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FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1964-1968, Volume XXIX Korea
Department of State |
Korea U.S. Efforts To Encourage Normalization of Relations Between the Republic of Korea and Japan 332. Telegram From the Embassy in Japan to the Department of State/1/ Tokyo, January 3, 1964, 2 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 33-4 JAPAN-KOR S. Confidential. Repeated to Seoul and CINCPAC for POLAD. 1947. Ref: Deptel 1635./2/ ROK-Japan Settlement. /2/In telegram 1635 to Tokyo, December 30, 1963, also sent to Seoul as telegram 566, the Department of State transmitted information concerning new supporting-assistance levels to Korea for FY 1964, intended to urge a Korean settlement with Japan, and asked the Embassy in Tokyo to provide an update on where the issue stood in Japan. (Ibid., POL 33-4 JAPAN-S KOR) We feel now is more favorable time for settlement than we shall see again before 1965 at earliest. Quite apart from our belief that ability of new Korean Government to push through settlement will tend to decrease rather than increase with time, ratification of settlement before June adjournment of Diet offers best chance in Japan. If this opportunity missed, Diet recess together with Olympic fever would put off serious Diet consideration of settlement until 1965 at earliest. Meanwhile, July elections for LDP presidency would add new note of doubt. Ikeda has fully committed himself to settlement and [garble] political skill needed to carry it through smoothly. While reelection of Ikeda seems probable, if Sato succeeded Ikeda in July though he would be equally eager for settlement, he might find it harder to win ratification because of greater disunity within LDP. If Kom, who has been showing increasing strength as candidate to replace Ikeda, were to be successor, outcome would be even more problematical since his attitude on many matters is not clear. If ratification before July is necessary, time is running out. FonOff tells us that, after basic political agreement reached, two months will be required for drafting and then three months for Diet consideration. This perhaps too generous timetable would call for agreement before end of January, but we estimated agreement will be necessary by early March at latest if we are to catch present high tide. We see little we can do at Tokyo end to speed settlement. GOJ is perfectly aware of all points stated above and of intense US interest in settlement. Ikeda and Ohira have skillfully led Japanese public into accepting normalization as only common sense and consequently determined Socialist opposition will probably not cause major problem. GOJ has consistently made clear during negotiations what it considers negotiable and what not, we believe it will not retreat from 12-mile limit./3/ Nor would it be consistent with basic US policy for us to try to persuade it to. GOJ has shown flexibility on other issues and recently has proposed that fisheries negotiations be moved to Seoul to have Korean delegation near source of its instructions and thus speed up talks. /3/Reference is to the extent of Korean territorial waters. From here it appears that bars to settlement are on Korean end. Superficial one is unrealistic effort to avoid 12-mile limit. More basic problem is hostility of Korean public to Japan and therefore political danger for a government that makes settlement. This admittedly makes settlement terribly difficult, but unless we find way to help Koreans surmount this problem, we may miss tide, which may not rise this high again for some time. Conceivably ROK Government has idea that time is on their side (e.g., that Sato will be Prime Minister and will give them better deal than Ikeda). If so, it might be helpful for us to disabuse them of such notions and point out clearly our estimate that failure to get settlement now would result in long delay with no prospect of any better terms from Japan in future. Reischauer
333. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ Washington, January 21, 1964, 3 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL JAPAN-KOR S. Secret. Drafted by Bacon and approved in S on February 8. This memorandum is Part 1 of 2. The conversation took place in the Secretary's Office. SUBJECT PARTICIPANTS Ambassador Kim Chong-yul, Embassy of Korea The Secretary Ambassador Kim, who had called at his own request, opened by saying that Foreign Minister Chung Il-kwon had asked him to make a statement which he hoped the Secretary would draw on as he saw fit in any discussions he might have with the Japanese in the course of the Economic Conference to be held in Japan the following week./2/ /2/Rusk was in Tokyo January 24-28 to attend the meeting of the Joint US-Japan Committee on Trade and Economic Affairs. (Here Ambassador Kim read the statement, as follows: "1. It is the consistent policy of the Korean Government to seek an early normalization of the relations between Korea and Japan with a view to establishing good neighbourly relations and strengthening the solidarity among free nations. It is, however, to be noted that the Korea-Japan Talks has become a domestic political issue because of the past relations of the two countries and the critical attitude of some opposition parties. It is, therefore, hoped that a full consideration be given to these facts, and accordingly a broader approach be made by Japan in the Talks. "2. Following is the basic position of the Korean Government on the fishery question which is the main pending issue: a) the fishery resources in the waters in question be conserved; b) interests of the Korean fishing population be safeguarded, and the Korean fishing industry be protected from any adverse effects of Japanese fishing activities. "3. One of the major obstacles to the settlement of this question is the great imbalance of fishing capabilities between the two countries. Therefore, a sufficient amount of fishery cooperation fund should be secured for the development of Korean fishing industry. Accordingly, it is considered that the practical means of settling the fishery question are for Japan to agree to regulatory measures limiting Japanese fishing activities within the Peace Line/3/ to the present level and to render a full fishery cooperation. If Japan intends to increase fishing activities within the Peace Line through the conclusion of a fishery agreement or insists on any regulatory measures under which such an increase is anticipated, the settlement of the question will become difficult. /3/In 1952 former President Syngman Rhee created the Peace Line, also referred to as the Rhee Line, by expanding the boundaries of South Korea's territorial waters, in some cases by 100 or more miles, into the Sea of Japan and the Yellow Sea in an attempt to protect Korean fishing interests. (DIA Intelligence Summary, March 25; Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of Robert W. Komer, Japan-Korea, December 1963-March 1966) "4. There are expressed apprehensions among the Korean people that, when the Korea-Japan relations are normalized, the role of the United States of America in supporting Korea would be shifted to Japan. Therefore, a reassurance by the United States of continuous support to Korea is necessary.") The Secretary asked whether the reference to "domestic political issue" in the first paragraph of the text referred to domestic problems in Korea, Japan, or both. Ambassador Kim said that both countries were intended. In Korea it was the Government several years ago which had held back in the negotiations for a settlement while the Opposition Party and the Korean people favored coming to a conclusion. The situation was now reversed. In Japan the public was likewise not fully in agreement on a settlement. Referring to the second and third paragraphs relating to the fisheries question, the Secretary asked how much fishing was done by the Japanese within the "Peace Line". The Ambassador replied that, according to Japanese figures, roughly 120 thousand tons are taken annually by Japanese vessels within the area enclosed by the Line. The Japanese have informed the Korean Delegation in Tokyo of the results of their fishing operations. The Koreans have agreed that the same amount could be caught by the Japanese in the future but warned that any increase would create a problem. The Secretary asked whether the Koreans would expect to raise their catch to the Japanese level or to limit their catch to the present volume for conservation reasons. Ambassador Kim said that the Koreans contemplated an increase in their catch but would need improved equipment which they would expect the Japanese to provide by way of compensation for Korean agreement to Japanese fishing within the Peace Line. The Secretary thought that it would be important to determine with as much precision as possible the figures on the total catch of each country and on the maximum permissible catch. He asked whether Korean-caught fish is sold principally in Korea or in Japan and whether any third country engages in fishing within the Peace Line. Ambassador Kim said that Korean fishermen sell their catch largely in Japan. He added that the Russians did not fish within the Line although seven years ago Chinese Communists had come close to Korea and had sunk a Korean fishing boat besides capturing a Korean fisherman. The Korean armed forces had orders to sink such invaders and the Chinese Communists' vessel was chased but because of darkness could not be found. Ambassador Kim expressed the hope that United States assistance and support would be assured as noted in the final paragraph of the statement. The Secretary replied that the United States would hope that normalization of relations between the Republic of Korea and Japan would result in cooperation between the two countries which would be beneficial to both, but that the United States had no intention to discontinue its support of the Republic of Korea. (On leaving, Ambassador Kim left with Department officers a copy of his statement "for informal reference", not as an aide-memoire.)
334. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson/1/ Washington, January 23, 1964. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of Robert W. Komer, Japan-Korea. Secret. When you see Dean Rusk before he leaves for Japan/Korea,/2/ you might remind him we want to push hard to get a ROK/Japanese settlement. /2/Before returning to Washington from Tokyo, Rusk stopped in Korea and met with Pak in Seoul on January 29; see Document 3. This has been hanging fire for ten years. It would mean a flow of over a half billion dollars into the Korean economy, which would greatly reduce the burden on us over time. At long last we're close to the wire on this. A word to Rusk that you're personally interested would put him on his mettle, and help get State to push harder. A ROK/Jap settlement would be a nice foreign policy plus in 1964. R. W. Komer/3/ /3/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
335. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ Tokyo, January 26, 1964. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330, January 1964. Confidential. Drafted by Barnett and approved by Reischauer. The meeting was held at the Foreign Minister's residence. PARTICIPANTS The Secretary Foreign Minister Masayoshi Ohira SUBJECT The Secretary invited Ohira to assess prospects for a Japanese-Korean settlement. He said that Washington had not entered into discussion of details of the settlement but was greatly interested in the outcome of negotiations. In effect, Washington wanted an agreement and did not much care on what basis. Ohira said that the Japanese and Koreans had gone over the hump when they had achieved agreement on claims. The focus of negotiations now was on the fisheries issue: width of the exclusive zone, regulation of the "outside" zone, and fisheries cooperation. Japan had made certain proposals to Korea and, as of this moment difficulties were on the Korean and not the Japanese side. Ohira felt that Pak was being too much intimidated by the opposition and that he could overcome it just as the GOJ was determined to override its domestic opposition on the normalization issue. Ohira went on to explain that Japan's proposals on the fisheries issue were subject to flexible negotiations. If this matter could be wound up others could easily be disposed of. The Secretary urged flexibility on both sides, expressed conviction there was room for maneuvering and hoped for an early conclusion of the settlement. Ohira said if there was some way he believed the Secretary could be helped in advising Seoul he would pass along his suggestions. [Here follows discussion of US-USSR relations.]
336. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Korea/1/ Washington, February 14, 1964, 7:32 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 33-4 JAPAN-KOR S. Secret; Immediate; Limdis. Drafted by Barnett; cleared by Davis, Bacon, Green, and Harriman; and approved by Rusk. Repeated to Tokyo for Reischauer. 716. From Secretary to Ambassador Berger. Barnett expressed to Ambassador Reischauer opinion, formed on basis talks in Embassy Seoul, that if Japanese would (1) move closer towards Korea's desire for adequate financing modernization its fishing industry and (2) announce intention exercise effective restraint Japanese fishing operations in area between 12-mile limit and Rhee Line, a settlement could be concluded immediately, and no other or new demands would be advanced by Koreans. Provided this present Embassy judgment, Dept would be willing depart from past policy non-involvement in details of negotiations, and instruct Ambassador Reischauer to urge Prime Minister Ikeda or Foreign Minister Ohira to make generous offer in manner best designed help President Pak overcome Korean opposition. Perhaps you--without consulting Koreans--would wish formulate with greater precision formula which would meet Korean economic desires and political sensitivities, while taking account Japanese interests and sensitivities (Tokyo's 2390 and 2400)./2/ Believe Japanese both flexible and sincere in declared desire complete negotiations, and would welcome deliberated judgment of U.S. Embassy Seoul that such offer would bring it off. Embassy Seoul should not lend its support to this tactic unless confident that it would be our only intervention in negotiations, and be successful. Request immediate reply. /2/In telegram 2390 from Tokyo, February 11, Reischauer reported on Ohira's "firm determination" to reach an agreement with Korea. Ohira told Reischauer that he "was prepared to be amply flexible on fishing zones, conservation measures, and financial aid to Korean fisheries" and that he believed "if the Koreans ready to take action, normalization can be achieved before summer." Reischauer concluded from his comments that Ohira had presented "ROK with golden opportunity that may not soon return." Telegram 2400 from Tokyo, February 13, set forth the Japanese position on fishing issues currently being negotiated with the Koreans. (Both ibid.) Rusk
337. Telegram From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State/1/ Seoul, February 17, 1964, 7:30 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 33-4 JAPAN-KOR S. Secret; Priority; Limdis. Repeated to Tokyo. 1043. Deptel 716, rptd Tokyo 2102./2/ /2/Document 336. 1. Remaining major obstacles to ROK-Japan settlement are fisheries control in restricted areas and amount of fisheries cooperation loans. On basis our discussions in Seoul and Embassy Tokyo's reports (Tokyo's 2390 and 2400 to Dept)/3/ both problems appear negotiable although important differences still separate two sides. On question of fisheries cooperation loans we believe a Japanese offer of 60-70 million dollars over given period (perhaps 4-5 years) would meet ROK needs. /3/See footnote 2, Document 336. 2. Fisheries control issue is much more complicated. ROKG willing to accept de facto 12 mile limit but insists that Japanese fishing effort in key areas [garble] Peace Line and 12 mile limit be kept at or only moderately above current limits for a few years during which (with help GOJ fisheries loans) ROK fleet could be expanded and modernized. Absence of agreed historical catch data and of agreed standards for limiting Japanese fishing effort by number and types of vessels and duration of their operations are obstructing settlement. Also ROKG wishes to draw 12 mile limit in manner which GOJ considers would take in too much of open sea. 3. Koreans have indicated that there is flexibility in their position. FonMin has stated that government has fall-back positions on delineation of 12 mile zone and restricted areas, conceding to Japanese some of disputed areas around Cheju Island. FonOff sources have also implied willingness to consider modification of current proposals to limit number of Japanese craft within restricted area if GOJ would present statistical support for number of craft it claims are currently fishing within Peace Line. 4. In view complexity of fisheries problem, and all possible permutations which can enter into a compromise, I do not believe it possible for third party to formulate with precision detailed terms on which a settlement can be reached. Detached formal agreement can only be reached by two govts concerned on basis present negotiations. If we attempted to put forth a specific formula, even on one time basis, we would soon find ourselves caught in middle and involved in mediating technical questions. Therefore we cannot guarantee that single intervention on our part along lines reftel would be successful. 5. Our intervention, if attempted should be designed get negotiations going at a level which gives promise of success. This requires a decision on both sides to resolve fishery issues at a high political level. 6. I therefore propose that Amb Reischauer and I be instructed to approach respective govts and urge them to schedule an early meeting of such persons as can negotiate with full powers, whether at FonMinister or other levels. We should urge Koreans to move ahead regardless of internal political opposition, and urge Japanese to be as magnanimous as possible. 7. Our representation to GOJ might usefully urge: A. Commitment to $70 million in fishery cooperation loans. Our representation to ROKG should urge on them: A. Delineation of 12-mile limit in manner approximating
international practice. 8. I put above suggestions forward in conviction that USG should move forcibly to convince both govts of need to act now, and that normalization will not come about if both sides continue to haggle about details. Berger
338. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ Washington, February 29, 1964. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL JAPAN-KOR S. Confidential. Drafted by Fearey and approved in S on March 8. SUBJECT PARTICIPANTS Ryuji Takeuchi, Ambassador of Japan The Secretary The Secretary said that he had invited Ambassador Takeuchi in to express again our very great interest in a Japan-Korea normalization agreement. He had left his conversations with Prime Minister Ikeda and President Pak with the strong impression that both really wanted agreement and believed that recent developments were conducive to finalization of an agreement in time to permit ratification during the present Diet session. Both capitals might think we were pressing hard but the advantages of a settlement for all of us are so great that as agreement appeared in sight "one could almost taste it". The Secretary said that he would appreciate the Ambassador's passing on to Foreign Minister Ohira the importance we attach to conclusion of the agreement this spring if at all possible. Noting that he had made the same points to Ambassador Kim,/2/ the Secretary asked if Ambassador Takeuchi had any late information on the progress of the negotiations. /2/Rusk met with Kim on February 28; telegram 758 to Seoul, February 28, contains a summary of their conversation. (Ibid.) Ambassador Takeuchi said that he had received a cable the previous day responding to his request for such information. Claims were considered the main issue on the Korean side, and the GOJ felt strongly it had done its best. The next most important problem was fisheries. The GOJ is ready to negotiate but wants more progress at the working level on the technical problems involved before raising the matter to the political level as the Koreans appear to desire. Progress had appeared possible until about a month ago when the Korean side began to show itself unwilling to move ahead in the technical negotiations, and instead to push for a political settlement. The GOJ considered political-level discussions unsuitable now due to the highly technical nature of the problem, centering in three issues: 1. Twelve-mile Base Line--The ROKG is making unreasonable demands. Their proposed line would embrace areas which, if the GOJ were to agree, would set a bad precedent for Japanese fishing arrangements with other countries. 2. Number of Boats--The Koreans are proposing a very limited number based on arbitrary, totally unacceptable calculations. Both Governments agreed to respect present practices but the Korean proposal violates this understanding. The GOJ will not agree to any proposal which would result in a reduction of the present Japanese catch in the affected areas. 3. Fisheries' Cooperation--This issue is less troublesome, but the Koreans requested $178,000,000. Although the GOJ is unable to increase the previously agreed grant and long-term, low-interest loan figures, it is prepared to agree to normal commercial loans, provided the over- all fisheries issue is solved in a satisfactory way. Ambassador Takeuchi reiterated that the GOJ considers further negotiation at the expert level necessary. Political level discussions could not resolve the technical issues involved, at least until the outlines of an agreement have been reached. The Secretary asked whether it might be feasible to schedule both technical and political discussions in relation to each other, so each side could enter into the kind of discussions it wants. Ambassador Takeuchi replied that the GOJ fears that if political level discussions were entered into, the Koreans would be encouraged to neglect the working level negotiations. The GOJ is concerned by the Korean attitude of almost boycotting the technical negotiations and insisting instead on political negotiations. The GOJ, having gone far to meet Korean desires in a political settlement of the claims issue, considers sincere negotiations at the technical level essential on fisheries. Ambassador Takeuchi said that Japanese fishing interests are exerting strong pressures. They are afraid that the Foreign Office will compromise their interests. The Agriculture Minister had called on Mr. Ohira formally to call his attention to this aspect, making it difficult for the Foreign Office to show flexibility. Mr. Barnett said that it was our understanding from recent reports that all relevant fisheries considerations are now on the table, with little or no further "research" necessary. Technicians tend to become obsessed with technical aspects. The will to agree seems strong on both sides and the gap relatively manageable if dealt with concurrently at the technical and political levels as the Secretary had suggested. Ambassador Takeuchi said that there had been prospects of working level agreement but recently the atmosphere had changed, possibly due to internal difficulties on the Korean side. The Koreans are proposing that the exclusive Korean fisheries zone be extended far out into the open sea, almost to the Rhee line. The Secretary said that it had been his experience that when experts differed, the solution sometimes was for ministers to tell them to resume their discussions and come up with a solution. This was well illustrated by the experience of technicians and ministers in the GATT negotiations. Ambassador Takeuchi said that he believed Foreign Minister Ohira's role to be one of key importance, particularly with the Agriculture Minister subject to fishing industry pressures. Perhaps it would be a very good thing to meet at a higher level, but this was not the present position of his Government. The Secretary asked whether it might be useful to set a date now for a meeting at the Foreign Ministers level and to establish a preparatory committee to prepare for that meeting. Ambassador Takeuchi saw advantages to such a procedure but feared that if the preparatory committee failed to make progress and an abortive meeting of Foreign Ministers took place it could make a bad impression. The Secretary expressed appreciation for the information Ambassador Takeuchi had provided and asked him to convey to Foreign Minister Ohira the U.S. Government's hopes for an early Japan-ROK settlement.
339. Editorial Note In March and April 1964 Korean and Japanese Cabinet Ministers met to try to resolve the fisheries question and normalization of relations. Plans for talks were underway when the Embassy in Seoul reported that both sides were "apparently determined to make full effort achieve settlement," and the Korean Foreign Minister foresaw an agreement being reached by the middle of April. (Telegram 1118 from Seoul, March 5; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 7 KOR S) As negotiators wrestled with outstanding issues, student demonstrations erupted in Korea on March 24 to protest the impending settlement and the involvement of Assemblyman and Chairman of the Democratic Republican party Kim Chong-pil in the negotiations. (Telegram 1244 from Seoul, March 30; ibid., POL 23-8 KOR S) The Embassy reported the demonstrations "revealed widespread public fears of subsequent Japanese domination as well as misgivings about terms of settlement and dissatisfaction with way negotiations conducted." That situation coupled with strengthening political opposition led to speculation that the Pak government could be overthrown. (Telegram 1277 from Seoul, April 10; ibid., POL JAPAN-KOR S) The combination of circumstances brought negotiations to a standstill. Concomitantly, unabated, escalating student demonstrations against the settlement, government corruption, the belief that Kim Chong-pil would profit financially from an agreement with Japan, and similar issues strained Korean-Japanese relations and resulted in the imposition in Seoul of martial law on June 3. Seoul remained under martial law for 56 days; the order was revoked on July 28. Relevant documents are ibid., POL 2 KOR S; POL 7 KOR S; POL 15 KOR S; POL 33-4 JAPAN-KOR S; and in the Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Korea, Vol. I.
340. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson/1/ Washington, April 9, 1964. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Japan, Vol. I. Secret. The 86-year old Yoshida, our favorite Japanese Prime Minister back in the '50s, is a doughty, anti-Communist, pro-Westerner. However, he's a good deal more so than most Japanese including the present PM. So take whatever he says with a grain of salt. I'd urge you simply mention to both Yoshida and the Korean PM our great hope for a ROK/Jap settlement and the long-awaited normalization of relations between these two countries./2/ We have consistently said for the past two years that this was a matter of highest level US Government interest (it could be worth a billion dollars of Jap support for Korea). The negotiations are now at a crucial stage and a simple affirmation of our interest by you would help greatly to push them along. /2/Both Yoshida and Choi Doo Sun were among the foreign dignitaries attending the funeral of General Douglas MacArthur in Washington. The President met briefly with each on April 9. There won't be time for much other business. However, both Yoshida and Doo Sun Choi would like to hear that we remain as deter- mined as ever to hold the Asian flank against Communist China until such time as they can pick up a larger share of the burden. This kind of generalized reassurance would buck them up without tying our hands./3/ /3/When he met with Choi Doo Sun and Kim Chong-yul, President Johnson delivered both messages suggested by Komer. Expressing his "perfect agreement" with the President's statements, Choi confirmed his government's commitment to reach an agreement with Japan in the near future. (Memorandum of conversation, April 9; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL KOR S-US) The Johnson-Yoshida meeting consisted of an exchange of pleasantries and "a brief, light discussion of the Japanese and American political scene." (Memorandum of conversation, April 9; Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Japan, Vol. I) R.W. Komer/4/ /4/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
341. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Korea/1/ Washington, May 12, 1964, 7:54 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL JAPAN-KOR S. Confidential; Limdis. Drafted by Barnett, Fearey, Vettel, and Norred; cleared by Bacon, Green, and Poats; and approved by William Bundy. Also sent to Tokyo. 1029. 1. Department believes that in this crucial period of ROK-Japanese negotiations careful consideration should again be given to possibility of US initiative which might help to drive agreement over the top. Although Department has always been willing consider useful initiatives enhancing possibilities of agreement, conclusion to date has been that any sign of US "interference" would be counter-productive. It remains of utmost importance that terms of settlement be arrived at by two parties on their own responsibility. Care must be taken to avoid any appearance that Japan settled at behest of US, and on Korean side we should carefully avoid appearance of inducing ROKG to "knuckle under" to Japanese. 2. Serious obstacles to full and final agreement nevertheless lie on Korean side. Korean Opposition, recognizing ROKG's lack of popularity, has seized on ROK-Japan negotiations issue to try to bring Government down, playing in part upon suspicions that Kim Chong-p'il and others have, or hope to, profit personally from settlement. Underlying political maneuverings and emotional attitudes appear to be two widespread fears: 1) fear of Japanese domination, but little appreciation of economic benefits of normal relationship with Japan, and 2) fear that with normalization US would attempt shift burden of Korea to Japan and perhaps "abandon" Korea. Overcoming first problem requires education and experience on which only limited gains possible in short time. We wonder, however, if there is some action US might take at this time which might help significantly to dispel fears that we hope to unload Korea on Japan. New Cabinet's professed intention resume negotiations (Embtel 1453)/2/ may offer favorable opportunity for such action. /2/Telegram 1453 from Seoul, May 11, contained comments made by newly appointed Prime Minister Chong Il-kwon outlining the aims of the new Cabinet, including his statement that "ROK-Japan talks will be actively pursued." (Ibid., POL 15-1 KOR S) 3. One possible action for your consideration and comment with understanding that it has not been fully cleared in USG would be: Ambassador Berger would inform ROKG that USG would be prepared to announce upon successful conclusion of ROKG-GOJ negotiations that subject to parliamentary ratification of settlement USG will support an expanded Korean capital development program, specifically (1) Take initiative in seeking to form international aid consultative group for Korea to broaden, enlarge and coordinate capital assistance to Korea; (2) Establish a $100 million AID development lending program with goal of allocating funds for development projects and capital goods import programs over a two-year period, in consultation with other lenders; (3) Continue basic economic support of a sustained Korean financial stabilization policy through adequate provision of Supporting Assistance and PL 480. Development lending program assumes, of course, unprecedented Korean effort in development acceptable projects which US, Japan, International Agencies and other members of consultative group could help finance. Expansion of US development lending also assumes parallel expansion of availability additional local funds. Recognizing profound effects on stabilization effort and counterpart allocations of such an expanded inflow of capital, we need your assessment advantages and disadvantages such USG public commitment. 4. In suggesting to Koreans possibility of offer, we would hope that ROKG would see it as means to obtain needed additional popular support to help conclude ROK-Japan settlement, and to overcome current lack of confidence in government. We recognize of course danger that ROKG, instead of being encouraged by our offer to move to immediate settlement, might bargain for more favorable offer, or even worse, regard offer as substitute for Japan settlement. Fact is, however, utility of offer is dependent, as practical matter, upon establishment of new relationship with Japan and availability Japanese resources, especially as far as Korean trade expansion prospects concerned. We must be prepared therefore to say offer will not stand unless settlement reached. Embassy Tokyo meanwhile must appraise impact this type offer on Japan's motivations in settling affairs with Korea, and possible Japanese fears that we intend to "manage" their aid. 5. Request comment and suggestions from both addressee Embassies./3/ /3/In telegram 1521 from Seoul, May 21, Berger expressed doubt that the aid package would promote a settlement at this time. He noted that with or without a settlement the Koreans have been assured of U.S. aid, so the proposed package would not overcome the twin barriers of insufficient popular support and the precarious position of the government presently hindering achievement of a settlement. (Ibid., POL JAPAN-KOR S) In telegram 3393 from Tokyo, May 16, the Embassy expressed its belief that the Japanese would be receptive to the proposal and would have no major difficulties with coordinating assistance efforts. (Ibid., POL JAPAN-KOR S) Ball
342. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)/1/ Washington, May 19, 1964. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Korea, Vol. I. Secret. Mac Top priority in NE Asia today is ROK/Jap settlement. This could mean so much more in the way of long-term US dollar saving than a troop cut that there's no comparison. We're still spending over $300 million a year on 20 million ROKs, with no end really in sight. So we've got to find someone to share the long-term burden, and it's logically the Japs. Settlement would pump $.6 to 1 billion of public and private funds into ROK, with more later. But many of us fear that if talks (now on brink of success after 11 years) break down once more, Japs will lose interest. They don't need ROKs that much. Also, Jap Diet will adjourn soon. We badly need that extra push which might put us over the top. State/AID have a scheme for packaging $100 million in DL (which we'd spend anyway) to promise ROKs a bait if they'll sign with Japs (see attached)./2/ But this should be given oomph by sending a high-level salesman. It would even be worth it to send WPB/3/ (though doubtless too busy) or at least Bob Barnett to Seoul and Tokyo. Or how about cranking up Wilson Wyatt?/4/ /2/Another copy of this memorandum indicates that the attachment was telegram 1029 to Seoul, May 12 (Document 341). Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of Robert W. Komer, Japan-Korea, December 1963 to March 1966) /3/William P. Bundy. /4/Bundy added three handwritten notations at the bottom of this memorandum: "Anyone but WPB." "I'd agree to Bob or Wyatt." "Why not have Bob sell WPB." Wilson Wyatt was the Lieutenant Governor of Kentucky and had served as the President's Special Emissary to the Government of Indonesia in 1963 to represent the U.S. in negotiations on Indonesian oil. RWK
343. Telegram From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State/1/ Seoul, June 25, 1964, 7 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL JAPAN-KOR S. Confidential. Repeated to Tokyo and CINCPAC for POLAD. 1729. 1. Prime Minister Chong Il-kwon told me June 25 he is now actively considering possibility achieving "limited" normalization ROK-Japan relations in period immediately following LDP election assuming Ikeda again elected party president. Chong envisages exchange full diplomatic missions and simultaneous agreement on part of Japanese to liberalize imports from Korea./2/ Once normal diplomatic relations established under such arrangement full settlement pending issues could proceed in less controversial manner. /2/In response the Embassy in Tokyo reported that with regard to "limited" or "partial normalization" the Japanese Government "has always favored such a step and would welcome it now." The Japanese were also willing to accept a diplomatic mission, rather than a full-scale embassy, in Korea. The imports question was a problem because the Japanese were reluctant "to permit increased imports Korean marine products as long as Rhee Line issue unresolved and because of opposition from Diet members with ties to industries concerned." (Telegram 3987 from Tokyo, June 29; ibid.) 2. Chong expressed belief it would not be possible secure full settlement this year under present procedures. He was concerned that indefinite postponement normalization would lead to growth of two Koreas concept in Japan and greatly weaken ROK position. Therefore wanted to push ahead quickly to limited goal and hoped for US support. 3. Chong believes overt participation by US in such a limited settlement would ensure widest acceptance in Korea./3/ Opposition some time ago indicated willingness accept diplomatic exchange and trade expansion as short-term goal and US support would simplify govt's task. /3/The Embassy noted Japanese wariness of overt U.S. participation, which would have to be credibly justified to the Japanese people, advising "that generally speaking the less overt US involvement the better." (Ibid.) 4. Chong will discuss his proposal with President Pak and meet with us again on this question if latter approves. I cautioned Chong against possible press leaks. I told him we would consider role for US once proposal is clearly defined. 5. Comment: We agree with Prime Minister's judgment that it is difficult conceive of early progress on overall normalization and favor further exploration concept of limited normalization timed for late summer. At this stage we would welcome Dept and Embassy Tokyo views. Are we prepared to indicate our support through direct action, e.g, high level US visit to Tokyo or Seoul to help achieve early limited agreement? What would be Japanese reaction to such proposal and to overt US involvement? Berger
344. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Bundy)/1/ Washington, July 22, 1964. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Korea, Vol. II. Confidential. Here's a strong plug for Marshall Green's idea that we shoot for a limited ROK/Jap normalization, so long as prospects for early agreement on the full package seem limited. I still wonder why the ROKs would settle for so much less, but if Marshall, Embassy Seoul, and Chong Il-kwon are all interested why not try. Marshall mentioned separately to me his idea that as part of the exercise the US would depart from its backstage role to make strong direct approaches, especially to the ROKs. I note that Chong Il-kwon also wants the US to associate itself publicly with the enterprise. To me, the potential gain is well worth the risk. Wouldn't Win Brown's arrival be a good time to spring this one?/2/ We could even arm him with some words from the President; we could use a few foreign policy pluses before November, and ROK/Jap normalization might just be made into one. /2/Winthrop Brown was appointed Ambassador to the Republic of Korea on July 31. R.W. Komer/3/ /3/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
345. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson/1/ Washington, July 31, 1964. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Korea, Vol. II. Secret. Purpose of seeing Winthrop Brown, our new Ambassador to Korea, is so you can tell him personally why you want movement on our Korean policy, especially a Korean/Japanese settlement. Five minutes should suffice./2/ /2/The President, Komer, and Brown met at the White House on July 31 from 6:18 to 6:22 p.m. In reply to President Johnson's inquiry about "prospects for political stability in Korea and for an early settlement with Japan," Brown briefly informed the President of the current situation. The President told Brown "that he regarded an early settlement between Korea and Japan as a matter of top priority." (Memorandum of conversation, August 10; ibid.) We've poured into South Korea more than $6.6 billion in aid ($3.8 billion economic, $2.8 billion military) since World War II. Despite all our aid, this nation is still an unstable U.S. stepchild. Part of the problem is the absence of leadership after years of Japanese occupation, but part stems from bad planning and neglect by the U.S. Brown is a top man (he did a great job as our man in Laos 1960-62); he'll follow through on what you tell him. Suggested talking points are: 1. You are concerned over the long and frustrating record of U.S. involvement in Korea--with so little to show for it. We simply can't keep paying with so few results (we're planning $350-400 million in aid for FY 1965). 2. So you give top priority to the long-delayed Korea-Japan settlement. Let's get Japan to start sharing the burden. Aside from $600 million in Jap aid which a settlement would bring, we want to redevelop the natural economic ties between Korea and Japan. Brown should tell Reischauer in Tokyo your views when he goes through en route. 3. You'll put personal weight behind getting a settlement in any way necessary. 4. To start off, Rusk suggests attached oral message/3/ for Brown to deliver to President Park. We have word that Park has told his new foreign minister to give priority to a settlement, so these words will come at a good time. /3/Transmitted by a July 28 memorandum to President Johnson from Rusk asking the President to approve the message and pointing out that it "would be a good means of pressing the Koreans to go ahead" and could be used by Brown in "conversations with Korean Opposition leaders and with Japanese Government officials." (Ibid., Komer Files, Japan-Korea) The President approved the message, Brown discussed the issue with leaders of several Korean political parties between September 10 and 18. Memoranda of those conversations are attached to airgram A-170 from Seoul, September 22. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 12 KOR S) 5. You are personally inclined to cut our 50,000 U.S. troops in Korea; our needs are more in Southeast Asia. Defense of Korea is vital; but can't we do it with fewer men? Such big ROK armed forces (550,000) are also a terrible drag on the economy of such a poor country. You've held off on these cuts because they might give the wrong signal to the Chicoms just now, but Brown should keep a close eye on when it might be feasible. R.W. Komer
Attachment/4/ Proposed Oral Message From the President /4/Confidential. President Johnson asked me to give you his warm personal regards. He also asked me to speak to you for him about the negotiations for normal relations between Korea and Japan, which he discussed with you last November./5/ He hopes that you will move forward shortly to establish normal relations and reach a settlement with Japan. It is not healthy for Korea to continue long to be so exclusively dependent upon a single outside friend as it is at present. Korea needs greater trade and a wider circle of strong supporters from abroad. A settlement would be of great benefit to Korea, both economically and politically, and would have good effects for Korea far beyond the direct arrangements established between Korea and Japan. It would also benefit the Free World position in the Far East. /5/A memorandum of this November 25, 1963, conversation is printed in Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, vol. XXII, Document 318. The President hopes that delays will not continue, fearing that Korea's diplomatic and economic prospects and the Free World position in Asia will deteriorate unless this normalization is soon achieved. The United States Government is prepared publicly to support such a settlement, and to make clear that it will not affect the basic United States policies of economic assistance to Korea. In fact, such a settlement would make United States assistance more fruitful, for it would be working in a stronger and more broadly based economy. It is because the President holds these views strongly that he authorized me to stress United States support of a Korea-Japan rapprochement in my public statement on arrival.
346. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)/1/ Washington, August 3, 1964. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Korea, Vol. II. Secret. Mac-- I think I've got rolling another effort at ROK/Jap settlement, utilizing arrival of new ambassador and LBJ's willingness to weigh in personally. Regrettably, LBJ/Brown encounter Friday night/2/ was quite hurried (Dirksen was waiting). Also LBJ clearly hadn't digested his brief; in fact, I had to rescue it from his desk so I could get his approval of Rusk memo proposing oral message to Pak./3/ /2/See footnote 2, Document 345. /3/See footnote 3, Document 345. So I can't throw much light on your earlier comment that you didn't know how much LBJ is signed on to: (a) troop cuts; (b) ROK/Jap exercise. However, he did say we seemed to have a lot of troops there, and when Brown explained our ROK/Jap scenario he warmly endorsed, said he regarded settlement as "top priority" (thank God), and told Win "I'll pray for you." At any rate, we now have State brought around to point where it agrees US should take a direct hand in pushing settlement through. We've got LBJ saying so orally to Pak through Brown, and we've got Brown ginned up and willing to fire up Reischauer. Attached gives the play;/4/ I'll keep the fires lit./5/ /4/Another copy of this document indicates that telegrams 97 and 99 to Seoul were attached. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Komer Files, Japan-Korea) Telegram 97 to Seoul, August 2, also sent to Tokyo as telegram 331, outlined actions to be taken by Brown in Seoul as well as in Tokyo in order to restart negotiations and help both sides accept interim agreements on several issues to facilitate reaching a general agreement. Telegram 99, August 2, forwarded the text of the oral message Brown was to give to Pak. (Both in National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL JAPAN-KOR S) /5/Bundy wrote "Good. MGB" at the bottom of this memorandum. RWK [Continue with the next documents]
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