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FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1964-1968, Volume XXV South Asia
Department of State |
51. Memorandum From Robert Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)/1/ Washington, June 2, 1964. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, India, Vol. II, Cables, 4/64-6/64. Secret. Mac-- Shastri's victory/2/ is a definite plus for our side. He was the guy who had the guts to vote for letting Abdullah out of the clink. What remains to be seen, however, is whether Shastri can make that inchoate mass known as the Congress Party pull together, and whether he has the ability to lead. /2/Lal Bahadur Shastri was elected leader of the Congress Parliamentary Party on June 2. He was sworn in as Prime Minister, Minister of External Affairs, and Minister of Atomic Energy on June 9. Ayub's conciliatory noises yesterday/3/ are also a plus. /3/Ayub responded to Shastri's election by urging a "fresh look" at relations between Pakistan and India. Shastri stated at a June 2 press conference that he was "much impressed" by Ayub's statement. (Telegram 3633 from New Delhi, June 3; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 32-1 INDIA-PAK) Meanwhile Talbot says Rusk wants to go slow on arms aid to India, till we see how Indians and Paks perform on SEA. In other words, let's not offend the Paks just now. Do you agree? I'm more inclined to agree with Bowles that now's the time for a gesture toward Indians. RWK/4/ /4/Bundy wrote a note to Komer beneath his initials: "speak to me on this."
52. Letter From Secretary of Defense McNamara to Minister of Defense Chavan/1/ Washington, June 3, 1964. /1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 68 A 306, India 381. Secret. Drafted by Solbert. The text of this letter was transmitted to New Delhi on June 3 in telegram DEF 971909. (Ibid., OSD Files: FRC 69 A 7425) Dear Mr. Minister: I am very pleased that our recent discussions concerning the Indian Five-Year Defense Plan reached general agreement, but the event which terminated them has caused us all great sorrow. Prime Minister Nehru's sudden death has brought to a close a remarkable career, devoted throughout as it was to the service of India. All of us here join in sending you our sympathy on such a loss. I know that we are both interested in the momentum of our talks in Washington carrying on. I agree with your suggestion to Assistant Secretary Talbot that we omit from the Memorandum the sentence referring to the Rs. 650 crores level of foreign exchange./2/ As you recall, at our meeting I indicated my feeling that moving toward the Rs. 650 crores level would constitute a less severe drain on India's economic development, but I see no necessity to include this in the Memorandum. /2/Both of the changes proposed by Chavan in the language of the memorandum of understanding were explained in a June 3 memorandum from Solbert to McNamara. Solbert noted that Chavan felt that the Rs. 650 crores objective in the memorandum of understanding would be difficult to sell to the Indian Cabinet, and the language relating to force levels would be read by the Shastri government as an unacceptable abrogation of decision-making authority to an external power. (Ibid.) I understand that your other point related to the Indian force plans referred to in Article 3 of the Memorandum. Here again I agree with your suggested revision of the Memorandum so that the second and third sentences of Article 3 of the Memorandum read as follows: "Minister Chavan said that Indian Defense Representatives would determine the specific items in the Plan to be deferred to come within the above-mentioned foreign exchange level and would determine appropriate readjustments in the Plan. Projection by the United States of its military assistance, both grant aid and credit sales, on a multi-year basis will depend on these determinations." As you can well appreciate, any multi-year projection of United States military assistance to India must rest on a general understanding between us with respect to proposed defense foreign exchange expenditures, rupee military budget, and force plans which such assistance would go to support. Your Defense Plan, including the force plans, will certainly continue to be a topic of mutual discussions between us. I hope that these suggestions are helpful in putting the Memorandum of Understanding into appropriate form for execution./3/ I am very pleased by the tenor of the discussions which we had over the past few weeks here in Washington on your Defense Plan and I look forward to agreement on longer term arrangements between our Governments in this respect. /3/Bowles reported in telegram 3626 from New Delhi, June 3, that Chavan had secured Cabinet approval for the memorandum of understanding, subject to the two changes he had proposed. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, DEF 19 US-INDIA) Sincerely yours, Robert S. McNamara/4/ /4/Printed from a copy that bears this signature and an indication that the original was signed.
53. Memorandum From Robert Komer of the National Security Council Staff and the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson/1/ Washington, June 4, 1964. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, India, Vol. II, Cables, 4/64-6/64. Secret. McNamara's talks with Indian Defense Minister Chavan went quite well, until interrupted by Nehru's death. Indians had produced a 5-Year Defense Plan at our request, and we managed to squeeze the key foreign exchange component down $332 million (about 20%) on grounds deleted items were militarily unnecessary and too great a burden on the economy. In turn McNamara has agreed to $50 million MAP in FY'65 for mountain warfare equipment, communications, and defense production. He has withheld any 5-year MAP promises until he can work over their plan some more, especially on the air side. We did, however, tell Indians they could assume for planning purposes roughly same level in future years. McNamara also agreed to sell on credit terms up to $10 million in FY'64 and $50 million FY'65 certain items to be agreed. Since the Indians intend to spend some of their own hard currency anyway, this neat device meant that much of it will flow to us rather than to the Soviets or UK. Both we and Indians regard this exercise to date as successful and want to tape it down in a Memorandum of Understanding (Tab A),/2/ which McNamara has OKed. Chavan has himself appealed to us to OK it, so that he can run it through Indian cabinet, and we can put out a brief announcement on success of talks, a good gesture in India just now. /2/Not printed. This revised draft, dated May 27, the essentials of which are summarized in this memorandum, was signed by Bowles and Chavan on June 6 as a memorandum of understanding on military assistance. The text of the agreement, as signed, was transmitted to the Department in airgram A-1290 from New Delhi, June 18. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, DEF 19-4 US-INDIA) The Memo, and proposed bland press release (Tab B),/3/ fall far short of what Bowles wants (but will be a plus in India even so). For example, it does not include any US jet offer designed to pre-empt Indian MIG deal with Soviets. Bundy and I hope you'll hear argument on this separately later. /3/Not printed. The text of the press release was transmitted to New Delhi on June 5 in telegram 2534, with authorization for the Embassy to release it. (Ibid., DEF 19-3 US-INDIA) We simply want to give you the final word on this before going ahead./4/ It's only an early stage in a long and painful dialogue with the Indians but both sides are happy with progress to date. Nor will Paks be too unhappy, because we haven't given much (we've kept them clued). /4/Bundy received preliminary approval for the agreement from President Johnson in a telephone conversation the previous evening. (Johnson Library, Transcripts of Telephone Conversations, Alpha Series, McGeorge Bundy) Recommend your early approval. Indians hope to get it so their cabinet can act before it goes Saturday to bury Nehru's ashes./5/ /5/President Johnson checked the approval line. R.W. Komer
54. Telegram From the Embassy in India to the Department of State/1/ New Delhi, June 6, 1964, 1300Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 1 INDIA-US. Confidential. Repeated to the White House, Defense Department, London, and CINCMEAFSA for POLAD. 3686. Late Friday afternoon I met with Lal Bahadur Shastri for forty-five minutes. The new PriMin was calm, cordial and relaxed. The talk which included some pointed references to military assistance agreement developed along following lines: 1. Shastri opened conversation with an emotional and extended reference to Nehru in course of which he reviewed his 37-year personal relationship, the unique influence that Nehru had on the Indian people, his moral and physical courage, etc. through his efforts a strong national political foundation has been built. The new Indian Govt was determined to build on that foundation and he was personally encouraged by the initial response of Congress Party and Indian public. 2. I stressed world-wide implications of Indian democratic experiment, growing understanding in US of Nehru's personal qualities and historic role, warm press and public reaction to his own recent election, and continuing determination of USG to back Indian economic development and military defense with greatest vigor. 3. Picking up my last point, Shastri reminded me of our last conversation in which he had expressed view that outcome of Chavan visit to US was of profound importance. He was delighted to hear that negotiations had been successful. Although Chavan had shown him agreement he had been so harried that he had not had opportunity to study it. 4. At his request I outlined main points, stressing need for balance between the economic growth which is essential to national unity and motivation and an adequate force with which to defend Indian borders. Shastri asked incisive questions about US help for domestic military production, nature of grant aid arrangements, likely magnitude of our assistance plans, prospects for continuing congressional support, etc., and next step in regard to air force negotiations which he understood had not been completed. 5. In regard to latter point I expressed the hope that discussions would soon be resumed and that decision satisfactory to both of us could be reached in near future. Perhaps more than any other nation we shared India's concern over long range implications of China's political objectives and military capacity. Although we felt that Indian Defense Ministry was inclined to overrate China's present air capacity and to underrate her potential missile capacity, we fully agreed that India needs an effective air defense system with a number of high performance aircraft, and we expressed our willingness to provide such aircraft. Our difficulties lie along two lines (1) our belief that the Indian defense authorities as in every other govt have failed to balance questions of financial costs against practical requirements and (2) our concern over growing dependence of Indian Air Force on USSR. If in addition to transport planes, SAMs and some MIG-21s this should now be expanded by the addition of a large MIG-21 assembly line, major US assistance to Indian air force would not only be unnecessary but would also create many security problems for us. While we welcome lessening of tensions with USSR we cannot forget that less than two years ago Mr. Khrushchev's government had surreptitiously attempted to place forty missiles in Cuba armed with nuclear warheads and aimed at forty US cities. If India could visualize a Chinese attempt to place similar installations in Bhutan or Burma she would understand our reaction. In any event it is important that the Prime Minister and his key associates understand our view of India's actual air defense needs based on many years of experience in similar situations. In initial stage we believed that India needs reasonably effective airplane with high rate of climb that could be delivered here quickly and at low cost. Over longer haul India needs a supersonic plane preferably produced or assembled in this country. In regard to first need we had discussed with Mr. Chavan F6As, a proven plane with fast rate of climb, and an extremely low cost, relatively easy to fly and available promptly. In regard to second need, we had expressed our willingness during Washington discussions to help India in every practical way to find suitable engine for her HF-24 (Mach II). Naturally the question had arisen: but what if our combined efforts should fail? The Indian Air Force had expressed an eagerness for US F-104Gs. Although this is an outstanding plane we had stressed that it is extremely costly, hard to fly and prone to accidents. Moreover present assembly lines in Japan, Germany and Canada are likely to be closed down before end of next year. We had also discussed the F-5 which although not as fast as the F-104 is fully capable of handling Chinese bombers and much less expensive although more so than the F-6A. In any event the situation was still hanging fire. Indian Air Force like every other air force naturally wanted the best regardless of cost. We on other hand are deeply concerned about unbalancing the defense budget with unnecessarily sophisticated weapons. If we did decide to backup HF-24 project with supersonic plane acceptable to Indians we would do so on assumption that India would not feel that a major MIG-21 production effort was also required in addition to our contribution plus the expensive Soviet SAMs which we understood had already been contracted for. 6. Shastri listened attentively to this presentation and asked pertinent questions; his final one being "Does Chavan agree with your views?" I replied that although Mr. Chavan had seen all three planes and undoubtedly had formed some opinion he was probably waiting for US decision as to what we are willing to do. The Indian Air Force was greatly taken with F-104 which we all agreed was an outstanding plane. In the end, however, such decisions as in our own govt would have to be taken by the civilian ministries; in doing so I only hoped they would not forget that the added cost of the Air Force proposals would probably be enough to build two or three new Indian universities or dam over one of India's greatest rivers. Although PriMin might assume he was not a military expert I could assure him that he would soon be forced by such situations to become one. He would find that it is a rare occasion when he will be provided by wholly right or wholly wrong alternatives; on questions of defense as elsewhere the available policy choices are bound to be unsatisfactory in one way or another. 7. Shastri then asked me about procedure. I replied that the classified general agreement was all set and in Mr. Chavan's hands and that as soon as he approved it we would issue joint press statement. I said that press statement that we had prepared was deliberately in low key and rather vague on key questions because from Indian point of view and our own it was essential not to upset the Pakistanis. As PriMin himself had pointed out, Ayub Khan had taken moderate and encouraging position in regard to India. If this mood is adequately encouraged we may expect further weakening of the Sino-Pak relationship which will serve our common interests. Shastri agreed with this and commented that he was glad general agreement had been reached, that he was grateful for my explanation of air force question which he had not previously understood, and that in meantime Chavan had full authority to sign agreement. 8. I closed my end of conversation with remarks on overriding importance of the US-Indian relationship, our heavy stake in India's economic and political success and in her military defense, and the fact that as India's new Prime Minister he could count on President Johnson, Dean Rusk, me and everyone else in our govt for understanding and support in good times or in bad. Shastri replied that he hoped we could talk frequently about many things, that he was particularly conscious of my long interest in Indian development, and that he would like to feel free to discuss with me some special problems in that regard. For instance, he shared my conviction that India's political future would be determined in her villages, and added that new land reform measures were high on Congress Party agenda and that he hoped to talk with me about them soon. His final comment at the door was a request that I personally thank Dean Rusk for interrupting his busy Washington schedule to come all the way to New Delhi for Nehru's funeral. Bowles
55. Telegram From the Department of Defense to the Embassy in Pakistan/1/ Washington, June 7, 1964, 0008Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, DEF 19 US-INDIA. Secret. Repeated to New Delhi, London, CINCMEAFSA, and State Department Operations Center. DEF 972285. From OASD/ISA. This is a joint State/Defense message. Reference Deptel 2374./2/ As indicated in our cables to New Delhi on the need for cautious press play on the McNamara-Chavan understanding, we recognize that Paks will have difficulty in swallowing new stage of US military assistance to India. The Indian military buildup inevitably is changing the military power balance in the subcontinent and we recognize that Pak unhappiness over this is compounded by our significant assistance role with the Indians. It is extremely important therefore that both India's buildup and most particularly our role be kept in as accurate a perspective as possible by the Paks. Following should be helpful in clarifying for your information what has been agreed to with the Indians as reftel has indicated some misunderstanding. /2/The reference is in error. The correct reference is telegram 2374 from Karachi, June 5, in which the Embassy expressed concern about the memorandum of understanding on military assistance to India that was about to be signed. Although the agreement did not embrace the sensitive issue of supersonic aircraft for India, the Embassy was deeply concerned about the impact of the agreement upon the balance of military power on the subcontinent, upon prospects for an Indo-Pak reconciliation, and upon the U.S. position in Pakistan. (Ibid., DEF 19-3 US-INDIA) Our discussions with the Indians resulted in a cut back of their program for offshore defense acquisitions during five years from a total of $1911 million including aircraft to $1432 million averaging $286 million annually. The latter includes all identifiable offshore acquisitions including US, UK and Soviet assistance as well as those from India's own foreign exchange (do not understand source of your erroneous figure of $400 million for the annual level of Indian offshore acquisitions). The offshore procurement ceiling of $1432 million includes not only all direct procurement for the armed forces but also many of the indirect foreign exchange charges, e.g., raw material for Indian ordnance factories (does not however include certain other indirect foreign exchange costs such as POL). The $286 million annual rate is about the average for the past two Indian fiscal years including all foreign military aid. The result, therefore, of our $50 million credit in FY 65 will be to reduce the use of India's own foreign exchange for military procurement to a level well below that of the past two years and primarily result in channeling increased procurement to US market. We realize that this is a difficult point to convince the Paks on; however, given the ceiling we have agreed to with the Indians, it is valid and needs to be reiterated to the Paks. Our assistance to Indian defense production has been concentrated on infantry requirements, particularly ammo production and not, as Paks may fear, in major equipment production. For example, the Ambajhari ordnance plant is to produce primarily ammunition for mortars, pack 75's and recoilless rifles which are particularly required for mountain divisions even though also used for the regular infantry divisions. You can indicate to the Paks that our review of the Indian five year plan has resulted both in substantial reduction in Indian plans and also in increased concentration of their buildup to respond to the Communist threat. (FYI. e.g., Indian plans for naval modernization were cut back drastically by some 75 per cent. End FYI) You will note from McNamara letter to Chavan/3/ and memorandum of understanding that in fact US has agreed only to FY 1964 and FY 1965 programs. Longer term projection of our assistance will depend upon India satisfying certain conditions as listed in McNamara letter. We anticipate that as a minimum it will take several months before we are in position make long term projection should we decide at that time such a course is appropriate./4/ /3/Document 52. /4/On June 15 the Embassy reported that Foreign Minister Bhutto expressed sharp criticism of the U.S. military assistance agreement with India. Bhutto stated in a press conference that the agreement would aggravate tension on the subcontinent and make a settlement between India and Pakistan more difficult. (Telegram 2459 from Karachi; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, DEF 19-3 US-INDIA) The Embassy noted in telegram 2498 from Karachi, June 19, that Bhutto's attitude reflected the concerns of the rest of the Pakistani Government. Since the United States was held to be largely responsible for what the Ayub government saw as an increasingly dangerous situation, the Embassy felt there was a need to restore the U.S. position in Pakistan and to give Pakistan a greater sense of confidence in its security. (Ibid.)
56. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in India/1/ Washington, June 10, 1964, 9:40 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, DEF 19-3 US-INDIA. Secret; Immediate. Drafted by Schneider; cleared by Talbot, Cameron, Solbert (substance), and Freshman (G/PM) (substance); and approved and initialed by Rusk. Repeated to Karachi, London, and CINCSTRIKE for POLAD. 2573. New Delhi's 3685 to Dept,/2/ repeated Karachi 1631, CINCMEAFSA unnumbered. /2/In telegram 3685 from New Delhi, June 6, Bowles argued for building upon the success achieved with the memorandum of understanding on military assistance by negotiating an agreement to meet the Indian Government's desire to upgrade the Indian Air Force. (Ibid.) Air Defense Assistance. During year and half of Indo-Pak tensions since Chicom attack we have not permitted Pak objections to stand in way of larger US interest in strengthening Indian forces against threat Chicom aggression. At same time we have done what possible to encourage Pak-Indian accommodation in realization that any lasting security of subcontinent requires Indo-Pak cooperation. Nehru's death, accession of moderate Shastri government, and friendly reaction of Ayub has opened new vista of possible Pak-Indian accommodation. Under these circumstances believe main play of USG for coming weeks should be to leave field open for possible development of forces leading toward accommodation and avoid actions which might tend rekindle flames of subcontinent controversy. Underlying this policy is thesis that as prospects for Indo-Pak accommodation improve, long run security of subcontinent requires that major determinant US policy be what will contribute to proper climate for accommodation. Judged against this background, we believe Memorandum of Understanding recently concluded with GOI is about as far as we can go at this moment without risking injecting new disruptive factor into Indo-Pak relations. Therefore, while we believe we should meet our commitment to continue discussing air defense assistance with Indians, we should defer for time being presenting comprehensive package for air assistance. Accordingly, Embassy should delay continuation of current talks on comprehensive aircraft assistance. We will follow-up in later message with strategy by which we propose to meet commitment to continue discussions while deferring any new offer. FYI: We are planning continue our initiative with Indians for comprehensive feasibility study of HF-24 while deferring discussion with Indians of possible backup of project with US supersonic aircraft./3/ End FYI. /3/On June 17 the Department instructed the Embassy to implement this strategy in discussing the requirements of the Indian Air Force. (Telegram 2624 to New Delhi; ibid., DEF 19-3 US-INDIA) We believe Memorandum of Understanding has already effectively demonstrated for the present our support of new government. Your reports show that Indian officials are quite pleased results Chavan mission. Moreover, talks with Rao and Khera indicate Indians may be further down MIG-21 road than we had previously realized. Under circumstances described above seems our best tactic now would be to do what we can to encourage Indians keep available options open (i.e., MIG-21 and HF-24) until they have facts which would enable them in making decisions to take into account technical and military factors, as well as their evident preference for domestic production. Feasibility study of HF-24 is essential ingredient of this tactic. We count on you to help reduce sense of immediacy which has been built up around this subject. Your return to US would in itself contribute to this. Rusk
57. Memorandum From Robert Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson/1/ Washington, June 16, 1964. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, India, Vol. III, Cables, 6/64-11/64. Secret. Chet Bowles is back full of vim and vigor. He's quite optimistic about the new Shastri cabinet, which he sees as more practical and less woolly-minded than Nehru's. You should get his slant. The chief pending item of Indian business is whether we should include in our longer term military program an air defense package designed to preempt their MIG deal with Moscow. Proposal is that we offer to sell or grant India (within proposed MAP ceilings--so no added cost to us): (a) 72 surplus F-6As; (b) help in making their own homegrown HF-24 supersonic; and (c) if HF-24 doesn't pan out, we'd provide 24-36 F-104s a few years from now; all this only on condition that India give up MIG-21 production. Most of us are convinced that India is much too far down the road to renege on MIG deal (only Bowles differs--and he's climbing down now too). Thus we'd get all the political benefit of showing the Indians they're not second-class citizens (i.e. we're willing to give F-104s to them as well as Paks) without ever having our offer taken up. Or, if we were all wrong, and Indians bit, then we have the great plus of getting non-aligned India to reject MIGs. This would also protect the Paks, since a few squadrons of Indian F-104s would be less dangerous than a whole MIG production line. McNamara has come around to buying this deal. He says let's offer F-104s to both India and Pakistan or to neither. State, however, is more equivocal; it sees an air offer to India as upsetting the Paks just when Ayub is coming around to a conciliatory policy. So State says let's hold off awhile (see their brief attached)./2/ /2/Not printed. The brief on the air defense assistance package took the form of a June 16 memorandum from Talbot to Rusk, passed to the White House. But one of the factors bringing Paks around (aside from Nehru's death) is that we're finally getting through to them that they can't have a veto on our Indian policy. Also this air offer is a non-starter anyway, so why all the worry? At any rate, you might hear argument from Bowles, and then take issue up at lunch if you see a case./3/ /3/No record of Bowles' meeting with President Johnson has been found. Only other issue is State's proposal you give Shastri an open-ended visit invite. I told them you couldn't do this before election, but suggest instead you allow Bowles to tell Shastri this, and to say that if elected you'd much look forward to seeing him at some mutually convenient time thereafter./4/ /4/A handwritten note by Talbot on the June 16 memorandum to Rusk cited in footnote 2 above indicates that President Johnson discussed this issue with Bowles on June 15 and authorized him to tell Shastri that if the November elections went well Johnson hoped that he and Shastri would find the opportunity to meet. R.W. Komer/5/ /5/Bundy initialed below Komer's signature.
58. Letter From Secretary of State Rusk to Secretary of Defense McNamara/1/ Washington, June 17, 1964. /1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 69 A 7425, India 381. Secret. Received in the Office of the Secretary of Defense on June 18 at 11:22 a.m. A stamped notation on the letter reads: "SecDef has seen, 20 June 1964." Dear Bob: We may be close enough to agreement on the contents of a comprehensive U.S. air defense package for India so that it would be worthwhile for me to try to set them down in writing. My objective is to secure Executive Branch agreement on this now. As you probably know, for the immediate present we are deferring presentation of any comprehensive air package in order to avoid introducing a jarring note during the Indo-Pak honeymoon which seems to be in process. In this regard I might add that Pak Foreign Minister Bhutto has already publicly criticized our recent announcement to the press of additional military assistance to India at a time when Pakistan is trying to improve its relations with India. He has done this despite the obvious restraint imposed by his government on critical press reaction to the announcement. So that we will be in a position to move when the time is ripe--and we have our eyes very much on possible Soviet moves and the timing of any Indian military mission to Moscow--I suggest an air package on the following order: 1. F6A's. Three squadrons of (72) F6A's. (We have, of course, already discussed these with the Indians. I should express our strong view that we should not go in with the F6A's alone but that they should be only a part of a comprehensive package.) 2. HF-24. If our feasibility studies are positive, we would be willing to provide technical assistance in adapting a Western engine to the HF-24 airframe, and other technical assistance in developing this airplane into an operational Mach 2 interceptor. 3. Supersonics. If, after a year or so of joint efforts to develop the HF-24, this aircraft does not seem likely to become an operational Mach 2 interceptor, we would be prepared to help the Indians find suitable Western supersonics. We now see our way clear to offering some 36 of these. We would tell the Indians this when we present the comprehensive air package. If the Indians should come back and say that this package is not responsive to their desire for some sort of domestic assembly--which the MIG deal would permit--I should hope that we would be prepared to look most closely into what could be done to meet this point. For planning purposes I believe we need now an Executive Branch determination that these 36 aircraft could be F-104G's, although I would hope that we could get the Indians to settle on some other interceptor, such as the F5A or F-104 A/B. (We have gone beyond the 24 F-104's which you suggested as we don't believe we could sell the package at this level; at 36 we would have something which would give us a chance with the Indians. We would not expect in any event that deliveries of U.S. supersonics to India over the next five years would get ahead of deliveries to Pakistan.) I am particularly persuaded that this entire package, including individual components such as the F6A's, should be offered only on the condition that India drop its plans for obtaining MIG 21's beyond rounding out a single squadron of no more than 24 aircraft. Our position with Pakistan would be greatly weakened if the Indians were able to secure substantial combat air assistance from both blocs. Furthermore, I am greatly concerned regarding the reaction on the Hill should we help the Indians with combat air while they build up their stock of MIG 21's. Reaction on the Hill may be hard enough to deal with after an Indian MIG deal even if we do not help the Indians in the combat air field. I hope you agree that we can move forward with our planning on this basis. Sincerely, Dean
59. Memorandum From Robert Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)/1/ Washington, June 23, 1964. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Pakistan, Vol. II, 6/64-11/64. Secret. McGB: It looks as though Mikoyan's surprise stopover in Delhi (en route to Djakarta) may have clinched MIG deal. Our DCM was told (Delhi 3851)/2/ that it was "confirmed" by Mikoyan. DCM regards die as cast, but a few of us here still hope there may be some F-104 play left for us. In any case, we can keep plugging HF-24 engine, in hopes that if it pans out we'll have new case for limiting MIG purchases. /2/Dated June 22. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 7 INDIA) Meanwhile Paks seem to be whomping up another anti-US MAP for India campaign (note attached)./3/ To me, this is not yet the time to start being nice to Paks, but to growl back at them a while longer. Paks claim long-term US aid prevents India/Pak reconciliation, but in point of fact unless we keep them in suspense it is they who lose incentive for compromise with Shastri. /3/Two telegrams were attached. Telegram 2523 from Karachi, June 23, reported that Foreign Minister Bhutto told the National Assembly on June 22 that in light of the new U.S.-Indian military assistance agreement, the "time has come for Pakistan to undertake a reappraisal of its foreign policy and review her political and military commitments." Telegram 2528 from Karachi, June 24, cited a local press report of that day that quoted President Ayub as charging the United States with basing its policy toward South Asia on opportunism and not hesitating to "let down friends." RWK
60. Letter From President Ayub to President Johnson/1/ Rawalpindi, July 1, 1964. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, DEF 19 US-PAK. Secret; Exdis. The classification marking was added in the Department of State. The text of this letter was transmitted to the Embassy in Karachi in telegram 25, July 9. (Ibid., DEF 19-3 US-INDIA) Ambassador Ahmed delivered the letter to President Johnson on July 7; see Document 63. My dear President Johnson, I am asking my Ambassador to call on you and apprise you of the likely repercussions of the recent decision of your Administration concerning military aid to India. I think the time has come for me to make a personal approach to you. We have, over the last two years, repeatedly represented to the United States Government the dangers implicit in their policy of massive arms aid to India. From the very beginning we have held the view that the arming of India on the scale chosen by the United States was uncalled for. Time has proved that we were right. It must now be clear to everyone that China does not plan to invade India and there is no likelihood of recrudescence of even a limited arms conflict between India and China. On the other hand, this aid imperils the security of Pakistan, your ally; it prevents an Indo-Pakistan rapprochement over Kashmir which immobilises the bulk of their armed forces in a dangerous confrontation; it must lead to an arms race between India and Pakistan and thereby place a crushing burden on their economies. Surely this is no way of preventing the inroads of Communism into the sub-continent--if this is the United States objective. On the contrary, it would facilitate them. Further, by continuing to build India's armed might, the United States might well force India's smaller neighbours already deeply mistrustful of India--to seek the protection of China. In short, the policy the United States is following in this area is self-defeating. The foregoing considerations have been put before the United States Government time and again. If I am restating them, it is because I have a feeling that these considerations have not been given the weight they deserve. On May 26 my Foreign Minister explained to Ambassador McConaughy Pakistan's growing concern at the continued arming of India. He also stated that if this policy continued, Pakistan would be compelled to reconsider its commitments to her allies. Your Government has since decided not merely to continue to arm India; it has offered India twice as much arms aid in FY 1965 as in previous years. India has also been given to understand that she may expect to receive military aid of this order for the next five years. Not to mention the timing of previous decisions to arm India which have all contributed towards complicating Indo-Pakistan relations, the present decision, in particular, has been singularly ill-timed. Latterly, we were moving towards a relaxation of tension in our relations with India. There was some hope that the Shastri Government recognised the importance of improving relations with Pakistan and, to that end, might be willing to settle the Kashmir dispute. That hope has now been rudely shaken. This latest manifestation of US Administration's resolve to continue to give long term military aid to India has caused deep misgivings in Pakistan. Faced with the resultant growing peril to our security, because of the enormous Indian arms build up with US support, I am writing to you in the hope that you will please look personally into the issues I have mentioned and take suitable corrective action in the interest of Pakistan-United States relationship which has so far been cordial and warm. And to my way of thinking very little effort is required to maintain it so. I am saying this as I have belief in your wisdom and sagacity. I also believe that this is not only necessary in the interest of Pakistan but also very much in the global interest of the United States relating to Asia. With warm personal regards, Yours sincerely, Mohammad Ayub Khan
61. Letter From Secretary of Defense McNamara to Secretary of State Rusk/1/ Washington, July 2, 1964. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, DEF 19-8 US-INDIA. Secret. Dear Dean: I agree with the proposal for an air defense package for India as set forth in your letter of June 17, 1964,/2/ with the exception that I think we should limit the number of F-5 or F-104G aircraft which we offer to India to a total of 24 aircraft. These aircraft would presumably be supplied to India primarily on a credit sales basis. I think we should maintain a balance between the high performance aircraft offered to India and those offered to Pakistan, and accordingly the present 12 F-104A/B's in Pakistan should be augmented by not more than an additional 12 F-104's through grant aid, bringing Pakistan's total of F-104 aircraft to 24. /2/Document 58. I believe we should make every effort to limit the Indians to the acquisition of about a dozen MIG-21's rather than permitting them to go to two dozen aircraft. I think our package, with the offer of up to 72 F-6 aircraft and support for the HF-24 included, is sufficiently attractive to warrant a firm U.S. position in limiting the Indians to the smallest number of MIG's possible. I would like to emphasize that any agreement with respect to our assistance in connection with the HF-24 should be limited at this stage solely to technical assistance. Sincerely, Bob
62. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in India/1/ Washington, July 2, 1964, 8:45 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, DEF 19-3 US-INDIA. Secret. Drafted by Crawford in NEA/SOA, cleared by Laise, and approved by Talbot. Repeated to London, Karachi, and CINCMEAFSA for POLAD. 17. Embtel 3851./2/ During call on Assistant Secretary Talbot June 30 Cabinet Secretary Khera said he had pretty clear impression India not likely obtain combat aircraft from US as long as it committed to MIG deal. Wanted to know if this actually the case. Talbot asked about MIG developments during Mikoyan's visit, was told commitment for production facilities (not assembly) made some two years ago and had been "reinforced" during Mikoyan's visit. He added many technical details remained to be worked out but basic deal firm and it hard to imagine could be changed now. In response question whether this meant India would be embarking on two supersonic production lines he replied this apparently the case. Talbot said we considered this too much of foreign exchange burden. We had wanted be responsive to India's request for help on HF-24 in hope this would ultimately meet need for supersonics, but question of two supersonic production lines would cause us serious trouble. Grant, who also present, remarked we recognized GOI would have political problems with Soviets depending on how far MIG deal had gone but that we thought it might be possible for US to help in combat aircraft field if GOI could phase out MIG program with a squadron of planes. Khera said he understood our position on problems MIG production caused us and would convey it to GOI. He wondered if this ruled out US help on jigs and tools for HF-24 production line. Talbot replied we would have to look at this very carefully. /2/See footnote 2, Document 59. Khera asked for reduction military credit sales interest from 3 per cent to 3/4 of 1 per cent on grounds India's debt servicing load increasing greatly. He was told possibility putting military credit sales on same basis economic aid would be examined. Reporting on London talks, Khera said he talked about HF-24 engine to Rolls Royce who now studying drawings and might possibly be in India in fortnight for on-the-ground look at plane. Rusk
63. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ Washington, July 7, 1964, 5:48-5:58 p.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Pakistan, Vol. II, 6/64-11/64. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Talbot. The meeting was held at the White House. The time of the meeting is taken from the President's Daily Diary. (Ibid.) Another copy of this memorandum is in National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, DEF 19-8 US-INDIA. SUBJECT PARTICIPANTS Ambassador Ahmed congratulated the President on the passage of the Civil Rights Act, and expressed the admiration of the Pakistani people for the President's courage and skill in successfully carrying through legislation of such historic importance. He then handed over a letter from President Ayub./2/ /2/Document 60. When the President had read the letter, the Ambassador suggested that from its contents the President would recognize the depth of President Ayub's anxiety about United States military assistance to India. Pakistan had hoped the time had come when this aid would be stopped, since the Chinese threat to India had clearly receded. Instead, United States military assistance to India had been doubled. There was also now a long-term understanding on arms aid. He was sorry to have to say that these regrettable developments had definitely upset the balance of power in the subcontinent, and, in addition, had clearly eroded Pakistan's ability to meet its obligations to its allies. The President interrupted to ask if this were why President Ayub had not replied to requests for some assistance to Vietnam. He had been shocked at President Ayub's silence, especially as Pakistan had once before offered troops to assist in protecting Southeast Asia. He had thought that now President Ayub would at least put the Pakistan flag there. The Ambassador, clearly uninformed on this question, said he did not know about other assistance but, of course, Pakistan could not now put any soldiers there. Pakistan faced a difficult threat. Its neighbor, India, was completely non-aligned and had made no commitment whatsoever to any free world cause. As President Ayub had pointed out before, Pakistan could foresee that a militarily strong India would oust the American presence from Southeast Asia. President Ayub had great respect for President Johnson and trusted that, with his knowledge of the situation in the area, he would be able to understand the situation and rectify the steps that were being taken. After a quiet pause, the President said he would study President Ayub's letter carefully and talk with his associates about it. However, he did not share President Ayub's feeling that because the United States has helped India, Pakistan should ignore its alliance obligations. Obviously Pakistan would have to decide its course. He himself did not think it would be in Pakistan's interest to leave the alliances, but that would have to be Pakistan's decision. The Ambassador, visibly concerned at the President's reaction, interposed that President Ayub had not said he would leave the alliances. In response the President read from the Ayub letter, saying he had inferred the President was thinking of this possibility from such phrases as the following: "On May 26 my Foreign Minister explained to Ambassador McConaughy Pakistan's growing concern at the continued arming of India. He also stated that if this policy continued, Pakistan would be compelled to reconsider the commitments to her allies." The Ambassador asserted that what President Ayub hoped was that this United States policy would not continue. The President then read another quotation from the letter: "Further, by continuing to build India's armed might, the United States might well force India's smaller neighbors--already deeply mistrustful of India--to seek the protection of China." The Ambassador responded that this could happen. Without referring to Pakistan's relations with China, he said that after all Nepal was already almost in the mouth of China; Burma was under considerable pressure; Ceylon, as everyone knew, was going wildly from policy to policy; and there were difficulties in Sikkim and Bhutan. Speaking slowly and seriously, the President expressed great admiration for President Ayub and great affection for the people of Pakistan. He knew that the Ambassador was about to go to London to see President Ayub,/3/ and asked him to give President Ayub his warm personal regards. However, he added soberly, he did not agree with what President Ayub had written about the necessity of the United States following the course President Ayub recommended. In light of the way President Ayub seemed to feel, he guessed we were coming to the point at which we would all have to re-evaluate the condition of our relationship. This troubled him deeply, he concluded, because there was no people for whom he had greater regard then for the Pakistani people. /3/Ayub was attending the Commonwealth Conference in London. After a pause, when it became clear that the President had no more to say, the Ambassador, who appeared shaken by the tone and content of the President's comments, said he would carry the President's message to President Ayub, and took his leave.
64. Memorandum From Robert Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson/1/ Washington, July 15, 1964. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Pakistan, Vol. II, Cables, 6/64-11/64. Secret; Exdis. A handwritten "L" on the memorandum indicates that it was seen by the President. You've so shaken all of us on India/Pak policy that we want to be sure you know in advance about tomorrow's pledging session for the 1964/65 share of the Pak Consortium. We and our friends will announce pledges of $420-430 million (about $212 million US),/2/ which will get a little play in Friday's papers. /2/The sixth meeting of the Pakistan consortium took place in Washington on July 16 at the initiative of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. The meeting was attended by representatives of Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, the United States, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and the International Development Association. The purpose of the meeting was to consider aid for the fifth year of Pakistan's Second Five-Year Plan, covering the period July 1964-June 1965. A total of $431 million was pledged, of which the United States pledged $212.5 million. This just makes public an AID commitment already given; in fact, we've gotten the Paks in return to make some very sensible moves to liberalize their private sector. But we'll also have McConaughy make the point to Ayub that we and our allies are continuing to give him major aid at the very time when he's slanging us. R. W. Komer/3/ /3/Bundy initialed below Komer's signature. [Continue with the next documents]
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