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FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1964-1968, Volume XXIX Korea
Department of State |
Korea 285. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union/1/ Washington, February 24, 1968, 1901Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 33-6 KOR N-US. Secret; Priority; Nodis; Cactus. Repeated to Seoul. Drafted by Toon; cleared by Walsh, Clifford, Yager, and Rostow; and approved by Katzenbach. 120291. For Ambassador. We now believe oral demarche to Soviets is more appropriate at this juncture of Pueblo situation than formal communication./2/ Request you see Gromyko soonest and discuss situation along following lines (Bohlen discussed problem with Dobrynin February 23 when latter called on another matter, but only in general terms):/3/ /2/The Department of State had earlier considered sending a letter from Rusk to Gromyko. The thrust of the draft letter paralleled the instructions contained in telegram 120291. (Telegram 117432 to Moscow, February 19; Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Korea--Pueblo Incident--Cactus Ia, Cactus State Cables, February 11 to 29, 1968) /3/A memorandum of their February 23 conversation and telegram 120035 to Seoul, February 24, summarizing the meeting are in National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 33-6 KOR N-US. On February 15 Rusk and Bohlen met with Dobrynin and briefly discussed the Pueblo incident. (Memorandum of conversation, February 15; ibid.) 1. It is now a month since North Korean patrol boats forcibly seized the USS Pueblo in international waters. Despite the clear illegality of this action and despite the strong emotions which it has aroused in the United States, we have shown considerable restraint and made every effort to arrive at a quick, peaceful solution. As you know, we have acted on your advice by making certain adjustments in our posture in the hope of facilitating a prompt settlement. 2. We have now had eight private meetings in direct talks at Panmunjom. As you know, copies of the verbatim transcripts of the meetings have been given to Ambassador Dobrynin, since we wish to be sure you are fully informed on what has transpired at Panmunjom. 3. Our position in these talks has been moderate and reasonable. We offered to conduct a full and impartial inquiry after the ship and its personnel have been returned to us. We further offered to express our regrets if that inquiry develops facts which would warrant our doing so. The North Koreans reacted negatively to these proposals. At the next meeting, we will offer to submit the Pueblo problem to an impartial fact-finding body provided the personnel are first released into our custody or into neutral hands. We will tell the North Koreans that if the commission should find that, in violation of its instructions, the Pueblo entered waters closer than 12 miles to the North Korean coast, we would express regret. 4. We do not see how we can go further. Nor do we believe that by any objective standards should we be expected to do more. The present acute tensions in the area have not diminished. I think you will agree that it is in your interest as well as ours that this vexing problem is resolved without further delay. 5. These tensions have their origin primarily in the behavior of the North Koreans. You know of the raid on Blue House and of the numerous violations of the DMZ. Beyond this, the North Koreans have recently voiced irresponsible threats which can only serve to inflame the situation. 6. Let me give you just a few examples. At the open meeting of Military Armistice Commission on February 19, senior North Korean representative declared that North Korea would exchange "punishment for punishment, retaliation for retaliation, and all-out war for all-out war." Just prior to this, on February 17, North Korean Vice Premier Pak Song-chol made an equally intemperate statement in which he concluded: "If the US imperialists and the Pak Chong-hui clique should dare attempt some retaliatory action, it will at once mean the beginning of war. The US imperialists and their stooges should take a square look at reality and act with discretion. Whether a new war will break out or not in Korea depends entirely on the attitude of the US imperialists and their stooges. The more the US imperialists cling to intimidation, blackmail, and war clamors, the more complicated the current situation will become. If they gain anything from this, it will be only corpses and death." 7. North Korean spokesmen have said publicly that the Pueblo crew may be tried and punished. This was said here in Moscow by the North Korean Charge d'Affaires. This is highly irresponsible behavior, and clearly any such action would seriously aggravate the already tense situation. 8. Mr. Cyrus Vance recently returned from talks with high officials in Seoul and confirms reports from our Ambassador that the South Koreans' patience is sorely tried. They are angered at what the North Koreans have already done and what they understand they plan to do in the future. Captured agents over the past years have provided a picture of size and character of North Korean training program to infiltrate saboteurs and assassins. There are other indications that point to a step-up in campaign of violence against Republic of Korea in the very near future. We should both consider very carefully what might develop in this potentially explosive situation, if Republic of Korea is subject to more depredations such as attack on Blue House on January 21. 9. We are doing our utmost to restrain the Republic of Korea, and we hope Soviets are exerting similar effort with North Koreans. Neither of us is in complete control of situation, but we should do what we can to prevent a flare-up. Immediate release of Pueblo and its crew will contribute to relief of the tension. We wanted you to know these facts regarding the situation before the North Koreans made any reply to our offer./4/ /4/Thompson met with Gromyko on February 26; see Document 286. Rusk
286. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State/1/ Moscow, February 26, 1968, 1405Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 33-6 KOR N-US. Secret; Nodis; Cactus. 2913. Ref: State 120291./2/ /2/Document 285. 1. I saw Gromyko at 1430 today and made oral demarche per reftel. 2. Gromyko confirmed receipt verbatim transcripts Panmunjom meetings which had been given to Dobrynin and wondered if I could summarize to him proceedings last meeting. This connection, it became obvious that some confusion exists in Soviet mind re number of private meetings held, since Kornienko, who also present, said they had received transcripts of eight meetings and thought another, ninth, meeting had taken place on February 21. In particular, Gromyko wondered whether we had answered all questions put forward by North Koreans and whether any progress had been made. 3. I said I did not have report on last meeting with me, but noted North Koreans had demanded apology before release of ship and crew and rejected our offer conduct impartial inquiry on our own. Now we intended offer impartial investigation by completely outside body. 4. Gromyko said that on basis information Soviets had from different sources he could say little at this time. If he spoke at length, he was afraid that would result in repetition of what had been said in Kosygin's message and his own statement to me earlier. He stressed Soviets hoped very much problem would be settled, the sooner the better. Soviets not sure U.S. using all possibilities. He said he had noted in my statement assertion that detention had been illegal; in fact, entire U.S. position seemed to be based on this assertion. He did not wish dwell at length on this point but wanted to state that Soviet views on it as stated before still valid./3/ /3/The Soviet view was also repeated in a letter from Kosygin to Prime Minister Wilson written in response to a British appeal that the Soviets exert their influence with the North Koreans to resolve the crisis. (Telegram 6716 from London, February 26; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 33-6 KOR N-US) 5. I said we believed disagreement may be result of each side's basing itself on different facts. Therefore, we making offer of impartial investigation those facts. As I had noted in my oral statement, it difficult see what more we could do. In any event, we could not rely on statements by other side or other statements which we doubt had been made voluntarily. 6. Asking rhetorically if U.S. would agree to impartial investigation of U.S. statements re situation in other parts of world, Gromyko said proposition would not satisfy other side. He wondered whether North Koreans had accepted proposal. I explained we had not yet made this offer, but intended to do so at next meeting. Gromyko said question arose what could be regarded as impartial. After all, past U.S. actions in Korea had been under UN label but UN had had nothing to do with them. I stressed we meant an impartial investigation which should be acceptable to North Koreans. 7. Gromyko said he was sure we knew Soviets wanted problem resolved as soon as possible. I said we believed Soviets rational people, and we also thought the sooner this dangerous situation resolved the better for everyone. As to Gromyko's remarks re impartiality, we did not exclude possibility facts might be against us but we prepared accept results impartial investigation. 8. Gromyko said main thing was for U.S. to tell its people not to engage in this sort of activity; as experience had shown, such activity might result in precarious situation. I pointed out our crews had their instructions to stay out of territorial waters. 9. Comment: Although Gromyko was cautious in his reaction, I believe he was impressed by position we are taking and would guess that Soviets will at least recommend if not urge North Koreans to accept. Thompson
287. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Korea/1/ Washington, February 29, 1968, 0120Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 33-6 KOR N-US. Secret; Priority; Nodis; Cactus. Drafted by Yager; cleared by Brown and Warnke; and approved by Katzenbach. 122259. Subject: Instructions for Tenth Closed Meeting. 1. Since ball is now in North Korean court, we see no need to supply Admiral Smith with detailed instructions for next closed meeting. Smith will probably have to do no more than listen to and acknowledge Pak's response to new proposals which Smith made at ninth meeting. 2. We recognize that Pak may try to avoid direct and specific response on our new proposals by repeating position he has taken at earlier meetings and merely denouncing our position in general terms. If Pak does adopt this or other unresponsive line, Smith should say: a. At this meeting, I had hoped to receive your serious and carefully considered reactions to the various concrete proposals for settling the Pueblo case which I made at our last meeting. I urge you to study those proposals more thoroughly and come to the next meeting prepared either to accept one of them or to tell me in precisely what respect you believe they should be modified, and why. b. We have now had ten private talks. We should be well past the stage of general discussion and should focus on specific means of reducing the dangerous level of tension in this area by releasing the officers and men of the Pueblo from the detention in which they have been held for far too long, and by returning the ship itself to United States control. Rusk
288. Telegram From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State/1/ Seoul, March 4, 1968, 0855Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 33-6 KOR N-US. Secret; Immediate; Nodis; Cactus. 4652. Subj: Summary and comments on tenth closed senior MAC members meeting at Panmunjom, March 4./2/ /2/A verbatim text of the meeting was transmitted in telegram 4655 from Seoul, March 4. (Ibid.) 1. Today's meeting lasted 48 minutes, mostly devoted to uncompromising presentation by Pak of NKorean position as stated in sixth and subsequent meetings and equally firm rejection of proposals we put forward at ninth meeting. At end of his opening statement, Pak handed RAdm Smith English version with heading again describing him as rep of Govt of DPRK. He also gave Smith handwritten letter addressed to President Johnson purportedly signed by entire crew, including wounded. Letter says wounded in final stages of recovery. Text of letter being transmitted with comments by septel./3/ Smith accepted letter as "document addressed to President of the United States" to avoid any endorsement of authenticity. /3/The texts of telegram 4652, the letter from the crew, and Porter's comments, which center on an analysis of the signatures appearing on the letter, were transmitted in telegram CAP 80651, March 4, from Rostow to President Johnson. In the letter, which had been read over Radio Pyongyang, the crew admitted violating North Korean territorial waters, argued that North Korea properly deserved an apology, and urged the President to issue an apology so that the crew could return to the United States. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Korea--Pueblo Incident, Vol. Ib, Part B [beginning February]) 2. Following Pak's long statement, Smith made statement based on guidance contained para two, State 122259./4/ Pak responded with shortened version of his previous line. Meeting ended with Pak proposing recess after Smith had said he would refer Pak's statement to appropriate authority and advise Pak when he had reply. /4/Document 287. 3. Believe following aspects this meeting are noteworthy: A. Communists obviously used interval between meeting to draft letter to President Johnson with considerable care and to obtain (or possibly forge some of) crew's signatures. B. Pak had carefully rehearsed his presentation. He deliberately projected tough image during portion of his statement in which he rejected impartial inquiry by third party and indicated U.S. in no position to "accept" release of crew to neutral custody. He added in very harsh tones that such remarks constitute defilement of DPRK sovereignty and asked rhetorically and sneeringly whether this meant U.S. believes DPRK has neither law nor ability to deal with situation. He concluded this most dramatic portion of his presentation with statement in softer tones that it would be height of folly for US to believe that it can compel DPRK to accept "unwarrantable" claims. C. Pak's presentation contained only vaguest references to possibility that crew might be tried, but implication was present in such statements as: "As long as your side keeps on taking such an unwarranted stand as present at our meetings, our side will have no other way but to understand that your side has no concern about the fate of the crew of the Pueblo and tries to evade the responsibility for them. Accordingly, our side will have no alternative but to consider another step." D. In arguing for U.S. acceptance of DPRK position, Pak at one point referred to existence of "precedents of having settled similar cases in the past under the terms acceptable to both sides," by which he doubtless meant helicopter crew. E. Pak clearly left door open for further meetings, although there equally clearly no give in DPRK position. F. There was nothing in Pak's presentation to indicate DPRK thinking in terms of prisoner swap or ransom as suggested last week by Czech and Polish NNSC members. Porter
289. Memorandum From Alfred Jenkins of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow)/1/ Washington, March 4, 1968. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, National Security Council History, Pueblo Crisis, 1968, Vol. VII, Day-by-Day Documents, Part 14. Top Secret. A copy was sent to Jorden. SUBJECT 1. We should rule out definitively as inappropriate, unseemly, not in the American character, and a knuckling under to simple blackmail: --a swap of Korean prisoners, of whatever ilk, for the Pueblo
crew; 2. I reluctantly conclude that our best tack for the foreseeable future is sticking to the diplomatic pressures line, while building up, rapidly, substantially, and very overtly, ROK capabilities. 3. U.S. forces in Korea, although understrength, should not be built up at this time because of Vietnam needs, balance of payments problems (the 25,000 men required for minimal meaningful buildup would cost $200 million per year), and various adverse readings which would be taken in many quarters because of greater American presence, other than in Vietnam, on the Asian continent. 4. While something like symmetrical retaliation theoretically would have been the best move immediately after the Pueblo capture, I do not believe we would now profit by small-scale harassing military actions. If there were one or more ships which could be "snatched," I would not rule this out, but the Korean ships stay too close in and non-Korean ships should be off limits. Other harassing military actions would not be designed to release the crew, but would probably have the opposite effect and would damage our legal position as the injured party. Such harassing actions would invite retaliation. There would almost certainly be gradual escalation and a second front could easily result. 5. While we are on the diplomatic course, and now that tensions are reduced, we might release a carrier force for Vietnam duty. It could return fairly quickly if needed and meanwhile its departure could give an excuse to the North Koreans to take a favorable step forward if they have any reason to do so. 6. In addition to beefing up ROK capabilities, we should build up our overall strategy posture from which we can speak and be listened to. This would mean calling up reserves, and keeping larger reserves in CONUS, but the better we are prepared the less likely we are to have to use additional force. We do not now have the military posture to take risks in Korea, according to the JCS. 7. While we should be ready to talk at all times, we should not play along in seeming weakness with the North Korean propaganda game by seeming to want frequent meetings. Each side has given its position and I don't see how we can alter our last position appreciably. Over-eagerness is weakness. 8. We should keep the NNSC channel open, but I am not sanguine as to its utility. 9. We may yet want to return to the UN, particularly if a trial seems likely and the Panmunjom talks can be shown to have broken down because of North Korean unreasonableness. We should prepare thoroughly for this contingency through such means as a detailed handwriting analysis of the recent letter to the President, and its signatures. The North Koreans are on a weak wicket in any multilateral forum, because of the increasingly convincing record of fabrication on their part. 10. As galling as it is, I fear that on this Pueblo case we may have to lick our wounds, wait out release of the crew, and wait our chances for action when the advantage is more ours. The only way I see where we could act sooner would be in Vietnam--presumably by mining Haiphong Harbor. North Korean actions seem partly designed to aid the Communist Vietnam effort and it is important that we not permit that to happen. 11. Some people in town are playing with the idea of coming a bit closer to what the North Koreans want by way of an apology. I do not quite understand what we have to apologize for unless we did invade territorial waters, but this presumably we do not yet know. It seems to me that absolutely basic to problems of this sort is the integrity, prestige and credibility of the United States. As tempting as it might be to make an apology--with tongue quite prominently in cheek--in order to ransom the 83 crew members, I believe that such opportunistic duplicity would be playing loose with the ultimate security of 200 million Americans. In today's world the adversary can escalate--short of allout war--to match us. Short of allout war, then, our one tremendous advantage over the enemy lies not in what we do but in what we are. That must be safeguarded at all costs. It means we should not apologize unless an apology is in order just as it means we should apologize, with dignity, and promptness, if one is in order. Alfred Jenkins/2/ /2/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
290. Memorandum From the Director of the Korean Task Force (Brown) to the Under Secretary of State (Katzenbach)/1/ Washington, March 4, 1968. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 33-6 KOR N-US. Secret; Nodis. SUBJECT 1. Facts: North Korea at the tenth closed meeting: A. Rejected our offer of impartial inquiry. B. Insisted on apology. C. Indicated apology would make release of men possible. D. Threatened "some other measure" if no apology forthcoming. 2. Next Steps Available: A. Restate our ninth meeting position, i.e., that we are prepared to submit factual issues to an impartial international body, that we would express regrets if warranted by results of inquiry by such body and that we would accept release of men to neutral body prior to inquiry. B. Try to get NNSC to issue appeal for release of men primarily on humanitarian grounds. C. Military moves (aerial feints, aerial reconnaissance, blockade, sailing USS Banner off North Korea under escort, etc.)./2/ /2/Next to this paragraph Walsh added the following handwritten notation: "Bohlen opposes this." D. Exploit internal inconsistencies in North Korean case (alleged confessions and navigational data) by either: (1) Informing Russians of these inconsistencies and of fact we are seriously considering exposing North Korean case at United Nations, or/3/ /3/Next to this paragraph Walsh added the following handwritten notation: "Bohlen thinks this premature." (2) Simply publishing our analysis of North Korean "evidence". E. Offer in private Panmunjom talks to express regrets, concurrently with release of Pueblo crew, for any hostile acts contrary to international law which may have been committed by the Pueblo./4/ /4/Next to this paragraph Walsh added the following handwritten notation: "Bohlen prefers this." F. Ask North Koreans for precise language which they would accept as expression of regret justifying concurrent release of Pueblo and crew. 3. Relevant Considerations: A. Impartial inquiry non-starter. If held it could only show up North Koreans as liars. B. If we stick to our present position, there is high risk of men being put on trial and punished. C. NNSC appeal almost certainly non-starter. North Koreans not interested in humanity. D. Available military action would be mere pin-pricks unlikely to move North Koreans, and would probably prejudice chances of getting men back. E. North Koreans would probably reject conditional expression of regret and insist on unqualified apology. F. Apology, whether conditional or otherwise, can be undercut after return of crew. In tenth meeting, General Pak hinted that 1964 helicopter case might be precedent. In that case (inadvertent intrusion), the North Koreans insisted that we admit "criminal espionage" as well as intrusion. General Combs signed receipt admitting "crimes of espionage and illegal intrusion. . ." and guaranteeing "that it will not commit such criminal acts. . . in the future", but repudiated this admission publicly the next day. There appears to have been little or no adverse reaction in the US to the temporary admission of wrong-doing made to get the men back. G. Soviets might be disturbed by any threat to expose North Korean "evidence" and might press Pyongyang to settle Pueblo case promptly. H. Course followed by US in Pueblo case could have important impact on our relations with ROK and possibly also on those with South Viet-Nam and Thailand. Thus, abject apology, particularly after prolonged private negotiations, would outrage Seoul and probably also Saigon and Bangkok. On the other hand, open attack on North Korean evidence would clearly gratify these allies. 4. Recommendation: Smoking out North Koreans on precise language of acceptable expression of regret would keep the private talks going and possibly provide us with useful information without in any way prejudicing any of the other options listed in 2. above. We therefore recommend approval of the attached draft instruction to Seoul for the eleventh meeting./5/ /5/The draft instruction was not attached. The memorandum does not indicate if the recommendation was approved or disapproved.
291. Telegram From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State/1/ Seoul, March 5, 1968, 0825Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 33-6 KOR N-US. Secret; Immediate; Nodis; Cactus. 9439. 1. Last night we heard reading by an American voice of letter addressed to President which Smith was handed yesterday by Pak at Panmunjom. The tone of voice was subdued, as well it might be in view of degrading contents of letter. It is unimaginable that all 82 Americans of Pueblo would agree to such a condemnation of their government, their service and their principles after hardly more than one month's confinement unless they were subjected to harshest mental/physical pressures. I do not believe for a moment that all of them did. FBIS English language tape of 1100/1200 GMT March four Pyong- yang broadcast to Southeast Asia would contain text mentioned. 2. Broadcast no doubt monitored by governmental and private services, and if its sequence of admission of guilt and abject apology comes to public attention at home strong reactions may result. Also, it would seem from present handling of letter that NKs intend to keep repeating it, perhaps to lay foundation for whatever next move they may contemplate. 3. It is important, nevertheless, that officers and crew of Pueblo not be judged prematurely. Hopefully news media will cooperate in this. I suggest to deal with that aspect of matter and the problem generally, time may have arrived for you to consider complete press briefing in Washington during which efforts of USG to bring about reasonable solution of this matter could be related. There would seem no longer to be basis for continued silence on Panmunjom meetings. The NKs appear to be preparing field for further action against crew, and their use and re-use of "confessions," "admissions of guilt," and "apologies" should no longer go unchallenged. I do not know whether there is still a steel fist inside that silken glove, everything considered, but I am sure that our approach to this problem has been characterized by both restraint and reason of which our people would approve. 4. It might be desirable to give Pak notice at next meeting that we intend to publicize our proposals to NK which we consider fair and reasonable, and then to note his reaction. It will probably be nasty, and could bring about end to present series of discussions at Panmunjom. NKs would call for and claim we are breaking understanding for mutual agreement on what we would say publicly about those proceedings. It might also force their hand on trial of crew, and we should be prepared to face this contingency./2/ But Pak's performance yesterday confirmed what we here have believed since this exercise began--that is, that we will not be able to get back these men on anything resembling our terms. The exercise was necessary but unless it is desirable to keep it going to cover up other possibly useful contacts, it seems to have run its course. As to next moves, several possibilities were mentioned in State 119560 (para ten) and Seoul 4321./3/ They offer no panaceas but unless we undertake some psywar and/or economic measures we will soon be without even the appearance of motion provided by the fact of the closed sessions at Panmunjom. /2/In telegram 125332 to Seoul, March 6, the Department of State advised that a response to an announcement that the crew would be tried was being considered and asked for Embassy suggestions to prepare for that eventuality. The Department of State also admitted that the closed talks may have reached a dead end, but they would not be broken off yet. (Ibid.) /3/Documents 282 and 279. Porter
292. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Warnke) to Secretary of Defense Clifford/1/ I-21216/68 Washington, undated. /1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD/OASD/ISA Files: FRC 73 A 1250, Korea 385.3. Secret. The memorandum indicates that Clifford saw it on March 5. SUBJECT Secretary McNamara informed Secretary Rusk that the Department of Defense desired no role in coordinating the diplomatic initiatives designed to secure the return of the Pueblo and its crew. Accordingly, our only activity relating to the Pueblo incident has been the preparation of information on the incident itself for members of Congress, and the preparation, in coordination with the Joint Staff and State, of some general military options papers. As you know, the North Koreans gave us some photostatic copies of maps which purport to prove that on six occasions the Pueblo intruded into North Korea's claimed territorial waters. The attached book/2/ prepared by the Department of the Navy demonstrates that these maps are almost certainly false. /2/Not printed. The North Koreans have now given us a letter to President Johnson, purported to be signed by all surviving members of the Pueblo crew, confessing again that they were indeed seized in North Korean waters and asking the President to apologize for this act. A copy of the letter is attached./3/ I believe that we should consider using this letter as a basis for an apology if the North Koreans would agree in advance that our apology would result in the release of the crew of the Pueblo. If interrogations of the crew confirm our belief that the North Korean charges are false, this fact could be given wide publicity, and we could retract the apology which we had based solely on information provided to us by the North Koreans. /3/Not printed. Paul C. Warnke
293. Telegram From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State/1/ Seoul, March 9, 1968, 0020Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 33-6 KOR N-US. Secret; Immediate; Nodis; Cactus. 4795. Subj: Eleventh Senior MAC Members Meeting at Panmunjom, March 9, 1968. 1. Meeting began at 1200 hrs March 9 and ended at 1253./2/ /2/Telegram 4797 from Seoul, March 9, transmitted the verbatim text of the meeting. (Ibid.) 2. RAdm Smith opened by reading statement contained State 125424./3/ Apparently anticipating that Smith would reiterate our basic position, Pak responded after short interval with prepared statement which began by referring to fact that at previous meetings he had "already clearly" told Smith about "unwarrantedness of your side's claim on the matter of crew of armed spy ship Pueblo." This prepared statement contained much of language Pak used at past two meetings. In essence he said if US sticks to its position this will only create artificial difficulties, further complicate situation, and give no help in solving matter. If US really wants to solve problem of crew, it should not ask NKorea to return criminals for nothing but should accept just and reasonable NKorean proposal which will make it possible to have crew returned. /3/In telegram 125424 to Seoul, March 6, Smith was instructed to restate the proposals submitted at the ninth meeting and request a North Korean response to them. (Ibid.) 3. At mid-point of his statement Pak again implied that crew might be punished, saying in effect that if US sticks to its proposal NKorea can only conclude that US has neither concern about fate of crew nor intention to bear responsibility for them, in which case NKorea "would have no alternative but to take another step." 4. RAdm Smith took this opportunity to use language from State 123157/4/ to effect that any trial, punishment or threat of punishment can only aggravate already serious situation. Pak asked for written copy of this statement, which was provided. /4/Dated March 1. (Ibid.) 5. After pause of nineteen minutes, during which he carefully wrote and checked his reply, Pak made statement which in essence repeated language of his first statement, again describing US proposal as request for return of crew in exchange for "nothing" from US side. 6. Meeting ended with brief exchange devoted to Smith's request that NKorean side carefully study US statements and to agreement that Pak would call next meeting. 7. Comment: Beyond Pak's keen interest in obtaining written copy of Smith's statement on implications of punishment of crew, meeting contained nothing noteworthy. Pak was restrained and reasonably cooperative, reading his own statements with effort to reflect air of conviction. Porter
294. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Korea/1/ Washington, March 9, 1968, 1856Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 33-6 KOR N-US. Secret; Priority; Nodis; Cactus. Drafted by Brown, cleared by Walsh and Katzenbach, and approved by Brown. 127735. Offer to express regret after release of crew and if impartial inquiry discloses violation of NK waters has now twice been refused and Pak has twice hinted that if stalemate persists NK may take "other steps," presumably trial and/or punishment of crew. We are considering next steps, among them the following proposal: 1) At next meeting Smith should try to pin Pak down on fact that crew will in fact be released without trial or punishment concurrently with expression of regret and assurance that US ships will continue to be ordered to stay out of 12 mile limit. 2) If Pak officially confirms this we would then propose to express regret at time of release "for any hostile acts contrary to international law which may have been committed by the USS Pueblo." (Obviously there is an infinity of variations on this theme which could be considered in drafting our expression of regret.) 3) Immediately upon release of the crew we would publish our refutation of the NK "evidence" together with a blast at North Koreans for both their duplicity and their series of illegal and aggressive actions. This might give significant comfort to ROKs. We recognize that almost any variation of this formula would cause difficulties with the ROKs, as it would for us here. We recognize also that North Koreans may well not accept any such formula and ultimately face us with choice between a helicopter type of statement and impasse./2/ /2/The Department of State prepared variations of the wording of a conditional apology based on the helicopter case in the event that course was adopted. (Memorandum from Brown to Katzenbach, March 7; ibid.) We would appreciate your comments on this proposal, your suggestions as to any variations in it which would make it more palatable to the ROKs and any alternative courses of action which you may wish to propose./3/ /3/In telegram 4798 from Seoul, March 10, Porter replied that the proposed statements were generally acceptable and should be tried. He agreed that the approach would displease the South Koreans, but noted "ROK displeasure should not be controlling factor at this point, and we agree that if one is possible, a tough, post-release statement would ease matters." (Ibid.) After reflecting further, however, Porter submitted a more pessimistic view of the approach, cautioning that North Korean demands for an apology and an admission of wrongdoing from the United States could have unforeseen and completely unacceptable ramifications. (Telegram 4851 from Seoul, March 12; ibid.) Rusk
295. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Warnke) to the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Nitze)/1/ Washington, March 11, 1968. /1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD/OASD/ISA Files: FRC 73 A 1250, Korea 385.3. Confidential. A stamped notation on the memorandum indicates that Nitze saw it. SUBJECT I am increasingly concerned about the American stance in the Pueblo situation. The position expressed at the Panmunjom closed meetings is basically the reiteration of the fact that we have no convincing proof that the Pueblo came within the 12 mile limit claimed by the North Korean Government, that we will not be in a position to determine this question until the crew is returned to us or to neutral third party custody, that we will investigate the charges promptly upon such return and, if the North Korean claim appears justified, will express appropriate regret. This position appears to concede that we must respect the 12 mile limit and that, on its own definition of the territorial sea, the contiguous state may seize naval vessels of another power that venture within it and intern the crews. Up to this point in history, our legal position has been that we do not recognize a territorial sea more than 3 miles from any shore and that instructions to our vessels to remain further off shore are an exercise of discretion rather than a legal necessity. Moreover, we have maintained that, under international law, the only right of the contiguous state is demand that the intruding vessel leave the territorial waters. The closest approach to its shores claimed by North Korea is about 7.6 nautical miles. The purported confessions of the Commanding Officer and crew admit such "intrusion" and implicitly assume that this is a violation of legitimate territorial sea claims. Our reaction has not emphasized that, under our construction of international law, our vessels are on the high seas when outside the 3 mile limit, that all American naval personnel are aware of this US position, and that the North Korean action was illegal even on their statement of the facts. As a legal proposition, therefore, we should not be asserting our willingness to express regrets if subsequent investigation shows that the North Korean claims are correct and the "confessions" are bona fide. Under our legal interpretation, no claim of the North Koreans, even if accurate, could lead to an admission that we have violated the territorial waters of North Korea. And, as noted above, even if our ship had been within 3 miles, international law would not justify the seizure of our crew and ship and the killing of an American service- man. It thus appears to me that we have already given away our legal position on the Pueblo seizure. We have indicated a willingness to apologize if the Pueblo ventured between the 3 mile limit we recognize and the 12 mile limit claimed by the North Koreans. We have indicated this willingness despite the fact that the North Korean seizure of an American warship and its crew, occasioning the death of one crew member and the wounding of three others, is certainly a far more serious offense than any intrusion for non-violent purposes, within even the three mile limit we recognize. The implicit assumption is that the Pueblo's activities would warrant violent response if conducted in territorial waters. We therefore are sticking on only the relatively minor factual issue: Did the Pueblo, in violation of orders, come closer than 12 but further than 3 miles from North Korean territory? Perhaps we should now rely on the letter to the President from the Pueblo crew and try and devise a statement that might satisfy the North Korean demands and effect their return. Any such statement should, in my opinion, be predicated not on our legal obligations--since even the facts as claimed by the North Koreans would involve no violation of international law as we interpret it. It would instead have to be predicated on the fact that the purported confessions show a failure to abide by orders. It is obviously illogical to apologize to North Korea solely because US naval personnel have failed to obey US naval orders, but we are already in this anomalous and ignoble position. To get out of it, and to get our men back, it might be better to go the rest of the way. A possible semantic formula might be for Admiral Smith to prepare a letter noting that President Johnson has received the letter that appears to be signed by the Pueblo crew; without mention of the North Korean claim of a 12 mile territorial sea, the United States has instructed its naval vessels to remain more than 12 miles from North Korean territory; the statements contained in the crew's letter show a failure on their part to obey orders; and the United States expresses its regrets at the violations described in the letter and repeats its intention to continue to order its ships to remain more than 12 miles from North Korean territory. This could be shown to General Pak at Panmunjom and he could be told it will be given to him concurrently with the return of the crew. No mention would be made of the ship. Admittedly, this concession might involve some loss of prestige. But in my view, we have already capitulated on the major legal points involved and conceding the factual question on the basis of the crew's letter would be preferable to protracted maintenance of a demeaning stance. Our capitulation then would turn solely on the statement of facts allegedly signed by the Pueblo crew. It would not imply that the Pueblo's mission was illicit. Establishment of the falsity of the statement would enable us to retract our apology. As you know, the Navy analysis indicates that the North Korean asserted intrusions could not possibly have been accomplished by a vessel of the Pueblo's speed. This evidence would be made public after the crew is returned. In addition, we would presumably have from the crew other evidence that their "confessions" were contrived or extorted. Our expressed regrets would then be withdrawn, because based on North Korean fraud. As things now stand, world opinion is probably that we've been caught in tawdry behavior. Exposure of North Korean lies would give us support we now lack. It must be anticipated that adoption of this course of action would provoke strong adverse reactions from the South Koreans. If, however, it led to prompt return of the crew, and prompt withdrawal of our apology, it might well be better for US/ROK relations than the continuation of the present futile closed meetings. A draft letter is attached. Paul C. Warnke
Attachment Draft of Letter President Johnson has read with concern the letter sent to him by the officers and men of the USS Pueblo. The operations of the USS Pueblo as set forth in that letter violate the orders issued by U.S. Naval authorities to remain more than 12 miles from North Korean territory. The United States regrets the violations of orders described in the letter and will continue to order its ships to remain more than 12 miles from the coast and offshore islands of North Korea.
296. Memorandum From the Director of the Korean Task Force (Brown) to the Under Secretary of State (Katzenbach)/1/ Washington, March 11, 1968. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 33-6 KOR N-US. Secret; Nodis. SUBJECT The closed talks in Panmunjom appear to have reached an impasse. I believe that we must now choose one of five possible courses of action: 1. Stonewall repetition of our present position. 2. Publish falsity of North Korean "evidence", with or without private advance notice to the U.S.S.R. 3. Offer conditional expression of regret. 4. Sign helicopter-type receipt. 5. Ask Pak for language of apology or receipt which would meet his requirements. It is pretty clear now that stonewalling would achieve nothing but would damage the reasonable record which we have thus far made in the talks and risk early trial and/or punishment of the crew. Exposing the North Korean "evidence" at this stage might both harden the North Korean position and precipitate a decision to try and punish the crew. The U.S.S.R. is not likely to be impressed by exposure of the falsity of North Korean evidence or to be either willing or able to be helpful. Signing a receipt similar to that signed by General Combs in the helicopter case would amount to the very humiliation of the U.S. which the North Koreans are seeking and would cause serious trouble with the ROK. Asking Pak for his language would probably lead to prolonged negotiations damaging to our relations with the ROK. In the end, we would probably have to choose between breaking off the talks or signing a humiliating statement. Offering a conditional expression of regret also poses difficulties, but these appear to be of a lesser order than those noted for the other four possible courses of action. Thus, such an offer could lead to prolonged negotiations, but these might be avoided by indicating that the substance of our offer was not negotiable. The possible formulation of conditional expressions of regret are of course almost infinite. The three best formulations which we have been able to come up with are set forth in the attachment in order of preference. We also attach a draft presidential letter received informally from DOD/ISA which contains an expression of regret in response to the Pueblo crew's letter of February 29./2/ The principal difficulties which we see with DOD's suggestion are (1) it escalates the level of the expression of regret and therefore the degree of humiliation; (2) it would accord a degree of status to the North Korean regime and cause a violent reaction in the ROK; and (3) it appears to validate the letter ostensibly signed by all members of the crew. /2/See the attachment to Document 295. As we now see it, a conditional expression of regret should probably not be tabled until the 13th meeting. We would use the 12th meeting primarily to request clarification of the North Korean position. A draft instruction for the 12th meeting is attached./3/ /3/Not printed.
Attachment CONDITIONAL EXPRESSIONS OF REGRET Draft One 1. I acknowledge receipt of the 82 surviving members of the crew of the USS Pueblo and the body of Seaman Wayne D. Hodges. 2. On the occasion of the release of the Pueblo's crew, I am authorized to state: A. The sailing orders of the USS Pueblo explicitly directed that the ship remain at least 13 nautical miles from North Korean territory. Ships of the United States Navy will continue to be ordered to remain more than 12 nautical miles from the coast of North Korea. B. The North Korean authorities have made public photographs of documents which they regard as proof that on several occasions the USS Pueblo entered their claimed coastal waters. The United States Government has not until now been in a position to verify inde- pendently the evidence on which the North Korean authorities rely. We nevertheless have no hesitation in expressing regret, in advance of the full and impartial inquiry which will now be conducted, for any violation of orders by the USS Pueblo which may have resulted in the ship's approaching closer than 12 nautical miles to North Korean territory. Signed: /4/Each of the three drafts contains this typed signature; none is signed. Draft Two 1. I acknowledge receipt of the 82 surviving members of the crew of the USS Pueblo and the body of Seaman Wayne D. Hodges. 2. On the occasion of the release of the Pueblo's crew, I am authorized to state: A. The sailing orders of the USS Pueblo explicitly directed that the ship remain at least 13 nautical miles from North Korean territory. Ships of the United States Navy will continue to be ordered to remain more than 12 nautical miles from the coast of North Korea. B. The North Korean authorities have made public photographs of documents which they regard as conclusive proof that the USS Pueblo was on an intelligence gathering mission and that on several occasions the USS Pueblo entered their claimed coastal waters. The United States Government has not until now been in a position to verify independently the evidence on which the North Korean authorities rely. The United States Government does not dispute that the USS Pueblo was on an intelligence gathering mission and has no hesitation in expressing regret for any violation of orders by the USS Pueblo which may have resulted in the ship's approaching closer than 12 nautical miles to North Korean territory. Signed: Draft Three 1. I acknowledge receipt of the 82 surviving members of the crew of the USS Pueblo and the body of Seaman Wayne D. Hodges. 2. On the occasion of the release of the Pueblo's crew, I am authorized to state: A. The USS Pueblo, a commissioned ship of the United States Navy, was captured on January 23, 1968 by patrol craft of the Korean People's Army while engaged in an intelligence gathering mission off the coast of North Korea. B. The North Korean authorities regard the Pueblo's mission as provocative and have provided the United States with photographic copies of documents which they regard as conclusive evidence that the Pueblo intruded into North Korean territorial seas. C. As conditions for the release of the Pueblo's crew, the North Korean authorities have demanded that the United States both apologize and provide assurance that intrusions of the nature cited above will not occur in the future. D. In response to these North Korean demands, I am authorized to declare: 1. Ships of the United States Navy will be ordered to remain more than 12 nautical miles from the coast of North Korea. 2. The United States expresses regret for any hostile acts contrary to international law which may have been committed by the USS Pueblo. Signed: [Continue with the next documents]
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