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FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1964-1968, Volume XXV South Asia
Department of State |
154. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson/1/ Washington, July 16, 1965, 11:05 a.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, India, Vol. V, Memos and Miscellaneous, 6/65-9/65. Confidential. SUBJECT The best way of meeting your objectives has been studied by Komer, Bator, Schultze, AID, Agriculture, and State (Freeman is away, but Schnittker has signed on). The basic problem is to steer a course that will endorse food for India, and open the way for a broad new food program next year, without undermining or attempting to replace your existing PL 480 authority this year. (To seek small changes in the present law would merely open Pandora's box for the Committees, and to put a whole new program forward for legislation this year is just not practicable, according to Budget and Agriculture.) The best arrangement we can think of is as follows: First, to give turn-around time, authorize an interim food program for India, redesigned to meet as many as possible of the new criteria. This is purely a standby operation and we recommend four months instead of two simply to avoid useless nervousness both in the bureaucracy and in India. We also believe it may be better not to use a short-fuse deadline on the Congress, but you will have a better judgment on this point. Four Months /2/There is no indication on the memorandum that Johnson responded to any of the options. Second, send up a message asking for a joint Congressional resolution with the following components:/3/ /3/Komer prepared a draft of such a message on July 15. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, India, Vol. V, Memos and Miscellaneous, 6/65-9/65) 1. An endorsement of this brief extension of the PL 480 agreement with India. 2. A further endorsement of other interim programs that will be necessary in the months between now and the new legislative proposal. 3. A broader endorsement (after the manner of the Vandenberg Resolution of 1948) of your intent to develop a basic new program to provide food for the hungry in cooperation with the governments of the hungry nations and the other food-producing countries--a new world-wide war against hunger. The components of the resolution would be framed to match the following position, which would be set out in an accompanying message: a. Stress your concern over the dangerous food problem facing the world and particularly Asia in the coming years. b. State your conviction that our Food for Peace program will require major redirection if we are to help the developing nations cope with this problem. c. Announce that you are now studying ways of redirecting these programs so that US food aid will: --be contingent upon effective self-help efforts by the recipient nation, particularly those aimed at securing an expansion in agricultural output. --maximize the contribution of food aid to overall economic development goals. --meet the nutritional needs and prevent famine among the peoples of the recipient countries. --encourage the cooperative participation of other food exporting countries in this whole effort. d. Emphasize the connection between the food problem and the population problem and reiterate your willingness to work with LDC's on programs to moderate the population explosion. e. State your intention to submit major changes in PL 480 legislation at the next session, once your intensive study has been completed. The attached outline message shows the skeleton of what could be done. There are plenty of statistics and lots of eloquence which can be supplied in support of this basic argument. What we need to know now is whether this basic approach meets your requirements. If it does, we can produce a fleshed-out resolution and a draft message over the weekend with help from Goodwin and Galbraith, both of whom are in town. Yes McG. B.
155. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Pakistan/1/ Washington, July 16, 1965, 8:39 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, AID 9 PAK. Secret; Immediate; Limdis. Drafted by Laingen, cleared by Laise, and approved by Talbot. Also sent to Rawalpindi and repeated to New Delhi and London. 78. Deptel 72./2/ Following summary based on uncleared memcon; FYI, Noforn and subject to revision on review: /2/Document 151. Secretary met with Pakistan Ambassador July 16 to continue conversation reported reftel. Secretary told Ambassador he had seen press reports Ayub PML speech July 14 sharply critical US; thought it desirable resume discussion after full text available. Secretary wondered, however, on basis apparent GOP public reaction to date what GOP had in mind and where we went from here. Ambassador said reaction in Pakistan had been foreshadowed in oral message he had communicated earlier. He understood GOP stance to be it sought no confrontation with USG but still believed postponement Consortium session provocative and discriminatory. General policy GOP remained one of supporting principles moderation, peaceful settlement disputes and good neighborliness (even with India if it would agree). GOP felt in pursuit this course it had made contributions to moderation and responsibility Afro-Asian world. Even where there had been differences with Allies, especially on continuing arms aid to India, Pakistan had not gone off deep end. He thought it fair to say that in matters vital to US Pakistan as ally and friend had been very mindful US requirements. Ambassador cited as examples Ayub's speech Peiping advocating a negotiated settlement South Viet-Nam that recognized US interests and Ayub's firm refusal go along with Chicom and Soviet demands to include condemnatory paragraphs against US policy Viet-Nam in joint communiqués after visits those countries. After both visits US Ambassador Karachi had been given detailed briefing GOP actions. Nevertheless, Ambassador Ahmed doubted whether USG fully appreciated how Pakistan, even though "in lion's den itself," had sought to protect US interests. There may have been isolated instances, particularly where Pak politicians had said one thing or another, where US could take exception to Pak actions. But even so there was sharp contrast between Pak actions and those of India. India constantly made statements critical US policies South Viet-Nam but India seemed to be able to get away with almost anything. Ambassador said essential point was whether or not Pakistan had joined with forces inimical to US. He was authorized to say in categorical terms that answer was no and he could say this with full authority his Government. Secretary interjected this was very important statement. Secretary found statement particularly interesting in light of fact he had recently felt it necessary to say in response query from Congressional friend that he really could not say what Pakistan would do should there be general conflict in Pacific. Ambassador said: "Well you have my answer." Ambassador observed U.S. of course could not expect Pak support on every issue. Secretary emphasized last thing in world we wanted was satellite relationship; wondered, however, if Pakistan wanted U.S. to be satellite of Pakistan. Ambassador said this out of question. Secretary said he not so sure; noted we had concluded at time Chicom attack on India 1962 that it in our vital national interest come to India's support. From that point on U.S.-Pak relations ran into difficulty. Since then U.S. did not really know what Pakistan asking of us in our relationship. In response, Ambassador discoursed on GOP disagreement U.S. policy toward India; emphasized view arms aid India could only be directed at Pakistan. In response Secretary's earlier query about where we went from here, Ambassador said that if U.S. wanted discussions GOP ready have them whenever U.S. desired. Secretary asked if it would be unfair to say that one source long-standing misunderstanding between U.S. and Pakistan had been different view from very outset as to objective our alliance relationship. We saw it directed against communist aggression; Pakistan apparently saw alliances as source strength against India. Ambassador said he could not really say; he assumed objective in any event was strong Pakistan that would not fall prey to anyone. Secretary reaffirmed our interest in continuing discussion; said objective should be to identify both our common interests and points of divergence and see how we can circumscribe those differences. It possible that most of our problems had arisen out of misunderstanding and he thought there was good chance they could be cleared up. During conversation Secretary said he wanted take opportunity inquire of Ambassador about report we had heard from Indonesian source that Indonesia getting C-130 spares from Paks. Indonesians had gotten C-130's from us in past but we had suspended program after Indonesia began using them against Malaysia and one or two shot down. He assumed only C-130 equipment Paks had was from U.S. MAP. Ambassador said he uninformed but would check, adding comment Pak C-130's "falling apart too." Rusk
156. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson/1/ Washington, July 18, 1965, 10:30 a.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. 12, 7/1/65-9/65. No classification marking. A handwritten note on the memorandum reads, "ret'd from Pres. Has seen 7:45 a.m. 19 July 65." SUBJECT Yesterday you told me that you would like to get a message to the Paks either through a letter to Ayub or a talk with the Ambassador--making it very clear indeed that you do not propose to talk about assistance programs until they have been authorized and appropriated by the Congress. I spoke to Dean Rusk about it. He said that this message had been communicated over and over, but that he thought it would be good to do it again. He is drafting a Presidential letter to Ayub, and he will make the point again to Ahmed next week himself. He and Ahmed had an unsatisfactory conversation Friday,/2/ and the Secretary is very fearful that the Paks may "overreact" in the next few days. My own impression is that there is a contest between the bad Bhutto and the good Shoaib, and that Ayub will not do anything final in the next little while. /2/July 16. Meanwhile, I think it is getting more urgent that we get beyond the immediate tactical point--that we can't do business until the Congress has acted--and get as clear an understanding as we can of what you really want from the Paks. McConaughy certainly, and Rusk probably, do not really know what you want, and with the best will in the world, their ignorance may lead to complicate the problem. Even your White House troops may fall into the same error. For this reason I venture to offer for your consideration the attached paper prepared by Bob Komer's very bright Asian hand, Hal Saunders./3/ The first four pages are all you really need to read, although the supporting papers on Pakistan behavior in the last three years is instructive. If the policy Saunders outlines is somewhere near your own view, it might well be wise for us to draft a memorandum from you to the Secretary of State which would spell out your views. If Saunders is way off base, then we need to know it. /3/Reference is to a 4-page memorandum, dated July 16, entitled "What Do We Want In Pakistan." Saunders supplemented his memorandum with a 14-page chronology, also dated July 16, entitled "Pakistani Transgressions of US Friendship." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Pakistan, Vol. III, Memos and Miscellaneous, 12/64-7/65) I don't quite know how to offer a set of choices for your answer on this one. If you could write just one line of your own views, it would be a great help, or, alternatively, I can ask you for a reaction sometime in the coming week. McG. B.
157. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson/1/ Washington, July 19, 1965. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Pakistan, Vol. III, 12/64-7/65. Top Secret/Sensitive. Received in McGeorge Bundy's office at 1:19 p.m. In response to Mr. Bundy's memorandum of July 6,/2/ I have explored the suggested options which might be taken in the intelligence field pursuant to your desire for an orchestrated U.S. Government effort to convince Pakistan of our dissatisfaction with its current posture. The Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State, has also participated fully in USIB deliberations on this subject. A copy of the current USIB study,/3/ together with the State Department's comment on it, will be available to you separately. /2/Document 143. /3/Not found. I agree with you that the whole question of our intelligence relationships with Pakistan must be subject to the most searching examination. This question involves a variety of complex and interrelated factors. I believe, for example, the Government of Pakistan puts great weight on the importance of our intelligence facilities in terms of our massive assistance program and that their official statements on the discomfiture which they feel over these installations are designed to increase their leverage with us. Nevertheless, the possibility of an ouster remains. I welcome the view expressed in the USIB paper that all elements of the Government should bend their efforts in close cooperation to develop any feasible alternatives for our intelligence installations in Pakistan. I believe this effort should include thorough exploration of the possibilities for space and seaborne facilities, as well as installations in Iran [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]./4/ Despite the formidable technological and budgetary problems involved, it seems to me that the development of alternatives is a matter of the highest importance which must be pursued vigorously irrespective of our current problem with Pakistan. /4/On July 27 Ambassador Bowles discussed with DCI Raborn the possibility of [text not declassified]. (Central Intelligence Agency, Job 80-B01285A, DCI Files, DCI Memos for the Record, 22 July-3 Nov 1965) I can conceive of circumstances (especially as we get further along in our development of alternatives) in which it may be possible and useful to use our intelligence facilities in Pakistan to help convey a message to that Government. This might, depending on circumstances, be done by either reducing or expanding present activities. However, in view of (1) the actions we are taking or considering in the political, military, and economic fields, (2) Pakistan's reaction to these to date, and (3) the importance of the intelligence acquired from the facilities, I do not consider it necessary or desirable for us to reduce existing facilities at this time. We also face the question of whether or not currently planned improvements at existing facilities in Pakistan should be carried out according to the present schedule. We will want to make certain that any such improvements will not re-emphasize to the Pakistanis our dependence on the Peshawar complex. Such an interpretation could complicate our efforts in other fields to establish a more desirable relationship with Pakistan. I recommend therefore that no further additions or improvements to the facilities be undertaken at this time. There is a final problem. I understand that one major improvement, i.e., construction of an addition to the operations building and new dormitories at the Peshawar installation, is already underway. This work, which was authorized before our present policy initiative was undertaken, is likely to be conspicuous. We will need to examine carefully whether or not it too should be suspended temporarily. I believe a final decision on this subject should be reached after the Secretary of Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence have had a chance to present their views on it to you. Dean Rusk
158. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Pakistan/1/ Washington, July 23, 1965, 3:11 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, AID 9 PAK. Secret; Priority; Limdis. Drafted by Mann and Komer, cleared by Talbot, and approved and initialed by Rusk. Also sent to Rawalpindi. 105. For Ambassador. 1. We regret that GOP has over-reacted to notice that USG was unable to pledge at consortium meeting scheduled for July. It would appear that Ayub, at least initially, followed the anti-American line of Bhutto and other extremists. 2. To the extent that GOP intention is to apply pressure on us--and this would appear to be motive of Bhutto and his associates--USG wishes to continue at all times treat GOP with courtesy and politeness while making it clear tactic of abuse and attack will not cause USG to change its policies or decisions. It is important that the Paks know of the extremely bad impression Pakistan's behavior is creating from top to bottom in the US. 3. We are concerned, however, that Ayub may have been led to believe that US is embarked on a specific course to force Pakistan acceptance of a subservient role to India. When you next see Ayub you should make clear to him this is totally false. Our position was and is that we do not want to take sides in dispute between India and Pakistan; that we have hoped and continue to hope for a peaceful solution of the Kashmir and other issues between the two countries; and that we do not consider that US friendship with one is incompatible with friendship with other. 4. You should also make clear US has no desire compromise Pak sovereignty or force Paks to abjure normal relations with any country, including Red China. Instead, what is largely at issue is obligations of alliances freely entered into by Pakistan and which Ayub himself has repeatedly said have been of great benefit to it. As Paks well know, we have construed SEATO and CENTO as directed specificially and exclusively against the Communist threat. US has taken these alliances into account in providing truly massive investment in Pak viability and security, an investment which on any proportionate basis far greater than that which US has made in India, for example. Indeed, Pakistan second largest recipient US aid in world. Yet, as focus of US effort resist Communist expansion has shifted increasingly to Southeast Asia, it has received less and less cooperation from its Pak allies. This, despite fact that US defending flank of South Asia, including Pakistan. We deeply disappointed. 5. Even so, we have always respected the sovereignty and independence of Pakistan and its right to conduct its domestic and foreign policies in the way which, in the opinion of the GOP, best meets the requirements of the Pakistani people. We shall continue to do so. But by the same token we expect all other countries to treat decisions of the USG with the same mutual respect. A USG decision, for example, to devote a larger or a smaller portion of its resources to foreign economic or military assistance or to allocate the amount made available in a particular way is certainly an appropriate subject for quiet and constructive discussion between countries such as the US and Pakistan, which have enjoyed friendly relations over a period of years. Yet with all due respect we cannot agree that there is any obligation to maintain a particular level of aid in any country or, indeed, any aid at all. The allocation and use of US resources is a matter which ultimately must be decided by the USG. The supplying of foreign aid is a privilege not an obligation, just as the receipt of concessional loans and other types of assistance is a privilege rather than a right. We cannot therefore accept the suggestion that our attitude in a consortium can properly be called "pressure." 6. The GOP is doubtless aware of the propensity of some US aid recipients to attack US policy and motives in an extreme and unfair fashion, particularly in public forums. Quite apart and separate from Pakistan, the attacks in various parts of the world have created resentment among the people of the US and in our Congress. This and other problems related to aid (including inadequate self-help measures in some countries and the gold outflow from the US) have recently resulted in increasing opposition to the level of US foreign aid as well as to its allocation. This opposition, while not new, is greater than before and constitutes a real problem. Even a brief study of recent Congressional debates and proposals on this subject should be sufficient to demonstrate current temper of US public and congressional attitudes. 7. We believe that it is reasonable to expect that problems of this kind--indeed, any problems which either US or Pakistani government wishes to raise--should be discussed in a quiet, dignified and constructive manner. Anytime after House of Representatives has completed its action on current aid bill would be satisfactory from our point of view. This should occur in two to three weeks, although the exact date is not within Department's control. As for channel for conducting meaningful dialogue, in view of strong and unfriendly reaction of GOP we have no plans at this time to send any high official to Pakistan. We gather the GOP plans send no one here. Perhaps best and most effective communication channel for time being is through US Ambassador. 8. You are authorized convey as much of foregoing to Ayub as you deem helpful. Our position should on the one hand be dignified and courteous and even friendly and, on other, should indicate US does not consider either its motives or its action improper or harmful to Pakistan's sovereignty or dignity in any respect. Rusk
159. Telegram From the Embassy Office in Pakistan to the Department of State/1/ Rawalpindi, July 30, 1965, 1600Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, AID 9 PAK. Secret; Priority; Limdis. Repeated to Karachi. 29. Re Rawalpindi's 27 to Dept/2/--Consortium Postponement. /2/Not found. 1. My overall conclusion at close of rather frustrating 18-day stay in Pindi is that Paks remain bitterly resentful of consortium postponement action; determined to adhere to posture of injured innocence; disinclined to take any initiative toward reconciliatory talks with US at this time; and dead set against any gesture toward adjustment of present GOP foreign policy orientation in remaining weeks before September 23 consortium meeting. 2. I have encountered no disposition on part of any GOP leaders to take advantage of my extended presence in Pindi to get any preliminary meaningful dialogue under way. I have had to take initiative for every appointment I have had, and I have invariably had to do the steering to get the conversation around to the critical subject, except, of course, in case of Shoaib. All Ministers to whom I have talked have seemed generally well disposed, but timid on this issue, and evidently powerless to exert any decisive influence. They are disposed to assume that any modification of posture required to get relations back on its track will be taken by the US. Clearly, the President himself is calling the shots aided and advised by Bhutto. FinMin Shoaib is doing his best to keep GOP rational but is increasingly feeling pressure of his critics and is so much on defensive that he is wary of seeing me with any frequency. 3. President's mood toward US is amalgam of shocked disappointment, angry outrage and some degree of plain spitefulness and animosity. He has evaded on flimsy pretext my request made on July 21 for a quiet, private, personal and informal talk with him aimed at restoring a good cooperative working relationship. I am bound to conclude that President in his present heated mood does not wish to open any meaningful dialogue with US. 4. Immoderate trend of President's thinking can be seen in his decision to allow Bhutto to reveal and distort in inflammatory terms before National Assembly our interest in discussion of "certain other matters" during waiting period consortium meeting; and in his refusal to allow Shoaib in his July 24 speech to National Assembly to dwell on bona fide Congressional reasons for postponement of pledging session. 5. President undoubtedly feels that our renewed appeal for support of Vietnam is related to consortium postponement, which he envisages as power play to bring him into line. I hear on good authority that he resents omission of any reference to consortium pledging problem in US appeal for GOP assistance to Vietnam. He is also hurt by continued absence of any reply to his Presidential letter of last spring regarding Indian belligerence./3/ /3/See Document 120. 6. Paks by and large remain suspicious that US plans for them to play second fiddle to India in containment of Communist China on this flank. They are increasingly convinced we will not use our growing leverage on India (resulting from increased Indian economic dependence on US) to induce Kashmir settlement which would solve whole problem of subcontinental solidarity. With U.S. consortium pledge to India already made they consider that we are blind both to India's military trafficking with Soviet Russia and to India's abysmally poor economic performance. They consider that either of these circumstances should result in India's getting short shrift from US instead of--as they see it--far better treatment than Pakistan. 7. GOP as of this moment evidently does not envisage any circumstances under which it would be willing to [garble--bend?] on so-called "independent" policy of non-provocation of Communist countries and substantial improvement of relations with them. Paks have industriously worked themselves into a public position where they could hardly live with an abrupt change of policy stance now, even if they wanted to. Both Chinese Communists and USSR are working assiduously to enlarge their opening. 8. We can only stand steady on our present position for the next two or three weeks. We need to show great forbearance and keep the way open for any possible Pak change of heart about starting a meaningful dialogue./4/ I have let it be known widely that I am ready to return from Karachi for this purpose on a few hours' notice. I am leaving now for a talk with Bhutto enroute to airport. /4/The Department concurred with McConaughy's analysis in telegram 129 to Karachi, July 31. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, AID 9 PAK) 9. Further analysis and recommendation will follow from Karachi. McConaughy
160. Editorial Note On August 2, 1965, President Johnson discussed the contretemps that had developed with Pakistan over the postponement of the Pakistan consortium meeting in a telephone conversation with Secretary of State Rusk. Johnson was at his ranch in Texas and Rusk was in his office in the Department of State. In a conversation that also dealt with Vietnam, Rusk assured Johnson that the pledge the United States had made in the Indian consortium meeting in June represented the fulfillment of a prior commitment, and differed in that respect from the new commitment contemplated with respect to the Pakistan consortium. After some additional discussion of the problem, relating in good part to an assessment of the Pakistani response to the postponement and the steps that could be taken to restore relations to a more normal basis, Johnson referred to a number of suggestions made to him by William B. Macomber, Assistant Administrator of the Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs in the Agency for International Development. In response to those suggestions, Johnson said he had decided "we ought to take every means, direct and indirect, one, to tell him [Ayub] to quit trying us in the newspapers with his speeches, two, to stop the construction [of additional facilities at Peshawar] if that was the judgment of the government, three, to tell them that they were welcome and we were ready to talk to them as soon as the Congress had acted, fourth, that we have not played any different policy with them than we have with any other government, that while we had tentative commitments before, we had not cancelled them and we were not cancelling his for this year but we were not making any new ones." (Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of a Telephone Conversation Between President Johnson and Secretary Rusk, August 2, 1965, 10:33 a.m. (Texas time), Tape F65.01, Side A, PNO 137. A transcript of this conversation is ibid., Transcripts of Telephone Conversations, Alpha Series, Dean Rusk. The transcript bears the heading "President Johnson's Notes on Conversation with Secretary Rusk." A slightly different transcript, bearing the same heading, but misdated July 31, is ibid.
161. Telegram From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State/1/ Karachi, August 2, 1965. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, AID 9 PAK. Secret; Priority; Limdis. Repeated to Rawalpindi. No time of transmission is given on the telegram, which was received at 2:29 p.m. 152. Ref: Rawalpindi's 29./2/ FonMin Bhutto on consortium postponement. /2/Document 159. 1. I saw Bhutto at my request just before my departure from Rawalpindi afternoon July 30. He was in personally cordial mood but substance his remarks reflected hard GOP position encased in velvet glove. 2. He expressed regret that President Ayub had so far been unable to meet my request for an appointment. He gave a new and apparently candid reason for Ayub's avoidance of appointment, namely that Ayub feared that in his anger he would lose control of himself and make some undiplomatic statement to me. Bhutto quoted Ayub as saying he would rather wait until situation had jelled somewhat before he saw me. I told Bhutto that I was accustomed to plain language and President need have no fear of speaking to me as bluntly as he wished. I felt dialogue should have been started, before now, and no inhibitions about diplomatic niceties should stand in the way. Bhutto said he would pass this to President. He said President had authorized him to inform me that he (Bhutto) was fully empowered to make and to receive all representations on behalf of the President in the current crisis. 3. I told Bhutto of our great regret at GOP decision to publicize current difficulties, arousing public opinion and making reestablishment of understanding far more difficult. I specifically deplored Bhutto's decision to stress (and in our view overstress) to the Assembly the relationship of "certain other matters" to the consortium postponement. I felt this was a fateful decision which called into question the real interest of the GOP in a quiet search for an amicable understanding. In the inflamed and emotional atmosphere now created it was hard to see how any diplomatic dialogue could have much chance of achieving concrete results. Bhutto responded that tradition of complete candor in foreign policy debate in National Assembly made necessary a complete exposure of any issue as fundamental as consortium postponement. The postponement would have leaked out soon anyway and GOP would have been in untenable position with NA if the matter had not been discussed first in Assembly. When I observed that he could have divulged fact of postponement without making inflammatory political charges which were bound to arouse strong emotions, he said GOP had to give its own interpretation of the event to the Assembly. He said patriotic emotions were undoubtedly aroused, but he did not think this would lead to anti-US violence, and government was determined to extend full protection to American nationals and properties. He cited painful action of Dacca police in tear-gassing demonstration university students as evidence of the resolve of the government to keep down anti-American disorders. 4. Bhutto said that Ayub's deep sense of grievance against US was aggravated by a second look in retrospect at postponement of his projected visit to US last April. With benefit of hindsight, abrupt postponement looked more offensive to Paks now than it did at the time. He said Ayub is convinced that postponement of visit and postponement of consortium are part of some pattern of unsympathetic and indifferent US attitude toward GOP essential interests and views. 5. There was extended discussion of Indian affairs, with Bhutto showing a particular interest in the Indian public record on the confrontation in Viet Nam, and in the US evaluation of Indian record. Obviously Bhutto believes that the Indian position on Viet Nam is less helpful from our standpoint than is the record of Pakistan, and he would like to document this if he can. He would like a list of Indian statements and actions and the American assessment thereof. 6. I told Bhutto in confidence of the deferral of any commitment on Fiscal 1966 aid funds for India, the same as for Pakistan. This meant there was no discrimination in practice, even though India consortium pledging session had been held before present Congressional question arose. He said he had not understood this before and he would inform the President. 7. I told Bhutto candidly that GOP decision to create a public crisis in our relations over consortium postponement issue, and the resultant stir of highly charged and misguided sentiment against the US had created an exceedingly unfavorable impression in the US which is not confined to any one sector of our government or people. The unwillingness of the GOP to get a meaningful dialogue started or do anything else to mend the situation has compounded the GOP mistake as we see it; he [I] said that the way the GOP was handling the problem would strengthen sentiment in the US for seeking a very clear and explicit understanding with Pakistan. Bhutto immediately interpreted this as a threat to take a hard line, and said if the US did take a hard line, Pakistan would immediately take a harder line. He said he knew this could result in a still harder US line, and then Pakistan would have to take a yet harder line. He said there could be an "escalation" in Pakistan as in Viet Nam, except that it would be a "peaceful escalation" here and not a warlike one. 8. Bhutto revealed full knowledge of President Johnson's message of July 25 to Ayub regarding Viet Nam./3/ He said reply would be forthcoming within next few days. Bhutto showed considerable interest in military situation in Viet Nam and asked in detail about USAF bombing of missile sites near Hanoi and whether we had evidence that Soviet personnel were present at sites. He reminded me that GOP had informed US some time back that ChiComs had agreed to permit Soviets to ship military material to North Viet Nam through Chinese territory. /3/Johnson sent a message to Ayub on July 25 explaining the decision to expand the U.S. military role in South Vietnam and asking for the support of Ayub's government. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Special Head of State Correspondence, Pakistan-Presidential Correspondence, Part I) 9. Bhutto said GOP would be glad to transmit for us any messages to ChiComs or others in regard to Vietnamese crisis. He said GOP wanted to be helpful. However, it was evident he was only thinking of GOP good offices role as neutral friendly to both sides. 10. Bhutto remained amiable and even somewhat complimentary throughout. Said he would be coming to Karachi about August 5 and would like to have dinner with me there. McConaughy
162. Memorandum From Robert Komer of the National Security Council Staff to Secretary of State Rusk/1/ Washington, August 2, 1965. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, DEF 15 PAK-US. Secret. Also sent to McNamara. The President wanted me to pass on the points I made to him over the weekend on Pakistan. I was pointing out the problems inherent in the apparent Pak decision to wait us out on our consortium, meanwhile mobilizing counterpressures on us. The risk in sitting tight under these circumstances was that if the Paks didn't get the word, and start coming to us, we'd face a tough decision on 23 September. If we then made the pledge they wanted, it would look as though we'd capitulated to Pak pressures. If we didn't make a pledge, it would trigger a far worse crisis with the Paks. Since we'd no longer be able to use the Congressional argument, it would appear as a straight political pressure play. The Paks might then feel compelled to put the squeeze on Peshawar, for example. So I suggested stepping up our effort to make Ayub come to us before 23 September by a series of steps designed to shake him loose. These wouldn't involve chasing after him but rather making quite clear that he was skating on thin ice: (1) Pass the word via direct and indirect means that by making such a public to-do over our request for consortium postponement, he'd changed the name of the game. Therefore, unless the Paks changed their tune we might not be able to make any pledge at all. (2) Shaking Pak confidence that they had an ace up their sleeve in Peshawar by suspending all new construction (thus making them think we might pull out). (3) Then passing word that we wouldn't run after the Paks and ask them to let us give them aid. If Ayub valued US support he'd be wise to pick up our "standing invitation" and himself suggest a visit here soon. My understanding is that the President is inclined to agree on suspending new construction in Peshawar, but wishes to have your views first. This might be worth discussing at your Tuesday lunch with him, and I attach a memo to him summarizing the matter to this end./2/ /2/The August 2 memorandum from Komer to Johnson, not printed, is headed "Intelligence Leverage on Pakistan." R. W. Komer
163. Memorandum for the Record/1/ Washington, August 4, 1965. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL PAK-US. Secret. Prepared by Komer. President's Meeting with John Bonny Mr. John Bonny, President of Morrison Knudson, came in on 4 August at his request to give the President an "oral message" from President Ayub. Messrs. Califano and Komer sat in. When Mr. Bonny transitted Pakistan en route home from Vietnam, he'd been invited by Ghulam Faruq, an old friend and a Pak cabinet minister,/2/ to see Ayub. Ayub had asked him to deliver a personal message expressing his highest regard for President Johnson and his deepest gratitude for the hospitality which both President and Mrs. Johnson had shown him at their ranch. Regardless of the US decision on the consortium, Pakistan would remain a friend of the US and considered itself irrevocably tied to the future of the West. /2/Minister of Commerce. Bonny then discussed the highlights of his almost hour-long talk with Ayub. He told Ayub he had just arrived from Vietnam, where M-K was doing military construction work. In Bonny's opinion the only nations which had stood up and been counted on the US side were Australia and New Zealand. It was time for other countries to stand up and be counted too. Ayub commented if he had the hydrogen bomb, he would adopt exactly the same policies as the US. Ayub then brought up his visit to Peiping (Bonny commented that all of Ayub's statements were subsequently confirmed by Ghulam Faruq, who had accompanied Ayub). Chou En-lai attempted to influence Ayub to withdraw from SEATO. However, Ayub replied that SEATO was a defensive alliance. If the Chicoms didn't violate the territory of other nations, they had nothing to fear from SEATO. If they did, Pakistan would do all in its limited power to defeat this aggression. Ayub said there was in his opinion a misunderstanding of his apparent appeasement of the Communists. Pakistan was weak so wanted to keep on good terms with its two powerful neighbors. The President broke in to say that that was Ayub's business. What concerned the President was his public attacks on us and his general assumption that our money grew on trees. The President had said that we could make no commitments to any country until we got the money (he described his Congressional problems). When he proposed that Ayub postpone his visit till Congress passed the aid bill, the first thing Ayub did was to leak it--thus causing us trouble with the Indians. Also, Ayub's own Foreign Minister was working against him and against us. Then Ayub said he would have to have a consortium meeting on 27 July, even though we had explained why we would be unable to pledge until after Congress acted. The President pointed out that he didn't have a "penny" of authority to spend until then. However, the minute the bill was through, he would be prepared to talk with Ayub. Then he would decide what to do in our national interest. At the moment he thought that providing aid to Pakistan was in our national interest. But if Ayub wanted to "try this case in the papers," he could take the consequences. Ayub couldn't "pressure" us. A host still had the right to say when he wanted a guest to come. Moreover, the President thought Ayub was wise enough that he ought to know that if he wanted a showdown, he wouldn't be able to pressure us. Who was he to tell us that we wanted to be "masters" of Pakistan? The President went on to say that if there was a pro-Pak man in town, it was Lyndon Johnson. But he didn't like being bullied. Bonny interjected that he didn't think Ayub felt that way. Ayub had an opposition party and a bad Foreign Minister. The President reiterated that he was Ayub's friend; he would sit down with Ayub when he got his money. Bonny could tell him that he had an open invite the day the aid bill was signed. Komer spoke further with Bonny after his meeting with the President. Bonny stressed that Ghulam Faruq, whom he described as the #2 minister in Pakistan, was an extremely close friend. In fact, Bonny was probably his closest American friend. Bonny suggested that if we wanted him to send back a message he could do so through Ghulam Faruq. M-K had a good code which it used repeatedly for communicating with its top man in Pakistan (the only one who knew it). If we thought it advisable, he would be happy to use this channel to Faruq. Bonny felt very strongly that the best way to resolve the crisis was to get Ayub here for a face-to-face talk; so he would be happy to send such a message. He agreed that he would call me next Wednesday upon his return to Washington to find out what we would prefer. He also agreed to have his notes typed up and send them to the President. Bonny felt that if Ayub came here we could get him to send perhaps even a division to Vietnam. Ayub had described how Chou told him the Chicoms had used less than one division in the border fight with India in late 1962. Chou told Ayub he was astounded by the way the Indians collapsed. Ayub commented that he had always believed one Pakistani division to be worth three Indian divisions, but after hearing Chou he was convinced that one Pak division was equal to at least five Indian divisions. R. W. Komer/3/ /3/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
164. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in India/1/ Washington, August 8, 1965, 8:33 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 32-1 INDIA-PAK. Secret; Flash; Exdis. Drafted and approved by Rusk. 177. Eyes only for the Ambassador from the Secretary. I have just been informed by UK Ambassador that Indian Government has reported to UK, US and Soviet Union that large-scale Pakistani infiltrations under way in Kashmir and that if this is not stopped GOI must take strong countermeasures. Please let us have your assessment most urgently./2/ /2/Bowles responded that C.S. Jha had told him and British High Commissioner Freeman on August 8 that Pakistani penetrations of Indian territory had started on August 5 and involved at least 4 groups of 50-60 men who had infiltrated Indian territory as much as 30 miles. According to Jha, captured infiltrators admitted to being members of a paramilitary organization trained by the Pakistani army. Jha stated that his government would take whatever measures were necessary to stop such infiltration, and asked the U.S. and British Governments to bring pressure to bear on Pakistan to halt the provocation. Bowles felt that if the situation was as Jha represented it could lead to a major reaction against Pakistan in India. (Telegram 225 from New Delhi, August 9; ibid.) Rusk
165. Memorandum From Robert Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson/1/ Washington, August 9, 1965. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. 13, August 1965. Secret. McGeorge Bundy sent this memorandum to the President under cover of a memorandum in which he noted that the roundup on Pakistan might be out of date in that Komer was unaware of Johnson's conversation with Rusk about sending Harriman to Pakistan. (Ibid., 7/1/65-9/22/65) Pakistan Roundup. Our Embassy says the Paks are at it again criticising the consortium postponement (Karachi 193 attached)./2/ Bhutto just gave another speech criticising our aid to India over Pak protests. He blamed the US for the aid "stoppage," but said it wasn't aid anyway because it was loans which had to be repaid with heavy interest. /2/Dated August 8; not printed. Since in fact we haven't stopped aid, only postponed new FY'66 commitments, would you see merit in discreetly letting out this fact (we have almost $300 million in old aid in the pipeline, are still shipping last year's wheat, etc.)? Canada's High Commissioner, who saw Ayub recently, is slightly more optimistic than our Embassy (Karachi 183 attached)./3/ He sees Ayub as at least admitting Pakistan might have been "guilty of some excesses." /3/Dated August 6; not printed. Pak pressure on Kashmir. We have good evidence that the Paks are stepping up infiltration into Kashmir, which could build up to a good-sized flap. The Indians are again threatening "strong countermeasures." This could be the Rann of Kutch all over again, with each side alleging the other is misusing our MAP arms. Iran's Ambassador to Pakistan, a shrewd observer, says that Bhutto admitted his policy is based on the assumption that the US will be forced out of Vietnam and that Pakistan had better accommodate to an increasingly powerful Red China. Suspending Peshawar Construction. Bundy and I have pushed this, but our intelligence people claim it wouldn't be understood. It's up to Rusk and McNamara. Ayub Visit. Shoaib told the Australian Hicom that it was up to the big power, not the little one, to take the initiative for improving relations. We've sent your "message" via John Bonny, Goldberg has talked with the Pak at the UN,/4/ and we are waiting for Rusk to activate the promising UK circuit. You may want to raise this at Tuesday lunch. /4/UN Ambassador Arthur Goldberg met in New York on August 7 with Amjad Ali, Pakistani Permanent Representative to the United Nations. Goldberg told Ali that he came at President Johnson's request following a conversation at Johnson's ranch. The President wanted President Ayub to know that he meant exactly what he said on U.S. aid to Pakistan, which was that a decision on such aid would have to wait until after there had been progress in Congress on the overall aid bill. Distortion of the reasoning underlying this decision in the Pakistani press had made things extremely difficult, and Johnson wanted Ayub to know that continuation of such distortions was not conducive to the good relations between Pakistan and the United States that had prevailed for so long. (Memorandum of conversation, August 7; Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Pakistan, Vol. III, Memos, 12/64-7/65) In sum, it's too early yet to tell whether we're moving the Paks. If we don't get some indications in the next week or so, however, we may want to step up our effort another notch. R. W. Komer [Continue with the next documents]
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