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FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1964-1968, Volume XXIX Korea
Department of State |
Korea 308. Action Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/ Washington, May 19, 1968, 10:50 a.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Korea--Pueblo Incident--Cactus IV, Cactus Miscellaneous Papers, February to December 1968. Secret. Johnson handwrote "Let's discuss Tuesday on Agenda" at the end of the memorandum. Mr. President: Herewith a proposal suggested by Nick Katzenbach, concurred in by Sec. Rusk, for retrieving the crew of the Pueblo. It involves our signing a receipt for the return of our men in a way which would permit us to disavow accepting a North Korean version of an apology but would permit them to argue that we had. An Australian in Tokyo with good North Korean contacts would explore, before the event, whether this procedure would be acceptable to the North Koreans; and that they would deliver the men at the time the receipt was signed by our new representative Gen. Woodward. Walt
Attachment Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State (Katzenbach) to President Johnson Washington, May 18, 1968. SUBJECT In February you approved an instruction to our representative in Panmunjom authorizing him to accept an unsatisfactory North Korean receipt for the Pueblo crew by overwriting in his own handwriting a simple statement that he had received 82 men and the body of the 83rd crew member./2/ /2/The intrusion was detailed in telegram 110781 to Seoul, February 6, in advance of the MAC Secretaries Meeting convened on February 7. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 33-6 KOR N-US) We have not as yet had a chance to use this procedure, since the North Koreans have never proffered a receipt. We now would like to revive this proposal through a back channel procedure, i.e., an Australian in Tokyo with good North Korean contacts. He would be fully briefed on our plan and would tell the North Koreans that we would accept their draft receipt with an overwrite, emphasizing that it must be simultaneous with release of the entire crew. If the North Koreans were to accept this procedure they would, of course, claim that we had signed their receipt; we would claim that we had signed only what General Woodward had written. Both sides would understand this ambiguity. We would also publish--immediately after release of the crew--the whole story of the seizure and the negotiations, including the transcripts of the meetings at Panmunjom. This record fully supports our refusal to sign their form of receipt as they presented it. Dean Rusk concurs in this approach. I recommend that you authorize us to go ahead with it./3/ /3/Ambassadors Porter and Johnson were informed of the proposed strategy on May 16 and indicated their support for the approach. (Telegram 00288 to Seoul and Tokyo, May 16; telegram 6549 from Seoul and telegram 0074 from Tokyo, both May 17, all sent through CIA channels; Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Korea--Pueblo Incident--Cactus IV, Cactus Miscellaneous Papers, February to December 1968) Warnke also supported the proposal for reasons he outlined in a May 21 memorandum to Clifford. (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 91-0017, Korea 385.3 [Sensitive]) The Department of State decided to implement the plan and delay the next senior members meeting until May 23 or 24 to allow Porter and Johnson time to make appropriate preparations. (Telegram to Seoul and Tokyo, May 17, sent via CIA channels; Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Korea--Pueblo Incident--Cactus IV, Cactus Miscellaneous Papers, February to December 1968) Nicholas deB Katzenbach
309. Telegram From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State/1/ Seoul, May 28, 1968, 0600Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 33-6 KOR N-US. Secret; Immediate; Nodis; Cactus. 7491. Subj: Seventeenth Senior MAC Members Closed Meeting at Panmunjom, May 28, 1968. Ref: (A) State 168988;/2/ (B) Seoul 7431./3/ /2/Telegram 168988 to Seoul, May 22, transmitted instructions for this meeting. Woodward was to repeat the U.S. position presented thus far and add "You cannot expect me to consider your draft as a proper basis for settling the issue before us in the absence of your clear assurance that, simultaneously with my acceptance of an appropriately amended version of such a document, you would release all of the members of the Pueblo crew." (Ibid.) /3/In telegram 7431, May 24, Porter suggested modifying the instruction to make clear that Pak "should come to next meeting armed with such assurance and that if he does so and also proposes appropriate amendments General Woodward will be prepared to discuss them." (Ibid.) The Department of State concurred. (Telegram 170389 to Seoul, May 24; ibid.) 1. Meeting began at 1100 hrs and ended at 1134./4/ /4/Telegram 7499 from Seoul, May 28, transmitted the verbatim text of this meeting. (Ibid.) 2. Woodward opened with statement contained Ref (A). Pak started to take notes while UNCMAC interpreter was reading Korean version of Woodward's statement but soon abandoned note taking and adopted air of boredom and indifference when he discerned direction of statement. However, he again began taking notes when UNCMAC interpreter reached that portion of Woodward's statement discussed Ref (B). 3. After pause of about six minutes, during which he looked carefully at latter portion of Woodward's statement and underlined several sentences including that discussed Ref (B), Pak chose one of several prepared statements to read in response. This statement was general expression of unhappiness with fact that US side had reviewed its previous position and had not come to today's meeting with document of apology and assurance along lines that which Pak had presented at sixteenth meeting. He said US failure to do so clearly shows US is not concerned about fate of Pueblo crew and has no intention of settling question at these meetings. He reiterated that NK-proposed document was based on "grim reality" of crimes committed by Pueblo, pointed out responsibilities US must assume as organizer of crime, and stated that to settle question US must write document of apology and assurance as demanded and present it to NK side. He then closed with statement that he would comment on Woodward's statement of today at next meeting./5/ /5/The results of this meeting prompted the Department of State to instruct the Embassy in Moscow to again approach Gromyko to review the Korean situation and express the desire of both Washington and Moscow to avoid an escalation of tension on the peninsula. (Telegram 173266 to Moscow, May 29; ibid.) 4. Comment: Although Pak's interest was clearly aroused by sentence discussed Ref (B), his failure to comment on it or to probe as to its meaning demonstrates again that he is allowed to exercise virtually no initiative./6/ /6/Porter later commented that he believed this meeting "provided indications NK waging war of nerves showing signs of some apprehension on its own part." (Telegram 8078 from Seoul, June 22; ibid.) Porter
310. Telegram From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State/1/ Seoul, June 27, 1968, 0850Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 33-6 KOR N-US. Secret; Immediate; Nodis; Cactus. 8217. Subject: Eighteenth Pueblo Meeting. 1. Meeting began 1100 hrs local June 27 and ended 1225./2/ Pak's manner was unoffensive and his language soft and obviously intended to be persuasive. Substance of his statements, however, was unyielding with no hint of accommodation. In brief, he reiterated theme of seventeenth meeting that if US wanted crew returned, it must admit criminal acts and apologize for them. /2/Telegram 174524 to Seoul, May 31, transmitted Woodward's instructions for this meeting; telegram 8221 from Seoul, June 27, transmitted the verbatim text of this meeting. (Both ibid.) 2. Pak flatly rejected receipt proposed by US at last meeting as basis for negotiating return of crew, and returned to demand for proper document as submitted earlier by NK side. Equally adamant on use of any third party. He noted we had both agreed that Pueblo was on intelligence gathering mission. Essential points, however, were for US side to admit that ship had entered NK territorial waters and had carried out hostile acts. At later point he noted that admission had to be accompanied by apology and assurances that acts would not be repeated. Pak noted that return of crew could then be discussed, implying procedure similar to that of helicopter pilots. Speaking in what US participants described as quite, persuasive manner, he said that if document of apology and assurance were submitted "You need not worry much about the delivery of your crew as there are precedents." 3. Pak reopened possibility of some sort of reprisal against crew saying at one point they should be punished for their hostile acts and at another that because of USG procrastination, crew might have to pay appropriate price. Both statements were conditional and were not major part of his presentation. 4. At seventeenth meeting Woodward had indirectly and in low key indicated US might make negotiations public. Pak today made veiled reference to this by saying US would have more to lose by such action than NK. 5. Pak refused to comment directly either on health of Bucher or welfare of crew./3/ On Bucher he said he had no knowledge of rumor we had cited and that he did not feel it necessary to clarify every rumor./4/ With reference to crew, he referred US to his Feb 2 statement and, upon being pressed by Woodward, repeated statements he had made re Bucher. Upon again being pressed, he said we should not believe the rumor and if we were really interested in crew welfare to submit document of apology and assurance. Pak's statements were sufficiently ambiguous to admit of interpretation either way. While evidence is very weak, we inclined to think he was saying Bucher and crew all right. We note that NKs did inform us of Hodge's death, although they probably aware we knew he wounded. /3/In the wake of unconfirmed rumors about the health and welfare of the crew, including the alleged death of another crewman and the reported suicide of Bucher, Woodward was also instructed to request specific information from the North Koreans about the men's physical and mental condition that, despite repeated requests by the senior member and the ICRC, had not been provided since they were taken captive. (Telegrams 182296, June 13, and 183139, June 14, to Seoul; both ibid.) /4/Prior to this meeting and on instructions from the Department of State, a formal inquiry was made through the JDO on Bucher's status, but no reply to the request for information had been received. (Telegrams 188397, June 21, and 190934, June 26, to Seoul, and telegram 8186 from Seoul, June 27; all ibid.) In a subsequent meeting at which the UNC presented another letter on the subject, the U.S. JDO was informed by the North Korean JDO that the matter must be handled through the Senior Members meetings. (Telegram 194259 to Seoul, July 1, and telegrams 8337 and 8348 from Seoul, both July 3; all ibid.) 6. Pak made clear he wishes to keep meetings going and referred twice to next meeting./5/ From repeated references to crew welfare and reiteration of possible punishment Pak aware US concern for crew safety remains strong bargaining counter on NK side. /5/The next meeting was held on July 10, 11-11:45 a.m. KST. Woodward's instructions for that meeting centered on requesting information about the health and welfare of the crew and addressing the issue of North Korean assurances of simultaneous release. (Telegram 196384 to Seoul, July 3; ibid.) Telegram 8475 from Seoul, July 10, transmitted a summary of the meeting, and telegram 8474 from Seoul, July 10, transmitted the verbatim text of the meeting. (Both ibid.) Porter
311. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ Washington, August 13, 1968, 5:30 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 33-6 KOR N-US. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Homme on August 14. SUBJECT PARTICIPANTS Ambassador Dobrynin called at the Under Secretary's request./2/ After greeting the Ambassador and presenting him with commemorative photographs of the NPT signing ceremony, the Under Secretary began by expressing our deep concern over the lack of progress at Panmunjom. He noted that more than 35 days had passed since the last joint meeting and questioned the purpose of continuing these meetings in view of the lack of movement. The Under Secretary noted that the North Korean demands, i.e., that we admit the Pueblo was engaged in espionage, admit intrusion into North Korean waters, apologize and give assurances against any repetition, remain unchanged. /2/A talking paper had been prepared in advance of this meeting. (Memorandum from Godley and Springsteen to Katzenbach, July 17; ibid.) The meeting had been delayed by Katzenbach's absence from Washington and by the onset of the Czech crisis. That situation, in turn, delayed the implementation of measures to prod the North Koreans to call the next Senior Members meeting. (Memorandum from Brown to Katzenbach, July 30, and memorandum from Godley to Rusk, August 9; both ibid.) The Under Secretary stated that the US Government is certain the Pueblo did not enter North Korean territorial waters. We assume that the Soviet Government would not wish us to consider the activity of the Pueblo as espionage. As to assurances, this posed no problem since we did not intrude and had no intention of ever doing so. He pointed out that the Pueblo was becoming more of a public and political issue in the United States. On his recent California trip, the first question asked was always what were we doing to get the Pueblo crew back. He called the Ambassador's attention to the fact that the biggest ovation Mr. Nixon received during his acceptance address was for his reference to doing something about the Pueblo. The Pueblo will undoubtedly be an issue in the Presidential campaign and the American public would associate the Soviet Union with North Korea. This type of agitation and oratory could not help but have an effect on our relations with the Soviet Union. While we could improve our public image by saying more, this would only increase demands for action. Referring to a possible solution, the Under Secretary reminded the Ambassador that we have told the North Koreans we would sign an appropriately amended version of the document they tabled on May 8 acknowledging receipt of the crew, if we would simultaneously receive custody of the crew. However, we have received no response to this suggestion. Ambassador Dobrynin replied that the Soviets had received a different version of the facts from the North Koreans. The Under Secretary suggested Ambassador Dobrynin examine the evidence himself. He was confident that if the Ambassador did so he too would be convinced the Pueblo made no intrusion. Ambassador Dobrynin asked why the Soviets should doubt the North Koreans. The Under Secretary replied that he personally knew the Pueblo was under strict orders not to go within 13 miles of the North Korean coast. It had good navigators and there was no reason to believe the Captain would violate his orders or make such a navigational error. The Under Secretary then asked the Ambassador whether, under similar circumstances, the Soviet Union would apologize for something it knew it had not done. If we had violated North Korean waters, we would, of course, apologize. We did so under similar circumstances when our aircraft violated Soviet air space over the Kurile Islands. The Under Secretary stated he would not hesitate to send another ship within the 12-mile limit and apologize for the intrusion if he thought it would prove this point. Ambassador Dobrynin commented that perhaps this was a big country-little country problem and that the North Koreans clearly do not view it in the same light as would a large nation. The Under Secretary repeated his sincere conviction, based on all the evidence which he had personally examined, that there had been no intrusion. He noted again that there was no operational reason for the Pueblo to approach within 12 miles, that navigational errors were unlikely and that if it had intruded we would have apologized. To this Ambassador Dobrynin again stated that his Government had no reason to doubt the North Korean statement that the Pueblo was in their waters, and mentioned that several of the Pueblo crewmen had admitted this. The Under Secretary observed that the statements made by some crew members could not be verified since no one but North Koreans have been allowed to see them. The Under Secretary then asked the Ambassador for his advice on how to resolve the problem, observing that the Soviet Union has influence with the North Koreans while we do not. Mr. Bohlen added that under international law and common maritime practice, if a ship of another nation crosses your 12-mile limit, the practice was to warn it and escort it out of your waters. The Ambassador replied that all this depends upon your point of view. Different-sized nations hold different opinions on such subjects. The Soviet Union has made its views clear to North Korea. As to the facts, there had been no Soviets present who could verify them. To the Under Secretary's question whether his Government objected to a third country inquiry, the Ambassador replied that this was all right with the Soviet Union. When the Under Secretary asked why no one had been allowed to see or talk to the crew, the Ambassador commented that there was much bitterness against the United States in North Korea. The Ambassador stated that he was really in no position to give advice on the Pueblo problem. The Under Secretary asked why the North Koreans should want to continue holding the Pueblo crew. Ambassador Dobrynin said he could not speak for them. The Under Secretary emphasized that the North Koreans had not even indicated whether they would return the crew if an apology were made. The Ambassador remarked that he was under the impression they had indicated to the US they would. The Under Secretary stated that they had never told us that they would do so. The Under Secretary repeated his question whether the Soviets wanted the type of legitimate intelligence collection the Pueblo was engaged in to be considered espionage. The Ambassador said the Soviet ships do not do this within territorial waters. The Pueblo issue, he said, always comes back to the question of fact. The North Koreans say one thing, while the United States says the opposite. The Soviet Government does not wish to be in the position of verifying the facts; moreover, the North Koreans know very well the Soviet Government's views. The Ambassador then asked what the United States is prepared to do to obtain the crew's release. The Under Secretary reiterated that we will not admit to espionage nor admit that the Pueblo violated North Korean waters. We will admit the intelligence gathering mission of the vessel and will give assurances against future intrusion. Ambassador Dobrynin again remarked that the central point is whether or not the Pueblo did intrude. The Under Secretary asked Dobrynin to put himself in our position. They are holding our crew--under conditions that could lead our men to say almost anything. We are convinced we did not intrude. Assuming we admitted our "guilt" and apologized, the American system being what it is the crew would disavow its guilt upon its return and the United States Government would be made out a liar. To the Under Secretary's query as to whether the solution might be our receipting an amended version of the North Korean draft apology document--one that did not admit to espionage--Dobrynin stated he did not think that was what the North Koreans wanted. The Ambassador, however, said he would report our view to his Government. The Under Secretary gave the Ambassador a memorandum summarizing the views he had expressed and again asked for the Soviet Government's suggestions on this matter. He showed Ambassador Dobrynin a copy of the draft North Korean apology statement. Ambassador Dobrynin asked what it was in it that we could not accept. The Under Secretary pointed out the espionage, intrusion and apology demands, and noted that, in fact, it was only a request for leniency toward men we would be admitting were guilty of espionage and asked if the Soviet Union would sign that kind of a paper.
312. Memorandum From Alfred Jenkins of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow)/1/ Washington, September 4, 1968. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Korea--Pueblo Incident--Miscellaneous, Vol. I. Secret. Walt: I have just learned that the Pueblo is on today's luncheon agenda. Attached is the best recent summary of where we are, which I have just received from State. I don't think any of us are very sanguine about the North Koreans buying this tactic, although it comes closer than any of us would like to a helicopter-type receipt. I have reluctantly come to the view that we should try this approach since other alternatives seem to be even less appealing. September 9 may, of course, make this ploy unnecessary but I would be very surprised if all of the crew were released then./2/ /2/The North Koreans planned a major celebration on September 9 to commemorate the anniversary of their independence. In telegram 234620 to Seoul, September 7, the Department of State forwarded guidelines for Woodward's use in the event the North Koreans did release some or all crew members on September 9. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 33-6 KOR N-US) Al
Attachment Action Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs (Brown) to Secretary of State Rusk Washington, September 4, 1968. SUBJECT The talks have, for some time, been at an impasse. The North Koreans insist on our admitting, and apologizing for, espionage and intrusion into their territorial waters. Then, they say, we "need not worry about the release of the crew." We have refused to admit espionage or to apologize for acts we are morally certain we did not commit. Various forms of conditional apology (e.g., we regret any intrusion that may have occurred) have been rejected. Consequently, by authorization of the President on May 18, we began to explore the possibility of General Woodward writing across the face of a document presented by the North Koreans an acknowledgment of the receipt of the crew and signing it. If the North Koreans accepted this they would presumably claim that we had signed their piece of paper and we would say that we had signed only what Woodward had written. We tried to explain this ploy in detail to the North Koreans through an Australian contact in Tokyo, but we are not sure whether this really ever got through to Pyongyang or whether Pak knows about it. Under Secretary Katzenbach reviewed the situation on August 13 with Ambassador Dobrynin without mentioning the over-write plan. There has been no feedback from this demarche. At our request, a number of other governments have approached the North Koreans but were given the standard response: "Let the Americans apologize." President Park has been kept informed by Ambassador Porter./3/ /3/Porter reported after briefing him on August 27 President Pak appeared puzzled by the overwrite ploy and "strongly advised against anything resembling apology." (Telegram 9415 from Seoul, August 27; ibid.) For the last two or three meetings we have been asking the North Koreans if they would release the crew if Woodward acknowledged receipt of the men "on a document" satisfactory to the North Koreans. The Twentieth Closed Meeting on August 29 produced an interesting exchange./4/ General Woodward repeatedly tried to get General Pak to say yes or no to our latest formulation: "If I were to acknowledge receipt of the crew on a document whose language was satisfactory to you, would you simultaneously release the crew?" On the third go-round Woodward said, "If you were to simultaneously release the crew, I would acknowledge receipt of a document whose language was satisfactory to you." Pak pounced on this, "noted that your side is ready to sign our document of apology and assurance", and promised a further comment later. Woodward said, "Your statement contains language I did not use," and recessed. /4/Telegram 210445 to Seoul, July 27, and telegram 223042 to Seoul, August 16, transmitted Woodward's instructions for the meeting. Telegram 9475 from Seoul, August 29, transmitted a summary of the meeting, which lasted from 11 a.m. to 12:47 p.m. KST. Telegram 9476 from Seoul, August 29, transmitted the verbatim text of the meeting. (All ibid.) The question is what instructions to give Woodward for the next meeting. It seems clear that we should continue to try to pin Pak down to release of the crew simultaneously with any signing. It is unlikely, however, that he would do more than agree to release the crew within a day or two after a document was signed. Are we willing to take the risk of signing and relying on North Korean promise to deliver the crew? How long could we wait? In the case of the helicopter pilots (1964), the North Koreans demanded and got our signature on a receipt--admitting espionage--without any promise of when the pilots would be released. They then immediately offered to release the next day and they did so. They keep saying at Panmunjom "There is a precedent. What more assurance do you want?" We feel that Pak is most unlikely to agree to actual release simultaneous with signature, and that 24 or 48 hours between signature and release would probably not hurt but that we need a commitment that it would be no longer. Recommendation: That we accept up to a 48 hour interval. It is possible that Pak might agree to simultaneous release and bring the crew to Panmunjom, but would reject a document if it consisted only of an over-write with Woodward's signature, and threaten to take the crew away again. Under those conditions, should Woodward then sign the document the North Koreans want? Comment: It is probable that an officer of Woodward's rank and experience would sign even though his instructions did not authorize such action, unless he were expressly forbidden to do so. We had planned, if Pak agrees to simultaneously, to tell him precisely what we would do, i.e. over-write but not sign the actual North Korean draft. Pak might well reject this ploy if he understood exactly what we planned to do. What then should be our position? Recommendation: That we do not spell out our proposal further. The ploy might just work, and explanation is likely to kill it. It is possible that the North Koreans would release only part of the crew, for example, all of the enlisted men but not the officers. Would we sign either the over-write or the North Korean apology in order to get part of the men back? It would be difficult to reveal nothing to the press and Congress on their debriefings, difficult to prevent leaks, yet difficult to say anything of what we learned from those released without hurting those still held. And it would seem logical for the North Koreans to hold some back as hostages to deter our denouncing whatever "receipt" we may sign, to prevent us from issuing a White Paper, etc. Yet obviously we cannot refuse to accept a part of the crew unless the terms are utterly outrageous. Recommendation: If we can get back all the enlisted men, or even half or more, we should sign while reiterating our demand for release of the others. We should refuse to sign anything for a merely token release. The papers today and previous rumors have reported that there would be a major development with respect to Pueblo on September 9 at the celebration of the 20th Anniversary of the DPRK. Should we call for a meeting before or after September 9? Recommendation: That we wait until after September 9. If anything is to happen on that date the decision was probably taken some time ago. We are unlikely to learn anything from Pak. If he wants to comment constructively on Woodward's statement at the 20th Meeting, he can let us know. Any further clarification on our part might cool him off. Decisions on these points are needed as soon as possible, since Woodward needs instructions in case of unexpected developments.
313. Telegram From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State/1/ Seoul, September 17, 1968, 1050Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 33-6 KOR N-US. Secret; Immediate; Nodis; Cactus. 9889. Subject: 21st Senior MAC Members Closed Meeting at Panmunjom Sept 17, 1968. Reference: Seoul 9475./2/ /2/Telegram 9475 from Seoul, August 29, transmitted a summary of the previous senior MAC members meeting. (Ibid.) For this meeting Woodward was instructed to press Pak to answer his previous question relative to simultaneous signature of a receipt and release of the crew. (Telegram 237348 to Seoul, September 12; ibid.) Instructions covering other eventualities were transmitted in telegram 238737 to Seoul, September 14. (Ibid.) 1. Meeting began 1100 hours Sep 17 and ended 1452 hours local time./3/ Length of meeting was due to persistent efforts on part of both sides to probe position of other side, with long pauses required to write out statements. /3/Telegram 9890 from Seoul, September 17, transmitted the verbatim text of this meeting. (Ibid.) 2. Some clarification of NK position emerged from General Woodward's questioning of Pak. The North Korean side went on record as stating flatly that the crew of the Pueblo would be released if the US would sign and submit the North Korean document of May 8. Second position of NK was that if US side agreed to sign and submit May 8 document the NK side would be prepared to discuss the specifics of the release of the crew and the signing of the document. 3. At no time was General Pak willing to reply directly to General Woodward's questions regarding simultaneous release. Presumption is that simultaneous release is one of specific details which would be discussed after US agreed to sign May 8 document. We note that Pak made no effort to find out what we meant by "acknowledge receipt." Again the presumption is that this is one of specific details to be settled after US agreement to sign. 4. We also note that Pak did not at this meeting mention existing precedent in connection with release of crew. Failure to mention precedent may have no particular significance as again, all questions of this nature presumably included amongst details to be settled later. 5. General Pak made several efforts to find out if by language acceptable to NK side, we meant their May 8 document. These efforts frustrated by General Woodward. 6. Typical statement of Pak setting forth first position mentioned paragraph 2 above was as follows: "I clearly stated that our side will send back to your side the crew of the Pueblo only if your side signs the document presented by our side at the meeting of May 8 last." 7. Second position NK side mentioned para 2 above was expressed by Pak in following language: "I have also stated that if your side indicates its willingness to sign the document presented by our side on May 8 detailed matters concerning signing of the document and return of the crew will be discussed." 8. General Woodward raised question of visit to NK of father of Angelo Strano./4/ General Pak flatly refused to deal with question stating that "this is not the place to arrange for issuance of a visa." /4/The parents of crew member Strano met with Benjamin Fleck, Country Director for Korea, in Washington on July 17, at which time Mr. Strano voiced his desire to go to North Korea to attempt to free his son and his expectation that the U.S. Government would arrange his entry. The matter was discussed with Katzenbach and brought to Rusk's attention. (Memorandum from Brown to Rusk, July 25; ibid.) The Department agreed to submit his request to the North Koreans, and Woodward was asked to do so in his instructions for the 20th closed meeting. (Telegram 210445 to Seoul, July 27; ibid.) 9. Meeting closed with General Pak asking for reply from US side at next meeting to question of whether US prepared to sign May 8 document. General Woodward's impression is that NKs, as result of question raised by US at 20th meeting and recent press furor, think that the US is prepared to sign. If this impression correct, NKs have incentive to call next meeting at reasonably early date. Porter
314. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State (Katzenbach) to Secretary of State Rusk/1/ Washington, September 18, 1968. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files, 1967-69, POL 33-6 KOR N-US. Secret; Nodis. SUBJECT Dean: As requested, at Tab A is a redraft--omitting the lurid adjectives and the paragraph requesting leniency for the Pueblo crew--of the May 8 document the North Koreans want us to sign. (The original is at Tab B.)/2/ /2/Attached but not printed, see Document 306. My personal view is that any move to tamper with the document now would be a serious mistake. We have been following a two-pronged course in our negotiations at Panmunjom: --Don't give an inch. This is the explicit approach we have taken in the closed meetings. We have probed for any flexibility in the NK position, without giving any flat assurances of our own willingness to compromise. --What compromise can we reach and repudiate after the crew is returned? Implicit in much that we have said, however (including a clandestine Australian contact with the North Koreans), is a hint that we would be willing to overwrite (in lieu of a simple signature) on the May 8 document an acknowledgement of receipt for the crew (assuming release is simultaneous with the overwrite). Our plan is to repudiate the document as soon as the crew is released, arguing that all General Woodward did was acknowledge receipt of the crew. It may be that at some future date the North Koreans would agree to release the crew on less onerous terms than those they now insist upon. But this is pure conjecture, and could be months or years away. It is by no means certain that the North Koreans will accept our overwrite ploy, should we reach the point where we might use it. But neither do we have any evidence to indicate that they will not accept it. There are several compelling reasons against trying to negotiate a document to replace that of May 8: --It would involve many weeks of negotiation (assuming we could ever arrive at a mutually acceptable document, which I doubt). This might be an acceptable price, if it were not for other serious drawbacks. --The North Koreans will continue for a very long time to insist on a document which (a) admits espionage and intrusion; (b) apologizes for both; (c) recognizes the DPRK. --If we are ever going to sign (or "acknowledge receipt on") any document, the more patently false the better. The May 8 document is so bad that it will make our reasons for acceptance and repudiation that much more believable./3/ /3/In a September 17 memorandum to Clifford, Warnke made a similar point, noting that "If we are to sign anything, I prefer that it be their document rather than one which we had revised. It would then be easier totally to repudiate the document." (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD/OASD/ISA Files: FRC 73 A 1250, Korea 092.2) --By entering into negotiations over the wording of the receipt we make the document "agreed", thus increasing the difficulties of a clean-cut disavowal. (It is easier to disavow a document--outrageous blackmail on its face and "signed" for purely humanitarian reasons--than to disown one we have had a hand in drafting.) It would also make the overwrite ploy less credible to our own and world opinion. --Anything less than the "clean-cut disavowal" mentioned above will raise questions about our consistent public denials of espionage and intrusion, and confirm the doubts of many--both in the US and abroad--who already tend to disbelieve them. We still face a number of unpalatable decisions on our present course, but I am totally convinced that we should play the hand out before trying something else. If we now begin to argue about the wording of a document we have had before us for more than four months, it will be extremely difficult to justify waiting so long to raise an issue which can only add many additional weeks to our negotiations--and with no real likelihood of success. Nicholas deB. Katzenbach/4/ /4/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
Tab A The Government of the United States of America: Accepts the statements of the crew of the USS Pueblo and the documents of evidence produced by the representative of the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to the effect that the ship, which was seized by the naval vessels of the Korean People's Army in the territorial waters of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea on January 23, 1968, had intruded into the territorial waters of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea on many occasions and conducted espionage activities on important military and state secrets of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea; Accepts responsibility and apologizes for the acts of espionage committed by the United States ship against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea after intruding into the territorial waters of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea; and Gives firm assurances that no United States ships will again intrude into the territorial waters of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.
315. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Korea/1/ Washington, September 21, 1968, 2036Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 33-6 KOR N-US. Secret; Nodis; Cactus. Drafted by Leonard; cleared by Brown, Walsh, and Steadman; and approved by Katzenbach. Rostow forwarded a copy of telegram 242963 to President Johnson at the ranch in Texas as CAP 82460 with an opening paragraph indicating that Rusk and Clifford cleared the instructions. Rostow told Johnson that Clifford accepted the approach after he "understood the North Koreans were clear about the ambiguity." Rostow reported that Katzenbach did not "think the other side will accept, but it's worth playing the hand." (Telegram CAP 82460 from Rostow to Johnson, September 22, Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Korea--Pueblo Incident--Cactus Ib, Cactus State Cables, March 1 to September 30, 1968) 242963. Subject: Instructions for 22nd Meeting. 1. Progress at last meeting makes it appear at least possible that overwrite ploy will work and next meeting should be used to press it hard. We note that Pak constantly reiterates idea that Woodward will "sign" but never himself contrasts or probes distinction between "sign" and Woodward's language. It may thus be that Pak will be satisfied with making a negotiating record to support contention Woodward is "signing" while allowing us to keep our own negotiating record clean of any assent to his assertion. Such agreement to disagree on record would satisfy us, particularly since audiences receptive to NK propaganda are not likely to pore over transcripts of talks, and careful reading by impartial observers will bear us out. 2. Pak will presumably open next meeting by restating assurance given at last meeting that crew will be returned "if your side signs document of May 8" and asking if Woodward can now agree to sign. Or he may again state his "understanding" that Woodward is ready to sign (as in para 25 of Seoul 9890)/2/ and ask Woodward's concurrence. /2/Paragraph 25 in telegram 9890 from Seoul, September 17, quotes Pak as stating: "I understand that this statement of yours implies that your side is ready to sign the document presented by our side on May 8 to have the crew sent back. If you agree to this understanding of mine, specific matters, including the matter concerned with your side's signing the document will be discussed later on." Woodward replied that he made no implications and simply wanted to understand Pak's position. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 33-6 KOR N-US) 3. In either case Woodward should respond as follows: "I have repeatedly asked you whether you agree to release the crew at the same time as I acknowledge that I am receiving them. You have repeatedly responded that I am reiterating a question which has already been made clear, because you are well aware that I insist on the simultaneous release of the entire crew and your side has already agreed to their release under certain conditions. You then have repeatedly asked me whether, when I spoke of a document whose language was satisfactory to you, I had in mind the document which you presented here on May 8. Since your side presented that draft, our side of course assumes that its language is satisfactory to you, even though its language does not reflect what we believe to be the true facts of this case and is in other respects inaccurate. The answer to your question is therefore yes, your draft of May 8 is obviously a document such as we had in mind. I am now prepared to state that if tomorrow you will release to me the entire crew, I will tomorrow acknowledge on your draft of May 8 that I am receiving them. I assume that this statement on my part will now make it possible for us to take the next step, that is, to discuss the specific arrangements for the release of the crew tomorrow. Is that correct?" 4. Pak will presumably respond by noting "that your side intends to sign our document of apology and assurance presented May 8" and will say that he cannot possibly make any arrangements for the next day, that he must consult with his authorities, etc. He will probably again seek ratification by Woodward of his "understanding" of US position. 5. Woodward should handle such efforts along following lines: "You are misquoting me. You have said that under certain conditions your side would release the entire crew. I have said that under certain conditions I would be prepared to acknowledge receipt of the crew on your document of May 8. For example, if you will agree to release the entire crew tomorrow, then I can agree today that I will tomorrow acknowledge their receipt on your May 8 document. I see no reason why the crew cannot be brought here tomorrow. (Woodward may expand on this point as he judges appropriate.) You say that these specific arrangements cannot be carried through tomorrow. I ask, why not? And if it really is not possible, then when can the crew be brought here? How long will it take you to assemble and transport them? These are the specific arrangements which you said could be discussed if I would indicate my general acceptance of your demand that your document of May 8 be used when I acknowledge that I am receiving the crew. Let us now move on to discuss these specific arrangements. I await your answer to my question on when the release can take place." 6. As you see, our object in foregoing is to draw Pak into discussions on time and place of release, bypassing any discussion of what Pak calls "detailed matters concerning signing of the document". It might, for example, be easier for Pak to agree to simultaneity if he did not have to agree to it in principle but only had to talk of fixing dates. We do not expect any commitment on time at this meeting but Woodward should hammer at necessity for firm date as next move, while avoiding any unconditional statement of our willingness to use May 8 document, i.e., absent their agreement to imminent, simultaneous release. 7. As you can gather, it is most helpful to have on record repeated restatements of whatever commitments Pak has authority to make, not merely for sake of negotiating record, but in order to be sure they are solid commitments and not merely result of slip by Pak or his translators. 8. After squeezing from Pak as much blood as this turnip has in it, Woodward should attempt to close meeting on following lines: "You have said that despite statements I have made you still are not ready to discuss with me the time and place for the release of the crew. I propose that we recess until 11 a.m. tomorrow so that you can obtain the authority to discuss that matter. Do you agree?" 9. We doubt that Pak will, in fact, agree to reconvene after 24 hours or any other specified pause, but Woodward should press on above lines to indicate that US side demands minimum and clearly specified delay from moment when it gives unconditional agreement to acknowledging receipt on May 8 document. (See FYI at end of para 11, State 237348.)/3/ /3/The referenced portion of paragraph 11 in telegram 237348 to Seoul, September 12, reads: "Though we cannot accept any delay between actual signed acknowledgment and release we probably could accept 48 hours between agreement to acknowledge receipt and release. If Pak suggests something like that Woodward should note it as firm offer which will be reported to Washington." (Ibid.) 10. If Pak should indicate either firm or approximate date when crew might be released, Woodward should propose meeting 24 hours in advance "to reach final agreement and make final arrangements on the conditions of the release". 11. We would prefer that next meeting come quickly and in your discretion you may indicate to other side that we are ready. Rusk
316. Telegram From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State/1/ Seoul, September 30, 1968, 0913Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 33-6 KOR N-US. Secret; Immediate; Nodis; Cactus. 10159. Subj: 22nd Senior MAC Members Closed Mtg and Panmunjom Sep 30, 1968. Ref: Seoul 9889./2/ /2/Document 313. 1. Meeting began at 1100 hrs Sep 30 and ended 1219 hrs local time./3/ Gen Woodward commented that Gen Pak had never been so polite. /3/Telegram 10157 from Seoul, September 30, transmitted the verbatim text of this meeting. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 33-6 KOR N-US) Telegram 10159 and the verbatim text were given to President Johnson under a September 30 covering memorandum from Rostow in which he stated he thought the ploy would work and added: "Although the device is a trick, I must say that Woodward is so clear in this exchange as to what he is doing that we have a good basis for defending our position if, in fact, the release does take place." Rostow's memorandum indicates the President saw the documents. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Korea--Pueblo Incident--Cactus IV, Cactus Miscellaneous Papers, February to December 1968) 2. Gen Pak made opening statement, restating standard NK line, but ending with commitment to release crew simultaneously on signature of apology. 3. Gen Pak at same time handed Gen. Woodward copy in English and Korean of exact statement to be signed. Complete text in English as follows: "To the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea the Government of the USA, acknowledging the validity of the confessions of the crew of the USS Pueblo and of the documents of evidence produced by the rep of the Government of the DPRK to the effect that the ship, which was seized by the self-defense measures of the naval vessels of the Korean People's Army in the territorial waters of the DPRK on January 23, 1968, had illegally intruded into the territorial waters of the DPRK on many occasions and conducted espionage activities of spying out important military and state secrets of the DPRK." "Shoulders full responsibility and solemnly apologizes for the grave acts of espionage committed by the US ship against the DPRK after having intruded into the territorial waters of the DPRK, "And gives firm assurance that no US ships will intrude again in future into the territorial waters of the DPRK. "Meanwhile, the Government of the USA earnestly requests the Government of the DPRK to deal leniently with the former crew members of the USS Pueblo confiscated by the DPRK side, taking into consideration the fact that these crew members have confessed honestly to their crimes and petitioned the Government of the DPRK for leniency. "Simultaneously with the signing of this document, the undersigned acknowledges receipt of 82 former crew members of the Pueblo and one corpse. "On behalf of the Government of the USA: Gilbert H. Woodward, Maj Gen, USA" 4. Since Pak's statement and document he presented to Gen Woodward answered questions regarding nature of signature and simultaneity raised State 242963,/4/ Gen Woodward proceeded to press Gen Pak as to whether NK side prepared to release crew within 24 hours if he were to acknowledge receipt of them on the document which Gen Pak had handed him. /4/Document 315. 5. Gen Pak replied that question of procedures on delivery and receipt of the crew could be discussed at next meeting. Gen Woodward did not press further as it obvious Gen Pak had no instructions regarding time of release. 6. Gen Woodward did not raise points raised State 245979/5/ regarding additional "intrusions." /5/Telegram 245979 to Seoul, September 27, provided Woodward with instructions in case Pak raised allegations of 11 additional intrusions into North Korean territorial waters based on records found aboard the Pueblo. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 33-6 KOR N-US) 7. We intend to tell ROKG at this stage only that NK side has agreed to simultaneous release and that "acknowledgement of receipt" question has not been resolved. ROKG may suspect on the other hand that agreement is near and problem of briefing them (FonOff) at this time is becoming acute. 8. Dispatch now of public relations team mentioned State 246749/6/ would certainly feed this impression and might lead to speculation jeopardizing chances of release. We continue to believe team should not be sent until all arrangements for release completed. /6/Telegram 246749 to Seoul, September 27, informed the Embassy that the Departments of State and Defense intended to send to Seoul "officials concerned with post-release problems," composed of both military and civilian representatives. (Ibid.) 9. If US should agree to present NK proposal, it would be imperative that Amb give Pres Park full briefing at least 24 hrs before time of actual release, though this will entail certain risks. We will need all the cooperation we can get from ROKG in handling public relations problem here. It is also highly desirable that simultaneous announcement of release be made in Washington and Seoul. 10. If US should decline present NK proposal danger exists that NK side may release text of document stating that US has refused offer for return of crew. 11. Embassy pouching Korean text of NK document./7/ Korean text appears to coincide closely with English version. /7/Not found. 12. Department will note heading on NK document of "to the government of the DPRK " in heavy block letters. To best of Embassy's knowledge this salutation has not previously been used in any dealing with NK. Phrase has appeared in body of military documents such as receipt signed by Gen Combs for helicopter pilots in 1964. Dept will also wish to note language of concluding para of document which is combination of simultaneity, signature, and receipt. Gen Woodward states that tone of meeting such that he expects notification NK side ready for US call next meeting in very near future. Porter [Continue with the next documents]
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