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FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1964-1968, Volume XXV South Asia
Department of State |
65. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ Washington, July 15, 1964, 1:38 p.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Pakistan, Vol. II, Cables, 6/64-11/64. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Talbot on July 20. The meeting was held at the White House. The time of the meeting is taken from the President's Daily Diary. (Ibid.) SUBJECT /2/Ambassador McConaughy was in Washington on home leave and was scheduled to return to Pakistan on July 21. In an undated note to President Johnson concerning his scheduled meeting with McConaughy, Secretary Rusk noted that McConaughy should be in a position to respond to President Ayub's July 1 letter when he returned to Pakistan. Rusk attached a draft letter to Ayub that he recommended the President sign as a basis for McConaughy's discussion with Ayub. (Ibid., National Security File, Country File, Pakistan, Vol. II, Cables) PARTICIPANTS Ambassador McConaughy said Ayub has manifested strong feelings of rapport with President Johnson, especially after his visit to the Texas ranch in 1961. Ayub had been disappointed with what he felt was a failure by President Kennedy to understand fully Pakistan's problem with arms assistance to India and had counted on a more sympathetic hearing from President Johnson. Ayub felt that we were not taking Pakistani views enough into account. The Ambassador thought it would be most useful to build on the great respect which Ayub had for the President by inviting Ayub here for a face-to-face talk after the U.S. elections. This would please Ayub and give him a chance to get things off his chest, even though we might have to agree to disagree again. The Department had incorporated a suggestion for such a meeting in the draft Presidential letter for the Ambassador to take back with him, if the President approved. After rereading President Ayub's July 1, 1964 letter/3/ and reading the proposed reply, the President outlined a different type of reply he wished to have made to Ayub. Instead of taking a letter, Ambassador McConaughy should give an oral response when he next saw Ayub. The President did not want to give Ayub an invitation to Washington now, or anytime before the November election. He did not see much point in another session of unproductive argument with Ayub. /3/Document 60. The President said that the Ambassador should restate the President's highest personal regard for President Ayub. The Ambassador should then say that the President had read President Ayub's letter with a great deal of interest and considerable distress. The President had little to add to what he had already told Pakistan Ambassador G. Ahmed when the letter was presented. He did not share President Ayub's viewpoint that he was being disloyal to the Alliance by trying to work with India in what he considers to be our interest and also Ayub's. Moreover he was distressed that such an old and valued ally of ours as President Ayub should want to give the attention he has given to Communist China. Ayub must know we Americans felt strongly about China; we were having all sorts of trouble with China in Southeast Asia right now. As for President's Ayub's suggestion that he might have to reappraise Pakistan's commitments to the Alliances, the President could not see that this would be in Pakistan's interest or in ours, but it was a decision that only President Ayub could make. We valued the Pakistan alliance. As he had said to Ambassador Ahmed, we recognized Pakistan's right as a sovereign country to re-examine its policies. Regrettable as it might be, we would have to re-examine ours also, if Pakistan did so. Commenting on these statements to be made to President Ayub, the President said he did not wish to provoke Ayub. Ayub, who is about as able, tough and ruthless as anyone the President had known, was enough of a dictator so that if the President were to respond to the letter by inviting Ayub to Washington, Ayub would think we were admitting we had been wrong in our policy toward India. After the election, the President would see if he wanted to have Ayub here for a debating contest, or let Pakistan go its own way. If Pakistan wanted to change its course, there wasn't much we could do about it. We were giving Pakistan more than double the per capita aid that we gave India. If Ayub wanted to jeopardize this, it was up to him. The President doubted that Pakistan could get much from either Communist China or the Soviet Union. Ambassador McConaughy estimated that as long as Ayub was in control in Pakistan, he wasn't about to commit suicide by reversing Pakistan foreign policy and risking the loss of U.S. aid. Ayub was very conscious of the value of his U.S. ties, and while a shrewd bargainer was unlikely to go over the brink. In fact, Pakistan was continuing to work with us in many fields and had just recently offered to share any intelligence they collected on the new air route to Communist China. However, Ayub was very disillusioned with what he saw as a shift in U.S. policy and in the sub-continent power balance at the expense of Pakistan. We should try to bring Ayub around, seeking to avoid any action which might cause him to think he was being forced to the brink. The President wondered how much we were getting for the very large amounts of aid we were giving to India as well as Pakistan. He asked how much our aid to Pakistan was running; when told that it was over $400 million including PL-480, he commented that the question of aid to Pakistan would certainly be settled if the Morse Amendment were passed. The President said that when Ayub was willing to send men to Laos, he thought our aid was worthwhile. But now that the Pakistanis refused to help us in Viet Nam, he didn't know whether we were getting very much for our money. Mr. Komer and the others present noted the special facilities available to the U.S. and cooperation in various intelligence fields, but agreed that the price was high in terms of specific benefits. Ambassador McConaughy thought that a Kashmir settlement would contribute more than anything else to the solution of our dilemma on the subcontinent. Ayub had made clear that if only Kashmir could be settled, he would again offer joint defense to India. Pakistan and India would not have to deploy against each other and they could release forces for use elsewhere. The President didn't think that either side would settle Kashmir. The President observed that what we did for many countries was repaid by their involving us in their own ancient feuds--not only Kashmir between India and Pakistan, but the Arabs and Israel and now the Greeks and Turks over Cyprus. The President had endured what Ayub had written without questioning his loyalty to our cause, but he did not share Ayub's view that while we were giving twice as much aid per capita to Pakistan as to India we ought to be precluded from doing with India what we thought to be in our interest and the over-all interest as well. He was not sure that all our actions with India have been the wisest possible, but we were set on that course and would see it through. After the election we should take a "long look" at our Indian policy over the next four years. The President then reiterated that he didn't want to set up a meeting with Ayub now. As the President put it, "Ayub says he'll take a look at his hole card. Let's wait till he does so and then we will look at ours. Isn't this good poker?" Mr. Talbot agreed. Summing up, the President requested Ambassador McConaughy to restate to Ayub the position the President himself had taken with G. Ahmed on July 7. He should tell Ayub that the President had read his letter with interest but with distress. He regretted Ayub's feeling that it was necessary to re-evaluate the desirability of Pakistan's alliance. But he recognized that this was a decision for Ayub himself to make. In this case, we would have to re-examine our policy toward Pakistan, too. The President then repeated that he wasn't sure about all aspects of our India policy either and we should take another look at our policy after the election.
66. Letter From the Ambassador to India (Bowles) to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)/1/ New Delhi, July 18, 1964. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, India, Vol. III, Cables, 7/64-11/64. Secret; Eyes Only. Bundy sent this letter to Komer on July 24 with a handwritten note that reads: "What can we do for him?" Dear Mac: By the time you receive this letter you will perhaps have read and digested our Embtel 143/2/ in which I outlined the situation I found on my return to India in regard to military assistance in general and the proposed Air Force package in particular. /2/Bowles used telegram 143 from New Delhi, July 16, to express in more detail the concerns and proposed solutions set forth in this letter. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, DEF 19 US-INDIA) Although the GOI was greatly pleased by our willingness to provide grant and loan assistance on a five year basis, they became convinced some time in late June that we are not prepared to provide the assistance to the Indian Air Force which was the primary item on Chavan's shopping list./3/ At the same time, they decided that the British, to whom we referred them, would not come up with a submarine to match the one we gave the Pakistanis. /3/India Desk Officer Anthony Lakeland discussed the Chavan visit with Chavan in Bombay on July 7 and drew a different conclusion concerning Chavan's view of potential U.S. assistance for the Indian Air Force. According to Lakeland's record of the conversation, Chavan considered the question of India's requirement for a supersonic fighter to be still open for discussion and he urged that it remain so. (Memorandum of conversation, July 7; ibid., NEA/INC Files: Lot 68 D 207, POL 15-1, Y.B. Chavan Defense Minister) This gives the USSR the opportunity to enter the Indian defense situation by the dramatic measures which we had sought to deny them. Khera will be in Moscow sometime in August and the Chavan mission arrives there on August 28. In the normal course of events, we may expect announcements in the Indian and United States press in early September stating that the Soviet Union has agreed to provide surface-to-air missiles for the protection of north Indian cities, twelve additional MIG-21s to make an active squadron of sixteen, an assembly line to produce MIG-21s here in India, and possibly one or more submarines. Such announcements in the midst of a particularly bitter United States election debate on foreign policy will provide an open invitation to the more irresponsible elements at home, and consequently our difficulties in dealing rationally with the Indian subcontinent will be further compounded. As you know, this is precisely the kind of situation that we have been warning against for months. Indeed you may find it worthwhile to reread the memorandum which I prepared on November 12/4/ for my visit to Washington just before Jack Kennedy died. (There is a copy in your files.) /4/This memorandum, entitled "Toward a Balance of Political and Military Forces in South Asia," is in the Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, India, Security, 1963. The memorandum is summarized in a November 12, 1963, memorandum from Komer to President Kennedy, printed in Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, vol. XIX, Document 337. I think you will be impressed all over again with the opportunity which we had then to evolve a realistic South Asian military-political policy which would take into account our relations with India and Pakistan, reconcile the defense needs of each nation in a balanced fashion, encourage a greater Indian involvement in South Asia and keep the Soviets away from the more sensitive and dramatic military areas--all at a modest cost to ourselves. If we had been free to offer at an earlier date the five year $50 million grant-$50 million loan military program outlined in the McNamara-Chavan exchange plus the aircraft proposal which Rusk recommended to McNamara (and which he largely accepted) we could have largely pre-empted the military situation in India in a way that would be greatly to our advantage and that of the Paks. Although I am most appreciative of your support and that of Bob Komer and Jim Grant, I am deeply distressed over my own failure to break through the wall of timidity and inertia that I encountered in other quarters. However, this is water over the dam; our task now is to consider what we can do to make the best of a situation which still contains many major elements of strength. As soon as T.T. Krishnamachari has a chance to settle down after his visit to London, I shall describe to him the implications of this situation in our forthcoming election and stress the importance (a) of making sure that the Khera-Chavan purchases in the Soviet Union do not result in India's exceeding our agreed ceiling on foreign exchange expenditures and (b) the advisability of keeping publicity regarding whatever agreements may be reached with the USSR to an absolute minimum, and, if at all possible, of spreading these agreements over a period of several months in order to cushion the public impact here and in the United States. I will see that this message comes through loud and clear to TTK and to Shastri. However, it is important that the United States Government at this stage avoid any appearance of petulance or frustration in India and so I plan to limit myself to casual comments on this particular subject in discussions with other members of the Cabinet and the press. For the time being this is about all we can expect to accomplish here within our present authority. However, to establish the optimum tactical position a further step is essential, i.e., well in advance of Chavan's visit to the USSR we should casually establish the fact that if the GOI had chosen to follow a different course, we would have been prepared to provide India with a comprehensive and fully adequate Air Force defense program including some arrangement for F-104s. With a little elbow room and a few well placed but hazy conversations, I believe I can establish the impression that the present situation was India's deliberate choice. This may help persuade the Indians to keep their present air defense dealings with the Soviets in a low key; above all it will prepare the ground first with the Indian Government and later, if necessary, with key members of the Indian press when the announcement comes that the Pakistanis are getting their additional squadron of F-104s. It is particularly important, Mac, that I quietly establish this point soon; otherwise it will look like the comment of a petulant loser on the eve of the Soviet-Indian negotiations in Moscow. I'll be deeply grateful for your support and help. In the meantime, we are proceeding vigorously with our analysis of the overlapping interests of Pakistan and India in economic, military and political fields, which I am hopeful can be used effectively in our dealings with both governments. I am also embarking on a renewed effort to persuade the GOI and key members of the Indian press not only of India's stake in keeping the communists out of Southeast Asia (which they already accept) but also the similarity of United States-Indian interests in this area and the expedient character of the whole Soviet operation there (witness USSR support for Sukarno against Malaysia). With a little luck perhaps I can bring them into some degree of conflict with the Soviets on this question and eventually persuade them to take a somewhat more active role. It is folly for either the United States or the Indians to assume that they can count on Soviet policies in Asia paralleling our own interests. To be sure, there may be occasions when for tactical reasons we will momentarily find ourselves on the same side of the table. But a little more than three years ago Khrushchev was threatening Jack Kennedy with oblivion if we failed to get out of Berlin and less than two years ago he was busily planting missiles in Cuba. The Indians must gradually be convinced of these realities./5/ /5/Joint State/Defense telegram 190, July 24, replied to Bowles that the conclusions drawn in Washington from the military assistance negotiations with the Indians differed from his. Washington officials thought India had achieved most of what it had sought in the Chavan talks and was not likely to abandon the possibility of air defense assistance from the West, whatever the outcome of negotiations in Moscow. They expected India, as a non-aligned power, to shop broadly for military supplies and assistance. The telegram concluded: "So long as we demonstrate responsiveness and steady support for principal Indian requirements in military field, we do not see Soviet aid, including that in the military field, as seriously threatening over the long term our present basic level of influence in India or India's capability to maintain its independence and integrity." (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, DEF 19 US-INDIA) In the meantime, United States influence is bound to suffer in some degree because of the deep concern over the news of the Goldwater nomination. The fact that he was nominated by the Senate minority leader and seconded by the leader of the House and that all the other Republican candidates promptly moved to make the nomination unanimous has compounded the impression that a major segment of the American people actually favor a program of reckless adventurism in world affairs, and the abandonment of our present efforts in the developing nations. The possibilities are rather frightening and I only hope that our good Republican business friends such as Jack McCloy, as well as Nelson Rockefeller and other political leaders, will see the urgent need to help us assure not only Goldwater's defeat but his political destruction. Warmest regards. Sincerely, Chester Bowles/6/ /6/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
67. Telegram From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State/1/ Karachi, August 11, 1964, 6 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 7 PAK-US. Secret; Priority; Limdis. Repeated to London and New Delhi. 301. Deptel 108./2/ /2/Telegram 108 to Karachi, July 29, reviewed for Ambassador McConaughy the instructions he had received from President Johnson during their July 15 meeting; see Document 65. 1. August 10 at Murree I had first meeting with President Ayub since my return. Meeting lasted about 90 minutes. Only others present were FonSec Aziz Ahmed, and FonOff note-taker. Ayub was in warm responsive mood, despite serious aspects of occasion. He showed lively interest in my account of Washington consultations, with marked degree of personal affability. 2. I started with recital of favorable developments on economic front which took place during period of consultations, including impressive consortium outcome and hopeful outlook for Karachi steel mill and for Indus River dam studies by World Bank. 3. I then delivered President's oral reply to Ayub letter of July 1. After stressing President's message of greeting and high personal regard, I made the three substantive points clearly and directly, although as considerately and non-abrasively as I could. I expounded the reasoning supporting the President's position, spelling out the variety and the depth of the strong assurances, and safeguards which Pakistan enjoys and inescapable responsibility resting on US as nation bearing heaviest share of burden of ChiCom containment to determine for itself how it could best contribute to countering of rising ChiCom pressures on India, which threatened all of South Asia. 4. Ayub took this exposition in good spirit, and heartily reciprocated President's expression of good will and high personal regard. Although he could not break down all of premises underlying US exposition, he recognized the predominant share of the load which US bears for preserving freedom and stability in Asia. He acknowledged that we have the right and obligation to make our own independent decisions after we have listened to our friends and allies. He still urges US to weigh seriously and point-by-point his argument that China has no motivation to move militarily against India, that India has no legitimate justification for the huge military establishment she is acquiring, and that India's disproportionate military establishment will actually play into Communist hands by: (A) breaking India economically (witness the current food riots as one small forerunner) and (B) driving her distrustful small neighbors toward China as a make-weight against an overbearing India in an unbalanced situation. 5. I then made use of most of the remaining material contained in reftel. I laid particular stress on the seriousness with which whole American nation regarded ChiComs challenge, even before last week's Gulf of Tonkin crisis. I told him why we considered that ChiCom shadow would be even longer and more ominous than the Soviet one for next few years. I described the conviction of the American Government and people that we are entitled to ask our allies and indeed every free country to stand up and be counted in the current dangerous confluence of events. I indicated the disappointment in the highest quarters of our government that the GOP had not yet seen fit to make even a token non-strategic contribution in Viet Nam. 6. Ayub confirmed that the GOP was not making a contribution in Viet Nam. He expressed his regret at inability to do so and said reason was "impossibility of enlarging Pakistan's political or military commitments in that area" owing to increased vulnerability of Pakistan vis-a-vis India. I asked Ayub if he thought a token contribution in the non-military field would represent any enlarged political or military commitment. He said in his opinion it would, and furthermore "people would not understand." I replied that undoubtedly the Chinese Communists would profess not to understand. Ayub said his own people would not understand either. I surmised that if so, it would be because of the conditioning they had received in recent months from official and other public news media. Ayub then made puzzling remark that if there was any contribution from Pakistan to the US which we needed or thought might be useful, we should let him know. He would want to comply and would make every effort to do so. But a contribution to some other government in the Southeast Asia area he would have to rule out. 7. I probed for precise meaning of GOP intimation that it might be obliged to "re-examine its policy." This was in the light of my unvarnished presentation of the President's position that in such regrettable event we would correspondingly have to re-evaluate our policy. Ayub then gave me most significant pronouncement of meeting. He said that what he had had in mind as a possibility was a re-examination of Pakistan's tie to SEATO. Only this and nothing more. He said that Pakistan had never had a deep intrinsic interest of its own in SEATO anyway. Pakistan had joined in 1954 only as a cooperative gesture to the US. (He turned aside my observation that East Pakistan was very close to the treaty area with the remark that East Pakistan was surrounded by India.) Pakistan had been prepared through 1961 to contribute armed forces in fulfillment of her treaty obligations. Pakistan was embarrassed by her current inability to pull her weight in the organization because of liabilities nearer home and therefore it might be the most honorable and realistic course for Pakistan to withdraw. He did not intend for any "re-appraisal" to go beyond this. 8. I gave him the background for our action in Tonkin Gulf crisis, building it around the President's statement in his Syracuse University speech that "aggression unchallenged is aggression unleashed." I told him that although it might seem a paradox at first blush, the course we had followed was actually the most prudent and the one best calculated to preserve the peace. Ayub was clearly sympathetic to our case in Viet Nam, but he voiced a neutralist line of thinking, stressing the importance of immediate conciliation and negotiation with a view to prompt compromise agreement with the Communists. This neutralist stance was unnatural and out of character for President Ayub and I told him so. I told him that it would not work to negotiate with the Communists from a position of disadvantage. The Communists would not abide by any agreement unless they had to, or unless it served their interests. This meant that an agreement with the Communists must be virtually self-enforcing in order to survive. Unhappily the forces of freedom are not yet in that position of strength in Southeast Asia. This was the reason that we were opposing a neutralist-slanted 14-nation conference now, and this was why we regretted the hasty and public GOP endorsement of such a conference without any consultation with us. Ayub almost admitted that he agreed with our reasoning, saying rather defensively that he had thought perhaps we could conduct a conference negotiation while still carrying on the war. 9. I told Ayub that we regret the rather unfavorable press treatment in Pakistan so far on the Tonkin Gulf incidents. The government news media had been carefully correct and impartial in their publicity over the radio and elsewhere, but the private press generally had made considerable use of Communist propaganda releases, and had ranged from unsympathetic to hostile in its news and editorial treatment of the US action. I thought that the press attitude, combined with the recent government policy of attentiveness to Communist China, had confused the public, and had caused the Pakistani people to take a distorted view of the fundamental confrontation in Southeast Asia, the successful outcome of which was vital to the freedom and national integrity of Pakistan, as of all other peoples of Asia. I thought that this distorted view might have contributed to the regrettable attack on the USIS Library in Dacca by a student [garble]August 6 and the anti-US demonstrations in Chittagong on August 7. I mentioned the apparent lack of alertness on the part of the Daiw police in dealing with the Dacca incident. Ayub said he greatly regretted these incidents and he was investigating the reported shortcomings of the police. He thought the East Pakistan troubles were fomented by organized Communist agitators operating in Dacca with guidance and support from Calcutta. In response to my observation that it was a tragic irony that the Pak public seemed to be extending its sympathies to the wrong side when Pak freedom would eventually be jeopardized by the loss of freedom in Viet Nam, Ayub thought the Pak public was confused by the authoritarian and hard-fisted nature of the present GVN, and by apparent intervention of the USG as an outside government in favor of an unpopular and unrepresentative government of General Khanh. I asked if the GOP could not do some educative work over the radio and in the press so that the people would understand which side their vital interests were really identified with. But he was skeptical that his government could do anything effective along this line. 10. In referring to India, I expressed the Department's commendation of the constructive and conciliatory words and actions of the GOP toward India at the time of Nehru's death, Shastri's accession, and thereafter. I expressed guarded optimism that notwithstanding the setback of Shastri's illness, favorable developments might be in the offing, with some ferment still in process in Kashmir, and with the Indians clearly groping for some positive initiatives. I said we fully recognized the decisive part that a Kashmir settlement could play in an Indo-Pak détente and the frustrations of ChiCom machinations on the sub-continent (an aspect which Ayub had broadly hinted at early in the conversation). Without being coercive, we would continue to encourage the search for a settlement. Ayub said he had had a frank talk with TTK at the London Prime Ministers conference. TTK had invited Ayub to pay an official visit to India soon. Ayub told him he was ready for a meeting with Shastri as soon as Shastri was physically able, provided there was first tangible evidence of a genuine Indian disposition to mend relations. Ayub indicated a dislike of TTK's idea that he (Ayub) should do a lot of traveling about India on his visit to make himself known and "sell" the Indian people on the need for a settlement. Ayub felt that the selling was a job for the Indians to do for themselves and that he should not pay a visit until there was some positive prospect for real accomplishment. He felt that an unsuccessful or inconclusive visit would do more harm than good. But he told me he is ready for a visit when he gets a meaningful Indian signal, with or without a preparatory meeting at the Ministerial level. FonSec Aziz Ahmed made his only contribution to the conversation at this point, interjecting that he had just heard from the GOI that Swaran Singh was agreeable to a preliminary Foreign Ministers meeting with Bhutto. Aziz Ahmed obviously favored this. The President bade me goodbye very cordially. He and I agreed that the meeting had been a useful one and had cleared the atmosphere considerably, although problems remain which have not been fully plumbed. A few additional subsidiary items from conversation and comments will follow. McConaughy
68. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Pakistan/1/ Washington, August 16, 1964, 5:31 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 1 PAK. Secret; Priority; Limdis. Drafted by Laise and Cameron, cleared by Director of the Office of Regional Affairs in EUR Joseph A. Mendenhall and Harriman, and approved by Talbot. Repeated to London and New Delhi. 194. Karachi's 301./2/ Definitive assessment of appropriate response to Ayub must, of course, await your comment./3/ Initially we read his conversation with you as confirmation of two already apparent trends in Pak foreign policy: a pulling away from alliances, and a narrowing of a Pak relationship with U.S. to bilateral interchange. At same time we are puzzled that his response shows no comprehension that his "reappraisal" will necessarily lead to similar action on our part. /2/Document 67. /3/McConaughy provided his assessment of his August 10 conversation with Ayub in telegram 347 from Karachi, August 18. McConaughy viewed the conversation as further evidence that Ayub had deliberately charted a course of limited disengagement from Pakistan's ties with the United States. McConaughy felt that Ayub had made clear that as long as he considered U.S. policies toward India inimical to Pakistan's national interest, Pakistan would pursue a China policy that interfered with U.S. objectives in Asia. McConaughy feared that Pakistan's ties with the West were slowly ending. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 1 PAK) Whatever his professed willingness to do anything for U.S. (as contrasted to third country in SE Asia) may mean, we are more concerned at this juncture with Ayub's pronouncement that in talking of reappraising GOP policies he "only had had in mind a possibility of re-examination of Pakistan's tie to SEATO." Such threat is of course not new and we find it difficult to believe Ayub would judge in his interest to move precipitously to follow through on this threat as he would obviously forfeit his bargaining counter and in process run risk of seriously jeopardizing aspects of U.S.-Pak relationship in which Ayub remains interested. Nevertheless, in our present confrontation with Chicoms, we must guard against sudden GOP move to withdraw from SEATO and we consider we must respond quickly and firmly to Ayub's observation. We have following series of steps in mind: 1. You would be instructed see Ayub without delay. You would state that we of course do not question GOP's sovereign right to determine where its national interests lie. However, we have same right. We want Ayub to know that we would regard GOP withdrawal from SEATO during our present critical confrontation with Chicoms as adversely and seriously affecting our national interest and such action could not but affect adversely U.S.-Pak relations. He must realize that any actions appearing to support Chicom position will elicit profoundly adverse reaction from Congress and U.S. public. Since we cannot believe President Ayub would knowingly launch upon a course that is bound to have such serious consequences for Pakistan, we wish to request that before GOP decides to initiate action to terminate its SEATO membership we be consulted to ensure that there is a full mutual understanding of the consequences of this action for Pakistan before it is taken. 2. Simultaneously with your approach we would call Ambassador Ahmed in to get across same points. We also would plan to give Ambassador additional food for thought by recalling to his mind general lines of Secretary's talk with Bhutto on April 29./4/ You will recall that in this talk Secretary described "political climate" which could affect our delivery of additional 104s in terms of developments in our confrontation with Chicoms. We would want the Pakistanis to draw the conclusion that Pak actions which adversely affect our posture against Chicoms will inevitably affect our ability to continue same quality of assistance to Paks. We shall also find way to get across to Ambassador that course of action and reaction such as this will unfortunately prejudice continuation of personal exchanges at the highest level which have characterized our relations with Pak and which we had looked forward to continuing at appropriate opportunity in future. /4/See Document 41. 3. When Shoaib arrives in September we would take soundings to ensure that our exchange of signals is understood and hopefully to arrest any further deterioration of our relationship. Your views on above course of action urgently requested./5/ /5/McConaughy replied in telegram 348 from Karachi, August 18. Although he did not view Ayub's threat to leave SEATO as implying an imminent move, he felt that Pakistan's policies in Asia were running sufficently counter to U.S. interests to warrant the type of firm response outlined in telegram 194. He was slightly more optimistic about Ayub's mood and intentions than the Department, however, and suggested that the response be tempered by probing for what Ayub meant when he offered to do anything to help the United States. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 1 PAK) Rusk
69. Telegram From the Embassy in India to the Department of State/1/ New Delhi, August 27, 1964, 9 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, DEF 19 US-INDIA. Secret. Repeated to Cairo, Karachi, London, Moscow, Kathmandu, Bombay, Calcutta, and Madras, and also sent to CINCMEAFSA/POLAD. 677. On August 26 at 6 PM I met with Lal Bahadur Shastri for 45 minutes. Shastri opened conversation by apologizing for having postponed our meeting which was originally planned for noon of that day. He had decided, at the last moment, to have frank meeting with all top civil servants and meeting had lasted for over two hours. He had emphasized need for much greater administrative effort, longer hours, elimination of red tape, courage to make decisions, etc. The primary purpose of my visit was to communicate our views on military aid situation before Chavan's departure for Moscow August 28. On this subject conversation developed along following lines: 1. Since previous conversations with Chavan, Patil and TTK had made it clear that right now GOI feels itself to be under particular pressure from us in regard to economic, military and other matters, I opened discussion by frankly acknowledging difficulties that exist when one country gives another major sums of money. However, we did not see the situation as a one way street. Although our aid might be important to India, her success was vital to our security and hopes for a more rational world. Such a relationship called for frankness in discussing our respective problems. I then reviewed original military aid discussions last October and my understanding that if our assistance was reasonably large and maintained over period of years, GOI would not find it necessary to rely in any significant way on USSR in defense area. US military aid program which was finally agreed to in June represented substantial sum with assurances, with certain qualifications, that it will be continued for five years. Shortly thereafter Khera told us that the MIG deal, on which we had had much contradictory information, was settled, and we also heard that two Soviet SAM complexes were agreed to. All of this plus Chavan's departure for Moscow created certain complications for all of us which I wanted PriMin to understand. I was not questioning India's policy of nonalignment which we understood. I was, however, concerned that India was putting too much trust in a nation which Shastri, as a former Home Minister, knew did not necessarily have India's best interests at heart. I added that there was no need for him to comment on a subject which probably involved certain difficulties for him. I simply wanted him to understand our reasoning and particularly my own reaction in view of long negotiations which I had been conducting with his government for last ten months. 2. Shastri replied that I had clarified several questions which he had not thoroughly understood. He was particularly disturbed that we had not been told more precisely about MIG decision which had been made personally by former PriMin Nehru and April in face of some differences of opinion within GOI. Although under these conditions he would find it impossible to revise this decision unless Soviets themselves reneged, he would talk further with Chavan before he left and do all he could to handle situation in a way that would cause the least possible embarrassment. 3. Shastri then turned to question of HF-24 which he said was creating all kinds of difficulties for India with UAR. He described his Ambassador in Cairo as an emotional man who sent back messages stating that unless India did precisely what UAR wanted her to do, present friendly relations between UAR and India might be destroyed. This impressed Shastri as unreasonable since as far as he knew UAR was in no position to provide fully acceptable engine within reasonable period of time. Furthermore UAR proposal called for the engine to be built in Cairo and the air frame in Bangalore. This was contrary to India's interests since her major objective was to produce an indigenous plane. Nevertheless with nonaligned conference coming up in October, situation did create a formidable political problem and it would be necessary to mark time until dust settled. 4. I suggested that all nations face somewhat similar political problems in regard to development of their defenses. For instance, many of our cities and states bring heavy pressure to bear on federal government to continue production of obsolete and semi-obsolete equipment on grounds that curtailment would create local unemployment and political difficulties. A major achievement of present US administration has been its willingness to face up to these pressures and to insist on best possible defense for smallest amount of money. India, facing huge economic requests, could not afford to build her armed forces on a political basis. The MIG deal was primarily based on the questionable hope that it would involve Russians on Indian side in case Chinese attacked. An agreement with the UAR in regard to HF-24 was in India's interest if it provided better plane, but if it were designed to placate Nasser it might prove to be an expensive undertaking. Shastri accepted this and I believe over a period of time, he will act in accordance with it. In the present situation, he is involved with decisions made by the already legendary Jawaharlal Nehru which, barring a fumble by the Soviets which we have no reason to anticipate, he cannot be expected to reverse. Throughout discussion Shastri acted very much like the PriMin of India and once again I was impressed with his intellectual capacity and his direct, earthy approach. If he keeps his health, he will do well, perhaps very well. Bowles
70. Memorandum From Robert Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)/1/ Washington, September 10, 1964. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, India, Vol. III, Cables & Memos, 7/64-11/64. Secret. Mac-- Have been holding open option of President announcing new one-year PL 480 agreement for India, which will probably be signed 16 September (it doesn't depend on new law). Agreement involves $398 million worth of wheat (4 million tons) and rice (306,000 tons) and vegetable oils. This ain't hay, and could be tied to other US actions to meet Indian food crisis/2/ (stepping up wheat shipments from 400,000 tons per month to 600,000 etc.). /2/In a July 30 memorandum to Rusk, Talbot described a "major political-economic problem" confronting the Indian Government as a result of a sharp rise in foodgrain prices. Prices had risen steadily throughout 1964 and were one-third higher than a year previous. NEA's assessment was that the high prices were due to poor distribution rather than a shortage of grain. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, E 8-1 INDIA) Much of this has already been made public by Freeman, Bowles and others, but only NYT has made much of it from what I've seen. So there's still play. All I'd have in mind would be WH statement unless press conference happened to fall that day. If this doesn't excite you, I'd like to remove block from story now./3/ /3/Bundy's handwritten note at the end of the memorandum instructed Komer to postpone a press release until after the P.L. 480 legislation had passed. On September 30 a Title I P.L. 480 sales agreement and two loan agreements were concluded and signed in New Delhi. A press release was issued at the time of the signing. The texts of the agreements and the press release were transmitted to the Department as attachments to airgram A-365 from New Delhi, October 5; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, AID (US) 15-8 INDIA. RWK
71. Letter From the Ambassador to India (Bowles) to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)/1/ New Delhi, September 16, 1964. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, India, Vol. IV, Cables, 12/64-6/65. Top Secret. Dear Mac: I believe we are faced with an important question of tactics in regard to the handling of questions involving nuclear power here in India./2/ /2/In late August the Committee on Nuclear Weapons Capabilities, chaired by Llewellyn Thompson, was formed to consider the question of the proliferation of national nuclear weapons capabilities, particularly with respect to India. Documentation on the activities of the Thompson Committee is in Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, volume XI. It has been our view that while the development of Chinese nuclear weapons is an ominous development it can with skilled handling be made to serve our political purposes here in India. With this in mind I have discussed with Shastri, TTK, Chavan and Desai in the last several months, the possibility that the Chinese may be able to develop not only a crude nuclear bomb but also intermediate range missiles with nuclear war-heads. In developing this possibility I referred vaguely to information about a testing installation in West China which has come to us from [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] and other sources. I have pointed out that when and if these weapons are fully developed, India will find herself faced with the choice of three courses of action. (1) India could take a position similar to that which we took regarding Cuba, i.e. an ultimatum to the Chinese to remove such installations from Tibet or to see them blown up by the Indian Airforce. This involves obvious risks in brinkmanship. (2) India could proceed to develop her own nuclear deterrent capacity. This, I suggested, would not only run contrary to India's clear commitment in the United Nations and elsewhere, but it would also be a losing game both technologically and financially. While the Chinese could reach the major northern Indian cities with relatively few shortrange missiles, the Indians would require many more weapons of greater range and precision to reach comparable targets in China. Clearly it would make no sense for a country facing India's vast economic problems and financial difficulties to embark on a program of this nature. (3) India could reach a quiet understanding with the United States under which we would undertake to provide India with the same type of nuclear umbrella that has enabled Japan, the Scandinavian countries and other nations to maintain an effective defense at a reasonable cost. I believe that these three or four discussions have done much to make some Indian leaders think in broader terms about questions of nuclear defense. If carried somewhat further I believe they might also provide an arresting influence on India's plans to build up a major supersonic airforce which clearly has no relevance to India's air defense vis-à-vis the potential threat from China. Against this background I recently sent a message to John McCone/3/ suggesting that his briefing team which met here last weekend with the GOI be authorized to discuss Chinese nuclear installations and potentialities and the ultimate need for further information on their development. John took a rather dim view of this on the ground that if India becomes too aware of this possibility she may move into the development of nuclear weapons herself. /3/Not found. McCone discussed the proposal to brief Shastri about the progress of the Chinese nuclear weapons program with Richard Helms on September 8. His concern about such a briefing was that it might stimulate a similar weapons program in India. (Memorandum for the record by McCone, September 8; Central Intelligence Agency, Job 80-B01285A, DCI (McCone) Files, Memos for the Record, 9 Jul-10 Sept 1964) This impresses me as miscalculation. The more opportunity we have to talk to the Indians about this situation the more likely we are to persuade them that the nuclear deterrent that could provide a real threat to Chinese cities was beyond their capacity and that the ultimate solution may be some kind of understanding with us. The question I may add goes beyond this particular point. [2 lines of source text not declassified] If we fail to come clean the Indians will eventually discover through their own sources (and very possibly from the Russians) precisely what the Chinese have been doing. At that point we will appear in their eyes to either have been inept in our own intelligence work or to have withheld vital information from them. I will be grateful if you will think about this complex problem, discuss it with John and also whoever you may feel should be involved and then give me your considered views. Warmest regards, Sincerely, Chester Bowles/4/ /4/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. [Continue with the next documents]
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