but Soviets again used diplomatic channels, apologized, paid fine and settled matter. In no instance had the Soviets dispatched their naval vessels although, in case of Norway, there was powerful Soviet surface and submarine fleet in vicinity. In every instance Soviets had sought settle incidents through diplomatic channels without raising tensions and without creating possibility of conflict. On other hand, US reacted to Pueblo seizure by dispatching aircraft carriers and other vessels, which indicated that there were many hotheads in Pentagon who needed tranquilizers. Kosygin said time had passed when threats worked or when great powers could simply flick their fingers and have smaller nations do what they wanted them to do. It was in desire to put Pueblo incident in proper perspective that he had said in New Delhi that this was local conflict which should be settled by two parties concerned. 3. Referring to President's mention of infiltration, Kosygin asserted infiltration going in both directions and merely reflected natural desire Korean people for reunification their divided country. If US were divided, we would also have infiltration in both directions. In any event, area was close to Soviet territory and Soviet Union could not but be concerned about increased tensions and possibility of incidents there. He reiterated that it better to work through diplomatic channels through exchange of messages, etc., and not to resort to show of force. 4. This connection he noted Soviets had not dispatched their fleet when recently US destroyer collided with Soviet merchant vessel. In this case too, US decided not even to apologize but rather to argue that Soviet vessel was at fault. At sea, there were certain rules to be abided by and if they were violated, apology was in order. Fortunately, Soviet vessel was damaged above rather than below water line, otherwise it would have sunk. 5. I pointed out we had delivered a note to MFA yesterday in which we described circumstances of collision and indicated fact that our destroyer had right of way under international regulations. Kosygin countered by asserting our case not convincing and we simply trying protect our captain by stretching the truth. Soviets dealt with their captains committing similar violations quite differently: they demoted them and deprived them of ship command. 6. Reverting to Pueblo incident, I pointed out that while incident cited by Kosygin involved Soviet fishing vessels, Pueblo was a naval vessel. There was difference between procedures for handling fishing vessels and those regarding naval ships. There had been cases where Soviet naval vessels intruded in US territorial waters, but we merely asked them to leave and did not seize them. As Kosygin knew, our position was that Pueblo had been seized in international waters. However, even if it had intruded into North Korean territorial waters, proper procedure should have been to ask it to leave rather than seize it. I then pointed out that coincidence of recent events in Korea, such as North Korean plan for assassination of President Park and our Ambassador and Pueblo seizure, created great concern among South Koreans who did not know what to expect next from North Korea. I also pointed out that we were trying to use diplomatic means to secure release of Pueblo and its crew, and expressed hope that meetings at Panmunjom would soon bear fruit. 5. [sic] Kosygin said he thought discussions at Panmunjom were proceeding normally and should be continued. Direct US-North Korean talks much more useful than intercession by third party. He felt that Panmunjom meetings apparently gave some satisfaction to both US and North Korea. 6. When I reiterated my hope for prompt successful outcome those talks, Kosygin said Soviets also interested in prompt settlement of incident since there were enough conflicts in world already and there was no need to have a new one. 7. Kosygin then raised Middle East and Vietnam, which reported separately. At end of meeting I asked him what he proposed to give to press about our meeting. He said that, as last time, he would issue statement that he had met with me at my own request, with no indication of subjects discussed. Thompson
270. Telephone Conversation Between President Johnson and George Ball/1/ Washington, February 7, 1968, 9:59 a.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of Telephone Conversation between President Johnson and George Ball, February 7, 1968, 9:59 a.m., Tape F68.02, PNO 3. Secret. This transcript was prepared by the Office of the Historian specifically for this volume. Ball: I think we're going to complete this report we're making this morning, finish preparation of it. I went over it with Bob and with Dean/2/ last night, and we're classifying it very highly, so it will be in the nature of a report to you, and we're also putting a special classification on it to keep it quite secret, so that you can use it as you want. But, on the whole, I think that we've come out with an agreed report that indicates that we ought to perform these missions in a somewhat different fashion in the future, that we probably shouldn't send them into waters of this kind without protection, and so forth. I wondered if you would like me to come over for five or ten minutes and just run through it before we finally put it to bed. /2/Robert McNamara and Dean Rusk. President: I sure would. I had two folks that I kind of wanted to--'cause they'll have to live with it some--to talk to you before you all really got it down finally, because I'm afraid that it'll be like the Gaither Report,/3/ somebody in some department looks at it, will leak it. I thought that these folks would be my best defense, if you're in Europe or some other place when we call you for help. And I wondered if you would mind spending ten minutes with Taylor and Clark together-- /3/The Gaither Report, which examined U.S. defense capabilities to respond to a surprise nuclear attack by the Soviet Union, was given to President Eisenhower in November 1957. The Top Secret report was later declassified and published in U.S. Congress, Joint Committee on Defense Production, Deterrence and Survival in the Nuclear Age (The "Gaither Report" of 1957), (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1976). Ball: Sure. President: --because they had gone out and done a lot of things for us. They'll both be here. Max is testifying from time to time. He was on the Bay of Pigs thing. He has a background. He's on that intelligence board. Clark is chairman of it, and Clark has to kind of do what you used to do--oppose, put in the no vote sometimes, so I don't think everything's love and peaches-and-cream. If you would do that, then come right on in. Marvin Watson will open the door any time you're ready. You can bring them--bring them or you can just come by yourself and just tell 'em I'd like to have a little reaction from them and any suggestions they have, because Rivers/4/ is already refusing to hear Bob up there on his valedictory, and we've got the Thurmonds/5/ and the Rivers and these wild men that want to blow up a city, and I've just got to have Clark handle some of those and Taylor will have to give them a little touch. So, if you'll talk to them, I'll tell Marvin now to give me an hour or two's notice and we'll bust up what we're doing and receive you any time. And I thank the Lord you're living. /4/Representative Mendel L. Rivers, Chairman, House Armed Services Committee. /5/Senator Strom Thurmond. Ball: Fine, Mr. President.
271. Memorandum for the Record/1/ Washington, February 7, 1968. /1/Source: National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Vietnam Policy, Memos to the President, T-167-69, Box 57, SPC-S-094-93. Secret. Drafted by Taylor. SUBJECT In a meeting with the President by Ball, Clifford and Taylor, it was agreed that Ball would endeavor to obtain agreement from his colleagues on his committee for him alone to make an oral report of the principal findings to the President. He would avoid policy recommendations, limiting his comments to the specifics of the Pueblo incident. In the written draft report,/2/ the following points are made: /2/A copy of the sixth and presumably the final draft of the committee's report, February 7, is in the Johnson Library, National Security File, Intelligence File, Pueblo, January 1968. a. It would probably be wise to abandon efforts to conduct covert ELINT collection activities at sea. If this attempt were abandoned, then it would be possible to operate ELINT ships without radio silence and to protect a ship by an armed naval vessel further out to sea. b. The government should review the sensitivity of coastal areas of ELINT interest before dispatching Pueblo-type ships on new missions. c. There should be adequate destruction devices aboard ELINT ships to assure quick destruction in times of emergency. d. Instructions to the skippers should be reviewed. Apparently there is an ambiguity in the instructions regarding the use of weapons in self-defense. Ball is to pull in all copies of his draft report from other members of the committee. We will decide at the next meeting with the President (probably toward the end of next week) what kind of public statement to make upon query with regard to the Ball Committee report. Some such statement as the following seems to be contemplated: "The Ball Committee has filed an oral report which emphasizes the complexities and technical character of many of the matters raised by the Pueblo incident and points out that committee has not been able to explore all these matters in depth in the time available to it. Hence, the report to the President limited itself to suggestions of certain areas which require further examination in order to determine appropriate action by the responsible governmental agencies. It took note of the fact that the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board is already seized with certain aspects of the Pueblo incident and that the Eaton Board is in the course of making a thorough study of the many kinds of intelligence activities in which the Pueblo was engaged at the time of the incident. "The President expressed his appreciation to the members of the Ball Committee for their help and for the effectiveness of their work in the relatively short time available to them." At the next meeting of the Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, the Pueblo matter will be given top priority. The principal question will be the scope of any study of the Pueblo incident which is within the capability of the Intelligence Board. MDT
272. Action Memorandum From the Director of the Korean Task Force (Berger) to Secretary of State Rusk/1/ Washington, February 7, 1968. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 33-6 KOR N-US. Secret; Exdis; Sensitive. SUBJECT 1. The North Korean stand at the Fourth Meeting is unpromising for an early settlement and could further complicate our relations with the Republic of Korea./2/ The North Korean requests for the addition of a deputy, the exchange of minutes and more formalized procedures, including press releases, seem to have the following purposes: /2/The Embassy did not send a summary of the fourth Senior Members meeting, since it lasted only 26 minutes, but noted that the "meeting was again businesslike" and "Pak's manner was cooperative and polite." (Telegram 4047 from Seoul, February 7; ibid.) A verbatim text of the meeting was forwarded in telegram 4051 from Seoul, February 7, and corrections based on an analysis of the Korean-language tape recording of the meeting are in telegram 4058 from Seoul, February 7. (Both ibid.) a. To establish even more clearly that we have moved to government-to-government negotiations for prestige purposes. b. To spin out the negotiations on the assumption they can do so with impunity, and to inhibit us from taking more forceful action while the talks continue. c. To increase the existing strains on ROK-US relations, for the very idea of government-to-government talks, and especially without them, is anathema to South Korea. The North Koreans perhaps hope that these strains might become so acute as to produce street demonstrations in Seoul, and growing public resentment that would lead the ROKG to withdraw some of its forces from Viet-Nam, or at least keep them from sending additional troops. d. To keep the situation sufficiently unsettled and roiled as to keep US forces pinned down in the area. The North Koreans know, of course, about our foreign exchange problems, budgetary deficit, and the President's domestic difficulties, and it may be they think maintaining a certain amount of tension in Korea will put added strains on our resources and add to the President's troubles at home. 2. The request for a change in procedure, per se, presents no great problem for us, and we could accept it were it not for the strong [South] Korean reaction. However, we need not make a decision on this request for another meeting or two. By then, the news of the additional $100 million in military assistance will be public, and this might help moderate Korean feelings about these talks. 3. Probably the most significant sentence of the Fourth Meeting is: "You will be able to express your opinion at the next meeting on the disposition of the case of your armed spy ship Pueblo." This is a clear indication that they expect us to table some specific proposal. 4. At the next meeting we should state again that we agree with them that a situation of acute tension, of which they complain, exists in the area, and it will not be reduced until: a. The crew and vessel are released. b. The provocations against the ROK stop. 5. We should stress that no amount of talk in this forum, or any other forum, is going to produce agreement on the facts. 6. We therefore see no special need for a new procedure. The North Koreans should be asked what the new procedure can do that can't be done under existing arrangements. 7. We should at the next meeting say we are ready at that meeting to table proposals for the disposal of the case. If this is a true negotiation they should table their proposal for disposal of the case at the same time. Are they prepared to table? If not, will they table theirs at the next meeting? 8. We have two proposals we can make: a. We might state that we are prepared to submit the Pueblo issue to an international fact-finding body provided they agree to release the crew and vessel to us in connection with such an inquiry. This will give them something to chew on and smoke them out on this course of action. They are not likely to agree since they say the issue should be settled in direct talks./3/ /3/The instructions sent to Admiral Smith in preparation for the fifth meeting reflected this proposal. Smith was also instructed to inform the North Koreans that the United States had no objections to their proposed procedural changes. (Telegram 111812 to Seoul, February 8; ibid.) b. Our second proposal is to provide them with the following signed statement and assurance when the men and the vessel are released to us:/4/ /4/Smith also received instructions covering potential responses to an unexpected release of the crew. (Telegram 112831 to Seoul, February 9; ibid.) i. "The USS Pueblo is a vessel of the US Navy. It was engaged in intelligence collection at the time it was seized by force of arms. It was, according to our information, in international waters at the time it was seized. ii. "Vessels of the US Navy are under the strictest instructions not to approach closer than thirteen nautical miles off the coast. An inquiry will be held when all the crew has been returned to the United States. The question whether the Pueblo approached closer than thirteen nautical miles to the coast of North Korea will be particularly examined. We shall make public the results of that inquiry and take appropriate action." 9. General Bonesteel is absolutely opposed to agreeing to the new procedure./5/ /5/When informing Sharp of the North Korean proposal on instituting new procedures that would "in effect, make it more formal and obvious that meetings were between representatives of US and DPR," Bonesteel stated unequivocally, "In light of intensifying ROK bitterness re U.S. unilateralism in MAC, I recommend strong opposition to any U.S. acceptance of any version of Communist proposal." (Telegram KRA 0473 from CINCUNC to CINCPAC, February 7; Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Korea--Pueblo Incident, Military Cables, Vol. II, February 1968 to March 1968) 10. Ambassador Porter recommends moving the talks outside Korea./6/ The trouble with this is that it will take time, and the North Koreans may not agree if their purpose is to cause trouble between us and the ROKs. /6/Porter submitted his comments on the meeting and the implications for future negotiations in telegram 4062 from Seoul, February 7. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 33-6 KOR N-US) The Department of State informed Porter of its opposition by pointing out that to "change from military to diplomatic channels would go farther toward giving appearance of recognition of North Korea than present procedures," which could only have a detrimental effect on official and public reaction in the ROK. (Telegram 111805 to Seoul, February 8; ibid.) 11. I think we should hold to the present venue and arrangements for another meeting or two, by which time we may have the North Korean proposal for "disposal of the case."
273. Information Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/ Washington, February 8, 1968, 7:30 p.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Korea--Pueblo Incident, Vol. Ib, Part A (beginning February). Secret. The memorandum indicates that the President saw it. Mr. President: I have been speculating with the members of my staff most directly concerned with the Korea problem. We have been looking beyond the present situation to the possible failure of Panmunjom or its endless stringing out. We are conscious of the following weaknesses in all the forms of action which have been proposed: --The Soviets have committed a high proportion of their Far East fleet to the area. They will feel their prestige is on the line if we move in on North Korean ports or attack North Korean installations with our air or naval power. --but equally, in our message to Kosygin we have indicated that time was relatively short before some form of action might have to be taken. Nothing would damage our credibility with the Russians more than if, having put forces in the area and stated to Kosygin the urgency of the matter, we did nothing. --it is true we can pick up some North Korean-Polish ships; but they turn out to be almost wholly Polish. Sect. Rusk is worried about possible pressure on the road to Berlin if we fuss with Polish transport, although I don't think the Poles want a Berlin crisis at the moment. But you should know that Gronouski, when sounded out, said in effect: Please don't. --we don't have any firm fix on the possibility of a Free World denial of shipping and bunkerage in trade to North Korea, but it doesn't look like a very substantial measure. In the face of these thin prospects and our desire to avoid a second front in Korea--at least at our initiation--the following thought has arisen: that we now mine the Haiphong and other harbors of North Viet Nam. The advantages are: --even if not a decisive action, it is an important action which bears upon the major battle we are fighting; --the Russian capacity to deal with it, and the Russian commitment to deal with it on a military basis is much less than something done in the Sea of Japan; --it would maintain our credibility with Kosygin & Company, especially if timed in relation to the indication in the letter concerning the Pueblo. If we wish to institute the policy by increments, we could start by laying mine barriers in the south of North Viet Nam and progressively but swiftly moving north, perhaps using a back channel to suggest to Moscow that if they wish to have the mining stop short of Haiphong, they had better deliver the Pueblo and its crew./2/ But it is a course which, once embarked upon, we would have to mean. /2/The wisdom of saying anything to Moscow--even back-channel--would have to be checked. [Handwritten footnote in the source text.] As for the men and the crew, we could continue being just as patient in the Panmunjom negotiations as the other side; but we would have to accept as likely that we would not get them back for some considerable period of time. I am not recommending this course of action; but I believe it deserves careful thought if in fact the North Koreans and the Soviets are going to play this game out to extract humiliation of us. Walt [Continue with the next documents]
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