NOTE: External links to other Internet sites should not be construed as an endorsement of the views contained therein.
| The State Department web site below is a permanent electronic archive of information released prior to January 20, 2001. Please see www.state.gov for material released since President George W. Bush took office on that date. This site is not updated so external links may no longer function. Contact us with any questions about finding information. NOTE: External links to other Internet sites should not be construed as an endorsement of the views contained therein. |
 |
FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1964-1968, Volume XXV South Asia
Department of State |
182. Memorandum From Robert Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson/1/ Washington, September 4, 1965, 4 p.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Pakistan, Vol. IV, 8/65-9/65. Secret. Pak/Indian SitRep. While the Pak Army thrust toward the only key road into Kashmir was halted temporarily, they seem to be resuming their drive. Meanwhile both nations are in effect mobilizing. Another issue is whether the Indians will retaliate or try the UN cease-fire route. Bowles is doing a bang-up job of pleading restraint with the Indians. He's telling them that war would set back both countries for a generation. The Indian reply to the SYG's cease-fire appeal is fuzzy and argumentative, but it does seem largely responsive to the SYG so long as the withdrawal includes the Pak infiltrators who started the affair. Meanwhile the Indians are raising a public storm over Pakistan's "US-supplied" tanks and planes. This is inevitable, and will build up quite a head of steam. We'll get insistent queries in the SC on it. As for the Paks, they seem hell bent on forcing a Kashmir negotiation--whatever the cost. They see themselves as compelled to this desperate gamble by their inability to get any negotiated settlement over the last 17 years. Thus the odds are that the Paks won't accept the cease-fire appeal unless it includes a new Kashmir negotiation. It is essentially an exercise in brinkmanship. All this seems clear from Bhutto's hortatory speech saying this is hour of reckoning, and in effect rejecting the 1949 CFL which the UN and the rest of us are frantically attempting to restore. State may propose you send a friendly reply to Ayub's letter,/2/ for delivery by McConaughy when he sees Ayub Monday./3/ It would urge compliance with the SYG's appeal. This makes sense, but the real issue is whether McConaughy should also take a vigorous stand on use of our MAP equipment and US/Pak relations, or should simply listen. /2/Ayub sent a letter to Johnson on September 2 providing a detailed justification for Pakistan's involvement in the Kashmir dispute. The text of the letter, as conveyed by Ambassador Ahmed to Secretary Rusk on September 2, is in National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 476, Lebanon through Pakistan. /3/September 6. The State experts now fear that a vigorous stand might drive the Paks to even more desperate action. I wouldn't underestimate these risks; there's a good case for playing it cautiously at a time when passions are running so high. But my own sense is that one reason the Paks are causing such trouble is that they don't yet realize what thin ice they're on with us. Thus sobering words from McConaughy and then the British (who see Ayub Tuesday) would serve more as a restraint than as a goad. So my instinct would be for McConaughy to hit Ayub at least on US/Pak relations, as an indirect means of sobering him on Kashmir. But playing it cautiously at a moment of high tension may be the safer course. R.W. Komer
183. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Pakistan/1/ Washington, September 4, 1965, 9:05 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 32-1 INDIA-PAK. Confidential, Immediate. Drafted by Laingen and Laise; cleared by Handley, Sisco, and Bundy; and approved and initialed by Rusk. Repeated to USUN, New Delhi, London, and Paris for Ball; and pouched to CINCSTRIKE/ CINCMEAFSA. 283. Deliver soonest following letter from President in response Ayub letter September 2./2/ /2/See footnote 2, Document 182. "Dear Mr. President: Thank you for your letter of September 2 concerning the critical situation in Kashmir. I share most earnestly the concern you express over the threat in the current situation to the continued maintenance of peaceful relations between Pakistan and India. The consequences of war would be so serious and so sweeping as to undermine all of the impressive progress that your country and India have made in the short years since independence. On this we can all agree. It therefore seems to me that you and India, and indeed all of us, have an immediate interest in bringing the current fighting to an end. Secretary General U Thant has urgently appealed for an immediate cease fire and other steps to restore normal conditions along the Cease-Fire Line. The UN Security Council has now also unanimously called for an immediate cease fire./3/ Those appeals merit prompt and wide support if the peace is to be kept. We are giving the Secretary General our full backing. We will continue to do so. I profoundly hope that your Government, as well as India, will not hesitate in offering him the support and cooperation necessary so that peace and calm can be restored. /3/Security Council Resolution 209, adopted September 4. (UN doc. S/RES/209) I am well aware that a restoration of normal conditions along the Cease-Fire Line will not in itself bring an end to this dispute. And I know of the depth of feeling of your countrymen regarding Kashmir. But I am convinced that a real settlement of that difficult problem cannot be had by resort to force or unilateral action by either side. Whatever the merits of the dispute there can be no real settlement except through peaceful means and through redoubled efforts by men of good will to reason together in both your country and India and to find a way, as you say, to settle this and other disputes in an honorable and mutually beneficial manner. It will continue to be the policy of my country to do whatever we can to encourage and support efforts toward that end. I would welcome any suggestions you might have on what could usefully be done. This could perhaps best be discussed in the personal talks which I hope we shall be able to have soon. Sincerely, Lyndon B. Johnson." Rusk
184. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Pakistan/1/ Washington, September 5, 1965, 1:21 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 32-1 INDIA-PAK. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Bundy, and approved and initialed by Rusk. Also sent to Rawalpindi, and repeated to London and to Paris for Ball. 284. For Ambassador from Secretary. The following are your instructions for your meeting with Ayub on Monday./2/ They are framed in the light of our information from the British that the Paks apparently still think we will go ahead and pledge on 23 September. /2/September 6. 1. You should say you are speaking under instructions. 2. Paks will notice we have so far refrained from public apportionment of blame in current Kashmir crisis. But whatever the merits of Kashmir dispute itself, US cannot condone attempt to compel its settlement by use of force. 3. Therefore, US strongly supports SYG's appeal for cease-fire and will of course have to take whatever steps are indicated to support him. 4. For example, Paks should have been well aware--from Rann of Kutch episode--of spot in which US placed by Pak use of MAP equipment provided as part of defensive anti-communist alliance and not for purposes of local wars among neighbors. So we hope Pakistan will understand our problem and act in accordance with our agreement. 5. The violent Pak reaction to what began as a simple US request for two month postponement of our aid pledge was deeply regrettable. It was inconsistent with the mutual respect expected among allies, and the continued massive flow of US aid. Its predictable effect was to surface all the basic concerns about US/Pak relations which were growing in minds of people of America. 6. We see little point in a sterile debate over who is the "aggrieved" party. The US feels it has nothing to apologize for. We have consistently given Pakistan highly preferential treatment over far larger India in the allocation of our aid. Even after the apparent community of interest between Pakistan and the US began declining, we continued and even increased such assistance in the hope that matters could be sorted out. 7. But current situation has persuaded President there must be a basic examination of Pak/US relations. The President believes these fundamental issues can and must be thrashed out only between the two key people and feels that until this can be arranged US will not attempt to take any far-reaching decisions on bilateral matters (if Ayub asks whether this means no pledge, you should answer that you simply don't know but that that is the way you would interpret it yourself). The President believes that a mutually beneficial relationship would likely grow out of this meeting. 8. Meanwhile, we appeal to Ayub's statesmanship not to risk Pakistan's future on a set of risky gambles which could easily prove disastrous. We see Pakistan at a major crossroads. It will determine for itself the future course of its policy. We naturally hope it will remain basically disposed toward US, and the President hopes to discuss this whole matter personally with Ayub. However, we do not feel able to act as if nothing has happened until the basic issues have been discussed at summit. Finally, you should inform Ayub that early this week the US Government will be forced by American public opinion to state whether it is continuing military supplies to countries which have not accepted UN appeal for cease-fire. You should make it clear that when this question is posed the US will have to answer that no military assistance is being supplied to any such country. You should say that you do not know just when or how this statement will become necessary, but that our Government has asked you to give this private notice in advance that such a statement is sure to be necessary soon unless there is a very prompt and affirmative response to the UN appeal. You should not respond to any question from Ayub as to whether this same message is going to India, on which you are "without instructions". For London: Please inform CRO substance this instruction. Rusk
185. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Pakistan/1/ Washington, September 5, 1965, 3:57 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, DEF 19-8 US-PAK. Secret; Limdis. Drafted by Colonel C.P. Miller (DOD/ISA) on September 4. Cleared by Sisco, Mann, Handley, and in substance by Meyers and Komer, and approved and initialed by Rusk. Also sent to New Delhi, CUSMSMI New Delhi, and CMAAG Karachi, and repeated to USUN, CINCSTRIKE, CGAFLC DAYTON OHIO, CGUSAMC, and CGMTMTS. 285. Joint State-Defense message. In effort to avoid embarrassment to USG during Kashmir conflict delivery of certain major end items enroute or pending shipment is being suspended for the time being. Specifically these are: 1) For Pakistan--Three T-33 aircraft in France, approximately 160 Sidewinders in Germany, 47 M-48 tanks in CONUS, and ammunition on board SS Victory (MSTS) now at sea, and 2) For India--rebuilt engines for C-119 aircraft in CONUS. No other impact shipments of this nature known here as due to arrive either country within 30 days. If other deliveries this nature known to addressees, please report immediately. No publicity is to attend these suspensions and local governments should not be informed. If queried, respond in non-abrasive manner that delay is for administrative reasons. Rusk
186. Memorandum Prepared in the Office of Current Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency/1/ OCI No. 2316/65 Washington, September 6, 1965. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Pakistan, Vol. IV, Memos and Miscellaneous, 8/65-9/65. Secret; No Foreign Dissem/Controlled Dissem; No Dissem Abroad/Background Use Only. POSSIBLE SINO-PAKISTANI MILITARY ARRANGEMENT 1. A series of clandestine reports received since early 1964 indicates a possible secret Sino-Pakistani mutual defense agreement of some kind. It seems probable, however, that any such understanding would be very loose and cast in terms which provide Peiping maximum latitude in deciding when or whether it might come into force. 2. It appears from the reports that US involvement in support of Indian military operations would be a key element in any Chinese undertaking to help Pakistan. China's behavior toward Pakistan, although very friendly, has been marked by caution in matters which involve mutual defense questions. Chinese commentary on the Rann of Kutch crisis appeared calculated to provide political backing for Pakistan while avoiding any commitment of Chinese military support. In the present Kashmir fighting, Chinese commentary has so far been largely limited to reportorial accounts of the clashes which are slanted to show that the Indians are the culpable party./2/ /2/On September 4 visiting Chinese Foreign Minister Chen Yi stated at a press conference in Karachi that China supported the "just struggle of Kashmir people against tyrannical domination of India." He condemned Indian violations of the cease-fire line for provoking the conflict, and he noted that China supported the "just" actions of Pakistan to repel Indian armed provocation. (Unnumbered telegram from Karachi, September 6; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 7 CHICOM) 3. We believe, nonetheless, that some secret understanding exists between Peiping and Rawalpindi. Moreover, we foresee that however loose and "uncommitted" the Chinese may have kept themselves, the understanding gives Pakistan something which Rawalpindi can consider an "ace in the hole" in the present confrontation. At minimum, this could produce a feeling of greater confidence in Rawalpindi than is warranted either by the terms of the understanding or Pakistan's present military advantage in the Jammu area. At worst, it could make Pakistan utterly foolhardy. 4. A chronological record of the reporting on this subject is at annex./3/ /3/The 4-page annex is not printed.
187. Telegram From the Office in Pakistan to the Department of State/1/ Rawalpindi, September 6, 1965, 1430Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 32-1 INDIA-PAK. Secret; Flash. Received at 11:45 a.m., and passed to the White House at 11:47 a.m. Repeated to Karachi, London, New Delhi, DOD, CINCMEAFSA, and USUN. The telegram was also passed to USIB agencies. 38. I met one hour this morning with Pres Ayub and FornMin Bhutto. I asked Pres if report of large scale Indian attack true./2/ His reply affirmative; at map he pointed out four areas current Indian activities: 1) Dara Nanak against Jassar; 2) Lahore-Macbulpura enclave; 3) south east of Lahore against Bedian Link Canal where Pak/Indian forces currently engaged east of canal; 4) north east of Lahore, air action against rail line. Said Indians have considerable concentrations of troops in Jammu and Pathankot areas with total 75 battalions near Kharian. Maintained this concentration was what forced Pakistan undertake Bhimber-Chhamb operation. Said Indians have offensive capabilities north from Akhnar which "we are watching," and around Jammu. Estimated Indians want to go for Lahore, acted in hurry pushed by politicians. Rest of Indian armed forces closing in on area and probably expected be committed later. Said main military access route current Indian movements is along Patti, Harike and Mabul road. Responding my observation this appeared by major military undertaking Pres said, "Yes sir, it is catastrophic and we are getting ready for desperate fight." /2/On the morning of September 6 Indian forces launched a four-pronged attack across the border between India and Pakistan in the vicinity of Lahore in the Punjab. (Telegram 409 to USUN, September 6; ibid., POL 27 INDIA-PAK) I observed both sides had sown wind and now reaping whirlwind of disaster. What with Mujahideen operations since August 5, Paks not clear of responsibility. Pres agreed but pointed to constant Indian harassments in area, and Bhutto interjected GOI since death Nehru has treated Kashmir as closed question refusing even discuss it. I stressed it nonetheless difficult for us understand Pak resort force, even granted it was on smaller scale than that which appears to have just overtaken them. Pres acknowledged point but commented events boiling this direction for some time. Ayub replied it quite clear Indians have now invaded Pak proper. There nothing else to do but prepare for fight to finish. Said friends have obligations to Pak. U.S. has obligations and GOP going to ask fulfillment. We also going ask other friends, "or so-called friends." Added GOP must now ask you what U.S. proposes do. Said U.S. has great responsibility. Quite clear India got American arms only to fight against Pak. GOP warned United States, now it has come to pass. Ayub pointed to record of unilateral Indian action against the original U.N. resolution and against people of Kashmir. I pointed to evidently clear Pak use of U.S. military equipment in Kashmir. Pres asked how could he deny those people arms. I pointed out bluntly that U.S. arms made available against Communist aggression not for local wars. Said I cannot predict how American government and people will react their use now. I stressed need Pak acceptance in principle UNSYG's appeal and underlined this very pressing matter. Pointed out if GOP could accept appeal in principle, it should have greatest importance now as move toward cessation of hostilities. Ayub replied Pak had accepted original (1948) cease fire with understanding other things to follow leading toward settlement, but through all the years nothing had happened. I replied simple cease fire now essential first step any solution. Ayub said if there a package deal, GOP be prepared to consider. I stressed it first necessary put out conflagration and hardly possible discuss permanent settlement while house burning down. Ayub said GOP response Sec Gen's appeal delivered today but now there new situation. Said let there be cease fire by all means but some sense must come of it too. I reiterated unlikely substance of matter could be fruitfully discussed in heat conflict and stressed first requirement now is stop shooting. Pres said, "First you honor your commitment to us. As to cease fire, if India ready talk, we can have cease fire in place, call it armistice if you like." Bhutto interjected, would be possible have mutual Indian/Pak complete military withdrawal from all Kashmir. Ayub agreed. When I observed India likely to reject such a proposal, Pres agreed and maintained then it would be question of bringing pressure to bear. UN forces could maintain law and order in interim period if necessary. I drew Pres's attention to fact American people would now feel pulled squarely forward [toward?] middle destructive sub-continental conflict and tremendous pressures would arise not to contribute to internecine warfare and to suspend military assistance both sides. Bhutto declared no country outside sub-continent has such stake as U.S. this matter. Neither India nor Pak are Communist. U.S. has heavy investment both countries. U.S. occupies special position sub-continent. These fundamental considerations. I told Pres I wished he could meet face to face with Pres Johnson. I realized obstacles which new situation placed before any such meeting. I had intended renew suggestion two chiefs of state meet for discussion. Pres Johnson had wanted mutually beneficial discussion so things could be worked out by two leaders. Ayub responded would like take first opportunity such a meeting. Personally, believed there very little differences between us, only petty misunderstandings, but nothing real. Understood U.S. under pressure Vietnam and Pak under pressure also. Said differences will arise but basically impossible change geography and basic need both sides for understanding. I noted need for understanding higher now than ever. Ayub said "Whether you believe us or not, wherever we go we plead for U.S., because we are allies and you have helped us. I am chiefly responsible and very interested in U.S. alliance. It based not on whim but on sound factors." Pres said Pak only could assure security by alliance with U.S. He pleaded for understanding that given state Pak relations India, Pak cannot take risk of opposing massive ChiCom/Soviet power. Said, "If you wish us do anything which concerns us only, we will go the limit. But if it impinges on our relationships with others, we must weigh limits our possibilities. As long as you understand these two fundamentals, I cannot see serious difficulties arising between us. When I have opportunity see President Johnson, will explain this in detail." Pres said GOP "has cause complain over U.S. support to India. We have right as friends and allies to complain to you. We do not complain to Indians. That would be pointless. you must understand we in difficult situation." Bhutto said it now necessary go back to basics. If one thinks only of cease fire, fundamental problem only gets worse and tangled upon charges and counter charges, actions and counter actions. Said now is time for honorable settlement. Said this is time when we "can use not pressure but realities of situation to press for honorable settlement." Ayub said U.S. hopes not to come into middle of current Indo-Pak crisis and stressed in chorus with Bhutto, that nonetheless U.S. is in middle. President said U.N. weakened and won't work. Said, however despite U.N., there are bilateral obligations. Said "You can warn us and India too, but you cannot avoid responsibility. You are on trial. You cannot hedge or hide from this obligation. Otherwise, dispute will go on interminably." I said we must try for solution through U.N. President replied, "All right, try but you have a bilateral obligation and we are going demand fulfillment." I stressed case hardly clear, certainly not black and white. President said, "All right, all right." I referred to provocations and counter-provocations on mounting scale by each side alternately. President responded Kashmir disputed territory, and GOP has not aggressed against Indian territory. I stressed dispute cannot be settled by force. President agreed. I asked President whether I might with confidence report to Washington, GOP has no arrangement or understanding with Chinese Communists or Soviet Union. Ayub replied, "I can say, how will Soviets assist us, how can they? ChiComs will only do what suits them. If they could assist us, India could not have withdrawn troops from that northern border and thrown them against us. We have no obligation with USSR and they have none with us. We have not approached Chinese. We do not want them, for Russians and U.S. forces would come in. We do not want that." I asked whether he expected ChiCom diversionary action. Ayub replied, "What Chinese or Soviets will do in future, I do not know. We have not heard anything of such intention. Naturally, they won't waste any advantage." I asked President whether he anticipated current crisis would stimulate communal disturbances. He said did not know, GOP had taken all reasonable precautions but in India that possibility endemic. I asked whether President anticipated GOP would be able maintain internal law and order. President replied, "Yes, it our duty and will do very best." Ayub said "You have role to play. You must and can play it. If sub-continent goes up in flames, as it will, what then? There are irresponsible men in Indian Cabinet." I reiterated plea for positive GOP response SecGen appeal. I pointed out GOP would then be in strong moral and legal position in contrast previously defensive position regarding infiltrators. GOP could put itself on side of peace and put India on moral defensive if India failed to respond and GOP did. It historic decision and GOP stands at crossroads. President said, "We will give them damn good battle. We not over optimistic, but we not pessimistic. As to cease fire, where does it get us?" Bhutto interjected, that resolution basic question would subsume question U.S. arms to both sides. I pointed out consortium meeting question seemed overtaken although it remains for later consideration. At moment house on fire. I noted that with war, all bets off concerning consortium meeting. We naturally hope won't be war when that date comes but who can say now. Bhutto handed me aide-mémoire invoking our defense agreement reported Embtel 37 to Dept./3/ Full text my discussion with President follows separate tel./4/ /3/Telegram 37 from Rawalpindi, September 6, transmitted the text of the aide-mémoire. The aide-mémoire alleged that India had unleashed a war of aggression against Pakistan, and called upon the United States to fulfill the terms of the agreement entered into in 1959. Under the terms of that agreement, the United States would view any threat to the security, independence, and territorial integrity of Pakistan with the utmost gravity, and would take effective action to assist Pakistan to suppress aggression. (Ibid., POL 32-1 INDIA-PAK) /4/Telegram 41 from Rawalpindi, September 6. (Ibid.) McConaughy reported his impressions of the conversation in telegram 43 from Rawalpindi, September 6. He noted that Ayub showed signs of strain but gave the impression of determination, and Bhutto made "occasional emotional and provocative interjections." McConaughy quoted one such comment by Bhutto: "India commits aggression and Pak aid consortium is postponed." McConaughy felt that while Ayub leaned on Bhutto's counsel to some extent, he was master of his own house. And he noted that Ayub had given every indication of being anxious to improve his relations with the United States. (Ibid.) McConaughy
188. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Pakistan/1/ Washington, September 6, 1965, 2:28 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 32-1 INDIA-PAK. Secret; Immediate. Drafted by Laingen and Talbot; cleared by Sisco, Deputy Legal Adviser Richard D. Kearny, Townsend Hoopes, and Komer; and approved and initialed by Rusk. Also sent to Rawalpindi, and repeated to New Delhi, London, USUN, CINCMEAFSA, Tehran, Ankara, Paris for Ball and DOD. 290. Rawalpindi's 37./2/ You should respond as follows to GOP request for USG action pursuant our assurances to Pakistan: /2/See footnote 3, Document 187. (1) Like Ayub, we are deeply disturbed at most drastic and grave turn that has occurred in the situation between India and Pakistan. Point has now been reached that risks disaster for both Pakistan and India. Situation requires most sober reassessments both Pakistan and Indian leadership before it too late; (2) In accordance with our assurances to Pakistan we are acting urgently, as we said we would, to meet this common danger by full support for immediate UN action to end the hostilities; that must be first objective of all concerned; (3) We regard Indian military strike across Punjab frontier as most serious development. To meet situation effectively, however, Paks and we need to be completely frank with each other. We must view India's attacks across Pak border in over-all context events past few weeks. It clear from UNSYG report/3/ that immediate crisis began with substantial infiltration of armed men from the Pakistan side. We aware India first put regular forces across CFL but Pak responses thereto in Chhamb area struck at points India considered vital, and Indians have long asserted (a) they could not tolerate continued Pak offensive, and (b) if Pakistan should strike India's vital interests, India would have no choice but to respond in area of its own choosing. GOP must have been well aware of risk involved in its own actions in Jammu and Kashmir; /3/See footnote 2, Document 181. (4) To have any chance of averting immediate prospect of sheer disaster for both Pakistan and India, which would also have grave repercussions for Free World security in Asia, appeal of UNSC must be honored by both parties. We urgently ask Pakistan's cooperation by immediate and full acceptance of UNSC's resolutions./4/ This will assist us to act effectively. /4/The UN Security Council adopted Resolution 210 on September 6, renewing its earlier call for a cease-fire. (UN doc. S/RES/210) (5) We are fully aware, as President indicated in his letter to Ayub,/5/ relationship unresolved Kashmir dispute to present tension. But neither we nor any other friends both parties can assist in coping with this or other root causes of Indo-Pak tensions without immediate and respected cease-fire and withdrawal of forces both sides. /5/See Document 183. (6) We have appealed to Shastri for India's immediate cooperation with UN efforts. (7) Our subsequent actions will depend in first instance on response both countries to UN efforts./6/ /6/Rusk sent a personal message to McConaughy and Bowles on September 6 in which he noted that both India and Pakistan would be making a major effort to gain U.S. support, and each would develop its own brand of disappointment and resentment toward the United States. In the face of pressure and recrimination, the Ambassadors and their staffs "should be ready to explain firmly but sympathetically why the U.S. is not moving in to participate in the way each might wish." Essentially, Rusk stated, "we are being asked to come in on the crash landing where we had no chance to be in on the take-off." (Telegram 293 to Karachi also sent as telegram 364 to New Delhi; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 32-1 INDIA-PAK) Rusk
189. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in India/1/ Washington, September 6, 1965, 2:22 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 32-1 INDIA-PAK. Secret; Immediate. Drafted by Schneider; cleared by Talbot, Sisco, Kearney, Lang (DOD/ISA) and Komer; and approved and initialed by Rusk. Repeated to Karachi, London, Rawalpindi, Ankara, Tehran, USUN, CINCSTRIKE/ CINCMEAFSA, Paris for the Under Secretary, and DOD. 359. You are requested to seek appointment at highest possible level to convey following views of USG: (1) The United States is deeply concerned by the growing escalation of the fighting between India and Pakistan. We cannot believe that these two great nations wish to hurl themselves into disaster which threatens them as a result of present developments. (2) Also of great concern is danger of involvement (politically and or militarily) of Communist Chinese. Continuation of conflict likely plunge India more deeply into cross currents of cold war and internal Communist bloc conflicts. Chicoms will be certain winners; it difficult see how either India or Pakistan could benefit regardless of outcome. (3) If there is to be any chance of averting immediate prospect of sheer disaster for both India and Pakistan, it is extremely important that UNSC appeals be honored by both. (4) We therefore earnestly appeal to GOI to accept the call of the United Nations Secretary General and the Security Council for an immediate cease fire and withdrawal of all armed personnel. (5) We are addressing similar appeal to Pakistan for cease fire in accordance with call of SYG and Security Council. Rusk
190. Memorandum From Robert Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson/1/ Washington, September 7, 1965, 7:30 p.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. 14, 7/1/65-9/22/65. Confidential. Rusk drafted the attached statement,/2/ which he and Bell request you authorize Mahon/3/ to put out tomorrow. It is primarily an effort to forestall restrictive Pak/Indian amendments to the aid appropriation. Mahon is strongly so urging. /2/The statement indicated that in view of the conflict between India and Pakistan the United States had suspended military assistance shipments to both countries, and that, pending action on the foreign assistance appropriations bill, the United States had not been making new economic commitments since the new fiscal year began, including India and Pakistan. /3/George H. Mahon, Representative from Texas, Chairman of the House Appropriations Committee, made the statement in the debate in the House on September 8. He indicated that the positions with respect to military and economic assistance had been outlined for him by Secretary of State Rusk as administration policy, and he urged legislative support for that policy, as well as for the administration's policy of supporting the UN efforts to seek a resolution to the conflict on the subcontinent of South Asia. (Congressional Record, Vol. 111, pt. 17, p. 23141) The text of the statement was transmitted on September 8 to Karachi as telegram 310 and to New Delhi as telegram 379. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 27 INDIA-PAK) You'll see that it not only covers the halt in MAP deliveries but mentions the holdup on new economic aid commitments. This no more than accords with the facts of life, and helps establish our case for postponing any Pak consortium pledge. But there is no easy solution to the underlying policy issues involved in aid suspension. It will certainly be highly resented in both India and Pakistan, and risks pushing both even further off the deep end. On the other hand, it may well help bring home to both the consequences of their folly. So Bundy and I think the argument is swung by the point that the importance of protecting the aid bill outweighs the risk of further affront to India and Pakistan. Rusk wants your clearance tonight, but you may want to discuss the matter at the leadership breakfast. Bundy is available at home this evening if needed, and I can be reached through the Sit Room./4/ /4/Johnson wrote "OK" at the end of the memorandum. R. W. Komer
191. Memorandum From Robert Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson/1/ Washington, September 7, 1965, 7:30 p.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. 14, 7/1/65-9/22/65. Secret. A handwritten "L" on the memorandum indicates that the President saw it. Pak/Indian Roundup. The military situation remains confused. Apparently the Paks have held the Indian thrust into the Punjab. An Indian thrust into East Pakistan seems imminent, if not underway./2/ Neither party shows any signs of response to cease-fire appeals as yet. /2/Intelligence reports as of September 6 indicated a build-up of Indian forces all along the border with East Pakistan. (White House telegram CAP 65565 to the LBJ Ranch in Texas, September 7; ibid., Country File, India, Vol. V, Cables, 6/65-9/65) The Chicoms have announced "firm support" of Pakistan, but there are no signs yet that this means more than words. The USSR has come out strongly in favor of the UN cease-fire appeal. U Thant leaves this evening. We've offered him logistic support, including use of our Attaché aircraft for travel around the area and planes to bring in more UN observers if needed. Attached are two cables (Delhi 503/3/ and Karachi 398/4/) which give important insights into the current mood of both parties. Our announcement of aid suspension tomorrow will lead to howls from both, but it should also help bring home to them the consequences of their folly. /3/In telegram 503 from New Delhi, September 7, Bowles reported on a conversation that morning with L.K. Jha, Secretary to the Prime Minister. He asked Jha if the situation was beyond recovery or if diplomatic efforts might yet prevent full-blown war. Jha responded that a cease-fire was possible if the Pakistani infiltrators were removed from Kashmir, if the cease-fire line and the UN apparatus to enforce it were revamped to avoid further violations, and if Pakistan agreed to take the pressure off the Kashmir issue until an atmosphere could be reestablished in which reasonable negotiations were possible. Jha also noted that after the border war with China in 1962 and subsequent Chinese and Pakistani propaganda about the fighting qualities of the Indian army, Shastri was determined in the present conflict to establish India as a nation of vitality, purpose, and strength. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 27 INDIA-PAK) /4/Telegram 398 from Karachi, September 7, reported on a message from Finance Minister Shoaib, which McConaughy felt merited high-level consideration. Shoaib noted that Bhutto had arranged the call upon the United States to fulfill its pledges to Pakistan knowing that it would not be able to respond in a clear and conclusive manner. The war therefore offered the opportunity in Bhutto's words to "silence once and for all the American party." Shoaib worried that attacks on the United States would increase and the misunderstanding between the two countries would grow. He asked for some gesture of U.S. support to offset the negative atmosphere building in Pakistan, preferably a statement that the United States intended to make the scheduled consortium pledge. (Ibid., POL PAK-US) When UK High Commissioner James saw Ayub today, the latter was apparently now more fully aware of the mess he's in. We infer this from Ayub's willingness to accept Pearson/5/ as mediator. James felt it was not the time to bring up how we were unlikely to pledge. /5/Lester Pearson, Prime Minister of Canada. Shastri has just written you a letter, which BK Nehru asks to deliver personally. We don't know the contents but suspect it is a defense of India's position. R. W. Komer
192. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in India/1/ Washington, September 8, 1965, 1:57 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 27 INDIA-PAK. Secret; Immediate. Drafted by Rusk, cleared by Talbot and Bundy, and approved and initialed by Rusk. Repeated to Karachi. 383. Personal for the Ambassador from the Secretary. As seen from here there are very urgent reasons why we should attempt to prevent Indo-Pak fighting from expanding into the Bengal-East Pakistan area. Quite apart from strong humanitarian reasons for not extending ground and air operations in area of massed populations, the military situation in the West still appears to be somewhat tentative and possibilities of getting cease-fire and pullback still exist. Opening up of front in the Eastern subcontinent would be further major inflammation and would substantially increase risks of Chinese involvement. Surely, given threatening noises out of Peiping,/2/ Indian authorities can see the point of conserving their resources in the East to meet a possible Chinese move rather than catch up East Pakistan in the step by step escalation which becomes increasingly difficult for either of two governments or the UN to control. Further factor is our own national interest against spreading of fighting into areas in which reasonable care of foreign residents will be extremely difficult. Unless you see strong objections, in which case we would wish your prompt comments, you are authorized to take this matter up urgently with highest Indian authorities. If they are responsive, we would make immediate and similar approach to Pakistan to get their agreement not to expand the violence into the East. You should make it clear that this is in no sense an endorsement by us of the validity of the fighting in the West and that this is without prejudice to our full support of UN SYG. But if both countries are to avoid a catastrophe some restraint must begin to enter the picture and, given the menacing threats from Peiping, peace in the East is at least a beginning./3/ /2/On September 8 China sent a note to India protesting serious violations of Chinese territory by Indian troops and warning that if the violations did not cease, "India must bear responsibility for all consequences arising therefrom." (Telegram 573 from New Delhi, September 11; ibid.) In Washington, the Chinese threat was taken seriously. Komer wrote a memorandum on September 8 entitled "US Policy at the Crossroads in the Subcontinent" in which he concluded that if China became militarily involved in the war between India and Pakistan, the United States would have little choice other than to become similarly involved since "the whole Western power position in Asia may be at stake." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, India, Agenda Points, 9/17/65) /3/Bowles responded on September 9 that he agreed with Rusk's message and instructed his staff to make the points with senior members of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Defense. He did not feel the issue needed to be pressed at the highest levels of the government since Defense Minister Chavan had just made a statement in the Indian Parliament indicating that India had no plans to escalate the war into East Pakistan. (Telegram 541 from New Delhi; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 27 INDIA-PAK) Ambassador McConaughy reported in telegram 459 from Karachi, September 12, that he delivered a note to the Pakistani Foreign Ministry expressing U.S. concern that every effort be made to avoid expanding the war into East Pakistan. (Ibid.) Rusk
193. Editorial Note In a telephone conversation on September 8, 1965, President Johnson and Secretary of Defense McNamara discussed what they saw as dangerous possibilities developing as a result of the conflict between India and Pakistan. McNamara noted that he was concerned about a number of contingencies that might develop which the United States was not fully prepared to deal with, the most serious of which was the possibility that China might initiate military operations against India. McNamara observed that the Chinese threat to India posed a very serious problem. The danger that China might move against India had become immediate in light of the note China had sent to India earlier in the day. Referring to the Chinese note, Johnson said: "And looked like she was threatening to today, didn't she?" McNamara responded: "She'll threaten and we ought to know what we'd do if she did move. We'd be in a terrible jam if she did and we didn't have plans. So we'll be working on that." Johnson asked what McNamara thought the Soviet Union would do in the event that China entered the conflict, and when McNamara indicated that he didn't know, Johnson answered his own question: "I think they'd move too." McNamara expressed his concern about what the British would do in the event the conflict mushroomed to include China and possibly the Soviet Union. Johnson commented: "They're going to run out, as they usu- ally do." McNamara agreed: "I think so. And I think we've got to have some plans for that. So these are some of the projects we'll be working on." (Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of Telephone Conversation Between President Johnson and Secretary of Defense McNamara, September 8, 1965, 6 p.m., Tape F65.02, Side A, PNO 1)
194. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in India/1/ Washington, September 8, 1965, 7:12 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 27 INDIA-PAK. Confidential; Priority; Limdis. Drafted by MacArthur and approved and initialed by Rusk. Also sent to Karachi as telegram 322. 390. For Ambassadors from the Secretary. Deptel 382 to New Delhi repeated 312 to Karachi./2/ I have just returned from two and one-half hour session with Senate Appropriations Committee that is considering Aid bill. Sentiment in that Committee and on Hill against continuing not only military but also economic aid to India and Pakistan unless hostilities are halted is even more violent than I had anticipated it would be. There is also talk on Hill of amendments to halt all arms and aid to India and Pakistan outright instead of just suspending it and to condition all further economic assistance on a cessation of fighting. /2/Telegram 382 to New Delhi, also sent as telegram 312 to Karachi, September 8, instructed the two Embassies to give their host governments the text of the proposed statement by Mahan, noting that it had been approved by the Johnson administration. For a summary of the statement, see footnote 3, Document 190. The Embassies were instructed to make clear that the announced action was not meant as a punishment or threat, but was what U.S. opinion required in a situation of de facto war. The United States could not support the UN appeal for a cease-fire and, at the same time, provide the equipment that might be used to pursue that conflict. (National Archives and Records RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 27 INDIA-PAK) I am informing you of this situation as it is important that Indian and Pakistani Governments not underestimate extent of Congressional reaction and are aware that continuing hostilities are jeopardizing future aid programs for both countries. Rusk
195. Memorandum for the Record/1/ Washington, September 9, 1965. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, India, Vol. V, Cables, 6/65-9/65. Secret. Prepared by Komer. The President's Meeting with Indian Ambassador B. K. Nehru, 6
p.m. Ambassador Nehru gave the President a letter dated 7 September 1965 from Prime Minister Shastri./2/ After the President had read it, Nehru explained that he had asked for a meeting so that he could stress certain points in the letter. First, "we want peace not war". Second, "The only way to stop Pakistan's attack in Kashmir had been to counterattack in the Punjab." This was the only reason why India had responded as it did. Third, India genuinely wanted a cease fire and withdrawal; its reply to U Thant's appeal had been badly "misunderstood". But India had to have all of the people shooting at Indians up there in Kashmir stop firing and withdraw. It couldn't just be the uniformed forces. India had to cross the cease-fire line in the first place to stop such infiltrators from causing havoc. /2/In the letter, Shastri reviewed the conflict with Pakistan and argued that India's involvement was a defensive reaction to deliberate provocation. (Ibid., Shastri Correspondence) Nehru then gave the President a copy of Defense Minister Chavan's 8 September speech/3/ with certain passages marked, saying these indicated that India acted purely as a defensive measure. For example, India would not take any action to escalate the war in East Pakistan. He also showed the President a copy of the Secretary General's report/4/ with passages marked citing Pak infiltration into Kashmir. He said that he wished to make such points clear at the top level to the President. /3/See footnote 3, Document 192. /4/See footnote 2, Document 181. Nehru went on to say that two additional points disturbed India. One was the use of US arms against them. India had based its whole defense policy on US assurances that it would not permit Pakistan to use US arms against India. Otherwise it would have armed much more heavily. This assurance had not been honored, but Nehru admitted he didn't see what could be done about it. Then he complained that the State Department kept saying that both sides were using US arms. This was just not so up to the present. Mr. Komer mentioned, in response to the President's inquiry, that this had occurred once but that he believed that it was inadvertent and had not been repeated. The President stated with vigor that this war must be halted somehow. Neither side could win anything in any way commensurate with the risks involved. The stakes were far bigger than Kashmir now. We were going to "put all our chips behind U Thant." We had also made strong representations to Pakistan about the use of US equipment. We had made clear that we could not accept this. Nehru asked about the China problem. He said that his government had no firm evidence, but that it felt there was a clear Chinese-Pakistani-Indonesian understanding "to put a triple squeeze on us." Perhaps the Chinese would not go to war, but at least they would use political pressure. If the Chicoms did come in, what do we do? The President said this was "giving us gray hairs right now." We were worried, but we just didn't know what the Chicoms would do. The cardinal point was, however, to keep Pakistan from going the Chinese route. For all we knew, Pakistan might have some kind of agreement with China. Nehru interjected that India thought the Indonesian contribution might be to take the Andaman and Nicobar Islands. India couldn't stop this; it had no navy. The President reiterated that we must all back U Thant in order to get peace. The whole future of Asia was at stake. However, stronger US public noises about the Chinese Communist threat might only provoke Peiping. Raising the Kashmir question, Nehru said that a nation under attack could not even talk about a Kashmir settlement at such a time. That would mean surrender. "We can not let them shoot their way into getting Kashmir." At this point the President raised the question of our aid bill. He was afraid that the India-Pak mess might kill the aid bill. He had managed to ram it through the House, but the Senate was another matter. Other countries didn't seem to realize our problems on these matters. Those who criticized our lack of sophistication or our policies didn't realize that Congress might just listen to them and stop aid. Then the President described how Shastri and Ayub visits last spring would have been at precisely the wrong time. Congress was always looking for awkward statements by foreign leaders or for the President himself to make mistakes which would permit them to cut aid. Then recently we were within one week of passing the aid bill when war broke out. He regretted that the delays in postponing the earlier visit scheduled for Ayub, and then the leak, had made it difficult for us to notify Shastri in time. Nehru assured him that there was "no ill will left" about the visit postponement. The President had no need to worry. Indeed Shastri had hoped to come in October, but this was probably impossible now because of the war. The President summed up by saying that what was urgently needed was (1) all-out support for the Syg; (2) rush the aid bill through; (3) tell both sides not to use our equipment; and (d) watch the Chinese. He had spent two hours on this problem today, and stressed that we "must find the solution". We would do everything we could. The future of Asia is at stake. Recalling his 1962 visit with pleasure, he said he had the warmest feeling for the people of India. We were anxious to do everything we could in the hope that India one hundred years from now would be like the United States. The President said that "what I am doing in this country this year, I would like to do worldwide. My foreign policy is the Great Society." He described how there were only four bills left of all those that he hoped to get passed this year. When he got these passed, his domestic job would be largely done. Foreign aid was the toughest, though. The US had spent $800 billion on armaments since the end of World War II. One could remake the world with $800 billion. The President then took Nehru to meet various members of his staff. RWK
196. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson/1/ Washington, September 9, 1965. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, India, Memos and Miscellaneous, 6/65-9/65. Secret. McGeorge Bundy sent this memorandum to the President on September 10 under cover of a note that reads: "Here is an important paper from the Secretary of State giving his current thinking on the South Asian crisis. He is clearly moving toward a position of heavier engagement--as I think we all are. But his thinking is not very concrete--and neither is anyone else's yet." (Ibid.) SUBJECT I Events just down the road in the subcontinent can have the most complex and farreaching consequences for the United States. We don't yet know how far the Chinese Communists will involve themselves. However, their strident "demands" on India yesterday (which give color to reports of a Pakistan-Chinese Communist understanding and Shoaib's warning that Bhutto would play the Chinese Communist card) make it a clear contingency. This could convert the Pakistan-Indian war into a Free World-Communist confrontation. In any event, Pakistani-Indian warfare bites deeply into American interests. U Thant's mission offers a chance for the two countries to pull back from the abyss. Its success could get us back to the disagreeably bumpy, but relatively safe, verbal hassling over Kashmir with each country still seeking maximum United States support for its position. Otherwise, the prospect is grim. Fighting could exhaust one country or both, and subject the 50 million Moslems in India and upwards of 10 million Hindus in Pakistan to unbelievable blood baths. Collapse and communal chaos would call into question the future of the subcontinent itself and would certainly negate our effort to build there a viable counterweight to Communist China. II If Kashmir were the only issue, the U.S. could reasonably hope to stand aside. However, the whole Western power position in Asia may shortly be at stake. So far, with an investment of nearly $12 billion, we have helped move the 600 million people of India and Pakistan along a line that has frustrated Communist ambitions. India along with Japan is the only power potential in Asia comparable to China. Were it now to go down the drain, we would face a new situation in many ways as serious as the loss of China. And as India goes, so eventually will Pakistan. The effects would be directly felt all along the Asian rim: --The Shah, sympathizing with Ayub and pressed by him for help, sees this as a question of how in a pinch the United States meets its assurances. So to a degree does Turkey. --As Indonesia drifts toward greater hostility, and probably Communist domination, our position in Southeast Asia is directly affected, and South Asia becomes even more important. --Latent Japanese neutralist tendencies could bloom disturbingly in the wake of a major humiliation of India and of what would be seen as a Chinese Communist victory over the U.S. --Chinese Communist involvement would make South Asia and Vietnam actually two parts of the same basic problem: that of containing Peiping's outward thrust, and thus reasonably add to our burdens. --Finally, if the Chicoms get involved or this conflict runs its present course, Pakistan will wind up deeply committed to the Chinese Communists while India, feeling let down by the West and its national prestige at stake, would almost certainly go for the nuclear bomb. III Against risks this great, the question is whether the U.S. can afford or even maintain non-involvement. There is a strong Congressional urge that we get out of South Asia. Should this succeed in tying your hand, there can be no crisis management but only crisis drift, since whether acting indirectly (through the U.N., the U.K., the Commonwealth or Pearson) or directly, only the U.S. has at its disposal the essential carrots and sticks to influence the situation in the long run. IV There are risks in crisis management but also opportunities. Ayub seems fearful of all-out war with India, as he has reason to be. Shastri should fear the Chinese factor as well as domestic disruption arising from communal explosions. Continuing warfare will bankrupt both. In this moment of truth, both may realize their need to be more responsive than heretofore. The shifting Soviet position holds possibilities of less interference than usual if we should bear down. We might get both countries to stop hostilities if we were prepared to give full support to efforts towards a negotiation of their outstanding disputes, including Kashmir. Our involvement would also improve the chances of keeping both India and Pakistan reasonably linked to the West and reasonably firm against Chinese Communist encroachment into the subcontinent. Pakistan-Indian bitterness makes it extraordinarily difficult to keep good relations with both. If at the end of the day we were forced to choose between them, India with its much larger population, industrial base, rudimentary democracy, and other potentials would probably be a better bet. However, we could never fully support policy goals of either India or Pakistan. The best protection of American interests rests in maintaining adequate, though probably not intimate, links with both. Dean Rusk [Continue with the next documents]
Volume XXV Index | Foreign Relations Online | Historian's Office | Department of State | Secretary of State |