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FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1964-1968, Volume XXV South Asia
Department of State |
103. Telegram From the Embassy Office in Pakistan to the Department of State/1/ Rawalpindi, April 15, 1965. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 7 PAK. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Repeated to Karachi and New Delhi. No time of transmission is on the telegram; it was received at 4:06 p.m. 37. For the Secretary from McConaughy. Deptel 1143 to Karachi./2/ I had 50-minute meeting with President Ayub in Rawalpindi beginning at 6:30 this evening. FonSec Aziz Ahmed only other person present. I set forth President's reasons for suggesting postponement of visit in non-abrasive terms, indicating his belief that such action was in best interests of Pakistan. I informed Ayub that corresponding postponement suggestion being made to Shastri. I presented President's letter of April 14/3/ which President read carefully in my presence. /2/See footnote 2, Document 100. /3/See Document 100. I affirmed that suggestion for postponement was not a cancellation and that President would want visit rescheduled when time was opportune. President took the postponement suggestions well and responded in amicable vain, although he seemed slightly taken aback. He did not give any evidence of having had any forewarning from Shoaib or any other source. President said that he would never wish to take any action which might embarrass the President or complicate his grave problems in this serious hour. He would want to accommodate to any viewpoint of the President on the projected visit and he could understand how criticism could be arising in the Congress and with the US public. He stated that of course he would agree to the postponement of the visit. At the same time he wanted to express his disappointment that he would not have the opportunity of consulting and exchanging views with the President his assessment of the Chinese Communist and Soviet attitudes toward the United States, especially in relation to Southeast Asia, based on his recent visits. President good-naturally reminded me that he had not suggested April date for visit, and that this date had been put to him as the time most convenient to President Johnson. He said he had then adjusted his tight schedule with some difficulty to meet what he understood were the preferences of the USG. However, he recognized that circumstances could change and he knew that the current problems of the United States administration with Congress as well as in other respects had to be reckoned with. While President's acceptance of postponement was unconditional he clearly attached considerable weight to the parallel postponement suggestion to Shastri. This was saving element in our presentation. Prompted somewhat by Aziz Ahmed, he said that he would like for announcement of postponement his visit to be timed to coincide with release of news of Shastri postponement. He suggested that I work with FonSec Aziz Ahmed on phraseology of postponement announcement, which he thought might be issued jointly. He did not seem unduly concerned about explanation of postponement, indicating only that he thought it could be plausibly attributed to heavy preoccupations of President Johnson with Southeast Asia and other issues, both foreign and domestic. He would like announcement to emphasize that action was more postponement, with hope expressed that meeting could take place later in 1965./4/ /4/President Johnson issued a statement on April 16 from Johnson City, Texas, indicating that because of the situation in Vietnam and the press of business in Congress he had to reduce his schedule and postpone a number of visits to Washington by foreign leaders. He noted that President Ayub and Prime Minister Shastri had graciously agreed to postpone their visits. (Telegram 1158 to Karachi, April 16; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 7 INDIA) President said that he had tried to do all he could in general cause, both in Peking and Moscow. While his success was limited, he believed he had made a reasonably effective exposition of positions opposed to the Communists, and had gained a fairly revealing insight into Chinese and Soviet attitudes and approaches to current critical issues, which could be of some background value to US./5/ /5/McConaughy reported in more detail about Ayub's discussion of his trip to the Soviet Union in telegram 1970 from Karachi, April 17. (Ibid., POL 7 PAK) FonSec Aziz Ahmed is to take up draft postponement announcement with me as soon as word is received that Shastri also has agreed to postponement. I would welcome Department's proposed text of announcement by return cable. Brief general conversation with Ayub unrelated to foregoing will be reported separately tomorrow./6/ /6/McConaughy also reported that during his April 15 conversation with Ayub, he had expressed strong concern over the succession of inflammatory incidents which had recently been exacerbating relations between Pakistan and India. He pointed in particular to the fighting which had developed in the Rann of Kutch. Ayub assured him that Pakistani soldiers had not gone beyond and did not intend to go beyond their traditional patrol routes in the disputed area. (Telegram 1971 from Karachi, April 18; ibid., POL 32-1 INDIA-PAK) McConaughy
104. Telgram From the Embassy in India to the Department of State/1/ New Delhi, April 16, 1965, 0812Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 7 INDIA. Secret; Flash; Limdis. Repeated to Karachi and passed to White House. 2932. Deptels 2161,/2/ 2165,/3/ Rawalpindi's 37/4/ to Dept. Since PriMin Shastri is out of town until Sunday evening I delivered President's letter to L. K. Jha. I also noted that postponement of Shastri and Ayub visit has leaked in Washington. /2/See footnote 3, Document 101. /3/In telegram 2165 to New Delhi, repeated to Karachi as telegram 1152, April 15, the Department warned that news of the postponement of the Ayub and Shastri visits was leaking in Washington. It was therefore "imperative" for both countries to agree quickly upon press statements relating to the postponements. The Department transmitted proposed drafts to be used as models. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 7 PAK) /4/Document 103. Jha read letter and expressed his disappointment and concern. His concern was compounded as we assumed it would be by linking of withdrawal of Ayub Khan invitation with that of Shastri. I stressed that only reason why two actions appeared to be coupled was that both visits happened to fall in same time span and President found it essential to clear his schedule because of crisis in Southeast Asia. Indeed all engagements that did not deal directly with urgent domestic questions or Southeast Asia were being simultaneously cancelled or postponed. Jha replied that he could readily understand pressures to which President referred. However fact that Ayub Khan and Shastri visit were being cancelled simultaneously would surely lead to feeling within India and abroad that Shastri, who was opposing Chinese both militarily and politically, has been linked with Ayub Khan who has been cooperating with Chinese, and that Americans are indifferent to this distinction. Misunderstanding in India will be compounded by leak to which I referred and fact that Paks armed with American weapons are pressing in Kutch border area will lead further to confusion. I admitted that there are bound to be some misunderstandings and confusion in press. However it is our task to minimize this confusion and to make sure that postponement which I believe to be wise under circumstances did not lead to unnecessary difficulties for all of us. Although President and administration understood India's unaligned position, fact of matter was the GOI had often mishandled its public relations in such way as to create misunderstandings and in some cases resentment. For instance, we knew Indians had worked most effectively behind scenes in regard to Southeast Asia situation at Belgrade and elsewhere and we were hopeful that they would continue to do so. However their failure publicly to recognize that we are in fact fighting their battles as well as our own creates a sense of disappointment. In that regard I was hopeful that PriMin would be able to make strong case in Moscow for more forthcoming Soviet position in support of some form of Johnson plan. Jha picked up my reference to Moscow by stating that PriMin had always linked Moscow and US visits together and had deliberately arranged to go to Moscow before going to Washington so he could report to President progress that he had hoped to make there. Under present conditions Jha felt sure PriMin would wish he were not going to Moscow. We then turned to problem of how best to handle situation here in India. Jha said he would get PriMin on telephone in next few hours. We agreed to coordinate with GOI as best we could press handling both in Washington and here in India. Admittedly leak had created serious difficulties for us all but we would do our best to ease problems for both govts. Jha particularly asked USG hold its announcement until he has talked to Shastri./5/ /5/After a telephone call to Shastri, Jha reported to Bowles that Shastri was deeply disappointed. Jha indicated that the Indian Government would issue a press release stating that the postponement was agreed upon as a result of President Johnson's heavy schedule, and that there would be further discussions concerning rescheduling the visit. (Telegram 2934 from New Delhi, April 16; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 7 INDIA) In Washington, Rusk called in Ambassador Nehru, gave him a copy of the letter to Shastri, and explained the reasons for the postponement. Nehru's reaction was that postponement of the visit on such short notice was "an act of discourtesy" certain to cause resentment in New Delhi. (Telegram 2175 to New Delhi, April 17; ibid.) Bowles
105. Telegram From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State/1/ Karachi, April 21, 1965. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, DEF 15 PAK-US. Secret; Priority; [classification designator not declassified]. No time of transmission is given on the telegram, which was received at 3:39 p.m. 1995. 1. When I saw Foreign Secretary Aziz Ahmed April 19 (Embassy telegram 1981)/2/ he said he wanted to mention off the record another matter, namely "US communications installations." He had five requests to make, enumerated below. /2/McConaughy's meeting with Ahmed on April 19 was devoted in large part to a discussion of Ayub's visit to the Soviet Union. (Telegram 1981 from Karachi, April 19; ibid., POL 7 PAK) (A) He wanted full statement from me in near future as to recent, current and prospective expansion of facilities at Peshawar installation. He said this report should cover both equipment and buildings. Said he had studied 1959 agreement and realized that expansion now taking place did not contravene "letter" of agreement since area not being expanded. However, GOP felt that any additional buildings or equipment not authorized by it violated the "spirit" of the agreement, especially since we had sought and failed to obtain President Ayub's agreement to certain expansion proposals some time back. (B) He wanted information as to when we could close down the "three smaller installations" (not otherwise identified, but obviously referring to [2 lines of source text not declassified]). He said if we were not prepared to close them down soon, GOP would want explanation as to why they could not be closed down and would have to insist on negotiation of agreements to provide for their continued operation. He said the three facilities appeared not to be covered by any written agreements at present, and GOP understood they had been installed as "ad hoc" arrangements for short term period. He said GOP was not well informed about functions of these units and would like better access. I commented that we had not considered installations to be on ad hoc or temporary basis but rather for indefinite period. I noted that [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] had full access, and had personally inspected some or all of them, as I recalled it. I asked if he was suggesting blanketing of small installations under 1959 Peshawar agreement. He said if small installations could not be closed in near future GOP would expect separate agreements to be negotiated for each. He did not refer to 1964 discussion of "regularization" of status these units [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. (C) [10 lines of source text not declassified] (D) He wanted full and unlimited access to every sector Peshawar installation granted for a [1 line of source text not declassified]. While he was vague I gather he was asking for blanket clearance for any person who might be designated by [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] to inspect on his behalf at any time, and not necessarily the individual who has the official title of [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. (E) He wanted us to exclude from Peshawar installation any naturalized American citizen of Indian origin. He complained strongly about a naturalized non-commissioned officer of American Air Force named Singh, formerly stationed at Peshawar, who he said had returned occasionally for unexplained visits and had also visited India after his Peshawar trips. He said there was "another Sikh" with American papers who also had visited the installation and who was a source of concern to Pak intelligence. 2. I was noncommittal with Aziz Ahmed, only stating that I would be in touch with him later as to the general subject. I questioned his invocation of "spirit" as a workable basis for interpretation of the explicit provision of an international agreement. 3. When I saw Finance Minister Shoaib privately on April 20 I made guarded reference to Aziz Ahmed's attempt to intrude the Foreign Office into this delicate intelligence field. Shoaib confirmed my surmise that nothing transpired during Moscow visit which would seem to jeopardize existence of our facilities and that Aziz Ahmed probably was free-wheeling to some extent in an effort to make trouble for us. (It would be a major coup for Aziz Ahmed if he could seize complete control of negotiations and operations in this field [less than 1 line of source text not declassified], capitalizing on continued Russian diplomatic pressure and threats, and on undoubted desire of President and entire GOP to get maximum mileage out of their cards.) Shoaib advised me strongly to resist Pak Foreign Office intrusion into this subject if I possibly could, since it would at a minimum greatly complicate our difficulties. But he did not know offhand the best means of handling this tough, tactical problem. 4. I expect to transmit further thoughts and recommendations when I have considered matter further and examined it more completely with Shaffter. Meanwhile, I request Hughes to inform Secretary, [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. 5. I plan to request renewal of my consultation orders near future and this will be one of major subjects I will expect to take up in Washington, hopefully early May. McConaughy
106. Telegram From the Embassy in India to the Department of State/1/ New Delhi, April 21, 1965. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 7 INDIA. Secret; Priority; Limdis. Repeated to the White House. No time of transmission is on the telegram; it was received at 4:15 a.m. 2970. Tuesday/2/ evening at 9 PM I met for one and half hours with PriMin Shastri who was accompanied by L. K. Jha. Mrs. Pandit had warned me earlier in evening that PriMin was deeply and personally offended but I was unprepared for painful and difficult discussion which followed. /2/April 20. I opened exchange by emphasizing President's, Secretary's and my own deep regret that visit had not gone through on schedule and by expressing hope that postponement which President had suggested would not create too many difficulties for him. I then filled in silence that followed with description of massive pressures on President generated by Vietnam crisis, adding that charges which would have been leveled at India by Ayub Khan during his Washington visit however unjust would have created difficulties for all of us, especially in light of delicacy of legislative situation, etc. After further silence Shastri responded with stream of comments which reflected profound sense of personal hurt. These comments included following: He had been personally embarrassed before his country, his party and world at time when India had been striving diligently to cooperate with us in bringing peace to South Vietnam; if President had wanted to postpone or cancel visit he would have been glad to cooperate and why was he not given opportunity to withdraw his acceptance with dignity. His capacity to influence events for India in Moscow, Algiers and Commonwealth had been greatly diminished, while in India extreme left would accuse him of having been too subservient to US while extreme right would say he had not been subservient enough. Manner in which invitation had been cancelled indicated deep psychological gap between India and US which he was afraid could never be bridged. He in any case was at loss to know how mutual confidence could be restored. For instance, if US gives India aid under present circumstances it would be said we were attempting to buy her good will and if we refuse her assistance it would be said that [we?] were punishing India for failure to follow American line. Although PriMin listened politely to my rebuttal in which I touched on our strong support for India's fight for freedom when he, Gandhi and Nehru were in prison, our encouragement to India in days of her constitution building, our willingness to provide substantial economic aid even through difficult Krishna Menon era without political strings, etc. I can't say that I accomplished much. However illogical and unreasonable Shastri's reactions may appear in Washington it is essential that we understand that we are now dealing with deeply hurt man. Under normal circumstances he is sensitive person, often unsure of himself, but he has been striving for a more affirmative foreign policy role which he had felt, according to Jha, was almost within his grasp. In India I am afraid we are in for some difficult times and it will be some months before situation is back where it was ten days ago. Best thing we can do is quietly to go about our business and resist temptation publicly to trade criticisms or to create new grounds for debate. Present situation is most serious I have encountered in my many years in dealing with Indian people and government. However, it is vitally important that we remember that a strong common ground between Indians and ourselves has been built up over years. Although it may be dented and scarred it will not disappear overnight./3/ /3/Bowles sent another cable to Washington on April 21, for Rusk and McNamara, in which he stated that he felt the atmosphere in New Delhi could be improved if he were authorized to tell Shastri and Chavan privately that the response to the Indian request for F-5 fighters was favorable, and that an announcement to that effect would be made at a time mutually satisfactory to the two governments. (Telegram 2978 from New Delhi; Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, India, Vol. IV, Cables, 12/64-6/65) Bowles
107. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Read) to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)/1/ Washington, April 24, 1965. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, India, Vol. IV, Memos & Miscellaneous, 12/64-6/65. Secret. SUBJECT Enclosed is a memorandum surveying the background and implications of developments in the Rann of Kutch. The highlights are: --Indo-Pak border negotiations in 1960 could not sort out the conflicting claims in this sector of the border, but both countries acknowledged that there was a dispute. --Hard evidence on what is actually taking place is limited. The present train of events began in January of this year when Indian patrols discovered that Pakistani posts had been established in area claimed by India. --The terrain gives Pakistan a military advantage which it appears to have exploited in the escalating series of incidents that have occurred in recent weeks. --Regular military units have recently been deployed by both sides. --Pakistan is bringing in troops from MAP-supported units. --There is danger that the fighting will intensify and spread. --The dispute has assumed major political significance in both Delhi and Rawalpindi, and has serious implications for our policies and programs in the subcontinent. Both parties are seeking to draw us into an emotion-laden dispute at a difficult time in our relationships with both countries. Benjamin H. Read/2/ /2/Another member of the Secretariat signed for Read above his typed signature in an illegible hand.
Enclosure/3/ /3/Secret; Noforn. RANN OF KUTCH DISPUTE Background The area in dispute, extending out from the old fort of Kanjarkot, lies on the northern edge of the Rann of Kutch, a desolate area in Western India on the Arabian Sea. It is alternately salt flats and tidal basin. (The inundation lasts from June to November.) The area was admitted by both sides to be in dispute at the time of the Indo-Pakistani border negotiations of 1960. It was agreed at that time that further discussions would be held to explore the validity of the conflicting claims, but so far as we know these have not taken place. The current difficulties apparently began in January 1965, when the Indians became aware that Pakistani border police were patrolling below the Indian claim line. India lodged a protest and increased its own patrolling activity. In mid-February, Pakistani forces dug themselves in around Kanjarkot, which may have been previously unoccupied, although Ayub claims that Pakistan had "long" occupied it. Both sides have since built up the forces available to them in the area, manned strong points, and shifted defense responsibility from border units to the army. During April, a series of incidents has occurred with both sides blaming the other. The Pakistanis, enjoying a militarily superior position, have moved forcefully against Indian outposts near the border fort of Kanjarkot and most recently staged a "preemptive" attack at Biar Bet, deeper within the disputed area. The Indians have been mainly on the defensive but, according to Pakistan, have established outposts within undisputed Pakistani territory. Both sides allege that the other has employed armor. The Indians have denied the charge and we have no evidence to support it. Although firm proof is lacking, there are reports supporting the Indian claim that Pakistan has moved armor to the Kutch area and that it may be engaged in action. The unit concerned, according to Embassy Karachi, is MAP-equipped. Casualties have been reported by both sides, shooting continues between patrols and strong points, and public opinion--especially in India--has been aroused sharply. Pakistani patrolling south of Kanjarkot may have been going on for quite some time without the Indians knowing it. There is little doubt, however, that Pakistani occupation of Kanjarkot would have upset a long-standing status quo. The Indian response of occupying other posts near the frontier and, reportedly, building an airstrip nearby brought the latent crisis to a head. It will probably not be possible to determine who began firing, and since the area involved is legitimately in dispute between Pakistan and India, it is difficult to ascertain that either side committed aggression against the territory of the other. (All action thus far has, however, been much closer to the Indian claim line than to that of Pakistan.) Both sides have engaged in sparring over negotiations to ameliorate the situation. The Indians accepted a Pakistani ceasefire offer on April 15, but it has never been implemented. The Pakistanis demand a demilitarization of the entire disputed area as a precondition to talks, and the Indians would require a restoration of the status quo ante, including Pakistani withdrawal from Kanjarkot. Pakistan claims that Kanjarkot is not within the disputed area and India would be understandably loath to evacuate all the way down to the 24th parallel, so the prospects for a ceasefire and negotiations are dim. Political Implications a) India: In an atmosphere colored by India's military humiliation by the Chinese in 1962, strong public resentment over Pakistan's developing relationship with Peiping and the hurt feelings over the postponement of Shastri's visit, the already beleaguered GOI cannot afford domestically to be gotten the better of by Pakistan in a military confrontation. The Indian Foreign Secretary has told our DCM that "the country is in no mood to take any more pushing in the Rann of Kutch and the GOI may be constrained to retaliate elsewhere, where conditions are more favorable to Indian forces". The GOI's domestic political discomfort is increased by aspects of the Kutch dispute which are analogous to the pre-1962 situation in Ladakh--e.g. the belated discovery by Indian patrols of foreign military posts in a neglected area of Indian-claimed territory. Even before the activization of the Kutch dispute, the moderate Shastri government proved to be most vulnerable politically to charges of weakness and indecision. Pakistan's apparent utilization of U.S.-supplied MAP equipment in the dispute further complicates the situation domestically for the GOI by providing additional grounds for criticism to extremists of both the left and right who can exploit traditional Indian resentments over U.S.-Pakistan security agreements of the 1950's and India's acceptance in 1962 of more rigid constraints on the use of U.S. military equipment. b) Pakistan: The Kutch dispute, occurring in an area of Pak military superiority, provides the GOP with several opportunities. Diplomatically, it provides Pakistan an opportunity to damage Indo-U.S. relations, through the use of MAP equipment in a situation where there is some ambiguity over the justification of its use. Additionally, the Kutch dispute provides Pakistan, in the weeks just before Bandung II, with an opportunity to brand India as an aggressor in Afro-Asian eyes. This objective will be further advanced if Pak actions in Kutch cause India to retaliate elsewhere, especially if India should move into an area generally recognized as Pak territory. Domestically, the Kutch confrontation enables the GOP to score over India, despite India's overall military superiority, particularly in Kashmir and along the East Pak border. Finally, Pakistan undoubtedly calculates that India's response to the Kutch situation will lend a plausibility to the basic Pak contention that India would use its military strength enhanced by our military assistance to intimidate Pakistan and stick to an intransigent policy on Kashmir, rather than in combatting Communist China. c) United States: The fighting in Kutch, particularly Pakistan's probable use of MAP equipment, has propelled us once more into the center of a subcontinental dispute at a moment when our leverage in both countries is at a low point. Our relations with India, already exacerbated by the postponement of Shastri's visit, will be further strained by public charges of Pakistan's use of MAP equipment. Moreover, our problems with the GOI will be complicated by the fact that we have imposed more stringent conditions on Indian use of MAP equipment (i.e. only against Communist China) than the conditions imposed on Pakistan. This discrepancy may assume exaggerated significance in view of the fact that the Soviets have imposed no conditions whatsoever on use of the military assistance they have supplied India. This complicating aspect of the situation may be highlighted by Shastri's imminent departure for Moscow in an atmosphere of resentment over the postponement of his visit to the United States. In recent years, India's preoccupation with the China threat has led the GOI to rely heavily on our ability to restrain Pakistan whenever Indo-Pak tensions have threatened to get out of hand. In the present situations, the Indians have indicated they would like help in promoting a ceasefire.
108. Telegram From the Embassy in India to the Department of State/1/ New Delhi, April 24, 1965, 1305Z. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, India, Vol. IV, Cables, 12/64-6/65. Secret; Immediate. Repeated to DOD for DIA, CINCMEAFSA, Karachi, and London, and passed to the White House. 3018. References Embtels 3015,/2/ 3016./3/ DCM called on Foreign Secretary Jha afternoon April 24 to solicit facts and statement of GOI policy into which Chaudhury's presentation fits. Jha's comments boiled down to effort to place on U.S. onus for restraining further Pak "aggression." He also seemed to be fishing for offer of good offices in getting cease-fire and talks. Finally, it apparent that all or most of this will be in tomorrow morning's papers. /2/In telegram 3015 from New Delhi, April 24, the Embassy reported that the Chief of the Indian Army Staff, General J.N. Chadhury, had requested U.S. assistance in restraining the escalation of what he described as an attack by Pakistani tanks of U.S. origin supported by infantry in the Rann of Kutch. (Ibid.) /3/Telegram 3016 from New Delhi, April 24, reported on Chadhury's request in greater detail. Chadhury said that he had irrefutable evidence that the tanks being used in the Pakistani attack were of U.S. origin. It was his understanding, he said, that the United States had promised to intervene if either India or Pakistan used MAP equipment against the other. (Ibid.) Efforts to illuminate facts added little to previous knowledge and Chaudhury's presentation. Tank attack had occurred at 7 A.M. this morning and in Jha's view fits into growing pattern of Pak aggressiveness. This is compounded by fact attack took place while GOP was presumably awaiting GOI response to latest formulation of proposal for cease-fire. Jha several times used the phrases "grave situation" and "general war," saying in latter connection that the country is in no mood to take any more pushing around in Rann of Kutch and Government of India may be constrained retaliate elsewhere, where conditions more favorable to Indian forces. He said this has not been decided by GOI. Jha summarized exchanges between himself and Pak High Commissioner over last several weeks on cease-fire and talks. He said he thought both GOP and GOI had agreed on desirability of cease-fire and that problem arises over search for agreed formulation. Jha gave DCM text which he said has been given to GOP and remains GOI position: "1. There should be a cease-fire effective from (date to be agreed); "2. Immediately thereafter, there should be an official level meeting to determine the status quo ante which should be restored; and "3. Thereafter, there should be a high level meeting to discuss the Kutch-Sind border question. "Both governments have assured each other of their sincere desire and determination to find a peaceful solution to the Kutch-Sind border problem and to avoid the use of force." Latest Pak proposal he described as serious retrogression even from previous Pak proposals, and supplied text as follows: "1. There should be a cease-fire effective from (date); "2. Immediately thereafter the armed forces of both India and Pakistan whether civil or military shall be completely withdrawn from the disputed territory namely the area which extends from a line running south of Kanjarkot to the disputed Sind-Kutch boundary which runs roughly along 24 degree latitude; "3. Thereafter there should be a high level meeting to resolve the dispute relating to the above-mentioned territory. "Both governments have expressed their desire to reach an early settlement of this dispute through peaceful means." Jha said that although there may be something to talk about in respect of precise location of boundary, and small disputed area "around Kanjarkot," it is quite intolerable to identify disputed territory as reaching to 24th parallel in ground rules for talks. He would be telling Pak High Commissioner so immediately following this conversation. DCM deplored possibility of escalation hostilities and repeated importance of getting cease-fire. Jha continued insist there is no doubt who is aggressor and reiterated it should be matter of deep concern to USG that GOP is using U.S. weapons in face of Eisenhower-Nehru and subsequent assurances to GOI. Leaving aside question of weapons, DCM stuck to importance of cease-fire and, speaking entirely personally, wondered whether it would help any if friend or friends of India and Pakistan were publicly to call on both to cease-fire. Jha said he had been trying to demonstrate that GOI wants cease-fire and he hopes GOP does too. He also threw out point about good offices, making clear, however, that these should not go to substance of dispute (e.g., mediation or arbitration) but only to getting agreed formula for talk. He clearly did not think GOP is receptive to this sort of proposition. In fact, at one point, elaborating on dangers of "general war," he speculated that GOP and Chicoms are in collusion to try provoke GOI. DCM said this was a grave accusation, or better hypothesis, to which Jha replied "accusation" would do. In reply DCM query whether GOI would be turning to United Nations, Jha disparaged capacity of UN to do anything constructive in this situation. Conversation concluded with Jha's assertion that one cannot keep out of the press either the "fact" that U.S. tanks have been used by Paks or that GOI has brought USG into this issue. Comments follow./4/ /4/In the comments that followed in telegram 3019 from New Delhi, April 24, the Embassy concluded that unless the United States could disprove that U.S. equipment was being used in the Pakistani attack, the Indian Government and populace would expect the United States to take effective action to stop such use. (Ibid.) Bowles
109. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Pakistan/1/ Washington, April 24, 1965, 9 a.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Pakistan, Vol. III, Cables, 12/64-7/65. Secret; Immediate. Drafted by Laingen and Laise, cleared in substance by Stoddard in DOD/ISA, and approved by Handley. Also sent to New Delhi as telegram 2222, and repeated to CINCMEAFSA and London. 1195. Delhi's 3015 repeated Karachi 628./2/ Since Paks have already confirmed to us that their forces have attacked in Biar Bet area and that this well within disputed area (Karachi's 2003 repeated Delhi 699),/3/ and since you report that these are MAP supplied forces, you should seek appointment soonest with Forn Minister or Forn Secretary to express our strong concern over what appears be worsening situation Rann of Kutch. You should recall assurances given you by Ayub (Karachi's 1971 repeated Delhi 687)/4/ that Paks had not and did not intend to go beyond traditional patrol routes in disputed areas and that Pak forces would not use any more force than necessary to repel force resorted to by Indian side. Moreover Ayub recognized something had to be done to relieve worsening situation and that Pakistan shared responsibility for this. Pak action confirmed by MFA Director Akhund would appear inconsistent with these assurances and we must now ask what Pak intentions are. /2/See footnote 2, Document 108. /3/Dated April 22. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 32-1 INDIA-PAK) /4/See footnote 6, Document 103. In making representations you should cite accusation re use of MAP equipment made by General Chaudhri and seek confirmation./5/ Since we assume there little doubt that accusations well founded, believe you should sound warning that use of our MAP equipment in this type of situation could jeopardize MAP program. /5/In telegram 2015 from Karachi, April 25, the Embassy reported that a Defense Ministry spokesman had emphatically denied the Indian allegations. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Pakistan, Vol. III, Cables, 12/64-7/65) You should also say that we are expressing our strong concern over Kutch situation to Indians. For Delhi: In whatever followup steps Embassy takes with MEA noted reftel, assume Ambassador will register our increasing concern. Ambassador should inform MEA we are making representations to GOP. Agree with Delhi on importance of coordinating closely with British, who we would hope also bringing their influence to bear on both parties. Rusk
110. Memorandum From Robert Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)/1/ Washington, April 26, 1965. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Pakistan, Vol. III, 12/64-7/65. Secret. Mac-- This Rann of Kutch business could build up to a real mess. To oversimplify, the Paks found a good new place to lean on Indians--one where the terrain favored Pak side. The Indians reacted with their usual ineptitude, but at any rate both sides have built up to 6-7000 men and the Paks hold the forward position in the disputed area. What worries State is that Indians are building up to a binge. They are determined not to let the Paks of all people get away with a Ladakh-type humiliation. So there's a strong chance of Indian retaliation elsewhere, where the odds favor them more. If this occurs, who knows what will happen. An Indian deputy foreign minister told the new UK High Commissioner, Freeman, that it might mean a major Pak/Indian war./2/ /2/In response to news reports that Pakistan had ordered the mobilization of its armed forces, the Department of State sent instructions to Karachi and New Delhi on April 25 to approach the governments and counsel restraint. (Telegram 1201 to Karachi, also sent to New Delhi as telegram 2228; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 32-1 INDIA-PAK) We're hesitant to weigh in too hard because neither Paks nor Indians are very friendly to us at the moment. Ergo, I'm plugging for UK,/3/ Commonwealth, and UN admonitory noises with us in a supporting role. If things take a turn for the worse, however, we may have to buy a share. /3/On April 27 Komer sent a note to Bundy to report that British Prime Minister Wilson had weighed in personally with Ayub and Shastri and proposed a cease-fire. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Pakistan, Vol. III, Memos, 12/64-7/65) The British démarche was reported in telegram 2033 from Karachi, April 27, and in telegram 3069 from New Delhi, April 28. (Ibid., Cables, 12/64-7/65; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 32-1 INDIA-PAK) RWK
111. Telegram From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State/1/ Karachi, April 27, 1965, 1530Z. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Pakistan, Vol. III, Cables, 12/64-7/65. Secret; Immediate; Limdis. Repeated to New Delhi and CINCMEAFSA for POLAD, and passed to the White House, DOD, and CIA at 1:50 p.m. 2040. Embtel 2039./2/ /2/In telegram 2039 from Karachi, April 27, McConaughy reported on a conversation with Foreign Secretary Aziz Ahmed in which Ahmed told him that India rejected Pakistan's proposal for a cease-fire. Ahmed said that in light of the Indian rejection, Pakistani forces in the Rann of Kutch would have to "stay put." (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 32-1 INDIA-PAK) 1. Events relating to Rann of Kutch clash seem to be propelling us toward milestone in US relations with Pakistan and India. Thanks to needlessly belligerent and self-centered actions of both countries, not only are we faced with a major crisis in Indo-Pak relations, but major crises in US-Indian and US-Pak relations. Immediate issues are of course fighting in Rann of Kutch and use of MAP equipment there by Paks. But, in fact, much broader issues involving our position on Subcontinent are actually at stake. Rann of Kutch has made it clear that US and UK cannot safely remain aloof from intramural Indo-Pak disputes although they are not of our making. US assistance is significant factor in enhanced military capabilities of both countries. In case of Pakistan five and one-half of its seven and one-half divisions are MAP supported. In the case of India, US military aid and US assistance in defense production area serve indirectly if not directly to upgrade appreciably India's ability to sustain operations like Rann of Kutch engagements. This broadest context of issue posed by Rann of Kutch is how to avoid frustration of US efforts, undertaken in both countries at enormous cost, which would surely result from enlarged and prolonged hostilities. 2. Regardless of merits India's claim that Paks are employing MAP equipment in Rann of Kutch for aggression or Pakistani contention that its actions are justifiable defensive reactions to Indian encroachments disrupting long established equilibrium in upper half of Rann, present situation is not tolerable for us in terms our essential interests in Subcontinent. We are faced thus by a most crucial dilemma. To withdraw MAP support from Pakistan, however justifiable in the abstract would be to open here a Pandora's box of outright neutralism and sweeping policy reorientation. MAP is lifeblood of Pak national security. If Paks are cut off from MAP because of its use in disputes with India, where facts (other than shared culpability both sides) have always been almost impossible to sort out and with Indians still benefitting from US military equipment while still not entirely dependent on it, Paks will consider that they have no choice but to look elsewhere for military support and guarantees against aggression. In our view, it would be difficult to over-estimate the emotional impact of this issue in Pakistan, or the adverse effect on the American presence here, including without doubt status of our special facilities, that would flow from a rupture of the Military Assistance Program. Yet, to decline to control in some effective way, improper or questionable Pak employment of MAP equipment would be impossible to defend not only before Congress and in India, but in terms our ability to exercise influence through MAP on Paks. 3. We see no clear answer to this dilemma. To move all the way to either of these alternatives would have far-reaching ominous implications, forcing very choice between India and Pakistan we wish to avoid. In the case before us, we consider that the only course we can readily live with is one which makes the choice unnecessary in present inflamed circumstances [garble] one of either reversion to 1960 arrangements in Rann of Kutch, including agreed ground rules, or an immediate and unconditional cease fire. We might thus avoid involvement in merits of case or need for decision for the present on the MAP issue--although we probably must face up to latter over longer run. We urge full weight of US Government be put behind British good offices effort (Embtel 2033),/3/ both here and in Delhi. /3/See footnote 3, Document 109. 4. To reinforce this effort, Paks must be admonished again at highest level that US MAP programs, apart from legal interpretations, clearly jeopardized as a defensible practical proposition by continuation of Rann of Kutch fighting. I believe I can get this across to President Ayub in a form that he will comprehend without undue resentment. At same time, responsibility for concoction and vigorous stirring of Rann of Kutch witches' brew rests equally on Pak and Indian shoulders. Our warning to GOP therefore should be matched with similar emphatic warning to GOI, particularly in view GOI threats to extend conflict to other areas, apparent Indian interest in compounding our difficulties in Pakistan, and Indian exploitation of [garble--closer?] Soviet ties. Both GOP and GOI must be faced with fact that aid to both will be imperiled if they do not buckle down to business of arranging immediate cease fire. McConaughy
112. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Pakistan/1/ Washington, April 27, 1965, 8:02 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 32-1 INDIA-PAK. Secret; Immediate. Drafted by William L. Simmons in NEA/SOA, and approved by Handley. Repeated to London, New Delhi, and CINCMEAFSA. 1217. Rann of Kutch. Talbot called in Pak Ambassador Ghulam Ahmed today to reinforce Ambassador McConaughy's earlier representations of U.S. concern re Rann to GOP Foreign Secretary. Talbot said that we are also having talks in New Delhi./2/ He said that what troubles us most is that apparently for first time since Kashmir cease fire, military forces of two countries are engaged in organized conflict. We see very considerable risks and dangers ahead in this situation. /2/Talbot also discussed the Rann of Kutch situation with Indian Ambassador Nehru on April 27, and argued for the wisdom of a cease-fire agreement. (Telegram 2245 to New Delhi, April 27; Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, India, Vol. IV, Cables, 12/64-6/65) As Ambassador knew, Senate recently reduced FY-66 MAP by $115 million. This decision was reversed after intensive efforts. Cut was assigned to India, Pakistan, Greece and Turkey. This mood is fed by present situation, and implications for subcontinent cannot be ignored. Aziz Ahmed told Ambassador McConaughy MAP-supplied tanks were being used in conflict. Aziz Ahmed also indicated that GOP would welcome clarification from U.S. of interpretation our military assistance agreement regarding use of MAP equipment in such dispute. Talbot said he wished state our position in response to Aziz's request and covered points in Deptel 1200 to Karachi./3/ He said it was quite evident Pakistan's attack on Biar Bet is inconsistent with maintaining "legitimate self-defense." /3/Telegram 1200 to Karachi, April 24, defined the U.S. legal position regarding the use of MAP equipment in disputed territories, such as the Rann of Kutch. MAP equipment was furnished with the clear understanding that it was required for internal security, legitimate self-defense, or collective security. The Department concluded that the United States could not unilaterally determine where the disputed border was for the purpose of establishing the right or wrong of the use of equipment supplied under MAP agreements. The Department also did not feel that either Pakistan or India could offer assurances that the equipment was being used for internal security or legitimate self-defense. Therefore the United States was not willing to countenance the use of MAP equipment in disputed areas such as the Rann of Kutch. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 32-1 INDIA-PAK) Our larger concern is to bring this situation to an end before it assumes importance of another Kashmir, creating deep frictions between two nations. We earnestly hope both countries can find way to arrange cease fire. Ambassador said he was not familiar with latest Karachi talks. However as he understood it Bhutto's April 15 statement and GOP's letter to Security Council stood as basis Pakistan's position. He recalled that area above 24th Parallel was regarded in pre-partition days as part of Sind. Therefore in his view not correct to say that this territory disputed and question of use of MAP equipment in disputed territory did not arise. What was important was to define what is disputed territory. He continued that war talk had been coming from Indian side. Indian allegations of Pakistani mobilization have been categorically denied while GOI has admitted to mobilization. Ambassador noted Ayub's Dacca speech and contrasted President's peaceful remarks with Indian statements relating alleged Pak casualties. Looking at it from Washington, Kashmir incidents, Dahagram and Rann of Kutch seemed to fall into pattern of planned Indian aggression. Ambassador stated that this is a case where U.S. should firmly come to Pakistan's aid. He recalled Under Secretary Ball's assurances of U.S. assistance to Pakistan in event of Indian aggression./4/ Pakistan obviously cannot match India in duplicity. Already India has presented better case internationally than Pakistan. Ambassador asked for Talbot's views on what U.S. would do. /4/In a conversation with Ayub in Rawalpindi on September 5, 1963, Ball reiterated the assurance that the United States would come to Pakistan's assistance in the event of aggression from any source. The conversation was reported in telegram 236 from Tehran, September 5; for text, see Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, vol. XIX, Document 328. Talbot said that in first instance cease fire should be arranged. He said it should not be beyond ingenuity of disputants to find way to bring prompt end to fighting, particularly since both countries are in agreement on desirability of cease fire as well as negotiations to resolve impasse. Following cease fire both sides might set up machinery to settle disputes of this type. Ambassador commented that such machinery does exist with regard to West Pakistan-Indian frontier. Pakistan certainly wants peaceful solution but India charges of Pakistan wanting to broaden the conflict and Chinese-Pakistan collusion indicate opposite view holds for India. Ambassador said that apart from tanks he was not aware of what other MAP equipment may be in use. He thought that it might be useful to examine "at leisure" 1961 Kennedy-Ayub communiqué/5/ which he believed had extended scope of use of MAP equipment. /5/For the joint communiqué issued on July 31, 1961, at the conclusion of the Washington portion of a State visit to the United States by Ayub, see Department of State Bulletin, August 7, 1961, pp. 240-241. Talbot closed by noting U.S. can foresee very serious consequences both on subcontinent and outside unless there is cessation in present hostilities. Rusk
113. Telegram From the White House to the Embassy in India/1/ Washington, April 28, 1965, 11 a.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, India, Exchanges with Bowles. Secret; Immediate. [text not declassified] CAP 65138. Eyes Only for Bowles from Bundy. Have just seen your 3057/2/ asking help on pending matters before you return here mid-May. We are fully and sympathetically aware of hectic situation in subcontinent and will do our best to push some of these matters forward. However, with all the candor you have come to expect via this channel, let me warn against great expectations just now. With Vietnam in the forefront of all minds, there is simply not likely to be the kind of constructive focus on the issues you raise which is necessary to push them through. /2/In telegram 3057 from New Delhi, April 27, Bowles raised the question of pending decisions on three issues he felt it was important to move forward on before his return to Washington in mid-May. The two most important related to the Indian requests for a 2-year agreement on P.L. 480 assistance and for F-5 fighter aircraft. Bowles urged positive decisions on both, although he recognized that in view of the fighting in the Rann of Kutch it would not be possible to announce a decision to provide F-5s to India for some time. He also urged action on his proposal for the creation of a binational cultural foundation, noting that a decision had been pending for more than a year. (Ibid., Vol. IV, Cables, 12/64-6/65) Moreover, while tactical considerations may argue for early gestures before Shastri goes to Moscow, we still see merit in reserving some of the items you propose till we can fit them better into package approach being considered here, rather than dishing them out piecemeal. Two-year PL 480 commitment now, for example, might deprive us of major leverage before we have fully worked out what we want Indians to do in return, at least in agriculture sector. A one-year, frankly interim, agreement might suffice for our immediate purpose. As for F-5A, we see little chance of promising aircraft now when Paks and perhaps Indians are using our MAP for purposes far afield from what we intended./3/ /3/On May 8, Rusk informed Bowles, in a personal cable, that the decision had been made to defer a response to the Indian request for F-5 aircraft. (Telegram 2348 to New Delhi; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, DEF 19-8 US-INDIA) In sum, my reading of Washington end is that the way of wisdom is not to push too hard on big new programs till we can revalidate our Indian enterprise and get the aid bill through. Here we must grant the President's own unparalleled sense of the rocky road the aid bill is travelling and his strong desire not to rock the boat till he knows what's in his pocket. Nor does Vietnam, where the course we have to take will not win us many short term plaudits overseas, ease the problem. So timing is everything just now. On this score, Komer and I strongly urge that you postpone your home leave for six weeks or so. When we heard you were coming, we thought it wise on your behalf to check with the President, and this is his own distinct preference. Aside from the value of having you at the helm in Delhi during a ticklish period in US/Indian relations, we may need your guiding hand in handling Vietnam affairs with the Indians. Equally important, you could not come back now without talking India and it is simply not a propitious time to do so. You would inevitably be caught in the backwash of the Shastri affair, and have to answer embarrassing queries. Even strictly home leave might be misconstrued, and you couldn't really come back without a Washington leg. These are difficult times, not least for you, and we all appreciate your gallant handling of affairs at your end. I also realize how difficult it is in Delhi to get the full flavor of the situation here. However, I'm sure you will understand the President's own judgment as to why the timing would be better, and your presence here more productive, when our own affairs on the Hill and in Vietnam are more fully sorted out. [Continue with the next documents]
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