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FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1964-1968, Volume XXV South Asia
Department of State |
81. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Pakistan/1/ Washington, December 24, 1964, 4:04 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 32-1 INDIA-PAK. Secret. Drafted by Simmons (NEA/SOA), cleared by Cameron and Kimball (IO/UNP), and approved by Talbot. Also sent to New Delhi, London, and USUN. 676. Assistant Secretary Talbot called in Pak Ambassador Ahmed December 24 to follow up on Ambassador's December 11 conversation with Governor Harriman on Kashmir integration moves by GOI./2/ Talbot said we have made firm diplomatic representations to Indians regarding our attitude towards recent Indian action extending provisions of Articles 356 and 357 to Kashmir./3/ He noted that we have seen Pakistan's letter to SC which seemed to us an appropriate way to deal with the matter. Talbot reiterated our long standing legal position that we do not recognize validity of unilateral actions to change the status of Kashmir. He affirmed US had made this legal position clear to Indians. He pointed out on other hand US feels that such deep international dispute as Kashmir is unlikely to be resolved solely in terms of legal considerations. Talbot cited our extensive and unsuccessful efforts to help resolve problem, most recently in 1963. He stated that it seemed to us afterwards neither side regarded substantial compromises in its positions as in its national interest. Only with such compromise can movement toward a settlement occur. As US ponders current situation we do not see how outside powers can be helpful until disputants decide themselves to make such concessions. /2/See Document 80. /3/Talbot called in Ambassador Nehru on December 18 to express U.S. disagreement with and disapproval of the Kashmir integration decisions announced by Nanda on December 4. He said the United States was surprised and disappointed over India's latest moves with respect to Kashmir, and would not recognize any Indian action to settle the Kashmir dispute unilaterally by changing Kashmir's status with respect to the Indian Union. (Telegram 1250 to New Delhi, December 18; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 32-1 INDIA-PAK) Talbot expressed concern over sharpening tensions over Kashmir and within Kashmir noting Azad Kashmir President Hamid Khan's statement that his government considered itself relieved of its CFL obligations because of latest GOI measures. We were also aware of escalation of CFL incidents. US failed to see how rising tensions would improve chances for settlement. However US hopeful that tentative beginnings of a dialogue which began in 1964 between Shastri and Ayub could be carried forward in the new year. Talbot said Pakistan knows our concern for stability and security of subcontinent and our desire to maintain closest possible relations with Pakistan. But, Pakistan must also be aware of our deepening confrontation with Communist China. This confrontation must affect and color our policies in Asia at this stage. Ambassador Ahmed in reply said GOP was quite appreciative of US position concerning recent Indian action. But in Pakistan's opinion asking for substantial compromises is asking too much. Fundamentals of an issue cannot be disregarded summarily because party in the wrong is adamant on facing facts squarely. Facts are Kashmir is held against wishes of its people and this condition is recognized by world opinion. Ayub had said that if plebiscite impossible, he was prepared to listen to any other ideas. GOI response has been to strengthen its stranglehold on Kashmir at time when atmosphere of good will had been built up at least from Pakistan side. Increased tensions were inevitable results of India's action and explosive situation may develop in Kashmir whose leaders must now be restive. With respect to Azad Kashmir President's statement this reflects his own view and does not commit the GOP. Talbot commented that one factor increasing turbulence in the subcontinent and Indo-Pak relations is political and military pressure by Chicoms. This was not a factor in the pre-1962 Kashmir situation. Chicom policies however now are important factor and have made Indo-Pak relations more difficult. Ahmed agreed that this argument has been used with good effect by US and India. But he stated argument should not cloud US judgment. Every question is now being pivoted around China which is new factor in calculus but impasse on Kashmir has existed 15 years. Ahmed said that Pakistan appreciates our difficulties in Far East. GOP has maintained for two years there would be no Chinese attack on India and that China and India will settle their differences. Therefore China should not be considered major factor in Indo-Pak problem. Nonetheless the US, UK, and USSR arms build up in India goes on encouraging Indian intransigence. This is why the US is getting nowhere on Kashmir. Assuming subcontinent defense is an American objective, the USG should tell GOI that until it does come to terms on Kashmir, India will not receive American aid. "The US has whiphand but refuses to crack the whip." Ahmed said he would like to hear not only that US deplored GOI action but also that US would do something about it. US should use leverage with India. This was his suggested solution; he believed that US should consider others. US position should not rest solely that India and Pakistan must make substantial concessions which is both Indian and Soviet position. Ahmed said he was not happy with this posture which in effect meant no decisions. Ambassador Ahmed then asked if Indians had given us any explanation for their action. Talbot responded that whatever their reasons may have been Indians had been left in no doubt as to our attitude. Ambassador Ahmed expressed his puzzlement over Shastri's consent to recent Indian action. Shastri had reputation of being man of conciliation and did not give impression he was under pressure to take hard line on Pakistan. In closing he reiterated his view that Kashmir problem was not only problem for GOI and GOP but USG had interest in its resolution and should and could play more active role in subcontinent. Rusk
82. Telegram From the Embassy in India to the Department of State/1/ New Delhi, December 31, 1964, 1 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, DEF 18-8 INDIA. Secret; Limdis. Received at 4:19 a.m. 1862. Two days ago [1 line of source text not declassified] told Emb officer, in strictest confidence that Cabinet had instructed Bhabha to proceed with first stages of producing atomic bomb. Bhabha had previously reported that eighteen months would be required to produce bomb and once initial explosion had occurred, he could produce fifty in five years. According to [less than 1 line of source text not declassified], Bhabha was then instructed to proceed with first twelve months of necessary work. At end of that period GOI would review situation and decide whether or not to push project to completion. Factors influencing final decision would include progress during this twelve month period by nuclear powers to bring ChiCom nuclear bomb production under control and additional amount of prestige ChiComs would have acquired by having bomb. Bhabha had assured Cabinet that final test could be handled underground and hence there would be no violation of Moscow agreement./2/ /2/Reference is to the Limited Test Ban Treaty signed in Moscow on August 5, 1963. (14 UST (Part 2) 1313) Although efforts of mission officers [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] to check this story have produced no further evidence, [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] has thus far been accurate reporter and because procedure he described could be rationalized however painfully in Indian mind as not violating previous agreements or contradicting stated policy, we have been concerned. Therefore at completion of my regular business with Swaran Singh in yesterday's meeting I expressed serious distress over what I described (in order to divert suspicion from [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]) as two apparently well authenticated stories from Bombay that indicated Cabinet had decided to move ahead with program as described above. Swaran Singh asserted flatly that rumor was unfounded, that such effort would be breach of public understanding and that I should accept his assurance that no such plan was in wind. I replied that I was reassured by what he said since it would be impossible for GOI to prepare for setting off atomic device without it becoming generally known, and this in turn would greatly undercut India's present forthright position. Swaran Singh remarked that while I must realize GOI is under great pressure from various groups in country to go ahead with bomb, PriMin was adamant on this subject. We could rest assured that if GOI should change its mind we would be so informed. I said it has been suggested to me that story might have been floated deliberately by someone interested in pressuring U.S. into guarantee of India's security so that building of Indian bomb would not be necessary. I reminded Swaran Singh of President's statement of assurance on Oct 16 and said we had deliberately avoided further reference to nuclear umbrellas because we did not want to appear to be pressing them into relationship with us which they might not be prepared to undertake./3/ Furthermore, public comment about U.S. nuclear support for India at this time would tend to frighten off Russians who otherwise might conceivably be persuaded to undertake parallel if not joint approach. /3/Ambassador at Large Llewellyn Thompson sent a memorandum to Rusk on December 31 expressing his concern that Bowles was encouraging the Indians to think that the United States would be prepared to offer a unilateral guarantee to India against nuclear attack, or be prepared to enter into a joint guarantee with the Soviet Union. Thompson noted that he was unaware that any such policy had been discussed in Washington and added that he did not see how such a specific guarantee could be offered to a non-aligned country and not offered to all of the allies of the United States. He also observed that the Joint Chiefs of Staff had serious reservations about the concept of a joint guarantee with the Soviet Union. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, DEF 18-8 INDIA; also available on the Internet, National Security Archive (www.gwu.edu/nsarchive), Electronic Briefing Book No. 6, "India and Pakistan--On the Nuclear Threshold," Document 5) Swaran Singh expressed his appreciation of our sensitivity to his political problems but made no comment on my suggestion that story might have been deliberately planted. Comment: [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] statement to Emb officer was made on highly confidential basis and it is of vital importance that his name be protected within Dept and elsewhere. Otherwise we will lose good friend who in past has been excellent source. Bowles
83. Telegram From the Ambassador to India (Bowles) to Robert Komer of the National Security Council Staff/1/ New Delhi, January 8, 1965, 1220Z. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, India, Exchanges with Bowles. Confidential. [text not declassified] When I left Washington on December 7 I felt we were all agreed on both critical importance of persuading India not to produce nuclear weapons and also on best means of achieving this. In my meetings with President, Secretary, Mac, Phil, you, etc. I suggested that this could be best accomplished by (A) creating sense of pride on part of Indian Govt and people in their own scientific capacity and as contributing factor, demonstrate to people all over world India's scientific prowess; (B) encouraging India to take lead not only in condemning China's disregard of Moscow Treaty but in leading fight against further proliferation; and (C) being alert to any opportunities that might come our way to assure India that if she were blackmailed or attacked by China with or without nuclear weapons, we would not stand on sidelines. Since my return here, I sense that these objectives are not as clear in some peoples' minds as I assumed them to be. Indians are still eager to take major role on proliferation issue and as I stressed with no negative reactions in Washington, we should be trying in every way to encourage them. If they will take lead position as non-nuclear country that is easily capable of producing weapons, our interests will be far better served than by teaming up with white nation of four million people with no such nuclear potential or political weight. In regard to deterrent question and US position in support of India, I do not think we need to do anything at present moment. Indians are aware of President's Oct 16 statement. However we should be flexible enough to grab any opportunity that comes along, conceivably by some kind of parallel action with Russians. Purpose of this message is to alert you to opportunities we see here outside flow of traffic through State Dept. Jerry Wiesner/2/ can be extraordinarily persuasive in educating such high Indian officials as Shastri, in background discussions with Indian press, in exploring scientific projects on which we can cooperate, in coming up with fresh ideas and on his return home in presenting these ideas to people in Washington. /2/On December 21 Bowles discussed with Prime Minister Shastri the possibility of a visit to India by Dr. Jerome Wiesner of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology to review the status of Indian science and to discuss with Indian scientists the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Shastri welcomed such a visit. (Telegram 1778 from New Delhi, December 21, 1964; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, SCI 7 US) On January 12, the Department informed the Embassy in New Delhi that Wiesner had agreed to undertake the mission. The Department anticipated that Wiesner might be influential in helping to strengthen the Indian resolve to limit the Indian nuclear program to peaceful purposes. (Telegram 1393 to New Delhi; ibid.) I know as always that you will give us all help you can.
84. Telegram From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State/1/ Karachi, January 14, 1965, 8 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 7 PAK. Secret; Priority; Limdis. 1323. Deptel 733./2/ My meeting with Ayub in Rawalpindi this morning was the best in over a year. In response to an intimation from me, the usual Foreign Office note-taker was omitted and we met alone for entire 50-minute period. Feeling post-election euphoria, he was in relaxed, communicative mood and seemed full of good will toward US. He responded with warmth to my reiteration of our congratulations and sense of satisfaction at his impressive election success. He drew friendly analogy between President Johnson's electoral triumph and impending inauguration, and his own. I had definite impression that he considers he has a freer hand and more latitude of action now that election stresses and uncertainties are over, and that he will feel less constraint about seeking some improvement of his relations with US. /2/In telegram 733 to Karachi, January 12, the Department, responding to a suggestion made by Shoaib to Rusk in September, authorized McConaughy to extend an invitation to Ayub to visit Washington to meet with the President in the latter half of April. (Ibid.) Early in conversation I extended President's invitation for Washington visit latter half April, recalling that it had been over two years since Ayub was last in the US and 3-1/2 years since his last full-fledged visit, emphasizing importance and urgency we attach to wide range of bilateral and regional issues which call for consideration Chief of State level. Ayub concurred heartily in urgent requirement for face-to-face meeting with President Johnson to consider many pressing matters and spelled out in warm, even affectionate, terms his eagerness to see President and his family again. He said "President Johnson knows depth of my friendship and regard for him which is so evident it does not even need to be restated." He said only difficulty with suggested latter part of April date was the heavy program of major engagements already laid on for him throughout entire spring period March through June. He mentioned Afro-Asian conference at Algiers, prospective visits to Communist China and Soviet Union, National Assembly elections, budget session of National Assembly, Commonwealth Ministers conference in London and possible State visit to UK. He asked if it might be feasible to postpone US visit to latter half of 1965 in view of this problem. Then he inquired if, better yet, the President could not visit Pakistan? He indicated that with any encouragement at all he would like to extend the invitation. I discouraged the latter suggestion mentioning the most formidable schedule of visits and trips already in prospect for the President throughout 1965. I then questioned the wisdom of postponing Ayub visit to US to late 1965. I pointed out that our continuing assistance programs, both economic and military, needed to be planned ahead and that while we did not tie our assistance directly to political considerations, we needed to be sure that the broad policy framework within which our programs operated was appropriately set and reciprocally understood. His visit was important and urgent from this standpoint. The entire spectrum of problems relating to our interests, programs and presence in Pakistan, the position of Pakistan in the free alliances, the paramount issues between Pakistan and India, Pakistan in the Afro-Asian context, and the Pak relationship with Communist China and the Soviet Union, needed top level attention sooner rather than later. We would prefer to consult with him as our ally before our consideration of current problems in South Asia went much further. This gave the President pause and he said he would like to have a short time to consider further the timing of a visit. He expressed his wish to arrange the visit at the time mentioned if it were in any way possible. I told him that if necessary the visit could be limited to the suggested two days in Washington, although we would be disappointed if he could not make a week's tour of the country. I added that it might be possible for him to combine the short visit to Washington with some other scheduled trip in a westerly direction. He replied he would give me a definite reply within two weeks at the outside. I accepted this. It was evident from a later portion of the conversation, which I will report separately, that his current idea of trying to moderate and restrain the aggressive tendencies of Communist China during his forthcoming visit to Peiping looms large in his mind and that he would like to discuss with the President and Secretary Rusk before he goes to Peiping tactics and arguments he might use in seeking to influence the Chinese Communists. While I did not encourage him in this quixotic concept, I infer that this may be an additional reason for him to try to squeeze in the visit to Washington at the time we have offered, notwithstanding the undoubted difficulties for him. Other principal topics covered in our wide ranging discussion were: (1) Bhutto's current visit to Moscow and Pak-Soviet relations in general, (2) Nature of Pak relationship with Communist China, (3) Chicom policy in South and Southeast Asia, (4) Post-election domestic situation here, (5) Indian negotiating attitude toward Pakistan, (6) need for periodic US Naval task force presence in Indian Ocean, (7) slanderous election charges by Pak official against local US representatives, and (8) requirement for permission to rent housing in Rawalpindi to enable US Mission personnel to make the move from Karachi to Rawalpindi. On all these matters the President's reaction ranged from slightly better to materially better than my expectations. Separate telegram covers all these topics./3/ /3/These topics were reported on in telegrams 1336 and 1343 from Karachi, January 15 and 16 respectively. (Ibid., POL 15-1 PAK) Tone of President's attitude can be summarized in his statement that "Pakistan remains in alliance relationship with you and nothing has changed that." McConaughy
85. Telegram From the Embassy in India to the Department of State/1/ New Delhi, January 21, 1965, 11 a.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, Nuclear Weapons, India, Vol. I. Secret; Immediate. Repeated to the White House for Bundy. 2054. Message to Secretary from Dr. Wiesner. Pass to White House. Before leaving New Delhi Wednesday/2/ evening for home I left following report for John Palfrey, AEC,/3/ who will be in New Delhi on Thursday. I have asked to have it sent on to you in the thought it may be helpful in evaluation situation here. Report is as follows. /2/January 20. Wiesner arrived in India on January 14. In telegram 2055 from New Delhi, January 21, Bowles reported that during a week divided between New Delhi and Bombay, Wiesner met with Shastri and other senior officials of the government. Bowles noted that Wiesner was very favorably received and that, during the course of his visit, Shastri stated that if nuclear weapons were ever made in India it would not be during a Ministry headed by him. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, SCI 7 US) /3/John G. Palfrey, Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, visited India to attend the inauguration of a plutonium plant at Trombay on January 22. "There has been a very considerable debate here both in public and private regarding the possibility and desirability of making an Indian nuclear weapon. The main motivation to date is political, but there is also some desire for a deterrent against China and some vague feeling that if a nuclear mine field makes sense in Europe it could be useful on India-China border. The issue here was confused by Bhabha's quotations from the AEC report on Plowshare/4/ presented at Geneva that gave a cost of $600,000 for a 2 MT explosion. This was generally interpreted to mean that India could carry out a nuclear explosion for such a sum. In particular this is what the PriMin seems to have believed at one point. Many scientists have complained to the PriMin about this and Bhabha has clarified the point. /4/The report has not been further identified. Plowshare was a program initiated by the Atomic Energy Commission during the Kennedy administration to explore the possibilities of peaceful nuclear explosions. The program continued during the Johnson administration. Documentation on Plowshare is in Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, volume VII, and 1964-1968, volume XI. Nonetheless I believe that he is still underestimating the cost of carrying out a nuclear explosion. He told me that he could make and test a crude nuclear device for approximately ten million dollars. Incidentally I think it would be helpful if the AEC could provide a cost estimate having some solidity. The estimate should be based on the assumption that the Indians have plutonium available but must develop everything else./5/ /5/Telegram 425 to Bombay, for Palfrey, January 21, forwarded the assessment of the U.S. intelligence community that it would take 1-3 years and would cost India $30-$40 million to develop a modest weapons program. Palfrey was authorized to share that information with Bhabha, and to discuss Plowshare-type projects with him. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, India, Cables, Vol. IV, 12/64-6/65) Bhabha is still saying that it would be possible to make a nuclear explosion in 18 months. Many of the scientists object to this optimistic figure and at least two have written to the PriMin stating that it was too optimistic. Bhabha apparently wants authority and resources to move forward without final decision regarding actual explosion. No one has estimated what a real weapon system would cost or understands what will be done with it. On the constructive side there are several possibilities. Best of all would be to support the Indian resolution,/6/ or some variant of it, in the UN. The Indian resolution would put the Indians squarely on record against acquisition of weapons and certainly would be a powerful deterrent to any bomb movement here. /6/Apparent reference to the resolution submitted on September 14, 1964, to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee in Geneva by the delegations of Brazil, Burma, Ethiopia, India, Mexico, Nigeria, Sweden, and the UAR calling for a cessation of nuclear testing. See Documents on Disarmament, 1964, pp. 428-429. Of a more limited scope are the various technical things that could be done. I have discussed the possibility of a small satellite, Plowshare experiments, tropical weather studies, Asian-region ground water development, collaborative research on thorium fuel and fast reactors and further cooperative activities on technical education. Bhabha is anxious to explore availability of Plowshare with you. He is interested in the possibility of making harbors and water reservoirs. He also raised the question of the exchange of radioactive sampling data obtained from Chinese tests. It would help the Indians politically if some test data could be made available. I don't know what the restrictions would be but believe that some could be given to them quickly without any harm. I made no statement regarding the possibility but said that he should explore the matter with you and I would look into it at home. Bhabha is also interested in talking about nuclear desalinization. We touched on this briefly but without reaching any judgment regarding the desirability of doing anything at the present time. I did not explore the question of an AEC representative in Bombay." End of report of Dr. Wiesner to John Palfrey./7/ /7/A January 30 memorandum from Llewellyn Thompson to Secretary Rusk, Under Secretary Ball, Assistant Secretary Talbot, and Walt Rostow, on the subject of "Indian Nuclear Weapons Capability," considered alternatives to U.S. assurances to India. Thompson proposed suggesting that India make a unilateral statement that it would not submit to nuclear threats "from anyone" and that the Indian Government was confident that the major nuclear powers would take "appropriate action" if India were attacked with nuclear weapons. The U.S. response to such an Indian statement would reserve U.S. freedom of action in such a case but note that the "heavy price" any country would pay if it considered using nuclear weapons against India made such a contingency "highly unlikely." (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, DEF 12 INDIA; also available on the Internet, National Security Archive (www.gwu.edu/nsarchive), Electronic Briefing Book No. 6, "India and Pakistan--On the Nuclear Threshold," Document 6) Bowles
86. Telegram From the Embassy in India to the Department of State/1/ New Delhi, January 29, 1965, 1:30 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, DEF 19-3 US-INDIA. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to DOD, CINCMEAFSA, London, and Karachi. 2113. A new development has occurred in Indian military planning which we believe to be of significant importance. First indication occurred last Friday/2/ during courtesy call on Defense Minister Chavan on which I accompanied General Johnson./3/ /2/January 22. /3/Major General Charles E. Johnson, Chief of the U.S. Supply Mission to India. After usual pleasantries Chavan stated that important changes had occurred in GOI thinking in regard to Air Force. As result he would like to renew at future meeting his request for American assistance on somewhat different basis. Consequently on January 28 Gen Johnson, John Millar/4/ and I met with Chavan and Secy of Ministry of Defense PVR Rao for three-quarters hour. Exchange developed along following lines: /4/John Y. Millar, First Secretary of Embassy. 1. Chavan stated that after several months consideration he and his colleagues are now ready to accept analysis which Secy McNamara advanced in their Washington conversations last May; i.e., that India should cut down her present wide variety of planes, that F104G was expensive toy which India could not afford, that India had urgent need for ground support aircraft to defend itself against China, that F5 was ideal plane for this purpose to complement Indian-produced HF-24 Mark I and that it would be long time if ever before HF-24 Mark II would become reality. Based on this review GOI would therefore like to request assistance in procuring minimum of three squadrons and maximum of six squadrons of F5As to be spread over two or three years. He explained this to mean 16 aircraft per squadron plus spares. 2. In response to my inquiry about current GOI plans in regard to MIG-21s Chavan stated that they expected to receive 24-36 MIG-21s from Soviets. In reply to my further question about MIG-21 production in India, Chavan said that while project was proceeding satisfactorily it would be at least ten years before this production line could contribute significantly to India's defense. Rao added that there was no security threat to U.S. equipment since Soviets were limited to two sites--Chandigarh and Nasik--and were forbidden to leave them. The last Russians to visit Hindustan Aircraft Limited were Bulganin and Khrushchev. In regard to plans for HF-24 Mark I Chavan stated that he and his colleagues believed that with our help this plane could be made into effective ground support aircraft. They would greatly appreciate help of U.S. experts in solving technical problems and any advice for improving plane generally. They would also appreciate modest amount of U.S. financial assistance to which we referred in previous cables. Rao added that a successful HF-24 (model unspecified) would eliminate the need to produce MIGs. 3. In response to Defense Minister's presentation I stated that while we were prepared to help India in every reasonable way to strengthen her defense against China, we were concerned by relationship of Soviet Union to Indian Air Force. If India had not decided to proceed with MIG-21 production line willy-nilly we would have been willing last June to go a long way towards meeting India's needs for more modern air force. Although we had no desire to carry on cold war here in India or anywhere else, we were faced with practical problems which involved not only our security but also India's. U.S. and Soviet Union were both agreed that primary need is to avoid nuclear war. However, once we move beyond that first priority U.S. and USSR national objectives varied profoundly. For instance our second highest priority is to develop working relationship with Soviets which will enable us to lower tensions and to cooperate in solving many disturbing problems which now threaten peace. In contrast, second highest priority of Soviet Union is to lessen tensions between Moscow and Peking and ultimately to create effective basis for cooperation between Russia and China. Although it is now clear that fulfillment of Soviet objectives is impossible as long as aging Long March veterans are running China, Kremlin hopes that once Chinese leadership role has passed to younger men the two nations can coordinate their efforts in economic, political and military fields. In meantime we Americans cannot expect any profound changes in Moscow's attitude towards us. India should also realize that as long as this situation exists, USSR will be at best uncertain friend. Indeed if Soviets ever have opportunity to choose between China and India, they will surely pick China since China is potential threat to Soviet security and India is not. 4. Chavan stated that he understood our position and thought it was reasonable. India was fully determined to stand up to Chinese political or military aggression. However, he was faced with practical day-to-day problem of building India's defense on month-to-month and year-to-year basis. I closed this exchange by remarking that planes we were discussing had ten year life span and during this period we must face possibility of profound changes in Soviet-Chinese relationship. However I would carefully consider his request with my associates here in Delhi and then transmit it with my recommendations to Washington. Comment: Gen Johnson, Millar and I came away with clear impression that Chavan was not only reversing position his Air Force people had pushed him into last spring and putting in an order for American planes that he rejected at that time but also that he was easing away from Soviet Union as source of military procurement and towards US. In effect he accepted our position on present costly proliferation of IAF, impracticality and extravagance of F104 cost and performance advantages of F5A, and practical difficulties in way of building HF-24 Mark II. Only item on which he did not fall in line was MIG assembly line on which GOI is publicly committed and from which it would be difficult for them suddenly to pull back. We here are agreed that it is politically and militarily sound to provide Indian Air Force with a combat aircraft of characteristics of the F5A, for following reasons: A. Since F5A could be used as interceptor provision of significant number would at least sharply improve chances that MIG project will fade out if not fall through entirely. B. If we do not provide F5As we see no likely alternative to vigorous continuation of MIG project. Since there would be no controls on MIG production or use this would be to the disadvantage of Pakistan as well as US. C. F5A would replace multiple makes of obsolescent aircraft and should permit reduction in total Indian requirements. D. They would strengthen Indian defenses against Chinese and hence would be serving US interests./5/ /5/On February 2 Peter Solbert, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, ISA, sent a memorandum to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff asking for the Joint Chiefs' assessment of the request put to Bowles by Chavan as reported in this telegram. Solbert noted that, in his view, the Indian request for F-5 aircraft might provide an opportunity not only to limit the Indian acquisition of MIGs, but might to bring about a substantial restructuring of the Indian Air Force. (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 70 A 3717, 452.1 India) Bowles
87. Telegram From the Embassy in India to the Department of State/1/ New Delhi, February 19, 1965, 4 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 32-1 INDIA-PAK. Secret; Priority. Repeated to Karachi. 2351. M.J. Desai has privately informed me that a new crisis in Pak-India relationship may soon erupt in area of Kutch. According to his report number of Pak police, perhaps company or two, have taken possession of old fort several miles within established Indo-Pak border. Desai stated that border in this area is based on agreements made many years before partition and is clearly marked by high ground on Pak side and desert on India side. Consequently in his view there could be no possibility of mistake. In answer to my question as to why Paks would be interested in occupying exposed desert fort on Indian territory, Desai suggested that prospects for oil in this region are excellent and Paks may be preparing to stake out their claim. I expressed hope that Indians would use greatest care in dealing with situation since any incident might readily escalate to which Desai agreed. Although we have no way accurately to assess this, Embassy Karachi should know about it. Desai spoke to me in confidence and it is therefore essential that my source be protected. Bowles
88. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ Washington, February 22, 1965. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, DEF 12-1 INDIA. Secret. Drafted by Schneider on February 25 and approved in U on March 8. SUBJECT PARTICIPANTS Calling at his own request, Dr. Bhabha opened the conversation with a description of India's nuclear power reactor program. Analyzing the economics of nuclear power plants he concluded that although capital costs were somewhat high, in areas where hydroelectric power potential was fully exploited or did not exist and where the sources of coal were remote, nuclear power was very much less expensive in India than coal power. Dr. Bhabha then directed the conversation to what he called the dilemma India faced regarding what to do to counteract the "noise" of Communist China's nuclear explosion. He explained that India needed to make some dramatic "peaceful" achievement to offset the prestige gained by Communist China among Africans and Asians./2/ Mr. Ball noted however that African opinion on the Communist Chinese detonation was divided. The Africans had been impressed but they were also disturbed regarding the possible effects of fallout. Dr. Bhabha granted that this may be so but said very few Africans had been willing to join in criticism of Communist China. He believed that if any of these countries could secure nuclear weapons they would. Mr. Ball replied that the problem was to get the major non-nuclear countries to agree to forego nuclear weapons; then the way would be clear for other nations to follow. Dr. Bhabha said that in order to do this a way must be found so that a nation will gain as much by not going for nuclear weapons as it might by developing them. It was not helpful to differentiate between members of the "nuclear club" and non-nuclear nations. Mr. Ball agreed and said that we want to prevent countries from gaining status by developing nuclear weapons. /2/On November 23, 1964, AEC Commissioner John G. Palfrey wrote to Llewellyn E. Thompson suggesting discussing with Bhabha during his February visit U.S.-Indian cooperation in the peaceful uses of atomic energy. Palfrey attached to his letter a "Discussion Paper on Prospects for Intensifying Peaceful Atomic Cooperation With India." (Ibid., Thompson Files: Lot 67 D 2; also available on the Internet, National Security Archive (www.gwu.edu/nsarchiv), Electronic Briefing Book No. 6, "India and Pakistan--On the Nuclear Threshold," Document 3) Dr. Bhabha then examined India's accomplishments in the area of nuclear energy and contrasted them with those of China. He noted there were really only two nuclear powers in the world, the United States and the USSR. Britain and France were on quite a different level; still at a much lower level was Communist China. India could quite easily have achieved China's capability. Dr. Bhabha explained that the Chinese were greatly indebted to the USSR for helping them on their weapons program. At the end of the five-year period of Soviet assistance (about 1959 or 1960) the Soviets had been putting up a diffusion plant, which was not completed, however. The Chinese had asked for a model nuclear bomb but the Soviets had refused; the Chinese had then alleged that the Soviets were backing out of an agreement with them. The Soviet Union must nevertheless have left the blueprints for a nuclear device with Communist China. Dr. Bhabha explained that if India went all out, it could produce a device in 18 months; with a U.S. blueprint it could do the job in six months. It was clear from this analysis how the Chinese gained time because of the Soviet help. In fact the Chinese in 1958 had admitted to the Indians that their first nuclear reactor was Soviet-built and that only the Soviets were fully acquainted with its operation. When Chou En-lai had visited the Indian Atomic Energy establishment at Trombay some years ago, he had said it would take China 15 years to accomplish what India had. Dr. Bhabha noted that even if this was exaggerated, China at that time was at least three years behind India. Dr. Bhabha noted that even today we do not know if all of the U-235 used in the Chinese device was produced in China. He said that an Indonesian representative at the recent inauguration of the Indian plutonium separation plant at Bombay had said she had learned in Peiping recently that the Chinese reactor there was operated only when VIP's visited it. "What other reason except shortage of fuel could there be for this?" asked Dr. Bhabha. Dr. Bhabha explained that if India is to maintain its prestige relative to the Chinese in the fields of science and technology two things should be done: (1) ways must be found for it to demonstrate to other Asian and African countries India's scientific achievements, (2) a greater awareness of Chinese indebtedness to the Soviet Union for its nuclear achievements must be created. Mr. Ball responded that the Department should look into what could be done about it. Concluding his presentation, Dr. Bhabha said that during the next four or five years there were very few countries which had the capability of developing a nuclear device. Even Japan and Germany had no plutonium separation plants and so were some four years away from being able to produce a device. In fact India was much the closest. India's plutonium separation plant is quite large, large enough to process all of the plutonium from the reactors India is now building. In five years India could produce 100 nuclear bombs per year. Dr. Bhabha stated that it was the policy of his government, with which he agreed, not to seek nuclear weapons. If his government is to justify this policy, however, ways must be found by which his country can gain at least as much by sticking to peaceful uses as it could by embarking on a weapons program.
89. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Talbot) to Secretary of State Rusk/1/ Washington, February 23, 1965. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, DEF 19-3 US-INDIA. Secret. Drafted by Schneider on February 17, and cleared in draft by Edward A. Padelford (NEA/NR), A.J. Moses (G/PM), Thomas P. Thornton (INR/RNA), and Joseph B Norbury, Jr. (EUR/SOV). SUBJECT This is to alert you that we will probably have to make important decisions regarding the supply of supersonic aircraft to both Pakistan and India before the Ayub visit in April and the Shastri visit some time thereafter. You should also know that the Vice President indicated he was interested in this question when I saw him just before my Jordan trip. India In an apparent policy shift, Defense Minister Chavan asked Ambassador Bowles for F-5's on January 22. (See New Delhi's 2113/2/ at Tab A.) We have asked the Ambassador if he can get more information about what is behind this request, particularly if it indicates the Indians are backing away from their MIG-21 agreement with the Soviets. (See Deptel 1584/3/ at Tab B.) /2/Document 86. /3/In telegram 1584 to New Delhi, February 5, a joint State/Defense message, the two Departments expressed interest in Chavan's request for F-5 aircraft, and listed a number of questions for the Embassy to pose in probing for the motivation behind Chavan's request. The response to the request would depend on a clearer reading of what prompted the request. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, DEF 19-3 US-INDIA) Also, we have received a report of undetermined reliability from a covert source to the effect that Chavan believes that the Soviets have reneged on an oral commitment they made to him to provide production facilities for an advanced version of the MIG-21. Now they insist that all India can have is facilities for producing a version of the MIG-21 that will be obsolete by the time it is produced. The report also indicates that Chavan believes the Soviets are lagging on deliveries of finished MIG-21's. (Deliveries now, however, seem in fact to be underway.) Pakistan On April 27, 1964 we told General Musa we would provide Pakistan with two additional squadrons of F-104's in FY 1966 if the political climate was right at the time. Our long-run modernization plan for the Pakistan Air Force calls for the two squadrons of 104's followed by F-5's in FY 1967, of course, subject to our political decision to do so. (During the winter we had some indications that we might be able to get by with only one squadron of F-104's.) We believe it is best that we reserve judgment for the present on both of these questions. In the case of India, we will need much more information regarding the factors behind the Indian request. In the case of Pakistan, we will wish to make a careful review of "political climate" as the time for President Ayub's visit approaches. We will, of course, want to consider carefully the effect of providing supersonic aircraft to each country on our relations with the other. In this regard we may wish to consider not only providing aircraft to both countries but also denying them to both.
90. Memorandum to Holders of NIE 4-2-64 and NIE 31-64/1/ Washington, February 25, 1965. /1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-R01012A, ODDI Registry of NIE and SNIE Files. Secret; Controlled Dissem. According to a note on the cover sheet, the memorandum was prepared by the Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State and Defense, the AEC, and NSA. All members of the U.S. Intelligence Board concurred on February 25, except the Assistant to the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, who abstained because the subject was outside of his jurisdiction. NIE 4-2-64, "Prospects for a Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Over the Next Decade," October 21, 1964, is ibid. For the conclusions of NIE 31-64, "The Prospects for India," see Document 78. LIKELIHOOD OF INDIAN DEVELOPMENT OF 1. Despite the October 1964 Communist Chinese explosion, the Indian Government has publicly reaffirmed its intent not to produce nuclear weapons. In addition, the Congress Party, at Shastri's behest, formally adopted a statement of policy against the production of such weapons. Moreover, the Indian Government has recently acknowledged to the Canadians that they had originally agreed that the Canadian-Indian Reactor--the only one presently capable of producing plutonium--should be used only for peaceful purposes. On the other hand, domestic pressures to build nuclear weapons have increased considerably since the Chinese detonation. 2. India can proceed with a number of the steps which are prerequisites to a weapons program without making a firm decision to develop nuclear weapons. It is probably now producing small quantities of plutonium metal, which could be used in the planned reactor program but also would be needed in a weapons program. Its atomic energy organization and its military establishment are big enough to absorb such activities as development of weapons designs and the necessary electronics. It could delay its final decision on the making of weapons for about a year, and could still have its first weapon at about the same time as if such a decision were made now. There is some evidence that the Indian Government has decided to proceed with work preliminary to a weapons program, and we believe this is the course which it will follow during the next year or so. 3. Indian policy over the longer run will depend on a number of factors. Important considerations will include the pace and scope of the Chinese program, the nature of Chinese policy, and the impact which the Indians consider that China's actions have on India's prestige and political position. If the Chinese carry out a vigorous test program and appear to be moving successfully toward an operational weapons capability, and if they continue their truculent foreign policy, the pressures within India for a weapons program will grow stronger. The Indian Government will continue to seek international agreement on nonproliferation and, more importantly, on arms control in order to reduce the Chinese threat. It is not optimistic that such agreements can be reached soon, if at all, and meanwhile its policy decisions will be influenced by its prospects for obtaining assurances of protection from the US, the USSR, and the UK, and the degree of confidence which it places in any such assurances. 4. The Indian Government is concerned with the cost of a nuclear weapons program and of an adequate delivery system. However, we do not believe costs will be the decisive element in India's decision. India has increased its annual defense budget fourfold--to nearly $2 billion--in the last eight years, and, in the course of the next several years, could undertake a modest weapons program and probably acquire a more advanced aircraft delivery system with only a moderate increase in its defense budget. India might indeed, during the next decade, be able to acquire, at an acceptable cost, a missile delivery system suitable to carry the warheads it could manufacture. The Indians regard their country as a potential if not actual great power, and when faced with disputes in the past their policy has been to build up their military strength. 5. We cannot estimate with confidence how the various internal and external factors will interact to determine India's ultimate course. However, we believe that unless the Indian Government considers that it has international guarantees which adequately protect its security, the chances are better than even that within the next several years India will decide to develop nuclear weapons.
91. Telegram From the Embassy in India to the Department of State/1/ New Delhi, March 5, 1965, 9 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 15-1 INDIA. Secret; Limdis. Repeated to Moscow and Saigon. 2504. Governor Harriman called on Prime Minister Shastri evening March 4. Greene, L.K. Jha and MEA note-takers also present./2/ /2/Under Secretary Harriman visited India March 3-7 following visits to Israel and Afghanistan and prior to attending a Far Eastern Chiefs of Mission conference in Manila. Deputy Chief of Mission Joseph N. Greene hosted the Harriman mission until Bowles returned from another commitment on March 6. In telegram 926 to Karachi, February 25, the Embassy was informed that the Department did not object to having the Pakistan Government draw the conclusion that Harriman's failure to stop in Pakistan was related to Ayub's forthcoming visit to Peking. (Ibid., POL 7 PAK) Harriman conveyed cordial greetings from President to PM and expressed gratification that Prime Minister will be visiting President June 1 and 2/3/ and assured him of warm welcome. /3/Bowles was instructed on January 12 to extend an invitation from President Johnson to Prime Minister Shastri to visit Washington. (Telegram 1387 to New Delhi; ibid., POL 7 INDIA) Shastri expressed pleasure at prospect. Harriman outlined progressive nature of President's domestic program with benefit to people and strength of U.S. economy. In response direct question by Jha on whether President was so preoccupied with domestic program he was not as concerned with foreign affairs, Harriman reassured him that although President had concentrated on getting his domestic program started in Congress, his attention to and concern for international issues has high priority. Harriman said one of President's major concerns is to protect against proliferation of nuclear weapons, and he asked for Shastri's assistance to this end. Shastri's position is admired and problems of Indian security are understood in Washington. U.S. has been glad to share with Shastri all information it has about Chinese capabilities and hopes Shastri will let us know if there is any further information he would like to have. Governor Harriman alluded to President's October 18 statement, emphasizing our determination to reassure Asian nations who may be subject to blackmail./4/ /4/Rusk sent Harriman instructions for his and Bowles' discussion with Shastri of Indian nuclear security in telegram 840 to Tel Aviv, February 27. (Ibid., POL 7 US/HARRIMAN; also available on the Internet, National Security Archive (www.gwu.edu/nsarchive), Electronic Briefing Book No. 6, "India and Pakistan--On the Nuclear Threshold," Document 7) Shastri agreed non-proliferation of vital importance and said major nuclear powers must figure out how to assure it. He said India is not going to make nuclear weapons, and this makes it most important for GOI to figure out how to assure India's defenses if India subject to nuclear threat, although India cannot join military pact. Harriman recalled that at the time negotiation of partial test ban treaty, Khrushchev would not discuss non-proliferation agreement but had wanted universal commitment to test ban treaty and indicated desire isolate China. (Shastri concurred in this.) U.S. would like to proceed to comprehensive test ban agreement, but Soviets not yet willing to give necessary inspection. In this connection, we hope for resumption ENDC meetings in April and that GOI will agree, but Soviets have not responded to this suggestion. Harriman expressed USG willingness discuss India's nuclear security problem at any time GOI wished to raise it, and asked about Shastri's talk with Wilson which it had been reported dealt with shield or umbrella. Shastri said he had had to deny public reports that he had asked Wilson for any such thing; he had told Wilson it was all right with him if Wilson discussed matter with President Johnson but it would be unwise for India, as only one of the non-nuclear powers, to seek a shield for itself alone. Thus the problem is for present nuclear powers to devise reassurances to all non-nuclear states against Chinese threat. In reply to question, Shastri said he had no precise formula for accomplishing this; perhaps reassurance could take the form of joint statement that any threat from any nuclear power would be met, that there should be no further proliferation and that test ban should be total. He thought there might be other ways, and Governor Harriman invited him to let us have any ideas he had and in any event to help assure non-proliferation now. In reply query, Harriman said we have no indications of change in Soviet policy on disarmament since Khrushchev's ouster. We hope, and believe new Soviet leaders do too, that bilateral US-Soviet dialogue will continue. In this connection it would be most helpful to get from Shastri when he comes to Washington the information he obtained in Moscow on Soviet thinking on these matters. Shastri agreed. Shastri asked what indications we have of ChiCom intentions regarding India. Harriman said we have nothing specific although ChiComs are generally more aggressive as they try to take from Moscow leadership of international Communist movement. They appear determined to support liberation movements and guerrilla actions rather than open warfare at present time. Shastri said he did not anticipate ChiCom attack on India in immediate future but there has been build up and logistic improvement in border areas. Jha interjected that India is still weak in the air and Shastri said he would also look forward to talking to the President about U.S. military assistance. He thought our help in aircraft had not been coming along as scheduled;/5/ Jha corrected this to note that agreement has not yet been reached. In reply to query, Shastri said Soviets had not been fully coming through either. He and Jha said MIG production project is, however, going ahead. /5/Indian Army Chief of Staff General Chadhury reinforced this point in a conversation with Harriman on March 6, expressing the hope that the United States would agree to supply India with F-5A fighters. (Memorandum of conversation, March 6; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, NEA Files: Lot 67 D 410, New Delhi) Shastri turned to Southeast Asia, noting that discussions in Washington would have to be in light of circumstances at the time. Harriman recapitulated U.S. White Paper/6/ and stressed our hope escalation by North Vietnam would stop but equally our determination to stay with the job until North Vietnam lays off interference in South Vietnam. He stressed our conviction there is nothing to talk about at a conference until they do. He urged Shastri to get our latest views on this question just before he goes to Moscow, stressed we consider De Gaulle's support of Soviet call for conference as unhelpful and hoped Shastri would not join with Soviets in that approach. Shastri indicated he understood. /6/Reference is to the report issued by the Department of State on February 27, 1965, entitled Aggression From the North: The Record of North Viet-Nam's Campaign To Conquer South Viet-Nam. The report, without its attached photographs and appendixes, is printed in Department of State Bulletin, March 22, 1965, pp. 404-427. In answer query, Shastri thought Kosygin had gone to Hanoi at least to offset ChiCom influence and possibly to seek a solution. He thought new Soviet leaders want to exercise moderating influence in SEA, where disillusionment with ChiComs is spreading, even including Ne Win but excluding Sukarno. Shastri also anticipated discussing with President India's economic affairs. Harriman noted there has been good progress but India's needs will doubtless continue and increased investment both public and private, foreign and domestic, will be important. He expressed certainty GOI could get more foreign private investment with a little more understanding of the requirements of American businessmen regarding the investment climate; important element in this is U.S. businessman's reluctance to let government, any government, control his investments. He added he was heartened in these respects by Prime Minister's statement in Parliament March 2 (Embtel 2452)./7/ /7/Telegram 2452 from New Delhi, March 3, reported that in a debate in the Lok Sabha, Shastri stated that, in general, majority Indian share-holding would be required in most businesses established with foreign participation, but the Indian Government would allow majority foreign share-holding in selected cases where there was a lack of either local technical knowledge or adequate foreign exchange. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 15-1 INDIA) Shastri and Jha said that foreign private collaboration with domestic Indian private sector always welcome and point Governor had raised only relevant in respect of collaboration in public sector. Shastri said visiting American businessmen had recently expressed to him willingness to sell their equity to Indian public after say ten years. Referring to his recent visit to Israel, Harriman described importance Israelis attach to water resources, akin to protecting national territory itself, and urged Shastri to keep an eye on outrageous and spiteful Arab diversion projects. In brief reference to UAR, Harriman noted Nasser and Ben Bella are fishing for trouble, e.g., by passing Soviet equipment to rebels in Congo. Shastri said he thought Nasser has "succumbed to pressure" and seemed disenchanted with him. In leaving, Harriman expressed confidence in Shastri's leadership and in expanding cooperation between our two countries./8/ /8/Harriman's meeting with Finance Minister Krishnamachari on March 4 was reported in telegram 2482 from New Delhi, March 4. (Ibid., POL 7 US/HARRIMAN) On March 5 Harriman met in the morning with Foreign Secretary C.S. Jha and Commonwealth Secretary Rajeshwar Dayal. That conversation was reported in telegram 2511 from New Delhi, March 6. (Ibid., POL 1 INDIA-US) On the evening of March 5 Harriman met with Swaran Singh, who became Minister of External Affairs in July 1964. In contrast to his earlier meeting with Jha and Dayal, Harriman's conversation with Singh, which ranged over such issues as nuclear policy, the Arab-Israeli conflict, the Congo, and Southeast Asia, was reported to have included a number of sharp exchanges. (Telegram 2512 from New Delhi, March 6; ibid., POL 7 US/HARRIMAN) Bowles [Continue with the next documents]
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