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FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1964-1968, Volume XXV South Asia
Department of State |
166. Minutes of Meeting of the 303 Committee/1/ Washington, August 9, 1965. /1/Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, 303 C.24, August 26, 1965. Secret; Eyes Only. Prepared on August 10 by Peter Jessup of the National Security Council Staff. Copies were sent to Ambassador Thompson, Vance, and Admiral Raborn. SUBJECT PRESENT 1. Pakistan a. Mr. Bundy asked Mr. Komer to provide the committee with a brief summary of the Pakistan problem. Mr. Komer pointed out that we were seeking ways to persuade Ayub--the only person one can do business with in Pakistan--to come to us before the 23rd of September, the consortium deadline. Among the few visible means of leverage would be suspension of construction on the U.S. [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] installations in Peshawar. Mr. Komer pointed out that the Paks regarded Peshawar as their hole card; if we could shake their confidence that this was so by such a gesture (while not affecting intelligence collection per se), it could indicate to Ayub that the U.S. meant business. b. Ambassador Thompson stated that he had discussed these matters with Secretary Rusk, who wanted to talk further with Secretary McNamara. He also suggested that the suspension of construction ploy could have the opposite effect of that intended: instead of "shaking up" the Pakistanis, they might interpret that we were being deferential towards them. c. The earlier suggestion of Mr. Vance that [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] was also thought to contain backfire possibilities: it might be difficult to get them back in at a later date, and it might be read as an admission that [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] did not constitute a priority project. d. Admiral Raborn felt that stopping the construction was a minimal gesture at best that would only muddy waters and could set in motion more undesirable events. e. On the question of alternate sites, Mr. Komer pointed out that presumably the Pakistanis could publicize any moves we make in the direction of Iran [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] with unfortunate results. Mr. Komer emphasized that ways to test the reliability of our ally were few and far between. He suggested [1 line of source text not declassified]. f. Admiral Raborn stated that he looked with little optimism on the alternate site [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] as long-range risks and that Pakistan was, in effect, a bonded ally and all methods of negotiating should be explored. He felt the threat of suspension of foreign aid was the single strongest weapon in our arsenal and reiterated that the suspension of construction threat was a minor tactic. g. Mr. Komer warned that higher authority was unlikely to respond to blackmail tactics by Pakistan. With the Pakistanis lambasting us on a regular basis it was going to be difficult when we reached the deadline of the 23rd of September to feed the hand that bites us. If we were then unable to make a pledge because it would seem like caving to Pak public pressures, the risks of Pak retaliation against Peshawar would go up. h. Mr. Bundy summarized the disparate views and stated that we must all search for quiet ways to convince Ayub in the next six weeks. We sought to produce a tactical situation to reopen talks with Ayub and to indicate our state of mind. He concluded that agreement could not be reached in this meeting, and the matter would be referred back to the Secretaries of State and Defense. He emphasized that we want to avoid creating an atmosphere of haggle. i. Generals Carroll and Carter summarized the exact status of the building program. j. Mr. Komer indicated the spiraling nature of the situation down to 23 September and repeated that even small efforts could be worth trying now. k. The Committee did agree to the following: (1) to proceed rapidly with all preliminary planning for alternate sites; (2) not to break ground for the construction of the BOQ at Peshawar (new construction, as opposed to work in progress); (3) not to use [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] for approaches to Ayub in view of certain recent changes, [1 line of source text not declassified]; (4) the results of this discussion would be brought to the attention of Secretaries Rusk and McNamara as possible assistance in their deliberations. [Here follows discussion unrelated to Pakistan.] Peter Jessup
167. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Pakistan/1/ Washington, August 10, 1965, 9:48 a.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL PAK-US. Secret; Immediate; Limdis. Drafted by Laingen on August 9; cleared by Handley, Macomber in AID/NESA, Judd in BNA, and Komer; and approved and initialed by Rusk. Repeated to New Delhi and London. 163. Embtel 193./2/ We are in full agreement your view that restored communication with Ayub at earliest moment is essential to get Paks clearly to see risks to their own interests that their current public campaign against us is creating. However in war of nerves Ayub has chosen to wage, it clearly also important we not appear be succumbing to pressure tactics he using against us. /2/Summarized in Document 165. Therefore we believe for present it best you defer making formal request for appointment, leaving your previous request for appointment on the record and allowing time for countervailing pressures of kind you and we are seeking stimulate hopefully begin having some effect on Ayub's public stance. For our part, after weighing several alternative courses action here, we have concluded we should concentrate for moment on asking U.K. to help us to get through to Ayub, since visit of neither George Woods nor Eugene Black is presently in the cards. Therefore we plan call in British Ambassador in next day or two to suggest HMG make renewed effort try to get Ayub to see seriousness present situation and encourage him to take steps necessary to break current impasse./3/ We want to convey through this channel that: (a) we will not succumb to pressure campaign of kind Ayub has mounted against us; (b) only way this can be straightened out is if GOP stops public criticism and anti-U.S. campaign and climate is created for better talks; and (c) that there is standing invitation for Ayub to come here in early fall and this could be dusted off and moved up if Ayub were disposed come here for Presidential talks. Our plans with British should not be revealed to U.K. Hicom. /3/Rusk had a conversation along these lines on August 13 with Ambassador Sir Patrick Dean. (Telegram 834 to London, August 13; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL PAK-US) FYI. Ambassador Goldberg has expressed to Amjad Ali our concern over current GOP tactics. We also envisage calling in Ambassador Ahmed again soon. End FYI. Rusk
168. National Security Action Memorandum No. 337/1/ Washington, August 10, 1965. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSAMs, NSAM 337. Top Secret; COMINT. Prepared by McGeorge Bundy. A copy was sent to the Director of the Budget. MEMORANDUM TO SUBJECT In the light of your responses to my memorandum of July 6 on this subject, the President approves your unanimous recommendation that we proceed as a matter of urgency to develop alternate facilities, and requests a firm recommendation on this matter as soon as feasible./2/ /2/On August 21 the Department asked the Embassy in [text not declassified] to comment [text not declassified]. (Telegram [text not declassified] to [text not declassified]; Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, [text not declassified] Cables, [text not declassified]) On August 25 the Department requested a similar assessment from the Embassy in Tehran; see Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. XXII, Document 94. He also approves the Secretary of State's recommendation that no further additions or improvements to the facilities be undertaken at this time. Finally, he asks that the agencies concerned keep this matter under continuous review and prepare, on a contingency basis, a list of measures they would recommend if it were decided to use this means of convincing Pakistan of our dissatisfaction with its current posture./3/ /3/The Department transmitted the conclusions of NSAM No. 337 to Ambassador McConaughy on August 19. (Telegram 28 to Rawalpindi; Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, [text not declassified] Cables, Rawalpindi) McGeorge Bundy
169. Telegram From the Mission at the United Nations to the Department of State/1/ New York, August 17, 1965, 2110Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, AID 9 PAK. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Passed to the White House. 399. Re: Consortium aid to Pakistan--US relations. Amjad Ali (Pakistan) called on Goldberg today to reply to informal suggestions made by latter, on behalf of Pres Johnson, to improve Pakistan-US understanding (memcon Aug. 7)./2/ /2/See footnote 4, Document 165. Amjad Ali said Ayub highly pleased at friendly contact established through Goldberg and wants latter to convey his "warm personal friendship for Pres Johnson." (Amjad Ali recalled Ayub visited Pres at LBJ Ranch.) Ayub was reassured on US reasons for postponement of commitments on aid. News of postponement came at very sensitive time, day after issuance by Pakistan Govt of semi-annual announcement of import policy. Announcement included estimates of imports, which depend in part on aid. Since legislature in session, Ayub had to bring matter to their attention and this inevitably created unfavorable impression. US move had come as unpleasant surprise to those (including Amjad Ali) who had worked for closer relations between two countries. Ayub believed that any temporary deterioration in relations between two countries can, "with objectivity," be put right. Any doubts US had re Pakistan foreign policy could be discussed in Wash. Ayub certain misunderstandings would thus be cleared up. Ayub noted further that there is large area of agreement in general orientation of policy of Pakistan and US and Pakistan intended continue such orientation. Pakistan cherished friendships with West in general and US in particular. Always prepared to hold bilateral talks and believes they be useful. Having conveyed foregoing message from Ayub, Amjad Ali made, apparently, on his own initiative, several alternative procedural suggestions: 1) perhaps Justice Goldberg could take hand in talks by going to Pakistan; 2) alternatively George Woods, Pres of IBRD, who also well regarded by Ayub might go to Karachi (Woods met with Ayub during last Commonwealth meetings in London); 3) high-powered "envoy" be sent from Karachi to Washington. Goldberg welcomed the spirit of Ayub response. As New York Times reported today, conf comite appears virtually to have resolved differences between House and Senate foreign aid bills and early passage likely. He was sure Pres Ayub would receive cordial welcome. He was particularly gratified at Ayub's assurances Pakistan orientation will continue as in past; he had no doubts himself about Pakistan's orientation and was glad misunderstanding in process of being cleared up. Re suggestions he go to Karachi, Goldberg said he would talk to both Pres and Secy of State about Amjad Ali's three procedural suggestions, including visit by high level Pakistan envoy to Washington. Would respond after consultations in Washington. Comment: Most striking element of Ayub message as conveyed by Amjad Ali was firm restatement of (a) friendship with West and US in particular and (b) continuance of its traditional foreign policy orientation. Presumably this implies continuing membership in SEATO and alliance with US./3/ /3/McGeorge Bundy sent a copy of this telegram to President Johnson on August 18 under cover of a memorandum in which he sought Johnson's reaction to the suggestion that Goldberg, Woods, or some other high-level envoy be sent to Ayub. Johnson wrote on Bundy's memorandum "Forget it!! Tell Goldberg we are out of travel cards." Bundy noted that the possibility of a visit to Pakistan by Harriman had been discussed with the Department of State, and Johnson also ruled that out. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. 13, August 1965) Plimpton
170. Memorandum From Robert Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson/1/ Washington, August 19, 1965, 5 p.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Name File, Komer Memos, Vol. I. Secret. Pak/Indian Roundup. Karachi 255/2/ at Tab A is a fascinating talk between Bhutto and McConaughy, which makes clear that the Pak tactic is to wait us out until they see if we make a consortium pledge. Then Ayub might be willing to come (perhaps before he goes to the UK in mid-October). Bhutto is clearly angling for a prior visit, and Rusk at least will have to see him because he's coming to the UNGA. Bhutto clearly has the wind up that we think him the enemy, so we'll have to treat him with kid gloves. We might even be able to softsoap him into being the conciliator. /2/Dated August 18; attached but not printed. Goldberg-Amjad Ali. At Tab B is Goldberg's report on the reply he got,/3/ which he says he discussed with you. We've asked him to go back at Amjad, stressing that only the two Presidents can make the real decisions needed, so an early summit is far better than special envoys./4/ /3/Reference is to telegram 399 from USUN, Document 169. /4/Johnson added a handwritten note at the end of the memorandum which reads: "We will await Cong action before commitments. Then we will await their visit before participating in consortium. Goldberg goes too far in assuming as soon as Cong acts all is well. We will determine what is in our natl interest & act accordingly after Ayub visit. Get this word to him loud, clear, & unequivocal. L." The UK Approach. We've finally given the British a brief,/5/ which makes clear to them at least our feeling that if Ayub can't come we can't pledge. They say they'll do their best, but their experts and ours agree that Ayub will regard coming so close to 23 September as negotiating under the gun. So they doubt we can possibly get Ayub here before October. Bundy and I keep saying "try!" /5/A paper entitled "Guidelines for British Talks With President Ayub" was given to Cyril Pickard of the Commonwealth Relations Office on August 19 at the conclusion of his visit to Washington for talks on the Pakistan consortium problem. The text of the paper was transmitted to Karachi in telegram 220, August 20. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, AID 9 PAK) Shastri Visit. Tom Mann and I have stressed to B.K. Nehru the desirability of Shastri coming here in October. Bowles also took up the matter with Shastri's chief aide again. My hunch is Shastri will come; if so, it's imperative this not leak till we've told Ayub. Kashmir crisis. This mess may yet get much worse, which could change the whole bidding on visits. The Pak infiltration effort to stir up a local revolt seems to have failed so far, but the Paks are still at it and the Indians are retaliating. R. W. Komer/6/ /6/McGeorge Bundy initialed below Komer's signature.
171. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission at the United Nations/1/ Washington, August 19, 1965, 7:56 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL PAK-US. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Komer, cleared by Talbot and Michael V. Connors in IO, and approved by Mann. Repeated to Karachi. 278. For Ambassador Goldberg. President desires that you go back at Amjad Ali to reinforce idea that Ayub visit here highly desirable, since new situation created by violent Pak attacks on US makes highest level meeting of minds almost essential if Pak/US relations to be unfrozen. Suggest you tell Amjad you have checked with Washington and found President greatly appreciative Ayub's friendly sentiments and assurances our ties still strong, but frankly found them hard to square with public stance taken by Paks, including Ayub himself. Even so, the President clearly reciprocates Ayub's "warm personal friendship" and believes that the two of them could quickly reach an understanding. So he welcomes the idea of highest level dialogue in Washington. You raised the question of someone like yourself going out to pave the way--but it's clear that you or George Woods or a high-powered Pak envoy couldn't settle matters. Only the two Presidents could. That's why an early direct meeting of minds at the top seems the best way to put Pak/US relations back on the tracks. The President regards Ayub as having a cordial standing invite for early fall, but you assume he'd be quite prepared to reinvite Ayub if the latter were receptive. As Secretary Ball told Bhutto in London, we had hoped the visit could be rescheduled for September. Therefore, your own personal instinct is to urge that the two Presidents get together soonest. In fact, your hunch is that it's hard to see how Pak/US relations can be unfrozen in the way the Paks want otherwise. FYI, though we are most unlikely to make a pledge until Ayub comes, we do not want to give any direct ultimatum to the Paks, lest it freeze their position. End FYI./2/ /2/Goldberg passed the message to Amjad Ali as instructed on August 20. Ali expressed appreciation for the cordial remarks and the renewed invitation, but he pointed out that it might be difficult for Ayub to leave Pakistan because of the tense situation developing over Kashmir. (Telegram 453 from USUN, August 20; ibid.) Rusk
172. Editorial Note On August 19, 1965, Ambassador Chester Bowles sent a 10-page memorandum to President Johnson entitled "Observations on Military Aid to the Indian Subcontinent." He sent it under cover of a letter in which he described the issue of military assistance as "one of the most complex and difficult on our Asian agenda." Bowles devoted part of his memorandum to tracing the history of what he saw as an opportunity wasted in the wake of the 1962 border war between India and China to establish the United States as the principal source of military assistance to India. The failure to do so, Bowles pointed out, had opened the door to increasing Soviet military assistance and influence in India. Bowles painted a picture of India evolving into an Asian Yugoslavia, but he argued that it was not too late to reverse the trend. He proposed that the United States should continue the 5-year $50 million grant and $50 million sales assistance support program for India, while at the same time opening the way for India's procurement of the weapons it needed for its defense, including F-5 fighters. He recognized that such a program would prompt an adverse reaction from Pakistan, but he argued that the United States should face up to the Pakistani reaction and cushion it with the economic assistance upon which Pakistan was dependent. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, India, Exchanges with Bowles) On August 28 President Johnson sent a note to McGeorge Bundy and Bromley Smith which reads: "I have read Chester Bowles' memo and I would like the best analysis I can get. In my judgment we ought to get out of military aid to both Pakistan and India. I want to see Rusk about it." (Ibid.)
173. Memorandum From Robert Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)/1/ Washington, August 20, 1965. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Name File, Komer Memos, Vol. I. Secret. Mac-- Other mood music on Pak problem is as follows: 1. Mann is opposed to looking nervous by too much frantic diplomacy to get Ayub here shortly. He fears that we'll cave at the last minute on pledging so doesn't want to see us get out on too much of a limb till we've looked all the way down the road. He wants to be sure the President is really prepared to see 23 September go by without a pledge, even at the cost of considerably increased risk to Peshawar (about which the whole intelligence lobby will scream). He thinks we must make a deliberate choice as to whether we're willing to lose it, if necessary. Tom says he's seen too many cases in which we got chicken at the last minute. 2. Talbot and the experts (powerfully abetted by Pickard) are leading the chickens, with an assist from Ball. They are genuinely fearful that we can push the psychotic Paks too far, with the result that: (a) a major crisis could be precipitated in the subcontinent, maybe even a rash Pak attack on India; and/or (b) the Paks could tell us to go jump, and take Peshawar with us. The Paks are playing with fire by their continued major infiltration into Kashmir; if the Indians decide to strike back elsewhere or Hindu-Moslem riots occur, we'll have a big mess. I think they overstate the risks, but am the first to admit that the stakes are big. Perhaps we should give the President a reminder as to the risks, however. 3. The experts also argue against softening up Ayub with counter-threats. A soft sell is better calculated to get him here, as well as some US gesture which will help him to save face (e.g. sending someone out or inviting Bhutto here). 4. In any case they also see the odds as strongly against Ayub coming here before 23 September. He won't come to Canossa on such short notice. Talbot says that to come just before 23 September would make Ayub seem to be negotiating under the gun. But he and Pickard see the odds as good that we could get Ayub to come later (earliest would be October), if we're careful not to crowd him too much. 5. No one has an answer to what we'd then do on 23 September. Mann says just "sweet talk" but no aid or at best a partial pledge. I'd agree. So just in case, we're now actively looking at ways to slide past 23 September with a minimum of fireworks. RWK
174. Memorandum From Harold Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)/1/ Washington, August 23, 1965. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Name File, Saunders Memos. Confidential. McGB: In case the President should quiz you about Selig Harrison's piece on Indian famine (attached),/2/ it's too early to tell whether India faces a crop disaster. We won't have an accurate measure of the summer crop until mid-October. But if dry weather continues another 10 days, the crop will probably fall well short of last year's. /2/Not attached. In an article datelined New Delhi, August 21, Harrison wrote that India appeared to be facing its worst food crisis since 1951 as a result of a persistent drought. (Washington Post, August 22, 1965, p. A25) The one thing that may trigger LBJ reaction is Harrison's putting the finger right on the President for holding up a full-scale extension of PL 480. He doesn't link it with Shastri's visit. Bell had hoped to send over this week his proposal for a 10-month agreement. However, the President's disapproval of Title III has thrown him off stride, and he'll probably wait until he finds out what the President wants. He'll propose an agreement of the remaining 5 million tons of wheat (plus minor commodities) originally planned. Bowles hopes to back this up with a memo from Subramaniam laying out India's plans to improve agricultural performance, and we'd weave these in as informal conditions. Hal
175. Memorandum From Robert Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson/1/ Washington, August 28, 1965, 10:30 a.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. 13, August 1965. Secret. Pak/Indian Roundup. Kashmir is still bubbling merrily and could blow up. U Thant fears the whole 1949 cease-fire agreement may collapse. He wanted to report blaming the Paks for starting the mess, but the Paks threatened to withdraw from the UN if he did. Nor are the Indians too eager to take Kashmir to the UN lest the whole question of its status be reopened (which is what the Paks want). Bowles sees mounting pressures for Indian retaliation and urges we call the Pak bluff that they aren't involved, lest they be encouraged to think they are getting away with the game. In fact, we have [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] a most reliable report that both the Kashmir infiltration and the earlier Rann of Kutch affair are part of a "well-organized plan" to force a Kashmir settlement. This plan was checked out with both the Chicoms and Indos. Worth reading (Tab A)./2/ /2/Reference is to Intelligence Information Cable [number not declassified], August 26, 1965. The UK gambit. Wilson sent a rather bland letter to Ayub (Tab B),/3/ as an opener to get Ayub to see his envoy next week. We think we frightened the Brits enough to get them to try hard, but I suspect that after they sound out Ayub Harold Wilson will be back at you. /3/An undated copy of Wilson's letter to Ayub, offering British help with the Pakistan consortium problem, is attached at Tab B. Meanwhile the true extent of our disillusionment with the Paks is being gotten out through various quiet channels (the Pak Ambassador here is highly chastened, whatever his demeanor on the Sequoia). Even if Ayub doesn't come till October or so, all this will help insure that he comes in the right mood. Ayub and Shastri Visits. The Kashmir flare-up makes it difficult for either to firm up plans now, though I'll wager we could land Shastri if you wrote him directly, reminding him we'd love to have him though we realized Kashmir might get in the way. My hunch still is that this would also help move along Ayub. Wednesday Meeting. Though we've scheduled a Wednesday/4/ morning meeting of Rusk, Mann, and Bell with you on Title III feeding programs, Bundy and I suggest we broaden it to include Pak/Indian problems in general. We keep putting out the word "no meeting no pledge"; but getting it directly from you would be quite useful at this point. /4/September 1. R.W. Komer
176. Memorandum From Robert Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson/1/ Washington, August 31, 1965, 4 p.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Name File, Komer Memos, Vol. I. Secret. We just got some very disturbing reports that Paks have decided to escalate in Kashmir by throwing in regulars, because they can't otherwise cope with Indian retaliation across the cease-fire line. The rationale is that the Paks, having failed to spark a "war of liberation" via a Kashmiri uprising, may now feel they've got to enter the lists directly to forestall a humiliating failure. CIA believes that the Pak generals are very unhappy with their bum intelligence and with the failure of the Ayub/Bhutto gambit to stir up Kashmir. But Pak escalation would trigger a critical Pak/Indian crisis--though still one big step short of a Pak/Indian war. There's a case for sitting back a while longer and letting both Paks and Indians face up to the awesome risks involved. These might make both more malleable vis-à-vis us. On the other hand, the chances of an explosion are great enough so that we ought to push the UN hardest to intervene--and perhaps the UK too. We could supplement by private blasts at both Paks and Indians. My impression is that we're not moving fast enough on this one (Goldberg was to see U Thant today, but we didn't yet have the new alarming reports). R. W. Komer
177. Telegram From the Embassy in India to the Department of State/1/ New Delhi, September 1, 1965, 1635Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 32-1 INDIA-PAK. Secret; Immediate. Passed to the White House, DOD, and CIA. 446. At 2000 hrs Delhi time today I called on ForMin Swaran Singh and Foreign Secy C.J. Jha and registered urgent plea for Indian restraint in dealing with Pakistan armored attack which was launched this morning north of Jammu./2/ I made following points: /2/Four hours earlier, General Chadhury, Chief of the Indian Army Staff, had called in General Johnson, Chief of the U.S. Military Supply Mission in India, and informed him that Pakistan had launched an attack spearheaded by a regiment of MAP-supplied M-48 Patton tanks in the Chhamb area at the juncture of the cease-fire line in Kashmir and the international border between the two countries. Chadhury stated that India was not using any U.S.-supplied military equipment in the conflict. At the time of Chadhury's report, Pakistani forces were about 3 miles across the cease-fire line. (Telegram 444 from New Delhi, September 1; ibid.) When Defense Minister Chavan reported the attack in the Indian Parliament at noon on the following day, he indicated that Pakistani forces had driven 5 miles across the cease-fire line. (Telegram 455 from New Delhi, September 2; ibid.) 1. Paks were clearly guilty of training large number of guerrilla infiltrators and sending them across cease-fire line and deep into Kashmir Valley. 2. Although India's action in seizing control of key infiltration points and breaking up supply lines on Pak side of cease-fire line may have been logical from purely military point of view it was serious political mistake. Paks already embarrassed by failure of their guerrilla effort were almost bound to react elsewhere and this they have now done. 3. India now faces historic decision which will affect her future and that of South Asia for generation to come. Counter thrust by India at some more favorable point either on cease-fire line or international boundary, will almost certainly touch off war that would soon be out of control. If on other hand India makes it clear that it has no desire to extend fighting and earnestly seeks peaceful solution, situation may still be brought under control. Swaran Singh, while defending India's thrust across cease-fire line as militarily necessary to stop infiltration, accepted my analysis, and asserted that India has no further moves in mind and is prepared to meet Pakistan more than half way. However, supported by C.S. Jha, he strongly protested use by Paks of US Patton tanks, and asked what we would do to carry out our assurances that we would not permit US military equipment to be used against India unless India were clearly the aggressor. I replied I had fully informed my government and I was certain that situation would be carefully investigated. Swaran Singh continued to press his point, asserting that only US was in position to restrain Pak Army which thanks to its American equipment had certain advantages over Indians particularly in tanks and planes. I then switched conversation back to central point, i.e. that India had big decision to make; counter thrust in response to today's action by Paks or reasonable posture that could save subcontinent from bitter conflict. Whatever arguments of tactical military necessity might be advanced, I was profoundly hopeful that political judgments would be overriding. Even if Paks refuse to negotiate and choose path toward war, India's position at least would be clear and world-wide support would be assured in whatever might follow. Bowles
178. Memorandum for the Record/1/ Washington, September 2, 1965, 9:30 a.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Kashmir, Vol. II, 9/65-10/65. Secret. Prepared by Komer. SUBJECT PRESENT Secretary Rusk described how Kashmir could erupt into a major fracas; perhaps the most serious problem could be communal rioting; there was a risk that millions could be killed. So every effort must be made to stop the fighting. The Pakistanis had started the current affair with a massive infiltration of several thousand men. Then the Indians crossed the CFL in a mop-up operation, especially to pinch off a dangerous salient. Now the Paks had escalated by throwing in their regular army in an apparent attempt to cut the road to Srinagar. The Secretary saw the key as being to restore the CFL, including against Pak infiltration. Yesterday we thought direct US intervention and threat of MAP suspension might be necessary. Now U Thant had issued an appeal,/2/ so we'd put out a strong supporting statement. The Secretary had talked to the Paks and Indians. Our next step depended on the answer to the SYG's appeal. For example, if one side said yes and the other no, a new situation would be created. So Secretary Rusk proposed a more limited démarche than yesterday, principally asking the Paks about their use of US equipment. In response to the President's query he indicated that the UK plans to put out a statement this morning. /2/On September 1, UN Secretary-General U Thant issued an appeal to President Ayub and Prime Minister Shastri for an immediate cease-fire in the conflict. U Thant offered his services in helping to reestablish peace and in seeking a solution to the Kashmir dispute. (Telegram 595 from USUN, September 1; ibid.) Ambassador Goldberg issued a statement shortly thereafter fully endorsing the Secretary-General's appeal. (Telegram 601 from USUN, September 1; ibid.) In Washington, Rusk called in the Indian and Pakistani Ambassadors and stated that the U.S. Government strongly supported U Thant's appeal. (Telegram 261 to Karachi, September 1; ibid.) The President wanted to be very cautious about anything we said. First, both sides wanted us to threaten them so they could be martyrs. Second, both would use US equipment if they needed it, regardless of what we said. So the President wanted to get someone else in--as in PM Wilson's last intervention. We should "get behind a log and sleep a bit." The President said he had found out over the last few months how little influence we had with the Paks or Indians. We had never threatened them, but they kept saying so. Thus the President's view was to let the SYG do it or let PM Wilson do it. The President did not want to intervene personally. He'd like to sit it out a little bit. The President questioned Paragraph 4 of the draft telegram/3/ before him. Wasn't this a subtle threat? /3/Apparent reference to a draft of the telegram sent on September 2 as telegram 266 to Karachi and 327 to New Delhi. The draft has not been found. For text of the telegram as sent, see Document 179. Secretary Rusk felt our own position was involved on the issue of the use of MAP-supplied arms. We'd told both the Indians and Paks that our equipment was not for this purpose. So we were on a spot. When the President asked when the pledging session was, Bundy told him 23 September, but pointed out that it was likely to be overshadowed by Kashmir. At some point we'd have to say we were not the quartermasters for two armies fighting each other. Secretary Rusk pointed out that once Pak use of US equipment was confirmed we'd begin getting strong Indian complaints. The President repeated that we should confine ourselves to supporting the UN. We should "hide behind that log." He disapproved of Paras. 3 and 4 and the first sentence of Para. 5 in the draft telegram/4/ before him. He also desired that we tell the Paks we intended to speak equally strongly to the Indians. /4/Paragraph 5 was apparently deleted before the telegram was sent. The meeting then took up Dominican Republic items. RWK
179. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Pakistan/1/ Washington, September 2, 1965, 6:58 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 32-1 INDIA-PAK. Secret; Immediate; Limdis. Drafted by Laise; cleared by Talbot, Captain Asbury Coward, USN, in G/PM, Assistant Legal Adviser for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs Donald A. Wehmeyer, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs William E. Lang, Sisco, Mann, and Komer; and approved and initialed by Rusk. Also sent to New Delhi as telegram 327, and repeated to USUN, London, Bonn for the Under Secretary, Ankara, and Tehran. 266. From the Secretary. Situation Kashmir has now clearly reached point of major Pak-Indian military confrontation, involving use of U.S. MAP equipment. It therefore urgent both Karachi and Delhi reiterate our very strong concern to highest appropriate authorities, coordinating closely with British. At this immediate point, however, we do not believe we should make any demarche to either side as to what we might have to do if fighting escalates but rather restrict our position essentially to full support for efforts UNSYG. What we do in future will depend on variety factors, especially situation as we see it after two parties have indicated nature their response SYG's appeal. Your approach should therefore rest on following points: 1. We are seriously concerned that situation which has developed in Kashmir will lead to major war between India and Pakistan. 2. We have given our full support to UNSYG's appeal of September 1 and have urged full, sympathetic and prompt response by both parties. 3. We could only view any further escalation of hostilities by either side in light UNSYG's appeal as seriously prejudicial to peaceful settlement. 4. We are speaking equally strongly to both GOI and GOP about complying with SYG's appeal. For Delhi: Above responds your 458./2/ Re Para C your 444,/3/ we consider we have given to GOI and GOP sufficient assurances for dealing with Communist attack and do not expect nor wish to reiterate them in present circumstances. /2/In telegram 458 from New Delhi, September 2, Bowles urgently suggested the need for direct U.S. pressure on both sides to respond to the Secretary-General's appeal. If India accepted the appeal for a cease-fire and Pakistan did not, Bowles requested authority to tell Shastri that the United States would promptly cut off all military assistance to Pakistan. (Ibid.) Bowles was informed, in telegram 330 to New Delhi, September 2, that a decision had been taken at the highest level not to engage in direct pressure on either India or Pakistan for the time being, but to place primary reliance on the United Nations. (Ibid.) /3/Telegram 444 from New Delhi is summarized in footnote 2, Document 177. In paragraph C, Bowles urged that both parties to the conflict should be informed that should either side be attacked by a Communist country, the United States would use all available constitutional powers to come to the defense of the side attacked. Rusk
180. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in India/1/ Washington, September 3, 1965, 6:38 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 32-1 INDIA-PAK. Secret; Immediate; Noforn. Drafted by Lakeland, cleared by Sisco, and approved by Talbot. Also sent to Karachi, London, USUN, and CINCMEAFSA for POLAD. 343. Following summary FYI and Noforn based on uncleared memcon and subject to revision upon review. Ambassador Nehru called on Secretary September 3 under instructions discuss Kashmir situation and Pak use of MAP equipment in fighting. Nehru's opening presentation made following points: a) he reviewed development current fighting in Kashmir, as seen by GOI, beginning with infiltration Pak guerrillas; said Paks apparently trying cut both Jammu-Poonch road and Jammu-Srinagar road. If former road cut, India would lose contact with major segment of cease-fire line (CFL); if latter road cut GOI would lose contact with whole of Kashmir. Nehru said GOI could not allow Paks to cut road to Srinagar. If Paks do, India will have to move across international boundary in Punjab to cut off Pak forces on Srinagar road; b) Nehru said he had not yet received word on GOI reply to SYG's appeal; added that his general instructions this regard are that GOI quite prepared to respect CFL if Paks do. However, GOI cannot accept distinction between "forces in civilian clothes and regular forces." Nehru then said GOI cannot withdraw unless Paks do; c) re Pak use of MAP equipment Nehru reviewed discussions he had had on this subject with Secretary and Assistant Secretary Talbot during Kutch dispute. Nehru said "We have to know where we stand on this once and for all. Here is clear cut case of your assurances not being fulfilled." He said questions of assurances is a matter between India and US, and not between India and Pakistan. Nehru then said, speaking personally rather than under instructions, "How are we to get a cease-fire? They (i.e. Paks) have your equipment and probably military advantage in Kashmir. If Paks do not stop, as we told them years back, India will attack across international border. We will have to do that unless you can stop them." In reply Secretary said USG very much aware of MAP aspect of problem; said he had been talking to the President about this and we have discussed it with GOP. Secretary said he did not want to give off cuff reply on MAP assurances questions. Secretary then said larger problem is to get peace established regardless of weapons being used. That is why we are supporting the SYG's appeal for cease-fire. When Nehru interjected that MAP assurances question was related but separate issue, Secretary acknowledged point but said if fighting continues both sides are going to use whatever equipment they have. Secretary added that MAP equipment now in US ports not relevant to question of fighting. Secretary then said that if larger problem of fighting solved in context SYG's appeal, smaller problems will fall into place. Secretary expressed hope that GOI will announce publicly today acceptance of SYG's appeal. He notes that SYG's private report and General Nimmo's report included question of infiltrators. Secretary said it very important for Delhi to make it clear that GOI accepts SYG's appeal. Nehru asked how peace could be achieved unless Paks accept SYG's appeal; said Paks have not yet done so. Secretary said if GOI accepts and Paks do not then UN machinery comes into play to get acceptance and compliance on the ground. Nehru asked how sanctions would be applied to Paks if they only say yes to SYG's appeal and do not actually comply. Secretary responded that for seventeen years neither India nor Pakistan has heeded our advice on Kashmir dispute and said we cannot control tanks from ten thousand miles away. Secretary said he could not be more precise at this time as to what USG would do if Paks do not comply with SYG's appeal; said if it gets to that point where he could be more precise he would let Nehru know. Secretary then asked whether infiltrators had expected popular uprising in Kashmir and said it our understanding that infiltrators were rather easily blunted and contained by GOI. If this the case, why did India move across CFL? Nehru replied that India had moved across CFL at main infiltration points to prevent further infiltration and cut off those infiltrators already on Indian side of CFL. Nehru said India had no intention of invading Azad Kashmir to re-occupy territory and that moves only designed to protect against infiltration. Nehru asked for clarification of news report he had seen that USG investigating reports of use of MAP equipment by both sides. Secretary replied we have had allegations concerning both sides and added we had sent couple of observers to investigate. Secretary returned to question of SYG's appeal, saying it would put GOI in strong position to come back promptly with affirmative reply. He added that if only one side accepts SYG's appeal this would not adversely affect its position on ground but in terms of UN and international machinery it would tend to shift things in favor of the side which accepts SYG appeal. Rusk
181. Telegram From the Embassy in India to the Department of State/1/ New Delhi, September 4, 1965, 1237Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 32-1 INDIA-PAK. Secret; Immediate. Repeated to Karachi, London, CINCMEAFSA for POLAD, USUN, and the White House. Received at 9:35 a.m., and passed to the White House, DOD, and CIA at 10:30 a.m. 478. At 1215 hrs Saturday I called on PriMin who was accompanied by L.K. Jha. PriMin was cool, collected, articulate and very clear in his views throughout conversation which lasted about 35 minutes. British HICOMM Freeman who saw him yesterday had similar impression. At least it is clear that we are not dealing with a mad man who is about to fly off on an emotional tangent. Although this does not mean that Shastri will necessarily come up with wise decisions, it does mean he is unlikely to act in blind anger. Conversation developed along following lines: 1. I stated I was speaking not only as American Amb but as established friend of India who has watched her development over long period of years, who has been deeply encouraged recent months by positive factors which are now beginning to contribute to India's faster growth, and who is looking forward with keen anticipation to major economic breakthrough here in India within next few years which could have tremendous implications for entire world. 2. I then took chance in regard to his mood based on previous conversations with him that involved historic parallels and delivered a bit of a lecture, i.e., PriMin is facing kind of fateful historic decision that had been faced by scores of other leaders in different parts of world in last several hundred years. Some had met challenge with courage and imagination, others under pressure had taken what turned out to be wrong path with heavy cost to everyone involved. For instance in Europe in late July and early August 1914 leaders of key countries found themselves locked in by previous speeches and pronouncements and what they assumed were demands of public opinion. In spite of fact that each one recognized in his heart that the powers were on military collision course, no man had courage and imagination to interrupt the deadly process. 3. In present situation one point at least was clear. Regardless of what his govt did now, it may be that Paks themselves have decided to push situation into all-out war; if so, there is nothing he could do to stop them. But what he can do is to make a war-like course on part of Pakistan much more difficult by establishing a strong case for India before world opinion by his own restraint. If under those circumstances Paks should decide in favor of war, Shastri's own personal role and that of India would be clear beyond question and thoughtful men throughout world would support him. 4. I stated I realized he was under heavy political pressure not only from opposition but from people within Congress Party who would criticize any compromise on his part at this time designed to establish peace. I reminded PriMin however, of situation in 1961 when our own relations with Soviet Union were at particularly explosive stage and President of US went before UN to state that although US was prepared to defend its interests whatever the cost, it was anxious above all for peaceful solution and would meet Soviet Union more than half-way in seeking such a solution. President's speech was warmly received throughout world and strongly supported by overwhelming majority of American people who took pride in fact that their President and govt were doing everything in their power to ease world tensions and to create basis for new and friendlier relationships. 5. Shastri expressed appreciation and agreement with principles I laid down. He stated, however, that our situation in 1961 and that of India in 1965 are very different. No one questions military and economic power of USA. However, world considers India weak, wobbly and divided nation. Pakistan seemed to be basing its current aggressive policy on this false assumption. In view of developments of last three weeks this greatly complicates his own problems at home and abroad. 6. I made obvious reply that it took strong man to make peace, while very weakest leader could start a war, and then asked Shastri how he intended to reply to SYG's appeal for ceasefire. He replied that three points were in his opinion of utmost importance: A. Nimmo report/2/ must be made public. UN border observers had no police power, i.e. no authority to stop fighting by physical means. Therefore it has been clear from outset that their role is to inform SYG and world as whole what is actually going on in Kashmir so that there is no need to depend on conflicting propaganda claims of the two nations. /2/On September 3 Secretary-General U Thant submitted a report to the Security Council on the situation in Kashmir which was based upon a report prepared by General Robert H. Nimmo, Chief Military Observer of the United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan. (UN doc. S/6651) An excerpt of the report is printed in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1965, pp. 797-800. Most direct way to achieve this objective would be to have SYG himself based on observers' report decide where blame should be placed and then publicly state his findings. Since SYG had decided to take neutral position in order to enhance his own peace-making powers, it was essential that report at least should become public knowledge even though in some respects it was critical of India so that world opinion could be brought to bear. If UN observers could not fulfill this function, what was purpose of sending them to Kashmir? B. Following publication of the report Pakistan must agree to withdraw remaining 2,000-3,000 infiltrators who had crossed border starting August 5. Until infiltrators are withdrawn by Pakistan, there can be no hope for peaceful solution. (Note: He was not clear whether this withdrawal should be part of general withdrawal of all forces or precede withdrawal of uniformed forces.) C. In order to prevent repeat performance UN observer team's staff should be greatly expanded to give them effective coverage of whole area. 7. Shastri then said he hoped US and other nations would not assume that this was good time to discuss long-term settlement of Kashmir problem. At present he said we are close to war brought on by Pak aggression. He earnestly hoped atmosphere could ultimately be created that would permit thoughtful discussions about problems that have in last seventeen years blocked good relationship between the two neighbors. Some day if Ayub Khan had change of heart and got rid of Bhutto, then essential broader agreement might become possible; if not, perhaps after Ayub Khan has gone. However it should be clear that current mood prohibited any such effort now and he hoped that US and other govts would not press India to discuss subject which, in present upheaval, was not ready for discussion. 8. In reply to Shastri's questions about use of American military equipment by Paks, I stated that observers which we had sent to area at Gen Chadhury's suggestion were unable to get close enough to fighting to see. It was my understanding that we are now making determined effort to get at facts from Pakistan side. I admitted that tanks and planes used by Pak Army may well have come from US, and that if so this would be violation of our agreements which we would view with great concern. However way to settle primary problem now is to stop all fighting. If fighting continued in face of SYG appeal with American equipment being used aggressively as distinguished from defensively by either Paks or Indians, we would have to consider measures that might be taken. 9. In final ten minutes of discussion we went over same points in various ways. I ended exchange by strong personal plea for moderate and affirmative response to SYG's appeal and by expressing hope that Shastri would seize this historic opportunity to establish himself as man of peace in Nehru-Gandhi tradition and at same time to win respect of hundreds of millions of people throughout the world who had learned at heavy cost what destruction modern war could bring. Shastri followed me to door and expressed his appreciation in warm, friendly and yet confident manner for what he described as helpful exchange. Comment: I do not dare predict how Indians in last analysis will react. In spite of Shastri's calm appearance, mood here in Delhi is one of frustrated militance; there is strong feeling even among normally sober people that once new ceasefire is established, Paks will turn to some new form of military harassment and that process will go on indefinitely. Faced with this situation Shastri has taken strong and not unreasonable position, i.e., that Nimmo report which makes no bones about Pakistan's responsibility for training and sending in large guerrilla unit should be made public and that based on facts established by this report, Paks should then agree to remove infiltrators from Valley and from Jammu. Indians and Pak troops should at such stage be withdrawn to their own side of ceasefire line, and then some new policing system involving adequate personnel and perhaps establishment of mile wide neutral belt would be set up in place of present ineffective system. However this combination is admittedly difficult one for Paks to swallow since they have officially denied there are any infiltrators from Pakistan on Indian-held territory and are still insisting that whole Valley is in wild revolt against Indians under leadership of non-existent Kashmir revolutionary govt. I again suggest that if Indians come through with reasonable presentation at Security Council as I earnestly hope they will, Paks can be persuaded to agree to ceasefire only by application of some kind of sanctions by US, by US and UK, or by UN generally. Bowles [Continue with the next documents]
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