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FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1964-1968, Volume XXV South Asia
Department of State |
114. Telegram From the Embassy Office in Pakistan to the Department of State/1/ Rawalpindi, April 30, 1965. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 32-1 INDIA-PAK. Secret; Immediate. Repeated to New Delhi, London, Karachi, CINCMEAFSA, and DOD. No time of transmission is given on the telegram, which was received at 4:34 p.m. Passed to the White House and CIA. 43. Deptel 1230/2/ and 1231/3/ and Rawalpindi's 42/4/ to Department. /2/In telegram 1230 to Karachi, April 29, the Department clarified its position with respect to the acceptable use of MAP equipment. The legal position outlined in telegram 1200 to Karachi, April 24, was intended to apply to the situation in the Rann of Kutch, and was not meant to imply that a case for legitimate self-defense could never be made in connection with a disputed border. (Ibid.) /3/Telegram 1231 to Karachi, April 29, instructed McConaughy to make clear the U.S. position with respect to the use of MAP equipment in his scheduled meeting with Bhutto on April 30. (Ibid.) /4/Telegram 42 from Rawalpindi, April 30, reported on McConaughy's first meeting with Bhutto on April 30. Bhutto, on instructions from Ayub, asked McConaughy to ascertain what the U.S. position would be in the event that "unmistakable Indian threats" led to general warfare between India and Pakistan. Bhutto described the situation as the gravest in the history of Indo-Pakistani relations and reviewed the history of U.S. assurances to protect Pakistan in the event of Indian aggression. (Ibid.) 1. Just after I left my noon meeting April 30 with Foreign Minister Bhutto, he requested me to see him again at 4 p.m. When I returned for second meeting, I found Foreign Minister Bhutto and Foreign Secretary Aziz Ahmed noticeably agitated. Bhutto explained that they had received, just after my noon call, message from Ambassador G. Ahmed reporting his conversation with Talbot on April 27 (Deptel 1217)/5/ at which Talbot had set forth our position that MAP equipment not to be used in disputed areas (Deptel 1200)./6/ Bhutto pointed out question had profound implications for GOP since bulk of its military equipment is MAP-supplied and probably any military action by India against Pakistan would be launched from or against disputed area, such as Kashmir or Rann of Kutch. Paks under this reasoning could not use MAP where it would be needed and would be in impossible position. /5/Document 112. /6/See footnote 3, Document 112. 2. I clarified our position in accordance with Deptel 1230 stressing that we were not laying out rigid generalized rule necessarily applicable to all disputed territories. We would expect to make determination on each issue based on merits or case. In case of Rann of Kutch we considered facts and circumstances murky, legitimate self-defense not established, and therefore use of MAP equipment by either side not justified. Situation here readily susceptible to settlement without dangerous resort to force and cease-fire should be pursued. Furthermore, question of use of MAP equipment in Rann of Kutch area would be merely academic point if cease-fire achieved. At later points in conversation, I hammered away at this point in order to emphasize necessity of Pak agreement to cease-fire. 3. Bhutto and Aziz Ahmed were at once relieved by clarification that no far-reaching generalized principle automatically to all disputed areas had been set up, and still deeply concerned by implications of our postulation as applied to Rann of Kutch situation. Two main points made by Bhutto and Aziz Ahmed in commenting on our position re use of MAP equipment were: (a) Before US attempted to make unilateral decision as to whether legitimate self-defense involved in Rann of Kutch or in other areas, further extensive consideration facts and full consultations between us should be held. (b) Since most Pak military equipment MAP-supplied, while Indians not dependent to any comparable extent on US sources, Paks would be more heavily penalized by US withholding from both sides, and Indians would be emboldened if Paks relatively disadvantaged. Under present circumstances in Rann of Kutch, GOP would be forced to withdraw all its forces onesidedly, since they mainly MAP-supplied, while Indians not thus handicapped. 4. Aziz Ahmed also presented Pak justification that use of MAP in Rann of Kutch in fact "legitimate self-defense" involving defense of territory properly claimed by GOP and wrongfully attacked by India. He pointed to following facts: (a) GOP maintained post at Chad Bet until 1956, at which time Indian forces came in with air cover and took over post by force, which GOP did not resist; (b) in 1960 when territorial dispute last discussed, it was agreed that neither side would disturb status quo; (c) beginning in January 1965 India in fact disturbed status quo by establishing a series of new posts in disputed territory and by moving in first police and then strong military forces; and (d) GOP did not move troops into disputed area until 18 April after Indians hit Pak post at Ding preemptorily, demanded Pak evacuation of Kanjarkot and took over other posts. 5. In reply, I stressed first that facts still murky, given strong Indian presentation of its conflicting position, that US taking openminded position in absence of basis for judgment, that pressing objective at moment is to achieve cease-fire, and that problem involved in this case clearly dictated closer consultations at early stage on any comparable threatening situation in future. I assured Paks that, in taking stance on Rann of Kutch, we are applying terms of standing agreement to particular existing situation rather than redefining this agreement or establishing any general restriction indiscriminately applicable to all disputed territories. 6. Bhutto came back to question he raised at earlier meeting on US assurances, drawing analogy between US determination on use of MAP equipment and US determination on whether aggression involved. He recalled that, during his discussions with Under Secretary Ball in Washington in October 1963, he had foreseen the very possibility that, in a murky situation, aggression could not be readily determined and that our assurances to GOP on aggression by India would be difficult to invoke quickly enough to help Pakistan. For this reason, Bhutto said, he had urged further definition and strengthening of our assurances. Instead, the US reaction in the Rann of Kutch crisis would appear to confirm Pak misgivings and to dilute the force and dependability of US assurances. Bhutto urged an early response to his inquiry of this morning on US reaction in event Indian threats of retaliation carried out. He also proposed that urgent problem of right to use MAP equipment be accorded further exhaustive consideration and analysis by two governments, even [given?] its far-reaching implications. 7. I told Bhutto that I was doubtful that reply would be received to his question about US assurances before he left for London evening May 2 but this was matter he might take up with Secretary at London. I also indicated again that it seemed unlikely that we would be able comment on hypothetical situations relating to recent Indian vague threats which we hope and believe India will not carry out. Bhutto argued that current Indian threat not hypothetical given statements made by Shastri and other recent Indian actions. 8. During discussion, in response my pressing on need for immediate cease-fire, Bhutto reiterated that Paks prepared for cease-fire as outlined to UK. He also informed me of gist of Ayub reply to Wilson letter of April 30 setting basis for "de facto" cease-fire. He informed me that Pak forces have been restrained from taking further action so as not to aggravate situation further in Rann of Kutch area. Pak forces in area are therefore not taking advantage of superior military position which would now permit them readily to reach 24th parallel, and to take over Chad Bet and cut off whole GOI force from its line of retreat. Comment: It quite clear at conclusion our meeting, which lasted almost one hour, that Bhutto and Aziz Ahmed quite shaken by definition of our position in context of actual Rann of Kutch situation, and also in context of how it might affect US MAP support and defense assistance in event of future fuzzed over aggression by India. 9. I would not recommend immediate response to Bhutto reassuring GOP on effectiveness of past assurances against aggression, since a little uncertainty on their part for next few days could provide the additional leverage needed to achieve cease-fire. However, I do not think that we can postpone providing these reassurances very long without risking very serious damage to our position here. At same time, I strongly urge that GOI be reminded immediately of the standing explicit US assurances to Pakistan as a further deterrent against an Indian contemplation of retaliatory action against Pakistan in another area, such as East Pakistan. McConaughy
115. Telegram From the Embassy in India to the Department of State/1/ New Delhi, May 1, 1965, 0400Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 32-1 INDIA-PAK. Secret. Also sent to the White House, and repeated to Saigon and CINCPAC for POLAD. 3111. Ambassadors Bowles and Lodge/2/ this evening called on Prime Minister Shastri who was obviously preoccupied with the situation in the Rann of Kutch. PM asked Lodge to convey the following message to President Johnson: the Government of India has no objections to discussions concerning boundary demarcations in Kutch area. GOI has agreed to British proposals for cease-fire and discussions. If Pakistan does not accept a cease-fire he "shudders" to think what position GOI might have to adopt. Not only is there a danger of a large conflict, internal difficulties are also possible (he mentioned specifically the possibility of communal disturbances in both countries). /2/Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge stopped at New Delhi on the way to Vietnam at President Johnson's request to assure Prime Minister Shastri that Johnson had meant no discourtesy in postponing Shastri's visit. Lodge was instructed to explain the reasons for the postponement again, and to tell Shastri that Johnson was anxious to reschedule the visit. (Telegram CAP 65137 to New Delhi, April 27; ibid., POL 7 INDIA) Pakistani propaganda concerning Indian attack is preposterous since, if India had planned an attack, it would never have chosen such an unfavorable area. Shastri further stated that on April 13 Pakistan had made proposals consisting of (1) a cease-fire, (2) return to the status quo ante, (3) further discussions. The next day GOI accepted. Immediately thereafter Pakistan withdrew the original proposal and made further demands. Lodge agreed to deliver the message to President Johnson. The conversation then turned to the situation in Vietnam. Lodge outlined the reasons why Vietnam is an important issue and described the nature of the struggle. He concluded with a request for any advice Shastri might want to proffer and suggested the possibility that GOI might want to assist the GVN in some concrete manner such as by sending ambulances and personnel. Shastri then commented that he appreciated the clear description of the situation and remarked that the U.S. was the best judge of what should be done. He stated somewhat wistfully that there seemed little chance for talks. In describing his position that conflict should cease, he stressed that the North Vietnamese and the Vietcong must cease their activities as part of an agreement. The meeting ended with a brief discussion of the degree to which Communist China is failing to gain complete support in Africa and the nonaligned countries. Bowles
116. Telegram From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State/1/ Karachi, May 4, 1965, 1700Z. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Pakistan, Vol. III, Cables, 12/64-7/65. Secret; Immediate. Repeated to London, New Delhi, CINCMEAFSA for POLAD, and DOD. Passed to the White House and CIA. 2125. Rann of Kutch. 1. I had a concentrated 15-minute conversation with President Ayub in Karachi today at a tea following investiture ceremony. He showed conciliatory attitude toward resolution Rann of Kutch dispute, but extremely tough posture toward Indians in event they attack Pakistan in new area. He said public opinion in this country would never condone a passive reaction to an unprovoked Indian strike at some new point along Pakistan border. In that event Pakistan would hit back without pulling the punch and he felt no other government could blame her. He noted that Pakistani forces had held back in the Rann. Could easily have pushed south to the 24th parallel and beyond. This restraint had been in deference to the views of their friends and to the fact that the situation was a confused one. The same restraints would not apply in the event of outright and flagrant Indian aggression in a new place unrelated to the Rann of Kutch. 2. I told President that we were strongly hopeful that Indians would not strike elsewhere. We felt that some of the strong statements made by Prime Minister Shastri in the Lok Sabha were dictated by domestic political requirements and should not be taken literally at face value. We were counseling restraint just as earnestly on the Indian side as on the Pakistani side. We thought that threatening talk on either side made the already dangerous situation more inflammable, and we hoped such talk could be avoided. 3. President said he was sympathetic with settlement efforts which British are making and he was cooperating to the best of his ability. Pakistan had been glad to do its part in virtual cease-fire now in effect./2/ He was rather worried that there had been some light artillery firing on May 2, significance of which was obscure. He said he had already agreed in principle to arbitration or mediation of substance of the dispute by impartial authorities of third countries. He would be willing to grant them every facility and to pledge the GOP to abide by their findings and their award. He hoped it would be possible to proceed promptly to this conclusive stage. He reiterated that Pakistan would agree to make the arbitration binding. /2/In telegram 2097 from Karachi, May 2, McConaughy reported on a conversation the previous night with Bhutto in which Bhutto said that his government had decided to observe a cease-fire, if India did the same. Bhutto stated that the paramount consideration in the government's decision had been the special relationship with the United States. (Ibid.) 4. I raised the problem of intermediate stages, presumably involving a formalized cease-fire, disengagement, restoration of some sort of status quo ante and possible negotiation or discussion of substance of dispute between representatives of interested parties. The President was distrustful of Indian good faith during intermediate stages and expressed the view that any restoration of status quo ante during interim period should be dispensed with. He also thought bilateral substantive negotiation between the two sides would probably be useless or worse, with Indians inclined to take advantage of any intermediate sites to consolidate their position in upper Rann and then refuse to budge or admit existence of dispute, regardless of recommendations of any outside impartial body, as in case of previous Indo-Pak disputes. The President said he thought withdrawal by both sides from disputed zone was only necessary preliminary to arbitration or mediation effort. If Indians distrusted Pakistan observance of withdrawal agreement because of relatively higher terrain on Pak side of disputed area, he would be glad to agree to impartial military observers coming into disputed area to insure that neither side violated withdrawal terms while arbitral group was deliberating. He reaffirmed that Pakistan would accept arbitral award even if it was entirely unfavorable to Pakistan. 5. I told President that I regretted GOP decision not to allow visit of our MAAG representatives to that part of Rann which Paks hold. I had thought it would be useful for officers to see exact situation and extent of use of MAP and other military material. Especially in view Indian permission for our officers in New Delhi to visit Indian side, I thought negative Pak decision was regrettable. I noted that Paks had assured us they had nothing to hide and I thought a policy of free MAAG access to the combat area would be more compatible with Pak position that there is nothing to hide. It would also be more consonant with general [garble--nature?] of full confidence between GOP forces and our MAAG, which was implicit in the mutual defense relationship. 6. President said it was idea true [sic] that Pak Army had nothing to hide. He had felt that there was no particular point in military visits since Paks freely state and acknowledge that they are using MAP equipment and MAAG knows exactly what each Pak unit has. Forces committed to the area are all MAP supported and he pointed out that of course troops in combat use whatever equipment they have, regardless of origin. 7. President then astounded me by saying that he had approved turn [down?] of US suggestion for military visit to Rann area because he understood that it was proposed to bring out officers from the United States for this purpose. He did not see the necessity of this when there were highly-qualified MAAG officers in Pakistan who knew the situation better than any outside officers could. 8. President, in turn, was astounded when I told him he evidently had been misinformed by his people; that we had never suggested or even thought of bringing out officers from the US to make the inspection. I told him that of course we had proposed to use only resident MAAG officers. President replied that he had no objection to visit by MAAG officers and that he would give appropriate orders to facilitate immediate visit, if I wanted this done. 9. I told him I thought it would be a good idea, assuming he perceived no substantial objection. President said he had absolutely no objection although he doubted if anything new would be established as a result of the visit. 10. He then called Brigadier Riaz Hussain, Chief of ISID (who was standing nearby) over to join us and instructed him, in my presence, to arrange visit of two MAAG officers immediately. He turned to me to say that General Ruhlen, MAAG Chief, knew the score completely and he would like for him to go personally. I said we had thought in terms of the Colonel who was chief of the Army section under General Ruhlen and perhaps an artillery officer. But I had no objection to General Ruhlen going and I would ask him to go if the President wanted him included. The President told Riaz Hussain to arrange for General Ruhlen and one other MAAG officer, named by me or General Ruhlen, to go immediately. He said they should go first to Badin, then to Eighth Division headquarters and then as far down in the combat area under Pak control as they cared to go. 11. I am now consulting with General Ruhlen as to details with a view to laying the trip on for Thursday, May 6. McConaughy
117. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ Washington, May 8, 1965. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, DEF 12 INDIA. Secret. Drafted by Schneider and approved in S on May 17. SUBJECT PARTICIPANTS Ambassador Nehru came in at his request to discuss Indo-Pakistan relations. The Ambassador said he did not want to discuss so much the pros and cons of the Kutch issue as the question of the use of U.S. arms by Pakistan in the Rann of Kutch. He said that there was "incontrovertible proof" that Pakistan had used U.S. tanks against India in the Rann. The Ambassador presented the Secretary with nine pictures of tanks, trucks and soldiers which he said had been taken at Biar Bet by a low flying aircraft. The Ambassador read from a Reuters report which said that President Ayub had indicated Pakistan was using U.S. arms and was entitled to the use of all arms in its possession. He said that the Pakistani units involved in Kutch were MAP-supplied units. Summarizing his position, the Ambassador said it was "incontrovertible" that Pakistan had taken action against India to alter the status quo in the Rann and had used U.S. arms in contravention of U.S. assurances to India given by President Eisenhower, Secretary Dulles, and Ambassador Bunker. The Secretary said we had expressed our position on use of U.S. equipment quite strongly to both India and Pakistan. Ambassador Nehru asked what the Secretary meant by both sides. India had not used U.S. equipment. The Secretary said Pakistan claims to have captured U.S.-made 106 mm recoilless rifles. Our inspectors who visited the Indian lines, however, have not seen such equipment. It was on the basis of the claims of both sides that we made statements to both India and Pakistan. Continuing, the Secretary informed Ambassador Nehru that we did not have the full story yet from our military observers but Pakistan had not denied it had used U.S. equipment. We had made it clear to Pakistan that we were not willing that such equipment be used. We have expressed our views strongly--very strongly. When the Pakistanis raised the question of our assurances to them in connection with a possible Indian retaliatory attack, we replied that we considered such a question hypothetical. We believe our representations have had something to do with the Pakistani decision not to escalate hostilities further in the Rann. We hope the British peace efforts will succeed in taking this dispute out of the military area to the conference table. Ambassador Nehru said that while India hopes the Kutch question will be resolved, a more important question of principle is involved. U.S. assurances to India had been the foundation of Indian defense policy. If these assurances were eroded, it would be a very serious matter. The Secretary asked what Ambassador Nehru would have us do. At first, the Ambassador said this was not for him to say except that, as far as India was concerned, the U.S. reaction had been inadequate. When further pressed by the Secretary, he said an adequate action would be to tell Pakistan that the U.S. would not provide any more arms. He said he was without instructions on this point, however. The Secretary suggested the alternative of stopping use of U.S. arms in the Kutch area. Ambassador Nehru commented, "If you can." The Secretary asked Ambassador Nehru what he could say about Indian troop movements. Indicating he did not know the details on this subject, the Ambassador said what movement had taken place was of troops without U.S. arms. He then returned to the theme that Indian defense policy was based upon the assumption that U.S. assurances were enforceable, mentioning that a substantial part of the GOI had been committed to this belief. He said he had argued with the Finance Minister years ago against increased defense expenditures on the grounds that U.S. assurances would be carried out. The Ambassador said one aspect of the problem regarding U.S. assurances was public and political. Mentioning a Selig Harrison article in the Washington Post and a speech by A.B. Vajpayee in Parliament, he described the great criticism of the U.S. in India for permitting Pakistan to use U.S. arms in violation of U.S. assurances. He then charged that the U.S. was merely equating India with Pakistan saying, "Every time Pakistan hits us, you must hit both sides." The Secretary referred to reports he had heard of the movement of Indian mountain divisions, which he thought were MAP supplied. Mr. Handley noted that the 50th para brigade which India had used in Kutch had been furnished limited MAP equipment, but that it was not known if it had taken any MAP items with them. The Secretary said that the test of the adequacy of our actions with Pakistan was the result, i.e., the end of the fighting. Ambassador Nehru said, however, something also must be done in public to help take care of India's Parliamentary problem. The Secretary responded that what we say publicly should be related to the British peace effort. Ambassador Nehru agreed we should do nothing to interfere with that. Looking to the future, the Secretary said we would get complete information on use of U.S. equipment shortly. Our people have already visited Indian forces and report they had not found any U.S. equipment. We have not had any report from the Pak side, but we suppose our inspectors will find U.S. arms. Then we will go to the Pak Government and ask that our understandings be complied with. At what point this becomes public depends upon the British peace-making effort. Mr. Handley said that we had spoken most strongly to Pakistan, as Ambassador Bowles has told the GOI. The Ambassador responded that Pakistan's use of the equipment nonetheless went on. When Mr. Handley pointed out that the proof of the effectiveness of our action was the cessation of hostilities, Ambassador Nehru said that India had also stopped and Pakistanis were still in Indian territory. The Secretary countered by saying that MAP equipment was not being used today to fire on Indians. Terming this a good argument but unsatisfying, the Ambassador said the credibility of U.S. assurances is in question and must be re-established. The Secretary repeated that the effectiveness of U.S. assurances and the cessation of hostilities were very closely related. The test of our fulfilling our assurances is in what happens. Taking issue with the Secretary, the Ambassador said the test was not whether the fighting stopped, but was whether Pakistan was prevented from using U.S. equipment. Under present circumstances, Pakistan can use the equipment at some other place again. The Secretary responded that if the Ambassador was suggesting that we take punitive action far beyond what is needed, such as a break with Pakistan, he should know we will not do this. The Ambassador replied he was not asking this and agreed with the Secretary that what we do is our problem regarding which he could not advise us. Mr. Handley asked that since the GOI knows we have taken a very strong position with Pakistan and this had had a favorable result, was there anything that could be done in Delhi to tone down the public reaction? The Ambassador dismissed this question by saying that he did not believe his Government considered the U.S. has taken adequate measures. The Prime Minister had said as much. When the Secretary asked what the result of the British effort would be, the Ambassador replied that it would succeed but only because India would make compromises. Returning to the subject of U.S. assurances, the Secretary said our objective was to end the fighting; then the question of use of U.S. equipment would not arise. If the problem of use of U.S. equipment came up again, we would deal with it at that time. The Ambassador replied this was not enough. It would not give India any assurance regarding the future. The Secretary said he should think that the cessation of the fighting was a demonstration that we considered our commitments to both India and Pakistan seriously. The Ambassador reacted strongly to this comment asking why the U.S. insists on considering India and Pakistan together. India observes its commitments scrupulously; to equate it with Pakistan was wrong. One party has obeyed the law, the other has not. Why this equation? The Secretary again asked about Indian troop movements. He ended the conversation saying that we had made representations to both sides on the basis of charges made by both India and Pakistan. We would continue to try to get more information regarding use of U.S. arms. Ambassador Nehru concluded saying India had given full facilities to U.S. observers who had found no U.S. equipment. Therefore, the U.S. should not equate India and Pakistan when "the other side" is guilty.
118. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in India/1/ Washington, May 8, 1965, 2:34 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 32-1 INDIA-PAK. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Drafted and approved by Rusk. A handwritten notation on the telegram reads "OK/L," indicating that it was cleared by President Johnson. 2349. Eyes Only Ambassador From Secretary. I would greatly appreciate your personal estimate as to whether Shastri's political weakness may not be major element of danger in present situation. Reports just received of arrest of Sheik Abdullah/2/ and rioting in Srinagar/3/ are further signs that he may be too weak to be wise. His attempt in parliament yesterday to lay blame on us, despite his knowledge of strongest possible efforts we have made in Pakistan on MAP problem is another. Reports of troop movements in India involving units equipped with MAP are relevant. So is London's 208 repeated to you./4/ Please let us know whether there is more we should do to support UK peacemaking effort. B.K. Nehru saw me and made it clear he wanted more than pull back or stand down of MAP equipment in Rann of Kutch; he wanted us to punish Pakistan by cutting off all aid. Public impression here that India moved to change a status quo in Rann of Kutch, that India refuses to acknowledge that a dispute exists, that India threatens to widen the conflict into other areas and that India is exploiting MAP to blame us for a difficulty with Pakistan. Regards. /2/The arrest of Abdullah on May 8 was reported in telegram 3199 from New Delhi, May 8. (Ibid., POL 29 INDIA) /3/According to an official government spokesman in New Delhi, four people were killed by police in Srinagar in demonstrations protesting the arrest of Sheikh Abdullah. (Telegram 3205 from New Delhi, May 8; ibid., POL 28-8 INDIA) /4/The reference is in error; the telegram has not been further identified. Rusk
119. Telegram From the Embassy in India to the Department of State/1/ New Delhi, May 10, 1965, 0930Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 32-1 INDIA-PAK. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. 3210. For Secretary Rusk. Deptel 2349./2/ I shall comment on questions posed in your personal cable as briefly and precisely as I can. /2/Document 118. 1. I agree that Shastri in dealing with present crisis has been weak, unsophisticated and needlessly fearful of his Parliamentary opposition. Because Parliament has been in session this has further complicated already complex situation and added to dangers. (Note: Parliament recesses this week until August.) 2. In present heavily charged atmosphere it would have been serious mistake for Abdullah to have returned to Srinagar; riots encouraged by Pak and/or ChiCom agitators could readily have got out of hand. However I believe Sheikh could have been persuaded voluntarily to stay away from Kashmir until dust settles. Fact that GOI instead of attempting so to persuade him arbitrarily sent him off to South India under house arrest reflects their present state of jitters. 3. In regard to US protest to Paks on use of US equipment, GOI has had only your statements to B.K. Nehru and my guarded off the record statements here to go on, and these did not help them in dealing with agitated oppositionists on floor of Parliament. Moreover unchallenged Pak insistence that USG had in fact made no protest further confused our public position and left us open to bitter attacks from leftwingers and suspicion from moderates. In this context Shastri's impatient reaction to taunt in Parliament (apparently based on leak from Talbot's talk with B.K. Nehru) that we had warned India against attacking Pakistan reflects Indian resentment at being bracketed with Pakistan in situation where they genuinely believe themselves to be victim. Nevertheless Shastri's comment was uncalled for and I shall so state when I see L.K. Jha this afternoon. 4. We believe US equipped Indian troops now in vicinity of West Pakistan border are limited to two brigades. We have asked clearance for USMSMI officer to visit area and ascertain facts. Most immediate danger lies in fact that both armies which by common consent had been five miles back from each side of border are now directly on border. UK HICOMM has expressed agreement with my suggestion that when and if we get cease-fire UK should continue in its mediating role to press for return to their former positions. 5. If we were publicly to chastise Paks for misuse of US equipment as urged by B.K. Nehru we would greatly ease public resentment against us here in India, which would make our lives easier, but we might also destroy hope for negotiated agreement. Under these circumstances, I agree with our position and have supported it vigorously with Indian press, members of Cabinet and other opinion makers. 6. In regard to border dispute itself Pak-India border was accepted at time of partition in all British official agreements and maps as the border between old state of Sind which went to Pakistan and old state of Kutch which went to India and is so registered on all US maps. Consequently it is difficult for either US or British, who were originally responsible for establishing border, to see how Indians could lose the case before impartial tribunal. India does not, however deny that disagreement exists as to precise location of this border since it was never demarcated by British and hence may run few hundred yards north or south of present line as shown on map. However not until 1954 did Paks introduce proposition that Kutch was inland sea and that hence they were entitled to half of it; i.e., down to 24th parallel. 7. In regard to who started Kutch squabble no one can be sure. Blow-up may have been result of deliberate Pak push to make Indians look foolish; if so, mission was accomplished. It is also conceivable that there was some tie with Chinese. However it seems to me more likely that fight started by accident as in case of two small boys pushing each other on playground after school. In any event, India with her deep concern over China which until three weeks ago was uppermost in minds of most Indians had nothing whatsoever to gain from attack on Pakistan. Moreover if India should in fact have plotted attack on Pakistan it surely would not have chosen area where Indian armed forces are at such disadvantage in regard to terrain and logistics. India had only police in area. Nearest Indian military was battalion sixty miles away on other side of sandy waste. 8. India right now is in angry, unreasonable, and indeed irrational mood due to combination of reasons: i.e., lingering humiliation from Chinese attack, Chinese prestige gain with nuclear bomb which India could also produce, Indian Army's alleged defeat at hands of Pak Army in Kutch, and frustrated feeling that US, whom six out of seven Indians according to our public opinion poll of few months ago considered India's best friend, does not understand their position. While Shastri has been responsive to this mood, and at times even contributed to it, he has thus far firmly retained power of decision at each step along way toward cease fire. Barring some accident there is no reason to assume that war is at hand. British HICOMM John Freeman believes that cease fire agreement may be reached before adjournment of Parliament Tuesday night. Shastri leaves for Moscow Wednesday and has extended his visit which had previously been cut to three days to comply with his original schedule. He will also leave on schedule for London, Ottawa and Algiers as planned. 9. In regard to how USG can best support British John Freeman believes that our most effective move would be to make it clear to Paks that US arms are not to be used against Indians except in clear case of Indian invasion of Pak territory. Barring this private reiteration of our previous statement we both feel US should stay on sidelines. In meantime we have made most vigorous effort to impress Indian leaders and opinion makers with total folly of retaliatory attack on Pakistan, to warn of Chinese plot designed to wreck both Pakistan and India, and to explain our unaligned position as best we can, etc. 10. Even though situation settles down as we feel it is likely to do, considerable ground will have been lost in India. I can foresee two particularly unhappy possibilities and one potentially favorable one. A. Whether or not we believe it to be justified Indians have been genuinely and deeply disturbed. As long as we describe ourselves as an ally of Pakistan they will not henceforth trust our guaranties. In view of their fear combined attack by both China and Pakistan this lack of confidence may lead them into costly and foolhardy guns ahead of butter approach with possibility of decision to proceed with nuclear explosion regardless of implications to US aid or to economic progress. B. If Soviets want to make big play for India, door is now wide open; even many normally sober and pro-American Indians for moment at least are easy target for Soviet blandishments. It is open question, of course, as to how Soviets may choose to use their opportunity. Soviet resources are limited and too close a relationship with still democratic India would confuse their Leninist role as revolutionary leader. I would expect them, however, to go considerable distance in Moscow meeting with Shastri, perhaps very great distance. C. One positive element that I can see at present is possibility that present eyeball to eyeball confrontation may have same sobering effect on Pakistan and India that Cuban confrontation had on US and USSR. If so, it could open range of more favorable possibilities. This, I hope, answers your specific questions. I am preparing more complete cable which will provide background in depth which I believe is urgently needed if we are to prevent rapid and disastrous erosion of US position in South Asia which we have been laboriously building up for last decade. Bowles
120. Letter From the Ambassador of Pakistan (Ahmed) to Secretary of State Rusk/1/ Washington, May 11, 1965. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Head of State Correspondence File, Pakistan, Vol. I, Pres. Ayub Correspondence, 12/15/63-12/31/64. No classification marking. The letter was forwarded to the White House on May 12, under cover of a memorandum from Executive Secretary Read to McGeorge Bundy. (Ibid.) My dear Mr. Secretary, I have received the following message from the President of Pakistan for transmission to the President of the United States: Begins "Dear Mr. President, I write to inform you of the grave situation that has arisen in the sub-continent as a result of India's aggressive actions in recent months: First, the forcible occuption of Pakistan's enclave of Dahagram, then an aggressive march into disputed territory of the Rann of Kutch and now concentration of virtually the entire striking power of the Indian armed forces on Pakistan borders. Dahagram was restored to us only after the Indians came to realise that their action was wholly untenable and it was impossible for them to continue to stay there; India's attempt to take over disputed Rann of Kutch territory by force was foiled only by counter military measures which we, under the circumstances, were compelled to take, and, now, we too have had to deploy our forces in defensive positions on the India-Pakistan border to meet the threat that arises from India's latest action. 2. As you know Kashmir has been the prime source of this conflict between India and Pakistan. Even as I write, reports are pouring in from Srinagar and other places in Indian-occupied Kashmir of wholesale arrests of Kashmiri leaders and firing by Indian forces on the unfortunate Kashmiri people whose only crime is that they are struggling to free themselves of Indian military yoke and are protesting against the imprisonment by India for the third time of their leader Sheikh Abdullah. This is yet another instance of India's cynical disregard of the need for a peaceful settlement of her disputes with Pakistan on a just and honourable basis. 3. This same attitude is demonstrated by the Indian stand in regard to the Rann of Kutch dispute. Here again, as in the case of Kashmir, the Government of India now claims that the disputed territory is Indian territory. In actual fact the dispute concerning this territory has been previously discussed between India and Pakistan on several occasions--the latest in 1960 when the two Governments agreed that pending further consideration of this dispute, neither side would disturb the status quo. India accuses Pakistan of aggression in the Rann of Kutch. In fact it was India that moved large forces into the disputed territory during months of January-April this year, established forward military posts therein and carried out full-scale land, sea and air manoeuvres in its vicinity, thus forcibly demolishing the status quo. It was only on April 8th when the Indian forces attacked a Pakistan out-post at Ding in an endeavour to complete a military take over of the territory to present Pakistan with a fait accompli that the Pakistan forces went into action for the first time, and it was on April 19th after patiently watching India's aggressive actions in the Rann of Kutch for three and a half months that Pakistan forces went into the disputed territory for the first time. Subsequent military developments in the Rann are known to your Government. 4. Foiled in her attempt to seize the disputed territory by force, the Indian Prime Minister proceeded publicly to threaten Pakistan that India would attack Pakistan on other points of our border of her own choosing if we refused to accept solution dictated by India. These were: a cease-fire and return to status quo ante, which meant that India would stay in possession of the disputed territory while we would have to clear out, and that the dispute would be settled only on the basis that the border needed to be demarcated and there was no territory in dispute. We could scarcely be expected to accept such a demand at the point of the gun. 5. Even in face of this I have exercised the greatest restraint. On April 29th I stopped our troops in the Rann of Kutch from exploiting a favourable tactical situation when after the capture of Biar Bet they were in a position to cut right through to the Indian forces on the 24th parallel and destroy from the rear the two Indian Brigades located in the disputed territory. Furthermore on April 30th I unilaterally ordered our troops in the Rann of Kutch not to do anything that might aggravate the situation, which ultimately led to a de facto cease-fire there. All this was done in face of considerable opposition and in the hope India may thus be convinced of our sincere desire to settle disputes by the sensible method available, i.e., by peaceful means. 6. Following these truculent declarations India has massed practically the entire Indian Army and Air Force, including all Indian armour, on Pakistan's borders in offensive formations. Pakistan has naturally had to deploy her own forces in defensive positions to meet this new threat. We have also informed the Security Council of the threat to peace that has thus arisen in this region. 7. The armies of Pakistan and India now stand poised against each other. The situation is one of the utmost gravity. A trial of armed strength between India and Pakistan will be a war without frontiers. It could engulf the entire six hundred million people of this sub-continent with all its terrible consequences. But we trust that even at this late hour it may be possible for the Indian leaders to pause and consider where India's true interests lie and that she may refrain from seeking a military decision. 8. As you know Mr. President we have time and again warned your Government that arming of India by the U.S. on the scale on which it has proceeded during the last two years could only lead to situations such as the present, that India would be encouraged to settle her disputes with Pakistan by force, that she was building two armies--one allegedly to fight the Chinese and the other to contain Pakistan--but that when she found a suitable opportunity she would employ both these armies against Pakistan. Your Government continued to believe that India had no such aggressive intentions, and has continued to arm India even though the Chinese military threat has admittedly receded. While defending this policy spokesmen of your Government have time and again reminded us of American assurances to come to our assistance in the event of aggression. At one time Mr. Harriman even expressed surprise to our Ambassador that Pakistan should not have been satisfied with those assurances. That India should have followed her aggressive actions in the Rann of Kutch by proceeding to mass against Pakistan practically her entire army--and a large part of forces allegedly facing China--regardless of your diplomatic persuasions to the contrary, and that the two countries should now be on the brink of war confirms fears we have repeatedly expressed about the unwisdom of arming an aggressive and unreliable India. 9. Explaining the explosive situation arising out of the massing of Indian troops on our borders we have suggested to your Ambassador that your Government consider reminding Mr. Shastri of the existence of American assurances in the event of aggression against Pakistan in the hope that such a reminder may help to deter Mr. Shastri and the other fire-eating Indian leaders from involving the sub-continent in a war which could do irreparable damage to the cause of freedom and peace in this region. With warm personal regards, Yours sincerely, Mohammad Ayub Khan." Ends. I should be grateful if the above message is conveyed to the President. Please accept, Mr. Secretary, the assurances of my highest consideration./2/ /2/Ahmed delivered the letter to Rusk on May 11. After reading the letter, Rusk commented that according to a Reuters report just received from Karachi, the two sides appeared to have reached agreement on British proposals relating to the dispute in the Rann of Kutch. If that were the case, the concerns mentioned in Ayub's letter became moot. Ahmed agreed but reiterated that until a settlement was effected the situation along the border was volatile. (Telegram 1288 to Karachi, May 11; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 32-1 INDIA-PAK) G. Ahmed
121. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Pakistan/1/ Washington, May 14, 1965, 8:09 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 32-1 INDIA-PAK. Secret; Immediate. Drafted by Laingen; cleared in substance by Murray in OSD/ISA, and Officer in Charge of UK Affairs Thomas M. Judd; and approved by Handley. Also sent to New Delhi and London, and repeated to CINCMEAFSA. 1305. Pak Ambassador G. Ahmed called on Acting Assistant Secretary Handley at former's initiative May 14. Ambassador said he had very urgent message from his Government following up conversation he had had with Secretary May 11./2/ /2/See footnote 2, Document 120. Ambassador prefaced his remarks by saying British were now at most critical stage of negotiations and that as he understood it there were two main points of difference. First related to definition of issue itself and on this GOP view was that it of utmost importance that issue be clearly described as dispute that it is. This particularly important because next and important step was arbitration. Second point of difference related to re-establishment status quo. Indians insisting on reversion in Kutch to status quo as of January 1, 1965 and Ambassador said it seemed GOP prepared accept this. In view of much more serious problem however of present concentration forces along other areas Pak-Indian border, his Government felt it of extreme importance that agreement also provide for withdrawal forces all along Indian border. In response question from Handley, Ambassador said Paks had made this proposal a condition to agreement to British proposals but he unaware of any Indian response. Ambassador then said he under instructions inform U.S. that GOP regarded this condition of very great importance, particularly because of recent serious violations Pak air space. On May 12 unidentified Indian aircraft had overflown Suleimanki; on May 14 Indian Canberra had overflown Kharian, headquarters Pak armored strength. Ambassador said that ordinarily of course such planes would have been shot down but such action not taken because of Ayub's firm instructions up to now avoid any retaliatory action that ran risk broader conflict. His Government had now informed him however that because of latest overflights, PAF now under instructions take whatever action necessary deter further such violations. Ambassador said this emphasized extreme urgency of some agreement that would result in disentanglement of armies now facing each other along borders. Handley said Ambassador well aware that we supporting British efforts. As Secretary said May 11 greatest possible prudence on both sides now essential and he wanted to re-emphasize what Secretary had said. He was sure Ambassador aware of tremendous costs to both countries should conflict ensue. He hoped strongly that agreement could be reached on cease fire so that both sides rather than risking pounding each other in battle would pound negotiating table across from each other. Said that alleged Indian overflights and possible Pak response highlighted extreme delicacy of situation and essentiality prudence and restraint on both sides. Handley said he would of course ensure that Ambassador's comments brought to attention all concerned. Ambassador said Paks already exercising restraint but this had to be considered against facts involved. Facts were that Indians now more seriously violating Pak air space. In East Pakistan at Lathitilla Indians were engaged in heavy firing at Pak positions that could have serious consequences. In West Pakistan India had four Divisions, including armored Division, drawn up as close as 150 yards and at 25-mile depth. In East Pakistan Indians had available seven Divisions, three of which near Sikkim facing Chinese but other four already poised at various places along East Pakistan border. All of these facts in Pak view emphasized need for U.S. to use its influence help ensure that there be speedy disentanglement of forces along borders and urgent steps to stop any further violations Pak air space. In subsequent telephone conversation Handley asked whether Pakistan had informed India of stronger position it now taking on alleged overflights. Ambassador said he did not know. Handley stressed urgent importance Pakistan doing so. We would of course inform our Embassy Delhi and GOI of what Ambassador had told us/3/ but this clearly no substitute Paks taking steps immediately ensure that Indians aware instructions Pak forces now operating under. /3/After his meeting with Ahmed, Handley called in Indian Minister Banerjee and conveyed to him the warning concerning Indian overflights of Pakistan territory that Ahmed had passed on to Handley. The Embassy in New Delhi was instructed to make a similar approach to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (Telegram 2408 to New Delhi, May 14; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 31-1 INDIA-PAK) Comment: We see G. Ahmed's approach combined with Ayub letter/4/ as Pak effort designed enlist our aid in applying pressure on Indians at crucial point in British cease-fire negotiations. Their intent seems to be to try to shift our attention from Kutch and use of MAP there to broader question of possible Indian action elsewhere and our assurances relating thereto. We do not intend see GOP turn tables to keep our feet to fire instead of other way on. /4/See Document 120. For London: Please pass this urgently to Pickard. Ball
122. Memorandum From Robert Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson/1/ Washington, May 20, 1965. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Name File, Komer Memos, Vol. I. Limited Official Use. Here is a new pitch from Dave Bell/2/ on the importance of going ahead with the remaining already authorized loans to India and Pakistan plus the advance program loans to both. /2/ Reference is to a May 20 memorandum from David E. Bell, Administrator of the Agency for International Development, to President Johnson. In the memorandum, Bell outlined the pending loans to India and Pakistan that would fulfill consortia commitments made to each country. (Ibid., NSC History, Indian Famine, Aug 1966-Feb 1967, Vol. IV) AID and State see a strong foreign policy argument for going ahead in a normal businesslike way, especially so as to avoid suspicion that there was a major policy change implicit in the postponement of the Ayub and Shastri visits. Beyond this, however, Bell is quite concerned over his domestic budgetary problem. All of the money involved, including the advances, is from already appropriated FY'65 aid funds. If we don't go ahead and obligate some of this before 30 May, it will look as though AID is crowding an unusually large amount of obligations into the last month of the fiscal year. Worse yet, if we don't approve any of these loans before the end of the fiscal year, AID will have about $250 million left over on 30 June. Since we presented the FY'65 aid program to Congress last year as a minimum figure, we will have some explaining to do if this large an amount is left unspent. A carryover of this size might also affect Congressional willingness to approve the full amount you've requested for FY 1966. Therefore, Bundy and I would join State and AID in urging that you approve going ahead with this program. If we desire to exert pressure on Pakistan and/or India by holding off on various aid loans we can easily do so with FY 1966 money, where we will not be under the same end of the fiscal year time pressure. Should you still have questions, Dave Bell is eager to talk with you on this matter. R. W. Komer Approve /3/Johnson checked this option line. Komer sent another memorandum to the President on this issue on May 25 urging a positive decision. Johnson responded with a handwritten note on the memorandum that reads as follows: "Bob--Don't press me or pressure me--I'll get to this when I can, I hope today." (Ibid., Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. 10, Apr 15-May 31, 1965)
123. Letter From Prime Minister Shastri to President Johnson/1/ New Delhi, May 23, 1965. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, India, Shastri Correspondence. No classification marking. Dear Mr. President, On April 16, 1965 Ambassador Chester Bowles conveyed to me your message/2/ informing me that for various reasons it would not be convenient for you to receive me in Washington on the 2nd June as previously arranged. In deference to your wishes, I had naturally, and I must confess with some sense of disappointment, to cancel the visit to the United States which was scheduled for early June. You have suggested that I should visit the USA in autumn. I am, however, not able to say at present whether my parliamentary and other commitments will permit me to do so. /2/See Document 102. You have referred to our close association in many common endeavours. We greatly value this association and trust that it will continue undiminished in a spirit of mutual understanding. I was happy to meet Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge who also handed me your letter of April 15. I was interested to learn from him about the Vietnam situation. The situation is really depressing and dangerous. I hope that it might be possible for circumstances to arise which will permit of a dialogue and a peaceful solution of the Vietnam problem. I know the same thought must be uppermost in your mind also. In today's situation when China is pursuing an aggressive policy, it is difficult to anticipate with any degree of certainty, the likely course of events. But believe me Mr. President, I do feel sincerely that the more rational elements might possibly respond well if it were possible for you to consider a cessation of the air strikes. In any case it would greatly strengthen the chances of a peaceful solution. Such a decision on your part would be a significant contribution towards the promotion of world peace and would be in keeping with the high statesmanship which the United States has displayed in moments of crisis. We ourselves have been passing through a difficult situation. You are no doubt informed of the recent attack on us by Pakistan in the Kutch-Sind border area. This has roused a great deal of feeling. We are a peaceful nation wedded to the pursuit of peace and economic development but it seems our neighbours China and Pakistan are determined to provoke us. We are exercising a great deal of patience and we have responded positively to Prime Minister Harold Wilson's initiative to bring about a ceasefire and restoration of status quo ante. I am afraid Pakistan has been raising all kinds of difficulties regarding ceasefire and restoration of status quo as on 1st January, 1965 which have prevented an agreement being reached. The fact that Pakistan has been using United States armour and equipment against us has naturally caused much concern in our country. I know, however, that your Government has already taken up this matter with the Government of Pakistan. With warmest personal regards, Yours sincerely, Lal Bahadur [Continue with the next documents]
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