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FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1964-1968, Volume XXV South Asia
Department of State |
139. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Pakistan/1/ Washington, June 30, 1965, 6:56 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, AID 9 PAK. Secret; Limdis. Drafted by Mann, cleared by Komer, and approved by Mann. 1485. Please inform Minister Finance Shoaib, and in your discretion President Ayub, that given fact that US Congress has not yet completed its authorization action on aid bill, given fact that after authorization process is completed it will be necessary to go through a separate appropriation procedure in the Congress, given reluctance of the Administration to make a pledge in advance of action by the Congress, and in view of certain other problems which we would be prepared to discuss with GOP should it wish, US is suggesting to World Bank that date of consortium meeting be postponed until after Congress adjourns. US thinking is that date of 27 September would allow adequate leeway and is so proposing to Bank. You should also say that while postponement of consortium meeting will ultimately become public knowledge, our suggestion is that both USG and GOP should avoid premature publicity. Rusk
140. Memorandum From Robert Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)/1/ Washington, July 2, 1965. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, India, Vol. V, Cables, 6/65-9/65. Secret. Mac-- I've asked Talbot to goose Rusk to join in on Indian PL 480. Let me recap that we've already cut down the new Indian request from a two-year 16 million ton deal to a one year 7 million ton one. Second, we've just had a new high level appeal from Indian Food Minister, Subramaniam, who says they need help now to "avoid crisis shortage." His "particular concern arises from fact that lean months are August and September" before the new Indian crop is in. Agriculture is our best source. Its key man tells me that to prevent interruption in food shipments, new shipments have to start by 1 September; this means contracts have to be made by 15 August; this means Indians have to have a PA by 15 July; this means we've got to allow say a minimum week before 15 July to negotiate the deal with India. Hence 6 July or so. Indian stocks are quite low (two months). If shipments are interrupted, word always leaks out. Once the public becomes aware hoarding starts almost immediately (we've been through this before). Traders hold out of the market to wait for higher prices. The experts are convinced that Indian opinion won't understand why we didn't come through, and Indian officialdom will try to shift the blame to us. We'll have a lot of flak in the US press too about why we're "starving" Indians./2/ /2/In a July 2 memorandum to Rusk, AID Administrator Bell warned: "I cannot emphasize too strongly the serious consequences that would follow from a cessation of wheat shipments--or even from publicity about the possibility of such a cessation. There were food riots in India last year and they could easily occur again." (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, AID (US) 15-8 INDIA) The way out is a simple two-month extension of the current agreement (only one million tons). If done by 6 July or so, it would buy time, avoid a political explosion, and still keep India on a mighty short rein. We'd insist on all the new tough PL 480 provisions, e.g. dollars for ocean freight, 20% US uses (up from 5%), and 4-1/4% interest. If we don't come through India will have to use its own scarce foreign exchange to buy wheat elsewhere as the UAR did. In this case our own aid dollars would be indirectly subsidizing Indian wheat purchases to help out someone else's balance of payments. RWK
141. Telegram From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State/1/ Karachi, July 4, 1965, 2020Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, AID 9 PAK. Secret; Priority; Limdis. 13. Dept pass AID. Deptel 1485./2/ Postponement of Pak consortium pledging session. /2/Document 139. 1. I personally delivered information contained reftel to President Ayub in Murree July 3. In consultation with Macdonald, I had decided it would be preferable to go straight to Ayub first with this news, thus relieving Shoaib of onus of having to carry and explain to Ayub this unwelcome message. 2. I set forth almost verbatim content of reftel. Ayub took the news quite hard--worse than I had anticipated. His first question was whether pledging action for India had also been postponed. Negative response to this seemed to embitter him. He noted that postponement now would cause maximum embarrassment for GOP, which had just come out with numerous policy statements and actions in economic field which would be prejudiced by US action. He complained that unexpected action left his government in vulnerable position. 3. Ayub asked with air of complete innocence, what were "certain other problems" referred to? Said blandly that so far as he knew, everything was set for consortium meeting and he was unable to identify the problems. I identified general foreign policy problem area for him, without getting down to specific complaints. 4. Ayub observed that he had not had any intimation from World Bank President George Woods in London last week that there might be difficulties in relation to consortium pledging session. He said emphatically that Woods had not hinted at any timing problems on part of US and he ventured the opinion that Woods, "being a man with common sense," would not agree with or want to approve the postponement suggestion. 5. Ayub said that he did not see how the postponement news could be kept confidential for any length of time. It could not be kept quiet and the effects of the news would be unfortunate. 6. Ayub opined that the postponement decision clearly represented the beginnings of a new US policy toward Pakistan. He interpreted the announcement as the first stage of the implementation. He said, "Anyone can see that this amounts to more than a mere delay." 7. Ayub did not anticipate any policy development which could be expected to change the position between now and September. He said he had done his best to persuade the US to see the argument for Pakistan's "independent" foreign policy. The US had not been inclined to heed him as to this, or as to the dangers of US arms aid to India. He did not see that there was much more he could try to do. 8. His immediate reaction was that Pakistan would have to "look elsewhere" for economic development assistance. If GOP was unable to find other sources of assistance, Pakistan would simply have to retrench. The people had been through adversity before and could do it again. "We will have to cut the coat according to the cloth." 9. Ayub was non-responsive as to whether he planned to pursue our invitation to discuss the "other problems." He did not register any noticeable interest in sending a representative to the US. He thought that no great interest in an exchange had been shown on US side, noting that his last letter to President on threat to Pak security from India/3/ was unacknowledged after more than a month. /3/The letter was dated May 11; see Document 120. 10. I made effort to damp down Ayub's disturbing over-reaction without diluting the force of our message. I told him that the message did not foreclose anything and that the way remained entirely open for a constructive plenary session the end of September. A delay of few weeks did not have to constitute any major setback. I said the situation was entirely recoverable and he should not consider that anything irretrievable had happened. The GOP had the means of readily restoring the situation, and giving US a case which we could effectively put before the Congress. I told him that I and my associates would be available day and night to assist the GOP in getting the program back on the tracks. However, Ayub gave no sign that as of today he is prepared to bring about any GOP policy modifications in response to postponement move. 11. The President thanked me for conveying the message to him privately. He said he would want to handle it in his own way and he asked me not to pass the information to any of his Ministers or other GOP officials. 12. Since there was no note-taker present and since he showed an interest in having an accurate summary of the message for reference, I wrote out in long hand for him a summary of reftel. I urged the President not to misread message, and assured him that I was here to do everything humanly possible to bring about a meeting of minds and to restore the old harmony of foreign policy outlook. 13. Separate message will follow tomorrow on discussion initiated by President and pursued at his request as to intent and significance of recent GOP foreign policy moves and their relationship to essential US interests in Asia./4/ /4/Telegram 15 from Karachi, July 4, described the tenor of Ayub's remarks in the extended discussion during his July 3 meeting with McConaughy. His remarks reflected disappointment at what he saw as his inability to make the United States see the validity of the reasons for Pakistan's "independent" foreign policy. Pakistan, he insisted, had to face the continuing hostility of India, and could not afford to incur the avoidable enmity of large Communist neighbors in addition to India's. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, AID 9 PAK) 14. Comment: It seems evident that reftel will precipitate a considerable stir and possibly an actual full-blown crisis in our relations with Pakistan. Ayub seems to feel that our postponement move challenges him, and strikes at self respect of country by seeking to penalize Pakistan publicly for pursuing "independent" foreign policy. While he may calm down after he has thought through the issues and consulted some of the fairly cool heads in his Cabinet, at the moment he is in a state of repressed anger at what he considers an unjustified punitive action, and the application of a double standard of international conduct to Pakistan and India. There is some danger of his reacting as if he has been "driven to the wall." Macdonald and I in consultation with senior staff will submit further comments and recommendations tomorrow. McConaughy
142. Memorandum From Robert Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson/1/ Washington, July 6, 1965. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. 12, July 1965. Secret. Postponement on Pak Consortium, which McConaughy personally told Ayub about on 3 July, was quite a shock. Ayub apparently took the Congressional argument quite well but asked about the "other problems" mentioned. McConaughy mentioned the general foreign policy area, at which Ayub launched into a defense of Pakistan's "independent" foreign policy. His Chicom policy was aimed solely at avoiding provocation of China. As for Vietnam, Ayub looked on this as essentially an example of "big-power rivalries." He said that the US wanted its associates to be "only satellites--non-thinking followers who blindly acquiesce to US policy." Ayub opined that the postponement clearly represented the beginning of a new US policy toward Pakistan. He said that anyone could see that this amounted to more than a mere delay. His immediate reaction was that Pakistan would have to look elsewhere for development aid; if this proved impossible the Paks would simply have to retrench. He did not register any interest in sending someone to the US. Ayub's foreign policy explanations were so thin that even McConaughy went back at him sharply. To characterize Vietnam as "big power rivalry" was far from the mark. The issue was the freedom of Asian countries to exist free from Communist intrusion. This was more important to the free Asian countries than it was to the US. He made a strong plea for Pakistan to declare itself on Vietnam. As to the allegation that we were only looking for satellites, McConaughy invited Ayub to look at some of the Asian countries that were standing four-square behind us--such as Turkey, Iran, Thailand or the Philippines. Would he brand these countries as satellites? McConaughy's judgment is that Ayub considers the US is taking a fundamental decision to force him to make a clear-cut choice between the US and an "independent" policy./2/ Ayub almost certainly sees our position as creating a tough problem for him either way he turns, succumbing to US pressure or sustaining loss of US aid. Either could undermine confidence in his leadership and provide a major issue for his opponents. As McConaughy points out, Ayub has been riding high and undoubtedly considers consortium postponement as a US effort to whittle him down. So "a fundamental showdown with Pakistan is thus abruptly looming for us." /2/McConaughy conveyed this assessment in telegram 19 from Karachi, July 5. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, AID 9 PAK) McConaughy comments that he noted a distressing contrast to Ayub's previous line of thinking; Ayub sounded at some points like an appeaser, an opportunist, an Afro-Asian extremist, and an advocate of full non-alignment. Our Ambassador sees this change as in part a result of Ayub's adverse reactions to our policy, but notes that the "malign and near-hypnotic influence of Bhutto is probably the chief contributing factor." McConaughy's best guess is that Ayub will make a cautious probe to explore our position more fully, but may not be disposed to send any emissary lest this be interpreted as a first step in surrendering to US pressures. He sees the most dangerous risk as a public crisis, which could be precipitated quickly by premature leaks leading to an outraged emotional reaction against US attachment of political strings to aid. He pleads that we avoid any Washington leaks suggesting pressure tactics, since the Paks would then feel compelled to come back with anti-US blasts. Our best bet is to sit tight and wait for Ayub's next move. Meanwhile we are working up contingency guidance to forestall any public spat. When the consortium postponement gets out, we can simply say that we want to wait until Congress appropriates the money and certain technical issues are resolved. All this will take delicate handling, but my hunch is that Ayub is too smart to jeopardize his meal ticket by lashing back too hard just yet. R. W. Komer/3/ /3/McGeorge Bundy initialed below Komer's signature.
143. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)/1/ Washington, July 6, 1965. /1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 70 A 5127, 350.09 Pakistan. Top Secret/Sensitive. MEMORANDUM FOR Pursuant to the President's desire for an orchestrated US Government effort to convince Pakistan of our dissatisfaction with its current posture, it seems worthwhile to explore the possibilities for appropriate supporting action in the intelligence field. One possibility would be to convey the impression that the US is taking positive measures to reduce its dependence on US intelligence facilities in Pakistan, because of its loss of confidence in Pakistani policy. The following options might be explored: (a) Suspend currently planned action to expand or improve our facilities, especially those actions which are non-essential (e.g. housing). (b) Reduce US personnel strength at our Pakistani facilities. Perhaps this could be done as a temporary measure and one involving non-essential personnel. (c) Proceed on a high priority basis to develop alternate facilities in Iran [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] to the extent feasible. This step might be desirable as insurance in any case. Since actions along these lines could prove costly in terms of intelligence and dollars, it seems essential that both pros and cons be carefully explored. I suggest we prepare to submit recommendations to the President by about 20 July. McGeorge Bundy
144. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Pakistan/1/ Washington, July 8, 1965, 5:25 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, AID 9 PAK. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Mann and cleared by Talbot and in AID by Bell. 36. For Ambassador. Our position is that USG does not think it should make aid commitments until Congress has authorized and appropriated funds necessary to carry out commitment. FYI. Pledging was made in Indian consortium some time ago and was related to last year of five year plan. Pakistan consortium faces question of new five year plan. US position has nothing to do with problems between India and Pakistan. Our position remains the same as it was before, namely, we hope that these problems can be solved and we have no desire take sides. End FYI. You should, as appropriate occasions present themselves, make it clear that we do not agree that our inability to make pledge until after US Congress has acted can properly be called "pressure". It simply means US not in a position to make any commitments until after Congress has acted. FYI. We have not suggested (Embtel 19)/2/ that Shoaib visit US. Understand President of World Bank has suggested to Ayub that Shoaib visit might be useful. While, if Shoaib decides to come to Washington, we would be happy to discuss problems with him, decision on whether Shoaib comes is entirely in the hands of GOP. /2/See footnote 2, Document 142. FYI. We do have number of problems which should be discussed and believe these should be discussed in a frank and friendly fashion. However again this is separate from Congressional question mentioned above./3/ End FYI. /3/In telegram 38 to Karachi, July 8, McConaughy was instructed to be governed by the guidance in this telegram in his discussions with Pakistani officials concerning the postponement of the consortium meeting. Once a dialogue was opened, the Department anticipated that there would be a number of issues that could be usefully discussed. Chief among these was the conviction in Washington that "Pakistan and US must find better way to work together towards common goals while avoiding unnecessary attacks on each other over matters on which we are in disagreement." (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL PAK-US) Rusk
145. Memorandum From Robert Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson/1/ Washington, July 9, 1965, 11:15 a.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. 12, July 1965. Secret. MAP for India and Pakistan. Attached is a longish memo from Secretary McNamara describing our current programs./2/ It breaks down into three categories: (a) FY 65 and prior programs still undelivered--roughly $50 million for Pakistan and $70 million for India; (b) FY 66 programs (roughly $46 million for Pakistan and $50 million for India), which have not yet been approved by DOD and passed as firm to the recipients; and (c) various other requests such as Ayub's recent plea for submarines, F-104s, and tanks. There are also certain dollar credit sales, which I presume we would not want to interfere with (e.g. the sale of $8 million in ammo to the Paks which you recently approved). /2/The memorandum to the President is dated July 6; not printed. (Ibid., 7/1/65-9/22/65) There are political risks in holding up MAP. It has traditionally been most sensitive to the Paks, who regard it as essential vis-à-vis India, and whose military are a major political force. As to the Indians, we could spook them to buy more from the USSR. There is also a real question of whether we want or need to hit either Paks or Indians harder than we have already, lest we trigger an open confrontation by pushing too hard. Thus there is a case for continuing business as usual, except for continuing to hold off on key items such as F-5s for India and F-104s or submarines for the Paks. A second alternative would be to handle MAP as you have economic aid: (a) continue with deliveries under FY 65 and prior grant programs for which the funds have been appropriated and commitments in effect made; (b) defer telling either we approve the FY 1966 programs, on the grounds that the funds have not yet been appropriated; (c) simply not respond on major additional requests until we have better indications as to the future attitudes of India and Pakistan. We are not recommending any action till we can get the views of State and Defense. In the meantime, however, DOD will hold off telling the Paks and Indians about any FY 66 program approvals./3/ /3/Johnson responded with a handwritten note on the memorandum that reads: "I would hold everything military etc in abeyance--see me for details." R. W. Komer/4/ /4/McGeorge Bundy initialed below Komer's signature.
146. Memorandum From Robert Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)/1/ Washington, July 9, 1965. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Pakistan, Vol. III, Memos, 12/64-7/65. Secret. Mac-- Paks are continuing their one-upmanship on consortium postponement. G. Ahmed braced Rusk this noon with attached bristling "oral message from his government"/2/ (no doubt drafted by brother Aziz and Bhutto). In effect it says stop trying to push us. /2/Ahmed's meeting with Rusk was reported to Karachi in telegram 51, July 10. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, AID 9 PAK) The text of the oral message, a copy of which Ahmed left with Rusk, was repeated to Karachi in telegram 44, July 9. The message stated that the Ayub government considered the U.S. proposal ill-advised. The proposed postponement of the consortium meeting was described as invidious and motivated by political rather than economic grounds. The fact that the Pakistan consortium was being postponed and the Indian consortium was not was bound to inflame public opinion in Pakistan, the message warned. (Ibid.) When Rusk pleaded Congressional problems, G. Ahmed brusquely told him everything was fine on Capitol Hill. He told Talbot after the session that "this game is not worth the candle" and that this was the first time in the history of US/Pak relationship that economic aid had been used for political purposes. I'm sure State is quivering but I hope that President will insist on simply staring the Paks down. The State experts' hunch and mine is that the Paks are probing to see how far they can rock us. Since one can't return an oral note, I hope we'll give the Paks the silent treatment. They have to come to us in the last analysis. RWK
147. Telegram From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State/1/ Karachi, July 10, 1965. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Pakistan, Vol. III, Cables, 12/64-7/65. Secret; Priority; Exdis. No time of transmission is given on the telegram, which was received at 8:16 a.m. 50. Personal for the Secretary. When FinMin Shoaib saw me this morning about postponement consortium pledging session,/2/ he said that you had offered him the use of our telegraphic facilities if he ever had a message of special importance and sensitivity which he wished to convey urgently to you. He said he thought the current situation called for such a message and asked that I transmit the following to you on his behalf: /2/The IBRD advised the Department on July 9 that in view of the U.S. inability to take a positive position in the pledging session scheduled for July 27, the Pakistan consortium pledging session was being rescheduled to September 23. (Telegram 153 to London, July 9; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, AID 9 PAK) Begin message: In the context of the recent Ayub-Woods conversation in London, favorable policy developments were under way here, which are threatened by the shift in the US Govt approach to the consortium pledging session. I ask your help in finding some way out so that a crisis does not arise. End message. McConaughy
148. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between President Johnson and the Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Mann)/1/ Washington, July 13, 1965, 10:50 a.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, Mann Papers, Telephone Conversations with LBJ, May 2, 1965-June 2, 1966. No classification marking. Transcribed in Mann's office. The President said he had received Mr. Mann's note./2/ He said that he thought it was a little late to get the letter/3/ changed. The President said he would be glad to see him when he wishes to come. The President said he would like Mr. Mann to get the best economic people thinking about the food shortage--make a special case out of it--there is starvation and famine--and then submit a recommendation to the Congress saying here is the situation, here is what they are asking for, here is a real serious situation and ask Congress to consider it, act on it and dispose of it. The President said he would like to send a special case up rather than taking the responsibility himself. /2/Not found. /3/Not further identified. Mr. Mann said the thing that bothered him was that the Indians might not realize that the timing of this visit may be important. He said he had not said anything to the Indians but he thought that somehow they ought to be made aware of this. Mr. Mann admitted that it may be too late this morning to try to get the letter changed and perhaps we should be working on some kind of talk between the President and Shastri and the President and Ayub. Mr. Mann said if they did not lose their heads over there, we might be able to really accomplish something. The President said that Mr. Mann should tell Nehru that Bhutto had announced this morning the postponement of the consortium, and that the President was hoping to see Ayub before the consortium was held at the end of September. The President said they might not want to be definite about next year in these circumstances. Mr. Mann said that was his idea exactly. He said he had no intention to press the Ambassador but only to make him aware. The President said he did not want to take the responsibility personally for this. Mr. Mann asked what would happen if these visits came through and we worked out some kind of a sensible arrangement with both countries. He said he did not know if this was possible with Pakistan but he thought it was possible with India. He said in this case, we might go ahead with the original program. The President repeated that he did not want to take this responsibility--he wished the Congress to pass on it. Mr. Mann said he would pass the message on in an oblique way to Nehru. The President said he would be most happy to see him as soon as the appropriation bill gets through the House. Mr. Mann said he understood. He said he was not going to urge the Ambassador to do anything. He is just going to make him conscious of the situation. [Here follows discussion unrelated to South Asia.]
149. Memorandum for the Record/1/ Washington, July 13, 1965, 5:26 p.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, India, Vol. V, Memos and Miscellaneous, 6/65-9/65. Secret. Drafted by Komer on July 16. The time of the meeting, which took place at the White House, is taken from the President's Daily Diary. (Ibid.) SUBJECT PRESENT The President greeted Ambassador Nehru cordially. After some small talk, the President asked about Shastri's trip to Canada and Europe. Nehru thought it had been quite successful. He described how Shastri had asked him in Ottawa how Vietnam was ever going to be settled. He had replied there was no easy way to settle Vietnam, but constant Indian comments didn't help the situation any. In effect Shastri should keep quiet about Vietnam. Nehru then presented a letter from Prime Minister Shastri,/2/ which he described as a response to President Johnson's letter of 5 June./3/ The President read it carefully, remarking that he was very pleased that the Rann of Kutch issue had been settled. Nehru agreed that it was a "great relief." /2/Shastri's July 9 letter to Johnson was devoted largely to prospects for India's economic development. He expressed gratitude for U.S. economic assistance, which had contributed importantly to India's development. Shastri noted that India was in the process of drafting its Fourth Five-Year Plan, which was scheduled to commence on April 1, 1966, and he asked if Johnson would discuss the draft plan with Finance Minister T.T. Krishnamachari when he visited Washington in September. Of more pressing importance, Shastri noted that the P.L. 480 agreement, which governed the flow of needed food grains to India, had expired on June 30. He asked Johnson to intervene personally to expedite the negotiation of a new agreement so that the movement of grain would not be interrupted. Finally, Shastri expressed appreciation for the renewed invitation to visit the United States and indicated that, although he would not be able to come until the next calendar year, he looked forward to a visit at a mutually convenient date. (Ibid., National Security File, Special Head of State Correspondence File, India, 4/15/65-2/28/66) /3/Document 127. The President expressed his appreciation for Mr. Shastri's letter. As for Shastri's request that he see Finance Minister Khrishnamachari during the latter's visit in September, he would be delighted to do so. Then the President noted Shastri's emphasis on food. He was considering a message to Congress on the Asian food problem so that Congress itself could become more fully involved. There was some feeling in the Congress against so much aid to other countries. Aside from the many complaints about aid in general, some Congressmen didn't understand why countries like India should go for steel mills instead of fertilizer. The President's idea was to get the House and Senate to debate out the issue of whether we should provide "food for famine", and decide on what position they wanted to take. The President himself was strongly for providing such help. He kept rereading Barbara Ward's book "Rich Nations and Poor Nations", and felt deeply the moral obligation of rich nations like the United States to help others. So he had told Secretary Rusk just today that he wanted a food for famine proposal put before the Congress as soon as possible. The President mentioned that because of the Congressional problem he had also held up a new pledge to the Pakistan consortium until the appropriation had been acted upon. He commented on the difficulties of getting the aid bill through, pointing out that the Administration had lost 12-8 on the bill in the Foreign Relations Committee, which simply shouldn't have happened. But the Indians kept telling us how to solve Vietnam and Ayub was off receiving Chou En-lai. This sort of thing certainly affected the vote. We had had to get the proxy of Senator Symington who was ill in Bethesda, but finally got the vote reversed 10-8. The President then described his current difficulties with conference on the authorization bill. Fulbright wanted a two year bill; the House was adamant on one year. Their positions were irreconcilable. Besides all this, the Senate had gotten tired and one afternoon had let $200 million get cut off the barebones request he had sent up. In an exchange with Nehru, the President indicated that he'd like to get the $200 million from the Senate side and the two year bill from the House side; but the House wouldn't budge. Then came the appropriation process. The President asked Nehru whether he had ever met Otto Passman. He described his next "easy job" was that of taking on Passman, who was always a tough customer. If he could only get by Passman, he was willing to gamble on the Senate in order to move ahead with discussions on aid to Pakistan. On India's food needs, the President felt that we should promptly send a food-for-famine message to the Hill. He described the difficulties on the agricultural bill this year--on which he thought we would probably get licked. When Nehru praised his record to date, the President philosophized about his increasing difficulties with the Congress. In his judgment a Presidential mandate lasted only about six months under the US system. The Administration was having increasing difficulty with the mass media, with the muttering of the "diplomats", and with the Congress. So he was due for some reversals. It would become more difficult for the Administration to lead here and to lead abroad. He had no illusions about being able to maintain the present pace; in fact, he expected some reversals within the next 45 days. So he asked Nehru to give us any help he could in convincing the Congress about India's food needs. The President insisted that Congress must share this responsibility. Nehru, referring to the Shastri letter, indicated that India's needs fell into two categories; first was the immediate need for food to avert great difficulty because India's food stocks were exhausted; second was a longer range aid need for the next 5 year plan. Commenting on India's immediate needs, the President said he certainly didn't want people to starve but wanted the Congress to be in partnership on whatever we did. So he told Messrs. Mann and Komer to get busy on a message to the Congress. Meanwhile, he said, we could do what needed to be done if necessary to avert catastrophe. The President then described "in confidence" the difficulties the US was having in Vietnam, and what we were going to have to do. We were going to have to put in more people--at least 100,000 and perhaps double that number. We would also have to go for several billion dollars more in additional defense expenditures this year, and probably call up reserves, postpone the discharges of people serving in Vietnam, even increase the draft--perhaps calling up married men. McNamara was going to Vietnam to get the facts on which to base any such decisions. As an added problem, the Republicans were beginning to criticize our Vietnam policy. People like Congressman Ford wanted the President to do reckless things, but he would not do so. We were not bombing Hanoi nor were we crossing the Chinese frontier. So the President was mystified by the Chinese accusation that we had done so; he speculated that perhaps the Chinese were seeking to provide an excuse to cover some move that they planned. As Nehru knew, we had also tried in every way possible to get the North Vietnamese to talk but had failed. Now the latest effort, Wilson's sending Davies to Hanoi, had flopped too. The President ended up by indicating that he wasn't pessimistic. He didn't think we would lose out in Vietnam but it would be a long hard struggle. However, in view of the way the Indians seemed compelled to comment so often on Vietnam, we would certainly like to know India's solution. If Shastri knew how to settle Vietnam, we wished he would tell us. As an example of how things could turn out better than they seemed at the low point, the President cited the Dominican Republic situation. He thought that it was steadily improving. There would have been a Castro regime in another 24 hours if we hadn't moved in. The Dominican Republic might yet go in this direction in the next election, but at least this would be a free choice. At this point the President was informed that Ambassador Lodge was waiting, so he invited Nehru to stay and visit for a few moments with Lodge. After a brief discussion of the problems Lodge would confront in Vietnam, the President showed the group the Rose Garden. R. W. Komer/4/ /4/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
150. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Pakistan/1/ Washington, July 14, 1965, 6:17 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, AID 9 PAK. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Drafted by Laingen and Laise on July 13, cleared by Talbot and Mann, and approved and initialed by Rusk. Also sent to Rawalpindi. 64. Embtel 50./2/ For Ambassador. You should thank Shoaib on behalf Secretary for personal message conveyed reftel and say that Secretary appreciates confidence in our relations on which it rests. Secretary strongly shares Shoaib's desire that crisis be avoided. Whole objective our actions and talks we seek with GOP is to avoid such crisis developing. He is confident that Shoaib will do everything he can to achieve same end. You should tell Shoaib however that considerations affecting our position on timing Consortium afford U.S. no alternative and we hope he can get Ayub to see this in proper perspective so that we can proceed to examine our problems and find a better way to work together toward common goals. /2/Document 147. Rusk
151. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Pakistan/1/ Washington, July 15, 1965, 5:14 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, AID 9 PAK. Secret; Immediate; Limdis. Drafted by Laingen and approved by Talbot. Also sent to Rawalpindi and repeated to London in New Delhi. 72. Following summary FYI and Noforn. It is uncleared and subject to amendment upon review. Secretary met briefly with Pak Ambassador Ahmed this afternoon/2/ but did not get substance of our differences with Pakistan because meeting cut short by Secretary's departure for airport to meet Amb. Stevenson's funeral cortege. Talk to be resumed July 16 at 4 p.m. Talbot also present as well as note takers both sides. /2/The Embassy in Pakistan reported on July 15 that Ahmed's scheduled July 15 meeting with Rusk was viewed as being of such significance that a Cabinet meeting was being deferred until a report of the meeting could be received. (Telegram 6 from Rawalpindi; ibid.) Ambassador referred to report he had received of Ambassador McConaughy's conversation with Shoaib July 11 from which he had concluded it view USG that political issues should not be linked with Consortium developments. Amb Ahmed said if this true this was sound position because it had after all been consistent USG policy not to link economic aid with political considerations. If however, USG should conclude on objective grounds that it must cut back commitment to Third Plan it only fair GOP should know soon so it could begin adjusting its own thinking. For present GOP must continue assume on basis preliminary Consortium meeting June that all members believed Pak Third Plan soundly based. Secretary's response emphasized three points. First, he did not want Ambassador to conclude from Consortium developments that we now tying aid to all sorts of political considerations. What we were doing was part of our way of dealing with facts of life on Hill. Secretary not sure that GOP fully appreciated depth of re-examination future aid legislation now under way, especially in Senate. House also had reservations, though of different kind. Conference committee on au- thorization bill deadlocked. In such situation it obviously important have better idea how things will work out before US makes major additional commitments in aid field./3/ /3/AID Administrator Bell made similar points on July 14 in a discussion with Ahmed of economic issues bearing on U.S. relations with Pakistan. (Telegram Aidto 97 to Karachi, July 15; ibid., Ball Files: Lot 74 D 272, Pakistan) Second point Secretary emphasized was that if we are perhaps a bit difficult to live with these days, our friends abroad should recognize why. Fact was that we faced in Southeast Asia life-or-death issues involving danger of general war in Pacific. Situation highly dangerous because other side has shown no sign of wanting peace--which could come within 48 hours if they were ready. Our friends should recognize that when we faced with issues of this dimension we naturally deeply sensitive. Third, Secretary said he wanted emphasize again cumulative adverse effect on Congress over recent years of differences between India and Pakistan and implication this could have for US policy. If India and Pakistan were at peace, subcontinent would be impregnable, arms race could be avoided and resources applied rationally across subcontinent. Indo-Pak tensions clearly had resulted in net added burden on all concerned including USG./4/ /4/Telegram 79 to Karachi, July 17, expanded the reporting on Rusk's July 15 conversation with Ahmed. Touching on the problem of differences between India and Pakistan, Rusk suggested that the improved atmosphere following the settlement of the dispute over the Rann of Kutch might provide a basis for secret talks on the Kashmir issue. Ahmed agreed to relay the suggestion to his government. (Ibid., Central Files 1964-66, AID 9 PAK) Ambassador said he wanted to respond to Pak actions cited by Secretary previous conversation, namely Pak-Chicom communiqué and Bhutto talk with North Vietnam FonMin Algiers. Ambassador said latter was in pursuance understanding Ayub had with PM Wilson that he would do what he could behind the scenes to improve outlook for Commonwealth Vietnam peace mission. Ayub had instructed Bhutto get in touch with North Vietnam FonMin at Algiers and Bhutto had done so but had run into stone wall. As for Peiping communiqué, reference to "imperialism" therein clearly not directed at US; to Pakistanis "imperialists" are Indians in Kashmir. Secretary said we accepted this explanation but when Communist regimes use this word in joint communiqués, it amounts to word of propaganda inevitably meaning US. Rusk
152. Telegram From the Office of the Secretary of Defense to the Commander in Chief, Middle East, South Asia, and Africa South of the Sahara (Adams)/1/ Washington, July 15, 1965, 1928Z. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Pakistan, Vol. V, Cables, 9/65-1/66. Secret; Priority; Noforn Def. Drafted by Colonel Lincoln A. Simon, USA, of the Office of Military Assistance, DOD/ISA, and approved by General Robert J. Wood, USA, Director of Military Assistance, DOD/ISA. Also sent to Department of the Army, Chief of Naval Operations, and Chief of Staff of the Air Force, and repeated to CMAAG Karachi, CUSMSMI New Delhi, Department of State, and the White House. 5899. From OASD/ISA. Message in Three Parts. Part I for All. 1. The Secretary of Defense has issued the following instructions regarding Military Assistance to Pakistan and India: Without disclosing the decision to the Paks or the Indians, defer until further notice approval of any portions of the FY 66 program of military assistance to those countries. This issue will be reviewed on or about 15 August 1965. Part II for CINCMEAFSA 2. Procedure to implement this decision influenced by following: FY 66 CRA MAP Orders were issued on 6 July 1965 and pursuant to this authority actions are under way to implement these orders. These actions include: (a) requisitions for spare parts initiated by host country personnel; (b) country personnel being selected and ordered to CONUS for training. Hence it must be assumed that this CRA element of the FY 66 Program has been communicated to Paks and Indians. Therefore, to preclude disclosure to Paks and Indians, implementation of all actions authorized by CRA will continue. 3. Further discussions in New Delhi and Karachi with host country personnel on FY 66 MAP should not be initiated, but, if requested on Pak or Indian initiative, discussions may be conducted on a low key "business as usual" basis without commitment. Other than CRA MAP Orders already issued, approval of additional FY 66 MAP will be deferred. 4. Regarding GOI FY 66 credit sales USMSMI should proceed with its review of GOI submission. USMSMI should limit its contacts or consultations with GOI representatives to minimum and limit such contacts to low level business as usual approach. Any GOI requests for urgent processing of items under FY 66 credit sales program should be accepted without comment or commitment by USMSMI and forwarded through usual channels with its recommendations. Part III for Military Departments 5. Continue delivery of programs approved and funded in FY 65 and prior years MAP Orders.
153. Memorandum From Robert Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson/1/ Washington, July 15, 1965. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. 12, July 1965. Secret. Pak reactions to consortium postponement. The Paks have apparently decided to take a tough line (perhaps to test how serious we are). After appeals to us not to postpone the consortium, Bhutto then announced our request/2/ (he expressed doubt that the US actually intended to cut off aid "or that it would dare do so even if it wanted to, in view of uniformly adverse and violent Afro-Asian reaction which could be expected.") /2/Bhutto announced the U.S. decision to request a postponement of the Pakistan consortium meeting during a debate on foreign policy in the National Assembly on July 13. (Telegram 3 from Rawalpindi, July 13; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, AID 9 PAK) The result is that the postponement has now become a public issue. McConaughy says "our position in Pakistan is rapidly assuming crisis proportions."/3/ Ayub himself in a speech said Pakistan seeks "friends not masters" and that the US has been acting in a manner prejudicial to Pakistan's interests in Indo/Pak disputes. It is not unusual, he said, that big powers become overbearing in their attitudes. The Pak press is taking this line. /3/McConaughy made this assessment in telegram 8 from Rawalpindi, July 15. He noted that through press articles and speeches the country was being aroused to unite behind the government's resistance to alleged U.S. attempts to suborn Pakistani sovereignty and national pride. (Ibid.) Earlier, Bhutto gave McConaughy a tough time, saying that Pakistan not the US was really the injured party. Hence, we should come to them, not they to us./4/ Then on 9 July Pak Ambassador Ahmed delivered a tough oral message to Rusk calling the postponement "ill-advised"; its "invidious nature" would not be lost on the Pak people./5/ /4/McConaughy reported this July 12 conversation in telegram 2 from Rawalpindi, July 13. (Ibid.) /5/See footnote 2, Document 146. Rusk talked briefly with Ahmed today, but asked Ahmed to come back tomorrow, because he had to meet the Stevenson plane. Rusk's main reason was that he wants to talk with you first. He and Talbot are deeply troubled that we're approaching an open confrontation with the Paks, and are inclined to play it cautiously. Rusk emphasized to Ahmed that our Hill troubles were real, citing the conference deadlock as evidence of a deeper malaise. In answer to Ahmed's question as to whether we still intended to make a pledge in September, Rusk told him this was our present intention. We're in for a rough ride, but there are even greater risks in backwatering in the face of the foolhardy Pak decision to create a public spat. Since we hold the better cards, we can afford to sit tight and keep quiet for a while longer, and see if they'll come to us./6/ /6/Bundy added a handwritten note that reads: "strongly agree." R. W. Komer/7/ /7/Bundy initialed below Komer's signature. [Continue with the next documents]
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