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FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1964-1968, Volume XXV South Asia
Department of State |
30. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State/1/ London, March 25, 1964, 2 p.m. /1/ Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL INDIA-PAK. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Repeated to New Delhi and Karachi for the Ambassadors only and passed to the White House at 1:15 p.m. 4705. For the Secretary from Talbot. 1. Since leaving subcontinent I have been pondering grave deterioration of Indo-Pak relations and implications for our policies, on which I should now like to comment. 2. As usual situation includes many conflicting strands. Compared to several years ago, both countries show substantial modernization and development, especially in cities and towns. Recent tours of Ambassador Bowles in South India and Ambassador McConaughy in East Pakistan yielded warm and friendly receptions. It is clear that in both countries our long-term policies are having beneficial effects; it is US which is looked to first for understanding and support. 3. Internal dynamics of India and Pakistan are, however, in sharpest contrast in years. With Nehru dessicated, Indian top leadership is defensive and defiant in face of farm shortfalls, rising prices, bankruptcy of Kashmir policy, conviction that Paks and ChiComs are making common cause, and evident reduction of Indian influence in Afro-Asian and world councils. Despite impact in economy and development, therefore, Indians now scheduling annual military outlays of nearly $2 billion, with emphasis on defense production and fascination with sophisticated weaponry. 4. Moreover, Indian focus on ChiComs as prime enemy has in recent months been befogged by Pak policies which have also refurbished position of Pak haters in India. Last year's confidence US would help India against China has consequently now been diluted by doubts US would similarly be available to restrain Paks if they should cause trouble alone or in association with ChiComs. Indians therefore are increasingly of mood to hedge position by finding alternative sources of military equipment. As fears of Pakistan have risen, earlier reluctance to become dependent on Soviet supplies has been dropping. Now many Indians seem pleased at prospect that in military procurement as in political field, they can play different options against one another. 5. Pakistan, by contrast, today shows mixture of basic anxieties and new-found buoyancy. While still driven to foreign policy extremes by fear and distrust of India, Paks are sufficiently pleased with prospects of making gains from current Indian weakness so there is risk they will badly over-estimate their tactical advantages. Nonetheless, I believe Shoaib is not alone in recognizing Paks have been suckered by ChiComs and now need to restore balance by greater caution with Peiping and more careful cultivation of US relations. Surprising warm-up of Pak delegation in recent CENTO economic meeting may have meaning in this connection. 6. However, in view centrality of India in Pak perspective we can anticipate Paks like Indians will welcome alternative options to full dependence on US. Assuming they now recognize they cannot cross permissible limits of alliance with ChiComs, Paks could become easy targets of those like De Gaulle and current Iraqi visitor who advocate neutralism in Asia and argue US will live with that. 7. Thus Soviets, ChiComs, neutralists and West--each with own objectives--are kibitzers and to some extent actors in present Indo-Pak turmoil. 8. It is in this context that some Indo-Pak climax is slowly approaching. Kashmir fever, armed clashes on borders, and refugee followers are spreading viruses that erupt in communal killings. These generated high tempers, naked distrust and intransigence on both sides. Most hopeful thing I can see is that situation may be producing its own anti-toxins. In similar crises in past both sides have finally pulled back for negotiations. Sometimes periods of relative calm and constructive activity have ensued. Both countries remain under control today of men who went through 1947 cataclysm. I found several on each side remembering those days and determined not to permit similar disintegration now. 9. Our stakes in subcontinent remain very high. At one level is our interest in preserving and if possible expanding our cooperation with Paks against Soviets and with Indians against ChiComs. At another is importance of preserving and strengthening freedom and viability of this region of 550 million which, if taken over by Communists, would represent setback of dimensions comparable to ChiCom victory of 1949. India and Pakistan are so intertwined we cannot expect either to remain healthy if other disintegrates. With these thoughts in mind, I suggest following policy lines for consideration: A. An over-all stance of sympathy and reserve on most explosive Indo-Pak issues. These conflicts are corrosive and costly, and deserve our understanding. They are also hot issues, and our counsels of restraint are likely have little impact until parties themselves see wisdom in pulling back from brink. Plethora of tactical advice sometimes reduces impact of our interventions at really crucial moments. It also tempts each party to use our readiness for immediate interventions in ploys against other. While I am somewhat out of touch at moment, I suspect this applies just now to refugee movements and communal rioting, for example. B. On Kashmir, a posture of limited diplomatic but, so far as possible, no public activity. For their own reasons Pakistan requires continued external involvement in Kashmir issue and India rejects any. I doubt any external enticement or pressure (within limits tolerable to maintenance of our overall interests in sub-continent) will soon loosen Indian grip on Kashmir. Certainly none will have effect at this moment of defiant weakness. I doubt equally that Ayub can afford to give up political dividends of continuous attack on Kashmir status quo; indeed, pressures on him to permit military pin-pricks and Algeria-type penetrations into Kashmir in absence of progress on diplomatic front may be real. Since this is not an obsolescent issue I believe outside powers involved in sub-continent cannot escape it. Our goal therefore should be to acknowledge it but to tamp it down. Best ploy I can think of is to encourage secret talks outside sub-continent, as privately advocated by Munuddin and B. K. Nehru but not yet by their governments. This would have advantage of being an operation process to keep heat on India but not a public circus. C. On military aid to India, prompt progress toward detailed and intimate discussion of Indian military plans in context of our five-year assistance proposals. To protect its economy as well as to avoid unnecessary provocation of Pakistan, India needs to re-examine its $2 billion military planning figure, with 15%-18% required in foreign exchange. Probably only US can substantially influence it in this direction, and then only if we are genuine participants in its defense build-up. Also, probably only US can press focus on ChiComs as real enemy. Considering our difficulty in applying restraints to ambitions in such countries as Iran and Pakistan, where we have provided bulk of military hardware available to armed forces, we can expect extremely difficult task in peddling advantages of restraint to Indians to whom even $50 million aid level will be only peripheral. Yet costs of failure so significant that major effort will be worthwhile. D. On economic aid to India, continuation of present policies. Need continues great; indeed, as economy grows balance of payments strains also grow, and our interests would be as adversely affected as in part by Indian inability to meet its problems. Even so, we can hardly increase economic aid to India while military expenditures are out of balance. E. On aid to Pakistan, a frank business as usual approach. In recent past we have sought to register our unhappiness with Paks by dragging our feet on aid projects and planning. It has not worked. It is now evident prideful Paks under Ayub's instructions are not raising aid questions with us. Hold-up of Dacca Airport loan, for example, makes us look picayune and a little silly. Economic aid considerations are the same for Pakistan as for India. On military aid, we ought to start talking promptly and with no fanfare about possible five-year planning. Paks know we are entering this phase with India, and as they examine alternative options in immediate future their estimate of our interest in them will be important. I incline to treat Paks in next stage as if Shoaib's assertion they want to improve relations with us were correct. If it is not, we can drag feet later. If it is, we do not want to lose this turn in their thinking by refusing to believe it is true. F. On weaponry, an effort to de-emphasize symbolism of supersonics. At present it seems crux of our military aid posture is yea or nay on supersonics. But rest of world has crossed this bridge and if such little fellows as Iraq and Syria have MIG 21's while we are about to give or sell supersonics to such countries as Iran and Lebanon, both India and Pakistan will find ways to develop supersonic fleets soon. If we could de-emphasize their symbolism and threat them like weaponry our military aid program in both India and Pakistan would be easier to handle. 10. My apologies for length of this message. I have not found time on this trip to distill it further./2/ /2/ McGeorge Bundy sent a copy of this telegram to Komer for comment, noting in the margin, "He's coocoo on the way to treat Ayub." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, India, Cables, Vol. II, 4/64-6/64) Jones
31. Memorandum From Robert Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)/1/ Washington, March 26, 1964. /1/ Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Name File, Komer Memos, Vol. I. Secret. Mac-- Phil Talbot's long cable (London 4705)/2/ strikes me as penetrating in its analysis but feeble in the responses it proposes. /2/ Document 30. Agreed that our stake in the subcontinent remains "very high." Agreed that "some Indo-Pak climax is slowly approaching." Phil's policy recipe for dealing with the matter is, characteristically, not to get too involved and to continue business as usual (i.e. aid). There's much to be said for this recipe. But one major flaw is the assumption that we can stand aloof--if real trouble develops the very fact that our stake is so "high" will tend to drag us in. Most active preventive diplomacy might at least minimize the likelihood of a galloping crisis in which our interests almost inevitably suffer. Cyprus is a case in point. And as in Cyprus, we face a double dilemma on the subcontinent--not only is a risky crisis likely but we are friends with both sides. So we're forced to carry water on both shoulders, to pursue a middle course, to satisfy neither of our suitors, while the Soviets and Chinese take the easy road of backing one side or the other. For these reasons I favor a more active effort to turn aside a Kashmir crisis. Phil himself admits we can't avoid being involved, but his "ploy" of encouraging secret talks will only be accepted if we do a lot of arm-twisting and above all make clear to the "aggressor"--at this point Pakistan--that continued escalation might cost it dearly. I also see compelling reasons for not returning to "a frank business as usual approach" to Ayub on such a slim basis as Shoaib's private assurance that the Paks are coming around. We'll remain trapped on the horns of the Pak/Indian dilemma until we get across to the Paks that they have only a limited partnership with us. We can subsidize their development, protect them against Indian aggression, continue to seek a Kashmir compromise, but we cannot back them in leaning on India. Moreover, we've never had a better opportunity for the necessary readjustment of our Pak relations (to rectify the overcommitment we slid into in 1954-60). Mao's attack awakened the Indians, while Ayub's flirtation with the ChiComs has belatedly made all of us realize that Pakistan's overriding concern is to use us against India. This is wholly understandable, but hardly a mutual US/Pak interest. Moreover, Pakistan's utter--and irreplaceable--dependence on us means we can, with skill, bring it around to accepting our terms, and still giving us the one thing we really want. I feel that if we revert to "business as usual" with Ayub now it will simply convince him that he can have his cake and eat it too. It will embolden him more than deter him. Phil argues that the alternative of registering "our unhappiness with Paks by dragging our feet on aid projects and planning . . . has not worked." I flatly disagree. In the first place this hasn't been a consistent policy--we've wobbled all over the lot. Only in the last few weeks have we begun to growl (even here we had to get Harriman to say what Talbot didn't)/3/ and more important, to show by actions as well as words that we're unhappy (Kashmir SC postponement, not talking 5 year MAP). /3/ On March 16 Under Secretary Harriman called in Pakistani Ambassador Ghulam Ahmed to emphasize U.S. concern about Pakistan's relations with China. Harriman stated that Pakistan's policy added to China's prestige and undermined U.S. interests. He added "we find this distasteful." He expressed the hope that Pakistan would recognize U.S. concerns and would do nothing more to harm U.S. interests. He also admonished Ahmed about the pressure Pakistan was exerting on India on the Kashmir issue, which Harriman stated was counter-productive and undercut U.S. ability to play a constructive role in India. (Telegram 1232 to Karachi, March 17; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 7 PAK-US) On March 31 Foreign Secretary Aziz Ahmed called in Ambassador McConaughy and registered an emphatic objection to the tone and content of Harriman's remarks to Ambassador Ahmed. (Telegram 1838 from Karachi, March 31; ibid.) So what's the risk in waiting at least a few more weeks to see if we've registered before starting to talk MAP. I want more to go on than Shoaib's siren song; I don't think we'll "lose this turn in their thinking" by waiting (it may make them turn more). And I doubt that "we can drag feet later" if we're wrong--it's been all too difficult to get even the half-baked foot-dragging we're doing now./4/ /4/ McGeorge Bundy made a marginal notation next to this paragraph which reads: "I agree strongly and so does LBJ." In sum, I urge (1) holding off till we get a few more signals on five-year MAP approach to Paks; (2) developing a scenario for US/UK preventive action to forestall a major Kashmir crisis this year (let's at least get an option to look at); (3) developing some kind of package to forestall Soviet pre-emption of all aid to the Indian air force (we were hot on this in mid-1962 but no one even heeds Bowles' pleas today). With these amendments, I'd buy Talbot policy lines (otherwise excellent) and see in Bowles' return a real opportunity to get top level focus on them./5/ /5/ Bundy added another handwritten note at the end of the memorandum which reads: "I agree, except I'm less scared and so less activist on Kashmir; I think Talbot's tamp-down is fairly good." RWK
32. Memorandum for the Record/1/ Washington, March 31, 1964. /1/ Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 68 A 306, 333 India. Secret. Prepared by Peter Solbert. SUBJECT 1. General Discussion. Ambassador Bowles discussed the Indian Five Year Defense Plan/2/ and there was agreement that this plan was too large from the point of view of budget, force levels, and number of personnel in the armed forces, and foreign exchange. Ambassador Bowles estimated that the proposed budget would run at about 5.9% of the GNP which was definitely too high. /2/ A copy of the 110-page Indian Five-Year Defense Plan, covering the years 1964-1969, which was presented to the Embassy in New Delhi on March 21, is ibid., 381 India. 2. Aircraft Package. Ambassador Bowles recommended that we offer to the Indians, under our Military Assistance Program something on the order of 70 F6A aircraft for relatively quick delivery and also offer to explore with the Indians the possibility of developing the HF-24. Ambassador Bowles stated that he was sure the Indians would proceed with the HF-24 whether or not we assisted. It was his hope that the foregoing package would be helpful in causing the Indians to reduce or discontinue their proposed MIG production. 3. Conclusions. Mr. McNamara agreed that we could offer the F6A under our Military Assistance Program to India. He also agreed that we could explore with the Indians the practicality of development of the HF-24, possibly with the Rolls Royce engine. Mr. McNamara also stated that our military assistance for India would have to include substantially more defense production (with the result that we might well have to do the same thing for Pakistan). Mr. McNamara also agreed to the proposed Chavan visit in May and will send a letter to Chavan via Ambassador Bowles inviting him to Washington. 4. Future Action. a. Study of the Chinese Air Force. Ambassador Bowles is very anxious to have a detailed study of the Chinese air force as a threat against India. The purpose of this study is to permit Ambassador Bowles to point out the capabilities and weaknesses of the Chinese air threat to India. Ambassador Bowles is leaving for New Delhi on Friday and it is doubtful whether such a study can be prepared by DIA in that time. However, we should collect for Ambassador Bowles a set of presently existing intelligence studies on the Chinese air force. If these studies contain information which Ambassador Bowles should not pass on the Indians we must so indicate to him. b. Comparison of Aircraft. Mr. McNamara would like to have an analysis prepared which will compare the Chinese aircraft capabilities with the capabilities of the F6A, the F5A, the F-104 A/B, the F-104G, the HF-24 in all versions including estimates on Mark II, and MIG 21. The table should also include similar information for certain aircraft in the Indian air force, namely, the Vampire NF-54, Mystere 4A, Hunter F Mark 56, Gnat F Mark I, Toofani, and Vampire FB-52. On a separate sheet information should be set forth concerning the capabilities of aircraft in the Pakistani air force so that a similar comparison can be made between the threat constituted by the Pakistani air force and the above name aircraft. c. Development of the HF-24. Arrangements should be made promptly to send U.S. representatives to India to look into the HF-24 development. A thorough investigation should be made as to the fitness of the Rolls Royce engine for the HF-24; the changes which would have to be made in the airframe design to accommodate the Rolls Royce engine; and the changes which would have to be made in the engine manufacturing plant in order to construct the Rolls Royce engine in India. If necessary U.S. representatives should be sent to England to look into the Rolls Royce engine further. If we need to go outside the armed forces and obtain people from industry to review such matters as the aircraft production plant in India, this should be done. The courses of action on this point would appear to be: (i) a cable to the British confirming our interest in this project and our desire to proceed promptly with the above investigation; (ii) the selection of the right people to go to India and possibly the UK and if necessary, Germany to review the availability of the engine with the Germans; (iii) alerting them so that they can carry out their investigation and be back with a report in the U.S. prior to Chavan's arrival in May; and (iv) obtain from Ambassador Bowles, on his return to New Delhi, assurance that the Indians will cooperate with the U.S. representatives and make all necessary information available to them to prepare their report. d. The F6A. We should be in touch with Douglas Aircraft Corporation to let them know that we are interested in presenting a package to the Indians which would include the rehabilitated F6A. It would be desirable if material comparable to that given to us at the briefing two weeks ago could be prepared for Ambassador Bowles to take back this coming Friday. In the meantime, we should obtain promptly the refined pricing of the F6A and the related spares and training equipment. This will involve determining from Navy what portion of the spares are surplus stock and what portion of the spares would have to be sold by Douglas to India. e. Sidewinders. Steps should be taken to obtain the necessary clearance to release to the Indians the F6A and Sidewinder missiles. This may prove somewhat sticky and should be started immediately so that problems can be ironed out as soon as possible and permission obtained. Peter Solbert
33. Memorandum From Robert Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson/1/ Washington, April 2, 1964. /1/ Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, India, Vol. II, Cables, 4/64-6/64. Secret. Chester Bowles, whom you're seeing at 5:30, is in good spirits and should be no problem. We've met his immediate needs within the guidelines you laid down earlier, and he's not asking for anything more. So a friendly hearing and reassurance you're backing him will fill the bill. The Navy's current phasing out of the old F-6A interceptor has fortuitously permitted McNamara to put together a minimal air package as a means of at least partly pre-empting Soviet SAM and MIG offers. It involves mainly 75 surplus F-6As. While not as good as the F-104s the Paks have (which will mute their reaction), the F-6 is plenty good enough to meet the Chicom air threat. Total cost with spares, etc. would be only $15-25 million out of planned MAP (not extra). Alternatively, Indians can have two squadrons of F-5As, but not till 1965-67. We and UK will also try to find an engine to power India's homegrown HF-24 fighter, as an alternative to their producing MIG-21s in India. Bowles is happy; he thinks this package good enough to show the Indians we genuinely want to help, though there's only a fighting chance they'll actually bite. Beyond this, he's made three points back here: 1. With Nehru on his last legs, this is a time of maximum weakness and indecision in Delhi. The emerging leadership, especially Shastri--the heir apparent, looks good from our viewpoint. Now is the time to encourage them, and to minimize the risk of a swing back toward Menonism. 2. It's also no time for the Paks to lean on India over Kashmir. First, this tactic won't work, because Indians will just crawl into their shells. Second, it diverts Indian eyes from the Chicom threat and back toward Pakistan as Enemy No. 1, which is just what we don't want. 3. The Indians feel we drew back after our first spurt of help to them when the Chicoms attacked. But our new MAP program should help recapture lost ground. The first draft of the Indian five year defense plan we asked for is, as expected, grossly inflated. But it's an asking price, not a final one, and Bowles will go back hard to get it trimmed. Even if cut back to what we think reasonable, however, it will entail more foreign exchange outlays than we and UK are willing to cover under military aid. So to pick up some of this business and help our gold flow, we'll offer reasonable credit terms for some dollar sales. Bowles has a scheme for using a large chunk of the over $300 million in surplus rupees we're holding to set up a bi-national foundation for all sorts of people-to-people programs./2/ Since these rupees are valueless to us, we can't lose. The only real problem is to shepherd this through Congress, on which a friendly word from you may be needed. /2/ Bowles laid out his proposal for a binational educational and cultural foundation in India in airgram A-864 from New Delhi, March 11. (Ibid., Exchanges with Bowles) Attached is a State background piece./3/ I'll sit in, if you've no objection, as the usual precaution against visitors overstating what is said./4/ /3/ Not attached. /4/ No record of the meeting between Bowles and Johnson, nor of a previous meeting scheduled for the day before between Rusk and Bowles, has been found. R. W. Komer/5/ /5/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
34. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ Washington, April 9, 1964, 4:30-5:15 p.m. /1/ Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 77-0075, Memo of Conversations Between Sec. McNamara and Heads of State (other than NATO). Secret. Prepared by Robert J. Murray on April 22. The meeting was held in McNamara's office. SUBJECT PARTICIPANTS Pakistan Side United States Side The Ambassador opened the meeting by indicating that he would like to discuss the letter of General Musa/2/ and the general state of MAP. The Secretary replied that he found the Musa letter one of the most upsetting he had ever read and indicated that it contained a number of misrepresentations. The Secretary said there was ample room for discussion of future performance but little for past performance. /2/This letter from the Commander-in-Chief of the Army of Pakistan has not been found. The Ambassador said that two major problems seemed to be slow induction of equipment and ammunition. Inadequate ammunition reserves and defective ammunition seemed to be causing the Pakistan Army great difficulty. The Secretary said that the ammunition was continuously being delivered and that we had taken steps to correct the defective ammunition. In any case these were the types of things that should be discussed between our respective military people in Pakistan, and the letter indicated to him a complete breakdown of communications on the scene. The Secretary said that if we are at fault we'll change, but "I don't think we are." The Secretary said we could not run the program in this detail from Washington. Ambassador Ahmed stated that President Ayub would like to know if this was a communications problem or whether the MAP difficulties arose from something else. The Secretary replied that it certainly was a communications problem, not anything else--not our unhappiness at Pakistan's current relations with the Chinese. Ambassador Ahmed mentioned that he would like to review a few items in the Musa letter: 1. Parachute Companies. Ambassador Ahmed said the record on this seemed unclear. The Secretary suggested that the record be looked at again: We had promised to increase the battalion from seven to nine companies, five of which were to receive parachute training. This training was now going on. Ambassador Ahmed asked if we could not consider this further and discuss it with General Musa when he is in the United States for the CENTO meetings. The Secretary replied that we could certainly talk about it but that unless new facts had come to light, he did not think the decision would be changed. 2. Hawk Battalions. The Secretary indicated that we had clearly been at fault on this one; we had asked the GOP to organize the necessary battalion personnel and that upon subsequent review of our MAP plans decided that for the limited defense offered and the high cost involved, it was inappropriate to supply one Hawk battalion. It was a question of cost-effectiveness. We should either make a much greater investment than the funds would allow or we should not pro- gram any Hawks at all. Ambassador Ahmed asked if that was where the matter now stands, and the Secretary said it was. The Secretary then reviewed the problem of air defense in general, indicating that in Europe they have just decided that a complete air defense was not worth the price. The Secretary noted that the Soviets had spent billions of dollars on their air defense and we can still penetrate them at any time, and that even U.S. air defenses are not 100% effective. 3. Defense Production Assistance. The Secretary noted that we were going ahead with defense production assistance and that we hoped this would resolve some of the outstanding difficulties we have on ammunition to our mutual satisfaction. 4. H-34 Helicopters. Ambassador Ahmed noted the Musa letter mentioned one squadron and asked where this stood at the moment and he was advised that six helicopters of a similar type had already been delivered in accord with the Secretary's commitment. 5. Modernization of Artillery. Ambassador Ahmed indicated that the slow modernization of our artillery seemed to be causing the armored brigade substantial difficulties. The Secretary stated that self-propelled artillery was being introduced gradually but that we don't have our own army entirely equipped. We have to modernize on a gradual basis even for ourselves. Ambassador Ahmed said that "these things struck me as important, and I thought I would bring them to your attention. I hope that General Musa can talk further with you when he arrives later this month. One further point that I thought valid concerned the 5 division force base and the two categories of `modernization' and `meeting deficiencies' being considered separately." The Secretary replied that while they are separate, they were considered concurrently. "It must be understood that no army can complete its modernization process overnight--we do not do it, the Soviets do not do it, no other country in the world does it, and certainly Pakistan cannot do it." The Secretary said that he was glad that the Commander-in-Chief, General Musa, was coming as we would have an opportunity to discuss some of these things. They should have been discussed in Pakistan. He reiterated his earlier statement that this was a most upsetting letter, that he thought some of the statements in it were irresponsible, that it erroneously implied that he had failed to meet his commitments and that it certainly indicated a breakdown of communications. Ambassador Ahmed replied that he will want to tell President Ayub, that this was a communications problem and not a problem of another sort. Mr. McNamara asked that he also tell the President that "when I make a commitment, I keep it." The Secretary also indicated that if this communications problem was not resolved, he would like Ambassador Ahmed to call him at any time to discuss the matter.
35. Telegram From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State/1/ Karachi, April 11, 1964, 6 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 1 INDIA-PAK. Secret; Priority; Limdis. Repeated to New Delhi, London, USUN, and CINCMEAFSA for POLAD. 1935. Indo-Pak relations. 1. As we survey coming months, period of unusual fluidity on subcontinent fraught with potential dangers to US interests must be anticipated. Conversely, months ahead could provide singular opportunity to take major steps toward stability and peace to subcontinent. While anyone surveying long and tragic history of subcontinent intolerance, hatred, strife, and inhumanity could not rate high prospects for resolving Indo-Pak differences, rewards of subcontinent peace would be so great that we cannot afford to neglect full exploitation any possible avenues which may emerge from increasingly fluid situation. 2. Status quo on subcontinent will be virtually impossible to retain under impact of successive developments foreshadowing basic readjustments. These developments summarized as: A) Gradual relinquishment of Nehru's leadership in India; B) Heightened communal tensions which pose alternatives of further mass upheavals or considerable degree of Indo-Pak cooperation to calm situation; C) India's proposed new 5-year military program, which, if not substantially modified in concept as well as degree, will herald such a radical alteration of balance of power on subcontinent as to drive GOP toward reckless counteracting measures; and D) Release of Sheikh Abdullah,/2/ throwing to Kashmiris large share of initiative on future status of Kashmir and seemingly making virtually impossible preservation of Kashmir status quo without most serious repressive action by GOI. /2/ Sheikh Mohammed Abdullah, head of the Jammu and Kashmir National Conference, was a nationalist leader jailed by India almost continuously from August 1953 until his release on April 8, 1964. 3. It is clear that Paks have not yet come fully to grips with implications of these newly emerging forces on subcontinent. Typically Abdullah's release has left Paks indecisive as to their next moves. While Paks have officially welcomed action in anticipation basic change in Kashmir's status, there is note of real caution as they recognize unpredictable Abdullah might come up with Kashmir settlement proposal generally acceptable to Kashmiris but unpalatable to some elements here, and without Pak participation in preliminary negotiations. 4. For present, Pak reaction to recent developments has been to continue pushing policy lines adopted after outbreak Sino-Indian hostilities, because this is most convenient alternative open to them and because these policies have in their view paid dividends. Paks thus have pursued policy of keeping strong ties to West and retaining benefits therefrom, while broadening their base outside, both among Afro-Asians and Communists--principally Peiping--with objective of keeping pressure on India. Transient successes of this policy have exhilarated some Paks and led to some cockiness. 5. Beneath surface, however, there are signs of ferment and dispute within Pak policy circles. Transition from Nehru and developments inside Kashmir have stimulated moderate elements such as Pak HICOM in Delhi, FinMin Shoaib, and former establishment Secretary Muenuddin to look for new and more restrained approaches to Indo-Pak issues. Essentially same forces also sense that current bifurcated policy has virtually reached limits of US tolerance and point where its inner contradictions can no longer be ignored; they are urging buttressing of Western alignment. But, hard-liners led by Foreign Ministry are holding to their ground and in fact ready to advocate some further and more significant steps away from West, notwithstanding risk of aid reduction. Ayub sits in center of this policy conflict and has not chosen. While inclined toward pro-Western policy, he has at least acquiesced in alienating actions proposed by Foreign Ministry elements. While Ayub apparently sees some value in continuation this dual policy for present, essentially he is marking time while waiting to see the course of impending developments, and in first instance US reaction to them. Thus, we may be facing precarious period in US-Pak relations, with Pak foreign policy delicately balanced in increasingly fluid environment. 6. Clearly, US and Indian interest lie in tipping the balance towards moderate elements in Pak inner circle and bringing weight of Ayub's authority fully on this side of scale. US retains sufficient position in Pakistan to influence heavily the crucial decision, but we cannot do it alone. In the final analysis, Indian policy will have far greater bearing on Paks, and I recognize our influence in India may be even more peripheral than in Pakistan. 7. The key area lies as always in Kashmir with essential question whether Abdullah's release can be exploited to fashion Kashmir settlement which serves as a bridge between India and Pakistan. Understandably, Indians would find far easier a solution worked out directly with Abdullah, excluding Pakistani participation or advice. Drawback is serious doubt that any solution thus arrived at would be acceptable or lasting, let alone conducive to Indo-Pak reconciliation. Most important, a unilateral Kashmir settlement by India with a softened-up Abdullah, along with major Indian military buildup and new increments of US MAP to India, most critically delivery of 72 F-6As, would be likely move Paks right out of Western alignment. 8. The months ahead could face us with formidable problems and difficult decisions. Pak actions of recent past do not merit any effort on our part seeming to reward their conduct, and would deserve stern warnings if by such tactics we could retrieve lost ground with Paks. But such demonstrations on our part have failed in past and it is my judgment that if "pushed to wall" as he defines the term, Ayub may--however rash the decision may seem to us--follow hard-liners advice and elect course of non-alignment, with all its consequences, including reduction in aid. 9. There is good chance we can avoid Ayub's being "pushed to wall" even by his distorted definition of term. Alternative is carrot and stick approach to both Pakistan and India in a major effort to exploit current developments to achieve an Indo-Pak reconciliation through settlement of the Kashmir question on basis internationalization formula which I believe we all feel has best prospect for mutual albeit reluctant acceptance all parties concerned. I realize enormous psychological obstacles in both countries but very fluidity of current situation may serve to damp down past prejudices. Furthermore, it is inconceivable to me that almost one billion dollars of economic and military aid on subcontinent annually does not offer us significant invisible leverage in both countries as distasteful as this fact may be to them. 10. In mounting such an effort, I am not necessarily suggesting direct pressures or even at this stage direct involvement in Kashmir negotiations. Indirect pressures would probably be more effective. I recommend, therefore, initially combination of following tactics: A) In Pakistan, giving discreet support for moderate elements, pointing out more emphatically counterproductive effect at this stage of pressure tactics on India; B) Slowing down temporarily any commitments to long-range economic and military programs (beyond fiscal 1965) for either India or Pakistan until we can judge their effect on prospects for Kashmir settlement, triggered by Abdullah's release; and, C) In India, emphasizing imperative requirement for settlement as only means of closing ranks against pressure on subcontinent from north and frustrating ChiCom machinations in South Asia. McConaughy
36. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Pakistan/1/ Washington, April 16, 1964, 3:56 p.m. /1/ Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, DEF 19 US-PAK. Secret; Limdis. Drafted by Naas; cleared by Talbot and Cameron, and in draft by Walsh, Komer, Lang (DOD/ISA), Warren (G/PM), Wriggins (S/P), Macomber (AID/NESA), and Hirschberg (AID/PC); and approved by Harriman. Repeated to New Delhi, London, and CINCSTRIKE for POLAD. 1380. We have been examining carefully our future policy respecting MAP policy for Pakistan in light of framework established by: General Taylor's report,/2/ Secretary's January 16 memorandum to President,/3/ NSAM 279 of February 8,/4/ instructions to Talbot (Deptels 1174 and 1182)/5/ and discussions which you and Talbot have had with Ayub and other Pak leaders. We have decided upon following course of action: /2/ See footnote 2, Document 3. /3/ Document 3. /4/ Document 13. /5/ Document 25 and footnote 2 thereto. 1. We will not raise with GOP at this time (April, May) subject multi-year MAP. In our view, discussions on "political framework" with Pak leaders have not produced fully satisfactory responses. Recent Pak signals tend to point to less cooperation rather than more. Our main concern centers on possible secret understandings between Paks and Chicoms. Until we have clearer picture of these and can judge possible effect on our over-all position in subcontinent, we will wish reserve our positions on longer term military aid questions. 2. We will proceed with discussions on FY 1965 MAP. We recognize necessity signal to GOP our intention and desire maintain present ties. Continued silence on our part in important MAP field, when it clear we are talking MAP to Indians, could lead GOP to make serious errors in judgment about our intentions. We have significant interests in Pakistan, some of which directly linked at least in Pak mind with MAP. We believe we must, in current situation, take some steps conserve these interests and head off Paks from taking actions inimical to them. 3. Therefore, we shall initiate discussions on FY 1965 MAP with General Musa in Washington later this month./6/ /6/ General Musa was scheduled to attend CENTO meetings in Washington. As we see it, timing of initial conversations on MAP is very important. GOP aware in general way of our Indian MAP intentions and that Chavan and defense team are coming here in May. We believe our talks with GOP should come before Chavan visit and not appear as attempt mollify GOP after Chavan departs. Musa visit provides excellent opportunity do this. 4. We shall inform Musa that FY 1965 program will not include additional aircraft but that we shall be in position to deliver additional F104As in FY 1966 provided that political climate at that time is right. We recognize that GOP will be very concerned over our getting into aircraft field with India and that we should not continue avoid question supersonics for Pakistan. We envisage reference to possible delivery in 1966 as important double purpose step. It should help keep Pakistan reaction to Indian air package within tolerable bounds, and also serve as signal to Ayub that, if he is prepared be mindful our concerns, we shall be mindful of his. Also, breaking ice on supersonic question may provide framework for pursuing discussion on one of our key concerns. 5. We shall continue keep GOP informed about our future MAP plans for India. You will receive instructions following Chavan visit to bring GOP up to date on our thinking on our MAP for India. During conversations here with Musa we shall inform him that we intend continue to give moderate military assistance to India and that this aid will be related to India's development of a sound defense plan. 6. We shall keep under constant review question of whether we should at later date proceed with multi-year Pak program. We view discussion on one-year program as interim measure and realize that by time we are ready firm up our five-year program with India, we may have to be more forthcoming with GOP to avoid serious imbalance in our military relations with India and Pakistan. Appreciate your 1935/7/ and 1936,/8/ which received after above decisions taken. Believe approach outlined here should help meet some of your concerns. /7/ Document 35. /8/ In telegram 1936 from Karachi, April 11, McConaughy warned that a decision to provide 72 F-6A aircraft to India would have "far reaching and immediate negative effect" on U.S. relations with Pakistan. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, DEF 19-3 US-INDIA) Ball
37. Telegram From the Embassy in India to the Department of State/1/ New Delhi, April 20, 1964, 3 p.m. /1/ Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, DEF 1 INDIA. Secret; Priority. Repeated to Karachi, London, and CINCSTRIKE for POLAD and passed to Defense. 3122. Dept pass Defense. Deptel 2085 sent April 15/2/ was delayed in transmission and did not reach us until Saturday. While we are in agreement with general principles laid down, we believe careful coordination between New Delhi and Washington is essential. In this regard, we are concerned about Dept's intention of spelling out US position to BK Nehru before our presentation to GOI has been more fully developed here. Following is report of our activities and plans in preparing GOI for Chavan visit and suggestions for future actions: /2/ Telegram 2085 to New Delhi, April 15, outlined the approach officials in Washington planned to take in discussing military assistance and the Indian 5-year plan with Defense Minister Chavan and his party when they visited Washington in May. The focus of the discussions would be on attempting to demonstrate how India could achieve a reasonably satisfactory defense within a limited resource ceiling. To pave the way for this approach, the Department felt that preliminary work was necessary in Washington and in New Delhi. The Embassy was instructed to encourage the Indian Government to impose a more austere limit on defense expenditures than that envisaged in the 5-year plan, and to do so prior to Chavan's visit. (Ibid., POL 7 INDIA) 1. Immediately upon my return from Washington on April 9, I held preliminary talks with Shastri, T.T. Krishnamachari and Chavan. Since all three individuals were in highly emotional state as result of Abdullah situation, I spoke in general terms about size of military budget and its effect on Indian development, the need to distinguish more clearly between Chinese intentions which are evil and Chinese capacity which is limited, and on our desire to work out close relationships on military matters similar to relationships on economic development. In this initial talk I felt it important to leave generally hopeful impression in regard to US assistance side-by-side with expression of deep concern that budgetary situation might be getting out of hand. 2. Simultaneously, DCM held meetings with Kaul and other members of Secretariat, while Gen Kelly talked with Chavan expressing same general views and then inaugurated series of more detailed meetings with Indian military. This completed what we consider to be first stage of our effort here in Delhi to give Indians sense of general direction we are likely to take. 3. The second stage of our New Delhi operation is comprehensive memorandum which I am directing to Prime Minister on India's defense problem and US relationship to it. Although I doubt PM has capacity or desire to discuss this memorandum, copies are going to TTK, Shastri and Chavan and I expect to discuss it with them in detail Wednesday or Thursday/3/ of this week. Copies of the memorandum are being airgrammed Dept. It contains the following points: /3/ April 22 and 23. A. Over period of time, close working partnership has developed between USG and GOI regarding India's economic development. Our present task is to develop similar relationship in military field. This requires us frankly to explore security problems which India faces, her own capacity to meet them, amount and type of assistance that is required and ways USG can be most helpful. B. US and India are generally agreed on the Chinese Communist intentions which are obviously aggressive and expansionist. It is also clear that Chinese military capacity under certain conditions is substantial. However, key question is manner in which Chinese may be expected to pursue their aggressive intents and their capacity to bring their potential strength to bear against India in particular. Comment: It is critically important to avoid appearing to water down the menace that China holds for India and Asia. We have been trying to persuade India for years that China is aggressive and dangerous power. A blunt USG effort to minimize Chinese threat at this stage would be considered first as inconsistent with what we have said before and second as transparent reaction to Pak pressure to reduce aid to India. Even if it should succeed, this approach would only play into hands of Communists, Menonites and Hindu extremists who are following precisely this same line in effort to substitute Pakistan for China as India's number one enemy. Our approach should be to play up evil intent of Chinese and then distinguish between the intent on one hand and capacity on the other of Chinese to bring their strength to bear. Even here we must be careful not to undermine the Indian confidence in our motivation and judgment. C. Therefore, we see India's defense problem as two dimensional: (1) an adequate military defense shield and (2) the building of vigorous, dynamic society which is impervious to covert Chinese Communist infiltration. Although we feel defense shield is of vital importance, USG's experience in other areas has demonstrated that even strongest and most expensively equipped armies are ineffective unless they are vigorously supported by people who feel sense of progress. On this score, we have made our share of mistakes and we do not want to see India repeat them. D. Against this background, we must say in all frankness that we do not believe India's defense projection is properly balanced between military-political-economic factors; indeed we doubt that India's economic development can proceed at an adequate pace unless foreign exchange allocated to defense is reduced. Although we strongly favor India saving her foreign exchange by producing items such as small arms ammunition, etc., we would warn against domestic production which puts too heavy drain on foreign exchange and capital and trained personnel. E. Although these questions will require definition and discussion, we are aware of India's need for more modern interceptors and hopeful we can be helpful in this regard; also in aiding domestic production which saves foreign exchange while not placing undue drain on India's domestic industrial growth, plus assistance along present lines for Indian army. 4. We have carefully avoided all references to Soviet equipment or specific ways that money can be saved. At this stage we believe it is far better to let Indians think situation out themselves. If we can once persuade them to cut down size of plan and foreign exchange that goes with it, pressure may be focussed on SAMs and MIGs which is where we want it. However, if we go too far in appearing to direct Indian foreign policy, they will dig in their heels regardless of effect of such actions on their relations with us. Indians, whatever their weaknesses, are bright people and we do not have to pound the desk and repeat our points ad infinitum for them to understand them. 5. Third stage here will be personal talks I expect to have with Shastri, Chavan and TTK. Hopefully these discussions will be completed by Thursday night; will promptly cable results. Until these talks are completed, I strongly urge that discussions between Department and BK Nehru be postponed. When Nehru was here in Delhi he was in an emotional and frustrated mood, and unpleasantly irritated at USG. Although this mood may be explained by concern over father, it was sufficiently noticeable for MJ Desai to comment on it to me. While I believe Department is correct that BK Nehru sees situation much as we do, I would not trust him at this point to report Department's views to GOI in balanced manner. If distorted interpretation of his talks with Dept suggesting somewhat different US position should arrive before we have completed our own presentation considerable crockery may be unnecessarily broken. 6. In any event, following my talks with Shastri, TTK and Chavan, which I hope will be reflected in tone and content in discussions with Nehru in Washington, we will follow through here to pick up loose ends. 7. In regard to Indian defense progress itself, we believe, as reported in Embtel 3052,/4/ that we are approaching moment of truth in our military relations with Indian Government. Although our long delay and indecision is understandable, we are now close to being dealt out of meaningful role in Indian defense situation, at a time when political situation here is in a state of flux and Soviet Union increasingly freed of its inhibitions in regard to China may be prepared to take much more forthcoming role in regard to military assistance. At present, we are in position of denying India sophisticated ground force equipment, dragging feet on domestic military production and offering them airplanes which they consider obsolescent. /4/ Dated April 14. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, DEF 19 US-INDIA) In our opinion, Gen Adams' message to JCS/5/ which arrived this morning is wholly sound; indeed it is along precise lines of our own recommendations in Embtel 3052. /5/ Not found. As Gen Adams properly states, anything less than a program of this kind will leave us sitting on side lines with only marginal influence over Indian military policy at time when Indian military may be called on for an increasing political role. One final word: since my arrival here last July, we have been faced with long list of difficult situations ranging from VOA to Bokaro to Kashmir wrangle, to failure last fall to go through with military assistance-political package, to need to explain USG position in SC which Indians considered antagonistic and unfair. If we are now planning to move ahead with Indian military program it is important that US Mission in New Delhi appear to GOI as primary means of communication and of US action. Therefore, if Department's and Pentagon response to our recommendations is positive, I recommend that we be authorized before Chavan group leaves for US to give top Indian officials preliminary knowledge of positive contributions that we have in mind, with whatever caveats may be required. This will greatly strengthen our ability to deal effectively with GOI on future questions in a particularly critical and difficult time./6/ /6/ In telegram 2144 to New Delhi, April 21, the Department concurred with the tactics proposed by Bowles of gradually moving into progressively expanding discussions regarding the Indian 5-year plan, but questioned the wisdom of a written exchange with the Indian Government concerning it, for fear of a leak, which might prejudice the negotiations. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, DEF 1 INDIA) On the same day, Bowles sent an 8-page memorandum to the Prime Minister entitled "India's National Defense and American Assistance." A copy of this memorandum was transmitted to Washington as an enclosure to airgram A-1049 from New Delhi, April 22; ibid. Bowles [Continue with the next documents]
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