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FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1964-1968, Volume XXV South Asia
Department of State |
11. Telegram [text not declassified] to the Department of State/1/ Washington, January 30, 1964, 2126Z. /1/ Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 32-1 INDIA-PAK. Secret; Exdis. 98158. For Under Secretary Harriman eyes only. The following message was received [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] on 30 Jan 1964 from Ambassador Bowles for Under Secretary Harriman with information copies for Mr. McGeorge Bundy and Mr. John McCone. Copies are being sent to Mr. Bundy and Mr. McCone. "When I left Washington late November, understanding was that Department would take initiative aimed at winning support, first in India and then in Pakistan, for autonomous Kashmir. You will recall that this decision was to be taken at high level, and not to be referred to in any but most tightly controlled communications. Need for this program has if anything become even greater in light developments of past six weeks. Deterioration in Indo-Pak relations so serious that chance of winning support in both countries for steps leading to modus vivendi has actually improved. During same period Indian Government has been forced consider seriously, as one means restoring popular rule Jammu and Kashmir, the release of Sheikh Abdullah, which would mean entire acceptance in principle of ultimate autonomy in some form. Time is ripe for careful covert campaign to bolster possibility such a step. Please let me know [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] present status of my November request."
12. Telegram From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State/1/ Karachi, February 1, 1964, 3 p.m. /1/ Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 1 PAK. Secret; Exdis. 1456. Bhutto Nov 29 meeting with President./2/ /2/ Bhutto's meeting with President Johnson on November 29 was summarized in telegram 755 to Karachi, December 2, 1963; see Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, vol. XIX, Document 341. 1. After dinner which I gave in Rawalpindi evening Jan 25, FonMin Bhutto in relaxed and confiding mood told me in strict secrecy of what he termed hitherto unrevealed aspect of his Nov 29 conversation with Pres in Washington. 2. He said that he had been given highly important oral message by Pres Ayub to convey directly and personally to Pres Johnson. This was distinct from the routine written communication which he delivered./3/ Bhutto said he had planned to convey this oral message near end of the meeting. Bhutto said that before he got around to delivering the message, Pres Johnson tackled him on the matter of the invitation to Chou En-lai to visit Pakistan. He said that frankly he had not expected to be reproached on this subject at that time considering the circumstances of his visit to the US and he was taken aback. /3/ The written message cited by Bhutto expressed Ayub's friendship and best wishes to the new President. The text of the message was transmitted to Karachi in telegram 756, December 2. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 15-1 US/JOHNSON) 3. Although his instructions from Pres Ayub were unequivocal that the message should be delivered, he made a quick decision not to convey the message feeling that the atmosphere was not right for the conveyance of his message in the wake of the President's remarks about the GOP invitation to the Chinese Communists. He thought the delivery of the message would seem inappropriate under the circumstances, and its impact would be lost. He said he even felt that it might seem like a weak, unauthorized and improvised defense against the criticism levelled at the GOP action. 4. He said he had told Pres Ayub of his non-delivery of the message, and the reason therefor, as soon as he returned to Pakistan. He did not state Pres Ayub's reaction, but the inference was that Ayub had at least tacitly approved his action, since no further effort has been made to deliver the message. 5. He then said he would summarize the message to me. Message in words as close to those actually used by Bhutto as I can recall them, was as follows: "My President (Pres Ayub) has instructed me to inform you (Pres Johnson) that you can consider yourself relieved of one worry, for my government will not under any circumstances reverse its present foreign policy. No government headed by me (Ayub) will enter into an alignment with the Communists or otherwise undermine the existing alliance relationships." 6. Bhutto said that this assurance was to be categorical. It did not have any escape clause. It was unqualified so long as Ayub remained at the head of the GOP. 7. I agreed that message was of great significance and told Bhutto that I considered it most unfortunate that a means had not been found to transmit the message as an actual statement of prevailing policy. 8. It was quite clear that Bhutto did not consider that he was giving the assurance to me now as current Pakistan policy approved by the Pres. He considers that the matter is back in the hands of Pres Ayub and if the Pres wishes to state this to the US as a binding commitment, it will be up to him to decide on the means of transmitting it to the US Government. 9. Comment: Following my return from Rawalpindi, I with my senior staff have given serious consideration to authenticity and implications of this purported message of assurance. In general, we have some very serious reservations and are not prepared to accept Bhutto's version at face value. More specifically our tentative conclusions are: A) Ayub probably gave Bhutto instructions to give some sort of assurances to Pres Johnson but Bhutto, who probably had doubts as to wisdom of this action, seized on circumstances in meeting to justify not delivering message. We doubt Bhutto would tell me of message if none actually existed since I could check directly with Ayub. Furthermore, there is Bhutto's request for meeting with Pres on grounds he had very important message from Ayub which was not in fact forthcoming. Our review of memcon also leads to conclusion Bhutto had more than adequate opportunity deliver message, but hesitated and then seized on exchange regarding Chou En-lai visit to rationalize its non-delivery. B) Assurances quoted to me have no binding force and we suspect that Bhutto may be seeking get best of both worlds, trying to ease our concern by this backhanded quotation of intended message and yet avoiding putting assurances in form of actual commitment. Such action would be consistent with Bhutto's posture in recent months. C) In any event, Ayub had subsequent opportunities during Taylor and Shriver visits and during my Jan 14 meeting to give us those assurances and did not choose to do so. D) There may well be element of threat in implication by Bhutto he not certain same assurances will be reauthorized by Ayub. 10. It is highly important that we probe in some discreet manner to ascertain what is back of this recital, and to see if Ayub now willing to give us assurance in categorical terms quoted by Bhutto. But this needs to be done without destroying my relationship with Bhutto. I will make recommendations after short further reflection. McConaughy
13. National Security Action Memorandum No. 279/1/ Washington, February 8, 1964. /1/ Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSAMs, NSAM 279, Military Assistance to India and Pakistan. Secret. Copies were sent to the AID Administrator and the Director of Central Intelligence. MEMORANDUM FOR SUBJECT I have no objection to going forward with exploratory approaches looking toward possible five year MAP programs for India and Pakistan under the conditions described in the Secretary of State's 16 January memorandum to me./2/ /2/ Document 3. However, I do not believe that we should yet discuss MAP levels with either country. Until we have a clearer idea of the prospect for the FY 1965 aid program, it seems to me premature to indicate to India or Pakistan how much military aid they might be able to count upon, regardless of how tentatively we put it. Instead, we should indicate to both governments that they should prepare austere minimum five year programs. Then, as their plans mature and as we get a better reading on Congressional attitudes, we can make a final decision on what MAP to provide. Furthermore, in the course of these discussions I desire that the following precautions be observed: 1. We should make clear to both countries what we expect of them in return for prospective long-term military aid. As to India, we particularly want it to hold foreign exchange diversions from development to defense to a reasonable level, lest we end up indirectly helping finance an excessive defense effort via aid which we provide for quite another purpose. 2. In the case of Pakistan, our MAP help should be appropriately linked to satisfactory performance with respect to its alliance obligations and to our intelligence facilities. 3. Both governments must be made to understand that no irrevocable five year MAP commitments can be undertaken by the US, both because aid levels each year will depend on Congress and because our actual aid each year will depend on continuing Pakistani and Indian performance. 4. Our approaches to India and Pakistan should be timed for optimum impact. For example, I do not believe that we should initially approach Pakistan until we have assessed the results of the Chou En-lai visit. With these caveats, I approve proceeding along the lines of the Secretary of State's 16 January proposals. L.B.J.
14. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations/1/ Washington, February 12, 1964, 12:10 p.m. /1/ Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 32-1 INDIA-PAK. Confidential; Priority; Limdis. Drafted by Laise on February 11 and approved by Talbot. Also sent to Karachi and repeated to New Delhi and London. A memorandum of this conversation is ibid., POL INDIA-PAK. 2174. Following summary for information only and contents should not be disclosed to foreign officials. It is uncleared and subject to amendment upon review of memcon. On very short notice FonMin Bhutto and Agha Shahi/2/ came to Washington February 10 for small working dinner at Secretary's invitation. SC Kashmir debate predominated. Bhutto made strong pitch for necessity of having current SC consideration terminate with resolution even if Soviets vetoed. He stressed importance of this: (1) to hearten people of Kashmir in new situation presented by recent demonstrations; (2) to continue to bring force of world opinion to bear on Indian actions; (3) to avoid deterioration in US-Pakistan relations. Secretary sought to make clear that US attitude toward Pakistan or Kashmir issue has not changed but that touchstone of our policy is Peiping. Our overriding concern is general war and necessity for curbing Peiping's aggressiveness. This is reason for our sensitivity to French moves, but more particularly Pakistan's/3/ because latter is power in Asia. Bhutto stated that if there were an honorable settlement of Kashmir, Ayub's 1959 offer/4/ could prevail, though he did not want this revealed to Indians. Secretary also told Bhutto our influence is limited both Pindi and Delhi and that requirement for solution of Kashmir in long run is desire of two countries for good relations. World opinion not likely to influence India any more than Pakistan. It is "mistake of lifetime" to think that India can be coerced. There is need for informal discussions among rational elements on both sides; with changing leadership in India, Pakistan has an opportunity to build climate favorable to reduction of tensions. /2/ Bhutto was in the United States to participate in the Security Council debate on Kashmir. Shahi was an official of the Pakistani Foreign Ministry. /3/ Reference is to French and Pakistani initiatives to normalize relations with China. /4/ Apparent reference to the offer Ayub made on December 22, 1959, at the urging of Ambassador Rountree, to issue a joint declaration with India that all questions between India and Pakistan would be settled for the indefinite future by peaceful negotiations, provided that prior agreement had been reached on basic principles, including settlement of the Kashmir dispute. See Foreign Relations, 1958-1960, vol. XV, pp. 197-201. In course of this discussion Bhutto claimed Ayub domestic position stronger in 1964 than in 1959. Appropos of nothing he warned that US was wrong to think it could separate individuals in GOP; he stated that as FonMin he spoke for Ayub and US must have confidence in GOP as whole. Bhutto seemed willing to consider consensus/5/ if it injected SYG and made it clear past SC resolutions are binding. However, Ambassador Ahmed continued to stress setback to US-Pak relations to point Bhutto chided him with observation US-Pak relations are more abiding than this. /5/ Reference is to a proposed consensus statement advanced by the Ivory Coast Representative to the Security Council to substitute for a resolution on Kashmir viewed as certain to be vetoed by the Soviet Union. Extensive reporting on the debate on Kashmir in the Security Council is in National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 32-1 INDIA-PAK. In post-mortem following dinner Secretary stated we should try to strengthen Ivory Coast consensus; that there is no point in being even-handed on substance of Kashmir in view our basic position; but that resolution should not be crammed down our throats with Chou visit coming up. Invitation extended by Secretary to Indian rep Chagla for working dinner February 14 turned down; efforts to find mutually acceptable time for appointment February 11 failed owing to prior engagements and weather./6/ /6/On February 12, Ambassador Bowles reported on a meeting he had that day with Lal Bahadur Shastri, Minister Without Portfolio charged by the Indian Government with responsibility for seeking to lower the level of tension in Kashmir. Shastri expressed deep concern over the course of the UN debate concerning Kashmir and stated that without U.S. neutrality in the debate, he would face great difficulties in achieving his mission in Kashmir. (Telegram 2391 from New Delhi, February 12; ibid.) Rusk
15. Telegram From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State/1/ Karachi, February 13, 1964, 5:30 p.m. /1/ Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 32-1 INDIA-PAK. Secret; Immediate; Limdis. Repeated to New Delhi, USUN, and London and passed to the White House. 1520. Kashmir. 1. I saw President for forty minutes in his Karachi office this morning. FonSec Aziz Ahmed also present. Pres was in good and responsive mood, although naturally concerned about various difficult foreign policy problems before him. Principal topic was Security Council consideration of Kashmir issue which is reported herein. Other topics reported separately./2/ /2/ In telegram 1529 from Karachi, February 14, McConaughy reported on that part of his conversation with Ayub in which they briefly discussed the visit to Pakistan by Chinese Premier Chou En-lai, which was scheduled to begin on February 18. (Ibid.) McConaughy reported in telegram 1530 from Karachi, February 14, on the part of the discussion relating to the military assistance program. (Ibid., DEF 19-3 US-PAK) I first delivered Mrs. Kennedy's Jan 23 letter of appreciation for Pakistani sympathy and support after death of Pres Kennedy./3/ Pres read letter in my presence and responded feelingly. /3/ Not found. 2. Pres turned to Kashmir debate in SC, urging that US support strong UN resolution, notwithstanding certainty of Soviet veto. He felt resolution would have strong effect regardless of Soviet opposition, meaning of which would not be lost on people of Pakistan or the world. On other hand he thought "consensus statement," especially in watered-down version and lacking unanimous support, would not have any propulsive effect, would not be interpreted as a meaningful action by the people of Pakistan, and would not give UN SecGen needed strong encouragement to enter Kashmir scene in an intermediary role. 3. President expressed particular unhappiness with reports he said he was still receiving from New York indicating that US was actively working against resolution and was pushing for diluted type of consensus statement as suggested by Ivory Coast representative. He understood that Ivory Coast draft would play into Indian hands by mingling Kashmir issue with other disputes between Pakistan and India in way which would prevent UN concentration on Kashmir and would enable Indians to divert attention from Kashmir and go through form of general bilateral discussions without ever having to face up to Kashmir question. 4. President said if these reports were accurate he wanted to plead earnestly with us to reconsider US position. He felt that GOI could perhaps be moved by resolution but not by fuzzy consensus. He said "Hindu are naturally bullies," but he said it was also characteristic of them to trim their sails quickly when they saw it was expedient to do so. He felt a resolute US position would be the best way of constraining the Indians to see where their best interests lay. 5. President hoped we would see that our broad objective of protection and security of subcontinent hinged entirely on Kashmir settlement. He argued that defense of every sector of subcontinent closely interrelated and penetration of any sector by either Soviet or Chinese Communism would pave the way for ultimate fall of entire subcontinent. As long as Kashmir remained source of fundamental discord and open wound on body of subcontinent, way was open for Communist infection of whole subcontinent by Communists. A strong cooperative defense of the subcontinent would be automatically established once the vulnerable Kashmir exposure is healed. The President professed his dismay that we could not see that our heavy expenditure on military assistance to India was wasted so long as Kashmir remained unsolved. Even from narrow standpoint our security concern would be best served by Kashmir settlement and he could not understand why we did not make such settlement the highest and most urgent objective of US policy in subcontinent. 6. I told President that Kashmir solution stood high on our priority list as it had for many years. I recalled our consistent support of UN resolutions and told him this position unchanged and that our differences at this moment over how to proceed in SC were essentially tactical rather than substantive. I urged President to look objectively at merits of strong consensus statement making essential points about (1) UN history of dispute and (2) importance of respecting will of Kashmir people, as against hunting up a resolution which would have no operative or Parliamentary validity because of inevitable Soviet veto. I said that a good consensus statement embodying the essential points and confirmed by SC President as representing views of preponderant majority of SC might well have less abrasive effect on Indians and have more potential for moving Kashmir negotiation forward than repetition of traditional resolution exercise. I thought that the significance and the hope in a good consensus statement could be explained to people of Pakistan in terms they would understand as a more realistic UN effort under present conditions than more repetition of ill-fated resolution attempt. 7. President said if consensus statement would in actuality carry more weight than a vetoed resolution, GOP would of course have to consider it but he doubted whether there was any real tangible potential in a consensus statement. He said if the consensus statement strongly covered the two points I had mentioned plus a third point, namely definite recommendation that UN SecGen U Thant or his nominee come into Kashmir picture in some sort of intermediary role, and if general assent to consensus statement by SC members could be obtained, then GOP possibly could go along. But not otherwise. He said he thought it was very important to find out what it would take to get U Thant actively into the Kashmir picture and he hoped our delegation would promptly explore this point in connection with its consideration of consensus versus resolution. He was worried about effect on US image among Pak people if for first time we do not promote resolution and he thought we would see the merit of putting Soviet Union rather than US in a blameworthy position in the eyes of Pak people. Also worried about effect on GOP position with Pak people of first failure to get impressive SC vote on a formal resolution. He said specifically that GOP understands certainty of Soviet veto and is prepared to live with that situation. Vetoed resolution would be better than a diluted consensus statement and better than a questionable consensus which might be rendered meaningless by non-concurrence of various members. 8. I mentioned Bhutto's working dinner with Secretary in Washington Feb 10 and told him that extended exchange on this issue had taken place. I stressed our view that voluntary Indian participation in Kashmir settlement effort was essential and that coercion of India on the issue would not lead to a viable Kashmir solution and was out of the question. 9. President agreed that India could not be coerced but he felt that Indian inertia on the question might be overcome by discreet US push. As Indians gain momentum perhaps they could be brought to see that Kashmir settlement is in their own immediate vital security interest. President maintained that other Indo-Pak issues, including joint defense, evictions, communal tension, trade and transit would wither away in light of Kashmir accord. 10. I told President that his statement that GOP might consider strong consensus statement commanding overwhelming support of SC membership was encouraging, and that we would continue to explore the possibilities. I indicated my assumption that Bhutto would keep in close touch with USDel. McConaughy
16. Telegram From the Embassy in India to the Department of State/1/ New Delhi, February 20, 1964, 11:30 a.m. /1/ Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 32-1 INDIA-PAK. Confidential. Repeated to London, Karachi, and USUN and passed to the White House. 2445. Department pass White House. Security Council debate on Kashmir/2/ has touched off predictable emotional outburst in both Indian official and public circles which has damaged UK-U.S.-Indian relations and further widened gap between India and Pakistan. /2/ On February 17, Foreign Minister Bhutto asked for and received a postponement of the Security Council debate on Kashmir to allow him to return to Karachi for consultations and new instructions. (Telegram 3114 from USUN, February 17; ibid.) Bhutto joined Chou En-lai and his party when they began their visit to Pakistan on February 18. (Telegram 1588 from Karachi, February 25; ibid.) On basis of discussions with MPs now in Delhi for current Lok Sabha session and with GOI officials and diplomatic colleagues, it is clear feeling now runs deep. Although British bearing full brunt of Indian indignation and resentment, U.S. is in strong runner-up position. In Calcutta press conference last Friday attended by some fifty newsmen, questioning on U.S. position in regard to Kashmir-Pakistan was more relentless than anything I had previously experienced in India. I refused to comment on U.S. position in regard to Kashmir on grounds Stevenson had not yet spoken and underscored as on similar occasions urgent need for some solution to Pak-India impasse acceptable to both sides. When anti-British statements became extreme I reminded press reps that UK as well as U.S. had been quick to come to India's aid when ChiComs attacked while USSR was unable to make up its mind. Even more moderate Indian press reps suggested afterwards that my remarks were beyond call of duty. At small stag dinner at my home last night attended by Ashoka Mehta, Lakshmi Jain of Indian Cooperative Union, S.K. Dey, Minister of State for Community Development and Cooperation, Vkrv Rao, Pitamber Pant and Raj Krishna, all of Planning Commission, subject of Kashmir-Pakistan-U.S. relationship wholly absorbed an evening that had been set aside for economic discussions. Even these firm friends of U.S. with their deep understanding of what we have done to bolster Indian economy were, with single exception of Ashoka Mehta, emotional and unreasonable. General theme running through discussion was that while Indians are appreciative for our economic and military assistance matters of national pride have become so involved in Kashmir-Pak situation that Indians can no longer afford to be taken for granted. Mood was both strongly anti-Communist and anti-Chinese with no suggestion of compromise on either position. However, heavy emphasis was placed on fact that Nehru era is drawing to close and regardless of efforts of presumably sober people like themselves India which had been denied close relations it wanted with U.S. would now find itself drifting further from West and towards admittedly rambunctious and unappealing role which they assert has been practiced successfully by other nations. Against this background following is our estimate of four factors which have contributed to this widespread emotional reaction. However unreasonable they may appear to us it is important that we understand them if we are to act realistically and effectively. 1. Factors that apply in general to India's relationship to what is loosely known as "the West": Following ChiCom aggression in Oct 1962 and Pak flirtation with our major Asian enemy there was deep conviction within GOI and among Indian people that their relations with West would now be on new and much closer footing. They felt this assumption was particularly valid in view of their efforts to maintain moderate response to what they genuinely believe to be accelerated Pak effort to stir up subcontinent and thereby prevent closer India-U.S. relations. Efforts to which they refer include decision of year ago, against their better judgment, to hold talks on Kashmir and to offer what they believed to be important concessions; agreement in December not to close Shillong in retaliation for Rajshahi; restraint following second wave of Pak riots on Jan 18 and 20; Nanda-Shastri proposal for joint review of communal riots by Home Ministers; GOI willingness to negotiate question of illegal Muslim settlers in Assam and Tripura at Ministerial level as requested by GOP (if those meetings went well they asserted that they would agree to discuss Kashmir itself), etc. When Pakistan failed to respond to these GOI efforts to ease tensions and took issue to SC Indians were keenly aware that we deplored this action, and therefore jumped to conclusion that UK-US position would at best favor GOI and at worse remain neutral. 2. Factors involving their own internal problems: GOI is embittered over fact that following Nehru's illness Pakistan had seemed to take ruthless advantage of period of political uncertainty which is now aggravated by Chou En-lai's State visit to Pakistan. Further to feed GOI frustration is embarrassment caused by their belated recognition that Kashmir govt which they built around Bakshi in addition to being corrupt had no public support whatsoever. At same time they are resentful of what they believe to be deliberate appeals by Paks to arouse religious antagonism previous to and following theft of sacred relic, appeals which they feel gravely threatened their vision of secular state in India in which all religions can live peacefully together. Finally new group headed by Shastri and Kamaraj which is gradually moving into leadership of GOI was itself persuaded of need for finding some basis for settlement Kashmir dispute and now finds itself badgered by extremists with little hope of meaningful discussions for some time to come. 3. Factors which produced particularly strong anti-British reaction: Ever since turn of century most Indians have been persuaded that British deliberately backed Muslim minority against Hindu majority as basic means of forestalling Indian independence. They feel that this British policy was thereby responsible for final partition which in their view unnecessarily split continent wide open and led to present difficulties. Indians look on British Conservative Party with particularly deep distrust. Duncan Sandys and Home are considered lineal descendants of British Viceroys who supported by Conservative govts in London were responsible for putting almost every member of present GOI in prison for at least one or two terms. Against this background they were infuriated by British SC suggestion that original accession of Kashmir to India in 1947 approved by Viceroy and by act of Parliament was irrelevant. Moreover in endorsing past SC resolutions both British and ourselves have emphasized self determination features of August 1948 resolution which Indians know have great appeal to people all over world while failing to mention related reference in same resolution that Paks must agree to withdraw from Azad Kashmir as prerequisite of self-determination process. 4. Factors which relate to Indian criticisms of U.S.: In India President Kennedy was looked upon as special friend who was author of Indian resolution in Congress, who had frequently spoken in behalf of Indian aid, and who had singled out India as great experiment in democracy. With loss of this friend, Indians now believe we favor Pakistan in its disagreement with India and discount India's importance. From this basic assumption have stemmed two further reactions. First of these is belief that military assistance program which after my return from Washington in Nov and particularly following Max Taylor's visit here two weeks later was assumed to be forthcoming was held up because of pressure by Paks on Johnson administration and second, feeling that Paks would not have taken Kashmir issue to SC if not convinced that new administration was oriented favorably in their direction. However unjust this may appear to people in Washington it must be realized that this is deep-seated conviction that runs through Indian Govt, press, Lok Sabha and informed citizens generally. In this framework Chagla's/3/ reports that U.S. had pushed Great Britain into forward role and quietly urged Ivory Coast to put forward formula that supported Pak position received credence which it did not deserve. /3/ M.C. Chagla, Indian Minister of Education, was representing India in the Security Council debate on Kashmir. Although these reactions may appear unreasonable and distorted we should not minimize their implications. In spite of great personal influence and prestige of Gore-Booth British ability to exercise constructive influence here will be circumscribed for some time. Krishna Menon has been given platform and equipped with issue on which he excels. His Feb 14 speech was effective and received reaction from sizable majority of Lok Sabha. Civil servants such as Gundevia who have preached futility of dealing with Paks and need for firm line have been strengthened, while moderates are being forced to get on bandwagon. After Congress Parliamentary Party executive indignation meeting on Feb 14 fifty-one Congress MPs issued statement sharply critical of pro-Pakistan stand of British. Signatories included such staunch pro-U.S. moderates as Tyagi K.C. Pant, Raghunath Singh and Ravindra Varma. Another element in general worsening situation is hardening of views of West Bengal politicians on status of East Pak Hindus and increasing communal attitude towards refugee problem which I encountered in Calcutta. Most distressing of all is fact that throughout India, Pakistan controversy once again dominates news and China for first time in over year is off front page. In addition Indians have again been forcefully reminded of Soviet contribution to GOI's position on Kashmir and of importance of non-alignment in order to insure continued Soviet support at very moment when MIG-21s and SAMs are under discussion with USSR. Although situation to put it mildly is unhappy one, it is no time for discouragement. In every way available to us we will strive to calm down GOI officials and to encourage more sober reaction from press. If Paks do not indulge in further provocative actions in connection with Chou En-lai visit or otherwise we may be able to resume in due course constructive dialogue with GOI which will underscore overriding need for Indians and Paks to seek some means by which they can live together in rational manner. Lest we lose perspective I think I should report that difficult dinner of last evening followed busy day in and around Kanpur where I encountered strong pro American sentiment at Engineering College and in two nearby villages where several hundred cultivators assured me that "Indians and Americans are brothers". Bowles
17. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Pakistan/1/ Washington, February 21, 1964, 6:51 p.m. /1/ Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, DEF 19-3 US-INDIA. Secret; Priority; Limdis. Drafted by Cameron; cleared by Deputy Director of the Office of Near Eastern and South Asian Regional Affairs John P. Walsh, Solbert, Harriman, and Komer, and in draft by Dean, Frazier Meade (BNA), Joseph Norbury (SOV), Howard Meyers (G/PM), William S. Gaud (AID/NESA), and Hirshberg (AID/PC); and approved by Talbot. Repeated to London, New Delhi, CINCSTRIKE, and Hong Kong. 1086. We are transmitting by separate messages Secretary's January 16 Memorandum to the President on "Military Assistance to India and Pakistan" and National Security Action Memorandum of February 8/2/ giving President's approval with certain caveats. Following represents our thoughts how best proceed within above policy guidelines. (Separate instructions being sent Embassy New Delhi.)/3/ /2/ In telegram 1084 to Karachi, also sent to New Delhi as telegram 1687, and telegram 1083 to Karachi, also sent to New Delhi as telegram 1686, both February 21. (Both ibid.) /3/ Document 18. In view para 4 of NSAM, we can go no further now than to pass to you our preliminary thoughts about communicating our decisions to Ayub. As we see it, this process involves four distinct steps: 1. A signal to Ayub that our thinking on military aid is well along and that we hope to be able to talk in greater detail before end of March. Deptel 1045/4/ authorized you to take this step with Ayub in your conversation on Feb. 13 and we see from Embtel 1530/5/ that you have done so. Our thoughts behind this instruction were: /4/ Dated February 12. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 32-1 INDIA-PAK) /5/ See footnote 2, Document 15. (a) Since we plan convey our decisions to GOI within near future but to GOP only after estimating effect Chou visit, it was urgent to give a signal to Ayub that we still planned to move ahead roughly in parallel. (b) In the event info of our approach to GOI reaches GOP, the fact that we had given a signal to GOP could be helpful in dampening its reaction. If leak occurs you could also remind GOP of statements about US military aid to India made by General Taylor to Ayub (Embtel 1189)./6/ /6/ Dated December 21, 1963. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1961-63, ORG 7 JCS) (c) Conceivably our signal could exert some moderating influence on GOP during Chou visit. 2. An assessment of the results of the Chou visit in terms of US-Pak-Chicom relations would be second step. 3. Third step would be a formal approach to Ayub setting forth the political framework within which we are prepared to engage in long-term military assistance to Pakistan. This step would take place as soon as practicable after completion of step two and certainly before visit to Pakistan by General Adams (JCS 4526 from CJCS for MG Ruhlen)./7/ Intent of formal approach will be to use prospect of continued military assistance both as a carrot to demonstrate value of continued alliance relationship and as a lever to get from Pakistan the necessary assurances that it will limit its relationship with Peiping and pursue policies in general which will not be adverse to US interests. We expect to insist on a genuine meeting of minds on these issues, and continuing performance, as the condition for this aid. /7/ Not found. 4. The fourth step would be technical discussions on military level about planning for five year program. Believe General Adams might initiate these discussions. We will count on you and Hong Kong to give us your best judgment on results Chou visit. We shall then send you instructions on carrying out steps 3 and 4. FYI. We have already told Paks in December that we intend going ahead with longer term aid. In fact, by our indicating general magnitude of $50 million, the Paks now know more of our intentions than we are as yet able to tell Indians. Therefore, if US-GOI talks raised with you before you are able to have full discussion with Ayub, you should take line that (1) GOP already informed in December that we are going ahead with military aid program for India and general thinking within Executive Branch about its scope, (2) we are having discussions this future program, (3) GOP will be kept informed when talks with GOI come into clear focus, and (4) we hope to hold parallel discussions with GOP on appropriate occasion before end of March. End FYI. Ball
18. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in India/1/ Washington, February 21, 1964, 6:52 p.m. /1/ Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, DEF 19-3 US-INDIA. Secret; Priority; Limdis. Drafted by David T. Schneider and Franklin J. Crawford (NEA/SOA); cleared in draft by Walsh, Gaud, Norbury, and Meade and by Warren, Dean, Komer, Solbert, Hirshberg, and Harriman; and approved by Talbot. Repeated to Karachi, London, and CINCSTRIKE/CINCMEAFSA. 1690. New Delhi's 2221 to Department./2/ We are now in position to make exploratory approaches to GOI looking toward possible five-year MAP program for India. We have transmitted separately text of President's decision on military assistance for India and Pakistan as well as text Secretary's memorandum to President of Jan. 16./3/ You will understand requirement to observe most carefully caveats on NSAM. These documents, plus General Taylor's report/4/ and Secretary's memorandum to President of Dec. 11,/5/ which you already have, provide framework for your approach. /2/ Not found. /3/ See footnote 2, Document 17. /4/ See footnote 2, Document 3. /5/ Printed in Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, vol. XIX, Document 342. While package has changed during its consideration here, which will complicate your task of negotiating it in Delhi, our willingness in principle to go forward on a long-term MAP program marks a major step forward, significance of which should not be lost on Indians. Moreover, it represents potential program of considerable magnitude. Your extensive talks with Indian leaders have laid excellent groundwork for gaining Indian acceptance concepts upon which our proposals based. As indicated below we are adding one and possibly two elements which may make Indians more receptive to your approach: our willingness to place all aid on grant basis and possibly some dollar military sales on favorable terms under an export promotion program. It seems to us General Taylor's approach provides us with best point of departure from which to follow-up, and get Indians make policy decisions which we consider sound as part their own plan. Thus, rather than seeking understandings from Indians re force levels, diversion of foreign exchange, etc., we would look to them to prepare their own austere plan which would satisfactorily deal with these factors. In this approach to GOI you should take following line: 1. Since Chicom invasion in fall of 1962 USG has been fully cognizant of India's determination build its defenses against continuing Chicom threat and its need for external assistance. To this end we first extended emergency Nassau aid. We are now following this up with roughly similar amounts of assistance for FY '64. It has now become more evident that India will require assistance over an additional period of years. Our assistance has been based upon our careful examination of the threat to Indian security, India's military requirements to defend itself over the long-term against this threat, Indian absorptive capacity and availability of US resources. Our latest studies of this question have included extensive consultation in New Delhi and Washington and have encompassed a review of the over-all situation at highest levels of USG. 2. However, central to India's own defense planning is need for inter-ministerial decisions by which Indian Government establishes sensible long-term military program, and achieves balanced relationship between this and its economic programs. General Taylor made this point clear in December, and we have been waiting for further word as to firming up of Indian plans. 3. To move this process forward, US now ready to discuss possible five-year military assistance program to India provided GOI works out austere minimum five-year plan for defense against Chinese Communist threat, taking into account needs of its military services. For purposes of preparing their plan GOI should assume minimum levels of assistance which it considers it requires and can obtain from foreign sources. It must be made clear that US assistance will, of course, be subject to availability of funds. No irrevocable commitments can be undertaken because Congressional appropriations will rule. Moreover, we want to make clear that actual level of our aid must depend on continued joint understanding as to purposes for which provided and effective utilization. 4. We realize planning of kind outlined above is time-consuming process. Consequently, if necessary, we are prepared to continue our military assistance during FY '65 at approximately current levels (FYI. As you know FY '64 program level is $50 million. End FYI.) until detailed Indian plan can be worked out. 5. A satisfactory Indian military plan should cover following factors: (A) Allocation of Scarce Resources Between Development and Defense. We are confident that Indians are aware of need to avoid stripping their economic development program to pay for a military build-up. In countering Chicom threat, continued economic growth is at least as important over long run as military strength. A satisfactory plan would hold to minimum diversion of resources, particularly foreign exchange, from economic development. We feel this point especially keenly because US is largest provider of scarce foreign exchange to Indian 5-Year Plans. US does not want both to provide MAP to meet what we regard as legitimate Indian needs and simultaneously to see additional hard currency which we provide for quite another purpose, diverted from it. (B) Allocation of Resources Among Indian Military Services. Just as any Indian defense plan would reflect decision on allocation of resources between defense and economic development, it would also set priorities among competing needs of Indian military services. It follows, therefore, that we would look to GOI to make initial decision on priorities for use of US assistance as between ground and air defenses, to meet Chicom threat. Should Indians inquire concerning our reaction if they include high performance aircraft from Free World sources in their plan, you should reply it up to them to establish relative priorities and individual items will be considered in our review of the overall plan. FYI. We see these coming later rather than sooner in plan for reasons of pricing, availability, Indian capacity to absorb, and, of course, reaction in Pakistan. End FYI. We obviously see number of MIGs and SAMs which Indians acquire from Soviets as affecting extent to which it necessary for US to fill Indian needs. (C) Force Levels. Satisfactory Indian plan would include time phased levels of force goals which were realistic in terms of limited resources available to India for defense purposes. (D) Soviet Military Assistance. Any Indian defense plan will, of course, take into account military assistance from all sources. In deciding on extent to which we can support such plan US will naturally be interested in extent and types of Soviet assistance GOI contemplates. We are aware that India has already made certain military purchase arrangements with Soviet Union. We recognize that Indians will be accepting some Soviet aid. We do, however, proceed from assumption that West is clearly more reliable source of support to India against Chicoms. Our specific judgment on significance of Soviet military assistance would be determined by number of factors including following: quantities and types of Soviet aid accepted, effect on security US equipment, compatibility of differing types equipment, extent to which Soviet assistance requires introduction Soviet technicians, impact of Soviet aid, degree of Indian dependence on Soviets, and U.S. Congressional attitudes. (See Deptels 1281 December 23, 1963/6/ and 96 July 10, 1963./7/) /6/ Printed ibid., Document 349. /7/ Not found. 6. In sum, we presume among other elements Indians would wish include following in their five-year plan: a. Their estimate of threat, to include most probable scale of Chinese Communist attack, if any. b. Statement of Indian resources available during period for military purposes, expressed in terms of internal expenditures and foreign exchange outlays. c. Assumption for planning purposes of minimum foreign assistance required and obtainable from all countries. d. Decision on force levels supportable by application of foregoing resources. e. Assessment of impact of this military program on economic development (including an assessment of total external assistance required to support this plan together with economic development plans). f. Decisions on defense production. 7. GOI will understand that US has been assisting India within context of broad agreement on certain aspects of foreign policy. Our assistance is provided to strengthen India against possibility of renewed Chinese Communist aggression. This assistance has greatly complicated our relations with Pakistan, and has become a new factor in Indo-Pak relations. You should drive home point that if we agree to support an Indian five-year plan we would assume India would in its national interest continue to explore ways of improving its relations with Pakistan. Furthermore, we would naturally expect India and US would continue in broad agreement regarding their assessment of Chicom threat to Asia and strategy required to meet it. 8. As further support to India's defense effort, US has under consideration new program of military sales so that certain high priority items not covered by MAP could be purchased from US on favorable credit terms. FYI. We wish emphasize still contingent status of this program. Since India will continue to make substantial military purchases abroad from own resources, we see considerable merit to military sales program for our balance of payments purposes. If program approved, terms will be such as to allow us to compete effectively for this foreign exchange. End FYI. 9. In response Indian request we are now willing to provide all our MAP aid on grant basis, provided that satisfactory arrangements are made for meeting USMSMI rupee expenses by GOI. FYI. Suggest you use this as bargaining tool to obtain Indian agreement to Memorandum of Understanding I. We will send further instructions regarding Memorandum of Understanding II. End FYI. 10. We realize defense planning of the kind we believe India should do may tax Indian capabilities. Should GOI desire, we stand ready to provide advice in defense planning techniques. (FYI. This is delicate area. Any assistance rendered would be only in techniques, and US planners would not participate in decision as to content of Indian plan. You are authorized use this opportunity renew our invitation to Defense Minister Chavan visit US, accompanied by appropriate military and civilian officers, to study our techniques for defense planning. You may also wish explore concept of permanent national security planning organization with full time staff, which we believe India needs. End FYI.) We plan have discussion with Ambassador B.K. Nehru here along above lines. We will also go over our plans with British Embassy. We know you will wish have similar talks with British in Delhi but we believe you should refrain from wide discussion (e.g., in Coordination Committee) for the present. Particularly since we have not yet had discussions with Paks on our MAP plans there it is important that we do utmost to keep info on our plans for India closely held. You should not approach GOI prior departure Chou En-lai from Pakistan. Ball [Continue with the next documents]
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