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FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1964-1968, Volume XXIX Korea
Department of State |
Korea 358. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ Washington, March 15, 1965. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 2 KOR S. Confidential. Drafted by Fearey and approved in S on March 22. SUBJECT PARTICIPANTS Tong Won Lee, Foreign Minister of Korea The Secretary After an exchange of greetings, the Secretary said that he had been looking forward to a discussion of a number of problems with Foreign Minister Lee. He invited the Foreign Minister to lead off. [Here follows discussion of Vietnam.] Korea-Japan Settlement The Secretary congratulated Foreign Minister Lee on the progress of the discussions with Japan. Initialling of the Basic Relations Treaty had been a very important step. He hoped that Korea and Japan were close to a final settlement. The U.S. had been very strongly interested in a settlement for some years. Delay itself was costly. Foreign Minister Lee said that recently there had been very satisfactory developments, though the US might be of assistance in producing a satisfactory and speedy result. Mr. Bundy had been of great assistance during his visits to Korea and Japan last fall. Ambassador Brown had also been doing very effective work behind the scenes. The Basic Relations Treaty concluded a few weeks ago dealt with the most fundamental and important issues, which were now settled. A few minor issues, such as fisheries, the status of Korean residents in Japan, and economic cooperation and trade relations still remained. The Korean Government was negotiating with Japan for a quick settlement of all these issues. The Foreign Minister said that he planned to stop in Tokyo for three days on his way back to Korea, when he would try to bring an end to the long-drawn-out negotiations and sign an agreement. He had told this to Prime Minister Sato and Foreign Minister Shiina. (The Foreign Minister interjected that Prime Minister Sato had asked him to convey his personal greetings to the Secretary.) Sato had said that Korea should make concessions on the fisheries question. The Foreign Minister said that he had told Sato that fisheries were a little matter and that making small concessions in such a little matter should present little difficulty for Japan. In Korea, however, the issue meant a lot, emotionally and politically. It was Japan's fault that this was so, because of its actions of the past half century. The Foreign Minister said he told Sato that Korea needs not just normal relations with Japan but good relations. Conclusion of the negotiations was very important, but it was even more important that the treaty be accepted by the Korean people. Korea did not want a treaty that caused instability and which might shake the foundations of the Park Government. The Korean people were very emotional on the subject of Japan; Japan should take this fact into account. The Foreign Minister said that Foreign Minister Shiina had said that maybe it was still too early for a settlement. Foreign Minister Lee said he had replied that Korea and Japan had been talking for the past 14 years and had no more to say. If Japan was prepared to proceed in a spirit of concessions the agreement could be concluded in two hours and signed in half a minute. Shiina nevertheless continued to express doubt that a settlement could be achieved so soon. The Secretary asked when Foreign Minister Lee planned to return to Tokyo. The Foreign Minister replied that he would arrive there March 23. He had told Sato and Shiina that they should bring a pistol and kill him if a settlement were not achieved--his loss of face would be so great he could not return to Korea. The Secretary demurred, saying that this would set a dangerous precedent among Foreign Ministers. The Foreign Minister said he was sure the Japanese would try very hard to reach agreement. Now was the best time, the golden opportunity. The Secretary observed that strong propaganda had been coming out of Pyongyang and Peiping against a settlement. He asked what influence this propaganda had in the Republic of Korea. The Foreign Minister replied that it had none. He said that when Shiina was recently in Korea there were no big demonstrations but that when he (Lee) was recently in Japan there had been demonstrations wherever he went. The demonstrations in Japan were by Communists, directed from Peiping. In Korea, on the other hand, the demonstrations were of a nationalistic nature growing out of Korea's past humiliating experience with Japan. The two should not be confused. The opportune time for a settlement had arrived in Korea. The Park regime is very stable and in a good position, and the people are enlightened on the question of a settlement with Japan, understanding the necessity for good relations with Japan. They appreciate the economic benefits which such a settlement would bring Korea. The atmosphere is good and it is most important that the existing momentum not be lost. The Secretary asked whether Foreign Minister Lee's initialling of the Basic Relations Treaty had caused an adverse reaction in Korea. The Foreign Minister said that it had not, because the treaty was acceptable to the Korean public. He said that the Korean people were poor but well educated; they were enlightened enough to have sound judgment on certain things./2/ /2/The Embassy had reported, however, that "opposition parties [were] pursuing relentlessly within and without National Assembly a series of actions designed to bring about cessation ROK-Japan negotiations." (Telegram 855 from Seoul, March 10; ibid., POL JAPAN-KOR S) The Foreign Minister went on to say that a couple of words in Foreign Minister Shiina's arrival statement had helped a good deal. Shiina had said that he was sorry for the past and looked to a new and different future. Shiina was the first Japanese ever to say that, and his statement had had a most helpful effect. It was most important that solutions of remaining issues be acceptable to the Korean people; otherwise the whole purpose of the settlement would be defeated. Korea did not ask that the U.S. apply pressure to Japan--he knew that we could not do that--but he did hope that we would talk frankly with the Japanese. This would be much appreciated by the Korean Government. The Secretary said that he would take note of the Foreign Minister's comments. He observed that we had been talking to the Japanese concerning a settlement during the four years that he had been Secretary, and before that time. [Here follows discussion of unrelated topics.]
359. Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency Washington, undated. [Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files: East Asia Country Files, Japan, 1964, 1965. Secret; Eyes Only. 2 pages of source text not declassified.]
360. Telegram From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State/1/ Seoul, April 8, 1965, 0400Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 7 KOR S. Confidential; Priority; Limdis. 970. Ref: Deptel 935./2/ /2/Telegram 935 to Seoul, April 4, noted Department of State and White House concern about "determining optimum moment for communication of USG assurances future aid," and the efforts to grapple with the question of Korea's plans for handling opposition to a settlement with Japan. (Ibid.) 1. I agree crucial question governing communication US reassurances future support is ROKG schedule of moves regarding ROK-Japan settlement. Current schedule calls for signature formal agreements first week in May./3/ Koreans determined sign before Pak's departure to Washington and are urging Japanese to speed up drafting. Agreement will be submitted to National Assembly for ratification as soon as possible after Pak's return to Korea, i.e. early June. Assembly consideration will require minimum of two or three weeks. /3/On April 3 the Foreign Ministers of Korea and Japan initialed outline agreements and issued a joint communique on a final normalization agreement. The outline agreements and joint communique are summarized in telegrams 3121 and 3123, April 3 and 4, from Tokyo. The Embassy in Tokyo forwarded the complete text of both documents to Washington in airgram A-1447, April 27. (All ibid., POL JAPAN-KOR S) 2. Meanwhile govt is conducting full campaign to explain agreement to public and counter opposition and student moves./4/ Opposition extremists, led by Yun Po-son, are out to topple govt and hope to use students as instrument. Govt prepared take all necessary measures protect itself and gain ratification including imposition of martial law if situation requires. /4/While the Korean Government and DRP politicians attempted to win popular support for an agreement with Japan, the Embassy reported that "opposition politicians continue to fulminate against ROK-Japan agreements and against govt." and that "activity among student groups against govt. and against ROK-Japan talks is increasing." Newspaper reports about the outline agreements appeared unfavorable, except in papers owned by or close to the government. (Telegram 966 from Seoul, April 7; ibid.) 3. Pak visit to Washington is important element in govt plans. In present schedule it is strategically placed between first shock of opposition moves now underway and final struggle over ratification. Barring unexpectedly violent demonstrations in next few weeks ratification period will be most critical period. 4. ROKG is counting on US political, military and economic assurances at time of visit to provide boost to Pak's position at this most important moment. From clear indications we have received from Blue House neither Pak nor his govt wish such a package to be presented prior to visit. I am convinced that if we were to approach Pak with draft letter proposed at this time he would ask matter be deferred until his visit. This would be especially true if, as is likely, visit were to take place only a week or so after signature of agreement with Japan. 5. I believe surfacing US commitments by letter before Pak visit would dissipate their impact, which is sure to be greatest if it comes at time when public opinion in Korea is sharply focused on Pak and relationships between Korea and US. Moreover, prior surfacing would certainly lead to further bargaining in connection with visit. Given Korean psychology and pervasive relationship between US and ROK that has been built up over the years there is no avoiding association of a package with visit itself. 5. Therefore, I continue to believe material content draft letter should be reserved for joint communique or other appropriate occasion connected with visit. I would however see value in simple letter of congratulation at time of signature as further evidence of US interest and support. For this purpose paras one, two, first sentence para three, penultimate para on page three, draft letter dated March 31, ending with para anticipating pleasure of meeting in Washington would be very appropriate. Similar message to Prime Minister Sato might well be felt necessary. 7. Form of expressions of assurances which we are prepared to give is almost as important as their substance and for maximum impact should be tailored so far as possible to Korean reader. With this in mind I will within few days submit recommendations as to how substantive matters contained in draft letter of March 31 and one or two other points I have to suggest might best be expressed in a joint communique. If it is desired to restrict joint communique to general statement, the commitments could alternatively be given at time of visit in some other appropriate form, e.g. an accompanying letter or memorandum. Brown
361. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Korea/1/ Washington, April 30, 1965, 9:35 a.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL JAPAN-KOR S. Confidential. Drafted by Norred, cleared by Fearey and Barnett, and approved by Bundy. Also sent to Tokyo and repeated to CINCPAC for POLAD. 1067. In meeting with Bundy today Ambassador Kim quoted Korean Ambassador Tokyo Kim Tong-cho to effect that signing of Korea-Japan settlement before Park visit was now almost impossible physically because FonMin Lee and Agriculture Minister Ch'a had had to waste three weeks in Assembly interpellations and there are four or five holidays in Japan in late April and early May. Bundy expressed surprise, saying very high level Japanese officials had expressed hope for signing before Park visit and their intention work to that end. Bundy said it is "strong" desire of U.S. Govt that settlement be signed before Park visit, and urged everything possible be done to that end. If it were not signed, we would try to make Park visit a success, but it would be far better if it were. Bundy added we have, and will continue, to do all we can to impress upon Japanese need for early signing. Kim said Park was still determined to sign before visit and some others in Korean Govt thought this still possible. He said he would report Bundy's representations to his Govt. In immediately prior talks, Poats/2/ and Barnett warned Kim that, in absence signature, U.S. Govt could find it impossible to justify to members of Congress "unusual" commitment of U.S. assistance for next several years, which it remains our common view should be made at appropriate time./3/ /2/Rutherford M. Poats was Assistant Director for the Far East, Agency for International Development. /3/Brown took "strong exception" to this "warning" and found "this approach incomprehensible," for "at no time in our talks with Koreans has commitment of continued support ever been connected with any specific deadline on ROK-Japan settlement." Brown also mentioned that "such virtual ultimatum totally unnecessary," because any delays in reaching an agreement could not be attributed to Korean reluctance to achieve normalization. (Telegram 1104 from Seoul, May 1; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL JAPAN-KOR S) Request Embassies Tokyo and Seoul approach appropriate officials at their discretion and make representations favoring early signature. Rusk
362. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Korea/1/ Washington, May 3, 1965, 8:16 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL JAPAN-KOR S. Confidential. Drafted by O'Donohue, cleared by Bennett, and approved by Barnett. Repeated to Tokyo and CINCPAC for POLAD. 1080. On instruction from Seoul, Ambassador Kim told Barnett President Park determined to reach Korea-Japan settlement as soon as possible and, if Japanese have "sincere desire", agreements can be signed before May 15. Kim added that in May 2 telephone conversation he urged President Park to effect signature Korea-Japan agreement package before U.S. State Visit. President Park told Kim he would do his best to achieve signature before arrival here. Kim expressed personal doubt, however, it possible sign agreements before Park visit in view detailed negotiations necessary to prepare drafts and his suspicion of Japanese Foreign Office "stalling"./2/ (He mentioned Ushiroku.) However, he stated emphatically agreements would be signed, at very latest, within week after President Park's return to Seoul from U.S. Possibly FonMin Lee, if his health permits, might stop off Tokyo to sign agreements on return from U.S. State Visit. /2/The Koreans were also concerned about their ability to negotiate a fishing agreement, since both Japanese Agriculture Minister Akagi and fisheries specialist Wada were in Moscow. The Koreans were puzzled by their absence, and some saw their departure as a deliberate act to delay signing an agreement, a view the Embassy sought to allay. (Telegram 1119 from Seoul, May 4; ibid.) In event impossible achieve signature before State Visit, Kim asked our view usefulness letter from Park to President assuring him of Park's intention to secure early Korea-Japan settlement. In that context Kim expressed view that President Park should return to Seoul with "maximum results" from Washington meetings, particularly long term commitment. Barnett told Kim that we do not doubt in least President Park's determination obtain signature and early ratification Korea-Japan agreements. Very important when Basic Relations Treaty and outlines other agreements were initialed, and we are now confident both Korean and Japanese Governments wish normalize relations as soon as possible. Barnett expressed the view Japanese shared sense urgency, and now we could only hope negotiators both sides would exert great efforts in striving for earliest signature. Because U.S. intention make commitment to support Korea's security and economic requirements over period of years rather unusual, Bundy had told Ambassador Kim we would like very much to be in situation where Korea-Japan agreements had been signed. With signature it would be easier to do all that we wish to make visit greatest possible success. In view high degree confidence expressed by Korean and Japanese governments as well as by Ambassador Brown that agreement will soon be reached, Barnett said he did not think presidential letter as described by Ambassador Kim would be necessary. Re substantive aspect visit Barnett said Park need not fear that Washington visit would be disappointing. Pointed out that there many aspects U.S.-Korea relationships unrelated to Korea-Japan settlement on which we will be focusing, such as our common interest and purposes in the Vietnamese situation, continuing success of Korean stabilization program, common hopes for economic growth in Korea, and expansion of Korea's international economic role. With a Korea-Japan settlement in sight, the visit is of course appropriate occasion for mutual pledges of continued cooperation in these and other areas. Rusk
363. Editorial Note On May 17, 1965, President Pak met with President Johnson, who congratulated him on the progress of Korean negotiations with Japan (see Document 48). President Pak stated that negotiations could be completed in June and, despite internal opposition, believed an agreement would be concluded. President Pak met with Secretary Rusk on May 18 and briefly discussed the Korea-Japan negotiations. Secretary Rusk urged an early conclusion to the talks, but President Pak raised the issue of Tokto Island (Takeshima), to which both Korea and Japan laid claim, characterizing it as an intractable problem between the two countries. Secretary Rusk suggested erecting a jointly operated lighthouse, allowing both sides a share of the island and gradually diffusing the issue. President Pak commented that such a project "just would not work." (See Document 50.)
364. Telegram From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State/1/ Seoul, June 15, 1965, 0600Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL JAPAN-KOR S. Secret; Priority; Limdis. Repeated to Tokyo and CINCPAC for POLAD. 1316. Ref: (A) Deptel 1272; (B) Tokyo's 4210 to Dept./2/ I told President Pak today of Washington's concern about the slow progress of the talks in Tokyo. We were not afraid of a breakdown, but were very worried at the amount of time it was taking to solve minor issues. If agreement were not reached by the 20th the matter could cause serious delay in view of the forthcoming Algiers conference,/3/ the elections in Japan, and the US-Japan Cabinet meetings in Washington. Everyone was agreed that this was a good psychological moment to conclude the agreement and it would be a pity if the moment were lost. This concern was personally felt by President Johnson, who had asked that President Pak be informed of his personal interest. I said that Ambassador Reischauer had been asked to express the same concern to Prime Minister Sato. /2/Telegram 1272 to Seoul, June 12, (also sent to Tokyo) instructed Brown and Rei- schauer to meet with Pak and Sato, respectively, to urge a conclusion to negotiations. In telegram 4210 from Tokyo, June 14, Reischauer reported on his discussion with Sato, who was optimistic that an agreement could be reached very soon. (Both ibid.) /3/Algiers was the site of the upcoming Afro-Asian Conference, which Shiina and Ushiba were to attend. President Pak replied that he entirely shared our point of view that this was the psychological moment for settlement, which must not be lost. He had written a personal letter to Ambassador Kim, instructing him to conclude the agreement by June 15 and giving him full authority to do so. He was assured by Ambassador Kim that agreement could be reached in time for every issue, except that of Tokto./4/ This had emerged as the sole remaining major obstacle to an agreement. /4/The remaining issues were the length of time a fisheries agreement would remain in effect and the procedures to settle disputes, claims issues involving property rights and other legal issues, and the status of Koreans in Japan, as well as the issue of Tokto/Takeshima. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL JAPAN-KOR S) The Japanese were insisting that agreement on Tokto should be specifically mentioned in the agreement. This the Koreans could not possibly accept. It would present an almost insuperable obstacle to ratification of the agreement by the Assembly and its acceptance by Korean public opinion. They realize that Mr. Sato had told the Diet several times that settlement of the Tokto issue would be included in the agreement with Korea and therefore that he had a political problem, but this was nothing compared to the problem which would be presented in Korea were Tokto to be mentioned in the agreement. To meet the Japanese problem, the Koreans were ready to include a paragraph at the end of the agreement which would say that any remaining issues unsolved by the agreement would be the subject of subsequent consultation. If the Japanese desire, as they had indicated that they did, that the matter be the subject of discussions with a third party as well as the two principals, the Koreans were ready to make provision for third party participation in the discussion of "remaining issues". The Japanese could say that Tokto was such an issue and that discussion about it was contemplated by the agreement. The Koreans could say that Tokto was not covered by the agreement. Both would be technically correct. This should help the Japanese was as far as the Koreans could go [sic]. The President stated flatly more than once that there was no give in this position. I suggested it might be useful to have a further meeting between Foreign Ministers Shiina and Yi Tong-won. The President said that if the Japanese persisted in their position on Tokto there was no point in a Foreign Minister's meeting and that if they would accept the Korean proposal on Tokto there was no need for such a meeting, since Ambassador Kim had full authority to settle all the issues. I suggested that our reports had indicated that there were a number of smaller issues which, though causing difficulties for the technicians, might very easily be settled at the political level. The President was not receptive to the idea of a further Foreign Minister's meeting. The President asked the United States to intercede with the Japanese on the Tokto issue. I said that Ambassador Reischauer had mentioned it to Mr. Sato, but had found him quite sticky. Comment: It is quite clear that the Korean position against any mention of Tokto in the agreement with Japan is adamant. I believe that the government's appraisal of the adverse effect which any mention of this ill-fated subject would have on the prospect for ratification and especially upon the principle of mobilization of indispensable support from the members of the DRP is probably accurate. Although Yi Tong-won told me yesterday he is quite prepared to meet again with Shiina if it would be helpful, I think it unlikely that President Pak would wish him to go to Tokyo unless it is quite sure that the Japanese will give on the Tokto issue. He might then be willing to have him go and his presence might be really helpful in buttoning up a number of lesser issues. Brown
365. Editorial Note Within days after Ambassador Brown met with President Pak and Ambassador Reischauer met with Prime Minister Sato to discuss the need for a speedy conclusion to negotiations, all outstanding issues between Korea and Japan were resolved. On June 22, 1965, the Foreign Ministers of Japan and Korea and their associates signed the text of the Treaty on Basic Relations between Japan and the Republic of Korea as well as five additional agreements covering specific issues, namely, fisheries, the status of Koreans residing in Japan, property claims and economic cooperation, cultural matters, and settlement of disputes. Documentation recording the last stages of the negotiations is in National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL JAPAN-KOR S. The texts of the agreements are ibid., POL 4 JAPAN-KOR S and POL 33-4 JAPAN-KOR S. The legislature of each country subsequently ratified the agreement, the Korean National Assembly in August and the Japanese Diet in December. The text of the agreement, which went into effect on December 18, is in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1965, pages 787-788. Initially violent student demonstrations accompanied the acceptance of the agreements in Korea, causing nearly all colleges and universities to close until August 20. Some colleges, universities, and high schools suspended classes temporarily. Factions of the political opposition in Korea also took to the streets and were dispersed only after the police used tear gas against them. (Telegram 1368, June 22, and telegram 8, July 2, from Seoul, National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 23-8 KOR S) Some members of the People's Party in the Korean National Assembly chose to resign en mass to defeat ratification of the treaty. Documentation on the political opposition is ibid., POL 15-2 KOR S and POL 4 JAPAN-KOR S. Student demonstrations against the treaty and "one party government" resumed after August 20, when universities reopened. They were met by police using tear gas and in some cases by Korean Army troops. Although the public complained of the forceful suppression of the demonstrations, the students did not otherwise win general sympathy for their cause. (Airgram A-76 from Seoul, August 27; ibid., POL 2-1 KOR S) In Japan political opposition to the treaty arose within the Socialist Party in November. Socialist criticism, however, was aimed at the way the Liberal Democratic Party pushed the package through the lower and upper houses of the Diet, rather than at the treaty itself. Documentation on political opposition in Japan is ibid., POL JAPAN-KOR S and POL KOR S-JAPAN.
366. Editorial Note On August 12, 1965, U.S. Government officials responsible for East Asian Affairs met to discuss the problem of opposition in the Republic of Korea National Assembly to ratification of a normalization treaty between Japan and Korea. The officials agreed that "the primary source of opposition to ratification of the normalization treaty with Japan lies in the 65 seats held by the People's Party in the 175 delegate ROK National Assembly." They also noted that this opposition "compares with the pro-government Democratic Republican Party's total of 110 seats." The officials identified the need to prevent the "People's Party from paralyzing National Assembly procedures and from increasing opposition sentiment in the population." The People's Party was divided roughly into those moderately opposed to the treaty and hard-liners unalterably opposed to the treaty. The officials agreed that the principal hazard to treaty ratification was resignation in bloc of the People's Party members from the National Assembly, that would force an election prior to Assembly consideration. The officials then discussed in detail actions that the United States was taking and could take "to diminish the number of fanatics and to dampen the opposition of the moderates." (Memorandum from Stuart to Hughes, Denny, and Evans, August 13, [text not declassified]; Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Country Files, East Asia and the Pacific General File, 1965 Weekly Far East Meetings, July to December)
367. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ Washington, November 29, 1965. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL JAPAN-KOR S. Confidential. Drafted by Fleck and approved in S on December 21. The memorandum is Part II of V. SUBJECT PARTICIPANTS Foreign Minister Tong Won Lee, Republic of Korea The Secretary ROK-Japan Normalization 1. The Secretary said he had great personal respect for the role played by the Foreign Minister in the negotiations for normalization of relations between the Republic of Korea and Japan. The Foreign Minister had displayed a high degree of wisdom and courage. The Secretary said he understood that the ratification instruments would soon be exchanged. He asked if the Minister saw any obstacles to good relations between the two governments arising in the near future. 2. The Minister replied that the instruments of ratification were scheduled to be exchanged on December 22 in Seoul. He foresaw no real problems arising. As he had mentioned to Mr. Bundy that morning,/2/ the negotiations were now over and the Korean people were trying to forget the sad memories of the past. Everything now depends on the sincerity and spirit of cooperation of each side. He said good relations with Japan were important to Korea but the Korean people are very sensitive and there would be trouble if the Japanese were too selfish. /2/A memorandum of their conversation is ibid. 3. The Secretary said that in view of the history of the last 60 years and the proximity of Korea, a small country, to Japan, a large country, the sensitivity of the Korean people is understandable. He pointed out that the United States has encountered similar feelings from time to time on the part of the Canadians and Mexicans. However, today's Japan is not the same Japan as that with which the Korean people had been acquainted prior to 1945. Great changes have taken place in Japan since then. 4. The Minister replied that he agreed and that his government, as well as Mr. Bundy and Ambassador Brown, has made great efforts to convince the Korean people of this truth. However, it is now up to Japan to demonstrate sincerity in its dealings with Korea. 5. The Secretary asked whether the Minister was suggesting that Japan adopt a "low posture" toward the Republic of Korea. The Minister replied that his government only wished the Japanese to adopt a "normal posture." The Secretary said the United States would help, when appropriate. Korean Proposal for Tripartite Consultations 6. The Foreign Minister stated that the United States is the big brother of the Republic of Korea and of Japan. The two younger brothers have quarreled with each other in the past. It might be useful if the elder brother would now bring the younger brothers into a family atmosphere to talk over family matters. He said he was not asking for a commitment or for institutionalized meetings. He said that his government is confident that U.S. policy toward the Republic of Korea will not change as a result of normalization of ROK-Japan relations. 7. The Secretary replied that in view of the great span of Korean and Japanese culture and history, the Minister was extremely flattering to speak of the United States as an elder brother. He said the Minister was quite right in assuming that there would be no change in U.S. policy. The United States has an unlimited commitment in Korea. If the United States Government were to relinquish any of its responsibilities in Korea, they would be turned over to the Republic of Korea and to no one else. 8. The Secretary went on to say that the effect of World War II on the Japanese had been radically different than its effect on the Koreans. The Japanese Government had renounced the use of force and had prohibited the establishment of armed forces. It was politically impossible for the Japanese Government to emulate the example set by the ROK Government in Viet-Nam. Japan was only gradually assuming the responsibilities appropriate to a country of its size and strength. The United States is encouraging it to do so, but the process will take a little time. 9. The Minister recalled that he personally had told Japanese Prime Minister Sato that it is time for Japan to share some of the responsibilities of the United States in Asia. Sato had agreed but had said that there are legal and domestic difficulties in the way. The Secretary remarked that we have been encouraged by recent Japanese actions such as the decision to participate in the Asian Development Bank. Foreign Ministers Conference 10. The Foreign Minister recalled that a year ago he had invited the Foreign Ministers of 10 Asian nations to attend a Foreign Ministers Conference in Seoul. Most replies had been favorable but the Japanese had adopted a negative attitude toward the proposal. He believed, however, that the Japanese attitude was being modified. Ambassador Kim Tong-cho had recently reported from Tokyo that the Japanese are now indicating an interest in participating in the conference. He said in his view the conference should not discuss specific problems. His idea in proposing the conference was to have Asian Foreign Ministers sit down together and hold a general discussion of Asian affairs and seek methods of cooperation. 11. The Secretary asked if the Minister had any date in mind for convening the conference. The Minister replied that he was going to be talking with Japanese Prime Minister Sato and Foreign Minister Shiina in Tokyo on his way back to Seoul. He intended to consult with them concerning a specific date and obtain their views regarding what type of conference should be held. He believed their desires should be carefully considered. 12. The Secretary observed that some subjects can be discussed more effectively if the United States is not present. The Minister replied that his government would remain highly dependent on continued U.S. support to make the conference successful.
368. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ Kyoto, Japan, July 6, 1966, 1 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, JAPAN-KOR S. Secret. Drafted by Zurhellen and approved in S on July 25. The memorandum is Part 3 of 5. Rusk visited Japan July 4-7 to attend the U.S.-Japan Joint Committee on Trade and Economic Affairs held in Kyoto. SUBJECT PARTICIPANTS Foreign Minister Shiina Secretary of State Dean Rusk 1. Foreign Minister Shiina brought up a problem concerning Korea. He said that Japan's relations with the Republic of Korea were going well except for one headache. This was the problem of the export of plants to North Korea and the entry of North Koreans into Japan in connection therewith. To accomplish the export of plants to North Korea it was absolutely necessary for technicians to come to Japan and carry out inspections. This was the usual business practice. The Japanese Government had delayed this matter for over three years on the grounds that the trea- ties to normalize relations with the Republic of Korea were in process. Now that the normalization had been accomplished this was no longer a possible out and the GOJ had to do something. The ROK, however, said that Japanese-ROK relations would suffer fundamentally if Japan admitted North Koreans to this country and carried out the plant exports. Mr. Shiina thought, however, that relations with the ROK had grown roots to the extent that no catastrophe would result from Japan's actions, but he had to admit there would be some difficulty. 2. Mr. Shiina said he did not want to involve the Secretary in this matter or ask him to bring it up in Korea. If the Koreans brought this problem up with the Secretary, however, he hoped the Secretary would not indicate that he had discussed it with the Japanese. The problem concerned not only the admission of North Koreans to Japan but financing of the exports by private means. There was no intent to use Japanese Export-Import Bank financing. Moreover, the GOJ action in this case would not set a precedent and future similar matters would be handled on a case-by-case basis. 3. Secretary Rusk asked whether Japan-North Korean trade was important. Mr. Shiina replied that the trade itself was not important but it appeared to Japan that it was only natural for such deals to be approved and the GOJ could not delay further since the matter had been postponed already for three years. 4. Secretary Rusk said that he had infinite confidence in the ability of foreign office officials to delay matters! 5. Mr. Shiina said that even the governing Liberal Democratic Party favored admitting the North Korean technicians and it would be difficult for the government to hold the line any longer. 6. Secretary Rusk said that this was surely a mosquito bite from the overall point of view of foreign trade but it should be remembered that malaria can develop from a mosquito bite. He thought Japan's relations with South Korea were of far greater magnitude and importance than those with North Korea.
369. Airgram From the Embassy in Japan to the Department of State/1/ Tokyo, February 14, 1967. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL JAPAN-KOR S. Confidential. Drafted by Armstrong; cleared by Farrior and in draft by Ainsworth, Gallagher, Baker, Fahs, and Nickel; and approved by Zurhellen. Repeated to Seoul, Consulates in Fukuoka, Kobe-Osaka, Nagoya, and Sapporo, CINCPAC for POLAD and HICOM for POLAD. A-1065. Subject: Japanese-Korean Relations in the Year Since Normalization Introduction and Summary 1. The first anniversary of the ratification of the treaty and agreements which normalized relations between Japan and the Republic of Korea came on December 18, 1966. The anniversary occasioned a flurry of background articles in the Japanese press, but there were no major public celebrations in Tokyo (the Korean Embassy selected last June 22, the anniversary of the signing of the agreements, as the occasion for an enormous party to which the conservative establishment of Japan came in their hundreds), and the day was a quiet reflection of the matter-of-fact acceptance by most Japanese of the controversial settlement with their closest neighbor. 2. The Embassy's overall impression is that, in the year since the restoration of formal diplomatic relations, there has been a significant broadening and deepening of private and unofficial contact and understanding between the two countries, although the Korean minority in Japan remains unpopular and the state of Japanese media and scholarly coverage and research of Korean affairs can only charitably be termed modest in comparison with Japanese interests there. On the official side, not only has a great deal been done to clean up the detailed problems surrounding implementation of the Treaty settlement, but problems which have arisen de novo during the year have for the most part been solved--although not, of course, without stresses and strains. Basic differences remain between the two countries in terms of their disparate levels of economic development and the gulf in their attitudes toward Communism (or, more precisely, the gulf in the range of attitudes and actions required of the two governments by their publics' differing estimates of the threat which Communist power poses to their national interests). The huge trade gap (in Japan's favor) remains a continuing problem, and Korea's intensified efforts during the past year to obtain commitments from Japan for larger imports of specified commodities (e.g., laver, cuttlefish) and for other concessionary trade treatment were only moderately successful. There are indications, however, that the two governments have evolved working relationships which not only recognize these differences realistically, but may even surmount them in favor of increased cooperation in multilateral forums for Asian economic development and in the United Nations vis-a-vis preservation of the ROK's special position there./2/ /2/Department of State intelligence analysts shared the Embassy's favorable impression of Korea-Japan relations, concluding that the two governments have created a "relatively amicable relationship" since normalizing relations. (Intelligence Note 1022, December 22; ibid.) [Here follows a detailed discussion of Korea-Japan relations.]
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