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FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1964-1968, Volume XXIX Korea
Department of State |
Korea 347. Telegram From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State/1/ Seoul, August 19, 1964, 6 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL JAPAN-KOR S. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to Tokyo and CINCPAC for POLAD. 163. Ref: A. Embtel 155, rptd Tokyo 51, CINCPAC unn. B. Embtel 158, rptd Tokyo 53, CINCPAC unn./2/ /2/Telegram 155 from Seoul, August 18, reported on Brown's August 17 meeting with the Korean Foreign Minister, Prime Minister, and Deputy Prime Minister. (Ibid.) Telegram 158 from Seoul, August 18, detailed topics discussed between Brown and Pak when they met on August 18. (Ibid., POL 1 KOR S-US) 1. It is clear from conversations with key figures reported reftels that differences of view exist within ROKG on how to best achieve objective Korea-Japan normalization. Foreign Minister wishes to program strategy for gaining full normalization, while Prime Minister proposes more modest goal of partial normalization. President Pak takes somewhat middle ground in that he supports attempt achieve full normalization but is prepared reconsider and accept something less if circumstances so dictate. 2. I believe President's position realistic and practical in that failure achieve full normalization will not preclude shifting objective to lesser goal if that becomes necessary. I do not, however, believe we should abandon preference for full normalization without full test of possibility./3/ /3/Reischauer agreed with this approach as well as with recommendations A, B, and D contained in paragraph 4. (Telegram 641 from Tokyo, August 20; ibid., POL JAPAN-KOR S) 3. President, Prime Minister and Foreign Minister appear convinced ROKG cannot simply reach agreement with Japan, then force its acceptance by use govt majority in Assembly and without "prudent regard" (Pak's expression) to public opinion. I agree and believe that we should gauge our actions and support with this in mind. 4. I recommend we pursue following courses of action at this time: A. Embassy Tokyo explore possibility early Yoshida good will visit to Seoul. We believe such visit would give substantial boost to govt efforts improve public attitudes and make easier resumption full scale negotiations. If Japanese response favorable we would arrange ROKG invitation. We can accept President Pak's and Yi Tong-won's assurance Yoshida would be received with respect. B. We should proceed with plans from DAC coordinating group. We will discuss subject intensively with ROKG in next few days and believe we can obtain ROKG agreement make formal request. Public disclosure these efforts should await further consideration as to best timing in relation to resumption of negotiations when domestic political reactions may again present problem to ROKG. C. We should discuss with Japanese and Koreans feasibility and utility arranging meeting of US, Japanese and Korean leaders to promote resumption negotiations. We should make clear US not taking on role of mediator, arbitrator or co-negotiator. I have in mind possible meeting in September between Under Secretary Ball, Shiina and high ROKG figure (Yi Tong-won or someone else). Alternatively we could think in terms similar meeting at time Asst. Secretary Bundy will be in area. Whether meeting should be in Tokyo or Seoul needs to be determined. Koreans would prefer Seoul, but if Yoshida visit precedes, they may more readily accept Tokyo meeting./4/ /4/Reischauer expressed "grave doubts" about a tripartite meeting, because its value in Korea depended on public knowledge of the simultaneous visit by high-ranking U.S. and Japanese officials. He indicated that such a meeting, although assisting Korea, would have "seriously adverse effects in Japan." In Reischauer's view it could not occur without "creating impression US 'intervening' directly in negotiations, which we still feel is most unwise" and would give the Japanese leftists an issue to exploit, thus significantly hindering the Japanese Government from making "conciliatory moves toward Koreans and complicating problem of ratification." Reischauer was not opposed to a visit by a U.S. official, as long as it did not coincide with the Shiina visit. (Ibid.) D. ROKG should be encouraged activate early campaign secure maximum public, press and opposition acceptance need for normalization on realistic terms. We can help discreetly with key opposition figures, especially if govt makes serious attempt to bring opposition along, e.g. by including leading opposition or non-partisan [garble] ROK del when negotiations resumed. 5. Above recommendations are not meant to imply substantially greater US role in resolving specific differences between Korea and Japan, but rather to improve atmosphere for resumption negotiations. I recognize that they may be construed as direct involvement, and that efforts will be made to draw us into such a role. On balance I believe we should take such risk. Past efforts in which we careful to remain in background have not ended in success, through no fault of ours. If we are to make new effort now, we should be prepared to extend ourselves and our involvement within carefully predetermined limits. Brown
348. Letter From the Ambassador to Japan (Reischauer) to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)/1/ Tokyo, August 21, 1964. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Korea, Vol. II. Secret. A copy was sent to Brown in Seoul. Dear Mac: In reply to your note of August 13,/2/ let me say that the message on Korean normalization brought by Win Brown from the White House got through to us loud and clear. /2/In his letter to Reischauer Bundy underscored the importance President Johnson placed on realizing a settlement and normalization of relations between Japan and Korea and the central role to be played by each Embassy in achieving those objectives. (Ibid.) Actually this problem has always stood at the top of my list of priorities. During a visit to Korea in the autumn of 1960, I became convinced that, without the economic boost that Korean-Japanese normalization would bring to Korea, we would never be able to build a solid economic foundation on which a viable political regime could develop there. I promised certain Korean leaders that I would try to convince people in Washington of this when I got back. I was in Washington for this purpose in January 1961 when the Department asked me to take my present job. So you see I have appreciated the vital importance of this problem for a long time. A major difficulty is that, to get normalization over the very great hurdles of party conflict and public opposition in Korea, we will probably have to push more openly for it in Korea than we have in the past, but any seeming intervention on our part makes the problem more difficult in Japan. This situation requires a careful balancing act between needs in Korea and risks in Japan. However, we do have a considerable margin of safety on the issue here, so I believe it may be possible to put on the needed pressure in Korea without building up unacceptable reactions here. Still it remains a delicate political operation to determine just what is the maximum degree of pressure we can safely exert. The present exchange of telegrams (see our 641, for example)/3/ is directed toward this end. /3/See footnotes 3 and 4, Document 347. In any case, please rest assured that we here in Tokyo regard the whole normalization problem as being of the greatest importance and are prepared to do everything we can and run considerable risks to get it satisfactorily solved. Cordially, Ed
349. Telegram From the Embassy in Japan to the Department of State/1/ Tokyo, September 8, 1964, 9 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL JAPAN-KOR S. Confidential. Repeated to Seoul and CINCPAC for POLAD. 869. Ref: Deptel 672 sent Seoul 208 info CINCPAC unn./2/ /2/In telegram 672 to Tokyo, September 4, the Department of State requested recommendations for improving relations between Korea and Japan. The Embassy in Seoul detailed its recommendations in telegrams 250 and 251, September 17, and the Embassy in Tokyo submitted the Japanese response to Seoul's analysis in airgram A-526, October 20. (All ibid.) 1. Japanese are ready to continue negotiations with Koreans at any time Koreans feel able to negotiate. Japanese could continue from where negotiations ended last April because of internal Korean political problems, but are more skeptical than ever of Korean ability to make agreement and obtain domestic Korean support for it. While Japanese are probably ready to make certain limited steps and gestures for the sake of improving atmosphere, they feel that these will have little appreciable effect until ROKG determined to make settlement and judges it can politically survive attempt. This they feel is and always has been the basic problem. Conciliatory steps and gestures made at a time when there is no hope for normalization, they feel, uses up ammunition that might better be used at more propitious time. 2. After years of urging on our part, GOJ made firm decision in 1962 to push ahead toward Korean settlement as necessary in Japan's own interests. The then FonMin Ohira told Ambassador of this determination, and urged us not to push GOJ but let Japanese do it in their own way and at their own pace. He argued that US pressure ran danger of being counterproductive in Japan, and that GOJ fully determined to see matter through. Although in August 1962 Ohira had said $70 million in claims was maximum figure (with Finance Ministry proposing $10 million) (Embtel 295, Aug 1, 1962),/3/ by December Ohira had delivered on his commitment in Kim-Ohira agreement by raising figure to $500 million (grant plus easy loans). GOJ considered this major Japanese concession. It was expected at time that this would soon be followed by fishery settlement, which would be major Korean concession since it was generally understood that worldwide fishing position gave Japanese only limited room for concessions here. Ikeda and Ohira skillfully worked on Japanese public until there was general acceptance of normalization concept even though it had originally been very unpopular with Japanese public and opposition still promised an allout fight to block it. Meanwhile, however, Koreans did not come through on fishery settlement and demanded an additional financial settlement tied to it and various other sweeteners. On whole GOJ has been forebearing and has agreed to additional fisheries financial aid and to various other gestures not contemplated in original deal. GOJ, however, has noted that this forebearance and occasional additional concessions, while helpful no doubt to atmosphere of negotiations, have not overcome basic problem of ROKG's unwillingness to risk settlement. Hence GOJ's skepticism regarding further concessions is not surprising. /3/Not printed. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Decimal File 694.95B/8-162) 3. We intend to keep urging GOJ to be as tolerant and magnanimous as possible. Further import relaxations and extension of more credits on better terms would be desirable both to help improve atmosphere and to increase economic relationship during interim period before normalization. Increase in training programs for Koreans in Japan might also be helpful but only over longer period. In return, expansion and regularization of Japanese representation in Seoul and ending of boat seizures/4/ would be helpful here and would encourage GOJ to make larger concessions. Clear Japanese apology for their colonial oppression of Korea in past would, of course, make major contribution to improved Korean attitude toward Japan, but after many years of urging Japanese in and out of Government to do this, Ambassador has concluded that maximum Japanese statement, if obtainable, might do more harm than good. Japanese officials and public simply do not feel they owe any apology to Korea. Goodwill visit by figure like Yoshida, while running some risk because of Yoshida's unpredictability, would probably be useful, since it could be interpreted by Koreans as meaning a great deal more than Japanese intended. However, GOJ obviously feels that this is not time for major gestures like Yoshida visit or substantial relaxation of restrictions on imports and that these should be reserved for a time when such major gestures had more hope of getting negotiations over final hump. We also conclude from Emb Seoul's recent telegrams that such gestures would probably not be helpful in overcoming the main hurdle to normalization, which is unwillingness of ROKG to risk settlement. /4/The Koreans regularly seized Japanese fishing vessels alleged to have breached the so-called Peace Line or to have violated Korea's 12-mile territorial-waters boundary. The Japanese recognized a 3-mile limit on territorial waters. (Telegram 899 from Tokyo, September 10; ibid., Central Files 1964-66, POL JAPAN-KOR S) In a discussion of the issue with Brown, Pak explained that the Japanese were at this point sending more boats and penetrating deeper into Korean waters than earlier, thus the incidents were likely to continue until an agreement resolved the dispute. (Airgram A-163 from Seoul, September 17; ibid., POL 1 JAPAN-KOR S) 4. As we see situation, primary need is to find means 1) to persuade Koreans that normalization is absolutely necessary for Korea and 2) convince leaders they can carry it out without committing political suicide. Are there arguments, guarantees, promises or gestures that we can make to convince the government and people of the first proposition and the government of the latter? When we see our way to clearing the major hurdle of ROKG unwillingness to ROK [reach] a settlement, then would be the effective time to pull out all the stops as described in para 3 to improve the atmosphere. 5. One point that we should think about ourselves and possibly use with the Koreans is that time may be running out on them in terms of Japanese attitudes. While Japanese political situation now stable and Japanese public willing to accept normalization with Korea on terms Kim-Ohira settlement, this situation could change for the worse. So far Japanese have accepted with some bitterness this public condemnation Korean refusal to permit establishment Japanese mission in Seoul similar to Korean mission in Tokyo as Koreans had promised at signing of peace treaty, Korean refusal to reciprocate Japanese gestures, and statements by Korean leaders that Japan not sincere in negotiating with Koreans. However, over the years Japanese sense of nationalism has been growing. The time may not be too far distant when this nationalism may rise to point where further seizures of Japanese fishing vessels would raise public storm requiring GOJ protect its boats by force. It should also be noted that both signers of the financial agreement (Ohira and Kim Chong p'il) are now no longer in their administrations. While we believe Ikeda will continue to honor Kim-Ohira agreement, we cannot predict what position of a new primin would be. On whole Japanese public opinion is likely to become less rather than more conciliatory toward Korea and demand may arise even for renegotiation of financial settlement. 6. One important factor in persuading ROKG to go ahead with settlement might be high level US visit to Korea or other intervention. In this connection we should remember that an important factor in GOJ success in winning Japanese public acquiescence in Korean settlement has been argument that this is being done by Japan in its own interest. US intervention in settlement would lend credence to opposition charges that settlement made at behest of US and is first step in Japanese adherence to SEATO, thereby making position of GOJ much more difficult. We therefore should be careful to see that any US intervention should not be in terms of mediation between Japan and Korea. Such visit, confined to Korea, would be to convince the Korean Government, political opposition and public of desirability of an agreement with Japan and to assure the Koreans that after this agreement the US will not leave them to the mercies of the Japanese. Reischauer
350. Letter From the Ambassador to Korea (Brown) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Bundy)/1/ Seoul, October, 23, 1964. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL JAPAN-KOR S. Confidential; Official-Informal. The letter indicates that Bundy saw it. A copy was sent to Reischauer. Dear Bill: This is the first letter in the bi-weekly series which you asked us to provide covering developments related to ROK-Japan normalization. As you suggested I will seek to record nuances in the Korean atmosphere which may not be apparent from cable reports. The Korean Government, and more particularly Foreign Minister Yi Tong-won, remain determined to resume negotiations as soon as possible. Yi has made clear his time-table. He hopes the Shiina visit to Seoul will occur in November and be followed immediately by a resumption of negotiations in Tokyo. He is also prepared to stop in Tokyo in December on his way back from Germany, to lend his own voice to resolving differences. Certain authoritative voices now speak of a settlement agreement being signed next spring. The new ROK Ambassador to Tokyo, Kim Tong-cho, will be working to this schedule. He arrived in Tokyo on October 20 carrying a letter of invitation to Shiina. Kim has told me that he intends to re-open negotiations with the Japanese at the point where they were broken off last spring. This appears reassuring because it implies that no attempt will be made to re-open those aspects of the financial settlement already agreed in the Kim-Ohira memorandum. It also would appear to recognize the need to conduct the fisheries negotiations with due regard to what has already been accomplished. That means negotiations on base lines, restricted zones, and economic cooperation in much the same manner as appeared acceptable to the Japanese earlier. On the other hand, I am not inclined to accept Kim's statement completely at face value. There are indications that the Koreans will seek to gain maximum concessions from Japan in connection with remaining differences and there may be some retreat from previous positions. Moreover, there continues to be pressure for re-opening the Kim-Ohira agreement, most strongly from the opposition but also to a certain extent from people in the government party. The fisheries-Peace Line problem remains critical. Excitement over Japanese fishing inside the Peace Line has died down but could flare up at any moment. We have been urging moderation and I believe with some success. At the moment the ROKG seems to be restricting itself to chasing Japanese fishing boats instead of capturing them. The move to arrange a Shiina visit will further this moderation as the Koreans know that seizures will make it hard for Shiina to come to Korea. Our efforts to bring about a greater degree of economic exchange between Korea and Japan have borne fruit slowly. The extended argument over the $20 million loan is nearing an end. The Koreans are just about to accept the loan, although after considerable haggling. Similarly, protracted discussions over the terms of commercial credits for the PVC and cement plants may be reaching an end. The bickering that went on has detracted from what otherwise could have been useful contributions to Korean realization of the economic benefits of normalization. Efforts at expansion of Korean exports to Japan before normalization continue to yield results and are worth pursuing but not much significance has been attached to them thus far by either side, even though Korean's trade deficit with Japan this year is likely to be substantially smaller than in 1963. The change in Soviet leadership, the British election results, and even more importantly the Chinese Communist nuclear explosion, have all had an interesting and probably significant effect on Korean attitudes in respect to normalization or relations with Japan. These events have caused Koreans to ponder the need for closer relations with Japan in a changing world, and to realize that isolation is not in their interest. The Foreign Minister has told me he intends to take advantage of this fortuitous development. To some extent the press is already reflecting the idea and calling for pursuit of national interest in the broadest possible terms. The government has used the occasion to repeat its plea for a non-partisan approach to foreign policy, especially in relation to Japan. Although non-partisanship sounds sensible and we expect some effort in this direction, I do not see enough signs of that "sincerity" of which Koreans frequently speak. The Foreign Minister looks at non-partisanship more as a gambit than a serious course of action. The more adamant individuals on the opposition side may give lip-service to the concept but deny the principle in practice. Nevertheless, I believe efforts to create a "national" rather than a "partisan" attitude are likely to continue. All of the elements involved in achieving a settlement will be coming into play over the next few months. Diplomacy will seek to express itself in negotiation, public support will be solicited, and political maneuvering will take place. President Pak and the Foreign Minister have sufficient determination to lead to a serious effort. The government's internal educational campaign is still in low gear but the Foreign Minister claims it will gather speed once a Shiina visit is in the offing and the resumption of negotiations approaches. Over the past two weeks the government has been publicly insisting on its intention to go ahead with negotiations. Perhaps this has been a way of testing the water. So far the reaction has not been adverse. Moreover, through a series of meetings within the government and between the government and the Democratic-Republican Party preparations for resumption of negotiations have been stepped up. There is also talk of meeting with the opposition. Good press coverage of these activities has added to the air of seriousness surrounding the government's efforts to get on with negotiations with Japan. Many uncertainties remain and I do not wish to exhibit unwarranted confidence. But I do believe that there has been a measure of improvement in the atmosphere. We have at least reached the stage where the government feels that the resumption of negotiations in itself is not likely to cause a sharp reaction in Korea. We therefore approach the next crucial round in the settlement process with just a bit more hopefulness than we had a month or two ago. Sincerely, Win
351. Letter From the Ambassador to Japan (Reischauer) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Bundy)/1/ Tokyo, October 28, 1964. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL JAPAN-KOR S. Confidential; Official-Informal. A copy was sent to Ambassador Brown. Dear Bill: Recent developments in the negotiations between Japan and Korea seem to have been marked by a more positive approach by the Korean side and by a "Missouri-like show me" attitude on the Japanese side, which has been complicated by the uncertainties attending the resignation of Prime Minister Ikeda. The new Korean Ambassador has given the impression that the Koreans are now prepared not only to start negotiations but to bring them to a successful conclusion in the near future. To this end, he said he would settle the outstanding problems concerning the $20 million loan and the loans for the cement and the PVC plants and that he is ready to proceed with similar speed and determination to settle the other issues between Japan and Korea. On the Japanese side, there appears to be something of the feeling that they are now hearing again the old record which they have heard many times over the past ten or twelve years. Asian Bureau Director Ushiroku has taken pains to point out to us that there are many problems which remain to be solved and that each of these many problems will require difficult negotiation. An important reason for this Japanese feeling is their inability to predict with much assurance that an agreement arrived at in Tokyo will be supported by enough political opinion in Korea to permit the Korean government to remain in power. For that reason, there is a fear that any concessions the Japanese may make at the bargaining table now will be ineffective in producing normal relations with Korea; thus, further Japanese concessions might become necessary in the new negotiations which would later be required. There is also a fear that the Koreans will use the weakness of their government to extract further concessions from Japan; the Japanese expect the Koreans will argue that unless Japan makes concessions, the Korean government may fall and normalization will not be achieved. There is also some fear that the United States will use these same arguments to pressure the Japanese into meeting the Korean demands. There was something of this in the reaction of the Foreign Minister to the recent visits by Bob Barnett and yourself. The Japanese press continues to regard normalization with Korea as a natural development. It has reported and condemned recent seizures of Japanese ships but there has been no call by the responsible press for refusing to carry on the normalization negotiations. The press has generally followed the guidance of the Foreign Minister, welcoming the new Ambassador but playing down the possibilities of an early settlement. The resignation of Prime Minister Ikeda and the political negotiations attendant upon the selection of a new Prime Minister will make it difficult, if not impossible, for Foreign Minister Shiina to visit Korea in the immediate future. However, as soon as the new Administration is installed, the Japanese should be able to proceed with negotiations. Japanese policy and positions are already well established and the Japanese negotiators can start their work without further guidance. Normalization with Korea has been established LDP policy for many years and we doubt that any new government will alter this policy substantially. Sincerely, Ed
352. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Korea/1/ Washington, November 11, 1964, 12:34 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL JAPAN-KOR S. Secret. Drafted by Komer and Barnett; cleared by Fearey, Stoneman (AID), and in substance by Blouin (OASD/ISA); and approved by Barnett. Also sent to Tokyo. 407. The Administration attaches high priority to early ROK/Japan settlement and is actively considering whether or not the U.S. should take more positive role, even extending to mediation, in achieving one. Moreover, Japan's growing interest in normalization of relations with Chicoms increases pressure on us to get ROK/Japan settlement first. Following paras intended to elicit from you contributions to current USG exploration of possible initiatives. We are prepared consider seriously pressures, if likely to be productive, both on Seoul where we have direct leverage and on Tokyo where we can appeal to Japan's great capabilities and the responsibilities which should go with them. 1. One possible move would be to tell the ROKG quietly that we are supporting ROK forces for use against Communists and not as means for pursuing controversy with another U.S. ally--at very time when U.S. and ROK should both be trying to engage this other ally in providing support to ROK development. Future MAP appropriations for Korea, already under severe Congressional examination, could be affected by Korea's use of its security and defense equipment in ways to inflame relations with Japan. 2. Another possibility is to hinge a substantial portion of further DL to an ROK/Japan settlement in some credible manner. We could say to ROKs that U.S. development aid not really effective until it can be augmented by complementing aid from other countries, particularly Japan. It is up to ROKs themselves to prove to us development intentions serious by gaining access to Japanese aid. ROKs would be far wiser to normalize now, when major U.S. presence still available as counterweight to any Japanese ambitions, than to risk loss of U.S. interest which would leave ROK eventually much more dependent on Japanese. 3. General feeling here is that we must achieve normalization of ROK/Japan relations before prospective normalization of Japan/Chicom relations introduces major new uncertainty. Would there be any mileage in delicately intimating to GOJ that U.S., which is in effect carrying whole burden of support of Korean buffer-zone for Japan, would find it most difficult to be confronted with steps toward normalization of relations with Chicoms prior to normalization with ROK? This would simply not be understood by U.S. Govt and public, which would see Japan as failing to live up to its strategic responsibilities in Northeast Asia. We would naturally wish avoid implying to Japanese that, once ROK/Japan settlement achieved, we would have no further objection to any Japanese moves toward Peiping. However, we estimate that some such moves are in the offing anyway, and that inserting ROK/Japan settlement as condition precedent might actually serve to delay rather than accelerate them. Similarly, would it be useful to impress on ROKs wisdom of normalization relations with Japan before Japan moves closer to Communist China (and by inference to North Korea)? Above are at present merely ideas on which we invite Embassy comments./2/ We would also be grateful for Embassy suggestions as to other ways in which ROK/Japan settlement could be brought closer. /2/In their replies Brown and Reischauer agreed that the climate for reaching a settlement was currently positive, but that the United States must continue to exert its influence effectively so that negotiations could be brought to a successful conclusion. Brown believed "new initiatives and possibly harsher intervention" were not yet required, whereas Reischauer advocated exerting pressure on Japan through strong and unequivocal U.S. support for Korea, especially in light of potential domestic and political turmoil in Korea that could accompany normalization with Japan. (Telegram 461 from Seoul, November 16, and telegram 1761 from Tokyo, November 17; both ibid.) Rusk
353. Telegram From the Embassy in Japan to the Department of State/1/ Tokyo, November 21, 1964, 0357Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 7 JAPAN. Confidential. Repeated to Seoul and CINCPAC for POLAD. 1802. 1. FonMin Shiina invited me to private breakfast today for general exchange of views before he plunges into current extraordinary Diet session and then leaves for UN week from today. To my inquiry what subjects he hoped discuss with Secy on Dec 3 he replied Korean-Japanese normalization biggest problem and next to it long-range planning on China problem./2/ /2/On December 3 Rusk met with Shiina, Takeuchi, and Matsui over lunch in New York. They discussed several matters, but did not review the Korea-Japan problem. (Telegram Secto 17 from New York, December 3; ibid., POL JAPAN-US) Rusk and Shiina met again on December 5 and briefly discussed Japan-Korea normalization, among other topics. Shiina told Rusk that conditions in Korea and Japan "had improved considerably and were now conducive to a successful conclusion of negotiations" between two countries. He expected a settlement could be reached in 1965. Rusk offered U.S. assistance to achieve that objective. (Ibid., Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330, December 1964) 2. On Korea he felt present was best opportunity to settle problem and showed strong determination to push ahead toward early normalization. He agreed with me that unless settlement achieved soon it might become progressively more difficult and also agreed that this was time for Japan to show maximum magnanimity. He said, however, that in talking with Koreans he had found unexpected difficulties. Deep fears of Japanese economic domination sometimes made magnanimous gestures suspect in Korean eyes, and since many Koreans are more interested in profit to themselves or their groups than in benefit to Korea, Japanese economic concessions became embroiled in domestic Korean politics (as they also sometimes did in Japanese politics for analogous reasons). Hence even acts of generosity required greatest caution or they might worsen rather than help situation. On Japanese side, fishing interests of west Japan were thoroughly aroused over threats to their traditional livelihood and created difficult political situation here. 3. I pointed out that most helpful act of magnanimity toward Korea would be some sort of apology to Koreans for colonial past. Shiina replied that any attempt along these lines would probably either arouse strong adverse reaction in Japan or else prove worse than unsatisfactory to Koreans. His private secretary who was also there interposed that proposed Shiina visit to Korea came as close to expression of apology as was feasible. I agreed that apology would be extremely delicate operation, but wondered if some forward-looking statement about turning backs on past unhappy history and moving to new period of friendly cooperation might not help assuage Korean feelings without irritating Japanese public. It might be tied to fact that 1965 is under same sign of sixty year cycle as 1905 when Japanese protectorate established and therefore in East Asian thinking is time for a new departure. (Point was made to me by Amb Kim who says Koreans refer to establishment of Japanese protectorate by cyclical name of year, thus emphasizing relationship of 1965 and 1905.) Shiina seemed unconvinced./3/ /3/In telegram 1817, November 24, Reischauer suggested that, when he met with Shiina, Rusk could emphasize the difficulties Korea had to overcome to achieve normalization and suggest that Japan "assist ROK by taking attitude of unusual and unprecedented magnanimity toward ROK during negotiations." Rusk could also mention that any Japanese sacrifices "should be viewed as investment in defense of Asian stability and freedom (Sato phrase) and will be more than repaid in future." Reischauer further suggested that Rusk discuss U.S. efforts in Korea to foster a settlement as well as the possibility of the U.S. playing a more direct role in bringing the two sides together. (Ibid., Central Files 1964-66, POL JAPAN-US) [Here follows a discussion of China.] Reischauer
354. Telegram From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State/1/ Seoul, November 23, 1964, 0225Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 7 KOR S. Secret; Limdis. 487. Ref: Deptel 429./2/ /2/Telegram 429 to Seoul, November 18, requested the Embassy's views on a visit by Pak to the United States and recommendations on the timing of such a visit. (Ibid.) 1. I believe visit by President Pak to US would be useful generally in respect overall US-ROK relations and more specifically in connection ROK-Japan normalization. Over past few weeks we have been reminded by Prime Minister, Foreign Minister and Presidential Secretary, Yi Hu-rak of Pak's desire make official visit. Yi Hu-rak said President definitely desires visit in spring but I have not discussed question with President. 2. Timing of visit should be related to progress ROK-Japan normalization. If settlement with Japan reached before March, Pak visit in March or April could help gain public acceptance normalization and give Pak extra boost in overcoming this difficult problem. If settlement not reached by then because of continuing popular opposition at home, Pak visit could be used to improve prospects early normalization. We will be better able to judge these possibilities after negotiations have been resumed. Whenever it occurs visit would be construed in Korea as US support for Pak and his policies. 3. Timing also related to usually unsettled political climate characteristic of springtime in recent years. With ROK-Japan normalization as focal point, and continuing political animosity to govt on part some opposition party elements, coming spring quite likely to be time of internal tension. Other factors at work include: emerging unification question, economic stresses, student activism, and possible return Kim Chong-pil. Strengthening Pak's position at such time would probably be desirable in interest overall stability and continuity orderly political developments of constitutional government. 4. Foreign Minister at one point suggested that because of expected tensions in spring he believes Pak should remain in Korea at that time and visit US later in year. Yi Hu-rak, on other hand, has remarked that visit in spring would distract public attention from other difficulties facing govt and would increase ability govt overcome opposition to its policies and quiet tensions. 5. I believe we can leave question of timing as related to internal tensions to Pak's judgement. My own judgement now would be to favor visit in spring for reason cited above but I would want to discuss timing personally with Pak. If Dept favors visit I suggest that I be authorized to tell Pak US would welcome visit and then explore various possibilities with him. In this connection it would be helpful if Dept could give some idea of possible alternative dates suitable to President Johnson's schedule./3/ /3/On December 4 William Bundy recommended to Rusk, who recommended to the President, that Pak make an official visit to the United States in March or April. (Memorandum from Bundy to Rusk; ibid.) Rusk repeated his recommendation memorandum to the President in mid-January 1965 after the Korean press had hinted that an invitation was in the offing. Although the White House advocated delaying the visit until the outcome of negotiations on the ROK-Japan settlement became clearer, Rusk believed that in light of the media attention in Korea for the United States to withhold or delay the invitation would "create the impression that we are putting a pistol to the head of the Koreans to work out a deal on any terms they can get." (Memorandum from Rusk to President Johnson, undated, attached to a memorandum from Bundy to Rusk, January 14, 1965; Department of State, Bundy Files: Lot 85 D 240, Miscellaneous Chronological File) Pak visited the United States May 17-19, 1965; see Document 363. Brown
355. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Korea/1/ Washington, December 31, 1964, 7:36 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL JAPAN-KOR S. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by O'Donohue, cleared by Bennett, and approved by Green. Also sent to Tokyo and repeated to CINCPAC for POLAD. 583. Seoul's 585, rptd Tokyo 217 , CINCPAC Unn./2/ We are seriously concerned about confusion and indecision within Korean Govt on approach to Korea-Japan settlement described reftel. While we do not oppose a staged approach to settlement beginning with early normalization diplomatic relations, Koreans seem to have no clear intention or program to move seriously in that direction. Govt leadership appears rather to be floundering about, looking for ways to avoid taking hard decisions necessary to achieve progress in negotiations. We share Ambassador Brown's fears that approach as outlined by Koreans might end in failure./3/ /2/In telegram 585 from Seoul, December 30, Brown reported that Kim Tong-cho "believed Sato govt. not in strong enough position to go ahead with settlement" and Chong Il-kwon appeared to agree, referring "unconvincingly to political divisions within Japanese ruling party and Sato's inability to rally support." Neither Kim nor Chong seemed optimistic about reaching normalization with Japan. (Ibid.) /3/In the event the next round of negotiations failed to achieve a settlement, Kim recommended a shift in focus to partial normalization that involved normalizing relations and reaching agreement on specific issues, but postponing resolution of more difficult issues, such as fisheries and financial settlements, to a later time. (Telegram 585 from Seoul, December 30; ibid.) We shall defer considering initiatives on our part until after Ambassador Brown's talks with FonMin and President Pak. In meantime, however, Embassy Seoul should strongly caution Korean Govt against prematurely disclosing to Japanese its current thinking. (On basis PriMin's explanation, we fear Japanese would conclude Koreans unable and unwilling to negotiate seriously for a settlement.) Ambassador Reischauer should similarly caution Ambassador Kim. Rusk
356. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ Washington, January 12, 1965, 3:30 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL JAPAN-KOR S. Secret. Drafted by Petree and approved in S on January 26. The meeting was held in the Secretary's Conference Room. SUBJECT PARTICIPANTS Eisaku Sato, Prime Minister of Japan Secretary Rusk Prime Minister Sato turned to Japan-Korea relations./2/ He said that his Government found the domestic political situation in the Republic of Korea hard to understand. Apparently both the President and Prime Minister of the Republic of Korea sincerely want to achieve an early settlement with Japan. He did not see any clear prospect for such a settlement, but his Government would do everything it could to promote normalization of relations. He felt strongly that a settlement with Korea could not be delayed. /2/Sato made an official visit to Washington on January 12-13. Secretary Rusk said that a Japan-Korea settlement is very important. We have regretted the delays in the settlement, which have been costly to all of us. As we look back and realize the benefits both countries have lost this past three years, we can see how costly the delay has been. We have felt that both sides desire a settlement, but that the problem is the terms. This problem has been vexing. The Koreans very earnestly desire a settlement of their differences with Japan. One has only to recall some of the demonstrations which have taken place to see that a domestic problem exists, however. Secretary Rusk said he hoped very much that an agreement could be worked out through diligence and patience. Such a settlement would be a stimulus to the Free World position in the Western Pacific; it would be a great achievement if Japan and Korea could put their relations on a long-term, stable basis. Prime Minister Sato said that he would be discussing this problem with Ambassador Reischauer and would see if a way could be found to move ahead with a settlement. It would be undesirable in both Japan and Korea for the U.S. to appear to intervene in the negotiations, and for that reason the Japanese side had asked for the deletion of the Japan-Korea paragraph from the Joint Communique./3/ The Secretary agreed. The Prime Minister said that his Government wants the abolition of the "Rhee Line," but the Korean Government finds it difficult to get public acceptance for this idea within Korea. He suggested that Japan could accept a de facto abolition of the "Rhee Line," without a formal approach to the problem in written form, if the Treaty--if ratified--superseded domestic legislation in Korea; but this was a difficult point to iron out. He said another outstanding minor problem is Takeshima (Dokto). /3/The text of the Johnson-Sato communique of January 13 is in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1965, pp. 769-771. Secretary Rusk said he thought that it might be possible to work out some kind of cooperation on the "Rhee Line." Similar problems have been worked out in the past. Perhaps the Rhee Line could be left to wither away and disappear ultimately through irrelevance in terms of the overall improvement in Japan-Korea relations. An example of this is the national frontier between Luxembourg and Belgium.
357. Memorandum From James C. Thomson, Jr., of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)/1/ Washington, February 20, 1965. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Japan, Vol. III. No classification marking. SUBJECT I thought you and the President should know that the first returns from Japanese Foreign Minister Shiina's trip to Seoul are extremely encouraging./2/ /2/Shiina visited Seoul February 17-20. We have just had word that both sides have initialed a draft treaty that includes: (1) the establishment of embassies and an exchange of ambassadors at once; (2) Japanese recognition of Korea's status (the UN formula that fuzzes the question of the geographic extent of the ROK Government's sovereignty; and (3) agreement that all ancient treaties (i.e. 1905, etc.) between the two countries have already been abrogated./3/ /3/Telegram 779 from Seoul, February 20, contained the text of the Treaty on Basic Arrangements. That document and others pertaining to the Shiina visit to Seoul are in National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL JAPAN-KOR S. Shiina came as close as a Japanese can to apologizing for Japan's past sins, and everyone--including State--is thoroughly pleased. (This means that the specifics regarding fisheries, etc., remain to be talked out but will not obstruct the basic settlement.) [Continue with the next documents]
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