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FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1964-1968, Volume XXV South Asia
Department of State |
92. Telegram From the Embassy in the Philippines to the Department of State/1/ Manila, March 7, 1965, 10 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 7 US/HARRIMAN. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Repeated to New Delhi and passed to the White House. 1641. For the President and SecState from Harriman. Following is summary of major impressions gained in 3-1/2 days concentrated discussions./2/ /2/Harriman subsequently submitted a report on his trip to President Johnson, which included a 1-page summary of his visit to India. (Memorandum for the President, March 15; Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Harriman Israeli Mission (II)) I have visited India four times in the last six years, the last time in 1962 in connection with India's emergency arms needs. I feel today quite a new attitude towards US and the world situation reflected by Indian officials as well as press. I almost felt I was in a different country. With one exception, discussions with Indian Ministers and officials were relaxed and frank with full agreement on such matters as aggressive intents of Red China, need to prevent Reds' take-over in South Vietnam and SEA, willingness to consider objectively our policies and work with us for common objectives in other areas of world. They show greater confidence in their ability to solve India's economic problems with increased production in agriculture and industry and have greater understanding of need to develop private sector by both domestic and foreign investment, although not yet taking all necessary actions. On other hand, Indians still are over-hopeful of Soviet Union's good intents, fear effects our tougher attitude toward Soviets, and are concerned that our policies toward Hanoi will bring Moscow and Peiping together again. They want to continue play non-aligned role although they are considerably disillusioned with Sukarno and Nasser. They want to work with us on nuclear controls but don't want to spoil their non-aligned image by bilateral security arrangements. They show a more pragmatic and less doctrinaire approach to political and economic matters, but are somewhat held in check by loyalty to interpretations of Nehru's principles and purposes. I had the feeling that I could talk freely with them without fear of being misunderstood and that we could reach understandings on a much broader area. They are, of course, still suspicious and fearful of some of our policies and methods, i.e., that we will fail to take advantage of what they consider Moscow's willingness to come to agreements on nuclear and arms controls, political settlements in Europe, etc. and although they don't want us to leave South Vietnam before an effective agreement, they fear we may overly react against Hanoi and thereby bring Red China and Soviet Union into the conflict. I feel our economic and military assistance is beginning to pay off, but if we don't continue, economy will not expand to breakthrough to self sufficiency, and military capability will not be sufficient to act as deterrent to Red Chinese aggression--first in Nepal and Bhutan and later Assam. Ambassador's absence first two days gave me better opportunity to get to know country team. I was favorably impressed by all--political, economic, information and military, and by the coordination under Bowles' vigorous and spirited leadership. Gen. Johnson, who was with me in 1962 has excellent relations with Indian Military. Chief of Staff General Chadhury spoke highly of him and our cooperation in general. There is no doubt army has made good progress in every way during last two years but air force is dangerously weak. Indians are prepared to emphasize air requirements in next year's aid program requests and I hope we can fill them. Indians are still stubborn over Kashmir settlement and relations with Pakistan are most unsatisfactory. Indo-Pak settlement is still number one problem and should have our continued attention in concert with British. The one exception to my generally favorable reaction in talks with officials was with Swaran Singh, Minister External Affairs. I felt I was arguing with Krishna Menon again. Not that he is Communist-inclined but because he took critical attitude on most all our policies. Bowles tells me Swaran Singh has little influence and hopes he will be replaced. Bowles does his business with Prime Minister and capable Foreign Office officials, as well as other Ministers direct. Press reaction to my visit was generally good with understanding editorials on our policies in Vietnam and fair reporting on my blunt statements. Surveys show public have increasing respect for and confidence in US. All in all, I am much more hopeful of India and feel we can expect her to play more effective role towards free world objectives./3/ /3/McGeorge Bundy forwarded a copy of this telegram to President Johnson on March 10 with a covering note in which he made the following comment: "I think it is good and accurate. We all feel that between now and the Shastri visit we shall have to look hard at our policy toward India." (Ibid., Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. 9, 3/3/65-6/30/65) Blair
93. Telegram From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State/1/ Karachi, March 16, 1965, 6 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 7 PAK. Secret. Repeated to New Delhi, Hong Kong, London, Moscow, and CINCMEAFSA and CINCPAC for POLADs. 1730. Embtel 1679./2/ Ayub's Communist China Visit./3/ /2/Telegram 1679 from Karachi, March 10, summarized the joint communiqué issued in Peking on March 7 by Bhutto and Chinese Foreign Minister Chen I. The Embassy reported that the communiqué reflected the closer ties developing between the two countries. (Ibid.) /3/Ayub paid a State visit to China March 2-9. He was accompanied by Foreign Minister Bhutto. 1. Emb evaluation of Ayub's visit to Communist China reaffirms our initial appraisal that on balance visit represents significant consolidation of Pak-ChiCom relationship and poses fundamental policy issues for US. 2. ChiComs once again outmaneuvered Paks and scored major propaganda victory both in Pakistan and internationally. Ayub's repeated expressions of admiration for and confidence in ChiCom leaders, identification of ChiCom achievements as providing model for other Afro-Asian countries, and enthusiastic references during trip to ChiCom desire for peace has created unfortunate image of close and increasingly amicable and cooperative Pak relationship with ChiComs in Afro-Asian context. Propagation of this image in Pakistan greatly abetted by Pak press play undoubtedly with general encouragement from GOP Ministry of Information. There is absence of any visible appreciation of problems which ChiCom aggressive challenge creates for US and other countries in FE and SEA. Moreover, joint communiqué/4/ and Ayub's speeches sharpen growing contrast between private assurances and remarks by Ayub to Ambassador, and public stance not only of Bhutto and other Pak leaders but of Ayub himself. /4/A copy of the joint communiqué issued on March 7 is attached to a March 9 memorandum to Talbot from Turner Cameron assessing the significance of the Ayub visit to China. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 7 PAK) Komer commented on Cameron's critical assessment in a March 20 memorandum to Bundy: "State is finally getting fed up with our Pak friends. This is a useful precursor to what I think is an essential showdown with him here in April." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Pakistan, Vol. III, 12/64-7/65) 3. Paks, however, have not come back empty-handed from visit. Their gains appear primarily psychological rather than tangible. communiqué reference to threat to peace presented by Kashmir problem goes beyond previous Pak-ChiCom formulations in stressing urgency of problem although there no indication of more specific ChiCom commitment of support to Paks. Secondly, Ayub has probably enhanced both his domestic image and international stature as leading Afro-Asian voice who able and willing to act independently of Western influences and who important enough to merit top-level treatment by ChiComs. Perhaps most vital to Paks, visit tended to place new pressures on India by emphasizing solidity of Pak-ChiCom ties. To achieve these objectives, Pak apparently prepared to pay price of accepting ChiCom formulations on several acute international issues and to bury their differences over approach to A-A conf. 4. Greatest potential risk to Paks lies in impact of visit on US-Pak relations. FonMin Shoaib clearly recognized this danger in conversation with me March 10 (Embtel 1726)./5/ Ayub may have felt that as long as he steered clear of sensitive Vietnam issue he could avoid stirring up US. Another consideration was undoubtedly MFA estimate that US is unprepared exert strong pressure on GOP to limit Pak-ChiCom relationship through restriction of economic and military aid programs. /5/Dated March 15. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 7 PAK) 5. As Ayub visit to US draws closer, we must therefore face the fundamental issue of how far we are prepared to support Pakistan in the face of some policies running counter to our interests. I will be submitting in the near future my recommendations for Ayub visit and our posture during interval preceding visit. To set the stage, I believe that it is essential to shake Pakistani confidence that continued full US support can be taken for granted, irrespective of GOP international posturing. We wish to bring Ayub to Washington genuinely concerned about the future of US-Pakistani ties. I have already started this process in my talks with Shoaib and intend to continue to plant seeds of misgiving. However, I strongly urge against any public US Govt remonstrations. These would only provoke a defensive reaction making it more difficult for Ayub to climb back from the limb. McConaughy
94. National Intelligence Estimate/1/ NIE 32-65 Washington, March 24, 1965. /1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-R01012A, ODDI Registry of NIE and SNIE Files. Secret; Controlled Dissem. According to a note on the cover sheet, the estimate was prepared by the Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State and Defense and NSA. All the members of the U.S. Intelligence Board concurred in the estimate on March 24 except the representatives of the Atomic Energy Commission and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, who abstained because the subject was outside their jurisdiction. THE PROSPECTS FOR PAKISTAN The Problem To assess the situation in Pakistan, and estimate developments over the next few years. Conclusions A. President Ayub is almost certain to retain his dominant position for the foreseeable future. Fairly effective economic management, if accompanied by continued large-scale foreign aid, probably would permit Pakistan to maintain its impressive annual GNP growth of five percent or so for the next two or three years at least. This will nevertheless leave Pakistan beset with numerous economic problems. (Paras. 1-15) B. Tensions between Pakistan and India are likely to increase in the next few years over the issues of Kashmir, communal violence, and refugees. Nevertheless, we think the leaders of both countries will be able to prevent major hostilities. (Paras. 18-20) C. Ayub sees little chance of persuading the US to alter its policies toward India and is, therefore, probably unwilling to change the basic direction of his foreign policies. Despite the growing divergence of US and Pakistani policies in Asia, Ayub probably believes that the US, because of its many interests in Pakistan, will continue to supply it with military and economic assistance. The initial Pakistani response to a direct US threat to reduce military and/or economic aid unless Pakistan modified its relations with China would probably be reciprocal threats against the alliances and the US special facilities. Nevertheless, if Ayub were convinced that the US really intended to reduce its support of Pakistan substantially, there is a better than even chance that he would mute though not abandon his China policy--at least until he could develop adequate alternative sources for US aid. (Paras. 23-28) D. Ayub probably now regards a working relationship with Communist China as one of the key elements in Pakistan's security against India. Ayub will continue his recent efforts to improve relations with the Afro-Asian states, keeping in line with the mainstream of Afro-Asian views on most issues--a policy which has great political appeal within Pakistan. He will also seek better relations with the USSR as a supplement to the main lines of his foreign policy. (Paras. 21-22, 29, 31) [Here follows the 14-page Discussion section of the estimate.]
95. Memorandum From Robert Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson/1/ Washington, April 2, 1965. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Pakistan, Ayub Khan Visit, 4/65. Secret. Foreign Minister Bhutto's latest effusion on Pakistan/Chicom relations is a harbinger of the line you'll get from Ayub on 26 April (see attached)./2/ Bhutto had the gall to say publicly there's no inconsistency in Pakistan being friends with both the US and Chicoms, since both are "peace-loving" states. Nor do we like Bhutto's remark that US aid to India after the 1962 Chicom attack "shattered" the whole concept of alliances with the US (SEATO and CENTO). These alliances were never at any time aimed against India (as the Paks well know, because they've been trying for the last 10 years to get them changed). /2/The attachment was telegram 1840 from Karachi, March 29, which reported on a press conference held by Foreign Minister Bhutto. (Ibid.) In essence, the Paks seem to have arrived at the conclusion they can have their cake and eat it too. Actually, Pakistan is being a lot more friendly to Peiping than to Washington, despite the fact that we still pay all the bills (about $450 million in FY 64). We're getting back quiet word that this casual equating of the US and Chicoms goes down like a lead balloon here. We're also making known our slight annoyance that when Rusk goes all the way to Tehran for the CENTO ministerial meeting next week Ayub and Bhutto go to Moscow instead of meeting with their allies. This, of course, after Ayub's recent well-publicized trip to Peiping. I'm still convinced that Ayub knows at heart he can't do without us, but is going to play the Chicoms off against India (and us) so long as he thinks he can get away with it. Our best Pak friend, Finance Minister Shoaib, says flatly that Aziz Ahmed (ex-Ambassador here) keeps telling Ayub that the Pak accommodation with Peiping can be carried much further without jeopardizing the flow of US aid. So the real problem is how to get across to Ayub that he can't cozy up to our Chicom enemies and pursue an anti-US line on most issues of concern to us (Vietnam, Malaysia), while still getting the second largest chunk of US aid. Unless he pulls back, present trends will carry Pakistan beyond the point of no return, and then Congress may not even allow us to provide $400-500 million per year. At that point we'll lose our crucial intelligence facility at Peshawar to boot. We've failed so far to get through to Ayub along these lines, partly because he's surrounded by people who tell him we're only bluffing. Thus his visit here provides our best opportunity (and perhaps our last). And only the President of the US can say such things to Ayub in a credible way./3/ /3/McGeorge Bundy passed Komer's memorandum to the President under cover of a memorandum in which he stated that he agreed with Komer. He added that "we ought to begin to blow the whistle on him" and agreed that the best time to do so would be during Ayub's scheduled visit to Washington. (Ibid., Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. 9, March-April 14, 1965) R. W. Komer
96. Telegram From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State/1/ Karachi, April 4, 1965, 7 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 15-1 PAK. Secret; Limdis. 1894. Re: Deptel 1072./2/ Conversation with President Ayub. /2/Telegram 1072 to Karachi, March 30, contained an overview of U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union for McConaughy's use in his discussion with Ayub prior to Ayub's trip to Moscow. Ayub was scheduled to make a State visit to the Soviet Union April 3-11. The Department instructed McConaughy to express the surprise felt in Washington at the timing of Ayub's trip, which coincided with the CENTO Ministerial Meeting in Tehran April 7-8. Since Bhutto was planning to accompany Ayub to Moscow, Pakistan would not be represented at the CENTO meeting at the Foreign Minister level. (Ibid.) 1. I met for one hour with Ayub early evening April 1 in Karachi. Appointment made as result brief private chat I had with him at morning ceremony, after FonOff had attempted to frustrate projected appointment, apparently without President's knowledge. Meeting took place on veranda President's house in outwardly relaxed and personally friendly atmosphere, with no other person present. 2. I spelled out our views on current Soviet foreign policy orientation and tactics in line reftel. President manifested unusual interest in our assessment and jotted down principal points. Said he would find it useful in making his own estimate after his Moscow visit. Promised to give us his corresponding evaluation after his return. He spoke as an ally working in close concert with US. He stated his belief that "Soviet menace far greater than Chinese" and reiterated his conviction that Soviet aspiration was undiminished to reach warm water at Arabian Sea at Karachi as well as through Caspian to Eastern Mediterranean and Persian Gulf. 3. I had a plausible opening at this point to seek reassurance on continuation our facilities at Peshawar (a matter which Soviets are certain to press) but they [he?] made no mention of subject, and I decided not to broach it either. 4. I turned conversation to Sino-Pak affairs, expressing concern at rapidly developing course of relations. I said it was my estimate that the downhill momentum was getting close to roller coaster velocity and that I would be lacking in candor if I did not tell him that the many gestures of Pakistan in the direction of Communist China at this juncture were coming under the serious scrutiny of USG. I cited various indications of a relationship of special closeness between GOP and CPR which have been played out before a national and world audience here in recent weeks following his visit to Communist China with its various unfortunate implications and repercussions. I told him that I had received a circumstantial but not entirely adequate explanation from FonOff Addl Sec Agha Shahi of the joint communiqué. 5. Ayub said earnestly that I was magnifying unduly the extent and significance of Pak gestures toward Communist China. His only purpose in his limited dealings with CPR was to pursue policy of good neighborly relations, and to preserve peace in Asia. Present explosive situation might lead to outbreak of hostilities involving Communist China, which would create a situation very dangerous for security of Pakistan as well as other countries. His object was merely to seek to abate tensions, which was in interest of all. He then gave me following points on his own talks with Chou En-lai, Chen Yi and other top Chinese leaders. A. Joint communiqué: Joint communiqués were the bane of his existence when he made foreign visits. They consumed an inordinate amount of time and energy, resulted in endless haggling, created trouble and misunderstanding. He said they were not binding and therefore they did not really mean anything anyway and we should not take the verbiage too seriously. He wished they could be abolished. He said certain gestures of accommodation had to be made by a visitor to the host government, especially when the reception was so stirring as in his case. He said that Vietnam was the most significant item that had come up in the joint communique discussions and he reminded me that he had held a firm line against the Chinese on this, resulting in an impasse and a conspicuous omission of any reference to Vietnam. B. Vietnam: Ayub said the Chinese gave him their standard version of the situation and issues in Vietnam, arguing that the US had prevented a plebiscite in Vietnam, and in many ways had violated the letter and spirit of 1954 Geneva Accords. They described US as direct successor of French as colonialist exploiters of Vietnam and portrayed insurgency of Viet Cong as essentially a nationalist, internally-based, patriotic uprising of South Vietnamese people against neo-colonialists and their puppets. Asserted war was continuation of "liberation struggle" which had begun against the French. Ayub said he did obtain an important admission from the ChiComs as a result of his probing questions, that they had "formerly" supplied arms and other military weapons to North Vietnam for use of Viet Cong. But ChiComs denied that they were currently extending support, alleging that it was now unnecessary in view of increased capability of Viet Cong themselves. In response to further Ayub questions about role of North Vietnam, ChiComs said they "supposed" North Vietnamese were "helping" Viet Cong to some extent. Ayub said that ChiComs were absolutely adamant in resisting his urging that they agree to third party recommendations for a conference on Vietnam without pre-conditions. They were uncompromising in their demands for full US withdrawal before any consideration given to conference possibility. Ayub said he told them that of course Americans could never agree to this and he could not associate himself with any such extreme ChiCom demand. Ayub also told me that ChiComs were explicit in their threat to enter the fray openly and directly if widened US participation made it necessary. Ayub saw no prospect for narrowing the gulf and expressed deep pessimism as to the prospects. He did not believe the ChiComs would even consider accepting a US requirement for prior withdrawal of outside Communist support of Viet Cong and he said the dilemma appeared insoluble. C. GRC, Taiwan and two Chinas: Ayub said Chinese took soft tactical line in response to his statement of US position as to GRC and Taiwan as he understood it. Apparently he stated the position in terms fairly sympathetic to US, putting it to ChiComs that US had assumed solemn defense obligations to GRC which no one could expect us to abrogate. He said the ChiComs replied that they understood difficulty for US which was inherent in its mutual defense obligations and that they were in no hurry about taking control of Taiwan. They intimated to Ayub that a long transition period probably of indefinite duration could be arranged if US would only accept general principle that Taiwan was part of China and that established Chinese Government on Mainland was entitled to exercise sovereignty over Taiwan. On this principle they would never yield. Ayub said ChiComs assured him that they had nothing against us other than Vietnam and Taiwan issues. D. SEATO and CENTO: Ayub told me that he had informed ChiComs at outset that GOP could not let down its allies with whom it was aligned and that his government expected to remain in both SEATO and CENTO. He said he told Chinese that since these pacts were entirely defensive and could not be invoked ("would be non-fructifying" was the phrase he used) in the absense of aggression, the Chinese had nothing to worry about. Ayub said that the Chinese, while perhaps not liking this too much, did not argue the point and tacitly accepted his position. E. US presence in Asia: Ayub told me that while he thought he had acted consistently with his obligations in presenting the foregoing points, the most significant act he had performed in US behalf was his statement in his speech in Shanghai that while China had a role in Asia which the US should recognize and accept, the US also had a role and responsibilities in Asia which China should recognize and accept. Ayub said that it was most difficult to take this position before a vast throng of Chinese, especially after the massive welcome he had received. But he thought it needed to be done and he had done it. He did not think any other visiting Chief of State could or would have done it under similar circumstances. The Chinese did not like this statement but it is now on the record and personally heard by a great Chinese audience. He hoped it would do some good. F. Essential character of ChiCom revolution: Ayub stated it was Pak firm conviction that ChiCom revolution is primarily nationalistic and internal. He was impressed with the profound absorption of the ChiComs with their own domestic problems and progress. He thought they were primarily interested in social and economic reforms at home and the prosecution of their economic development programs. He felt they had accomplished a lot already but they obviously had much more to do in the welfare and development field and he was inclined to credit the view that their ambitious goals at home consume most of their energies leaving little interest in foreign adventurism. He said the Chinese posture seems to him to be increasingly nationalistic. They are deeply aware of their national history before the advent of Communism and they frequently cite it. He said the Chinese told him that as part of their self-examination process they are continually reminding and admonishing themselves against the danger of the CPR itself falling into the error of "big nation chauvinism." They said their self-discipline saves them from this error. He quoted the Chinese leaders as saying that China throughout her history had suffered heavily from every involvement in foreign wars, and their leaders did not intend to be drawn into any more foreign wars which could be avoided. G. ChiCom attitude toward Communist insurgency in other countries: Ayub told me of a very significant and flagrantly contradictory position stated by ChiComs on above topic. Full import apparently not realized by Ayub. This enunciation by ChiComs was to effect they "were committed to assist, and would assist, `national liberation' movements or uprising against oppressive governments all over the world--whether in Asia, Africa, or Latin America." H. ChiCom attitude toward Ayub's US visit: Ayub said he had told ChiComs that he had not any authorization to speak for US in Peiping and he, of course, would not presume to speak for the Chinese in Washington. He had then told them that his objective was to further the prospects for peace between the two countries and that if he could "lower the temperature" even [garble--a little?] in both Peiping and Washington he would have served in some modest way the cause of peace. He said the Chinese endorsed this point of view, telling him that they wanted the temperature lowered in both countries and wishing him well on his Washington visit. 6. I expressed appreciation for comprehensive rundown given me by the President, giving him full credit for not yielding to ChiComs on Vietnam question, and implying I considered his dismissal of joint communiqué as meaningless, to signify that visit had not actually changed established Pak position on any of questions mentioned in communiqué. I then said that while there was some reassurance in what he had told me as to posture he had assumed with ChiComs during his visit, other aspects of Pak relationship with ChiComs remained deeply disquieting. I did not see how he could be so charitable in his interpretation of ChiCom motivations and I assumed he could see the inconsistency and the irreconcilability of various postures assumed by ChiComs. I asked him to postulate for a moment the contingency of a strengthened pro-Chinese Communist organization in East Pakistan which GOP had taken steps to curb. I asked him if he did not agree with me that by the ChiComs' own declaration of policy, they would find it necessary to support and incite such a movement against the GOP? Ayub conceded ChiCom support of such a subversive group would probably have been assumed. 7. Responding to my expressions of foreboding at the general trend of Pak-ChiCom relations, Ayub said with some fervor that relationship was strictly limited and did not undermine Pak internal security or Pak-US relationship. He said that if he had any desire or intention to enter into an entangling relationship with ChiComs he could easily have negotiated either open or secret agreements with them. He had done neither and there had been no agreements other than the innocuous cultural and economic ones which we knew about. He took issue with my anxiety that the Chinese already had a useful opening wedge for expanding their influence in this country. He thought that the strong Islamic faith of Pakistan was a certain bulwark against the penetration of Communist ideology. When I told him of the first hand evidence I saw on all hands that the press and people of Pakistan are assuming and accepting a more intimate association between Pakistan and Communist China as "the wave of the future," and are inferring that the US presence in Pakistan is in gradual retreat, he discounted such evidence by saying "a lot of our prominent people who should know better get wrong ideas" and by branding the entire Pakistan press and journalistic fraternity as unprincipled and irresponsible. 8. I wondered out loud if he exempted from the foregoing journalistic indictment Mr. Altaf Husain, the rabidly anti-American editor of Dawn, and outspoken advocate of a close Pakistani alignment with Communist China, whom he had just taken into his Cabinet as Minister of Industry. Ayub's reply was that he had taken Altaf Husain into his Cabinet only because of the acute lack of qualified Bengalis and the necessity for equal representation from East Pakistan in the Cabinet. He said that he would be able to control Altaf Husain as a member of his government whereas he could not control him as a newspaper editor. He had exacted an understanding from Altaf Husain and he thought I would see revised behavior from him as a Minister. He also thought that Dawn's editorial policy would be less objectionable to US with Altaf Husain out of the picture. 9. Ayub said that unavoidably the American position in Pakistan and Pak-US relations had suffered some damage. "That is not your fault and it is not my fault." He seemed to feel that intermediate level policy makers in Washington had persuaded the American leadership of the merits of a policy of US military assistance to India. This policy was responsible for all the mischief. He spoke with the deepest rancor of unalterable Hindu rejection of Pakistan's right to exist. He predicted with fatalism the eventual outbreak of a clash between Pakistan and India. Pakistanis could not then accept the assistance of US ground forces, even if offered, because Pakistanis would lose their self-respect (which was essential for national survival) if they did not fight their own battles. The Pakistanis would be overwhelmed and they would die, he said with mounting bitterness, but "every Pakistani would account for four Indians before he died." I endeavored to calm down such talk but he insisted that our support of India had emboldened the GOI to provocations beyond the danger point. He had been certain all along that there was no prospect of either China or India initiating a renewal of late 1962, and his recent talks in Peiping with the Chinese leaders had fully confirmed this estimate. The danger was between India and Pakistan, not between China and India. He knew the Indians had no intention of fighting, even if he was wrong about Chinese intentions. He accused the Indians of mounting a series of provocative incidents, citing the Indian pressure against the Dahagram enclave and "the increasing killings along the Kashmir cease fire line every day and every night." He said the Indian philosophy called for the expulsion of American presence and influence from the Sub-continent as soon as India could take care of Pakistan, and the US would see that its tooling up of the Indians would accelerate its own departure from this part of Asia. He pointed out that of the four large countries which come together in the northern part of the Sub-continent, Pakistan was the only one which naturally and logically welcomes American presence and American influence. Yet by taking the plunge in India, the US has deliberately alienated Pakistan and would in the end have nothing or less than nothing in return. He defined Indian known expansionist ambitions as extending from the Hindukush mountains in the west to Indo-China and Malaysia in the east. He predicted that the US would pay a heavy price in terms of its regional and global interests for feeding indirect expansionist ambitions. It was an American policy error of great magnitude, the full extent of which would be revealed only with the passage of time. 10. I told the President he knew the reasons we could not agree with him on the effects of our policy, and I did not go over that ground again. The President said the immediate bilateral and regional interests of Pakistan which the GOP considered vital to its national security and very existence would have to be reconciled with or worked into US global policy and global interests if the US wanted to preserve its position here. Pakistan could not accept a US position that the US global struggle against Communism must override everything else, if this meant making Pakistan a satellite of India. When I demurred at any suggestion that the US had any such thing in mind he said that he had been told by American official visitors that Pakistan's own security from India must be subordinated to global US interests, since "the US was in the business of fighting Communism." Ayub said, "We would be willing if necessary to be a satellite of the US if we remained secure from India, but we can never accept a relationship which would expose us to being a satellite of India." 11. After regretting the use of the term satellite in any such context, I returned to the topic of fraternization with Red China. I recalled the President's speech in Urdu to the Pakistan Armed Forces he reviewed on March 23. I told him that standing before Pakistan Army and Air Force entirely equipped with American arms and equipment intended for defense against the Communist threat, he had gone out of his way to extol Communist China. He had expressed confidence on the basis of his recent visit that China was peace loving and that the Pak forces had nothing to fear from that quarter. That speech had been made on the [garble--very day?] that the Chinese Communists had openly threatened to start another Korea-type of intervention in Vietnam. I asked him what he expected the American people to make of such a speech. I recalled that almost every newspaper, in both news columns and editorials, is frequently full of adulation to Chinese Communist policy and acts. There is equally enthusiastic abuse of the US, including excoriation of US employment of routine police gasses which do no organic harm and which are identical with what the police of Pakistan are using every week. A point had been reached where even the chairman of the Pakistan Red Cross, Mr. Wajid Ali, that very morning in the presence of both of us had found it necessary to insert praise of Communist China in his speech at the annual meeting. I said some of his assurances sounded soothing but the American people do not know how to take them when they look at the events. I mentioned a rapid fire succession of visits to Pakistan by ChiCom VIP's and growing exploitation of Pakistan contacts by ChiCom leaders for propaganda, tactical and prestige purposes. I mentioned the return of Chen Yi for a 5-day visit and the hurriedly arranged and seemingly triumphal re-visit of Chou En-lai, scheduled to arrive the next day with great fanfare. 12. I said that even if the Executive branch of the USG should be willing to set aside some of its misgivings for the time being and try to defend before the US Congress the appropriations request necessary to carry forward US programs in Pakistan. I didn't know how effective explanation or rationalization of current GOP foreign policy could be made, especially in the shadow of the deepening crisis fomented by Communist China in Southeast Asia. 13. President Ayub paused before he replied he could see that things looked worse than they really were. He recognized that the problem would need to be discussed when he went to Washington. 14. We had a pleasant exchange on President's preferences as to use of his free time while in US. This will follow in separate message. 15. Comments and assessment of conversation will follow by telegram near future. McConaughy
97. Telegram From the Department of State to Secretary of State Rusk in Tehran/1/ Washington, April 6, 1965, 7:55 p.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, India, Vol. IV, Cables, 12/64-6/65. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Drafted and initialed by Acting Secretary Ball. Tosec 13. For Secretary from Ball. At lunch today President took extremely strong stand on postponement of Ayub and Shastri visits. He feels that appearance of Ayub on April 26-27 and Shastri on June 2-3 would jeopardize passage foreign assistance legislation. Ayub's visit would focus attention on activities his Peiping and Moscow trips and recent unfortunate statements. Both would almost certainly feel compelled to make statements regarding Vietnamese problem that would cause trouble with press and in Congress. Ayub does not return from Moscow until April 11 so we have few days in which to consider how to best handle situation. Talk today was of sending Harriman to Pakistan to see Ayub and having Bunker talk with Shastri late next week in order to arrange postponement both visits. One difficulty is that President does not intend to delay Moro visit April 20-21 or visit of Wilson on April 15 and is still planning to invite Erhard again this spring. In addition Kenyatta has been asked to come in May and Park is also coming May 17-18. One possibility would be to postpone Ayub visit first but let Shastri visit stand at least for the time being. We could simply tell Ayub quietly that in view of his recent visits to Peiping and Moscow a visit to Washington at the present time could result only in confusion and would seriously jeopardize Pak foreign aid. This has some risks but at the same time asking Ayub quietly to postpone his visit might provide useful shock treatment since indications are he is being regularly advised by Aziz Ahmed and Bhutto that he can push US further without seriously endangering his foreign aid. On the other hand it may be better if we are going to postpone Ayub to try to postpone Shastri also. Personally, I doubt it but both solutions have their problems. I should greatly appreciate your advice as to what recommendation to make to the President. You may wish to have a private talk with Shoaib indicating the very real possibility that an Ayub visit at this time would not be healthy from the point of view of our aid program for Pakistan./2/ /2/ Rusk responded with a personal message for the President on April 8. He urged that any message to Ayub postponing his visit be deferred until after Ayub returned from the Soviet Union. Rusk stated that he planned to have a private talk with Shoaib and would discuss with him the difficulties posed by Ayub's impending visit to Washington. (Telegram Secto 20 from Tehran; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 7 PAK) President Johnson accepted Rusk's recommendation. (Telegram Tosec 43 to Tehran, April 8; ibid.) Ball
98. Telegram From Secretary of State Rusk to the Department of State/1/ Tehran, April 8, 1965, 11 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 7 PAK. Secret; Immediate; Eyes Only; Nodis. Secto 32. Eyes only President and Ball from Secretary. I had a very frank and private discussion with Pakistan Finance Minister Shoaib this afternoon about general state of our relations. Will be reporting full details later. I did, as though on my own responsibility, explore with him fully the dangers and disadvantages of an Ayub visit at this time. I explained both the complications with regard to the final stages of foreign aid legislation and the understandable preoccupation we have with South Viet Nam. I told him quite frankly I thought this was a very poor time for such a visit because Ayub might become embroiled in controversies which he would not relish and to which he could by inadvertence contribute. Shoaib's first reaction was one of considerable concern, for all of the obvious reasons. When I asked him directly however at the end of the conversation what the effect would be in Pakistan if the visit were postponed, he said that "it would not be too serious if it were made clear to President Ayub that Shastri's visit was also being postponed." He added that of course it would be entirely appropriate to inform Shastri that Ayub visit was off. I am not certain because of the very personal character of our conversation and the personal politics of Pakistan that Shoaib will report my conversation before Ayub returns to Pakistan. If he does, I am sure he will report it as expressions of my own concern rather than any decision already taken. I still believe that it is very important not to seek out Ayub in the Soviet Union with a request for postponement for reason I have already expressed. I do believe it would be advisable for the President to have a personal report from me on my talk with Shoaib as well as a fresh assessment of domestic and international political factors before the final button is pushed on postponement. My own assessment from this vantage point is that the President's Hopkins speech/2/ was a major contribution to international understanding of the American purpose in South Viet Nam. /2/Reference is to the speech President Johnson made at Johns Hopkins University on April 7 in which he expressed the readiness of the United States for unconditional discussions leading to a peaceful settlement in Vietnam. For text, see Department of State Bulletin, April 26, 1965, pp. 606-610. Rusk
99. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in India/1/ Washington, April 14, 1965, 10:02 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 7 PAK. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Drafted by Ball, cleared by McGeorge Bundy, and approved by Rusk. Repeated to Karachi. 2155. For Ambassador from the Secretary. Because of the delicate and pressing situation in Viet Nam the President feels strongly that both the Ayub and Shastri visits should be postponed. The President was looking forward to a fruitful talk with Shastri but he thinks it likely that early in June he will be preoccupied with Southeast Asia as well as with the legislative program that is likely to reach a crunch about that time. With these thoughts in mind he is reviewing his entire schedule to see how the load can be lightened. Thus he is planning to postpone a visit from Kenyatta as well as Ayub and Shastri. In view of the fact that the Ayub visit is scheduled to take place in less than a fortnight the President is sending a letter to Ayub/2/ that is being repeated to you. If you feel a Presidential letter to Shastri should follow up your initial approach such a letter can be sent. /2/See Document 100. I hope that you can approach Shastri in such a way as to lead him to feel that a postponement of his visit until fall is in the interests of India. In our view it would not be useful for him to come while the aid bill is pending in spite of the fact that the Indian attitude regarding South Viet Nam has been generally helpful. There are still substantial differences of emphasis between us regarding sensitive issues, including Southeast Asia, and Shastri would almost certainly find it necessary to make statements that could lead to adverse comment in the press and in Congress. You should also be aware that continuing failure of India and Pakistan to resolve their differences has been picked up and referred to most critically in executive sessions of congressional committees. I would appreciate it if you would coordinate your appointment with Shastri so that you and Ambassador McConaughy will be going in at approximately the same time. We are anxious to avoid having news of action in one capital reach the other before the appropriate approach has been made. You are of course at liberty to tell Shastri that we are suggesting to Ayub that his visit also be postponed. Rusk
100. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Pakistan/1/ Washington, April 14, 1965, 10:35 a.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Head of State Correspondence File, Pakistan, Vol. I, Pres. Ayub Correspondence, 12/15/63-12/31/65. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Drafted by Ball and Handley, cleared with McGeorge Bundy, and approved by Rusk. Repeated to New Delhi. 1145. For Ambassador McConaughy from Secretary. You should seek private appointment with Ayub soonest and deliver following message from President:/2/ /2/Rusk sent an accompanying personal message to McConaughy explaining that there was no give in the President's decision to postpone Ayub's visit. He encouraged McConaughy to stress to Ayub that the mood of Congress was such that his presence in Washington would seriously jeopardize foreign assistance for Pakistan. McConaughy was authorized to tell Ayub that Shastri's visit was also being postponed. (Telegram 1143 to Karachi, April 14; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 7 PAK) "Dear Mr. President: I need not tell you of the importance which the Government and the people of the United States have steadfastly attached to relationships between our two countries. These relationships have been good for both of us and strong enough to allow the frankest of discussions on matters where we do not share the same views. It was for this reason that I have been looking forward to your visit to Washington so that we might profit from our confidence in each other to discuss frankly our common problems and to chart our courses together for the troublesome months and years that lie ahead. The fact that you and I have both recently received unmistakably clear and strong mandates from our electorates to pursue our national and international goals has made this meeting seem even more opportune and desirable. What I now propose, therefore, comes only after the most serious reflection during the past few days and with our common interests foremost in mind. I have in fact reluctantly come to the view that this month is not a good time for the two of us to meet in Washington. Our foreign aid legislation is now before the Congress, and my years of political experience in Congress, as Vice President and President, have led me to the conclusion that your visit at this time would focus public attention on the differences between Pakistani and United States policy toward Communist China. This I fear might gravely affect our ability to assist your Government in the economic and defense programs on which you are embarked and would work against the shared interests of the United States and Pakistan. I cannot overstate the full depth of American feeling about Communist China. The mounting number of American casualties in South Vietnam is having a profound effect upon American opinion. This is being felt in Congress just at the time when our foreign aid legislation is at the most sensitive point in the legislative cycle. Under these circumstances I think it would be in the interests of both our countries and contribute to the assurance of close and mutually helpful relations between us if we could postpone our meeting until later this year--perhaps early in the fall. Certainly there is much for us to talk about when we do meet. While some of our [your?] policies have caused concern to us, our mutual interests unquestionably outweigh our differences. For my part, I shall continue to seek the most friendly and constructive alliance relationship with you and your country. I shall, therefore, look forward to a full, frank and friendly discussion, but I do think it can be more profitable in a few months than at the moment. I would appreciate your judgment on this matter and I would be guided by your thoughts as to how a postponement can best be worked out with a minimum of awkwardness on both sides." Rusk
101. Telegram From the White House to the Embassy in India/1/ Washington, April 15, 1965, 5:30 p.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, India, Exchanges with Bowles. Secret; Immediate. [text not declassified] Drafted by Komer. The fourth and fifth paragraphs of the telegram were revised by hand by Bundy. The final paragraph was revised and expanded by Komer. CAP 65102. Eyes Only for Bowles from Bundy. President and all rest of us here can well understand your distress at Shastri postponement,/2/ but I can assure you that this decision taken with best interests India as well as US thoroughly in mind. It is not to be construed as merely a conditioned reflex to decision disinvite Ayub. /2/Bowles reacted to the instruction to inform Shastri that his visit to Washington was being postponed in a telegram for the President and the Secretary in which he emphasized the consequences he felt would follow. He wrote of the "profound shock and resentment which will be felt by Shastri personally and which will be reflected throughout GOI and in press if he is disinvited under these conditions." Given Ayub's recent dealings with China, Bowles could appreciate the reasons for postponing Ayub's visit, but he felt that if the objective was to be tough with Ayub there was all the more reason to encourage Shastri's visit. Canceling both visits, he concluded, would be viewed in India as appeasement of Pakistan and an affront to India. (Telegram 2920 from New Delhi, April 15; ibid., Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. 10, April 15-May 31, 1965) In point of fact USG, with Vietnam and host of other problems on its plate over next few months, and with aid bill having rocky passage through Congress, is in no position talk turkey with Shastri just now. Nor for that matter does Shastri seem from here to be as yet in any position to say much to us. So rather than have merely a polite get-together with neither party yet ready for constructive palaver, the President prefers that we both do our homework and get aid bill passed first. You should know that President feels deeply a Shastri visit here could focus unwelcome attention on the fact that we're spending biggest single chunk of our aid money on an enterprise which isn't going anywhere fast. Add to this the risk of undue focus on the fact that our two largest clients don't seem able to live on the same continent with each other without constant bickering. Regardless of the causes, this doesn't go down well here. It also makes the time most unpropitious for those here who feel that US interests dictate consideration of a package of major help for India in return for some quite far-reaching understandings with respect to: (a) non-proliferation; (b) more sensible economic policies; and (c) movement toward Pak/Indian reconciliation. As we see it, Indians are not ready to talk sensibly about this yet. So larger interests, as well as immediate problems, argue for accepting any short term affront to Indian amour propre in the interest of a more productive visit later. Am sure you see this loud and clear. Thus our chore at this point is to find ways and means of softening the blow. Very much will also depend on your own ability to say convincingly that postponement must not be read as any more than what it is--a feeling on the President's own part plus that of all his advisers that the time would simply be riper in the fall. In short, the President says he respects your understanding of the Indians but wants you to respect his understanding of the Congress. Good luck./3/ /3/Rusk reinforced this message with a personal cable to Bowles the same day emphasizing that it was important for Bowles to see Shastri with news of the postponement in coordination with McConaughy's approach to Ayub, lest the Indian Government receive the news indirectly. (Telegram 2161 to New Delhi, April 15; ibid.)
102. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in India/1/ Washington, April 15, 1965, 8:57 p.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, India, Vol. IV, Cables, 12/64-6/65. Secret; Flash; Nodis. Drafted by Schneider; cleared by Handley, Rusk (substance), and McGeorge Bundy; and approved by Blaine C. Tueller (S/S). Repeated to Karachi. 2162. As indicated in immediately preceding instructions,/2/ there follows Presidential message to Shastri which you may deliver in your discretion: /2/See footnote 3, Document 101. Dear Mr. Prime Minister: You know how much I have been looking forward to your visit here as an opportunity for the two of us to share our thoughts on the efforts we are making to give our peoples a better life. As the date approaches, I have realized that circumstances have combined to deprive us of the atmosphere in which we could most profitably do this. The Viet-Nam crisis has focused the attentions of my Government, as I am sure it has yours, on immediate issues related to our security in the Far East. Ambassador Lodge will give you my views on this and I hope you will speak to him most frankly regarding yours. Furthermore, the future of the United States aid program has been called into question in the Congress, and the coming weeks promise to be ones of intense debate. In these circumstances the long-term interests of our two countries, and our ability to pursue them jointly, would be better served in my judgment if you came in the fall after the Congress has adjourned than in June. I have, therefore, reluctantly come to the conclusion that the next month or two would not be right time for us to exchange thoughts on our long-range plans and aspirations. I hope that you will not find it too inconvenient to defer your visit here until early this fall. Our countries have long been closely associated in many common endeavors. In this association I believe we have developed the confidence in each other which allows me to suggest a new time for us to meet. With warm regards. Sincerely, Lyndon B. Johnson Rusk [Continue with the next documents]
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