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FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1964-1968, Volume XXV South Asia
Department of State |
124. Memorandum From Robert Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)/1/ Washington, May 28, 1965. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Name File, Komer Memos, Vol. I. Confidential. McGB: FYI we face two other India-Pak aid problems, which we haven't dared put up to the President yet:/2/ /2/Bundy added a handwritten note to the end of the memorandum that reads: "Don't be scared--let's get ready to talk it out with him." 1. The pre-pledging session of the Pak consortium meets next Tuesday. Normally, we'd tell the other donors what we plan to put in, as an incentive to them. AID would normally lobby during this session to line up pledges for the next. The Paks are asking for $500 million (an economically sound step up from $435 last year), so the main issue will be who ups the ante how much. But this time we'll simply say we haven't made up our minds. This lack of our usual enthusiasm will signal to the Paks that we're not doing business as usual, even though we'll say the increased Pak request is justified. There's enough uncertainty in this kind of signal (since we've already done some lobbying with the Germans) not to provoke a sharp Pak reaction, but it will make Ayub wonder. This might provide some restraint on his performance at the Algiers conference. Then, we'll have to make up our minds before pledging meeting at end of July. 2. We have to negotiate a new PL 480 agreement for India in June. The present one expires 30 June, and the pipeline will begin running out in July unless the Indians can place new orders mid-June. Meanwhile, there are a lot of technical details to be ironed out here and then negotiated with the Indians. We've told the State and AID not to ask the President's approval until they've taken comprehensive Congressional soundings. They'll finish that process and be in with their request for go-ahead late next week. In sum, we can probably get through next week's Pak consortium session without going to LBJ, though we'll need his guidance before the end of July meeting. But Indian PL 480 is more urgent, since we really have to get going now to keep the food moving. RWK
125. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in India/1/ Washington, June 3, 1965, 10:52 a.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 32-1 INDIA-PAK. Secret; Priority; Limdis. Drafted by Schneider on June 2, cleared by Cameron, and approved and initialed by Talbot. Repeated to Karachi and London. 2518. Ref New Delhi's 3523, info London 909, Karachi 805./2/ Despite disappointing Indian response to latest British proposals and British discouragement in Delhi at near impasse reached there, it looks to us that British are far from dead end in current negotiating effort. While Indian position is more rigid, we note from complete rundown given by British here that Paks continue to be more flexible on points of difference, i.e., patrolling and disengagement. (This confirmed by NPR 793.)/3/ British here also indicate CRO considering alternate ways of resolving disengagement impasse and that James/4/ has specifically recommended that USG not intervene at this time. James says U.S. might help push agreement on disengagement later on but should do so in support of British proposals and not as separate initiative. /2/In telegram 3523 from New Delhi, June 2, the Embassy noted that the military confrontation between India and Pakistan was likely to become more dangerous if allowed to drift. Arguing that U.S. interests in the subcontinent would compel the United States to become involved if the situation became more heated, the Embassy proposed direct U.S. involvement in the search for a settlement before a more dangerous confrontation developed. (Ibid.) /3/Not found. /4/Sir Morrice James. We continue to see prospect that British effort may continue for some time with considerable hope for success. While Shastri may not have authority to negotiate with Ayub in London, we doubt either side will burn bridges before then especially as there are signs that both appear to be genuinely concerned about avoiding misstep that could have serious consequences for both. Following Commonwealth Conference there will be visits by Wilson to subcontinent later in summer. Knowledge of forthcoming visits should help prevent either side from breaking off discussions and visits should be occasion for further negotiation. In short, there seems to be time for further British efforts; two parties seem to want to find a way out of escalating conflict; and therefore there is room for further progress toward agreement. We doubt that US would be in better position than UK to bring Indians and Paks to agreement on disengagement at this time. In fact, we believe that so long as British effort continues, our participation in separate initiative would complicate British diplomatic task and lessen prospect for their success. US intervention on this issue in both capitals (particularly in Delhi) is not likely to be very effective at this time; even our bona fides are sometimes questioned. For example, Embassy suggests we use security assurances and military aid as leverage. Credibility of assurances has been seriously challenged in both countries (e.g. see Embtel 3518)/5/ and Indians, whose negotiating position would suffer most by disengagement, are already questioning value of our military aid. Finally it seems quite unlikely that US initiative could be kept secret. Leak would put great political pressure on Shastri, particularly because of current attitudes about US in India. /5/Dated June 1. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, DEF 18 UN) In light of above we have reached conclusion that US should not take up separate initiative on subcontinent at present time. Ambassador Bowles concurs. Rusk
126. Memorandum From Robert Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson/1/ Washington, June 5, 1965. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. 11, June 1965. Secret. I hesitate to bring this matter up again, but a new wrinkle has developed on remaining FY 65 aid loans to India and Pakistan. Otto Passman/2/ is pressing Dave Bell on how much money AID expects to have left over at the end of this fiscal year. Bell seeks guidance as he feels he can't delay answering Passman beyond next week or the latter will begin to smell a rat. /2/Otto E. Passman, Representative from Louisiana, Chairman of the House Subcommittee on Foreign Aid. A lesser problem is that the Indians and Paks are beginning to ask insistently how soon some of these loans will be released. They are not aware to date of any hold order; instead we think the Indians in particular are worried because their foreign exchange reserves have dropped to a record low of $162 million (they've even been forced to draw a $125 million standby from the IMF). To recap, AID and State seek a go-ahead on three categories of aid: (a) Some $227 million in loans to India and $18.5 million to Pakistan, which have already been approved, authorized, and announced, and where only formal loan agreements remain to be signed; (b) some $76 million in loan applications for India and $51 million for Pakistan--AID would like to authorize those which pass muster; and (c) new program loans of up to $100 million for India and up to $70 million for Pakistan as a first installment on this year's pledges. All but the new $70 million for Pakistan is covered by pledges already made./3/ /3/At the twelfth meeting of the India consortium, held in Washington on April 21, the United States pledged $435 million of the $1,027,160,000 pledged by the consortium to support India for FY 1965-66. (Circular airgram CA-12756, May 28; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, AID 9 INDIA) Bell expects to obligate fully all other AID funds, so his answer to Passman depends essentially on the India/Pak items above. There seem to be three options: A. Authorize Bell to proceed to the extent necessary to obligate all FY 1965 aid funds before 30 June, but to continue holding off on anything beyond. This is the course which State and AID recommend on foreign policy grounds, and to meet existing commitments. It would also permit Bell to meet the Passman problem. B. Authorize proceeding on all previously announced loans and other feasible project loans, but not the new program loans for India or Pakistan. In this case Bell sees us falling short on obligating FY 65 funds by about $125-175 million. C. Hold off on all further loans to India and Pakistan in which case AID will have about $250-300 million in Development Loan funds left over./4/ /4/Bundy sent this memorandum to Johnson on June 5 with a covering memorandum in which he explained that Komer had prepared his memorandum at Bundy's request. Bundy noted that he strongly favored alternative A of those listed in Komer's memorandum. (Ibid.) R. W. K./5/ /5/Bundy initialed below Komer's initials. Approve Course A, B, C. (check your choice), or /6/This option is checked.
127. Letter From President Johnson to Prime Minister Shastri/1/ Washington, June 5, 1965. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 294, Johnson/India, 1964-1965. Secret; Exdis. A typewritten note at the end of the letter reads: "Handed to Mr. David Schneider, NEA, 6-11-65 for delivery to Ambassador Nehru to be hand carried to PM Shastri in Canada." The text of the letter was transmitted to New Delhi in telegram 2540, June 5, for delivery to Shastri prior to his departure for Canada. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, India, Shastri Correspondence) Dear Mr. Prime Minister: Your letter of May 23/2/ arrived as I was writing to send my best wishes on the first anniversary of your assuming the office of Prime Minister. The year has been a difficult one for both of us, but I know that our faith in the democratic way of doing things will bear fruit. /2/Document 123. We have also been deeply concerned over the unhappy events in the Rann of Kutch and the use of U.S. military equipment in this dispute. The role of a friend to both parties is not easy and often misunderstood. But I believe our efforts to put a stop to the use of our military equipment were helpful in getting the fighting stopped. Now the problem becomes one of finding a formula for peaceful settlement as a substitute for settlement by force. Despite the problems you mention, I deeply hope that you can reach an agreement, and thereby reduce the awesome possibility of larger conflict. I fully share your desire that you and I, and our two governments, should act always in a spirit of mutual understanding. In that spirit, let me respond very frankly to your suggestion that the search for peace in Vietnam might be furthered by a cessation of the air strikes being conducted against North Vietnam by the South Vietnamese and U.S. air forces. You know the importance we attach to a solution to the Vietnam problem. To us, the Chinese Communist-supported aggression in Vietnam poses the same kind of threat to Free World interests as Communist China's attack on India in 1962. I wish to tell you in utmost privacy of the effort we have already made to induce a response from Hanoi by a suspension of air strikes, and the depressing lack of any response. I enclose an informal and confidential memorandum/3/ which candidly describes our efforts to date, and our current thinking as to certain future possibilities. It reflects my own deep desire to find a road to peace in Vietnam, and to share my thinking with you fully to this end. /3/Not printed. The text of this memorandum was also transmitted to New Delhi in telegram 2540. Let me assure you that we will continue prayerfully to explore any hopeful opening. There is no step I would not take if in my judgment it offered real prospect of the peaceful settlement we both want. I deeply regret that your parliamentary and other commitments may not permit an autumn visit. I assure you we would welcome a visit at any future date you should conclude would be desirable and convenient to you./4/ /4/The Embassy reported that the text of President Johnson's letter was delivered to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on June 6 and was received with the assurance that it would be passed on to Shastri before he departed for Canada. (Telegram 3567 from New Delhi, June 6; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 15-1 INDIA) With warm personal regards. Sincerely, Lyndon B. Johnson
128. Memorandum From Robert Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson/1/ Washington, June 8, 1965. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. 10, Apr. 15-May 31, 1965. Secret. Two pages of statistics detailing economic and military assistance provided to India and Pakistan, 1946-1965, were attached but are not printed. SUBJECT Rusk, McNamara, Mann and Bell have been asked to attend. This memo summarizes the current situation. Much of it is familiar ground but Bundy and I thought you'd like a recap. US aid an incentive to other donors. The precedents on economic aid to India/Pakistan go back almost to the end of World War II, basically as part of our effort to shore up the threatened nations on the borders of the Communist Bloc. Then in 1958, we organized a World Bank consortium for India as a device to get other Western countries to bear more of the aid burden. Each year since we've used a US pledge as a lever on them. This has proven quite successful--in FY 1965 for example we got total pledges of over $1 billion, of which our share was around 40%. In 1961 we did the same thing for Pakistan; here our share has run somewhat higher (around 50% in the last two years), but we've gotten other donors and the Bank heavily involved. So Bell is naturally concerned lest, if we begin to backtrack, our UK, Japanese, German and other friends will too. Administration clearance of FY'65 India/Pak aid. After being worked out among the agencies, the FY'65 figures went through the regular vetting procedure; (a) BOB reviewed the forward projections provided by AID for consistency with Administration guidelines; (b) the regular budget submission was reviewed by BOB, and then discussed with you; (c) the annual foreign aid message was cleared; and (d) the Congressional presentation was then checked with BOB. The Bundy shop participated throughout. I think it fair to say that all AID decisions and authorizations during FY'65, including consortium pledges, have been within these Administration guidelines. In late April, following your call to Tom Mann about our pending FY'66 pledge to the Indian consortium, we put out a special White House request that all pending Pak/Indian aid decisions be cleared here first. We've been operating on this basis to the present. Issues for Decision. Mostly because of circumstance, but partly because of our hold order, we have an end of fiscal year logjam. Since we've already disbursed most of Pakistan's FY'65 aid, the logjam mostly affects India: A. Some $227 million in loans to India and $18.5 million to Pakistan which have already been approved, authorized and announced. Only the actual signing of the loan agreements remains. The biggest item is a $190 million program loan to India under last year's consortium pledge. For Passman purposes this money is regarded as already committed (it will not show up as an end-FY 65 shortfall); of course, it is also regarded as committed by the Indians and Paks. B. Some $76 million in loan applications for India and $61 million for Pakistan. AID would like to authorize those which are ready before 30 June to utilize FY'65 funds, but not all will be ready. C. For the last two years we have given India an advance program loan for a fraction of our new consortium pledge, to keep aid flowing since the Indian fiscal year begins two months earlier than ours. This year State and AID want to give up to $100 million to India and start the same procedure for Pakistan with up to $70 million. Aside from being good economics, this is essential to commit FY'65 funds which otherwise would be haggled about by Passman on specious grounds. It does not deprive us of much FY'66 leverage, since it covers only a fifth to a third of what we'd normally give. Nor does this money flow till we actually sign the loan, it would only be authorized now. D. The Indian PL 480 agreement also expires 30 June, and the pipeline will begin running out this July. To forestall hoarding and then hunger in India, we need approval to make a new one-year agreement. The case for going ahead with the above items is threefold: A. It forestalls a sterile debate with Passman over why we couldn't even commit the allegedly minimum amount requested for FY 1965. If we hold up all new commitments beyond June 30, we'll run $250-300 million short. B. It avoids the risk of a major to-do with Paks and Indians over whether we are backing away from pledges and commitments already made. Both now strongly suspect we're holding out on them, but haven't been able to pin it on us yet. If we hold up past 30 June, however, this will be impossible to conceal. C. The story will inevitably be played up in the US press. Among other things, it will revive speculation about the real purpose of the Ayub and Shastri postponements. D. The backlash might affect current aid appropriations, if Congress gets a sense that the Administration is backing off on India/Pak aid. Recommendations. You can use tomorrow's meeting both to forestall the above kind of unnecessary trouble and to put State, AID and Defense on notice that you're highly sceptical about our current Pak/Indian policies and (a) want a hard new look at them before we spend a lot more money; (b) want to keep the Paks and Indians worried lest Uncle Sam become a lot less generous. Essentially, the trick would be to do the necessary to limit the risk to our FY 66 aid appropriation, but simultaneously instruct State and AID that we want to play a lot harder to get with the Indians and Paks. The following scenario would serve this purpose: 1. You'll go ahead reluctantly on using up FY 65 money only because we're too far down the pike to pull back gracefully without (a) accusations that we're backing off on pledges; or (b) giving Passman a handle to cut FY 66 money. 2. But you seriously question whether we're getting our money's worth from this huge investment, and intend to continue personally vetting all major new commitments until we've done a basic policy review which satisfies you and which you can use persuasively on the Congress. Rusk should take leadership on this. 3. You don't want to have Ayub or Shastri here till we've worked out our new policy line, and have softened both up to the point where they want to come for help rather than come tell you how to run Vietnam, etc. So you want much clearer signals to both Paks and Indians first (perhaps via special emissaries). 4. Despite Pakistan's fine economic performance, let's get across quietly but clearly to Ayub that he can't play China's game while being banked by the US. 5. Let's tell the Indians we're not very happy with them either, especially their tendency to take our aid for granted without doing enough to help themselves or to recognize that we're fighting their war in Vietnam. 6. In effect you fully recognize the central importance of India/Pakistan, but when we're investing as much AID money there as in the Alianza, you see a need for tighter control and greater emphasis on results./2/ /2/Bundy sent this memorandum to Johnson on June 8 under cover of a brief memorandum in which he stated: "I think he makes a very good case for authorizing the immediate public decisions, while insisting on a hard new look at our Indian/Pak policy." (Ibid.) Johnson responded with a handwritten note on Bundy's covering memorandum that reads: "I'm not for allocating or approving $1 now unless I have already signed and agreed--If I have, show me when and where." R. W. Komer/3/ /3/McGeorge Bundy initialed below Komer's signature.
129. Memorandum by the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)/1/ Washington, June 9, 1965. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Pakistan, Vol. III, Memos, 12/64-7/65. Secret; Limit Distribution. Copies were sent to the Under Secretary of State, the Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, and the Director of the Bureau of the Budget. MEMORANDUM FOR SUBJECT After reviewing and discussing a memorandum from Messrs. Bell and Mann,/2/ the President: /2/Reference is to a memorandum from Bell to the President, dated June 9, dealing with AID loans to India and Pakistan. A copy is ibid., NSC History, Indian Famine, Aug 66-Feb 67, Vol I. 1. Agreed that AID could proceed with those loans already authorized and announced, plus certain loans which are close to completion (these loans are detailed in the attachment to the 9 June Bell/Mann Memorandum). 2. Directed that there be no additional decisions, authorizations or announcements on loans to India or Pakistan without his approval, pending passage of the FY 1966 foreign aid appropriation. 3. Disapproved advance program loans to India and Pakistan, even if as a result we had to ask Congress to reappropriate the money involved. 4. Requested an early review of economic aid to India and Pakistan by State and AID, in the context of our global pattern of use of aid resources. It should cover such issues as: (a) whether the US should be spending such large sums in either country; and (b) how to achieve more leverage for our money, in terms both of more effective self-help and of our political purposes. 5. Requested early recommendations on (a) a new PL 480 agreement with India; (b) what US pledge, if any, should be made at the Pakistan Consortium pledging session in late July. McG. Bundy
130. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Talbot) to Secretary of State Rusk/1/ Washington, June 10, 1965. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 32-1 INDIA-PAK. Secret. Drafted by India Desk Officer Albert A. Lakeland. A handwritten "Saw" next to the Secretary's name on the memorandum indicates that Rusk saw it. SUBJECT According to reports from United Nations Observer Group (UNMOGIP) sources, on the night of May 16-17 Indian troops attacked and occupied two Pak outposts near Kargil on the Pak side of the Kashmir ceasefire line. On June 6 the Indians reportedly extended their salient by twenty to twenty-five miles to the west of Kargil. The Indians thus far have refused to give up the territory they have occupied. General Nimmo has not yet reported the Indian violation to UN Headquarters in the hope that he will be able to persuade the Indians to withdraw. The Pak posts occupied by the Indians overlooked the strategic Srinagar-to-Leh road, India's only land link to its forces in Ladakh. The Indians for some time have been concerned over possible Sino-Pak cooperation directed against India in sensitive areas. The incidents near Kargil are clearly related to the sharp increase in recent months of the number and intensity of incidents all along the ceasefire line; and the escalation of fighting along the ceasefire line is itself a symptom of the very serious deterioration of Indo-Pak relations evidenced by the fighting in the Rann of Kutch and the subsequent forward deployment of the armies of both countries at key points all along the Indo-Pak border. We are asking New Delhi's comments on the report from UNMOGIP sources (see Karachi's 2363 at Tab A)/2/ that the Indians are using American ammunition against the Paks in Kashmir. USUN has been asked to initiate discussions with Ralph Bunche regarding the capabilities of UNMOGIP to carry out its assigned functions (see Deptel 2896 at Tab B)./2/ /2/Dated June 9; not printed.
131. Memorandum From Robert Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)/1/ Washington, June 11, 1965. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Pakistan, Vol. III, Memos, 12/64-7/65. Secret. Mac-- Leaning on the Paks. Lest anyone should think we're utterly immobile, we've already done a few things (though I've had an uphill fight all the way): 1. We've stalled two years, and are still, on two squadrons F-104s, for which Paks are bleeding. 2. At recent Consortium pre-pledging session, we didn't even mention a figure, but instead joined World Bank, UK, and Germans in beating up Paks on certain economic conditions. 3. We didn't come through with new PL 480 agreement Paks wanted but simply extended present one six months with no add-ons (because Paks haven't complied with reporting provisions). 4. We turned down $25-30 million Roopur atomic power plant (on technical grounds that Paks couldn't market that much power). 5. We're stalling on $120 million Karachi steel mill (for which Paks are panting). Real grounds are that ExIm refused so much as a 2/3 share, so AID got cold feet and is doing a new survey. Fascinating thing is that all the above have apparently been taken by the Paks as political signals, when in fact the last three were straight economic in origin (so was the second in large part). This just shows you the perils of heliographing to parties that don't speak the same language. At any rate I've told AID that, whatever they may have intended, they did a swell job. New signals. Instead of special envoys, or tough talk just now, I favor keeping up the above line. For ostensibly legitimate economic reasons, we keep stalling and diddling. The Paks take it all as really political, but it's that much harder for them to confront us: 1. Postpone Pak pledging session a month, on grounds we need a better answer to US and IB queries. This will rock the Paks, and buy us another month to see if they come around. It also buys more time to decide how much we'll pledge. 2. Keep stalling on Karachi steel mill, new PL 480 agreement, etc. 3. Hold up deliveries on other MAP items besides planes. Stalling on tanks and APCs would painfully remind Ayub we don't want him using US-supplied armor in places like the Rann of Kutch. Also, Rusk just approved selling some ammo to the Paks./2/ Why? /2/Next to this sentence in the margin, Komer wrote: "Gawd!" 4. Now that McNamara has spoken his golden words, why not operate on the most sensitive nerve of all--Peshawar? If we cut back a little on personnel or new construction there, it would shake Pak confidence in what they regard as their hole card. They'd really be shaken if they thought we were getting ready to pull out. Such a signal would have to be carefully handled, lest the Paks think Aziz Ahmed's recent approach scared us off. What say we clue Raborn/Helms on LBJ's strong views, and ask them to look into this. We're embarked on a risky course, and it will take steady nerves, because Ayub will probably growl back before retreating. But we have a clear mandate now, and I'm really using it now to move the way we should have long since. RWK
132. Telegram From the Embassy Office in Pakistan to the Department of State/1/ Rawalpindi, June 11, 1965. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 15-1 PAK. Secret; Priority. Repeated to Karachi, New Delhi, Algiers, London, and CINCMEAFSA for POLAD. 58. (1) I had 70-minute meeting with President in Rawalpindi this morning, with Foreign Minister Bhutto and Foreign Office notetaker also present. Prevailing atmosphere was frank and favorable, with dominant note of seriousness. General environment confirmed recent impression there has been some limited GOP re-evaluation of foreign policy situation to our advantage. (2) We opened with discussion Indo-Pak confrontation crisis. On Rann of Kutch, I expressed our emphatic backing of UK Good Offices effort, and stated our earnest hope that search for settlement formula would be pursued diligently and non-stop until agreement reached. Indicated our disappointment that impasse so protracted. Suggested that if no agreement reached earlier, talks be pursued at London while Ayub and Shastri both at Commonwealth Prime Ministers Conference. Urged Ayub as leader in stronger and more prestigious political position be prepared to go the extra mile of conciliation if necessary in order to achieve agreement. Noted that two sides had already reached agreement in principle substantive question, and that remaining points of disagreement seemed to involve more tactics and supposed face-saving than substance. Ayub responded that he was indeed disposed to go the limit on conciliation and felt that he had already done so. It was Shastri who had refused to agree to immediate termination of dangerous deployment of forces along Pak border which GOI had initiated. And it was Shastri who refused accept an impartial formula for patrol routes in Rann of Kutch during interim period. Ayub said contemptuously that Shastri was "talking through his Dhoti" in his immoderate claims, demands, and threats. Ayub assured me he would continue diligently in the search for agreement and he spoke highly of British efforts. (3) On larger question of Indo-Pak confrontation outside the Rann, Ayub concurred with deep conviction in my statement of dangerous flammability of situation and wasteful, burdensome cost in economic and development terms of protracted deployment of forces along borders. He stressed Pak anxiety to normalize military posture immediately and deplored Indian refusal. He deprecated Indian HICOM's recent statement to him that Pak insistence on withdrawal of forces from borders was a challenge of Indian sovereignty. Stated he could not fathom such distorted reasoning, especially since Paks were not even suggesting where Indian forces should be stationed once they are removed from their present unnatural and threatening deployment in immediate border area. Ayub referred to Indian incursions in Kargil area of Kashmir cease-fire line. He said five lightly manned posts well over on Pak side have been completely overrun by overwhelming Indian force and continue to be held by Indians. Said he supposed this was implementation of Indian threat to respond to Rann of Kutch incident at unrelated place "of their own choosing." Ayub regretted inability of UN military observer group to prevent violations. Said he thought Commanding General Nimmo entirely too senile and feeble to be effective. When I speculated on the desirability of considering a strengthening of UNMOGIP as a means of keeping the peace, he indicated that he would be inclined to give sympathetic consideration to any UN proposal along such lines. [Here follows discussion of the forthcoming African-Asian Conference at Algiers and an assessment of developments in Southeast Asia.] 7. Ayub appeal for certain additional MAP by grant or credit sale being reported separately./2/ /2/In telegram 2416 from Karachi, June 18, McConaughy reported that during a June 11 conversation, Ayub made an appeal for limited additional military assistance. Ayub said he had carefully selected a few high-performance items designed to have a deterrent effect on a potential aggressor. He asked for a "moderate" number of higher performance planes to replace the aging F-86 fighters of the Air Force. McConaughy noted that when Ayub referred to higher performance aircraft, presumably he meant F-104s. Ayub also asked for a number of tanks and four submarines. (Ibid., DEF 19-3 US-PAK) McConaughy
133. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in India/1/ Washington, June 15, 1965, 10:51 a.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 32-1 INDIA-PAK. Secret; Immediate; Limdis. Drafted by Schneider on June 14, cleared by Judd in BNA, and approved by Talbot. Also sent to London, and repeated to Karachi, USUN, and CINCMEAFSA for POLAD. 2590. Following summary is FYI and Noforn. It is uncleared and subject to amendment upon review of memcon. Following return from Ottawa where he had seen Prime Minister Shastri, Amb. B.K. Nehru came in to see Secretary June 14. Said Shastri had asked him raise extremely serious matter at highest possible level in USG. Shastri wished inform us that if friends of India and Pakistan desired peace on subcontinent they should exert maximum possible pressure on Pakistan to evacuate Rann of Kutch. India had accepted initial British proposal for negotiations and had thereafter accepted number of changes proposed by Paks. India could make no further concessions and could not tolerate Pak occupation Indian territory. If diplomacy fails, India must use force to drive out Pakistan. GOI is quite aware of political, economic and social consequences of war. It has however reached point at which it can make no further concessions. In response Secretary commented on appalling consequences of subcontinental war which could not be limited to clash between armed forces. Said casualties would be comparable to those of nuclear exchange. Because of this India and Pakistan almost compelled approach idea of war as inconceivable. Since points of difference regarding British proposal small, Secretary saw great imbalance between nature of differences and consequences of war. Recalling difficult year and a half of discussions he had had with Gromyko following the 1961 Kennedy-Khrushchev meeting Secretary observed it easy to start war; alternative of working out peaceful solutions much more difficult. India and Pakistan should bear this in mind since consequences of war so enormous. Secretary said we strongly support British negotiating effort. We will be in touch with British as well as Paks and Indians, but obviously solution this problem not to be found in Washington. Nehru repeated that India fully aware consequences of war but could not make further concessions. Said Indian view was that President Ayub does not want war but Bhutto and Aziz Ahmed wish avoid settlement and are relying on Communist Chinese support. Shastri was concerned about possibility direct Chicom intervention. Secretary said he was not in position comment with assurance regarding this. In view of Ayub's attitude Secretary asked if there could be contact between Pak President and Shastri in London. Nehru said Shastri was committed to Cabinet to avoid discussion Rann of Kutch in London, although subordinate officials may take up question. Nehru also commented on great Indian political pressures on Kutch issue and said if Shastri doesn't take action his successor will do so. Asked about situation on Kashmir ceasefire line near Kargil, Nehru responded Indian action there did not represent government policy. Local Indian commander had taken action in disobedience of orders. This was not Indian countermove./2/ Indians will clear up this matter, but it may take a few days. Nehru said we could tell Paks we had Indian assurance Kargil situation would be "cleared up". /2/On June 16, Indian Charge Banerjee called on Talbot and presented a paper giving the Indian position concerning Kargil, which differed sharply from that conveyed by Nehru to Rusk on June 14. The paper alleged that Pakistani forces had initiated the conflict in the Kargil region and had been repulsed by Indian forces, which were "obliged" to occupy two posts on the Pakistan side of the cease-fire line. Nehru was with Shastri in London and unavailable for comment. (Telegram 2604 to New Delhi, June 16; ibid.) During conversation earlier in day, Nehru had made similar presentation to Talbot. In addition Nehru said L.K. Jha had told him Cabinet had agreed permit Kutch situation remain as is until Shastri's return. If matter not resolved by then there would be nothing to do but employ force. In response Talbot focused on narrow margin of differences separating India and Pakistan and great need for further effort reach agreement in order to avoid disaster. Talbot conveyed above to British Minister (Stewart) June 14. Stewart whether Indian approach was tactical maneuver to involve US or whether Shastri's position really as weak as this suggests. Talbot replied Indian position sounds unbelievable but cannot be discounted. Said this next week in London would be of crucial importance. British may wish consider what influence they can bring to bear. Also noted we had told Indians we support British negotiating effort and consequently we wish avoid getting into substance. Talbot made it clear that any action we might take with Paks would await UK reaction Indian approach. Stewart said he would inform London of above tonight and we could expect London's reactions June 15. Rusk
134. Memorandum From Robert Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson/1/ Washington, June 21, 1965, 1:45 p.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. 11, June 1965. Top Secret. We have set in train the following actions to flesh out your new tactical line designed to soften up the Paks and Indians, and make them come to us: 1. Stalling on MAP. Though matters referred to you recently have involved only economic aid and PL 480, we're operating on the assumption that you want well-orchestrated action across the board. So we've told DOD that, while not suspending everything, we should delay action on certain key MAP and sales items to make both Paks and Indians come to us. In India's case this means chiefly continued stalling on F-5s; in Pakistan's case on F-104s, ammo, and perhaps armor. Since there is a higher risk of a Pak/Indian flareup than any time since 1947, our stalling on MAP makes sense as a warning here too. A major risk, however, is that we're driving the Indian military to get more from the Soviets, which doesn't serve our longer term interest. 2. Intelligence. Since Ayub thinks the Peshawar/2/ facility is his top card, we're looking at ways and means of convincing him it isn't all that important to us. For example, we could halt new construction. This would make the intelligence community scream, but is probably worth it. We're also planning to use [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] to get across indirectly to Ayub that we're close to giving up on the Paks. /2/Johnson circled Peshawar and noted in the margin: "get Raborn opinion." 3. Stalling on Pak Consortium. So far our hold-up on economic aid is hurting the Indians more than the Paks (for the simple reason that more Indian matters have been pending). But the next big occasion will be the FY 1966 pledge to the Pak Consortium, due 27 July. We favor telling the Paks now that we want to postpone this a month, ostensibly for economic reasons. Our thought is to have George Woods go to London and tell Ayub. This will shake Ayub, and buy us more time to see whether our signals are getting through./3/ /3/Komer added a handwritten note in the margin at this point that reads: "Too late! Woods got back today. He did say U.S. was considering this." Are we on the right track on the above? Our new tough-minded Pak/Indian tactics are causing much anguish in the town, especially from those who see their programs endangered. It would help if you'd tell Rusk in particular/4/ (he missed the June meeting), so that we'll have State with us, instead of dragging its feet on such matters. /4/Bundy added a handwritten note in the margin at this point which reads: "(or I can)". R. W. Komer/5/ /5/McGeorge Bundy initialed below Komer's signature. Yes/6/ /6/Johnson checked the "Yes" option line.
135. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between President Johnson and the Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Mann)/1/ Washington, June 28, 1965, 1:20 p.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, Mann Papers, Telephone Conversations with LBJ, May 2, 1965-June 2, 1966. No classification marking. Transcribed in Mann's office. [Here follows discussion unrelated to South Asia.] Mr. Mann told the President that he was working on a draft concerning India and Pakistan./2/ He told the President that Mr. Woods had talked to Ayub in London and had told him that we were uncertain as to what we were going to do on the consortium July 27. Mr. Mann said that in essence Mr. Woods had said that our relations were not of the best; that we were sort of tired of being like a cow that is kicked in the side when milk is wanted and then kicked in the side to let it know that no more milk was needed at the moment. /2/Not found. Mr. Mann told the President what Mr. Woods had said and said he thought that Mr. Woods had done a good job. Mr. Mann said we have a different situation with the Indians. They have not been insulting us as much--particularly in the past ten days. Mr. Mann said that he hoped to have the memo ready by tomorrow. He said he was suggesting that we begin a dialogue with India and Pakistan in which we say in effect that we do not mind cooperating but we expect the same kind of respect everyone else does and say if we cannot establish the kind of understanding the people of this country have a right to expect and want, then we cannot go ahead. If we can reach an understanding then we can go ahead. Mr. Mann said all this would be in the memo and he hoped the President would buy it. He said he would like to see the President send somebody over to talk with Shastri--not at a high level--but quietly. He suggested Mr. Bell. The President said he did not wish to send anybody over and that he thought our Ambassadors should go and talk to these people. Mr. Mann said that the Ambassador to India (Bowles) was here. The President said that the Charge should do it. The President said that he should go in and say that we understand that they are not going to be able to come to America and our President cannot go there and the reason for the postponement was because of the heavy feeling and that we would be glad to discuss it if they want to send somebody over. If they do not wish to do this we will understand. Mr. Mann asked the President if he wanted these men to come over on State visits and the President said he did not but he also did not want to be sending his people over there to give money away. He said he thought that we should tell our Ambassadors in these two countries, that in a dignified and reserved way they should say that we regret very much but we completely understand Mr. Shastri's inability to come. We regret we have to postpone it, but in the President's judgment sentiment is such that he would have no bill at all and that there is a different attitude in our country now on the part of the people and the President (after spending 40 billion in Asia) and we had hoped we would be able to talk it out, but since he could not come, if he wanted to send someone else, or have his Ambassador talk with us about it, that will be fine. The President said that we could let Nehru come in. We then tell him we understand but we are not going to be able to go along on economic basis. Mr. Mann said he thought that on the Pakistan side, Mr. Woods had already made the first steps towards getting a representative over here. The President told Mr. Mann to go ahead and draft whatever he wanted to but that he would like to talk to him about it. He said he would prefer to discuss this with Mr. Mann. Mr. Mann said he understood and that he would draft a paper and then talk to the President about it. The President said that we should let these people know, through our Ambassadors, that we have pulled up business for a while. Mr. Mann said o.k.
136. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson/1/ Washington, June 28, 1965, 7:45 p.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of McGeorge Bundy, Luncheons with the President, Vol. I (Part 1). Secret. Agenda for Tuesday Lunch There are a number of special issues which need brief discussion in order to have your guidance clearly understood, and it may save you time to list them this evening. [Here follow background summaries of unrelated agenda items.] 3. The India-Pakistan problem. Both on Pakistan and India, it is time for specific guidance from you. In the case of the Paks, what is now needed is decision to postpone the Pak consortium scheduled for July 27. You have approved this postponement in principle, but we have not made a direct instruction on it, and that is what will be needed. There is also a smaller matter of Pakistan year-end arms purchases which Dean Rusk may bring up for decision. This is an $8 million straight sale which could go either way, depending on whether you want the foreign exchange or the signal to the Paks. On the Indian side, the principal problem is PL-480. The program is held up, in accordance with your instructions, but the Indians have been fobbed off with a series of stories about technical difficulties, and they simply do not understand that the United States Government is not going to come forward with any proposal at all until they come in and ask us for it in a serious political way. As a practical matter, they may not get this signal unless we make sure that it is communicated to them, and I think it may be time for you to authorize such a communication. It would have to be very skillfully done, and I think Rusk himself may be the man to do it. But you and he should have a very clear understanding of exactly what is to be communicated. Are we talking about not having a PL-480 agreement? Or is there a particular condition attached to it which Rusk should know about? [Here follow summaries of unrelated agenda items.] McG. B.
137. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson/1/ Washington, June 30, 1965, 1:30 p.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. 11, June 1965. Secret. SUBJECT 1. I have talked with Tom Mann this morning, and I think, as a result of your talk with him, the State Department for the first time has really got the signal. As Tom said to me, there has been great reluctance to believe over there that the White House meant what it said, but Tom himself has now taken hold, and I think the results will be very constructive. 2. Three major steps are being taken now: A. The first is definite notice to George Woods that we want the July consortium on Pakistan postponed. This will clear the decks for serious talk with the Pakistani representative who is likely to turn up here quite soon. B. Tom Mann is talking to B.K. Nehru and will make it very clear to him that we think the time is ripe for a very serious talk with the Indians about the whole range of our relationships, which are a very great expense to us. Tom's conversations will be careful and courteous, but thorough, and he will suggest to B.K. that he himself go back to India and get Shastri to designate a really high-level visitor to come over here for very serious talks. C. Bob McNamara is having a full review of the MAP pipeline and will have alternatives for the handling of that for discussion next Tuesday. Meanwhile there will be technical delays on all deliveries in that field. This has been the hardest spigot to get turned off, and Bob thinks there are some tough choices in the handling of it, pending the serious talks that are now in prospect with both countries. But he will have suggestions on that next week. 3. My own conversations with State, AID and Defense make it clear to me that the message is now getting across and that Mann, McNamara and Bell all mean to conduct their business in accordance with your basic desire. This is an important change for the good. 4. There does remain one special case which may require special treatment before we really finish talking turkey with these two governments--that is the question of food for India. I don't see how we can reach any general agreement with the Indians in the next week or two. Yet if we do not make some interim arrangement for shipments of wheat within that time-frame, there may well be a real problem of food shortage in India which the Indians could successfully blame on us. That could bring us a lot of violent and quite unnecessary criticism, and might even give the Soviets a chance to make emergency deliveries and make us look foolish. This is what we just avoided in Egypt a couple of weeks ago. I have told Bob Komer to prepare a contingency plan for interim wheat deliveries on a very limited basis. This plan will not be marketed around the city, but it will be available for a prompt decision in the light of what Tom Mann learns from his first hard talk with Nehru. McG. B.
138. Editorial Note On June 30, 1965, India and Pakistan signed an agreement that ended the fighting in the Rann of Kutch. The agreement, which was facilitated through the good offices of the United Kingdom, was signed separately in Karachi and New Delhi. (Telegrams 2496 from Karachi and 3788 from New Delhi, both June 30; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 32-1 INDIA-PAK) President Ayub of Pakistan issued a statement on June 30 welcoming not only the agreement relating to the Rann of Kutch, but also a second agreement signed by India and Pakistan which called for the withdrawal of troops from both sides of the entire border between India and Pakistan. (Telegram 6 from Karachi, July 1; ibid.) President Johnson sent a personal message to British Prime Minister Wilson on June 30 congratulating him on his success in bringing the conflict to a peaceful solution. (Telegram 8235 to London; ibid.) The agreement signed by India and Pakistan called for the dispute to be settled on the basis of binding arbitration, by an arbitral tribunal to be established with the cooperation of the Secretary-General of the United Nations. India subsequently appointed a Yugoslav arbitrator to the tribunal, Pakistan appointed an Iranian arbitrator, and UN Secretary-General U Thant chose a Swede as the chairman. The tribunal did not reach agreement on a final award until February 1968. The award gave approximately 10 percent of the disputed territory to Pakistan, including much of the high ground where the heaviest fighting took place. The award was reluctantly accepted by Pakistan, but bitterly resented in India, where it was generally felt that India had a strong case for sovereignty over the entire Rann of Kutch. (Memorandum from Thomas L. Hughes to Rusk, February 20, 1968; ibid.) [Continue with the next documents]
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