NOTE: External links to other Internet sites should not be construed as an endorsement of the views contained therein.
| The State Department web site below is a permanent electronic archive of information released prior to January 20, 2001. Please see www.state.gov for material released since President George W. Bush took office on that date. This site is not updated so external links may no longer function. Contact us with any questions about finding information. NOTE: External links to other Internet sites should not be construed as an endorsement of the views contained therein. |
 |
FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1964-1968, Volume XXV South Asia
Department of State |
38. Letter From Robert Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the Ambassador to India (Bowles)/1/ Washington, April 24, 1964. /1/ Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, India, Exchanges with Bowles (cont.). Secret; Via Classified Pouch; Eyes Only for the Ambassador. Dear Chet: I'm concerned by a number of developments, or the lack of them, which have tended to cloud the highly favorable atmosphere upon your departure. First is the lack, to my knowledge, of a major effort to get across to the GOI as yet about the grossly inflated size of their five-year plan. Any program of this magnitude would inevitably be at the expense of economic development and we've got to get across as soon as possible that this would be robbing Peter to pay Paul. AID is quite unhappy, and will become more so when the extent of diversion contemplated sinks in. Moreover, pressure against undue diversion of foreign exchange from the development program is a good indirect means of getting the Indians to focus on the need to cut down their elaborate hardware demands, especially in the air defense field. Chavan's visit and then TTK's will simply be a flop if we have to spend all our time pressing them to squeeze the water out of their plan. If we let this issue become later a major bone of contention between the US and India it will do neither country any good. By all odds the best thing, therefore, is to get the Indian Finance Ministry to do our dirty work for us. We're relying on you for this. I don't know what you did to General Adams (all to the good nonetheless), but it's highly premature to start plugging 104s. We barely got an F6A plus HF-24 engine program going, with a few squadrons of F5s as a possible alternative, when you come back changing the bidding again. Mind you, I think it makes political sense to give India 104s if necessary, but this must emerge as the logical outcome of a prolonged discussion in which we successively discard other options. Again, we here have seen nothing firm about whether you have ever even tried out the original package on the Indians yet. I hate to badger you like this, but we scored rather a breakthrough when you were here and it's dangerous to attempt to improve on what we got without even trying it out. As I know you realize, there are strong suspicions here that indeed you did try out the package and got nowhere, so are coming back for more. If this is the case, tell us so because only if you tried and failed will we be able to argue effectively for trying something else. I've just heard you have the amoebic bug. All best wishes for a quick recovery. It's also best for cosmetic reasons that you postpone your return in May as late as possible. Meanwhile, do try to warn off Chavan and others from coming with any exaggerated expections of the US cornucopia. Big ideas which are then disappointed will only set back our Indian enterprise at a time when we finally got it moving forward again. Once again my apologies for these admonitory words. But you know they come from a friend. All the best for an early recovery. Sincerely, R. W. Komer/2/ /2/ Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. P.S. Since writing this, I just saw your talk with TTK./3/ Good stuff! /3/ Reference is to a conversation that Bowles had with Finance Minister Krishnamachari on April 23, which was reported in telegram 3158 from New Delhi, April 23. Bowles found Krishnamachari in an emotional state anticipating a joint attack on India by China and Pakistan within 3 months, an attack he feared would have to be met without U.S. military assistance, which the United States would be unable to provide in an election year. Bowles reminded Krishnamachari that the United States had come to India's defense in 1962, and assured him that in similar circumstances it would do so again. Bowles then turned the conversation to the issue of military assistance, and stated that the United States had decided on a longer range program provided that the Indian budgetary situation was worked out in a rational manner with a minimum drain on foreign exchange. He noted that the proposed 5-year plan called for a doubling of foreign exchange defense expenditures as compared with figures discussed the previous fall. Bowles said that such expenditure was more than India could afford given her need for more rapid economic growth. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, DEF 19 US-INDIA)
39. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ Washington, April 27, 1964, 11:06 a.m. /1/ Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Presidential Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 66 D 149. Secret. Drafted by Talbot and Komer on April 30 and approved in the White House on May 11. The conversation was held at the White House. The time of the meeting is taken from the President's Daily Diary. (Johnson Library) SUBJECT /2/ Prime Minister Nehru's daughter was visiting the United States for the inaugural ceremonies of the World's Fair. PARTICIPANTS Mrs. Indira Gandhi The President The President greeted Mrs. Gandhi cordially, remarking on his previous meetings with her and with her father. It was because he regarded himself as such a strong friend of India that he was surprised at Mrs. Gandhi's referring to US favoritism toward Pakistan on Kashmir as she had in a recent interview with the New York Times. The President stressed that we were firm in our determination to have the most friendly relations with India. So, he said smilingly, he could not accept any implication of partisanship. Mrs. Gandhi reassured the President that India understood and appreciated US policy and US help. She and her father personally knew of the President's strong friendship for India, and she had merely been referring to one part of US policy, that toward Kashmir, on which we did not seem sympathetic to the Indian point of view. Ambassador Nehru interjected that two great powers could certainly disagree on one among many questions without any diminution in the overall friendly relations between them. The President came back again on the issue of US friendship for India and decried any suggestion of partisanship on any issue between us. As for the Indians being disturbed at our relations with Pakistan, they should realize that the Pakistani were far more angry with us. The Paks were much more unhappy about our policy toward India than India seemed to be about our policy toward Pakistan. The President went on to describe how the US was not only seeking to help nations abroad develop themselves but to deal with the problems of poverty and discrimination in the US. He outlined his own recent efforts to this end citing various statistics. He mentioned, for example, that 49% of draft-age Americans failed to meet minimum physical standards for the draft. Ambassador Nehru was shocked that this figure should be so high, but Mrs. Gandhi pointed out that India had had similar difficulties in recruitment after the Chinese attack. Mrs. Gandhi then presented a letter from Prime Minister Nehru to the President./3/ The latter read it carefully and commented on how much he appreciated the friendly sentiments it contained. India could count on US friendship and on continued US help. /3/ In his April 14 letter to President Johnson, Prime Minister Nehru referred, inter alia, to the continuing differences that troubled relations between India and Pakistan. He pledged that India's efforts to reach an understanding with Pakistan with regard to Kashmir and the communal problems would continue. Nehru noted that India faced a constant threat from China, and added that he was glad that Defense Minister Chavan would be coming to the United States to discuss India's defense requirements. He expressed his gratitude for all of the military and economic assistance the United States had provided to India. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, India, Nehru Correspondence) The President remarked on how many friends India has in his Administration. We sent Ambassadors to India who seemed to spend every day thinking of new ways in which we could be helpful. Mentioning his particular affection for Mr. Nehru, the President asked about his current health. Mrs. Gandhi replied that he was better and up and around a bit more. The President remarked upon how people had counted him out at the time of his own heart attack. But two months later he was back in shape again and had been ever since. No one should count Mr. Nehru out either. He urged Mrs. Gandhi to carry this message back to Prime Minister Nehru and to give him the President's affectionate regards. After pictures were taken, the President showed Mrs. Gandhi and the Ambassador the rose garden.
40. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ Washington, April 29, 1964, 4 p.m. /1/ Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 69 A 7425, Pakistan 091.112. Secret. Prepared by Commander John J. Shanahan of the Chairman's Staff Group on April 30. The conversation was held in General Taylor's office. PRESENT 1. The conversation began with General Taylor asking General Musa whether he had been able to see all the US officials whom he had hoped to see during his visit. General Musa stated that he had seen Mr. McNaughton, Mr. Solbert and General Wood./2/ The latter had spent two hours with him and they were able to discuss "the letter."/3/ General Musa reported that General Wood gave him a general indication of the 64-65 MAP which included no increase in the current ceiling. General Wood also emphasized that the entire program was contingent on the availability of funds and as a result General Musa felt little progress had been made. /2/ General Robert J. Wood, USA, Director for Military Assistance under the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs. /3/ Reference is to a letter from General Musa to General Taylor concerning the military assistance program for Pakistan. This letter, which has not been found, was discussed in a meeting between Taylor and Musa on April 22. Musa stated that the letter was intended to offer constructive suggestions and was not meant to criticize U.S. efforts. Musa added, however, that the fact that India had received as much military assistance during the past 7 months as Pakistan had received in 7 years was creating political problems for President Ayub. (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 69 A 7425, Pakistan 091.112) 2. General Taylor observed that he was glad General Musa had had the opportunity to make the same points to General Wood as he had made earlier to General Taylor. That even though General Musa might feel no progress had been made an exchange of frank views was usually helpful. 3. General Musa advised General Taylor that during his frank discussion with General Wood the latter informed him of the US intent to provide two squadrons of F 104's during the period CY 1965-1966, provided the political climate was satisfactory at the time. General Musa then told General Taylor that he was not happy with the condition now being attached to a military program. He felt that it removed the charm and grace which exists between the military in our two countries. General Musa was so concerned about this that he had discussed it with FM Bhutto who in turn agreed and said he would take the matter up with Secretary Rusk later in the day. 4. General Taylor advised General Musa that this was not really a condition in the sense described by General Musa but was a fact of life. As General Musa should by now be well aware, US Congressional reaction to MAP is influenced significantly by the political actions of our friends. 5. General Musa raised the subject of the "7th Fleet Units" currently in the Indian Ocean and stated that Pakistan's position on this subject is apparently misunderstood in Washington. General Musa said that there was never any intent on the part of Pakistan to give the impression that the "7th Fleet" was not welcome in the area. 6. General Taylor agreed that he thought the official Pakistan position had been factually reported to Washington, however it was entirely possible that the Pak press had confused the issue for some people. 7. General Musa reported that General Adams had been very kind to him and had spent considerable time over a two day period discussing the "exercise."/4/ General Musa has decided that the US is apprehensive on two points concerning advance planning for this exercise and that this explains our reluctance to agree to planning. He described the two points as: /4/ Reference is to a proposed joint U.S.-Pakistan military exercise described by Pentagon planners as a mobility exercise. The proposal was discussed by General Taylor during his visit to Pakistan in December 1963, and again by General Taylor and General Musa during their conversation on April 22. The intent underlying the proposal was to help relieve Pakistani concerns about the U.S. commitment to Pakistan's security. a. "We want you to plan against India." General Musa then emphasized that planning does not mean a commitment. The upshot of his meetings with General Adams is that he will take the exercise scenario home for discussions with his President. 8. General Taylor suggested that in view of the short time remaining it might be best to postpone the exercise, that such exercises are normally arranged and budgeted for at least a year ahead. General Taylor asked General Musa to make it entirely clear that the US is not pressing this exercise on Pakistan. 9. The conversation ended with General Musa advising that he has hopes of seeing the Secretary of Defense, in fact he had postponed his departure for two additional days in this endeavor. 10. General Taylor said he knew the Secretary of Defense would be pleased to see General Musa provided the Secretary's schedule would allow.
41. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Pakistan/1/ Washington, May 1, 1964, 6:13 p.m. /1/ Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 32-1 INDIA-PAK. Secret; Limdis. Drafted by Officer in Charge of Pakistan-Afghanistan Affairs Harold Josif on April 30, cleared by Special Assistant for UN Planning Elmore Jackson in IO, and approved by Grant. Also sent to New Delhi, London, and USUN. 1456. Kashmir. Following summary FYI and Noforn. It is uncleared and subject to amendment upon review of memcon. Secretary met with Foreign Secretary Bhutto April 29./2/ Bhutto accompanied by Ambassador G. Ahmed and Minister Iftikar Ali. Assistant Secretary Talbot also present. /2/ Bhutto was in Washington for the CENTO Ministerial meetings. Secretary opened conversation by expressing appreciation for Bhutto's help in getting agreement on CENTO communiqué. Bhutto said he would like to start with Kashmir situation. UN Rep Bunche had talked to Ayub during his recent visit subcontinent and told Ayub he had not known how critical situation was until he had visited Kashmir. He had been struck by intensity of feeling on issue. Ayub replied he hoped Bunche appreciated GOP's problem of keeping lid on those who demand action on Kashmir problem. GOP viewed release of Sheikh Abdullah as due to two factors, upsurge of feeling in Indian-held Kashmir following the loss of the Sacred Relic, and "our modest efforts in the Security Council." Credit goes, however, to Security Council itself and its members. Bhutto noted that US had had reservations about timing of Security Council debates in February and March and added "time has shown debates were helpful." Climax is now approaching. Security Council can assist in arriving at settlement of issue./3/ One could not expect anything miraculous but could expect some action to bring together parties to dispute to discuss problem, i.e., Sheikh Abdullah, Nehru and Ayub. It would be difficult for any of parties to take initiative however. This would not be true if Security Council requested talks. Bhutto personally out of touch due recent travels but his "tentative ideas" were as follows: There should be Security Council session. Short speeches would be necessary to bring record up to date. Council should then take some action to inject its authority into situation. Would be premature to send out SYG as mediator. However he could visit subcontinent personally and encourage talks between parties. Bhutto said he had discussed this idea with Butler/4/ who thought it was reasonable. Bhutto then asked, "Does this appeal to you?" /3/ The UN Security Council was scheduled to begin reconsideration of the Kashmir issue on May 5. /4/ British Foreign Secretary R.A. Butler. Secretary asked what clues GOP had as to influence of Nehru's illness on situation. He assumed it was considerable. Bhutto replied "So they say." Secretary remarked he had impression Shastri now more influential in foreign affairs. Bhutto replied, "Yes, but Security Council could strengthen his hands." A fair proposal coming from Security Council would do this and would bring world opinion to bear. On other hand, inaction would provide Indians with further opportunity to proceed with integration of Kashmir. Secretary noted release of Sheikh Abdullah must have introduced major new element into situation and Indians must have recognized this. Secretary asked for Bhutto's assessment of why Abdullah was released at this time. Bhutto replied Indians had probably released him to let off some of steam built up in Kashmir; his release sooner or later was inevitable. One theory was Sadiq/5/ had timed release so as to have Sheikh Abdullah eclipse Bakshi, Sadiq's personal rival. Of course Sadiq could also take credit for a popular measure. Another theory was that the release was planned to coincide with passage of a bill further integrating Kashmir into India. Personally he believed first theory more plausible. /5/ G.M. Sadiq, Prime Minister of Kashmir, succeeded G.M. Bakshi in October 1963. Secretary said he thought SYG had standing authority to go out to subcontinent if he were willing. Bhutto replied it would depend on members of Security Council. Talbot added "and parties to dispute." Bhutto said no, only members. India and Pakistan not members of Council and India has opposed past resolutions. Repeated he not asking for mediation by SYG, just that he get in touch with parties and go and assess situation which threatens peace of area. Ambassador Ahmed added India would not object; it could not object. Requirement now was to lend authority of Security Council to SYG role. He should act under new authority, not under continuing authority. Secretary inquired about expectation at last SC meeting of what next session would do. Bhutto replied that effort to reach consensus had broken down on language in operative part. The phrase "UN action" had not been acceptable to his Government. Said that if Council goes back to consensus route his instructions were to procure a reference to "wishes of the Kashmiri people in accordance with UN resolutions." Bhutto also expressed view that if SYG visits subcontinent he should certainly see Sheikh Abdullah. In reply to a question Bhutto also said it was not clear whether Sheikh Abdullah was talking about self-determination for all of Kashmir, though he seemed to have made an oblique reference to Azad Kashmir as one of the four regions of Kashmir. Secretary asked if Paks sufficiently confident about results of any plebiscite to agree to any number of options being put to people of Kashmir so long as one is accession to Pakistan? Bhutto replied yes. There is hope in Sheikh Abdullah's statements but he is vague as to what he wants. This is not true of people of Kashmir, even in Jammu. Secretary noted situation now in motion and offers opportunities, but this probably not due so much to Security Council as Bhutto seemed believe. Bhutto replied "We cannot get solution only with Security Council, nor without Security Council." Secretary said he would talk with Ambassador Stevenson and work out our position,/6/ also we should hear from New Delhi on Sheikh Abdullah's talk with Nehru. At close of conversation he added it would be hard to find any question whose solution would give us greater satisfaction. /6/In the wake of Rusk's conversation with Bhutto, the Department sent a message to USUN informing the Mission that the consensus statement approach followed before the Security Council adjourned no longer seemed viable. The Department felt that the minimum Pakistan could reasonably expect from the renewed Security Council debate was an outcome reminding the Indian Government that they were not conducting negotiations with Sheikh Abdullah in a vacuum nor with unlimited time. (Telegram 2833 to USUN, May 2; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 32-1, INDIA-PAK/UN) Remainder of conversation was on other topics and is being reported in separate telegrams. Rusk
42. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Solbert) to Secretary of Defense McNamara/1/ Washington, May 6, 1964. /1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 69 A 7425, India 091.3 MSP. Secret. Received in the Office of the Secretary of Defense on May 7 at 10:52 a.m. SUBJECT 1. Discussions with the Indians. We will be reviewing the Indian Five-Year Defense Plan with the Indian experts on May 11-15 and with Defense Minister Chavan on May 19-21. 2. General Approach. The main purpose of these discussions will be to persuade the Indians to revise their Plan downward. At the same time we will review the FY 65 program with the Indians. We also plan to be forthcoming (on a credit sales or grant basis) on certain specific items which we can agree are reasonable and have a high priority, such as aircraft as discussed below, which might be funded subsequent to FY 65. While this is a deviation from the JCS recommendation (Tab A)/2/ that we should not make any commitments beyond the FY 65 plan until the Indians revise their Plan, it seems a desirable step to evidence our good faith in the current negotiations. /2/ Not found attached. The attachment was apparently a draft of the memorandum dealing with air defense aircraft for India that the JCS sent to McNamara as JCSM-396-64 on May 8. (Ibid., India 452) 3. Military Assistance Credit Sales. We would hope that during the meeting with Minister Chavan we might be sufficiently forthcoming in the credit sales area to arrive at a Memorandum of Understanding to be signed by yourself and the Minister on an initial sales package using FY 64, and possibly FY 65, money to finance the credit terms. We anticipate that the major portion of credit sales which could be agreed upon at this time would be in the area of defense production machinery but might also include such items as vehicles, tanks, materials handling equipment, communications equipment, raw materials and road construction equipment. We understand that the Indians consider defense production as a most important field. In the longer run, upon agreement as to a more reasonable Indian Plan, a military assistance sales program can be established for India involving both cash and credit sales. This could provide over a 5-year period an annual credit line of $35-$50 million, repayable over a 5 to 10 year period at an interest rate not exceeding 5% as the initial U.S. negotiating position. Henry Kuss has in mind for consideration later some of the items in the Indian Plan such as transport aircraft (C-130s), supersonic aircraft (such as F-104s), and possibly Hawk missiles. While we may come to some of these items for India some day, they are not presently justified by the Chicom threat and their excessive expense is inconsistent with our pressures for reduction of Indian defense spending and our support of the Indian economic program. We plan at present to aim for a credit sales program for FY 64, and possibly FY 65, covering low cost but high priority items and not discuss at this time the above-mentioned more expensive items. 4. Air Defense Aircraft. As you recall, when Ambassador Bowles was here it was agreed that we would discuss with the Indians the capability, cost, and availability of F-6A and F-5 aircraft and offer to assist in development of the HF-24. Since the Ambassador has returned to India, he has reverted to his original position that supplying several squadrons of F-104s is the only method to achieve his objective of minimizing Soviet influence in the Indian Air Force. In our judgment, and that of State, supplying F-104s to India in the present time frame will cause serious problems with the Pakistanis and is not presently required by the Chicom threat (though there is now increasing evidence that the Chicoms have some MIG 21s). Accordingly, I recommend that F-104s not be offered to the Indians on any basis at present, though this would not necessarily preclude some future cash or credit sales arrangement if our efforts involving the HF-24 are not successful. In lieu thereof I recommend that we offer as alternatives F-6A aircraft on a grant aid basis or F-5 aircraft on a grant aid or credit sales basis, along with the assistance on the HF-24, as discussed below./3/ /3/McNamara initialed his approval on May 8. While we will make every effort to persuade the Indians to accept our F-6A or F-5 aircraft, along with development of the HF-24, the general feeling of the Country Team in India is that this aircraft package will be unacceptable to the Indians. If this turns out to be the case, we can consider possible alternatives during Chavan's discussions with you. One alternative, proposed by the State Department, is for the U.S. to say to the Indians that if, after an examination of technical feasibility, the UK and the U.S. agree with India to collaborate in the production of the HF-24, and if this collaboration fails to produce a supersonic interceptor adequate to meet the Chicom threat, at such time as this failure is determined the U.S. will assist in finding other means to meet the Indian need for supersonic aircraft. I regard this as a commitment to make available to the Indians, on a credit or cash purchase basis, a Mach 2 aircraft some two or three years from now if the HF-24 project fails. While this proposition has some merit, it is an extremely vague commitment and I recommend we defer any action on such a statement to the Indians pending our assessment of the Indian experts' reactions to the presently proposed aircraft package./4/ /4/ McNamara initialed his approval on May 8. HF-24. Our exploration of the feasibility of assisting the Indians with the development of an engine for the HF-24 has been held up because the Indians have not granted permission for the US-UK team to visit the plant in India. The Embassy in New Delhi believes this is because of current negotiations with the UAR for an engine. The Indians have, however, offered to send drawings of the airframe to Rolls Royce in London. The project still seems feasible, and accordingly we will suggest to the Indians when they are in Washington that they permit a team of US-UK personnel to visit India as soon as possible to study the problems of adapting the HF-24 airframe to the Rolls Royce engine and the problems of manufacturing the aircraft and engine in India. 5. Sparrow. I understand that the Navy has as of this date determined that the Sparrow missile should not be released to India. So far Sparrow III, which we have been considering giving to India for the F-6A, has not been given to any other country (including NATO), and the Navy feels that release would result in serious risk of compromising Sparrow III-6B which is used on our first line fighters. (We do have clearance on Sidewinder.) Peter Solbert
43. Memorandum From Samuel E. Belk of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)/1/ Washington, May 18, 1964. /1/ Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Kashmir, Vol. I, 12/63-7/64. Confidential. SUBJECT Kashmir: As you probably are aware, the Council has had this problem under consideration since mid-March when, after several inconclusive meetings, it adjourned until last week and has since met on the problem five times. It has been an extremely "ho-hum" exercise. The Paks originally believed they could push through a strong resolution condemning the Indians for not complying with the previous UN requests in connection with a plebiscite, troop withdrawals, etc.; but when it became evident that they could not get the votes, they asked for an adjournment. In the interim, we and other Council members tried unsuccessfully to get the Paks to agree to drop the matter entirely, but they felt they had committed themselves so heavily at home that it was necessary to come back to the Council. The situation now is that the Paks have abandoned hope of getting a resolution or even a consensus, and will be satisfied with a statement by the Chairman of the Council (Seydoux of France) which will sum up the views expressed during the Council meetings and which will note especially that the majority of the Council would like to see the SYG more strongly involved in the dispute than he now is. The USSR and Czechoslovakia, on behalf of the Indians, have come out strongly against this position. Seydoux convened a caucus of the Council members at 1130 today to try to work out final language and, having failed, he will convene another caucus at 1500 this afternoon. If he is successful, he may well hold what everyone hopes will be the final Council meeting on the problem still later in the day./2/ The problem is the degree of SYG involvement desired. At this morning's meeting, the Russians seemed to be taking a harder line than the Indians against a role for the SYG. For our own part, we would like to see the SYG in a procedural role which would allow him to explore quietly new methods of approach with the Indians and the Paks, e.g., is it feasible to seek out a third party who might be able to make some progress; perhaps even the SYG himself could play this role./3/ /2/ The summary statement by Security Council President Roger Seydoux at the conclusion of debate on Kashmir on May 18 was forwarded to the Department in telegram 4182 from USUN, May 19. On the issue of the proposed involvement of the Secretary- General in facilitating negotiations between India and Pakistan on the issue, Seydoux noted that some members of the Council supported such a role for the Secretary-General and other members opposed it. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 32-1 INDIA-PAK/UN) /3/ USUN reported that the mood of Foreign Minister Bhutto and his delegation as they left New York following the debate was one of bitter disappointment. Bhutto felt that Pakistan's two major allies had failed to support it during the debate. (Telegram 3185 from USUN, May 19; ibid.) On May 21, Ayub told McConaughy that he felt India would "take succor" from the Security Council debate because the United States and the United Kingdom had "kept quiet" while the Soviet Union had actively supported India. He anticipated that this would make the Indians less inclined to settle the Kashmir dispute by negotiation. (Telegram 71 from Rawalpindi, May 21; ibid., POL 32-1 INDIA-PAK) The Embassy in India reported that while the popular reaction to the outcome of the debate was generally positive, credit for the outcome went to the Soviet Union. There was widespread resentment of U.S. and U.K. support for Pakistan during the debate. (Telegram 3466 from New Delhi, May 20; ibid., POL 32-1 INDIA-PAK/UN) [Here follows discussion of Security Council consideration of a complaint lodged by Cambodia.] Sam
44. Memorandum From Robert Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)/1/ Washington, May 21, 1964. /1/ Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, India,Vol. II, Cables, 4/64-6/64. Secret. A note in Komer's handwriting at the top of the first page reads, "Urgent." Mac-- Indian Defense Team talks/2/ here have boiled down to two issues, which may be decided when McNamara talks with Chavan tomorrow morning. /2/ Talks with a team of Indian Defense experts, headed by Defense Secretary P.V.R. Rao and Lieutenant General Moti Sagar, Chief of Staff of the Indian Army, began in Washington on May 11. Documentation on the talks is in the National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, DEF 1 INDIA and Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 68 A 306, 381 India. A. FY'65 arms credit ceiling. Indian 5-Year Defense Plan called for $1.9 billion foreign exchange outlays 1965-69. By some tall talking about how to get more defense for less and overriding need to protect development program, we've brought Indians down to $1.5. We think proper level ought to be about $1.3 billion, a cool one-third cut (but we can probably get Indian Finance Ministry to do this). Issue turns on whether we should now offer Indians up to $50 million in FY'65 MAP credit sales (on top of $50 million MAP grants we plan). Since Indians will spend foreign exchange anyway, credit offers mean they'll buy from us rather than Sovs (or Brits, etc.) thus limiting purchases they can make from Sovs (pre-emption in fact). DOD wants to tell Indians now, so they can plan properly. State wants to hold off firm credit offer as lever to bring Indian ceiling down from $1.5 to $1.3. I don't feel strongly but lean toward State, especially since we could give 3/4% terms which makes Indian mouths water. B. Should we offer F-104s? We're convinced Indians won't buy our aid package of 75 surplus F-6As plus help on HF-24 designed to pre-empt MIG deal. If not, McNamara would like to offer his favorite F-5. But Indians don't want it; like everyone else they want flashy 104s (Lockheed went out and sold them again). Bob says "never!" From a purely military viewpoint he's dead right. F-5 or F-6A is cheaper, easier to handle, maintain, etc. But issue turns on political grounds (and NEA hopes to get Rusk to talk to Bob). NEA would like to tell Indians let's see if HF-24 deal can be worked out in lieu of MIGs. If not, we'll help you get alternate 2-3 squadrons of 104s within next 3-4 years, provided you don't build MIGs. Argument runs: a. This gives fighting chance of blocking MIG production (1 in 5 is my guess). But if Indians don't bite, as all too likely, then we at least get the credit for having been forthcoming. We've convinced them at least that we don't regard them as second-rate citizens vis-à-vis the Paks (who get 104s). So we get a free ride. b. True, 104s are "wasteful," but they involve no extra out-of-pocket cost to us. All we'd do is substitute 104s for other items, not add them on. Since Indians are going to waste money on supersonics anyway, why not let it flow back to us rather than to Soviets? c. Bowles is right, after all, that Sovs are mounting a major new Indian aid effort (in response to ours, by the way). We'll have to live with it, and it partly serves our purpose, but after the big upward push of 1961-63 why let the Soviets gain too much kudos by picking up every option--supersonics, BOKARO, new VOA transmitter--we let drop. d. We know we're going to give Paks two more squadrons of 104s, even though we're playing hard to get just now. Are 104s for Paks more sensible than for Indians? Hell no. I've carried this as far as I can with DOD. Would you entertain calling Bob on this before he sees Chavan tomorrow? Bob's right that 104s are wasteful, but I think you'll agree that's not the point. At minimum I'd like to see Bob avoid saying "no" till you, he and Rusk could talk with LBJ next Tuesday/3/ lunchtime. LBJ sees Chavan Thursday. He could make some real Indian mileage by offering 104s in lieu of MIGs, an offer which probably wouldn't be picked up, which wouldn't cost extra if it was, and which is no more than we're already doing for no better reason for Pakistan. /3/ May 26. Bob K.
45. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in India/1/ Washington, May 22, 1964, 9:04 p.m. /1/ Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 27 CHICOM-INDIA. Secret; Limdis. Drafted and approved by Schneider in NEA/SOA. 2398. Following summary FYI only and Noforn. It is uncleared and subject to amendment upon review of memcon. Indian DefMin Chavan and Amb BK Nehru met with Secretary and Talbot May 21./2/ Chavan opened up discussion saying talks between Indian Defense team and DOD indicated US and India were in substantial agreement on Chicom threat, which had increased somewhat since 1962. While there is apparently little imminent danger of attack, this cannot be ruled out. In order be prepared for this eventuality and make most careful use of resources, GOI has prepared Five-Year Defense Plan. Although defense effort under Plan sizeable, it will have no adverse effect on economic development. Plan places priority on building defense production base and securing combat aircraft. Chavan requested US support to Five-Year Defense Plan, consisting of MAP at the same levels as last two years and credit sales assistance. /2/Chavan also met with Harriman on May 21. The conversation is summarized in telegram 2400 to New Delhi, May 23. (Ibid., DEF 19-2 US-INDIA) Indicating specific reply on these matters up to Secretary McNamara and President, Secretary described difficulties we have already had with Congress this year concerning long-term military aid. Also stated President may be reluctant make commitments extending beyond his present term. Turning to Indo-Pak problems Secretary described circumstances under which CENTO established in order meet Soviet threat and under which US extended military aid to Pakistan. Now India was threatened by China and was also obtaining US military aid. India and Pakistan, however, are "looking over their shoulders at each other" and we must examine how we have unwittingly gotten into supporting arms race on subcontinent. When we think of possibilities for subcontinental defense we agonize at Indo-Pak enmity. Chavan replied India also wished resolve problems with Pakistan but must avoid actions which, instead of solving problems, might multiply them. Explained Abdullah's activities constitute new factor in Kashmir situation; India wishes him well. Secretary inquired how far Indians believed Pak-Chicom relationship has progressed. Chavan replied there apparently no Pak-Chicom military agreement but if Chicoms attack India GOI fearful Paks will take action to tie down Indian forces. Re China threat, Chavan repeated line that 1966-67 critical period because Katmandu Road and possibly Lhasa Railroad would be completed. Secretary inquired regarding effect in India of Chicom explosion of nuclear device. Chavan saw effect considerably greater in smaller Asian countries than in India although fact of explosion would also cause psychological reaction in India. Secretary commented he saw explosion possible within next year although Soviets had told us it not likely for 4-5 years. Remarked Asian countries could take little comfort from Chicom's lack of sophisticated delivery system since general lack sophisticated air defense in free Asia meant such delivery system unnecessary. Secretary also said, judging on basis his wartime experiences in eastern India, in his view Chinese unlikely attack through Burma because of logistic difficulties. When, in response question, Chavan commented on lasting character Sino-Soviet rift, Secretary said we have, nevertheless, assumed neither Soviets nor Chicoms could afford see other punished in conflict with capitalist nations. Therefore, we assumed alliance would not be dissolved. Secretary wondered if opportunity bring India under Communist control presented to Soviets and Chicoms, it might possibly draw the two together. He concluded Sino-Soviet split important but not complete enough for either US or India to rely upon. At conclusion of discussion Secretary said India could be assured US much concerned about any attempt by Chicoms break out into rest of Asia. Entirely aside from our concern for Indian development and security, basic US interest requires peace and security in both Atlantic and Pacific. If Peiping continues down course of aggression there will be serious trouble. Referring to great burden we bear in world, Secretary once more noted US distress at contrast between what could be achieved on subcontinent through Indo-Pak cooperation and what is being accomplished. This is tragedy for India as well as US. Rusk
46. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ Washington, May 22, 1964, 8:30-9:30 a.m. /1/ Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 77-0075, Memos of Conversation Between Sec. McNamara and Heads of State (Other than NATO). Secret. Approved by Peter Solbert on May 22. A stamped note on the memorandum reads, "Mr. Vance has seen." SUBJECT PARTICIPANTS Indian Side United States Side 1. Foreign Exchange Expenditures. The Secretary opened the meeting by asking Mr. Chavan whether he had any comments to make on the progress of the past week's negotiations. Mr. Chavan responded by stating that he understood the level of foreign exchange expenditures under the Plan was a point of difference between us, and suggested that a solution might be reached if we could increase our military assistance from $50 million a year to $60 million a year. In fact, he said he had understood before coming here that we were planning on a continuation of the Nassau level of $60 million a year. 2. Military Credit Sales for FY 65. Mr. McNamara responded by raising the question of our providing military assistance credit in the amount of $50 million for FY 65. He stated that he was willing to provide this credit if the Indians would reduce the foreign exchange expenditures under the Plan to a level of 682 crores ($1,435 million) and to try to work toward a level of 650 crores ($1,365 million). This would be regarded as an Indian declaration of intention. He went on to say that this figure of 682 crores of foreign exchange would include all of India's defense foreign exchange requirements, including the purchase of any aircraft. 3. Long Term Military Assistance. The Ambassador pointed out that unless the United States is prepared to declare its intentions over the five-year period, this would require the Indians to give a commitment to keep their foreign exchange at the 682 crores level for the five-year period against a one-year commitment by the United States to provide $50 million of military grant aid assistance and $50 million of military credit sales. Mr. McNamara agreed that this was the proposition, but that he would also be willing to agree to five-year military assistance of the Indian Plan, subject to the availability of funds, if the Indians would: a. Agree to limit their foreign exchange expenditures to 682 crores or less; b. Make corresponding reductions in their rupee defense budget; and c. Support reasonable force levels during the Five Year Plan, particularly in the air defense field. In response to Ambassador Nehru's point that this appeared to be a five-year commitment by the Indians as against a one-year commitment by the United States at this time, Mr. McNamara pointed out that if it became necessary for the Indians to go beyond the 682 crores foreign exchange level, one way was for them to pay back the U.S. $50 million loan and then be free of their commitment on foreign exchange expenditures. It was agreed that for the purpose of computations necessary to arrive at the 682 crores level of foreign exchange expenditures, $50 million of U.S. military assistance grant aid annually could be assumed over the period of the Plan. Mr. McNamara made it clear that this was not a commitment on our part to provide that amount of assistance over the period of the Plan. 4. Memorandum of Understanding. It was agreed that the best way to resolve the general question under discussion was to postpone commitments until Mr. Chavan returns to Washington on May 28th to see the President. In the meantime Secretary Rao will work with us to prepare a memorandum of understanding/2/ to set forth clearly what we have in mind. Mr. Rao said that he would reduce the Plan to 682 crores and make the corresponding reductions. /2/ Rao prepared a draft memorandum of understanding, drawn up on the basis of the discussion between McNamara and Chavan, and sent copies to James Grant and Peter Solbert later in the day on May 22. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, DEF 1 INDIA) 5. Air Defense. Mr. Chavan asked the Secretary's advice as to what should be done in the area of air defense. Mr. McNamara responded by saying that his Air Force people believed that the Chinese Communists have a limited offensive potential. They have obsolete aircraft with spare parts problems and limitations on pilot training, with no prospects for an improvement over the next 3 to 5 years. He did not feel that it was wise for nations on the perimeter of Communist China to expend excessive sums for air defense against such a limited air threat. Specifically, he believed the Indians should reduce their number of squadrons from the 45 level and that they should phase out as rapidly as possible the obsolete aircraft which they had in their aircraft inventory. 6. Aircraft. In response to Ambassador Nehru's comment that the Indians needed to look to replacement aircraft before removing obsolete aircraft, the Secretary responded that having a large number of obsolete aircraft results in a drain on the effectiveness of the other aircraft and that some reduction would improve the combat effectiveness of the Indian Air Force. With respect to the question of more modern aircraft, the Secretary said that he could not advise them specifically on this problem at this time. He said he knew that they had HF-24 problems, the question of MIG production, their desire for 104's, etc. He felt this would take some time to sort out, possibly weeks or even months. Ambassador Nehru and Secretary Rao commented that the Chinese Communist Air Force could bomb India today without successful interception and for this reason they needed Mach 2 aircraft. The Secretary of Defense stated that he did not agree with the need for a Mach 2 aircraft. This led to a discussion of details of the appropriate response to the Communist air threat to India and our view that subsonic aircraft, including F-6A, were nearly as effective at this time as Mach 2 aircraft. Ambassador Nehru then asked Secretary McNamara as to the correctness of his information that we had F-104s coming into surplus availability. Mr. McNamara pointed out that we were phasing F-104A/Bs from our Air Force into our National Guard, and that in any event only a limited number of about three squadrons were in our inventory at present.
47. Editorial Note The tenth meeting of the India consortium, organized by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, took place in Washington on May 26, 1964. The meeting was attended by representatives of Austria, Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, the United States, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and the International Development Association. The International Monetary Fund sent an observer. The purpose of the meeting was to consider aid for the fourth year of India's Third Five-Year Plan, covering the period April 1964-March 1965. The communiqué issued at the end of the pledging session indicated that members of the consortium had agreed to undertake commitments totaling $1,028,000. The U.S. share of the overall commitment was $435 million. Approximately one-half of the aid pledged at the meeting took the form of non-project aid intended to be used to finance the imports required for the maintenance of the Indian economy. (Telegram 7761 to London, May 26; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, AID 9 INDIA)
48. Memorandum From Robert Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)/1/ Washington, May 27, 1964. /1/ Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, India, Vol. II, Cables, 4/64-6/64. Secret. Mac-- While Bob McNamara is dead right that F-104s are too rich for India's blood (and that F-5 is far better suited than F-104 to most of our indigent clients), I suspect he'd agree that issue really turns on political grounds: 1. Indians are determined to get supersonics somewhere, most likely MIGs. To have a fighting chance of pre-empting them we have to offer something they think comparable. 2. All of us except Bowles feel that India is already so signed on to MIG deal that it couldn't back out now. Thus odds are we'd get the political credit for being forthcoming without really having to give. All-important here is not to make Indians feel they're second-class citizens, i.e. they can't have F-104s when Paks already have them. 3. True, F-104s are wasteful but they need involve no extra out-of-pocket cost to us. We'd merely substitute 104s for other credit items. Since Indians are going to waste money on supersonics anyway why not let it flow back to us? 4. While pre-empting MIG production isn't absolutely crucial, it is a sensitive sector. More important, since Indians are passionate about 104s (Chavan was simply afraid to raise it with Bob), it would put capstone on a highly successful Pentagon exercise in which we've brought Indians a long way. 5. Soviets are picking up too many options we let drop--Bokaro, VOA transmitter, supersonics, etc. An F-104 offer is about only big gesture we have currently available--at a crucial time of indecision following Nehru's death. On all these scores, I'd argue for a package proposal of: (a) F-6As as interim help; (b) all-out help on HF-24; (c) if this doesn't pan out, 2-3 squadrons of F-104s a few years from now--all predicated on India not going ahead with MIGs (except rounding out one squadron they have). I'll bet this offer (which probably wouldn't be taken up) would produce enough real political plus to justify the military loss./2/ And Paks, though mighty unhappy, couldn't complain too much; they're getting F-104s too, and they'd face supersonics in any case--better our 104s than a lot more MIGs./3/ /2/ Bundy sent a copy of this memorandum to McNamara with a covering note that reads, in part: "Bob--While I know how flinthearted you are on fancy birds for the underdeveloped, let me try out on you the political side of the case. Here's a note to me from Bob Komer, which I find quite persuasive." (Ibid., Vol. II, Memos and Miscellaneous, 4/64-6/64) /3/ Foreign Minister Bhutto called McConaughy in on May 26 and stated that Ayub had instructed him to stress the mounting Pakistani concern over reports of the likelihood of increased U.S. military assistance to India. Bhutto said that if the Indian threat to Pakistan was enhanced by such assistance, Pakistan would be forced to reduce its involvement in "free world concerns and interests in Asia" and concentrate on the preservation of its own vital national interests. (Telegram 2293 from Karachi, May 26; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, DEF 19-3 US-INDIA) R.W. Komer/4/ /4/ Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
49. Telegram From the Embassy in India to the Department of State/1/ New Delhi, May 29, 1964, 0530Z. /1/ Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 15-1 INDIA. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Secto 11. Personal for President and Acting Secretary from Secretary. It is quite clear as seen from here that it was indeed important for me to come to represent the President at Nehru's funeral./2/ Rank of dignitaries here from other countries and obvious appreciation of Indian leadership are both indicative. I have been invited to speak briefly at [garble] open-air meeting here in commemoration of Nehru presided over by President Radhakrishnan. /2/ Prime Minister Nehru died on May 27. Minister of Home Affairs Gulzarilal Nanda became Acting Prime Minister on Nehru's death. Secretary of State Rusk headed the U.S. delegation that attended Nehru's funeral. Nehru's death interrupted the talks Defense Minister Chavan was having in Washington, and Chavan and his party returned to India in Rusk's plane. Chavan sent a message from the plane to President Johnson regretting the fact that tragic circumstances precluded the meeting he was scheduled to have with the President. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, India, Vol. II, Cables, 4/64-6/64) In brief private call which Bowles and I made on Radhakrishnan last evening, he showed great strength and determination as India faces the future. He believes that the new India will be "more pro-West than ever." He believes new government will be constituted very quickly, no later than Saturday, and that Congress Party Parliamentary Group will probably cast about three hundred votes for Shastri and about one hundred for Morarji Desai. Curious combinations between far right (Morarji Desai) and far left (Krishna Menon) are complicating factor. Despite Shastri's apparent large lead, it could develop that Congress Party will attempt to find unanimity and turn to someone like Nanda, temporary Prime Minister. I am seeing Kosygin this afternoon and will do my best to underline the importance of Soviet Union and US working together for peace in Southeast Asia, especially in Laos. I am also calling on Japanese Foreign Minister this afternoon and will emphasize need for caution on Japan's part in building up its relations with Peiping at time when latter's militancy is threatening war in the Pacific. During my brief stop in Tehran, I learned that Shah is prepared to make contribution to South Vietnam. Bowles
50. Telegram From the Embassy in India to the Department of State/1/ New Delhi, May 30, 1964, midnight. /1/ Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Conference Files: Lot 66 D 110, CF 2405B. Secret. Also sent to the White House for McGeorge Bundy. 3577. Secretary pre-occupied with Southeast Asia and was inclined during plane trip from US to New Delhi to postpone decision on military aid to India. However, believe he was impressed with obvious political opportunity facing us with a new government coming in and the rapidly increasing GOI fear of Chinese breakthrough in Southeast Asia. As a result he seemed cautiously favorable to procedures and substantive recommendations which I have since his departure described in a comprehensive cabled proposal (Embtel 3572)./2/ This will reach him in Saigon Sunday and should be in your hands and McNamara's hopefully before McNamara leaves for Honolulu. /2/ In telegram 3572 from New Delhi, May 30, Bowles strongly endorsed McNamara's desire to expedite a military assistance agreement. He argued that the best way for the United States to associate itself with the new government in India would be to follow up on the favorable outcome of the Chavan talks. Bowles proposed that the agreement discussed in Washington should be finalized and initialed by Chavan and himself as soon as possible. When the new government was formed, Bowles would negotiate implementation of the agreement. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, India, Vol. II, Cables, 4/64-6/64) If the President can be persuaded to read our cable/3/ I think he will have clearer perspective of the current opportunities for US in India. /3/ Komer commented on telegram 3572 in a June 3 memorandum to McGeorge Bundy. Komer found Bowles' proposals persuasive, but added: "you and I are among the few people in this town who read Bowles' epistles for sense. He's so drawn down his credit that neither DOD nor the Seventh Floor in State really focus on his mail anymore. Even the President seems to react adversely to Chet's overbidding." Komer concluded that "the real issue is not whether Bowles is right but whether we can sell his wares to a harassed President over the niggling objections of Rusk and Defense." (Ibid.) Measures needed to button up the military aid situation here and to take advantage of dramatic opportunity with a new government are as follows: 1. Secure USG concurrence in modest adjustments requested by GOI in the agreement between Chavan and ourselves so that memorandum of understanding/4/ can promptly go to new Cabinet for final approval. /4/ A draft memorandum of understanding, based on the one provided by Rao to Solbert, was furnished by Solbert to Rao on May 27 prior to the departure of the Indian delegation. The text of this draft was transmitted to New Delhi on May 28 in joint State/Defense telegram DA 970998. (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 69 A 7425, India 091.112) 2. Authorize me to secure approval of new government of press statement included in Embtel 3572/5/ or some genuinely meaningful substitute. If I can get such a statement in the papers here within a day or two after the formation of the new government the political effect in what will inevitably be rather wobbly situation might well be both profound and dramatic. If I can be authorized to say that military loans in addition to grants will be in neighborhood of 50 million dollars this will further strengthen our position. After all, this will leak sooner or later in any event. /5/ The press release Bowles proposed in telegram 3572 emphasized the positive outcome of the discussions between Chavan and McNamara. It noted that the United States agreed that India's 5-year plan provided a sound basis for defense assistance and referred to discussions to develop plans for U.S. assistance in meeting India's need for high-performance aircraft. It is particularly important to get the story published before we are hit by leaks and distortions that can confuse the situation with added possibility of military aid proposals from Moscow to new Indian government. 3. Authorize me to proceed at once to negotiate package air agreement along lines proposed Embtel 3572 with whatever caveats may be required to secure approval. I believe it is essential that we include some reference to F-104s and the stronger the reference the greater the possibility of persuading the new government to limit MIGs to acceptable numbers. If technical questions arise that are beyond our capacities here experts should be sent from Washington. If you can manage this I will be greatly in your debt and the next message you can expect from me will be a Christmas card. Bowles [Continue with the next documents]
Volume XXV Index | Foreign Relations Online | Historian's Office | Department of State | Secretary of State |