NOTE: External links to other Internet sites should not be construed as an endorsement of the views contained therein.
| The State Department web site below is a permanent electronic archive of information released prior to January 20, 2001. Please see www.state.gov for material released since President George W. Bush took office on that date. This site is not updated so external links may no longer function. Contact us with any questions about finding information. NOTE: External links to other Internet sites should not be construed as an endorsement of the views contained therein. |
 |
FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1964-1968, Volume XXIX Korea
Department of State |
Korea 297. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson/1/ Washington, March 14, 1968. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Korea--Pueblo Incident--Cactus IV, Cactus Miscellaneous Papers, February to December 1968. Secret; Nodis. Attached to a memorandum from Rostow to the President, March 14, in which Rostow noted "Rusk's proposals on the Pueblo as we approach a dead end" and expressed "one thought: mine Haiphong and regard our Pueblo men as prisoners of the Vietnam war." Rostow's memorandum indicates the President saw it. SUBJECT After eleven closed meetings we have made little progress at Panmunjom. As conditions for the release of the crew (they have made clear they will not return the ship), the North Koreans demand: --an admission by us of hostile acts and intrusion into their claimed territorial waters; --"a proper apology"; --a guarantee against future similar incidents. We know--and can prove--that at least some of the documents which they have given us are falsified. I firmly believe that we should not admit incursions which we are reasonably certain did not occur. We have said that after release of the crew to our custody or that of a neutral power we would investigate thoroughly, and express regrets if any intrusion had in fact occurred. We have suggested that this investigation could be made by an impartial body. The North Koreans have responded that their "evidence" is conclusive and that an inquiry is unjustified. They have also said that if we persist in our attitude it will show "no concern for the crew", and require them to take "other steps" against these men--presumably trial and/or punishment. Pak has just advised the NNSC that U.S. proposals so far have been unsatisfactory (e.g., have not included an apology or offer of compensation) and that he does not propose to call or attend another meeting until he knows that we have some "constructive" proposals to make. This, then, is where we now stand. Our next step is to see that the twelfth meeting is held fairly soon and to prepare instructions for it. At this point, I think it best that we pass the buck back to the North Koreans. Thus, if you approve, we plan to instruct Admiral Smith to: Send word to Pak through NNSC that we expect him to call the twelfth meeting soon and that we would have something to say which would be of interest to him. At the meeting Admiral Smith would: 1. Say that we have a precise and constructive proposal, to wit: That at the time of the release of the crew we would --acknowledge the intelligence gathering mission of the Pueblo; --assure North Korea that we would continue to instruct U.S. ships to remain more than 12 miles from the North Korean coast; --express regret for any violations of the Pueblo's orders which may have resulted in the ship's coming closer than 12 miles from North Korea. (This is slightly further than we have yet gone on regrets--and as far as I think we should go.) 2. Point out that Pak has not made equally precise proposals. 3. Remind Pak that, while we are concerned about the crew, our primary concern is with the heightening of tensions in the area caused by their provocative and illegal acts. (A draft instruction to Admiral Smith is at Tab A.)/2/ /2/Not printed; the instructions were sent to Smith in telegram 131680 to Seoul, March 16. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 33-6 KOR N-US) Recommendation: That you approve the instruction at Tab A. Approve/3/ /3/This option is checked and a handwritten note indicates Rostow notified Walsh on March 16. Concurrently, we plan to let the Russians know--perhaps through a reliable correspondent here--that continuing to hold the crew is not necessarily helpful to the North Koreans. For example, seizure of the Pueblo has made certain an additional $100 million in military aid to the South Koreans. It also will make it easier for the Administration to call up substantial reserves if this becomes necessary, and could always be an additional support for Administration calls for greater effort in Korea or Viet-Nam. We would expect that the Russians would pass this on to North Korea. (Chip Bohlen has looked at this idea and thinks it a good one.) Recommendation: That you authorize us to have a reliable newsman talk to the Russian Embassy along the above lines. Approve/4/ /4/See footnote 3 above. Once we have gone through the next meeting--which will probably produce no real forward movement--we will be hard against the decision on where to go next. We shall probably have two main choices: 1. Stonewall. Admiral Smith could defer calling another meeting and confine himself to informing Pak that he is prepared to meet again if Pak has something new and constructive to say. 2. Apology. Smith could call the next meeting and either: --ask Pak for precise language for an apology which would lead to the release of the crew, or --table a specific draft of the receipt which Smith would be willing to sign at the time the men are released. We must face the fact that it is unlikely that any course will lead to a quick return of the crew. If we stonewall now, there is perhaps a small chance that the North Koreans will advance some proposal that will get things moving again. But this is very unlikely. It is far more probable that they will continue along their present course, making propaganda points where they can. They may even decide--as a pressure tactic--to bring the crew to trial. If we ask them to let us know what they want from us in way of an apology, they probably will refuse to give us anything. If they do come up with suggested language, it will almost certainly be something we can't possibly live with. If we give them suggested wording for a receipt they will reject it, and we will be faced with a long series of meetings in which we will argue over language--to the benefit of the North Koreans. In my view, we should stonewall for a bit longer to see if the North Koreans move at all in our direction. But, if things drag on too long without result or without "further steps" by the North Koreans vis-a-vis the crew, I believe we should be prepared to break off the talks and publish the record. This will improve our public image here and abroad at the expense of North Korea's. It would make it virtually impossible to get the crew back in the foreseeable future. In preparation for such a contingency, we are working on a White Paper which will give the full story of North Korean provocation, U.S. restraint, fairness and moderation at Panmunjom, and demonstrate the falsity of the North Korean "evidence". This should certainly be published in case the crew were put on trial, or if we or the North Koreans break off talks. (It could also be published immediately after the release of the crew, assuming we decide to go the conditional apology route and it is successful.) We are all convinced that minor military actions or shows of force would have no constructive effect. Some really massive effort--such as an attempt to eliminate the North Korean Air Force--involves obvious costs and risks. We do not recommend it. Dean Rusk
298. Memorandum From the Director of the Korean Task Force (Brown) to the Under Secretary of State (Katzenbach)/1/ Washington, March 15, 1968. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 33-6 KOR N-US. Secret; Nodis. SUBJECT 1. At your request, we have considered what we might do if we were confronted by an announcement from Pyongyang that the Pueblo's crew (or possibly only the officers) will be tried for alleged crimes under North Korean law. 2. The context in which such an announcement might be made would of course have a material bearing on how we should react. Thus, if the announcement came after the closed Panmunjom talks had been broken off and in a period of intensified North Korean raids on the South, there would be little reason for us not to take a very hard line. On the other hand, the announcement could conceivably be accompanied by indications that the North Koreans viewed the trial as a preliminary to releasing the crew. In this case, a softer reaction would be appropriate. 3. Under almost any circumstances, we believe that two actions should form part of our response to word that the crew was to be tried. A. We should issue a public statement which would at a minimum brand the seizure, detention and trial of the Pueblo crew as illegal and totally indefensible. A draft of one possible version of a public statement is attached./2/ /2/Not printed. B. We should seek to get Communist and neutralist governments and individuals to advise Pyongyang that trying the Pueblo's crew would seriously damage North Korea's international standing. Among the channels which we might use for this purpose are the Russians, Indonesians, the NNSC, and the North Korean editor in Tokyo. 4. Unless we were quite confident that trial of the crew would be merely a prelude to their early release, we should probably follow our initial public statement almost immediately with publication of a White Paper giving a full account of the Pueblo case in the broad setting of heightened North Korean aggression against the Republic of Korea. As you know, such a paper is being prepared. 5. We have also considered a number of other possible reactions to the contingency in question, but doubt that these reactions would be found appropriate or useful. Thus, we do not see how trial of the Pueblo crew would alter our judgment concerning the undesirability of various military actions, such as aerial strikes, aerial feints, sailing the USS Banner along the North Korean coast, blockading the North Korean Navy, etc. We also doubt that a threatening deployment of additional U.S. forces to the Korean area would serve any useful purpose. Calling up additional reserve units might improve our general posture, but could not be expected to have any significant impact on the North Korean decision to try the crew. 6. Our experience with prisoner problems in Viet-Nam may have some relevance to the question at hand. A summary of this experience, prepared in L, is attached./3/ /3/Not printed.
299. Telegram From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State/1/ Seoul, March 21, 1968, 0825Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 33-6 KOR N-US. Secret; Immediate; Nodis; Cactus. 5051. Subject: Twelfth Senior MAC Members Meeting at Panmunjom, March 21, 1968. 1. Meeting began as scheduled at 1100 hrs and ended at 1203./2/ /2/Telegram 5058 from Seoul, March 21, transmitted the verbatim text of the meeting. (Ibid.) 2. Pak opened with long prepared statement which, in terminology typical of previous NK presentations at these meetings, reiterated US position, reviewed "evidence" which NK side had presented, and reiterated NK position that "We would be able to consider return of the crew when you make a proper apology and give an assurance on basis of confessions made by crew of Pueblo." 3. Pak again insisted that it falls within right of DPRK to deal with Pueblo and there is room for no third party to meddle. He specifically refused to make any proposals or ask any questions concerning US proposals as Smith had asked at 11th meeting, and added that "We are completely unable to find in any of your statements the intention to practically solve the issue." He continued that "Should your side persist in its present unwarrantable claim, we cannot but think over the meaning of future meetings to be held under such circumstances and we will have no interest at all in such meetings." In two successive paragraphs Pak used words "for nothing" and "gratuitous" in describing US offer. He concluded opening statement by remarking that US should know that "our patience has its limit" and recommending that US "discuss businesslike details on the basis of our proposal," ending with phrase that "our side would be prepared to consider any reasonable opinion based on moral obligations which would take account of way shown by us and which would enable US to solve matter of Pueblo crew." 4. Since Pak had taken hardline anticipated reftel,/3/ Smith delivered entire statement contained therein. /3/Reference is to telegram 131680 to Seoul, March 16, which transmitted instructions for the meeting to Smith. (Ibid.) 5. When Pak received written copy of Smith's statement, he concentrated on element of new proposal concerning US preparedness to express regret for any violations of orders by USS Pueblo. He seemed particularly interested in portion of that sentence which read "which may have resulted in the ship's approach." 6. After 18-minute pause, during which Pak and his assistants sifted through large stack of prepared statements for appropriate reply, Pak then delivered statement which consisted of excerpts from some of prepared statements plus additional language written on spot. This second statement included phrase "if your side has any real concern about fate of crew," which was only hint of threat to punish crew apparent at today's meeting. 7. Operative paragraphs of Pak's second statement indicated that he understood Smith's statement to be an expression of willingness to discuss concrete businesslike matters for settlement of issue of Pueblo crew on basis NK proposal. Statement continued that if US side agrees to Pak's understanding, NK side is ready to discuss concrete means related to repatriation of Pueblo crew. Statement continued that Pak believes "we will be able to discuss the concrete, businesslike matters at the next meeting on basis our proposal," and concluded, somewhat disjointedly, with remark "I have heard your statement, I reserve my right to express later our position on it." 8. Smith merely responded he had noted Pak's last statement. Meeting ended with agreement that Smith would call next meeting. 9. Comment: Pak obviously changed his tune on subject of future meetings after reading Smith's proposal, which he then twisted into expression of willingness to deal on NK terms. Inference seems fairly clear. Pak thinks or hopes we are now moving in direction of apology and will be hoping to move us still further at subsequent meetings. Porter
300. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Korea/1/ Washington, March 23, 1968, 0043Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 33-6 KOR N-US. Secret; Immediate; Nodis; Cactus. Drafted by Yager and Brown, cleared by Steadman and Walsh, and approved by Katzenbach. 135403. Subject: Instructions for Thirteenth Closed Meeting. Ref: Seoul 5058./2/ /2/Telegram 5058 from Seoul, March 21, transmitted the verbatim text of the meeting. (Ibid.) 1. We believe that next closed meeting should be held day or two after open meeting which Communist side has requested./3/ We suggest that you get the open meeting out of way as soon as possible which might make it possible for Admiral Smith to call closed meeting on March 26 or 27. This should give Pak ample time to react to Smith's proposal at last meeting. /3/An open MAC meeting, lasting 53/4 hours, was held March 25. The North Koreans complained about five separate raids into the DMZ penetrated by ROK forces in March. (Telegram 5145 from Seoul, March 25; ibid., POL 27-14 KOR/UN) 2. At thirteenth meeting, Smith should open with following brief statement: A. At our last meeting I made a further specific proposal. You responded by saying that you understood my remarks as an expression of willingness to discuss concrete and practical means of settling the matter before us on the basis of your earlier proposal. You further indicated that, if your understanding was correct, you would be ready at this meeting to discuss concrete means of repatriating the crew of the Pueblo. B. I can confirm that your understanding of my remarks was consistent with my intention. The proposal which I laid before you at our last meeting was based on careful study of your statements in these private meetings and was deliberately cast in the general framework of your proposals./4/ /4/In telegram 5120, March 25, the Embassy in Seoul objected to the language used in paragraphs A and B as being "far reaching" and perhaps being on the verge of renouncing previous positions. Porter also mentioned the need to consider the ROK point of view and expressed his intention to meet with the President and Foreign Minister to make clear that the United States "will not consider language which would admit validity of NK 'evidence' or apologize for acts which we consider unproven." (Ibid., POL 33-6 KOR N-US) In response the Department of State agreed to delete the acknowledgment that the U.S. molded its response to the framework suggested by the North Koreans and approved Porter's approach to the President and Foreign Minister. (Telegram 135734 to Seoul, March 25; ibid.) C. Since we agree on these matters, I am prepared to move on to the concrete and businesslike discussion which you proposed at our last meeting. Specifically, I am prepared to discuss the time, place and other arrangements for release of the Pueblo's officers and men. I propose that the Pueblo's officers and men be turned over to me on March 29/5/ at the Joint Security Area here in Panmunjom. Information on the condition of wounded would be appreciated so needed medical personnel and transport could be on hand at time of transfer. We assume body of Hodges will be turned over at same time and place as 82 surviving members of crew are released. At the time of release of the men, I will be prepared to sign a receipt incorporating the proposal which I made at our last meeting. /5/Since the date of the next closed meeting was uncertain, Smith was instructed to set a date 2 days after the date of the meeting. (Telegram 135542 to Seoul, March 23; ibid.) 3. Pak's response is difficult to anticipate and all possibilities cannot be covered in these instructions. A. If Pak levels general blast against Smith's proposals at twelfth meeting. Smith should not respond in kind, but merely ask Pak to specify in what respect Smith's proposals are unsatisfactory and to state precisely how Pak would wish to modify them. B. If Pak attempts to twist Smith's opening statement into a complete capitulation to the North Korean demands, Smith should correct him by repeating verbatim his proposals of twelfth meeting (para 4.E. State 131680)./6/ /6/See footnote 3, Document 299. C. If Pak rejects Smith's specific proposals (para 2.C. above) on time and place of release of men, Smith should request alternative proposals. D. If Pak asks Smith for language of receipt which Smith would be prepared to sign, Smith should read and hand over unsigned copy of the following draft: "(1) I hereby acknowledge receipt of 82 members of the crew of the USS Pueblo and the body of Seaman Wayne D. Hodges. (2) I have read and taken note of the confessions of the crew of the Pueblo that the ship was engaged in intelligence-gathering activity and intruded closer than 12 nautical miles to the territory of North Korea,/7/ and other documents to the same effect provided by the Senior North Korean representative. /7/The Embassy suggested that, since previous references implying recognition of North Korea had been scrupulously avoided, the words "the territory of" be deleted here. The Department of State concurred. (Telegram 5199 from Seoul, March 27, and telegram 136936 to Seoul, March 27; both in National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 33-6 KOR N-US) (3) I have taken note of the request of the Senior North Korean representative that the United States Government should, based upon these documents, express regret for these actions and issue assurance that no U.S. ship shall in the future come closer than 12 nautical miles from North Korea. (4) Based on the foregoing, I (a) acknowledge that the U.S.S. Pueblo was on an intelligence-gathering mission when she was seized by the North Korean armed forces. (b) give assurance that ships of the U.S. Navy will continue to be ordered to remain more than twelve nautical miles from North Korea. (c) express regret for any violation of orders by the USS Pueblo which may have resulted in the ship's approaching closer than twelve nautical miles to North Korea." D [sic]. We are prepared, if doing so would result in release, to omit words "may have" in para 4.c. of receipt. We are also prepared to consider any other language which does not admit validity of the North Korean "evidence" or apologize for acts which we consider unproven. FYI. We will not sign a helicopter-case type of receipt. End FYI. 4. FYI. Return of ship not mentioned in these instructions because doing so might reduce prospects of obtaining early release of men. (At seventh meeting, Pak said "return of the ship cannot be the subject of the discussion . . . It will be good if you do not mention this question again.") As soon as men have been returned, however, Smith should immediately state that he is now prepared to discuss the return of the ship and call or ask Pak to call a further closed meeting for that purpose. End FYI. 5. At close of meeting, Smith should attempt to confirm fact that it is Pak's turn to call next meeting. Rusk
301. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State/1/ Moscow, March 26, 1968, 1615Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 33-6 KOR N-US. Secret; Priority; Nodis. 3270. Subj: Pueblo. In course my conversation with Gromyko today, I noted Soviets had been informed re our latest exchange with North Koreans on Pueblo and asked him if he could offer any suggestions. Gromyko inquired if we had received North Korean reaction to our latest proposal. I said that while North Korean response to our proposal for investigation by international body had been negative, we had not received any response to our latest suggestion. Gromyko said Soviets knew North Koreans had received our latest views but, of course, did not know whether or how they would react to them. Nevertheless, he thought perhaps North Koreans might comment on them. In any event, he felt it was very good that discussions continued in relatively calm atmosphere. He then asserted main difficulties stemmed from our refusal recognize facts. When I pointed out we could establish facts by getting the crew back and asking them what happened, as well as by having international body conduct an investigation, Gromyko pooh-poohed idea by saying only moon or stars knew exactly what the facts were. I countered by saying that if international body were to find that facts confirmed North Korean story, there would be no problem as far as we concerned. I then observed President had been receiving letters allegedly written by members of crew, noting this not helpful since it stirred up emotions in US. Gromyko concluded conversation on this subject by expression usual caveat that his remarks had not been made at anyone's request. Thompson
302. Telegram From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State/1/ Seoul, March 28, 1968, 1420Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 33-6 KOR N-US. Secret; Immediate; Nodis; Cactus. 5335. Subj: Thirteenth senior MAC members meeting at Panmunjom. Meeting began at 1600 hrs local and ended at 1748./2/ Much time was consumed by composition ad hoc statements. Both release of crew and delivery of mail were discussed (latter reported septel)./3/ /2/Telegram 5336 from Seoul, March 28, transmitted the verbatim text of the meeting. (Ibid.) /3/Not found. 2. Discussion of main item somewhat disjointed since RAdm Smith, who spoke first as one who called meeting, led off with statement contained para two, State 135403, as amended by State 135734;/4/ whereas Pak's first statement ignored this and addressed itself at length to position Smith had taken at 12th meeting. In essence, Pak raised govt-to-govt issue, criticized ambiguous nature and phraseology of proposal Smith had made at 12th meeting, reasserted NK demand for proper apology, [garble] negotiations. At end, Pak said he had no objection to Smith's understanding that Pak would call next meeting. /4/Document 300 and footnote 4 thereto. 3. Pak's first (and only substantive) statement opened with accusation that it was US, not NK, which responsible for tension, describing Pueblo intrusion and force build-up as part of premeditated maneuvers to provoke new war. Pak alleged that US position was that it perfectly all right for side which had infringed on sovereignty of another country to make threats while denying country whose sovereignty had been infringed on its right to self defense. This he described as "logic of stronger playing upon weaker." Such methods may go down with those suffering with nervous breakdown but not with Korean people. Clinging to such logic will make it impossible to settle Pueblo and only bring about unfavorable results. 4. Pak then alleged that US and not NK had violated understanding regarding secrecy of meetings,/5/ ending with rather strange statement that "I inform your side in advance that we shall act following this principle in the future." /5/Reference is to Smith's reference at the last meeting to a Radio Pyongyang broadcast on March 10 that violated the confidentiality of the meetings. (Telegram 131680 to Seoul, March 16; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 33-6 KOR N-US) 5. Pak asserted meetings are between reps of two govts. Said Smith has continued "discourteous act" of calling DPRK "North Korea," and that US must take into consideration fact that it can never solve question of crew without dealing with Govt of DPRK./6/ /6/Smith decided, and the Department of State agreed, to avoid references to "North Korea" in future meetings by using phrases such as "your coast" or "land area under control your side." (Telegram 5602 from Seoul, April 10, and telegram 144339 to Seoul, April 10; both ibid.) 6. Pak then said NK had noted statement made at 12th meeting that US prepared to make due apology and give assurance when crew of Pueblo is returned. Said, however, there are "not a few ambiguous points in US proposals." Referring to US admission that Pueblo had been on intelligence-gathering mission at time it was captured, Pak said whole world knows that armed spy ship Pueblo was engaged in espionage mission from outset. Said question is that Pueblo was not only on intelligence-gathering mission but was captured in territorial waters of DPRK while conducting espionage acts; US "must take precisely this point into account." 7. Pak noted that Smith had said US Navy ships would continue to be ordered to remain more than 12 nautical miles from "the DPRK." Said NK takes notice of this, understanding it as assurance against further violation by US Navy ships of DPRK territorial waters. 8. Pak then raised expression of regret for possible intrusion. Said at first sight it seems US prepared to bear responsibility for behavior of captain and crew and to apologize. In reality, however, US position is "nothing else but phrase making, using slippery ambiguous phrases," which under careful examination shows US wants to express regret for "certain unknown hypothetical action." "Is there anything in it? Nothing." With such phrase making US cannot conceal obvious crime or deceive anybody. "Don't you think that if you want to settle the matter you must among others make an apology properly at least?" Only then can so-called US proposal be taken into consideration as basis for practical settlement. 9. Smith responded that NK not approaching question in businesslike manner. Said NK had not been specific about desired changes in US proposal. Asked whether NKorean side had specific proposal in writing which meeting could address. Pak responded that his first statement was businesslike matter for practical settlement of question. 10. Smith said US had taken note of all that had been said and published and had made reasonable proposal under circumstances. If Pak had no written proposal to table, could he come to next meeting with one? Stated it Pak's turn to call next meeting. Pak reiterated that his first statement offered businesslike suggestion for settlement and recommended Smith seriously study it. Stated no objection to understanding NK would call next meeting./7/ /7/Since the Department of State expected Pak to make similar remarks at the next meeting, Smith was instructed to draw on past instructions as appropriate. The Department provided guidance covering various contingencies. (Telegram 139480 to Seoul, March 30; ibid.) 11. Comment: Pak's main statement, delivered in firm but not particularly harsh manner, supports our belief that NK is attempting obtain unambiguous apology from USG to DPRK Govt for intrusion, espionage, and commission of hostile acts. Believe this is first time at closed meetings that Pak has specifically stated Pueblo was captured in NK territorial waters. 12. Apparent willingness to accept US language on assurance (para 7) is probably false lure. Pak's statements today also notable for absence of threat to try crew; however, NK would probably feel that crew's letters over past week have covered this adequately. 13. Pak will speak first at next meeting, presumably addressing himself to whatever NK can make of second para of Smith's first statement today and possibly to nature of receipt Smith mentioned in third para, since Pak and his assistant appeared interested when Smith mentioned (para 9 above) specific changes in US position. Porter
303. Telegram From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State/1/ Seoul, April 11, 1968, 0950Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 33-6 KOR N-US. Secret; Immediate; Nodis; Cactus. 5639. Subj: Summary of Fourteenth Senior MAC Members Meeting at Panmunjom, April 11, 1968. Ref: (A) State 139480; (B) State 144448./2/ /2/Telegram 139480 to Seoul, March 30, transmitted Smith's instructions for this meeting; telegram 144448 to Seoul, April 10, outlined procedures for Smith to follow in the event the North Koreans brought a crew member to a closed meeting. (Both ibid.) 1. Today's lengthy meeting (2 hrs, 15 min) resulted in stalemate, with Pak rejecting latest US proposal along lines he took at 13th meeting and reiterating NKorean demand for "proper apology"./3/ Only significant new item to emerge on NKorean side was demand that Smith provide written document or documents embodying NKorean proposal. In his presentation Pak made no obvious threat with regard to fate of crew, but again NKoreans doubtless feel that many letters from crew which Pyongyang has broadcast since 13th meeting adequately cover this point. /3/Telegram 5641 from Seoul, April 11, transmitted the verbatim text of the meeting. (Ibid.) 2. Pak's opening statement was devoted to denial that NKoreans had failed to state what specific changes should be made in US proposal and to assertion that NKoreans themselves had made concrete proposal to settle issue. He said "our side has clearly indicated that question of returning crew may be considered if your side makes apology it deserves to make on basis of confessions of crew of Pueblo which was captured while perpetrating espionage and hostile acts after intruding into DPRK territorial waters and assures that your side will not commit again hostile acts against DPRK." He complained that by its proposal US was merely attempting to avoid responsibility for proven espionage and was attempting to treat intrusions as hypothetical acts. He concluded prepared statement by twice referring to necessity that US side present appropriate documents and "write clearly and submit to us details of apology," instead of asking for written proposal from North Korea. 3. As opening portion his response, RAdm Smith used language provided paras 4A, B, and C of Ref (A). He followed this with statement from paras 3B (1) and (2) of Ref (B)./4/ He concluded by offering to provide Pak immediately with copy of draft receipt which Smith had brought to 13th meeting, if Pak would request it, and by asserting that unless Pak prepared to accept this proposal he must provide in writing receipt Pak visualizes. /4/Smith's comments centered on the U.S. proposal and on the position of the Pueblo when captured. 4. After pause of 4 minutes, during which Pak sifted through various prepared statements and finally wrote his response, Pak revived old language concerning "unwarrantedness" of US claim and rejecting US position as basis for settlement. He reiterated refusal to provide written draft of documentation desire by North Korea, saying that basis for settlement could be easily provided only if US takes into consideration North Korean proposal and presents document apologizing for Pueblo acts in proper manner. He then again "seriously warned" Smith about discourteous act of describing DPRK as "North Korea". He concluded this statement by reserving right to answer Smith's statement of today. 5. Smith responded with language from para 7, Ref (A),/5/ again pressed for written proposal from NKoreans and acknowledged he would call next meeting. /5/Smith reminded Pak that after 14 meetings the North Korean side has still not offered a proposal to resolve the crisis. 6. Pak responded with another request for appropriate document from US side. 7. Comment: Issue has boiled down to which side will submit written document, with both fully aware that anything submitted by one will not be acceptable to other. NKoreans clearly anticipate additional meetings, however, since they said as much during this session, and were also overheard saying in Korean that they would hold one of their prepared statements for next meeting. In view their growing insistence that North Korea be referred to as DPRK, however, there is some feeling here that they may not respond to call for closed meeting unless request is addressed to representative of DPRK. Heretofore we have simply addressed request to senior member their side. 8. Of incidental interest, local Newsweek correspondent Kreisher says that item in this week's periscope column regarding movie of Pueblo crew was obtained through Newsweek Bonn Bureau, presumably from East German sources. Porter
304. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Korea/1/ Washington, April 16, 1968, 1810Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 33-6 KOR N-US. Secret; Priority; Nodis; Cactus. Drafted by Yager, cleared by Walsh and Smith, and approved by Katzenbach. Repeated to Honolulu for the Presidential party. Johnson was in Hawaii for discussions with President Pak; see Document 194. 147513. Subject: Instructions for Fifteenth Closed Meeting. Ref: A. Seoul 5641;/2/ B. State 135403./3/ /2/See footnote 3, Document 303. /3/Document 300. 1. In view of Pak's long delay in calling fourteenth meeting, and in order to avoid appearing eager, Admiral Smith should wait until April 19 and then propose private meeting on April 22. 2. Smith should open meeting with following statement: A. At our last meeting, I suggested that, if you cannot accept the proposals which I have made for settling the problem before us, you give me a concrete proposal of your own in writing. I cannot understand why you are unwilling to do so, but in an effort to get on with the business of these talks, I have brought with me a draft of the receipt which I am prepared to sign at the time of the release of the Pueblo's officers and men. (At this point Smith should read and hand Pak draft receipt set forth in para. 3.D., ref B.) B. As you can see, this draft receipt includes the three-point proposal which I first made at the twelfth meeting. The draft receipt also takes proper notice of the statements and evidence which you put forth at our past meetings. I believe that it provides a fair and reasonable basis for agreeing upon the immediate release of the Pueblo's crew. C. I trust that you fully appreciate the effort which we have made to be responsive to the views which you have expressed in these meetings. You must clearly understand, however, that we cannot go beyond the substance of the draft receipt. D. I must remind you that your side proposed that the problem created by the seizure of the USS Pueblo be solved through meetings of the Senior Members of the Military Armistice Commission. We accepted this proposal in good faith, hoping to reach a speedy agreement on the release of the ship and its crew. After fourteen meetings without agreement or concrete, reasonable proposals from your side, we are entitled to question your seriousness in proposing use of this channel. 3. In responding to Pak's remarks, Smith is authorized to repeat as appropriate any statements in his previous instructions. 4. Smith should not raise question of which side is to set time of next meeting. If subject comes up, however, Smith should agree that it is Pak's turn. 5. FYI. Purpose of paras. 2.D., and 4. is to create question in North Korean minds concerning our intentions. End FYI. Rusk
305. Telegram From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State/1/ Seoul, April 22, 1968, 0923Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 33-6 KOR N-US. Secret; Immediate; Nodis; Cactus. 5835. Subject: Summary of Fifteenth Senior MAC Members Meeting at Panmunjom, April 22, 1968. Ref: State 147513./2/ /2/Document 304. 1. Communist acceptance of today's meeting was not received until 0800 hrs today. Meeting began at 1100 hrs and ended at 1236./3/ /3/Telegram 5836 from Seoul, April 22, transmitted the verbatim text of the meeting. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 33-6 KOR N-US) 2. RAdm Smith opened with statement contained reftel and handed Pak draft of receipt as instructed. 3. Pak responded with reference to Smith's statements at 14th meeting, characterizing request for return of crew on basis US proposal as "shameless demand" and characterizing proposal itself as "nothing but practice of phrase-making to deceive others." Referring to legality of Pueblo activities under 1907 Hague Convention, Pak said US side can never justify criminal acts of Pueblo under international law. Continued with usual charge that Pueblo was armed spy ship seized while conducting espionage after intrusion into territorial waters of DPRK on mission to detect important secrets and that crew are spies caught in "flagrent delict" (sic). Charged that Pueblo disguised itself as "oceanographic electronic research ship," stealthily intruded into territorial waters, and tried to hide its identity by responding that it was "hydrographer" in answer to NK naval signals. Recited list of evidence which NK has provided and repeated charge that US attempting to deny "grim reality under all sorts of unreasonable pretexts." Said such attitude is inhumane act by which US side abandons moral duty to grant, by apologizing, petition of crew to enable them return US as early as possible and to realize fervent desire of waiting families and relatives. Pak then offered to show film which he said would actually show whether confessions of crew had been made under duress. After again deriding US proposal, Pak said it would be miscalculation if US side wants to get something on basis thereof. Ended by saying NK side had put forth concrete proposal for practical solution and fact that question remains unsettled is because of US persistence in maintaining unreasonable position. 4. Foregoing read from prepared statement. Pak then added statement, which he had written following Smith's presentation, acknowledging that he had received draft receipt, commenting that there no difference between receipt and "so-called proposal" of US side, and ending "however, I reserve right to answer at next meeting to the draft as well as to your statement today." 5. Smith responded that he did not desire to view film but asked Pak to give or lend him copy. He then stated that US side had, as Pak requested at last meeting, written out an appropriate document which would make it possible to settle issue. If NK side did not find this satisfactory, it incumbent upon Pak to present document which NK would consider acceptable. Smith then proposed conclusion of meeting. 6. During next interval Pak anxiously asked his assistant whether Smith had mentioned responsibility for calling next meeting. When he received copy of Smith's statement, he immediately looked at it to see whether mention made of next meeting. 7. Pak then reiterated that NK side had made perfectly clear what kind of apology has to be made to have crew returned and that it completely US side's business to make that apology and submit document in writing. He indicated unwillingness or inability to lend copy of film and asked again whether Smith wanted to see it "at this place." 8. Smith replied he did not wish to see film and again requested copy. Pak responded he had no intention "to positively ask" Smith to view film and repeated that film fully shows that crew confessed voluntarily under no restriction and is receiving humanitarian treatment instead of being treated as spies. Had Smith seen film, he would have admitted that his assertion regarding confessions under duress is inconsistent with facts. Smith's refusal reveals fear of having unwarrantedness of US position exposed by truth. Ended by warning Smith not to repeat again remarks that crew confessed under duress. 9. Comment: Session ended with question of who would call next meeting left unsettled. Pak did not volunteer to call next meeting and was apparently upset by Smith's failure to seek understanding on this question. 10. While NK position appeared firm at this meeting, Pak's tone was comparatively mild; he made no threats of punishment; and he did not even object to use of "North Korea" in draft receipt. Porter
306. Telegram From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State/1/ Seoul, May 8, 1968, 0710Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 33-6 KOR N-US. Secret; Immediate; Nodis; Cactus. 7078. Subj: Summary of Sixteenth Senior MAC Members Meeting at Panmunjom, May 8, 1968. Ref: State 151745./2/ /2/Telegram 151745 to Seoul, April 23, transmitted instructions for the next closed meeting. (Ibid.) 1. Meeting opened at 1100 hrs and ended at 1132./3/ /3/Telegram 7087 from Seoul, May 8, transmitted the verbatim text of the meeting. (Ibid.) 2. Pak opened with statement that meetings are between reps of Govt DPRK and Govt of US, discussing issue of Pueblo crew. Asked Woodward to make clear whether he representative of United States Govt replacing RAdm Smith with full authority to discuss issue of Pueblo crew./4/ Woodward responded he senior member Military Armistice Commission our side and that he represents United States Govt with full authority to discuss release of Pueblo and its crew. Pak noted that "you are representative of United States Govt" with full authority to discuss issue of Pueblo crew. /4/Brigadier General Gilbert H. Woodward replaced Smith as Senior Member of UNCMAC in the normal course of military rotation. He attended the Senior Members meetings only after being fully accredited to enhance as greatly as possible "the psychological impact of new representative, fresh from consultations in Washington." (Telegrams 5859 from Seoul and 151746 to Seoul, both April 23; both ibid.) 3. Pak then read prepared statement, first portion of which dedicated to rejection of draft receipt which RAdm Smith had presented at fifteenth meeting. He said draft fails to reflect any consideration of Pak's previous statements explaining in detail way in which document would be prepared to enable return of Pueblo crew, and that draft vividly reflects unjust position by which US side intends to persist in denying crimes committed by Pueblo and to refuse to bear responsibility for them. Said "we cannot but be surprised" at presentation of draft document devoid of any substance and cannot but doubt real intention of your side. After saying that it NK "consistent position" that question of return of crew "may be considered" only when your side makes "proper" apology, Pak continued that "in order to make document of apology and assurance which your side submits worthy of our consideration, it should be written as follows": "The Govt of the United States of America, Acknowledging the validity of the confessions of the crew of the USS Pueblo and of the documents of evidence produced by the representative of the Govt of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to the effect that the ship, which was seized by the self-defence measures of the naval vessels of the Korean People's Army in the territorial waters of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea on many occasions and conducted espionage activities of spying out important military and state secrets of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Shoulders full responsibility and solemnly apologizes for the grave acts of espionage committed by the US ship against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea after intruding into the territorial waters of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, And gives firm assurance that no US ships will intrude again in future into the territorial waters of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. Meanwhile, the Govt of the United States of America earnestly requests that the Govt of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, taking into consideration the fact that the former crew members of the USS Pueblo confiscated by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea side have confessed honestly to their crimes and petitioned the Govt of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea for leniency as well as the above mentioned apology and assurance of the Govt of the United States of America, deal leniently with the crew members." 4. Pak continued that if your side submits such document, means for settlement of question of crews will be easily arranged and preparations of receipt will not be big problem. Pak advised serious study of this statement and that Woodward come to next meeting with such prepared document. 5. Woodward responded with language of first two sentences para four reftel, but reserved use of language from this para beginning with word "specifically" as probably more useful at later meeting./5/ He also said he noted that contents of document Pak submitted today differed greatly from fair and reasonable proposals submitted by our side and that it would be necessary for him to submit Pak's document to higher authority. /5/Woodward emphasized he had "consulted intensively with responsible officials in Washington on problem created by illegal seizure of USS Pueblo," and assured Pak that all positions presented to date by Smith reflected the "policy of the United States Government." Woodward chose not to inform the North Koreans that the draft receipt given them at the last meeting "represents in substance furthest that United States Government is prepared to go." (Telegram 151745 to Seoul, April 23; ibid.) 6. Pak replied with ad hoc statement that his proposal today is just and reasonable one which can make it possible to settle matter practically, again recommending serious study and return to next meeting with such document in hand. Pak then proposed recess, and Woodward agreed. 7. Comment: Pak's manner at today's meeting was mildest yet observed according to Woodward's staff, and in reading his prepared statement Pak made definite effort to use persuasive tone. There was no hint of any threat to crew. 8. We will probably not be able to ascertain without further probing whether position Pak put forward in his draft document today represents starting point for further negotiations or something close to NK final position./6/ In essence, document is apology from USG and entreaty that NK deal leniently with crew. It does not even take form of request for release. Judging from language of Pak's presentation NK has in mind two documents: one of nature tabled today to be submitted first and probably exploited for propaganda purposes, followed by receipt which would probably incorporate much of language contained in basic document and which would be negotiated subsequently. Question of who might sign either apology or receipt, or even whether signature on basic document might be required, is left open. /6/In response to Porter's suggestions, the Department of State authorized him to brief the South Koreans on the proposal, but to refrain from giving them a copy of the documents "unless they press hard for them." (Telegram 7088 from Seoul and telegram 160538 to Seoul, both May 8; both ibid.) After the briefing on May 9, Porter reported being "compelled to give Pak written copy of the draft receipt" Smith presented at the 15th meeting and anticipated receiving a request for the text of the North Korean proposal. (Telegram 7119 from Seoul, May 9; ibid.) Shortly thereafter the ROKG submitted an aide memoire reminding the United States of its previous assurances not to sign "a helicopter-type document in return for the release of the crew." (Telegram 7279 from Seoul, May 17, and airgram A-594 from Seoul, May 20; both ibid.) 9. There was nothing in Pak's presentation today to indicate that NK is prepared now to discuss details or timing of crew release. Pak very carefully made clear that basic document tabled today is de- signed only to permit NK to "give consideration" to details of eventual return. 10. Byplay at beginning of meeting again emphasizes NK concern over govt to govt aspect of meetings and fact that NK considers it is negotiating on crew only and not on ship itself. We do not believe Pak has ever before used word "confiscated" when referring to ship. 11. Although question of who would call next meeting is also left open, it seems clear from Pak's statements about Woodward coming to next meeting with appropriate document and fact that Pak has tabled concrete proposal, that Koreans find it to their advantage to continue and prolong these sessions and probably intend to do so. Porter
307. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ Washington, May 17, 1968, 1-3:15 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 33-6 KOR N-US. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Leddy. The meeting was held in the Secretary's dining room at the Department of State. The memorandum is Part IV of V. SUBJECT PARTICIPANTS For the United States: For the Soviet Union: The Secretary said that the United States was very concerned about the Pueblo affair./2/ The United States has gone as far as it is possible for it to go. He said that we could not apologize for something that we do not think that we actually did, i.e., enter North Korean territorial waters. He hoped that we could obtain Soviet assistance in bringing this question to a satisfactory conclusion. /2/Thompson and Gromyko discussed the matter in Moscow on June 5. Each side repeated the positions set forth by Rusk and Kuznetsov. (Telegram 4114 from Moscow, June 5; ibid.) Continuing, the Secretary said we were also concerned about the infiltration of the DMZ by North Korea and statements by North Korea suggesting possible resumption of hostilities toward the South. He asked for Soviet influence with Pyongyang to keep things cool: the situation could become explosive. Mr. Bohlen added that the U.S. was ready to turn over the crew of the Pueblo to any country with which we have relations, including the Soviet Union, pending an objective review of what had happened. Kuznetsov said that he could not answer at the moment and could only express the hope that the problem would be solved. Dobrynin said that the North Koreans had shown the Soviets a movie of the crew in which they had made statements which left the impression that the crew supported the North Korean view of the Pueblo incident. The Secretary said that if the crew actually said to the U.S. Government what they were alleged to have said to the North Koreans, then the U.S. would be ready to apologize; but we could not place credence in any statements which had been made by the crew under duress. The Secretary stated in measured terms that if North Korea attacks South Korea, the United States will react with "maximum violence". Kuznetsov said that the North Koreans had given the Soviets evidence that South Korea had been infiltrating North Korea and that they, the Soviets, were concerned about this. The Secretary replied that he felt it important that the Soviets and the United States ascertain independently and as objectively as they can what the facts really are on both sides and that the two governments should keep in touch with this matter. He thought that both governments should work to cool down the Korean situation on both sides. Kuznetsov said that the Soviets strongly favor detente in Korea and that we should move against any tension or aggravation of the situation. The Secretary pointed out that a step toward this would be the release of the crew of the Pueblo. [Continue with the next documents]
Volume XXIX Index | Foreign Relations Online | Historian's Office | Department of State | Secretary of State |