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FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1964-1968, Volume XXIX Korea
Department of State |
Korea 274. Telegram From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State/1/ Seoul, February 10, 1968, 0756Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 33-6 KOR N-US. Secret; Flash; Nodis; Cactus. Given to the President under February 10 covering memorandum from James L. Brown, Briefing Officer, White House Situation Room, which indicates that the President saw it. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Korea--Pueblo Incident--Cactus IIa, Cactus Seoul Cables, February 10 to February 28, 1968) 4136. Subj: 5th Closed Senior MAC Members Meeting Feb 10. 1. Since meeting was so short and consisted largely of Admiral Smith's reading of verbatim text, we will not send full transcript of meeting until we have had qualified language personnel examine it carefully and make any necessary revisions./2/ /2/A verbatim text of the meeting was transmitted in telegram 4137 from Seoul, February 10. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 33-6 KOR N-US) 2. Admiral Smith opened meeting by reading verbatim text of statement contained State 111812/3/ as amended by para 6 State 112452./4/ /3/See footnote 3, Document 272. /4/Dated February 8. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Korea--Pueblo Incident--Cactus IIa, Cactus Seoul Cables, February 10 to February 28, 1968) 3. Although Pak was probably only prepared to receive Smith's response to his proposals regarding future conduct of business through formal meetings, he also noted without objection that portion of Smith's statement which presented our view on disposition of Pueblo case. He then immediately proposed recess and formal meeting next time. 4. Admiral Smith countered with request for response to two questions contained at end of his statement./5/ Pak replied that his side would express its position at formal meeting. /5/As reported in telegram 4137, Smith asked: "Are you prepared today to state your side's readiness to return the crew and vessel? If you are not prepared today, will you be prepared at the next meeting to state that you will release the crew and vessel?" 5. Admiral Smith, bearing in mind fact that NNSC conference room where this and previous meetings have been held is small and that additional personnel will attend formal meetings, asked Pak where he proposed that formal meetings be held. Judging from his reaction, Pak misinterpreted this question and apparently thought Smith had in mind holding meeting somewhere outside Panmunjom. He became flustered, consulted with KPA/CPV Assistant MAC Secretary who wrote out reply for him, and answered in manner betraying some anxiety that it his understanding both sides had already reached agreement that meetings will be held in NNSC conference room at Panmunjom. Smith concurred. 6. Pak agreed with Smith's assumption that he would propose next meeting. Smith then proposed recess. Pak agreed. 7. Meeting recessed at 1413 hours local. At precisely that time KPA/CPV JDO was receiving Smith's request for open MAC meeting Feb 12 to discuss tension resulting from armistice violations in and through the DMZ./6/ /6/A summary of the open MAC meeting, which was held on February 14, was transmitted in telegram 4226 from Seoul, February 14. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 KOR/UN) 8. Comments: During this meeting Pak parried request for information regarding NK intentions with respect return of ship and crew. Smith was prepared with special request for return of dead and wounded but, feeling that in this atmosphere he would accomplish nothing, he withheld request./7/ /7/The Department of State agreed that Smith's approach was appropriate and instructed that the request not be made at the next meeting, "since we do not want give North Koreans impression that we expect anything less than immediate release of entire crew and ship." The substance of the next meeting would determine whether the issue would be raised at a subsequent meeting or through the JDO. (Telegram 113551 to Seoul, February 10; ibid., POL 33-6 KOR N-US) 9. Pak did not go back to question of Smith's precise status in future formal meetings or refer again to point that two sides should be DPRK and USA. 10. Attendees feel that Pak was more polite, soft-spoken and cooperative than in previous closed meetings, albeit no more willing to concede or offer anything. Moreover, he was not aware during this meeting of our request for open MAC meeting, and we therefore have no basis for judgment as to how he will react to this request or what effect it will have on order and timing of subsequent meetings. Porter
275. Notes of Meeting/1/ Washington, February 13, 1968, 1:12-2:30 p.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, Tom Johnson's Notes of Meetings, Luncheon Group, February 13, 1968. Top Secret. Drafted by Tom Johnson. The meeting was held in the White House. SUBJECT PRESENT Director Helms: The report on a possible air attack by North Korea on Seoul was unnecessarily alarming. There is nothing to it./2/ /2/The comment apparently refers to North Korean messages of February 9 and 10 [text not declassified] indicating that the Soviets and North Koreans planned an atomic attack on Seoul and Osan. Several [text not declassified] officials received the report without being notified of the tenuousness of its contents, thus spawning [text not declassified] demands for increased military preparedness and similar measures. [text not declassified] concluded that the intercepted communication was merely part of a training exercise and represented no danger of imminent attack to South Korea. (Telegram from DIRNSA to the White House, February 14; National Security Agency, Center for Cryptologic History, Historical Files, Box 4, V. Initial Reaction) We are worried by reports that the North Koreans have the log of the Pueblo and are publicizing specific co-ordinates. Secretary Rusk: An operations order of 1966 CINCPAC Fleet permitted these ships to go up to a three mile limit./3/ We need to check to see if such an operation order might have been aboard this craft. /3/A copy of this order is attached to a February 13 memorandum from Leonard to Berger. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 33-6 KOR N-US) General Wheeler: The Pacific Command was placed on a high state of alert for the possibility of an attack on South Korea in any case. Mr. Rostow: Representative Pucinski took Secretary Rusk's answer to Representative Carey on Capitol Hill last week. He violated his word about the off-the-record nature of the discussion in the belief he was helping the administration. The President: When is our next meeting with the North Koreans? Walt Rostow: 9 p.m. tonight./4/ /4/The senior members met in open session on February 15 at 1400 (KST). [Here follows discussion of the situation in Vietnam.] [The President asked if Vance should go to Vietnam at the conclusion of his mission to South Korea and went on to say] I think Cy has a point that Pak wants me to get the message from him as quickly as possible. Secretary Rusk: Also we should not underestimate the trouble with South Korea Vance is handling. General Wheeler: Admiral Sharp asked me whether we should move the cruiser Canberra from the Sea of Japan back to Vietnam in light of the political problems this might cause with South Korea. The President: What is the situation on the Pueblo? Secretary Rusk: Ambassador Bohlen and I are having lunch with Dobrynin later this week. I am perturbed by this broadcast giving the log, plot, and co-ordinates of the ship. The North Koreans may want a confession and an apology. It is hard to confess something when you do not believe you did it. We need independent access to our men, but they may have us. The President: Should we review the orders on all ships of this type? Wheeler: The Pueblo Task Force under George Ball is looking at this now. The President: Is there a significant difference in intelligence gathered three miles out versus fourteen miles out? Director Helms: It depends on what you want to get. The farther out the ship is, the less communications intelligence you get. [Here follows further discussion of Vietnam.]
276. Action Memorandum From the Director of the Korean Task Force (Berger) to Secretary of State Rusk/1/ Washington, February 15, 1968. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 33-6 KOR N-US. Secret; Nodis. SUBJECT The sixth closed meeting of Senior Representatives was held yesterday afternoon at two o'clock Korean time and lasted twenty-two minutes. The whole meeting was devoted to presentation of the North Korean position on the Pueblo case./2/ /2/The meeting took place on February 15 in Korea. A summary of the meeting was transmitted in telegram 4262 from Seoul, February 15; the verbatim text in telegram 4261 from Seoul, February 15. (Both ibid.) The North Korean representative sharply attacked our version of both the facts and law bearing on the case. He made the following principal points: a. The intrusion of the Pueblo into North Korean territorial waters is proved by confessions of the crew, the ship's log and navigational plot, and by "other material evidence, including intelligence data." b. When challenged by North Korean patrol craft, the Pueblo attempted to escape "while committing provocative firings." The North Korean vessels returned fire in "self-defense." (This charge was first made at the January 24 open MAC meeting.) c. The Geneva Convention of 1958 concerning territorial waters refers to "violations of order in navigation" and cannot be applied to "the case of an armed spy ship." (We are not clear what the former phrase means. Possibly navigational error.) d. The US side has signed treaties recognizing "the inviolability of territory of states." The North Koreans were therefore fully justified in seizing the Pueblo. The concluding North Korean statement apparently indicates their terms for the release of the crew of the Pueblo. The word "vessel" is significantly omitted. "Therefore, we will give considerations to (will be able to consider) the issue of returning the crew members only when your side apologizes for the fact that the US Government dispatched the armed spy ship Pueblo to the territorial waters of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, conducted espionage activities and perpetrated hostile acts, assuring (and assure) that it will not commit such criminal acts again." It is the US turn to set the date of the next closed meeting. We believe that we should call for such a meeting as soon as possible. We will prepare an instruction for Admiral Smith and seek clearance on it by 6:00 p.m. today (8:00 a.m. February 16, Korean time), which will enable us to ask for a meeting the afternoon of February 16. In this instruction we will provide answers to the major points raised by the North Korean side and focus particularly on language that deals with "apologies" and "assurance" not to violate territorial waters./3/ /3/Instructions for Admiral Smith for the seventh closed meeting were transmitted in telegram 116188 to Seoul, February 15, and modified in telegrams 116350 and 116402 to Seoul, both February 16. Smith was instructed to repeat the U.S. proposal "to conduct a full and impartial inquiry" after the ship and crew have been released, "to express regrets if any facts revealed by this inquiry would justify our doing so," and to assure that all U.S. naval ships would "remain more than twelve nautical miles from your coast." (All ibid.) We will also prepare a message to Seoul giving Seoul the text of the Pueblo's Sailing Order which instructed the ship to go no closer than thirteen nautical miles from the North Korean land mass/offshore islands. Admiral Smith should be authorized to use the Sailing Order in the event that the North Koreans captured a copy of a 1966 CINCPAC Fleet directive which authorized surface patrols up to three nautical miles of the North Korean coast./4/ This instruction was, of course, superseded by the Pueblo's Sailing Order. /4/Telegram 116189 to Seoul, February 15, transmitted the text of the Sailing Order. Instructions for Smith on presenting the instructions to the North Koreans were transmitted in telegram 116190 to Seoul, February 15. (Both ibid.) We have checked with the office which controls reconnaissance flights over North Korea and have been informed that such flights are suspended pending receipt of approval from you. In a separate memo to you I am recommending that no reconnaissance be scheduled until there is a "go" sign from you. If no progress is made at the next closed meeting, we shall have seriously to consider possible pressure tactics against the North Koreans. The Korean Working Group has staffed out five such measures:/5/ /5/A paper prepared by the Korean Working Group, entitled "North Korean Aggression and the Pueblo Incident, Possible Future Strategies," includes an attachment discussing the rationale behind each option. The paper was undated, but it is attached to a February 13 note from Jenkens. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Korea--Pueblo Incident, Vol. Ib, Part A [beginning February]) a. Air reconnaissance over North Korea; We are now considering a phased combination of some of these measures, possibly in conjunction with a stepped up psychological and diplomatic offensive against North Korea. Recommendation: That you approve the general course of action outlined above./6/ /6/The memorandum does not indicate whether Rusk approved the course outlined by Berger.
277. Telegram From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State/1/ Seoul, February 16, 1968, 1122Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 33-6 KOR N-US. Secret; Flash; Nodis; Cactus. Rostow forwarded this telegram to President Johnson with an explanatory memorandum, February 16, which indicates that the President saw it. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Korea--Pueblo Incident--Cactus IIa, Cactus Seoul Cables, February 10 to February 28, 1968) 4304. Subject: Seventh Senior MAC Members Meeting, Panmunjom, February 16. 1. In essence, preliminary review of attendees' notes and tape recording reveals today's meeting produced very little in the way of progress. Pak was notably less truculent today but stated his position firmly. That position was: (A) If Pueblo crew is to be returned at early date US side must change its attitude and provide apology and assurances of nature Pak demanded at sixth meeting. (B) Return of ship cannot be subject of discussion on grounds there is no precedent for return of equipment used in espionage. Pak stated it "therefore will be better not to mention ship again." 2. At today's meeting Pak showed photostats of alleged confessions Pueblo crew and of various ship documents/2/ as evidence to prove his assertion that "armed spy ship Pueblo" had intruded into NKorean territorial waters to commit espionage and hostile and aggressive acts on order of US Government. RAdm Smith requested and received copies of these photostats. /2/Smith received copies of Bucher's and Murphy's alleged confessions, a photograph of the cover of a document entitled "Position Log Record" with a notation "Odd Day Log" and "Federal Supply Service 7530-28608363," photographs of various record books, and photographs of two maps allegedly plotting the Pueblo's course. (Telegram 4301 from Seoul, February 16; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 33-6 KOR N-US) On February 16 the North Koreans also released a joint letter of apology from the entire crew of the Pueblo for having violated North Korean territorial waters and other acts. (Memorandum from Rostow to the President, February 16; Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Korea--Pueblo Incident, Vol. Ib, Part A [beginning February]) 3. RAdm Smith read both statements contained State 116188 as amended./3/ Pak summarily rejected these as "preposterous assertions" and several times played on theme that to cling to this attitude will not be beneficial to US side. On several occasions he also requested careful study of statements he made at sixth meeting. He did, however, expressly reserve right to comment on Smith's statements of today at next meeting and agreed to call next meeting as soon as he had received reply to Smith's statements. Smith gave him written copies of his two statements but Pak did not request copy of statement Smith would be able to sign. /3/See footnote 3, Document 276. 4. NK attendees at seventh meeting were same as for sixth with exception absence one Jr. Lieutenant. 5. Verbatim text with language officer's comments on English translation of Pak's statements follows by immediate cable./4/ /4/Transmitted in telegram 4305 from Seoul, February 16. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 33-6 KOR N-US) Porter
278. Information Memorandum From the Director of the Korean Task Force (Berger) to Secretary of State Rusk/1/ Washington, February 16, 1968. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 33-6 KOR N-US. Secret; Nodis. SUBJECT Since no progress was made at the Seventh Closed Meeting held yesterday afternoon at Panmunjom, I believe the following steps are now in order: 1. Aerial Reconnaissance--I have sent you a separate memorandum today recommending that you approve the flying of a Black Shield mission at the first opportune moment./2/ /2/A handwritten notation by Read states: "Approved by S 3 pm 2/16. BHR" 2. Approach the Soviets--We do not know how fully the North Koreans have informed the Soviets of the closed talks. We therefore propose that Ambassador Bohlen pass to Ambassador Dobrynin verbatim transcripts of all seven meetings. These transcripts might be accompanied by a letter from you to Gromyko to be delivered by Dobrynin (Chip's suggestion)./3/ /3/A handwritten notation by Read states: "Bohlen letter and verbatim of 6th meeting delivered to Dobrynin on 2/15." Copies of that and subsequent letters are in National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 33-6 KOR N-US. We are preparing a draft for Chip to look at. Its general line would be: a. We have abided by the Soviets advice; b. We have not been belligerent and have kept the lid on in the United States and South Korea; c. We have stopped further deployments and turned the Enterprise around; d. We have direct dealings with North Korea and have had seven meetings; e. We have not had the slightest indication from the North that they are in any hurry to turn over the crew, and they have made clear they have no intention of ever turning over the vessel; f. We have reached the end of what we can say and concede; g. Finally, that Mr. Vance has returned and confirms reports from our Ambassador that a very dangerous mood exists in South Korea, and continued raids across the DMZ or raids against the South could inflame the situation, and produce an even graver problem. h. That we want the Soviet authorities to know where matters stand. 3. Request for Return of Dead and Wounded--We believe that this step should be deferred at least until after we have seen what results may be produced by the proposed approach to the Soviets. 4. Diplomatic Moves--We are preparing a circular telegram to a number of posts reviewing recent developments in Korea for their information and as a basis for answering inquiries./4/ /4/Paragraph no. 5 was handwritten by Read. Telegram 117319 to 30 embassies and missions, February 17, contained a summary of the status of the Pueblo crisis. (Ibid.) 5. Next Meeting--Sit tight and wait. If NK's ask for meeting, we listen and rest on past representations and authorizations.
279. Telegram From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State/1/ Seoul, February 18, 1968. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Korea, Memos, Vol. V. Secret. This is a retyped version of the telegram given to the President with an attached memorandum from Rostow, February 20, who wrote: "I am not at all sure that his [Porter's] particular scenario is the right one; but we had better get a scenario soon." A note on the telegram indicates that the President saw it. For the President Text of Cable From Ambassador Porter (Seoul 4321) 1. The following is in response to your request for an assessment of the outlook for the Pueblo case and contains my advice as to the next steps./2/ I have no doubt that you have considered all the possibilities I list below in the form of gradually increasing pressure on North Korea. They seem to contain, up to a point at least, a useful course of action short of open conflict which may change the North Korean attitude. However, such actions as I list would lead inevitably to even greater engagement of U.S. prestige and therefore, if they fail to achieve the desired result, to a hard decision whether to strike a blow. They also involve the fate of the crew, the reaction of North Korean allies, and the problem of deciding and coordinating the South Korean role. /2/The telegram as sent to the Department of State referenced telegram 117379 to Seoul, February 17, in which Katzenbach requested Porter's assessment and advice on the Pueblo situation. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 33-6 KOR N-US) 2. The North Koreans are now fully aware of the value of the men/3/ and are undoubtedly extracting very valuable information from them through use of hypnotic drugs and perhaps other devices. It would seem that this process could go on for some time and that, consequently, we will be kept waiting, cap in hand, at Panmunjom. It is but a short step from general "confession" to "request" of some crew members at least (probably the most valuable) to be allowed to remain in North Korea and serve the people in atonement for "past crimes." In fact, almost anything can be expected from a regime like that of North Korea, whose super-Maoist outlook requires that the leader's name be mentioned at least once in practically every sentence of hours-long broadcasts. /3/Intelligence reports indicated that Communist China had sent an interrogation team to question 17 crew members who had previously gathered intelligence off the Chinese coast and that the Soviet Union sent a team of electronics and decoding experts to assist with the interrogation of Pueblo crew members. (Telegram from the Commander of Naval Intelligence in Japan, February 16, 1529Z; Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Pueblo, 23 January 1968 to December 1968) 3. Your latest instructions to the U.S. senior representative at Panmunjom contained a fairly obvious warning to the North Koreans that seven meetings have proved unsatisfactory./4/ That will not move them. They are fully aware of our dissatisfaction, but as long as we are meeting and doing nothing else, they will not be moved by our views about progress or lack of it. /4/Smith had been instructed to state at the Seventh Meeting that it was clear "that further meetings will only be repetitious on both sides." (Telegram 116350 to Seoul, February 16; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 33-6 KOR N-US) 4. If it is now decided to apply other measures, I would begin by not responding for the time being to the next North Korean request for a closed meeting. I would not refuse a meeting--I would simply not respond. A brief message could be sent to North Korea through another channel to the effect we have had enough, that seven closed and three open meetings have proved useless. A clear warning about welfare of crew and responsibility of highest North Korean level should be included. 5. We could then commence a series of non-decisive measures, without verbal threats, which would engage North Korean attention. The first of these would be cancellation of leaves of all UN military elements along the DMZ. 6. After a short period (two or three days) to permit us to note any North Korean reaction, we could announce a black list of shipping to and from North Korean ports. The effect would be more psychological than substantial. 7. The next step would be to alert American dependents and non-essential personnel in Korea that the situation is not improving and that we advise visitors not to make plans to come to Korea for the time being. This would cause considerable comment and might have adverse effect on investment in Korea. 8. This would be followed by an air demonstration well inside [South] Korea, so handled as to have high press visibility. 9. At this point we would assess the North Korean reaction, if any, and decide in light of intelligence gathered through other sources whether to resume private meetings. This decision could of course be made anywhere along the line. If it seemed necessary to continue the process cited above, other measures such as blockade, closer-in naval/air demonstrations and actual evacuation of non-essential Americans here could be considered. Certainly, the last mentioned step would have ominous overtones. 10. I suggest serious consideration be given to the steps listed, in paragraphs 4 through 8, at the present time. If and as such a procedure is approved, we should take steps concurrently at the UN and elsewhere, to make known our feeling that we have done our best with the North Koreans who do not wish to settle the matter in a peaceful or honorable way. 11. I recommend this course of action because I have always felt it desirable to look and plan beyond what we are actually doing, especially with dealing with Communists. For understandable reasons, we have been a little too eager in this case and they have made us dance to their tune. As the process of recovering the men and ship now seems likely to be long drawn out for the reasons I have cited, I think our people would support a change of roles.
280. Telegram From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State/1/ Seoul, February 20, 1968, 0528Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 33-6 KOR N-US. Secret; Flash; Nodis; Cactus. A copy of this telegram was given to the President under a February 20 covering memorandum from Arthur McCafferty that indicates the President saw it. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Korea--Pueblo Incident--Cactus IV, Cactus Misc. Papers, February to December 1968) 4368. Subject: Eighth Senior MAC Members Meeting at Panmunjom, February 20. 1. Following is text of preliminary report today's meeting received from RAdm Smith over secure wire system from advance camp. Begin text. Meeting consisted largely of Pak reading long statement which was later passed across table. No acceptable solution yet apparent. Return of ship not mentioned. After a long justification of DPRK position and action Pak then said (English version follows): "I have noted your statement made at the previous meeting that your side will assure that 'United States naval vessels will continue to be ordered to remain more than twelve nautical miles from your coast.' I have also noted that the indication of the willingness of the U.S. Government to make an apology. Such being the case I considered that the issue of the crew will be easily solved in case your side does not try to make the apology after the return of the crew but makes a proper apology on the basis of the confessions made unanimously by all the crew members including the captain of their intrusions into the territorial waters of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and of their hostile acts. At the previous meeting, you asked me when the crew of the Pueblo would be returned. My answer to the question is that it completely depends upon your side which will take its position with regard to the matters raised by me in the above. Therefore, your side should seriously study the statement I have made today." End text. Porter
281. Telegram From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State/1/ Seoul, February 20, 1968, 0825Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 33-6 KOR N-US. Secret; Immediate; Nodis; Cactus. A retyped copy of this telegram was given to the President under a February 20 covering memorandum from Arthur McCafferty that indicates the President saw it. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Korea--Pueblo Incident--Cactus IV, Cactus Misc. Papers, February to December 1968) 4385. Subject: Eighth Senior MAC Members Meeting at Panmunjom, Feb 20. Ref: Seoul 4365./2/ /2/Reference should be to telegram 4368 from Seoul; Document 280. 1. As you will note from reftel and complete text of today's meeting to follow shortly,/3/ Pak uses apology by entire crew to alter NKorean position as stated in sixth (para 4X, Seoul 4261) and seventh (paras 3C and 10, Seoul 4305) meetings./4/ Position now is that confessions and apology by entire crew constitute all evidence US needs to take proper action and that the release of crew "will be easily solved" after US makes "proper apology." In this meeting Pak perhaps indicated (see reftel) that NK side would be willing to consider expression of regret as an apology. It seems more likely, however, that "proper apology" means something more than post-release expression of regret dependent on findings of impartial inquiry. It clearly means apology in advance of crew's release. Pak's failure to repeat request for assurance in his final statement and his notation of RAdm Smith's statement at seventh meeting that US will assure that US naval vessels will continue to be ordered to remain more than twelve nautical miles from NK coast may indicate satisfaction on this essentially secondary point, but this is only inference and is not spelled out. /3/Telegram 4391 from Seoul, February 20, transmitted the verbatim text of the meeting. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 33-6, KOR N-US) A copy of this telegram was given to the President under a February 20 memorandum from Rostow in which Rostow suggested that "the issue is narrowed to a question of whether we are prepared to 'make an apology' after the return of the crew, or on the basis of their 'unanimous confessions.'" Rostow's memorandum indicates that the President saw the telegram. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Korea--Pueblo Incident--Cactus IIa, Cactus Seoul Cables, February 10 to February 28, 1968) /4/Both telegrams transmitted the verbatim text of the respective meeting. Paragraph 4X of telegram 4261 from Seoul, February 15, quotes the North Koreans as saying they will consider returning the crew members only when the United States "apologizes for the fact that the US Government dispatched the armed spy ship Pueblo to the territorial waters of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, conducted espionage activities and perpetrated hostile acts, assuring (and assures) that it will not commit such criminal acts again." Paragraphs 3C and 10 of telegram 4305 from Seoul, February 16, contain Pak's restatement of that position. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 33-6 KOR N-US) 2. Main portion of Pak's statement today was devoted to repetitive references to fact that USG had dispatched armed spy ship to intrude into NKorean territorial waters to conduct hostile acts. (Although Pueblo's activities are described in various ways, phrase "hostile acts" is repeated in almost every other sentence.) Pak also makes passing reference to fact that DPRK has "full right" to punish crew members in accordance national law, but that in consideration of crew's apology for their crime, their oath not to repeat criminal acts, and their appeal for lenient forgiveness, NK side has expressed position that it will consider their return when USG has made proper apology and assurance. He also makes reference to six intrusions of territorial waters between January 15 and 23, to allegation that Pueblo fired on KPA naval craft, and to existence of "abnormal hostile relations" between DPRK and US. 3. Pak made no mention of return of vessel itself in this meeting. 4. RAdm Smith reports that Pak today was more polite and circumspect in his attitude than he has been at any other previous meeting. He spoke slowly, carefully and politely, and seemed determined to make his points without arousing emotional response. In light of fact that Pak made it clear in his opening statement that timing on return of crew would depend on prior US apology, RAdm Smith saw no point in demanding specific date for return. 5. Will pouch tape recording and English and Korean versions of Pak's statement which he provided RAdm Smith at close of meeting. Porter
282. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Korea/1/ Washington, February 22, 1968, 2142Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 33-6 KOR N-US. Secret; Priority; Nodis; Cactus. Also sent to Moscow, London, and Tokyo. Drafted by Berger, cleared by Rostow and Read, and approved by Rusk. Rostow sent a copy of this telegram to the President at his ranch in Texas, explaining that he, Rusk, and Clifford met that morning, February 22, and rejected apologizing to the North Koreans based on the alleged confession by the crew, and developed the approach contained therein. (Telegram CAP 80489 from Rostow to the President, February 22; Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Korea--Pueblo Incident, Vol. Ib, Part B [beginning February]) 119560. 1. We are unable for a variety of reasons to meet the North Korean request at the eighth meeting for an apology based on the confessions and other documents as a condition for the release of the men. Since North Koreans have refused to accept our offer to express regrets after an official inquiry, in the event results of inquiry justify our doing so, we may be approaching a deadlock in these private meetings of U.S. and North Korean seniors at Panmunjom. 2. We are therefore contemplating a four-pronged effort to find a solution. 3. At the next meeting we propose to say that the North Korean proposal for an apology in advance of the release on the basis of the confessions and documents submitted to us does not offer any possibility of a solution. We will repeat our offer of an inquiry after the men and ship have been released and say we will submit the confessions and documents to the Board of Inquiry as evidence pertinent to the inquiry./2/ /2/In reply the Embassy in Moscow strongly urged omitting this proposal and proceeding directly to the next alternative. Thompson believed doing so "would greatly increase possibility of Soviets bringing pressure on North Koreans although I am not sanguine they will go very far in any event." Thompson also noted that making "graduated concessions may encourage Koreans to hold out for more." (Telegram 2888 from Moscow, February 23; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 33-6 KOR N-US) 4. If the foregoing is not acceptable to the North Koreans we will offer them the alternative of an investigating commission once the crew, documents and vessel are released, to examine all aspects of the seizure and all documents and statements, and make its finding public. Each side would appoint a member and the two sides would agree on a third member from another country to serve as chairman. If the findings find us culpable we will offer to express regrets. 5. It is virtually certain the North Koreans will reject the investigating commission and possibly both proposals, but at least they will have something to chew on. 6. Before calling the ninth meeting we would make the following additional moves. 7. Embassy Seoul would approach the Swiss and Swedish members of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission, and inform them that the eight meetings have produced no result. For their private information, we have offered to express regrets after the men are released and an official inquiry held, should our findings warrant such expression, but the North Koreans are demanding an apology now based on the confessions and documents as a condition of release./3/ That offers no possibility of a settlement as far as we are concerned. They should also be told of the alternate offer we will make at the next meeting. All this for their private information. /3/The Swiss and Swedish members had received similar information from the Czech and Polish members, who met with Pak on February 21 to discuss the status of the crisis. (Telegram 4418 from Seoul, February 22; ibid.) 8. What we would like the Swiss and Swedes to do, or either one, depending on what Seoul and they decide, is to convey to the Poles and Czechs their alarm at the delay in releasing the vessel and crew. They can venture their opinion that the U.S. must hold an inquiry after the release, and that clearly the confessions and other documents will be introduced into that inquiry. Further that the Americans will have to publish the results, and if there was any violation or fault, the Americans would have no choice except to apologize. The North Koreans have got all the propaganda value they can out of the case, and what is now required are moves to ease the tensions arising from the seizure of the Pueblo. If the North Koreans try to press the U.S. too far and make impossible demands on them, the already grave situation can become even graver. They therefore urge the Czechs and Poles to try to impress on the North Koreans the need for an immediate release./4/ /4/At a meeting on February 25 Smith asked the Swede and Swiss members if they would impart this information to the Polish and Czech members and if they, in turn, would report it to the North Koreans. The Swede and Swiss members agreed and anticipated the information being passed to Pak. (Telegram 4476 from Seoul, February 25; ibid.) That and a follow-up meeting produced little, and in telegram 121942 to Seoul, February 28, the Department of State advised the Embassy that the NNSC approach had been taken "as far as can be useful for the time being." (Ibid.) 9. The third move will be made with the Russians, possibly through Dobrynin or Thompson or both or in a highest level or ministerial level message./5/ We will supply the Soviets with the transcripts of the eighth closed meeting, and indicate our plans for the ninth meeting. We would stress that an apology before an inquiry after the men are released is out of the question, and that if the North Koreans do not accept either of our proposals or come up with a reasonable solution, then we have reached the end of what we can say to the North Koreans or offer them. We could indicate our concern about reports that crew will be tried. We would let the Russians draw the conclusion that we shall soon have to tell our people and the UN that the meetings have produced no results. Our hope is that the Russians will get to the North Koreans before the next meeting or soon thereafter and urge on them the need to affect an early termination of this matter by release. /5/Thompson's inclination was to send a letter from Rusk to Gromyko, if only to preserve the record, although that step could make it somewhat more difficult for the Soviets to act. If the Soviets were approached through an informal discussion, Thompson suggested a meeting between Rusk and Dobrynin. (Telegram 2888 from Moscow, February 23; ibid.) 10. Our fourth approach will be to the Japanese and British, the two main non-communist trading or shipping nations with North Korea. They will be informed of our plans for the next meeting and of our general view that it looks as if we are reaching the end of these talks. They will be asked to inform the North Koreans privately at an appropriate time after the ninth meeting--if no progress is indicated there--that the gravity and tension in the area are such that they are considering suspension of all shipping into North Korean ports. We shall ask the Japanese and UK to agree in principle to suspend shipping if we should ask them to do so so that this is not regarded by them or the North Koreans as a bluff./6/ /6/The Embassy in Tokyo had no objection to approaching the Japanese Government, but could not "be sanguine as to results or, even if GOJ does agree, how much effect this would have on Pyongyang." (Telegram 5847 from Tokyo, February 23; ibid.) The Embassy in London could not comment on the potential British reaction. (Telegram 6696 from London, February 23; ibid.) In telegram 120318 to Tokyo and London, February 24, the Department of State advised that a decision on the shipping suspension had been left open and instructed the embassies to bring the Japanese and British up to date on the current status of negotiations and on the U.S. approach to the upcoming ninth and tenth meetings. (Ibid.) 11. The Japanese and UK will be told that we are not at the moment thinking of more forceful measures, and are still hoping to find some peaceful solution. 12. Japanese, UK and Soviets should be told that gravity of the problem should not be underestimated by them. We anticipate that March will see the start of a new North Korean campaign of violence in the DMZ and the despatch of more raider teams which, if the Pueblo and crew are still in North Korean hands, will further heighten the tensions which already exist. The release of the crew would draw the focal point of acute tension and make it easier to deal with the other causes of tension in the area. 13. The foregoing is for your information and comments which we would like soonest. Katzenbach
283. Telegram From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State/1/ Seoul, February 23, 1968, 0945Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 33-6 KOR N-US. Secret; Priority; Nodis; Cactus. 4463. Ref: State 119560./2/ /2/Document 282. 1. We agree with general thrust of reftel, which as we interpret it is that (a) North Koreans show no signs of willingness accept our past proposal, (b) that closed meetings cannot be continued much longer, and (c) time has come to go to outer limits of our position, backed by as much support as we can muster by third parties. In general, we concur that efforts it outlines are worth undertaking. Following comments are designed primarily to indicate limitations that apply to such efforts and some pitfalls we foresee. 2. North Koreans are now awaiting our comment on their demand for apology in advance of crew release. If this is completely unacceptable to us, we agree that ninth meeting is time to say so. We see no harm in repeating our previous proposal for purpose of establishing absolute clear record of their refusal of our offer. (And we are convinced they will not accept it.) There is possibility that proposed procedure could result in Pak going back for further instructions, resulting in a tenth meeting before Adm Smith could table alternative suggested para 4 reftel. 3. We agree with implication in reftel that offer of investigating commission should be made, at least for record purposes and as indication our willingness to bring impartial judgment to bear on Pueblo case. It would no doubt be to our advantage with respect to world opinion to be able to say we made such an offer and that NKs rejected it, as we agree they would probably do. Certainly there is little in their private or public positions on Pueblo or in their past history to suggest they would agree to anything like impartial outside inquiry into their affairs. 4. In highly unlikely event they consent to concept of investigating commission, negotiations on establishment thereof would offer them variety of opportunities to delay and wrangle. There is serious doubt that we and they could ever agree on chairman to be chosen jointly by their rep and ours. They would doubtless balk at releasing crew before investigation began. They would also seek to enlarge scope of charges against us which commission should evaluate beyond mere question of whether Pueblo intruded into their territorial waters. In short, we should make this offer only if necessity to establish this kind of record is overriding and we should be prepared to state at outset in very clear terms just what it is we envisage commission will investigate. 5. Other moves suggested reftel would be useful in terms of eventually establishing our case before world opinion. We are not hopeful, however, that Swiss and Swedes can accomplish much. They can talk only to Czech and Polish members of NNSC, who in turn can talk only to Pak or to their own and perhaps Russian embassies in Pyongyang. As Dept recognizes, NNSC is channel of limited utility, available for passing information but not for exertion of pressure. 6. Para 8 reftel also raises some other questions, which precise Swiss and Swede would doubtless inquire about. If they tell the Pole and Czech that we would have no choice but to apologize if impartial inquiry reveals any violation or fault, what will this imply to North Koreans? Violation or fault with respect to territorial waters? Or violation in terms also of other NK charges: commission of espionage, hostile acts, war provocation, etc. Does it mean we will punish crew? Does apology mean we abandon position that Pueblo was naval vessel with right to be where it was and doing what it was, and that only recourse of NK under international law was to warn and escort it out of territorial waters? 7. We agree with reftel that attempt to engage support or pressure from UK, Japan and Sovs could be useful. We question, however, need to provide them with transcripts of closed meetings. This is more than we have been doing with ROKs, and if word got back to our friend here that we have provided something to Japanese and Soviets, in both form and substance, which goes beyond what we have told them, we would have another ROK eruption. Accordingly urge that Moscow, London and Tokyo not pass transcripts until Dept has decided what we do about ROKs in this matter./3/ /3/In reply the Department of State made note of Porter's comments, but was reluctant to provide the South Koreans with transcripts "because of well-known ROK proclivity of leaking documents to press." The Embassy was instructed to continue briefing the President or Prime Minister on the substance of the meetings. (Telegram 120307 to Seoul, February 14; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 33-6 KOR N-US) 8. This leads of course to observation of immediate importance to us in Seoul that ROKs would not be very happy if they had full information on positions we have taken heretofore and would bitterly oppose notion that we would submit our case to investigating commission which would include friends of NK and before which US and NK would appear as equals. We may simply have to live with their reaction, but we should not minimize its importance simply because they are now quiescent. 9. Finally, while argumentation in para 12 reftel would be useful in appeals to Sovs, Japanese and Brits, we should recognize that it has no relationship to real attitudes of either North Koreans or ROKs. North Koreans find heightened tension in this area entirely to their advantage for a complex of reasons. They have deliberately raised tension and we fully expect that their future actions will be carefully calculated to maintain it. They have obviously decided long ago that stability in this area works only to advantage of their sworn enemies and they have taken serious risks to upset that stability. They must regard Pueblo seizure and Blue House raid as highly successful operations from their point of view, results of which indicate that US at least will tolerate very high degree of tension, perhaps one ruinous to US/ROK relations and stability in ROK, and that they run little risk of retaliation unless ROKs get out of hand. 10. As for the ROKs, return of Pueblo and crew under conditions which we have proposed would not relieve their anxieties, frustrations and desire to retaliate. We do not expect that prior return of Pueblo and crew would have material effect on ROK desire to retaliate. If North Koreans resume raids in March, ROKs will want to retaliate whether or not crew has been returned. Porter
284. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Korea/1/ Washington, February 24, 1968, 1853Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 33-6 KOR N-US. Secret; Immediate; Nodis; Cactus. Repeated to Tokyo, London, Moscow, Stockholm, and Bern. Drafted by Yager; cleared by Walsh, Clifford, and Rostow; and approved by Katzenbach. Forwarded to the President at his ranch in Texas; that copy indicates that the President saw it. (Telegram CAP 80531, February 24, Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Korea--Pueblo Incident, Vol. Ib, Part B [beginning February]) 120290. Subject: Instructions for Ninth Closed Meeting. 1. You should request next closed meeting soonest. 2. At next meeting, Admiral Smith should open with following statement. a. In previous meetings, I have made a specific proposal for resolving the controversy over the Pueblo and its crew. I have made it quite clear that the US Government is prepared upon the return of the ship and its crew to conduct a full inquiry and to make the results public. We have taken note of the various documents which you have handed over in these meetings. I can assure you that these documents/2/ are pertinent to the proposed inquiry and will be submitted to it. It would, of course, be important to authenticate these documents by testimony of the crew members involved. /2/The phrasing here and elsewhere was changed to "photographs of documents" on Seoul's recommendation that merely to refer to "documents" could "mislead the NKs into believing that we accept these photographs as valid evidence" and because of Smith's reluctance "to concede that any meaningful documents have been received at these meetings if this is not really the case." (Yager/Ericson/Smith Telcon, February 24, and telegram 120342 to Seoul, February 25; both in National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 33-6 KOR N-US) b. As I have also previously made clear, we are willing to express regret if the inquiry would justify our doing so. c. An expression of regret based exclusively on the documents you have provided might later prove inconsistent with the facts which a full and impartial inquiry would disclose. Moreover, until the officers and the men of the Pueblo have been released, the evidence which you have submitted is unverifiable either by us or by anyone else. In any event, an expression of regret on our part prior to a full inquiry into the facts and in advance of the release would not be understood by the American people. d. Our previous discussions in these meetings indicate that factual questions divide us. There is no dispute that the Pueblo's mission was to gather intelligence. We disagree as to precisely where this mission was carried out and where the Pueblo was seized. The U.S. is not reluctant to have these factual issues resolved. e. We would welcome any impartial resolution of this disagreement and would be willing to have the facts reviewed by any impartial, international, factfinding body. For example, we would accept assignment of this task to any person or persons named by the President of the International Court of Justice. f. We are prepared to express regrets, if the international body should find that, in violation of its orders, the Pueblo entered waters closer than 12 nautical miles to North Korea. g. Whatever the body agreed upon, we do not see how an impartial inquiry into the facts could be conducted with the crew still in North Korean hands. We believe it would be appropriate to return the crew immediately to the United States. We would, however, accept release of the crew to the custody of a neutral party, for example the Swiss Government. h. I urge you to consider most seriously adopting one of the concrete approaches to settling this matter which we have placed before you. 3. Pak will presumably not be in a position to respond to our proposals at this meeting. If this is the case, Smith should say: a. As you can see we have given most serious consideration to everything you have said in these meetings. We have placed before you concrete proposals which, if accepted by you, would permit settlement of the matter before us. b. You have now held the crew of the Pueblo for over a month. We can see no reason why you should want to detain them further. c. I hope that you will give me an answer to our proposals at our next meeting which will result in an immediate release./3/ /3/The ninth senior MAC members meeting was held on February 26. In reporting on the meeting the Embassy noted that "Pak was completely unprepared for what RAdm. Smith had to say and was forced to discard all statements he had prepared in advance." (Telegram 4503 from Seoul, February 26; ibid.) The verbatim text was transmitted in telegram 4504 from Seoul, February 26 (ibid.) and forwarded as telegram CAP 80584, February 26, to the President at his ranch in Texas by Rostow, who noted in an introductory opening paragraph that the North Korean response to the U.S. proposals was "surprise and virtual silence," meaning that "the next meeting will be critical." CAP telegram 80584 contains a note that the President saw it. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Korea--Pueblo Incident, Vol. Ib, Part B [beginning February]) Rusk [Continue with the next documents]
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