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FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1964-1968, Volume XXV South Asia
Department of State |
72. Telegram From the Embassy Office in Pakistan to the Department of State/1/ Rawalpindi, September 19, 1964, 7 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 15-1 PAK. Secret; Immediate. Repeated to New Delhi, London, Bangkok, Hong Kong, USUN, Kabul, Moscow, and Karachi and passed to the White House. 2. I had fifty minute meeting with Pres Ayub morning Sept 18 Rawalpindi. FonOff note taker only other person present. Personal atmosphere cordial and results substantially satisfactory within limitations to be expected. 1. SEATO I obtained the assurances we required on continuation Pak membership in SEATO. In effect we have highest level corroboration of what Bhutto told me Sept 9. After my exposition of intensified need for united front of SEATO allies in view acute confrontation taking place in Southeast Asia, Pres indicated his govts distaste for staying in the organization where it was unable to carry out the commitments and obligations normally associated with membership. He said that Pakistan unable carry out those commitments because of increased military capability which has been given Pakistan's neighbor, said this increased capability had "created great difficulties for Pakistan" and had "put Pakistan under severe pressure." He asked me if US nevertheless preferred that Pakistan retain her SEATO membership. I replied that we could not concede the validity of the premises he had spelled out, but in any event we consider it of high importance that a solid alliance front be maintained with Pakistan remaining in SEATO and identifying herself with objectives and spirit of the organization. Pres said in that case Pakistan would retain her membership. He added that this was being done solely out of regard for the US and in consideration the recognized need to avoid any action which in the US view would interfere with the implementation of broad US policy. 2. ChiRep issues in UN After I had set forth in pessimistic terms the unpredictable but certainly adverse effect which could be expected to flow from any favorable vote on the admission of Communist China to the General Assembly this autumn, Ayub assured me that Pakistan had no reason to get out in front on the Communist China issue in the UN and said he saw no reason why Pakistan needed to do anything other than cast affirmative ballot if issue came to vote. He agreed that Chinese Communists are carrying out disruptive operations in various places, although he did not know much about Chinese Communist subversive activities in Africa and wanted to know more about that, especially about the interplay of Chinese Communist and Soviet subversive efforts in the Congo. I told him in a general way of assurances I had from Bhutto on ChiRep issue. The Pres did not indicate any disagreement with Bhutto's position and said the GOP had no occasion to actually push for admission of Communist China this year. He seemed to assume that the vote could not be so close that Pakistan can some day be an honest broker in bringing about some sort of détente between US and Communist China and that it might be better to postpone any showdown on Chinese Communist membership in the UN. He said he believed that some US-Chinese Communist relations would have to be established. When I said there would have to be some changes made in Peiping first, he heartily concurred but noted there would need to be some adjustments of view in Washington also. 3. Exchanges of good-will gesture with Communist China I made the President aware of the difficulties that are caused by unnecessary and unfortunate gestures of friendship and goodwill between Pakistan and Communist China, especially during this trying period. I said the gestures were particularly regrettable when there was an appearance of some possible negotiations of a secret nature. I cited the recent extended and rather private Pak hospitality accorded ChiCom Vice Minister of Defense Air Marshal Liu, in Peshawar and Karachi as an example. President defended good-will gesture as necessary part of new Pak policy of good neighborliness. He assured me that absolutely no substantive talks of sensitive nature were held with Liu, and he chided us for hyper-sensitiveness and over-suspiciousness. He said Marshal Liu was received only as routine good-will gesture. Pak Air Marshal Asghar Khan had just that morning reported on the visit to him; and had reconfirmed that nothing of any significance took place during visit. He said visit lasted as long as it did only because of infrequency of flights from Pakistan to China. Liu had to wait for next scheduled PIA weekly flight. He urged that we trust GOP good intentions as a friend of the US and that we have confidence in Pak ability to deal with Chinese Communist without falling into any traps or giving anything away. He thought that some useful information and some Pak leverage on Chinese Communists might be developed out of Pak associations with Chinese Communists. I told Pres that appearances had to be considered and general impression gained by Americans was bound to be adverse. Chinese Communists were able to exploit their apparent gains in Pakistan. It was natural for Americans reading the headlines to take a dim view of what seemed to be going on. I said inexplicable Pak actions made it difficult for American friends of Pakistan in a better position to explain in comprehensive terms Pak courses of action. I told him high-level visits between Pakistan and Chinese Communist leaders, exchanges of good-will missions composed prominent people, and Pak senior level participation in Chinese Communist national occasions were all unfortunate and harmful to our relations in present circumstance. Pres said he wanted me to believe that his government did not intend to do anything inconsistent with her friendship with the United States or contrary to basic American interests. "We do not want to do anything that would hurt you." He said he was in favor of drawing closer to Communist China. 4. Indo-Pak relations and Narayan/2/ visit /2/Jayaprakash Narayan. I probed for further information on results recent visit of Narayan. Ayub said Narayan was "the best Hindu I have ever dealt with." He felt talks had been worthwhile, although only exploratory. He attributed influence and stature to Narayan in India even absence government position or mandate from Shastri government. He said he had given Narayan full Pak position that fundamental issue in Indo-Pak relations (Kashmir) would not be postponed or subordinated, and that any meeting of the two heads of government which did not produce tangible results would be a mistake. He said Narayan had spoken well of Shastri's intentions. In regard to a Pakistan settlement, Narayan was not certain Shastri considered himself in a sufficiently strong domestic position to take the unpopular steps that would be necessary to produce tangible progress with Narayan from summit meeting. Ayub said that the main result of his sessions with Narayan was apparently clear and sympathetic comprehension by Narayan of the Pak position and an undertaking by Narayan to find out from Shastri whether latter felt that he could open the way for a really substantive development at a summit conference this year. Ayub said Narayan is to give an assessment as soon as Narayan obtains Shastri's reaction. Ayub indicated that his decision is whether to go to Delhi would be influenced by Narayan's report. I told Ayub that I believed it was the estimate of Amb Bowles and his staff in Delhi that Shastri was genuinely disposed to press for constructive steps and that perhaps Shastri would be inclined to reciprocate affirmative moves by Pres Ayub, possibly including the return of a summit level visit. Ayub took note of this and perhaps took some encouragement from it. He seemed appreciative of our desire to facilitate a settlement, but again expressed dignified regret that we had not found a way of working our assistance to India into a framework of conciliation on the part of India. He accepted my statement that we could not force the GOI, but added that he believed our resources should be sufficient to find a way of inducing India without force. 5. GOP suspicions of US activities in Pakistan I told Pres that in view of systematic efforts of elements unfriendly to us to propagate fabricated stories of US official sympathy with opposition parties in Pakistan, I was going to give him an assurance which ought to be, and probably was, unnecessary. This assurance was that US reps would be fully circumspect in all their contacts to insure that none of their actions or relationships could be plausibly misconstrued as giving aid and comfort to anti-govt elements, or as constituting intervention in the forthcoming election campaign or in any aspect of the domestic affairs of Pakistan. I said that our people had not been guilty of any such impropriety but I knew that allegations to this effect had been manufactured out of the whole cloth and that unfortunately they seemed to have been given some degree of credence. Pres said he welcomed and appreciated this statement. He confirmed that reports along lines indicated had come to his ears, especially in reference to East Pakistan. He said the reports charged US reps with maintaining prejudicial contacts with such opposition leaders as Mujibur Rahman, disaffected student groups and other dissident elements. He said the reports included assertions that money had changed hands. I told him that it was incredible that such preposterous insinuations could be seriously entertained by anyone who knew anything about American policy. I said that as he knew Americans were mostly gregarious people who liked to get acquainted with all manner of people among whom they lived. Some of personnel might not inquire too closely about all the connections of people with whom they struck up a casual acquaintance. Americans could not be expected to hole up and isolate themselves and see no one except govt officials and those in East Pakistan could not be expected to confine their casual day to day contacts exclusively to other foreigners and govt officials. Pres had earlier said that GOP rep could not be expected to "go into purdah" so far as contacts with Chinese Communists were concerned. At this point I tossed the phrase back at him, saying that Americans could not be expected to "go into purdah" as far as casual social contacts with non-official Bengalese in East Pakistan were concerned. But I assured him that I had issued new instructions to all our people to use the greatest circumspection so as to avoid any even half-way reasonable inference that they were consorting improperly with anti-govt elements. Pres said he was very pleased to hear this and he accepted my assurances. However he picked up book on his desk which he said he had been reading with surprise and shock at its title "The Invisible Government."/3/ He hoped nothing like the operations described in the book were going on. /3/Apparent reference to David Wise and Thomas Ross, The Invisible Government (London: Jonathan Cape, 1964). I told him I assumed no one would take as gospel truth everything appearing in that mischievous and irresponsible book. (N.B. I understand on good authority the Pak Foreign Office has systematically distributed copies of this book among most of the officials in Pakistan.) I told the President that, of course, we were not assisting and would not assist in any opposition element in Pakistan. By the same token, although we recognized the key importance of Pres Ayub to the stability and welfare of Pakistan, we were, of course, not in any way intervening in his behalf either in the election campaign. Our posture was completely "hands off." Pres immediately expressed his approval, saying "I want to be judged by my own people." 6. Rail spur to Afghanistan I mentioned apparent Pak delay in signing agreement covering engineering survey for the rail extension from Chaman to Spin Baldak. I told him that we had a direct interest since AID was providing the financing through a development loan. We understood Afghans had already done their part and we were ready to make the loan. The absence of Pak signature to the agreement was holding up the survey. I knew he was interested in the early completion of the rail extension as an important element improvement of Pak-Afghan ties and a means of strengthening the Yusuf government. Pres responded that he did not want any delay and promised he would investigate immediately reasons for inaction on the Pak side. He made handwritten notation of this matter on his own pad. 7. Soviet role on sub-continent We discussed Chavan trip to Soviet Union and resultant announcement of substantial new Soviet military assistance to India./4/ I noted that publicity on this development had been received quite mildly by Pak Government, press and people, in sharp contrast to strong outburst which greeted every modest installment of Western arms assistance to India. Pres said reason for this was that US was a friend of Pakistan. Pakistan expected nothing from her enemies, but expected much of her friends. /4/Defense Minister Chavan reported to the Lok Sabha on September 21 on the military assistance for India which had resulted from his trips to the United States, United Kingdom, and Soviet Union. The text of Chavan's statement was transmitted to Washington in airgram A-332, September 23; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, DEF 19 US-INDIA. Komer summed up the agreement reached in Moscow in a September 21 memorandum to President Johnson. Beyond military credits, Komer felt that the most significant new element in the agreement was India's purchase of 90 Soviet amphibious tanks, which, he noted, "gives the Soviets their first foothold in the Indian army." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Pakistan, Vol. II, 6/64-11/64) Talbot assessed the agreement in a September 11 memorandum to Secretary Rusk and concluded that the understanding reached with Chavan in June, which called for a ceiling on Indian military procurement abroad, should hold down Indian purchases from the Soviet Union. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, NEA/INC Files: Lot 68 D 207, DEF 19-6, Communist Bloc Assistance) Pres expressed some puzzlement at double standard apparently applied by US to Soviet Union and Communist China. I explained why short-run threat from Communist China seemed greater, and therefore called for stricter immediate measures of deterrence, including tighter trade controls. Pres referred to overall ceiling on Indian arms procurement from all sources which he understood had been agreed to by Chavan in Washington last summer, and inquired if Soviet arms included in recent Indo-Soviet announcement would in US view come within this ceiling. I said I would want consult Washington before replying definitely, but it was my offhand impression that Soviet offer was a credit arrangement which would be includable. Pres said this was an important question to him, and asked [me to?] ascertain Washington interpretation urgently./5/ /5/In telegram 13 to Rawalpindi, September 22, the Department confirmed Mc- Conaughy's impression that the agreed ceiling on Indian foreign procurement applied to Soviet purchases. (Ibid., Central Files 1964-66, DEF 19-3 INDIA) McConaughy
73. Memorandum for the Record/1/ Washington, September 24, 1964. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Pakistan, Vol. II 6/64-11/64. Secret. A copy was sent to Talbot marked "Personal." McGeorge Bundy's 45-minute talk with Pakistan Finance Minister Shoaib was most cordial throughout. Shoaib explained that he was passing through from the Tokyo IMF/IB meeting and stopped off to talk financial matters with his old friends in Washington./2/ He had just hit George Woods for a $25 million "balance of payments" loan. Since Pakistan had taken a deliberate laissez-faire tack and was liberalizing imports, it needed some more money to finance these. /2/While in Washington Shoaib also met with Talbot, Harriman, Rusk, and McNamara. A record of Talbot's September 21 conversation with Shoaib is in the National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL PAK-US. Records of Shoaib's meetings on September 21 with Harriman and on September 24 with Rusk are ibid., POL 7 PAK. A record of Shoaib's meeting on September 21 with McNamara is in the Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 69 A 7425, Pakistan 091.112. He and Bundy exchanged thoughts on the differences between Pakistan and US views of Communist China and India. In effect, Shoaib admitted that the Pakistanis couldn't quite understand why we felt as strongly as we did about Peiping. However, he continued, Americans seem unable to understand how strongly they feel about India. These differences were probably based more on emotion and geography than on reason, but they were realities nonetheless. For example, Ayub and the Pak military simply didn't think that the Indians would ever fight China. Delhi would soon reach an accommodation with Peiping; then, of course, the future weight of India's defense buildup would be directed against Pakistan. Bundy refused to argue the merits of this Pakistan view, but he couldn't understand why, if the Indians were too "cowardly" to fight the Chinese, the Paks were so scared of India. Shoaib recalled his meeting with President Kennedy in 1963; he said that, just as he had assured the President then, Pakistan had made no serious moves toward China. They were just keeping on good terms so as to minimize any possible future difficulties. There was nothing in Pak/Chicom relations that was not in the newspapers. He described the circumstances surrounding the $60 million Chicom loan offer. Komer thought that, even accepting Shoaib's contention that nothing serious had happened, there was little question that Pakistan-US relations had soured noticeably in the months since the Shoaib/Kennedy interview. The combination of Pak needling and US defensive reactions was leading to a gradual shift in attitudes on both sides. Our fear was that Ayub might be boxing himself in--if he let Pakistan public opinion get so exercised that he would lose his freedom of action. Bundy philosophized a bit about the US-Pak alliance. When originally laid on, it had seemed doubly useful to both countries. First, there was the real common interest which we had in strengthening a vulnerable flank. Second, it had political salability in both countries. Our politicians could justify it as a move against the Communists; Pak politicians could justify it as reinsurance against India. Historic circumstance, rather than any shift in our own intentions, had tended to change this situation. Now, politicians here found it hard to defend our Pak alliance because of Pak moves toward China, while Ayub's political sense required him to complain about his US ally aiding India. But the Paks must understand that we had not changed our position--we had never envisaged our relationship as aimed at India. We still wanted to be on the best of terms with Pakistan, unless the Paks themselves made this impossible. Bundy probed on President Ayub's own attitude. So long as we were satisfied that Ayub himself had a clear sense of the desirability of maintaining our relationship, we could both sustain a fair amount of political sniping. We wanted to be sure that Ayub was solid on the continued value of the tie. It rather bothered us when Ayub himself used the respected pages of Foreign Affairs to tell us we were foolishly naive about India (Shoaib said "misguided" was a better word) or when he called the President's policy opportunistic in the Daily Mail. Shoaib insisted that Ayub had no intention of switching away from the US. True, he had certain political requirements which as a politician he must meet. But he knew he needed the US. To clear the air, and to make sure that Johnson and Ayub got through clearly to each other, the two Presidents must get together at the summit as soon as possible and talk this matter over. This was the best, indeed the only, way to avoid misunderstanding. It couldn't happen too soon. He had also mentioned this to Secretary Rusk. Bundy agreed that a summit would be useful; there was no one for whom President Johnson had more respect than Ayub. A meeting would rank high on our future agenda. Bundy stressed, however, that neither Ayub nor any other Pakistani should be under any illusion that leaning on the US or making noises toward China would change our determination to help India against China. This was a major aspect of our foreign policy. The Paks might disagree with our judgment as to the reliability of India and whether the Indians would ever fight China. But this was not the issue. We regarded India as a very important place and were determined to avoid the critical vacuum which would be created by India's collapse. This was also in Pakistan's interest. Did Shoaib, for example, want to see India fall apart in 15 years or so? Shoaib asserted, "Not in 15 years, nor in 50." Nonetheless, he feared that India could fall apart if it bankrupted itself by such huge military expenditures. The Indian military budget was now up to $2 billion. India couldn't afford this kind of military establishment. He, Shoaib, had firmly resisted this sort of thing in Pakistan. When the service chiefs had recently gone to Ayub and insisted that Pak foreign exchange be used for military purchases, Ayub had vetoed it on Shoaib's plea. Ayub has told Musa and Asghar Khan that he knew they could put up a jolly good scrap without the additional hardware. Yet we should understand that Musa and Ayub and many others were very unhappy about US military aid to India. Our decision last June to go ahead with a further program had had a bad effect, mainly because in the talks with General Taylor the previous December they had gotten the impression that they had convinced us there was no need for longer term MAP for India since the Chinese weren't going to attack again. Moreover, they had expected us to offer some compensatory military aid to Pakistan to preserve the previous three-to-one military balance on which the Pak military counted so heavily. Now the balance seemed to be going heavily against them. When the Indians made their peace with China, Pakistan would face this whole new Indian military machine. We should do what we could to butter up the Pak military. Komer interjected that we found the Pak military a bit too emotional and not coldly professional enough about our aid to India. Regardless of the comparable dollar value, we were sending a lot more fighting value to the Paks. As an example of how Pak emotionalism could work against its own interests, he recounted how we had considered suggesting to the Paks that a US offer of a few supersonics to India on condition that India not buy or build a much larger number of MIGs would actually serve Pak interests. But we concluded that the Paks just wouldn't think this through. Shoaib and Bundy fenced briefly on Kashmir. The former recounted how TTK had told him in Tokyo that Nehru wanted to settle Kashmir before his death. Shastri was an unknown quantity, and Shoaib was convinced that there was no likelihood of movement on Kashmir just now. Bundy assured him that we still thought a settlement essential, and would do what we could when the time was ripe. At several points Shoaib made allusions to the problem with Bhutto and the MEA. He subsequently told Komer that he was aware we knew that Bhutto was at one extreme among Pak policy-makers. Ayub deliberately kept in the middle, and didn't take all Bhutto's advice. He repeated what he had told Phil Talbot, i.e. that he had inspired the RCD gambit/3/ as an alternative to Bhutto's pressure for new gestures toward China. /3/Reference is to a proposal Shoaib explained to Talbot on September 21 that he had made to Ayub for a regional grouping of Muslim states to include Turkey, Iran, Pakistan, and possibly Afghanistan. Shoaib's idea was to create a security arrangement among the non-Communist Muslim states of the area that would shore up Pakistan's security position without requiring it to turn, as Bhutto preferred, to China for support. RWK
74. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ Washington, November 3, 1964. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, DEF 12-1 CHICOM. Confidential. Drafted by Foster. SUBJECT PARTICIPANTS Ambassador Nehru called at his request primarily to discuss the situation arising out of the explosion of the Chinese nuclear device./2/ /2/China detonated a nuclear device on October 16. On October 28 Secretary of Defense McNamara transmitted to Secretary Rusk an October 23 JCS paper that commented on a Thompson Committee report entitled "The Indian Nuclear Problem: Proposed Course of Action." McNamara and the JCS concurred with offering general assurances to non-nuclear states in light of the Chinese nuclear explosion. The JCS recommended, however, that if discussions with India were begun, no action be taken that would alienate Pakistan. (Ibid., DEF 19 US-INDIA; also available on the Internet, National Security Archive (www.gwu.edu/nsarchiv), Electronic Briefing Book No. 6, "India and Pakistan--On the Nuclear Threshold," Document 2) He stated that, as we knew, the Indian Government had made a formal decision prior to the explosion not to engage in the development of nuclear weapons no matter what any other country did. A formal reconsideration of this policy was undertaken after the Chinese explosion and the government confirmed its earlier decision not to go this route. The Ambassador recalled with satisfaction the comments that I had made at Geneva, the comments by the Secretary of State, and the comments by the President commending the Indian action. He said there was no intention to change this decision, but there were strong pressures in India to have the government explode a nuclear device so as to offset the genuine psychological advantages which the Chinese had obtained in Southeast Asia by virtue of their explosion. He said that this act of theirs, instead of being condemned by most of the non-aligned nations, was actually being commended to some extent on the basis of showing that the white world was no better than they and that the United States, at least in the Far East and Africa, was not the super power it used to be. He said that Dr. Bhabha/3/ had estimated that India could develop a reasonable nuclear capability for $20 million. He said that, on the other hand, in the course of a year or two China probably could work out a makeshift capability by which they could drop a nuclear bomb on New Delhi without much fear of Indian defense against it. He spoke feelingly of what had been interpreted as a defeat of India by China in the land attack of a couple of years ago. In his opinion, it was really not a defeat since India had chosen to defend wrong positions to begin with, but based on withdrawal to better and more appropriate positions would have been able to repel any later Chinese attack. /3/Homi J. Bhabha, Secretary of the Indian Department of Atomic Energy. The nuclear explosion, however, had the potential for seriously degrading India's position in the Far East and therefore political pressures within India might indeed build up so that it would be politically impossible to resist proposals for an Indian bomb. He asked our thinking with reference to these questions. I told the Ambassador we understood the pressures which might build up and yet his government must recognize that if India were to make the decision to produce nuclear weapons, this would be a long step toward proliferation of such weapons throughout the world. It seemed to us a much better decision, both from the viewpoint of best utilization of economic resources and indeed the security of the world, to devote the Indian influence to non-proliferation. I said that the United States is planning active attempts to achieve some sort of universal non-proliferation agreement, that this was a continuation of our proposals at Geneva, and the Soviet Union appeared to have a genuine interest in this, which interest had been stated by them to be blocked by the Multilateral Force. I said we do not agree with the Russians' appraisal. We feel that the MLF actually can contribute to non-proliferation by our retaining veto power in the multilateral group. It is also planned that no single nation in the group will have the option of utilizing the nuclear weapons assigned to it. I stated we could well understand why Germany and indeed all of Western Europe wished to participate in offsetting the hundreds of Soviet IRBM's and MRBM's pointed at Western Europe, and the Multilateral Force was designed to meet this desire. I called attention to President Johnson's statement of a week ago Sunday as to the United States support of nations which would be subjected to nuclear aggression or blackmail. He said, "But the United States would not come to our aid by attacking China if at the same time the Soviet Union said that it would assist China under such an attack." I said I could not speculate on such a contingency, but we had commitments with many nations in the North Atlantic Alliance to come to their aid, even though the United States was not attacked in the particular situation where North Atlantic countries were attacked by the Soviet Union. He said that the informal offer of aid could not be made formal since India because of its non-alignment policy could not enter a firm defense agreement with the United States. He expressed an interest in our plans for non-proliferation. I outlined some of these briefly. I said that India could be of great influence in helping to promote non-proliferation at the General Assembly and I hoped his government would support these efforts. Moving on to another question, he asked our intention concerning a meeting with China in response to the U Thant proposal for a five power nuclear conference. I said we thought that the Chinese proposal was for propaganda purposes only since they had shown no serious interest in disarmament questions; that a proposal by China for a conference to discuss the destruction of all nuclear weapons with China sitting in as a nuclear power was somewhat ridiculous in that they had exploded their one device and had suggested we discuss giving up all of ours in exchange for the meager demonstration China had given. The Ambassador said that the important point to keep in mind is that any participation by China in a five power conference concerned with nuclear weapons, which conference had been approved by the U.S. with the implication that China is a nuclear power, and excluding India, would be the end of Indian influence in Asia. In view of India's status in Asia and her peaceful nuclear achievements, such a meeting without her would be a disastrous blow psychologically and every other way to the Indian Government. Any such conference, therefore, in his opinion, should include all nations capable of nuclear weapons development of which India is one. In leaving, he said that India was deeply interested in any findings we had concerning the technology and so forth of the Chinese explosion, and I said that the Indian Government's request for this information had been forwarded by the State Department to the suitable agencies and whatever could be given to them I was sure he would hear about in the reasonably near future. I said the analysis of these events sometimes took considerable time, however, and there might not be detailed information available for some time./4/ /4/Telegram 918 to New Delhi, November 2, informed the Embassy of a telegram received by the Chairman of the AEC, John G. Palfrey, on October 23 from Minister Babha, in which Babha requested an arrangement to exchange information on the effects of the Chinese explosions. The Embassy was instructed to deliver Palfrey's response, which informed Babha that arrangements should be made through Ambassador Bowles since "a number of agencies of the USG would likely be involved." (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, DEF 12-1 CHICOM; also available on the Internet, National Security Archive (www.gwu.edu/nsarchive), Electronic Briefing Book No. 6, "India and Pakistan--On the Nuclear Threshold," Document 4) Ray Cline, CIA Deputy Director for Intelligence, briefed Prime Minister Shastri in New Delhi on October 27 about the Chinese nuclear program. (Telegram 1297 from New Delhi, October 27; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, DEF 12-1 CHICOM) In response to my question concerning Krishna Menon's new activities, he said that, in his opinion, Menon did not have any additional influence and the comments made about Menon's participation in the All India Party Congress referred only to an internal policy statement which had no bearing on the governmental position. The discussion, which began at 3:30, ended at 4:45.
75. Memorandum From the Assistant for Counterinsurgency, Department of Defense (Carroll) to the Deputy Director of the Near East and South Asia Region, Department of Defense (Stoddart) Washington, November 23, 1964. [Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 68 A 306, 452.1 India. Secret. 2 pages of source text not declassified.]
76. Memorandum From the Deputy Director for Plans, Central Intelligence Agency (Helms) to Director of Central Intelligence McCone CSDB-312/012201-64 Washington, November 27, 1964. [Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Pakistan, Vol. II, 6/64-11/64. Secret; No Foreign Dissem/Controlled Dissem; No Dissem Abroad/Background Use Only. 2 pages of source text not declassified.]
77. Editorial Note In late 1964, Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs McGeorge Bundy was advised of information indicating that the Pakistani Government had a secret commitment from China that established a significantly closer relationship between the two countries than had been publicly acknowledged, although the details of such commitment were not available to the United States Government.
78. National Intelligence Estimate/1/ NIE 31-64 Washington, December 10, 1964. /1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-R01012A, ODDI Registry of NIE and SNIE Files. Secret; Controlled Dissem. Prepared by the Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State and Defense and the National Security Agency. All members of the U.S. Intelligence Board concurred in the estimate on December 10 except the Assistant to the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, who abstained because the subject was outside his jurisdiction. THE PROSPECTS FOR INDIA The Problem To estimate probable developments in India during the next three to four years. Conclusions A. India has survived the experience of the loss of Nehru with considerable initial success. We cannot yet be certain about the quality of Prime Minister Shastri's leadership. Clearly he lacks Nehru's prestige and authority, and thus far he has governed primarily by compromise and consensus. But in past posts he proved himself a generally effective leader, and we believe that he will gradually exert a firmer control. In domestic policy, he is unlikely to depart substantially from Nehru's line, though in practice his socialism may prove more flexible and pragmatic. (Paras. 1-2, 5, 13-15) B. The Congress Party, now led by a coalition of state leaders, will probably provide India with stable and orderly government for the next several years. However, continued jockeying for power between the center and the states, as well as strains within the central government itself, are likely at times to generate indecision and inefficiency. Prospects for Congress unity would be clouded were Shastri to depart from the scene in the near future, but the Congress leadership could probably agree on a successor. There are no effective nationwide opposition parties, and in the 1967 elections Congress will probably continue in its dominant position at the national level and in all but one or two states. (Paras. 4, 6, 8-12, 18) C. The pace of economic growth has slowed considerably during the past three years. In particular, agriculture has shown no increase in output. Industrial growth has been better, and industrial production is likely to grow by 40 to 50 percent during the Third Five-Year Plan (1961-1966). Over the five year period, GNP, instead of rising by the planned 30 percent, will probably increase by no more than 18 to 20 percent, or about the same amount it increased during each of the first two plans. The still tentative Fourth Five-Year Plan (1966-1971) sets forth even more ambitious goals, including much larger investments in the agricultural sector. India is unlikely to achieve these goals, though food grain production will probably increase significantly by the late 1960s. In any case, increased foreign aid will be needed, as import requirements and debt servicing charges will rise faster than exports. (Paras. 19-31) D. The Shastri government's foreign policies will probably be less concerned with broad international questions and more devoted to specific issues involving India's self interest. India will continue its policy of nonalignment, which in recent years has come to be focused on the need for support from both the US and USSR in the confrontation with Communist China. Between India and China, we foresee neither a general settlement nor an outbreak of major fighting. A prerequisite of any substantial easing of Indo-Pakistani tensions is a settlement of the Kashmir dispute, and of this there is no early prospect. However, major hostilities between the two countries are not likely, and some specific problems may be resolved. India will devote more attention than in the past to its other neighbors, seeking to reduce possible Communist Chinese influence. In the nonaligned world as a whole, India will probably play a generally moderating, but on the whole less influential, role than it did in earlier years. (Paras. 32-42) E. India's leaders want armed forces capable of containing both Pakistan and Communist China and to this end have sharply increased defense spending under a $10-12 billion Five-Year Defense Plan (1964-1969). This, combined with military aid from the US, the USSR, and the UK, is enabling India to further expand and modernize its forces, but the plan is likely to take seven years to complete. Though the army still suffers from deficiencies of leadership and training, its combat effectiveness is improving and it could probably overwhelm its smaller Pakistani foe. While the Chinese would initially have the advantage of terrain in any conflict, the Indian army could probably stop a Chinese invasion before it reached the plains. (Paras. 43-49) F. India has the capability for developing nuclear weapons, and the government is under considerable domestic pressure to do so. We believe that at a minimum India will continue to build up its nuclear capability, and this will enable it to start a weapons program promptly after a decision to do so. Whether the Indians decide to do so will depend on such questions as the cost of a nuclear weapons program and of a delivery system, the pace and scope of the Chinese program, and the importance the Indians attach to assurances from the US and other nuclear powers. (Paras. 50-51) [Here follows the 16-page Discussion section.]
79. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in India/1/ Washington, December 12, 1964, 1:28 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, FSE 13 INDIA. Secret; Priority; Limdis. Drafted by Schneider in NEA/SOA; cleared by Officer in Charge of Atomic Energy Affairs in SCI Charles W. Thomas, Hall of AEC, Wreatham B. Gathright and W. Howard Wriggins of S/P, Samuel DePalma of ACDA, and Raymond L. Garthoff of G/PM; and approved by William J. Handley. Repeated to London and Ottawa. 1185. This relates to your plans to see Shastri soon for further discussion of Indian nuclear problem. Since your last talk he has presumably had opportunity reflect on problem and climate may therefore be good for moving further along course we have charted. We hope, and his statements suggest, his exposure in London to variety of views and questions on nuclear matters may have stimulated more thought about what India needs to do to reinforce its present nuclear policy. We believe our focus with Indians should be on problem of building prestige of Indian science and technology, but first you will need to find out extent to which Indians have reflected on this question and ideas they have about coping with it. It seems to us that time at which we can offer assistance designed to increase Indian prestige depends upon the extent to which GOI thinking has developed. Consequently, our first need is to probe and if necessary to direct GOI thoughts in this area. If GOI has recognized and weighed full dimensions of their prestige problem, they are probably looking for ways to deal with it and may be receptive to our help. If their analysis of their situation and alternatives has not reached this stage, however, an immediate offer from us might either make them suspicious of our motives or cause them to think we are trying to buy their adherence to a peaceful uses only policy, thereby increasing their leverage over us. You are, of course, best judge of proper timing of raising subject possible US assistance with them. As you know, we still believe it is quite important that Indians take initiative and we play responding role. We note that during and immediately after Shastri's London visit there has been some public talk about assurances of support to India in event of Chicom nuclear attack./2/ As you know, we do not wish to proceed at present beyond general statement of assurances included in President's statement of October 16 and his speech of October 18./3/ We are therefore in position of wanting to know what Shastri may have in mind of not wanting to take any initiative to explore subject with GOI. /2/The Reuters news agency reported from London on December 4 that Shastri had publicly urged the world's atomic powers to consider how they could guarantee the security of the non-nuclear nations against attack. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Committee File, Committee on Nuclear Proliferation, India) British Prime Minister Wilson told President Johnson in a conversation in Washington on December 8 that Shastri had told him that he was under strong domestic pressure to authorize the development of a nuclear weapon. Shastri stated that he preferred not to, but the Chinese bomb had shifted the balance of power in Asia, and the only alternative he saw to an Indian nuclear program was a protective nuclear umbrella provided by the existing nuclear powers with the Soviet Union playing an important role. Wilson said that Shastri had asked him to pass his concerns to Washington. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Presidential Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 66 D 149) /3/President Johnson issued a statement to the press concerning the Chinese detonation of a nuclear device on October 16, the day of the test. On October 18 he made a radio and television address to the nation in which he offered the following assurance to non-nuclear nations: "The nations that do not seek national nuclear weapons can be sure that, if they need our strong support against some threat of nuclear blackmail, then they will have it." The October 16 statement is printed in Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1963-64, Book II, p. 1357. For text of the October 18 address, see Department of State Bulletin, November 2, 1964, pp. 610-614. When you believe time appropriate to discuss with Shastri possible US assistance to Indian science and technology you may draw as appropriate on following points: 1. We are impressed by achievements Indian science and technology which we believe exceed those of Communist Chinese. 2. We agree with Indians that world should know more about these achievements. 3. We wonder what plans Indians have for making known Indian progress and for further scientific endeavor. 4. (In response Indian request) USG would be pleased to talk over any plans Indians may have to achieve these objectives to see how we can appropriately assist. We have in mind jointly exploring possibility of developing one or more ventures in fields peaceful uses nuclear energy and space technology that would serve highlight India's capabilities. 5. We recognize that Indian need is to demonstrate Indian progress. Any possible US assistance would therefore be directed toward clearly identifiable Indian projects with US role unobtrusive. When discussions reach this point would appreciate your suggestions for next step. Before taking such step, know you agree on need to have established general framework with Indian political leaders for any expansion of cooperation in peaceful uses or space field. We see this as essential preliminary for making the most of discussions with Bhabha during his visit here next February. Ball
80. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Pakistan/1/ Washington, December 14, 1964, 7:40 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 32-1 INDIA-PAK. Secret. Drafted by Laise on December 11, cleared by Kimball in IO and Handley, and approved and initialed by Harriman. Repeated to New Delhi, London, and USUN. 639. At his request Pak Ambassador G. Ahmed saw Governor Harriman December 11 to express grave concern of GOP at announcement December 4 by GOI Minister Nanda of GOI intention to extend the constitutional provision of President's rule to Kashmir./2/ Points made by Ambassador Ahmed were: (1) by this action, even fiction of separateness of Kashmir is being destroyed; (2) this action, coming at a time when President Ayub had sought to be conciliatory and on heels of an Ayub-Shastri meeting, has special significance and indicates that India does not want peaceful settlement; (3) effect of this action on Kashmir itself might very well be explosive; (4) things are bound to become steadily more and more difficult; (5) GOP continues to believe that military aid to India is responsible for this stiffening Indian attitude; (6) because of India's dependence on US aid, US has a whip hand and nothing will stop India in its move to integrate Kashmir unless US threatens to stop aid; (7) GOP will certainly protest to the UN, but Ambassador was uncertain what GOP might do beyond that; (8) purpose of Ambassador's call was to ask US what GOP should do since earlier this year US chided Pakistan for taking issue to Security Council without prior consultation with US. /2/Home Minister Nanda's announcement concerning the application of President's rule to Kashmir was made during a debate in the Lok Sabha on December 4 on an opposition motion calling for the deletion of Article 370 from the Indian Constitution, which would have had the effect of fully integrating Kashmir into the Indian Union. The motion was ultimately defeated. In the course of the debate, Nanda stated that the government had decided to apply to Kashmir the provisions of Articles 356 and 357 of the Constitution, which provided for President's rule in the event of a breakdown of constitutional government, and enabled the central parliament to legislate for the state during President's rule. (Airgram A-566 from New Delhi, December 9; ibid., POL 18 INDIA) In reply Governor Harriman, noting his custom of always being quite frank with both Pakistan and India, stated: (1) we agree with GOP's position on Indian actions to integrate Kashmir, and consider Pakistanis have right to be concerned; personally Governor was shocked; (2) we continue to regard Kashmir as disputed territory and do not recognize right of India to change its status unilaterally; (3) we registered our position December 10 with Indians and must await their response; (4) question of GOP going to Security Council is within competence of GOP to decide but we appreciate GOP informing us frankly of problem and they should feel free to discuss it with us; (5) reason for Indian action at this time is difficult to assess. We did not believe there was any relationship between military aid and Indian actions on Kashmir. Prime Minister Shastri had demonstrated a constructive attitude in past toward India-Pakistan problems and US still believes there is a reason to hope he will move in constructive direction. However, his illness and many problems have slowed momentum in establishing his position and pressures on him, particularly on Kashmir, by opposition and within Congress to exist; (6) US ability to bring pressure to bear upon India is limited by our confrontation with Chicom threat and activities in area and elsewhere around the world. (Adverse effect of Pak-Chicom relationship also noted.) Ambassador Ahmed pressed hard on what US advice was to Pakistan and what US would do, stating that, if subcontinent is to be secured against external threats, it can only be done by arrangements between India and Pakistan. However, US actions contribute to deterioration of this relationship by not making military aid conditional on a Kashmir settlement. Governor stated he was not in position to offer any further comment on question raised by Ambassador but he would consult with his colleagues and keep in touch with Ambassador if there were anything further to say. He fully concurred that agreement between Pak and India essential for security of subcontinent and had so stated on numerous occasions. Ball [Continue with the next documents]
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